G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C.

TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents. DECISION

TINGA, J.: This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2 The facts, as culled from the records, follow. In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3 On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8 In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15 Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P.

Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21 However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28 In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration. The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for noncompliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30 The petition is meritorious. First on the technical issues. Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31 Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement. Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake. Now, on the substantive aspects. Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'

pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38 There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period. It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40 The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.46Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted. In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period. The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus: While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54 Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his

complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. G.R. No. 159703 March 3, 2008 CEDRIC SAYCO y VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 23, 2003 Resolution1 of the Court Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction of Cedric Sayco y Villanueva2(petitioner) for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294; as well as the August 7, 2003 CA Resolution3 which denied his Motion for Reconsideration. The facts are not disputed. Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with illegal possession of firearms under an Information which reads: The undersigned Prosecutor II hereby accuses ZEDRIC SAYCO Y VILLANUEVA of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions penalized and defined under Section 1 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 as amended by Republic Act Number 8294, committed as follows: That on or about January 3, 1999, at Bais City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry away one (1) caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P229" with fourteen (14) live ammunitions and with Serial Number AE 25171, without first having obtained the proper license or authority to possess the same. An act contrary.4 Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty".5 On August 2, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the evidence presented has sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused Zedric V. Sayco is convicted for violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294. There being no modifying circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentences the accused to a prison term ranging from THREE YEARS, SIX MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as minimum, to FIVE YEARS, FOUR MONTHS and TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional Maximum as maximum, and to pay a fine of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS. The firearm (Exhibit A) and the ammunitions (Exhibit B) are forfeited in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. IT IS SO ORDERED.6 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bais City issued a Decision dated March 14, 2003, affirming the conviction of petitioner but lowering his penalty as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated August 2, 2002 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bais City in Criminal Case No. 99-001 is hereby affirmed in all respects subject only to

the modification with respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court. The herein accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as maximum [sic] to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum [sic]. SO ORDERED.7 Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review but the same was denied in the May 23, 2003 CA Resolution assailed herein. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration8 was also denied by the CA in its August 7, 2003 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues: I Whether the lower court erred in convicting the petitioner for violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by RA 8294, despite the latter's proof of authority to possess the subject firearm. II Whether the prosecution's evidence proved the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.9 As summarized by the RTC and MTCC, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the following: EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION The first prosecution witness in the person of PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January 17, 2002. He declared that on or about 3:35 in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they received a telephone call from a concerned citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City, informing them that one unidentified person was inside Abueva's Repair Shop located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his waist. They immediately went to the aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they saw one unidentified person tucking a handgun on his right side waistline. They approached the unidentified person and asked him if he had a license to possess said firearm, but the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated from his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171. The arrested person was identified as Zedric Sayco y Villanueva, a resident of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. SPO2 VALENTINO ZAMORA, member of the PNP Bais City, testified on February 26, 2002. He was presented to corroborate the testimony of Mariano Labe. He further declared that during the incident, they talked to the accused in Cebuano, but they found out then that the latter is an Ilonggo, so they spoke to him in English. SPO2 VICENTE DORADO also testified on February 26, 2002. He corroborated the testimony of SPO2 Valentino Zamora and PO2 Mariano Labe. The following exhibits were admitted as part of the evidence of the prosecution: Exhibit A - one (1) 9 mm pistol with serial no. 25171. Exhibit B - fourteen (14) pieces live ammunition and one (1) magazine placed in a black plastic bag. Exhibit C - Joint Affidavit of the police officers.10 (Emphasis supplied) For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and ammunitions when he was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same, specifically: 1) Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property), which reads: Hqs Field Station 743, 7ISU, ISG, PA, Camp Montelibano Sr., Bacolod City, Philippines, 01 January 1999. I acknowledge to have received from MAJOR RICARDO B. BAYHON (INF) PA, Commanding Officer, FS743, 7ISU, ISG, PA the following property for which I am responsible, subject to the provision of the accounting law and which will be used in the office of FS 7431. QTY 1 2 24 UNIT ea ea ea NAME OF DESCRIPTION CLASSI FICATION UNIT PRICE TOTAL

Cal 9mm (SIG SAUER) Pistol SN: AE 25171 Mags for Cal 9mm pistol Ctgs for 9mm Ammo

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x- NOTHING FOLLOWS -x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x Basis: For use of subject EP in connection with his official duties/mission in the AOR. NOTED BY: APPROVED BY: Nolasco B. James (SGD) RICARDO B BAYHON SSg (Inf) PA Major (INF) FS Supply NCO Commanding Officer CA Zedric V. Zayco (SGD) PA (SGD)

Confidential Agent;11 and 2) Mission Order dated January 1, 1999, thus: Mission Orders Number: FS743-A-241 TO: CA Cedric V. Zayco I. DESTINATION Negros Island II. PURPOSE C O N F I D E N T I A L III. DURATION 01 January 1999 to 31 March 1999 IV. AUTHORIZED ATTIRE/UNIFORM GOA ( ) BDA ( ) Civilian (x) V. AUTHORIZED TO CARRY FIREARMS: (x) Yes ( ) No. Caliber Make Kind Serial Nr

MR/License Nr

Nr Ammo

9mm Sig Sauer Pistol AE25171 ISG Prop 24 rds VI. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS: a. For personnel in uniform, the firearms shall be placed in holster securely attached to the belt. Personnel in uniform without holster and personnel in civilian attire will ensure that their firearms are concealed unless in actual and lawful use. xxxx RICARDO B. Major FS 743 Commander12 BAYHON (INF) (SGD) PA

The RTC and MTCC gave no significance to the foregoing documents. The MTCC held that the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order do not constitute the license required by law because "they were not issued by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosives Unit, but by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army who is not authorized by law to issue licenses to civilians to possess firearms and ammunitions."13 The RTC added that, as held in Pastrano v. Court of Appeals14and Belga v. Buban,15 said documents cannot take the place of the requisite license.16 The CA wholly concurred with both courts. In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm and ammunitions are government property duly licensed to the Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same could not be licensed under his name;17instead, what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a Mission Order whereby ISG entrusted to him the subject firearm and ammunitions and authorized him to carry the same around Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that he merely acted in good faith when he relied on the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order for authority to carry said firearm and ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave injustice if he were to be punished for the deficiency of said documents.18 The Solicitor General filed his Comment,19pointing out that good faith is not a valid defense in the crime of illegal possession of firearms.20 The arguments of petitioner are not tenable. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law.21 To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.22 There is no dispute over these key facts: first, that the subject firearm and ammunitions exist; second, that petitioner had possession thereof at the time of his apprehension; third, that petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISG-AFP; fourth, that petitioner lacks a license issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP; and fifth, that petitioner holds a Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order covering the subject firearm and ammunitions. Thus, the issue to be resolved is confined to whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufficient authority for him to possess the subject firearm and ammunitions and carry the same outside of his residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license,23 and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, as this is a malum prohibitum.24 Petitioner interposed no new argument that would convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted jurisprudence.

