SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Division BRADLEE DEAN, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. NBC UNIVERSAL, et.

al., Defendants. Civil Action No: 2011 CA 006055 B

NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPERIOR COURT RULE 63-I AFFIDAVIT, CERTIFICATE, AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Plaintiffs Bradlee Dean and You Can Run But You Cannot Hide International hereby file, pursuant to Superior Court Rule 63-I, an affidavit setting forth grounds for the recusal and or disqualification of Judge Zeldon (Exhibit 1), Certification of Counsel (Exhibit 2) and the accompanying Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Affidavit And Certification For Recusal Or Disqualification Of Judge (Exhibit 3) in the above styled lawsuit.

Dated: July 9, 2012

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Larry Klayman Larry Klayman, Esq. D.C. Bar No. 334581 Klayman Law Firm 2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW #345 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (310) 595-0800 Email: leklayman@gmail.com

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Division BRADLEE DEAN, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. NBC UNIVERSAL, et. al., Defendants. Civil Action No: 2011 CA 006055 B

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

I certify that I am counsel of record for Bradlee Dean and You Can Run But You Cannot Hide International, co-claimants in the above named action. I am informed as to the proceedings in the above-entitled action, and Plaintiffs' Affidavit and accompanying Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Affidavit And Certification For Recusal Or Disqualification Of Judge were made in good faith and not for the purpose of hindrance or delay.

Dated: July 9, 2012

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Larry Klayman Larry Klayman, Esq. D.C. Bar No. 334581 Klayman Law Firm 2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW #345 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (310) 595-0800 Email: leklayman@gmail.com

Exhibit 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Division BRADLEE DEAN, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. NBC UNIVERSAL, et. al., Defendants. Civil Action No: 2011 CA 006055 B

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF AFFIDAVIT AND CERTIFICATION FOR RECUSAL OR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

"In order to preserve the integrity of the judiciary, and to ensure that justice is carried out in each individual case, judges must adhere to high standards of conduct." York v. United States, 785 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 2001). "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . ." ABA Code Of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1) see also Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 750 (D.C. 1989) (en banc). Recusal is required when judicial remarks create the appearance that the court's impartiality may be called into question, and "could suggest, to an outside observer, such a 'high degree of favoritism or antagonism' to defendants' position that 'fair judgment is impossible.' Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994)); See also Jackson v. Microsoft Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40 (D.D.C. 2001) (recusal was proper because the judge "ha[d] created an appearance of personal bias or prejudice"). Judicial bias "has been described as a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed

anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St. 3d 181, 189 (2002). The courts strive to eliminate even the appearance of bias. "Thus even if there is no bias in fact, an appearance of bias or prejudice requires recusal if it is sufficient to raise a question in the mind of 'the average citizen' about a judge's impartiality." York, 785 A.2d at 655. In the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, recusal is by statute. Civil Procedure rule 63-I, which is analogous to 28 U.S.C. 144, provides in its entirety: Rule 63-I. Bias or prejudice of a judge. (a) Whenever a party to any proceeding makes and files a sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is to be heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against the party or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned, in accordance with Rule 40-I(b), to hear such proceeding. (b) The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists and shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. The affidavit must be filed at least 24 hours prior to the time set for hearing of such matter unless good cause is shown for the failure to file by such time. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 63-I. It is clear that there is no discretion involved. Rule 63-I states "such judge shall proceed no further therein." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has consistently held, "[t]he rule is by its terms mandatory." In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 993 (D.C. 1980) citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co., 380 F.2d 570, 576 (D.C. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 327, 88 S. Ct. 437, 19 L. Ed. 2d 560. "If an affidavit meets the rule's standards, the judge has a duty to recuse himself." Id. citing Morse v. Lewis, 54 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 557, 76 L. Ed. 1291, 52 S. Ct. 640 (1932) (emphasis added). The criteria that trigger mandatory recusal are as follows: "1. The facts must be material and stated with particularity; 2. The facts must be such that, if true they would convince a 2

reasonable man that a bias exists; 3. The facts must show the bias is personal as opposed to judicial, in nature." In re Bell, D.C.App., 373 A.2d 232, 234 (D.C. 1977). See also State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St. 3d 181, 189 (Judicial bias has been described as a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.). Courts have also held that a jurist is subject to disqualification when extrajudicial bias toward the clients attorney becomes manifest. Souder v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. 939 F. 2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991) ("bias against an attorney can reasonably be imputed to a party"). 939 F. 2d at 653; United States v. Sykes, 7 F. 3d 1331 (7th Cir. 1993). See also United States v. Jacobs, 855 F. 2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Beard, 811 F. 2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ritter, 540 F. 2d 459, 462 (10th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Board of Sch. Commrs, 517 F. 2d 1044, 105051 (5th Cir. 1975). Judges have also been disqualified for their comments made in the course of a lawsuit. See generally In re Disqualification of Hoover, 113 Ohio St. 3d 1233 (2006) (disqualifying a judge who had made belittling comments toward a party in the course of litigation); Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 116 Ohio St. 3d 110 (2011) (holding that rude comments by a family court judge and his refusing to disqualify himself in a child custody proceeding violated the Code of Judicial Conduct). It is evident that Judge Zeldon held and continues to hold a bias against the Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants. Judge Zeldon's favoritism toward Defendants and prejudice against Plaintiffs, their religious beliefs, and this lawsuit, caused Judge Zeldon to be unable to impartially rule upon this case. In accordance with the Bell standards, Plaintiff has set forth an affidavit showing with particularity the material facts which establish Judge Zeldon's clear extra-

judicial bias and prejudice. Snide and offensive comments were made regarding Plaintiffs' counsel's appearance by telephone when he was recovering from a fractured knee that, upon the doctors advice, prevented him from traveling from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C., a five hour flight. Dean Affidavit 7. Judge Zeldons remarks, in the context of her entire Memorandum and Order of June 25, 2012, also show her biased and prejudiced view that Plaintiffs faked an injury in order to delay litigation. Id. Judge Zeldon mocked and ridiculed Plaintiffs and their counsel while, to the contrary, Judge Zeldon referred to Defendants' counsel approvingly as "distinguished," stating in effect that Plaintiffs and their counsel are not. Id. Judge Zeldon went so far as to imply that Plaintiffs were scoundrels for daring to challenge the inflated attorneys' fees and costs set forth by Defendants. Id. Judge Zeldon denied Plaintiffs' request for discovery into the true amount of attorneys' fees and costs, instead claiming that Defendants and their counsel -- without any factual record or basis -- are distinguished and were thus incapable of inflating the fees and costs. Id. Judge Zeldon could also have properly held a hearing to determine the true amount of attorneys' fees and costs, and allowed for cross examination, given Plaintiffs' assertion that they were inflated, but would not do so since Defendants counsel are distinguished and Plaintiffs thus are not. Moreover, at the initial stages of this case, Judge Zeldon chose to hold on to this action, despite having already announced her retirement from the bench. Dean Affidavit 4. This was obviously done so that she could ultimately dismiss Plaintiffs claims, with prejudice, and protect the Defendants while punishing the Plaintiffs. Id. Despite her retirement, and Plaintiffs' legitimate re-filing of this action to the federal court, Judge Zeldon then threw unnecessary obstacles into the federal action by threatening to dismiss the case before her with prejudice thereby cutting off Plaintiffs' legal rights in federal court -- if Plaintiffs did not pay these inflated

and exorbitant fees and costs within 30 days. Id. Plaintiffs had an absolute right to bring the action against Defendants in the federal court. Id. Indeed, both parties were set to continue Plaintiffs claims in federal court, and were in the same legal position as before Defendants moved to reinstate this action. A reasonable person could conclude that these actions were an effort to put an end to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants. With all the evidence set forth demonstrating Judge Zeldon's extra-judicial bias in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, and since Plaintiffs have submitted the requisite affidavit and certification, Judge Zeldon must, respectfully, remove herself from the proceedings in accordance with Superior Court Civil Rule 63-I. Accordingly, the Court must recuse itself and vacate all prior orders. On July 5, 2012 Plaintiffs contacted counsel for Defendants to ask for their consent to the recusal of the Court. Defendants did not consent.

Dated: July 9, 2012

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Larry Klayman Larry Klayman, Esq. D.C. Bar No. 334581 Klayman Law Firm 2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW #345 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (310) 595-0800 Email: leklayman@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of July, 2012 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Filing Affidavit, Certificate, and Memorandum of Law (Civil Action Number 2011 CA 006055 B) was submitted electronically to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Civil Division and served via courier, electronic mail, or U.S. mail upon the following: Via electronic service and U.S. mail: Laura R. Handman John Rory Eastburg Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 1919 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Suite 800 Washington D.C. 20006-3401 laurahandman@dwt.com; roryeastburg@dwt.com Attorneys for Defendants NBC Universal, MSNBC and Rachel Maddow Via U.S. mail: Susan Weiner Chelley Talbert NBCUniversal Media, LLC 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10112-0002 Susan.weiner@nbcuni.com; chelley.talbert@nbcuni.com Attorneys for Defendants NBC Universal, MSNBC and Rachel Maddow

Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Larry Klayman Larry Klayman, Esq. D.C. Bar No. 334581 Klayman Law Firm 2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW #345 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (310) 595-0800 Email: leklayman@gmail.com