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2118telecon With Joe Sisco at 2_50 p.m. 0000d85a

2118telecon With Joe Sisco at 2_50 p.m. 0000d85a

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Published by: National Security Internet Archive on Jul 04, 2012
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UNCLASSIFIED
Sr
2(V
14
TELCON
Joe
Sisco/Secy
Kissinger
2:50
p.
xn.
,
April
9,
1975
RELEASEDINFULL
Mr.
Secretary,
I
sent
to
you
a
cable
which
I
drafted.
I
feel,
particulary
in
view
of
the
fact
that
you
are
going
to
meet
with
Allon
has
surfaced
out
of
Israel,
that
we
ought
to
give
Fahmy
a
reading
on
where
matters
stand.
So
I'
vedrafted
a
telegraxn
and
I
assuxne
probably
reached
your
outer
office
now
and
you
may
want
to
look
at
it
soxnetisne
later
in
the
afternoon.
K:
Yeah.
Second
thing
is
I'
ve'
reflected
a
little
bit
on
your
meeting
with
Dinitz
yesterday
and
there's
just
a
couple
of
tactical
points
that
I
want
you
to
give
soxnethought
to
as
to
how
we
might
best
handle
them
over
the
days
ahead.
At
one
point
you
will
recall,
he
reiterated
this
theme
once
or
twice
that
the
Israelis
want
an
opportunity
tomake
an
input
in
our
reassessment.
Well;
obviously
the
most
important
thing
they
could
do
would
be
toget
off
the
dime
on
the
interim
agreexnent
but
I
think
you
ought
to
create
a
situation
--
either
you
or
one
of
us,
however
you
want
it
handled
--
so
that
Dinitz
or
someone
from
the
Israeli
Embassy
cancome
in
and
we
11
'
c
'
L
r
~
y
xs""-
~~
--
r
prepared
to
receive
your
input.
The
reason
why
I
say
this
is
I
think
you
and
we
have
got
to
protect
ourselves
toguard
against
the
tactical
argument
thatwill
be
made
domestically
that
we
cut
them
off
and
we
have
not
heard
them
out
in
terms
of
what
their
views
may
be
.
K:
Just
a
minute,
Joe.
You'
re,
in
my
judgment,
much
too
sensitive.
S:
Am
I?
You'
re
a
littleshell-shocked
based
on
your
Rogers
experience.
S:
I
don't
think
so,
Henry.
Just
a
minute
--
Now
we'
re
goingto
talkto
Allan.
If
that
doesn'
t
constitute
listening
to
their
views,
I
don't
know
what
is
their
views.
They
have
no
right
tomake
an
input
to
our
domestic
debate
to'
begin
with.
Secondly,
I
talked
to
Ribicoff
this
morning.
I
don'
t.
think
we'
re
in
suchbad
shape
domestically
here.
S:
Well,
I
don't
know
how
good
or
bad
shaPe
we'
re
in.
I
m
really
addressing
myself
to
a
very
limited
tactical
thing.
Fine,
whatyou
can
tell
Dinitz
over
the
phone
is
that
at
some
point
before
Allon
comes,
you
mention
this
reappraisal
business;
if
you
people
U/4ITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
REYIEw
AUTHoRITY:
RoBERT
H
MILLER
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/CASK
ID:
04
JAN
2005
200102979
 
UNCLASSIFIED
Joe
Sisco/Se
cy
Kissinger
haveany
thoughts,
why
the
Foreign
Ministry'shere
and
we'
re
obviouslvgladto
listen.
It's
no
more
than
that.
I'm
really
thinking
quite
tactically,
Henry.
K:I'm
not
worried
about
it.
S:
All
right.
K:
Before
he
comes
here,
I'm
going
to
ask
him
formally
to
give
me
concreteideas
on
next
steps.
I
told
him
there
are
three
possibilities,
which
are
exactly
the
options
we
are
considering.
S:
Right.
K:
Andwe
are
willing
to
listen
to
their
views
on
all
of
them.
That's
what
the
record
shows.
That's
my
secondpoint,
namely
that
I
think
you
ought
todo
just
that.
That
was
the
second
point.
K:
But
Pve
done
it.
S:
I
know
you
have
but
I
think
you
ought
to
repeat
it,
you
know,
withoutany
--
Just
say
We'
re
preparedto
consider
whatever-
ideas.
And
you
did
it.
I
was
there;
you
know,
I
heard
you.
[Laughs]
So
I
know
what
was
said
and
what
wasn'tsaid.
I
just
don't
wantyou
or
us
to
get
intothe
position
--
and
I
don'tthink
we
are,
don't
misread
what
I
am
saying
--
but
I
don't
want
us
to
get
into
the
position
of
where
we
can
be
accused
by
them
of
throw
ng
cold
water
on
one
approachagainst
another
and
so
on,
K:
Yeah.
S:
Okay?
That's
all
I
wanted
to
say.
K:
Okay.
But
I
agree
with
you
on
theFahmything.
S:
Al'1
right.
I'
ve
sent
it
along.
K:
Okay.
Let's
see,
I
got
one
out
three
--
that's
333
--
Laughter.
K:
Not
bad.
You
know,
I'zn
only
a
UNCLASSIFIED
 
UNCLASSIFIED
Joe
Sisco/Secy
Kissinger
K:
But
I'
ll
tell
you,
Ribicoff
toldme
that
one
of
the
most
shocking
briefings
he'd
ever
had
was
yours-because
he
had
previously
been
briefed
by
Dinitz
--
andhe
has
never
had
toconfront
the
fact
that
he
was
faced
with
ball-faced
lies
and
since
you
gave
him
so
much
detail
.
You
knowwhat
I
did,
don't
you?Well,
I
told
you.
I
actually
summarized
every
one
of
the
political
concessions
and
I
said:
Abe,
you'
ve
known
me
for
years,
I'm
telling
you
on
a
stack
of
bibles
this
is
what
Sadat
was
willing
to
do.
K:
Oh,
he
believed
you
totally.
It
is
Dinitz
who
hasgot
a
confidence
Well,
hewas
so
ghs!
sore
after
he
got
through.
I
hadn't
realized
how
I
had
gotten
through
to
him.
He
said:
You
know,
Joe,
I
want
to
tell
you
that
I
deeply
appreciate
this
and
I
only
want
to
tell
you
one
thing
--
this
is
not
the
picture
that
I
got
from
Simcha
Dinitr.
.
Well,
he
told
me
this
morning:
I'
ve
been
lied
to
and
this
is
a
serious
Inditer.
ovl
vlldiy~-
he
~aru
--
as
u
*
should
go?
S:
Y
eah.
K:
He
said:
If
you
come
out
for
the
'67borders,
if
there
are
adequate
guarantees,
I'
ll
support
it.
Yeah.
Well,
I
believe
it
because
he
has
long
believed
this,
by
the
way,
Henry.This
has
been
a
long
held
due
of
Ribicoff.
And
he
said
something
that
I
am
noteven
saying:
that
they
have
to
talk
to
the
PLO.
S:
Well,
that's
right,
we
haven'
t.
How
did
the
Fisher
matter
come
out?
Well,
S:
I
have
not
talked
to
him
so
I
am
in
the
blind.
'
I
have'a
paper
from
him.
I'
ll
let
you
read
it.
In
effect,
it'
s,
the
same
thing:
cool
it,
reestablish
good
relations
andthat.will
give
them
the
sense
of
security
to
be
flexible.
UNCLASSIFIED

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