However, rather than outrightly dismiss the present petition in the light of existing jurisprudence, this Court finds it opportune to examine the rules governing the issuance of memorandum receipts and mission orders covering government-owned firearms to special and confidential civilian agents, in order to pave the way for a more effective regulation of the proliferation of such firearms and the abatement of crimes, such as extra-judicial killings, attendant to such phenomenon. In 1901, the United States Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 175, providing for the organization of an Insular Constabulary. Section 6 vested in the Chief of the Insular Constabulary the following authority over the distribution of firearms: Section 6. The Insular Chief shall prescribe for the Insular Constabulary suitable arms, uniform, and equipment and shall report to the Commission, through the Civil Governor, his action in this regard, together with a statement of the cost, to the end that appropriation may be made to defray the cost thereof. The guns, revolvers, and ammunitions needed to equip the insular and municipal police shall be purchased by the Insular Purchasing Agent on the order of the Chief of Insular Constabulary, by whom they shall be distributed to the provinces and municipalities as they may be needed. The Chief of the Insular Constabulary shall keep a record of the guns and revolvers distributed, by their numbers, to municipalities and provinces x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Firearms owned by the government may therefore be distributed by the Chief of the Insular Constabulary to the members of the insular and municipal police, with merely a record of the distribution being required. Shortly, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 178025 regulating possession of firearms: Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, for purposes of sale, to import, buy or otherwise acquire, dispose of, possess, or have the custody of any rifle, musket, carbine, shotgun, revolver, pistol, or air rifle, except air rifles of small caliber and limited range used as toys, or any other deadly weapon x x x unless and until such person, firm, or corporation shall secure a license, pay the license fee, and execute a bond and otherwise comply with the requirements of this Act and the rules and regulations issued in executive orders by the Governor-General pursuant to the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis supplied) but exempted therefrom the following government-owned firearms: Section 16. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to firearms and ammunition therefor regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Constabulary, guards in the employ of the Bureau of Prisons, the police force of the City of Manila, provincial prisoners and jails when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. (Emphasis supplied) The 1917 Revised Administrative Code26retained the foregoing exemption: Section 879. Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by peace officers. - This article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the Unites States Army and Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal presidents, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. (Emphasis supplied) In People of the Philippines v. Macarandang,27 we interpreted Section 879 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code as applicable to a secret agent appointed by a governor as said agent holds a position equivalent to that of peace officer or member of the municipal police. We reiterated this ruling in People of the Philippines v. Licera.28 In People v. Asa,29 we acquitted a civilian guard from a charge of illegal possession of firearms on the ground that he acted in good faith in bearing the firearms issued to him by his superior. Two years later, in People v. Mapa,30the Court, speaking through Justice Fernando, overhauled its interpretation of Section 879, thus: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to x x x possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and

interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.31 (Emphasis supplied) We also abandoned the view that good faith is a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.32 On June 29, 1983, P.D. No. 1866 was issued, imposing stiffer penalties on illegal possession of firearms. It also added the following separate requirement for carrying firearms: Section 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms and ammunition or implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - x x x The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. xxxx Section 7. Unauthorized issuance of authority to carry firearms and/or ammunition outside of residence. - The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person, civilian or military, who shall issue authority to carry firearm and/or ammunition outside of residence without authority therefor. P.D. No. 1866 was later amended by R.A. No. 8294,33 which lowered the imposable penalties for illegal possession of firearm when no other crime is committed. However, neither law amended or repealed Section 879 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code. Even Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the 1987 Administrative Code,34 left Section 879 untouched. As matters stand, therefore, Section 879, as construed by this Court in Mapa and Neri, and reinforced by paragraph 6, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is still the basic law on the issuance, possession and carrying of government-owned firearms. In exercise of its rule-making authority under Section 835of P.D. No. 1866, the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary issued The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, which includes the following provisions salient to the issuance, possession and carrying of government-owned firearms: Section 1. Definition of terms. - For purposes of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the following terms shall mean and be interpreted as hereinafter defined: xxxx d. "Mission Order" - is a written directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed firearm outside of his residence when so specified therein. e. "Permit to Carry Firearm Outside of Residence" - is a written authority issued to any person by the Chief of Constabulary which entitles such person to carry his licensed or lawfully issued firearms outside of residence for the duration and purpose specified therein. f. "Residence" - refers to that place where the firearm and ammunition are being permanently kept. It includes the office or house where they are kept and the premises of the house enclosed by walls and gates separating said premises from adjacent properties. For firearms covered by a regular license or special permit, their residence shall be that specified in the license or permit; and those covered by a Certificate of Registration ora Memorandum Receipt, their residence in the office/station to which the grantee belongs. xxxx Section 5. Authority to issue mission order involving the carrying of firearm. - The following are authorized to issue mission orders with provisions which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his issued/licensed firearm and ammunition for the duration of such mission: a. For officers, men and regular civilian agents of the Ministry of National Defense (MOND)/Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) including members of the ICHDF: xxxx (8) Provincial commanders, METRODISCOM commanders, company commanders and their equivalent in the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy. xxxx Section 6. Specific guidelines in the carrying of firearms outside of residence. - The following specific guidelines shall be strictly observed in the carrying of firearm outside of residence:

a. Lawful Holders of Firearm Lawful holders of firearm (regular licenses, special permit, certificate of registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence except when they have been issued by the Chief of Constabulary a permit to carry firearm outside of their residence as provided for in Section hereof or in actual performance of duty or official mission under Section 4 and 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 6 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations was later amended to read as follows: a-1. Mission Order. - x x x No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside of residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which specifically requires the use of firearm(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher level of command. (Emphasis supplied) The Ministry of Justice also issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986, further strengthening the foregoing Implementing Rules and Regulations, to wit: x x x It is unlawful for any person or office to issue a mission order authorizing the carrying of firearms by any person unless the following conditions are met: 1. That the AFP officer is authorized by the law to issue the mission order. 2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also authorized by the law to have a mission order, i.e., he must be an organic member of the command/unit of the AFP officer issuing the mission order.If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for services they are rendering. (Emphasis supplied) Earlier, a Letter Directive dated May 19, 198436 was issued to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, prohibiting the issuance of government-owned firearms to civilians, viz: 4. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1866 which codifies all the laws on firearms and explosives clarify the following: xxxx b. Section 5 identifies the officials/officers of the MOND/AFP who are authorized to issue Mission Orders to enable AFP officers, men and regular civilian agents carry their firearms in the performance of their duties. Regular civilian agents are those who are covered by Permanent or Temporary Civil Service attested appointments in the plantilla of civilian employees. Special or confidential civilian agents or the like are not regular civilian agents and are therefore violating the law when they carry firearms (personal-owned or government-issued) with Mission Orders. c. There are no other laws or AFP regulations authorizing the loan of AFP-owned firearms to private firms and individuals. (Emphasis supplied) It is noted that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, allude to "memorandum receipts" covering government-owned firearms. While said rules do not define the term, we can derive its meaning from Section 492 of the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I: Government Auditing Rules and Regulations)37 to wit: Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers and employees. - Equipment issued by the property officer for official use of officials and employees shall be covered by Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (MR) which shall be renewed every January of the third year after issue. MRs not renewed after three years shall not be considered in making physical count of the equipment. (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the rules governing memorandum receipts and mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of government-owned firearms by special or confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows: First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence; Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms. Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.

The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry the same outside of residence. Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him. Petitioner is a planter38 who was recruited to assist in the counterinsurgency campaign of the AFP.39 However, as he offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular compensation from said agency, he cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof. Neither was petitioner authorized to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, petitioner was not even acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that time, he was not on an official mission in Bais City but had merely visited the place to attend to a family emergency.40 While this Court sustains the conviction of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms, we re-examine the imprisonment term to which petitioner was sentenced by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The MTCC imposed on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum.41 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC lowered the penalty to four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.42 The CA affirmed the RTC. A further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law, to wit: Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied) P.D. No. 1866 imposed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms. R.A. No. 8294 lowered the penalty, as follows: Section 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied.) Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, prision correccional in its maximum period ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, to six (6) years. As prescribed under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appropriate penalty that can be imposed on petitioner should keep within said range. Thus, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering that petitioner accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the government under the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and mission order issued to him legitimized his possession thereof, the appropriate indeterminate penalty is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day as minimum to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days as maximum. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. However, for reasons stated in the text of herein Decision, the Resolutions dated May 23, 2003 and August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27228 together with the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City are MODIFIED insofar only as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Petitioner Cedric Sayco y Villanueva is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)

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day of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005

VICENTE AGOTE Y MATOL, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol seeks to annul and set aside the following resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, to wit: 1. Resolution dated September 14, 1999,[1] dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order filed by the petitioner against the Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 43 for refusing to retroactively apply in his favor Republic Act No. 8294[2]; and, 2. Resolution dated February 8, 2000,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. As culled from the pleadings on record, the following are the undisputed factual antecedents: Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged before the sala of respondent judge with Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866[4] and violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826[5] (Gun Ban), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-149820 and 96-149821, respectively, allegedly committed, as follows: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820 That on or about April 27, 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly have in possession and under his custody and control, One (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial no. with four (4) live bullets. Without first having secured from the proper authorities the necessary license therefor. CONTRARY TO LAW. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821 That on or about April 27, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial number, with four (4) live ammunition/bullets in the chamber, by then and there carrying the same along V. Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which is a public place on the aforesaid date which is covered by an election period, without first securing the written authority from the COMELEC, as provided for by the COMELEC Resolution No. 2828, in relation to RA No. 7166 (Gun Ban). CONTRARY TO LAW. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the two (2) cases were tried jointly. Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in both cases, separately sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim. Case No. 96-149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and to a prison term of one (1) year in Crim. Case No. 96-149821 (violation of the COMELEC Resolution on gun ban). Meanwhile, on June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294[6] was approved into law. Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 has already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294, hence, the latter law, being favorable to him, should be the one applied in determining his penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 decision of the trial court. In its order dated July 15, 1999,[7] however, the trial court denied petitioners motion, saying: While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed favorable to the accused and therefore should be made retroactive we are also guided by Art. 4 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so provide that it shall have a retroactive effect. The Supreme Court likewise in the case of Padilla vs. CA declared: The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of the appellants commission of the

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offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK. In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14, 1999,[8] the appellate court dismissed petitioners recourse on two (2) grounds, to wit: (a) the remedy of certiorari availed of by petitioner is improper since he should have appealed from the July 15, 1999 order of the trial court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the issue involved is a pure question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its subsequent resolution of February 8, 2000,[9] petitioner is now with us, submitting for resolution the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari; and (2) whether the courts below erred in not giving Rep. Act No. 8294 a retroactive application. The petition is partly meritorious. At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the factual findings of the trial court. What he questions is said courts legal conclusion that Rep. Act No. 8294 cannot be retroactively applied to him. Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law. As we have said in Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[10] For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any one of them. And the distinction is well-known: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged. Considering that judgments of regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, while appeals from judgments of the [same courts] in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law[11], petitioner should have appealed the trial courts ruling to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,[12] pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the same Rules, viz: SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,[13] the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[14] As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what petitioner should have done was to take an appeal from the trial courts order of July 15, 1999 which denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 judgment of conviction. Petitioners case is worse compounded by the fact that even his period for appeal had already prescribed when he filed with the Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK. The Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received his copy of the trial courts order denying his motion for reconsideration on July 20, 1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was only on August 23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when petitioner filed his wrong remedy of certiorari with the appellate court. Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely address the issue raised in this case regarding the retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what with the reality that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For this purpose, then, we shall exercise our prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules and hold the bull by its horns, so to speak. After all, the power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice requires is not without legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor General, et. al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila Authority,[15] we held: Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. xxx xxx xxx xxx We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:

