termeasure started in the Second World War by both the British and the Germans each unaware they shared the same secret. In July 1942, Lady Joan Curran investigated the idea of generating a cloud of false radar echoes by dumping packets of aluminium stripes froman aircraft. The invention orig- inated from the idea by Doctor Reginald Victor (R.V.) Jones in 1937, that a piece of metal foil (Dipole) cut to half the wave- length of the transmitter radar frequency could be used dispersed from aircraft and create false target echos to deceive enemy radar operators. The invented device was codenamed Window by the British, Chaff by the Americans, and Duppel in Germany (named for the Berlin district where the first tests took place in 1942). However, Duppel saw limited use by the Germans during World War II as Field Marshall Goering thought it would invite retaliation. Thus, he ordered subsequent technical records destroyed. The decision not to use the Window application was a much debated and well-kept secret by the highest levels in Allied Command. It wasnt until early 1943 that Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved and authorized its use. A couple of weeks later, Window was first used by the Royal Air Force (RAF) during Operation GOMORRAH the devastating air-raids on Hamburg. During this operation, 90 mil- lion aluminized paper strips were dis- persed, each measuring 12 by 0.6 inches. Window greatly contributed to the confu- sion of the Wurzburg radar system and its operators, blinding them almost com- pletely and rendering the German air defence batteries useless. Out of the 791 RAF bombers deployed, only 12 did not return, whereas in previous missions, without the use of Window, more than 10% of the aircrafts had been lost. For a long time, Window was only used to attack the German Wurzburg radar sys- tems. Quite notably, and along with other deceptive devices, it was later used to pro- vide the two false-target (fictitious) fleets during the D-Day invasion components of Operations Glimmer and Taxable. The success of these operations was greatly contributed to by the Canadian destroyer HMCS Haida, which was designated as the lead ship for trials off the coast of Scotland a couple of months prior to the planned invasion. Haida, along with the Sterling and Lancaster bombers and smaller seaborne vessels, conducted extensive and successful testing trials which led to the enabling and success of these two operations. Chaff Today Window, which is more commonly referred to as Chaff, is used by many modern military forces to distract radar guided missiles off their targets. Three different types of Chaff Coun- termeasures techniques are commonly used. These are Chaff C (Charlie) for Con- fusion, Chaff D (Delta) for Distraction and Chaff S (Sierra) for Seduction. Each are deployed differently to provide the desired deception effect during the different phases of an active radar missile attack with the ultimate aimof creating deception to either the firing units targeting radars or the 20 I FrontLine Defence I Issue 4, 2011 I www.frontline-canada.com Chaff S: Seduction Countermeasures I NAVY I by Peter Huber Chaff C: Launched before the enemys targeting radar turns on. The aim is to pro- vide numerous equally sized false targets- thus creating confusion to the firing unit in its target selection prior to launch. In order for the chaff clouds to be effective after deployment, one must maintain a similar course and speed to that of the true wind. Chaff D: Launched just prior to when the active homing seeker of the in-flight enemy missile is believed to turn on and search for its target based on its pre-pro- grammed firing data. The aim is to distract the enemy missile from its intended target by creating additional false targets. As in Chaff C, it is imperative to manoeuvre and maintain a course and speed with that of the true wind. Chaff S: Launched when the fired missile is locked-on to its intended victim. This is usually indicated by its flight path plus the electronic emission parametric search pat- tern changes detected by the victims Elec- tronic Support (ES) sensor operator. The intent of Chaff S is to walk the missile away from its intended target by fooling the mis- sile tracking sensors and having it track and follow the deployed chaff. However, instead of using true wind, the targeted ship needs to manuvre to create the desired relative wind and speed to cause separation and lure the missile to the deployed chaff. