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Table Of Contents

1.1.1 Notation
1.1.2 The basic model of choice under uncertainty
1.1.3 Examples
1.2 The bridge crossing and rescaling Lemmas
1.3 Behavior
1.4 Problems
Correlated Equilibria in Static Games
2.1 Generalities about static games
2.2 Dominant Strategies
2.3 Two classic games
2.4 Signals and Rationalizability
2.5 Two classic coordination games
2.6 Signals and Correlated Equilibria
2.6.1 The common prior assumption
2.6.2 The optimization assumption
2.6.3 Correlated equilibria
2.6.4 Existence
2.7 Rescaling and equilibrium
2.8 How correlated equilibria might arise
2.9 Problems
Nash Equilibria in Static Games
3.1 Nash equilibria are uncorrelated equilibria
3.2 2×2 games
3.2.1 Three more stories
3.3.1 Stag Hunt reconsidered
3.3.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma reconsidered
3.3.3 Conclusions about Equilibrium and Pareto rankings
3.3.4 Risk dominance and Pareto rankings
3.4 Other static games
3.4.1 Infinite games
3.4.2 Finite Games
3.5 Harsanyi’s interpretation of mixed strategies
4.1 Examples of extensive form game trees
4.1.1 Simultaneous move games as extensive form games
4.1.2 Some games with “incredible” threats
4.1.3 Handling probability 0 events
4.1.4 Signaling games
4.1.5 Spying games
4.1.6 Other extensive form games that I like
4.2 Formalities of extensive form games
4.3 Extensive form games and weak dominance argu-
4.3.1 Atomic Handgrenades
4.3.2 A detour through subgame perfection
4.3.3 A first step toward defining equivalence for games
4.4 Weak dominance arguments, plain and iterated
4.5 Mechanisms
4.5.1 Hiring a manager
4.5.2 Funding a public good
4.5.3 Monopolist selling to different types
4.5.4 Efficiency in sales and the revelation principle
4.5.5 Shrinkage of the equilibrium set
4.6 Weak dominance with respect to sets
4.6.1 Variants on iterated deletion of dominated sets
4.6.2 Self-referential tests
4.6.3 A horse game
4.6.4 Generalities about signaling games (redux)
4.6.5 Revisiting a specific entry-deterrence signaling game
4.7 Kuhn’s Theorem
4.8 Equivalence of games
4.9 Some other problems
Mathematics for Game Theory
5.1 Rational numbers, sequences, real numbers
5.2 Limits, completeness, glb’s and lub’s
5.2.1 Limits
5.2.2 Completeness
5.2.3 Greatest lower bounds and least upper bounds
5.3 The contractionmapping theoremand applications
5.3.1 Stationary Markov chains
5.3.2 Some evolutionary arguments about equilibria
5.3.3 The existence and uniqueness of value functions
5.4 Limits and closed sets
5.5 Limits and continuity
5.6 Limits and compactness
5.7 Correspondences and fixed point theorem
5.9 Perturbation based theories of equilibrium refine-
5.9.1 Overview of perturbations
5.9.2 Perfection by Selten
5.9.3 Properness by Myerson
5.9.4 Sequential equilibria
5.9.5 Strict perfection and stability by Kohlberg and Mertens
5.9.6 Stability by Hillas
5.10 Signaling game exercises in refinement
Repeated Games
6.1 The Basic Set-Up and a Preliminary Result
6.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma finitely and infinitely
6.3 Some results on finite repetition
6.4 Threats in finitely repeated games
6.5 Threats in infinitely repeated games
6.6 Rubinstein-St˚ahl bargaining
6.7 Optimal simple penal codes
6.8 Abreu’s example
6.9 Harris’ formulation of optimal simple penal codes
6.10 “Shunning,” market-place racism, and other ex-
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Notes for a Course in Game Theory, Stinchcombe

Notes for a Course in Game Theory, Stinchcombe

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Published by: Mon0id on Jul 11, 2012
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