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Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. xxx Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. We shall now proceed to determine whether the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 amending P.D. No. 1866 can be retroactively applied to this case. Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was convicted by the trial court, i.e., (1) illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 and (2) violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on gun ban, were both committed by the petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the crime of illegal possession of firearms in Crim. Case No. 96-149820, he was sentenced to suffer a prison term ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to (18) eighteen years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in accordance with P.D. No. 1866, Section 1 of which reads: SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis supplied) When Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,[16] the penalty for illegal possession of firearms was lowered, depending on the class of firearm possessed, viz: SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the reduced penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 should be the one imposed on him. Significantly, in its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,[17] the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner, positing further that the statement made by this Court in People vs. Jayson[18] to the effect that the provisions for a lighter penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 does not apply if another crime has been committed, should not be applied to this case because the proviso in Section 1 of said law that no other crime was committed must refer only to those crimes committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm and not when the other crime is not related to the use thereof or where the law violated merely criminalizes the possession of the same, like in the case of election gun ban, as here. As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect,[19] this Court has pronounced in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals[20] that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. Since then, this Court had consistently adhered to the Gonzales ruling. [21] For sure, in People vs. Valdez,[22] where the accused was charged with the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under two separate informations, this Court even took a bolder stance by applying Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactively so that the accused therein may not be convicted of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same retroactively so as to aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had been applied in a host of subsequent cases.[23] Yet, in other cases,[24] although the Court had given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so as to prevent the conviction of an accused of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when the said unlicensed firearm was used to commit the crime of murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this use of such unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance as provided therein,

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when the use of an unlicensed firearm was not specifically alleged in the information, as required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter, the present case takes center stage presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak. Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of firearms was also charged of another offense: Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the unlicensed firearm was not used or discharged in this case. The question then which appears to be of first impression, is whether or not the unlicensed firearm should be actually used and discharged in the course of committing the other crime in order that Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of illegal possession of firearms may be charged. Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs. People,[25] the accused was charged and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms, and illegal possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of People vs. Almeida,[26] however, although the accused was acquitted of the separate charge of illegal possession of firearm for lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless made the following clear pronouncement: Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases that in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, there can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another crime committed such as, in this case, that of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. (Emphasis supplied) In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm was merely found lying around, together with the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being used in the commission of an offense. Given this Courts aforequoted pronouncement in Almeida, can the accused in the present case still be separately convicted of two (2) offenses of illegal possession of firearms and violation of gun ban, more so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually used or discharged in committing the other offense? In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam,[27] this Court, interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law, and categorically held: xxx A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.(Emphasis supplied). The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied in the subsequent cases of People vs. Garcia,[28] where the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal possession of firearms was set aside there being another crime kidnapping for ransom which they were perpetrating at the same time; People vs. Bernal,[29] where the Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No. 8294 in accusedappellants favor because it would mean his acquittal from the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,[30] where, in refusing to convict the accused-appellant of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 should be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearms. Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 96149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban. Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering that it would mean petitioners acquittal of the more serious offense of illegal possession of firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than violation of the COMELEC gun-ban resolution. However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam:[31] xxx Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give

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statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. While we understand respondent Peoples contention that the use of the firearm seemed to have been the main consideration during the deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act No. 8294, the fact remains that the word use never found its way into the final version of the bill which eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The Courts hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived deficiency in the final version without contravening the most basic principles in the interpretation of penal laws which had always leaned in favor of the accused. Under our system of government where powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the Legislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294. As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court from convicting petitioner of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually used. For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation between possession of unlicensed firearm and violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in Almeida. WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearms is hereby DISMISSED while the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149821 for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 in relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED. Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 96-149821, his immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless detained for some other lawful cause. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 84857. January 16, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODOLFO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, and RODOLFO QUIMSON Y NAVA (At large), accused-appellants. DECISION PUNO, J.: Rodolfo dela Rosa y Aviles appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, convicting him of illegal possession of firearms and explosives and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.1 On January 27, 1987, an information for illegal possession of firearms and explosives was filed against RODOLFO DELA ROSA y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA y AVILES, CRESENCIO REYES y DELA CRUZ and RODOLFO QUIMSON y NAVA, to wit: "That on or about the 9th of December 1986, in sitio (sic) Kadampat, Barangay Bolo, municipality (sic) of Labrador, province (sic) of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control three (3) homemade gauge 12 shotguns and fourteen (14) pieces of dynamite explosives, without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same. "Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866."2 All accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 3, 1987. On March 12, 1987, the four accused withdrew their plea of not guilty and substituted it with a plea of guilt. After ascertaining that the plea of guilt was not made improvidently, the lower court imposed upon them the corresponding penalty.3 However, on March 19, 1987, the four (4) accused filed a motion withdrawing their plea of guilt.4 The lower court granted the motion in a resolution dated March 25, 1987.5Thereafter, trial proceeded. However, accused Cresencio Reyes changed his mind again and pleaded guilty to a lesser offense punishable under the last paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866. The court accepted the plea and sentenced him accordingly. He was utilized as a witness by the prosecution. The trial proceeded against the three remaining accused. The prosecution established that in the morning of December 9, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson, surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor of Sitio Kadampat, Bolo, Labrador, Pangasinan claiming they want to lead a new life. They informed him that Benjamin Nano, alias Kumander Tamang, a member of the New People's Army (NPA), was shot by one of them. The four had with them a short shotgun (Exhibit A) and a bag containing several sticks of dynamite (Exhibit C to C-7).6 Kagawad Rigor offered them breakfast and afterwards went to the police station to report the presence of four (4) surrenderees in his house. At the police station, Patrolman Gasline Fernandez recorded the report in the police blotter. Cpl. Crispin Cancino, the station

