---'
..
-~
.
COMMONWEALTHOFMASSACHUSETTSMIDDLESEX,
ss.
SUPERIORCOURTCIVILACTION
NO.12-1649-A
IANFELDBERGANDMICHAELROGERS,Plaintiffs,v.HAROLDCOXALL,Defendant.ORDERONPLAINTIFF'SEMERGENCYMOTIONFORENDORSEMENTOFMEMORANDUMOFLISPENDENS
AfterhearingonPlaintiffsEmergencyMotionforEndorsementofMemorandumofLisPendens("Motion")onApril30,2012,atwhichbothPlaintiffsandDefendantwererepresentedbycounselandheard,theCourtenteredatemporaryrestrainingorder,aslaterextendedbytheparties.TheCourtalsoallowedfurtherbriefing.OnMay15,2012,thedefendant,HaroldCoxall("Coxall")submittedhisMemoranduminOppositiontoPlaintiffs'EmergencyMotionforEndorsementofMemorandumof
LisPendens
("Memorandum"),whichincludedaSpecialMotiontoDismissAfterreviewofallwrittenandoralargumentsandevidence,theCourt
ALLOWS
theMotionand
DENIES
theSpecialMotiontoDismiss.TheComplaintinthiscaseallegesthatCoxallownsvacantundevelopedlandshownasLots2and3onthePlanofLandtitled"PlanofLandinSudbury,MA",preparedbyThomasDipersio,P.L.S,recordedintheMiddlesexSouthRegistryofDeedsasPlanNo.66of2010("Property").
It
alsoallegesthat,throughaseriesofemails,
1
CoxallandtheplaintiffsenteredintoanagreementfortheplaintiffstopurchasethePropertyfor$475,000.ThepartiesdisputewhethertheemailsattachedtothecomplaintamounttoawrittenagreementforthepurchaseoftheProperty.Coxalldeniesthattheemailsreflectanofferandacceptancesufficienttoshowapresentintenttobeboundtothepurchaseandsale.Healsodeniesthattheemailsconstituteasufficientwritingtosatisfythestatuteoffrauds.
I.
TheLisPendensstatute,G.L.c.194,§15(b),providesinrelevantpart:(b)Anypartyseekingamemorandumoflispendensunderthissectionshallcommencetheunderlyingproceedingbymeansofaverifiedcomplaintorothercomplaintasisrequiredundertherulesofcourttoincludeacertificationbytheclaimantmadeunderthepenaltiesofperjurythatthecomplainanthasreadthecomplaint,thatthefactsstatedthereinaretrueandthatnomaterialfactshavebeenomittedtherefrom.Thecomplaintshallnameasdefendantsallownersofrecordandanypartyinoccupationunderawrittenlease.Uponmotionofaparty,ifthesubjectmatteroftheactionconstitutesaclaimofarighttotitletorealpropertyortheuseandoccupationthereoforthebuildingsthereon,ajusticeofthecourtinwhichtheactionispendingshallmakeafindingtothateffectandendorsethefindinguponthememorandum.Notwithstandingtheprecedingsentence,thecourtonitsownmotionmaydeclinetoendorsethememorandumoflispendens,ifthecourtdoesorderthetemporaryequitablereliefaswillpreservethestatusquopendingfurtherproceedings.Thecomplaintinthiscasemeetstheproceduralprerequisitesofthefirsttwosentencesofthissection.Theplaintiffshavemadethenecessarymotion.Theyhavecommencedthisactionbymeansofaverifiedcomplaint,signedunderpenaltiesofperjurybyplaintiffsIanFeldbergandMichaelRogersonApril30,2012.TheCourtfindsthatthesubjectmatteroftheactionconstitutesaclaimofarighttotitletorealproperty.Inparticular,thecomplaintclaimsthatCoxallmustconveytitletothePropertytotheplaitniffs.Despitethedisputeoverwhetherabinding,written2
contractforpurchaseandsaleofthePropertyexists,thereisnoquestionthatthe"[p]laintiffsseekadeclaratoryjudgmentthatCoxalliscontractuallyboundtosellthePropertytothePlaintiffsonthetermsagreedupon."Complaint,
'J
40.Thatclaimmayormaynotbevalidandmaybevulnerableonamotiontodismissormotionforsummaryjudgment,butthoseissuearenotbeforetheCourtonamotionforendorsementofamemorandumof
lispendens.
Wereject[defendant's]argumentthat,indecidingwhethertoendorseamemorandumoflispendenssoastomakeitpropertyrecordable,ajudgemustdeterminethatthecomplaintwouldsurviveamotiontodismissunderMass.
R.
Civ.P.12(b)(6)....Ratherthanstatingthatthejudgemustrulewhetherthecomplaintstatesavalidclaim,
§
15speaksofafinding(presumablyoffact)andpermitsanaggrievedpartytochallengeanyfindinginthejudge'sorder,ifleavetorecordthememorandumwasobtainedexparte.Section15doesnotstatewhat"finding"ajudgeproperlycouldmakebeyondtheonethestatuterecites("thesubjectmatteroftheactionconstitutesaclaimofaright"toaninterestinrealproperty)....Theissuesarewhatis'thesubjectmatteroftheaction,"anddoesitconsistofaclaimofarighttotitleoruseandoccupationofrealproperty.Thequestionwhetherthecomplaintwouldsurvivearule12(b)(6)motiontodismiss,withoutleavetoamend,andquestionsconcerningthedischargeofthememorandumoflispendenscomeatalaterstageintheproceedings.Withthemandatethatthejudge"shall"findandendorse,
§
15giveslittlediscretiontothejudgeoncethejudgedeterminesthatthesubjectmatteroftheactionconcernsaninterestinrealestate.Sutherlandv.AoleanDevelopmentCorp.,399Mass.36,40(1987).Coxall'sMemorandumdoesnotaddressthishighlyrestrictivestandard.Hisargumentsabouttheallegedinsufficiencyofthepartiesemailcommunicationstomeetthestatuteoffraudsandtoshowanintenttobeboundaresubstantialandmaywellprevail.ButthatisnotthetestbywhichtheCourtmustmeasuretheMotion.While
§
15appearstoallowtheCourtdiscretiontodeclinetoendorsethememorandumoflispendensifitenterstemporaryequitablereliefthatwillpreservethe3
Search History:
Result 00 of 00
00 results for result for
p.
Feldberg, Et Al. v. Coxall ORDER on Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Endorsement of Memorandum of Lis Pendens (01717406)
Superior Court Justice Douglas Wilkins ruled that a series of e-mail exchanges between the buyer's and seller's attorney, the last one attaching a revised, but unsigned, offer to purchase, arguably created a binding agreement entitling the buyer to a lis pendens (notice of claim).
4.0K
Reads
4
Readcasts
17.4K
Embed Views
Recommended
More From This User
Notes
Load more