15

commander, brought along several policemen and proceeded to the house of Kagawad Rigor. When the group arrived, only Kagawad Rigor and Cpl. Cancino entered the house. The other policemen stayed outside to secure the area. Inside the house, Kagawad Rigor introduced the surrenderees to Cpl. Cancino and showed him the short shotgun (Exhibit A) and the bag (Exhibit C to C-7) containing several sticks of dynamite. Then, all accused, except Rodolfo Quimson, who was left behind to guide the police in recovering the body of Kumander Tamang, were brought to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Headquarters in Lingayen. In Lingayen, they proceeded at the municipal building and called on Mayor Calixto Pancho. The surrenderees had their picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters, where their statements were taken by Cpl. Arsenio Paragas and Cpl. Cipriano Castillo.7 Meanwhile, the charred body of Benjamin Nano was recovered by the police in Sitio Tebel Patar.8 The following day, Cresencio Reyes informed the police that there were firearms left buried in Sitio Tebel Patar. Reyes pointed to the hiding place which was covered by banana leaves. When the banana leaves were removed, the police unearthed two (2) long barreled shotguns (Exhibits B and D).9 On the other hand, the three accused contend they were recruited by Kumander Tamang on different dates. Accused Rodolfo dela Rosa testified that he first saw Kumander Tamang on October 28, 1986 at a relative's wake. Kumander Tamang asked him whether he owned a piece of land. He said he did not, for he was only a sawali maker. Kumander Tamang then convinced him to join the New People's Army (NPA). He told Kumander Tamang he would think it over. On November 1, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and reiterated his offer to him. Cresencio Reyes was with Kumander Tamang at that time. Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C) while Kumander Tamang had a shotgun (Exhibit A). On November 10, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and succeeded in persuading him to join the NPA. Kumander Tamang brought him at a hideout in the mountains of Sitio Tebel Patar, Labrador, Pangasinan. On the evening of November 14, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang and Cresencio Reyes, descended the mountains and proceeded to the house ofAntonio dela Rosa, who was Rodolfo's cousin. At that time, Kumander Tamang was carrying a shotgun (Exhibit A) while Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C). When they arrived at said place, Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered the house and stayed inside for ten (10) minutes. When the two came out, dela Rosa was with them. All of them headed for the mountains afterwards. On November 20, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang Cresencio Reyes and Antonio dela Rosa went to the house ofRodolfo Quimson. Again, only Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered Quimson's house. They stayed inside for 15 minutes. When the two came out, Quimson was with them. Afterwards, they returned to their hideout in the mountains.10 On December 8, 1986, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Kumander Tamang called them to a meeting. Kumander Tamang took the bag (Exhibit C) which Reyes always carries and opened it. The bag yielded several sticks of dynamite. Kumander Tamang told them that at five o'clock in the afternoon they would go down Sitio Kadampat and assassinate Kagawad Rigor.11 He then instructed them on how to use the explosives. After the meeting, they returned to their hut and rested. At two o'clock in the afternoon, they heard a gunshot from the hut of Kumander Tamang. They rushed outside and saw Reyes holding Kumander Tamang's shotgun. He announced that Kumander Tamang was dead. He told them it would be better to surrender themselves to the authorities. He ordered them to gather the shotgun and the sticks of dynamite while he set on fire Kumander Tamang's hut. At five o'clock in the afternoon, they descended the mountains and headed towards Sitio Kadampat. At 7:00 a.m., the following day, they reached the house of Kagawad Rigor. They saw the Kagawad sitting by himself on a bench outside his house. Only Reyes approached the Kagawad, so as not to frighten him. The three others waited by the roadside. After five (5) minutes, Reyes signalled the three to approach the house. Kagawad Rigor let them inside the house and offered them breakfast. Reyes placed the shotgun and the bag on top of the dining table. Kagawad Rigor then left the house and went to the police station.12 He returned with several policemen. At first, the policemen pointed their guns at the accused but Kagawad Rigor told them there was no need for they were surrendering themselves to the authorities. Kagawad Rigor then showed the policemen the shotgun and the bag containing the sticks of dynamite. The policemen took all the surrenderees to the Municipal Hall, except Rodolfo Quimson, who was left behind, to lead the police to Kumander Tamang's body. At the Municipal Hall, Mayor Calixto Pancho greeted and congratulated them for coming back to the fold of law. They had their picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters. When an investigator started to question them, they asked for a lawyer to assist them but the investigator said they would not need one for they were surrenderees and would soon be freed. Hence, they gave their subscribed statements to the police. After their statements were taken, the police took them back to the police station in Labrador, where they were detained. On January 5, 1987, they were transferred to the provincial jail in Lingayen. They denied ever seeing the two (2) long

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firearms (Exhibits C and D) which were recovered in Sitio Tebel Patar. They saw said firearms for the first time when the prosecution presented them as exhibits during the trial.13 When trial concluded, the lower court convicted the three (3) accused. Antonio dela Rosa did not appeal 14 while Rodolfo Quimson escaped15 from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where he was detained after the lower court convicted him. Only Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed contending that: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RODOLFO DELA ROSA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866. We find merit in the appeal. It is undisputed that accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa and his companions were the ones who surrendered the subject firearm (Exhibit A) and explosives (Exhibit C to C-7) to Kagawad Rigor. However, Rodolfo dela Rosa denies that he was in possession of said ammunitions in the manner punishable by law. According to him, his real intention was merely to turn over the ammunitions, which were owned by Kumander Tamang, to the authorities. The trial court perceived otherwise. It declared that since Rodolfo dela Rosa joined the New People's Army (NPA), there is reason to conclude that he provided himself with arms such as Exhibits A, B, C to C-7 and D.16 And since mere possession is sufficient to convict a person for crimes which are malum prohibitum like illegal possession of firearms, appellant dela Rosa must be convicted. It is of no moment that he surrendered the ammunitions to the authorities. We fail to see how appellant dela Rosa could be convicted of illegal possession of firearms based on the above reasoning. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 punishes any person who shall "x x x unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition."(Underscoring supplied) 17 Broken down into its salient elements, illegal possession of firearms is committed when the holder thereof: (i) possesses a firearm; and (ii) lacks the authority or license to possess it.18 In People v. de Gracia,19 we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person under PD 1866, thus: "But, is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance for illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. "When a crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary, it is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime but he intended to commit an act, and that act is by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent." In the early case of People v. Estoista,20 we held that a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession of firearms is not punishable. We stated therein that: "The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down in the United States courts - rule which we here adopt - is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment."

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Also, in People v. Remereta,21 where the question posed was whether an accused who stole a firearm could simultaneously be prosecuted for theft and illegal possession of firearms, we held that transient possession is not sufficient to convict one under the latter crime, thus: "While in stealing a firearm the accused must necessarily come into possession thereof, the crime of illegal possession of firearms is not committed by mere transient possession of the weapon. x x x Thus, stealing a firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner defenseless, may suffice for purposes of establishing a case of theft, but would not justify a charge for illegal possession of firearm, since intent to hold and eventually use the weapon would be lacking." Hence, the kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same.22 It is not enough that the firearm was found in the person of the accused who held the same temporarily and casually or for the purpose of surrendering the same. Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.23 Thus, in People v. Leo Lian,24 we rejected the argument of the accused that the charge against him should be dismissed because there was no animus possidendi on his part. In said case, the accused contended that he was on his way to the municipal hall to surrender the firearm when he met some of his friends. He then forgot about the firearm, until the police officer unceremoniously seized the same from him, affording him no chance to surrender it himself. In rejecting accused-appellant's claim, Justice Regalado wrote that: "x x x, the Court finds it hard to believe that appellant still had to hide the firearm in his waist before setting out to surrender it to the authorities when he could have taken the gun to the town hall in the same bag in which he found it, in which case it would have been safer and would have avoided detection. In fine, the indispensable elements of possession without the necessary authority or license and the corresponding attendance of animus possidendi have both been convincingly established by the prosecution to warrant appellant's conviction x x x." That animus possidendi is determinable from the prior and simultaneous acts of the accused is further exemplified by People v. Lubo.25 In this case, while accused-appellant pleaded lack of animus possidendi, his conduct belied the same. Accused-appellant Lubo was found to have secured a "temporary license" for the subject firearm. Under such circumstance, we held that accused-appellant intended to possess the subject firearm beyond reasonable doubt. Coming now to the case before us, it is undisputed that the police officers never really arrested Rodolfo dela Rosa, for the truth of the matter was that there was no need for such arrest. Dela Rosa and his companions had surrendered the ammunitions to Kagawad Rigor even before the police arrived. In fact, the police learned of the surrender because Kagawad Rigor reported it to the police station in Labrador. This is in contrast to People v. Leo Lian, where appellant Lian merely feigned intention to surrender the firearm which the police found in his possession. In the case at bar, appellant dela Rosa's intention to surrender the ammunitions was very clear from the beginning and he was able to execute the same. Corollarily, the Office of the Solicitor General's contention that dela Rosa was in constructive possession of the ammunitions is irrelevant for possession -whether physical or constructive- without animus possidendi is not punishable. Dela Rosa's possession was harmless, temporary and only incidental for the purpose of surrendering the ammunitions to the authorities. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the first element of animus possidendi. Similarly, the records are bereft of sufficient proof that Rodolfo dela Rosa possessed the ammunitions without authority to do so. Except for the preliminary examination of Pfc. Cipriano P. Castillo conducted by Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Benjamin N. Abella,26 the prosecution offered no other evidence during the trial which showed lack of license. In the preliminary examination, the only relevant question asked by the judge was: "JUDGE ABELLA "Q: Did you or the Stn. Commander ask or verify whether any or all of the above-named suspects have any license to possess the above-mentioned firearms and explosives? "A: Yes, sir. But they stated that they have no license to possess any of the firearms and explosives which were recovered from their possession, control and custody." The Office of the Solicitor General offers the extrajudicial statement of accused Rodolfo dela Rosa27 that Kumander Tamang supplied him with explosives and dynamite in furtherance of subversive activities.28 According to the Solicitors, the extrajudicial statement is sufficient to prove that the firearms were illegally possessed. The presumption is erroneous. Aside from the fact that dela Rosa repudiated the extrajudicial statement because it was uncounselled,29 the same did not contain any admission that he had no license to possess the firearm. And, even if it had contained an admission that he had no license, it still would not have sufficed.

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In People v. Solayao,30 the prosecution relied only on the testimonial evidence that accused-appellant admitted before the police officer who accosted him that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. In acquitting the accused-appellant, we stressed that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license which is a negative averment.31 The burden is in consonance with the evidentiary rule that "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative."32 More importantly, the burden placed on the shoulders of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license is premised on the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.33Thus, in People v. Solayao, this Court suggested that the prosecution could have, at the very least, presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused did not have the license to the gun. But, an extrajudicial admission of the accused, solely, will not suffice. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that for accused-appellant to join the New People's Army and stay in the mountains without arming themselves is highly improbable. Thus, there is reason to believe that they illegally possessed the ammunitions to further their subversive activities even prior to surrendering them to the authorities. We reiterate that mere suspicion will not prove the prosecution's case in court. In a prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866, it is incumbent on the Government to prove both elements of the crime: (1) that the accused possessed the firearm and (2) that he had not first obtained a license or permit from the appropriate authorities.34 As always, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se or in crimes which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.35 We find that such quantum of proof was not adequately presented in this case. IN VIEW WHEREOF, accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa is acquitted in Criminal Case No. L-3616. His immediate release from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is ordered, except if charged and detained for other offenses. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Present: Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), - versus Carpio,* Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and

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Peralta, JJ. CARLITO DE LEON, BIEN DE LEON, CORNELIO AKA NELIOPromulgated: CABILDO and FILOTEO DE LEON, Appellants. x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26390 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, Branch 35[2] finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the private complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On June 14, 1989, an Information[3] was filed charging Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary That on or about the 5th day of April, 1986, in the Municipality of Pearanda, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or set on fire the house of one RAFAEL MERCADO, an inhabited house or dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said Rafael Mercado in an amount that may be awarded to him under the Civil Code of the Philippines. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary CONTRARY TO LAW.[4] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Gaudencio Legaspi died on February 5, 1987 prior to his arraignment.[5] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Appellants Bien de Leon,[6] Carlito de Leon,[7] Filoteo de Leon[8] and Nelio Cabildo[9] were subsequently arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty to the charge. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The facts of the case are as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint (Aquilina) and her sister Leonisa Mercado (Leonisa), together with their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., (Junior) were inside a hut owned by their father Rafael Mercado[10] (Rafael) located on a tumana in Polillo, San Josef, Pearanda, Nueva Ecija. The loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep through the window and saw five men approaching the premises whom she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut[11] and set to fire the cogon roofing. [12] While the hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at the group in order to see them more clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio ordered the

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others to leave and the men immediately fled the premises.[13] By the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On April 6, 1986, Police Officer Lucio Mercado (Lucio) conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime and saw a big wood still on fire. A certain Julio took pictures of the remains of the hut. [14] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings, some beddings, rice, P1,500.00 in cash and plenty of wood were also lost in the fire.[15] They also testified that prior to the incident, appellants had been to the premises, destroyed the plants, the fence and a hut which was first built therein. Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and issued threats that if he would not give up his claim on the land, something untoward would happen to him; and that their father Rafael filed several cases for Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical Injuries against appellants. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Appellants denied the charge against them. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had been staying for a year with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of the tumana contrary to Rafaels claims; that his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal therein until 1975 when he took over upon the latters request; and that when Gaudencio passed away in 1987, he applied for a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of Lands. [16] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafaels attempt to build a hut was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio.[17] On cross-examination however, he admitted that on March 12, 1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael on the subject tumana when the prosecution confronted him with evidence which showed that he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case No. 1985 filed against him by Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Pearanda.[18] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and could not have gone to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted in the pictures presented by the prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to charcoal; and that the cogon and bamboo shown in the pictures were materials brought by Rafael into the landholding during the latters unsuccessful attempt to build a hut on the tumana.[19] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants desire to grab the tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he has been living in Rizal, Nueva Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Pearanda.[20] For his part, Filoteo corroborated the claims made by his co-appellants.[21] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On December 14, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In the light of the foregoing, the prosecution had established the guilt of all the accused Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio aka Nelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of arson, and they are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Rafael Mercado the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned hut. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

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SO ORDERED.[22] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Appellants appealed before the Court of Appeals which rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accusedappellants Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado the sum of Php2,000 as temperate damages and Php20,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against accused-appellants. SO ORDERED.[23] Hence, this appeal. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Section 3 of Presidential Decree provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary No. 1613[24] amending the law on arson

Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: 1.x x x 2.Any inhabited house or dwelling; xxxx Section 4 of the same law provides that if the crime of arson was committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is planned or carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Under the following provision, the elements of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and, (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The appellate court correctly found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of the two essential elements of the offense. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused.There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.[25] If there is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness.[26] In the instant case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, found the testimonies of witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy of credence, thus: The inconsistencies and contradictions presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafaels house was intentionally burned by accused-appellants who were positively

22

identified by witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa. In the face of these positive declarations, accusedappellants puerile attempt to discredit them crumples into dust. [27] It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial judge was in a better position to determine their credibility.[28] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The testimony of Aquilina that she witnessed the burning of her fathers hut by appellants is positive and categorical, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ATTY. BAUTO: Q.Where were you when according to you they burned the house of your father? that house where you were residing? A.I was in the tumana, sir. Q.In the house or outside the house? A.Outside of the house, sir. Q.Why were you outside of the house? A.When they were arriving or entering the premises of the house of my father or the tumana, our dog barked and we peeped thru the window, sir. Q.What did you see? A.We saw that men are coming, sir. Q.How many men are coming? A.Five men, sir. Q.Were you able to recognize them when they were approaching the house? A.Yes sir we recognize them. Q.What did you do? A.We went outside of the house, sir. Q.Where did you go? A.We hid ourselves behind the files (sic) of wood, sir.

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Q.How far is that file (sic) of wood from the house of your father? A.More or less seven meters, sir. Q.Why did you, in the first place, go out of the house when you saw them coming? A.Because we wanted to hide, sir. Q.Why were you apprehensive? A.Because they were our adversary, sir. (Kalaban po namin sila.) xxxx Q.Who were with you when you went out of the house? A.Only my sister Leonisa because I already instructed my nephew to go to our house when we noticed them coming and I instructed him to fetch my brothers, sir. Q.When you were already behind the files (sic) of wood what happened next? A.They surrounded our house and they lighted it up with match, sir. (Pinaikutan po nila ang aming bahay at sinilaban.) Q.Who first lighted a match for purposes of burning the house? A.Gaudencio Legaspi, sir. Q.And what did the others do after Gaudencio Legaspi lighted a match? A.They also lighted their matches, sir. COURT: Q.You mean the five had their matches at the time? A.Yes, sir. xxxx Q.What portion of the house was lighted first? A.The cogon roofing of the hut, sir. That was the portion that could be easily burned.[29] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The

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appellants had not shown that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the time and place of the crime.[30] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts reliance on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.Findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. [31] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal offenses.Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.[32] The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the instant case. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The appellate court correctly imposed the penalty in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua considering the presence of the special aggravating circumstance. The crime was committed by a syndicate since it was carried out by a group of three or more persons. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On the matter of damages, the appellate court likewise correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of P2,000.00. In view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 is likewise appropriate. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26390, finding appellants Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson, sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. chanroblesvirtual

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

G.R. No.182061 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: March 15, 2010

- versus -

FERDINAND T. BALUNTONG, Appellant. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

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DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Ferdinand T. Baluntong (appellant) appeals from the August 13, 2007 Decisionca1cacalw of the Court of Appeals to which the Court had earlier referred the present case for intermediate review followingPeople v. Mateo.2cacalw In its challenged Decision, the appellate court affirmed appellants conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, following his indictment for such offense in an Information reading: That on or about the 31st day of July 1998, at about 10:30 in the evening at Barangay Danggay, Municipality of Roxas, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Josua (sic) Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequance (sic) but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.ca3cacalw x x x x (underscoring supplied) Gathered from the records of the case is the following version of the prosecution: At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was sleeping in the house of her grandmother Celerina Solangon (Celerina) at Barangay Dangay, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the house.She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they went out of the house. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near the terrace where the fire started, but appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw appellant near Celerinas house after it caught fire, following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the flames.Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbors house before the fire started, enter the burning house and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their death.Joshua sustained second degree burns. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming that he, on his mother Rosalindas request, went to Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and stayed there until February 1999.Rosalinda corroborated appellants alibi. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary By Decision of February 28, 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (a) The court finds accused Ferdinand Baluntong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in accordance with the existing law; xxxx

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(c)Accused Ferdinand Baluntong is also ordered to pay the heirs of Celerina Suba Solangon the sum of P50,000.00 ascompensatory damages and the heirs of Elvin sic] Savariz the following:(I) the sum of P50,000.00ascompensatory damages (II) the sum ofP16,500.00 as actual damages; and (III) the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary SO ORDERED.ca4cacalw(emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied) In affirming the trial courts conviction of appellant, the appellate court brushed aside appellants claim that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The appellate court, however, modified the trial courts decision by reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetuain light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,ca5cacalw and by additionallyawardingexemplary damages to the heirs of the victims (Celerina and Alvin), and temperate damages to Joshua representing his hospitalization and recuperation.Thus the appellate court disposed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 28, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, is MODIFIED as follows: 1. Accused-appellant FERDINAND BALUNTONG y TALAGA is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary 2. Accused-appellant is further required to pay theheirsofthevictims the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of P25,000.00 astemperate damages for the hospitalization and recuperation of Joshua Savariz. 3. In all other respects, the February 28, 2003 Decision of the regional trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.ca6cacalw(italics and emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

In his Brief, appellant raises doubt on prosecution witness Felicitas claim that she saw appellant fleeing away from the burning house, it being then 10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark.He raises doubt too on Jovelyns claim that she saw appellant, given her failure to ask him to stop putting dried hay around the house if indeed her claim were true. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary After combing through the records of the case, the Court finds that the trial court, as well as the appellate court, did not err in finding that appellant was the malefactor. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary There should be no doubt on prosecution witnesses Felicitas and Jovelyns positive identification of their neighbor-herein appellant as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given, among other things, the illumination generated by the fire.Consider the following testimonies of Felicitas and Jovelyn: FELICITAS: Q: Which portion of the house was on fire when you saw Balentong (sic) for the first time? A: The fire was at the rear portion going up, sir. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Q: How far was Balentong (sic) from that burning portion of the house? A: He was just infront (sic) of the house, sir. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Q: How far from the burning portion of the house? A: About two (2) meters away, sir. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Q: The two (2) meters from the front portion or two (2) meters from the burning portion? A: About two (2) meters, sir. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

27

Q: From the burning portion? A: Yes, sir.ca7cacalw(underscoring supplied) JOVELYN: Q: How big was the fire when according to you, you saw the back of this Ferdinand Balontong (sic)? A: It is already considerable size, Your Honor. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Q: What effect has this fire in the illumination in that vicinity, regarding visibility of that vicinity? A: The surrounding was illuminated by that fire, Your Honor.ca8cacalw(underscoring supplied) Appellants alibi must thus fail. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan9cacalwteaches: I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise,to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committedhomicide/murder and arson. (emphasis and underscoring partly in the original; emphasis partly supplied) Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, Amending the Law on Arson,reads: Section 3.Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: xxxx 2.Any inhabited house or dwelling; The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal. chanroblesvirtua| awlibary In her Affidavit executed on August 11, 1998,ca10cacalw Felicitas stated that what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting a house near Celerinas, to move out. chanroblesvirtua| awlibary How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon.ca11cacalw Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder.This is especially true with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was outsidethe house at the time it was set on fire.She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

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While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant may be convicted of Arson.For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house,the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.ca12cacalw When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.ca13cacalw Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when death results.In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,ca14cacalw the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. A word on the damages awarded. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The appellate court affirmed the award of compensatory damages to the heirs of Celerina.But entitlement thereto was not proven. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The appellate court likewise affirmed the award of compensatory damages, actual damages, and moral damages to the heirs of Alvin.Compensatory damages and actual damages are the same, however.ca15cacalwSince the trial court awarded the duly proven actual damages of P16,500.00 representing burial expenses, the award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 does not lie.It is gathered from the evidence, however, that Alvin was hospitalized for five days,ca16cacalw hence, an award of P8,500.00 as temperate damages for the purpose would be reasonable. chanroblesvirtua| awlibary As for the award to Alvin of therefor. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary moral damages, the records do not yield any basis

More.The appellate court awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of the victims, clearly referring to the deceased Celerina and Alvin.Absent proof of the presence of any aggravating circumstances, however, the award does not lie.ca17cacalw

When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the victim. The heirs of Celerina are thus entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.ca18cacalwAnd so are Alvins. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The appellate courts award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 to Joshua is in order. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision of August 13, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered asfollows: Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Appellant is ORDERED to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Celerina Solangon, and the same amount to the heirs of Alvin Savariz, representing civil indemnity. chanroblesvirtua| awlibary

29

Appellant is likewise ORDERED to pay the amount of P16,500.00 to the heirs of Alvin as actual damages for burial expenses, and P8,500.00 as temperate damages for hospitalization expenses. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Appellant is further ORDERED to pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of Celerina. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Finally, appellant is ORDERED to Savariz. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary SO ORDERED. Fortunately, however, petitioner can and shall be restored to his liberty in light of recent jurisprudence, specifically this Court's ruling in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil alias "Warpan".10 which shed light on the correct interpretation of the following provisions of Republic Act No. 8294: "SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess, any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat. pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages to Joshua

in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam that the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. Conversely stated, if another crime was committed by the accused, he cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. Thus, we ratiocinated: We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault

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and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

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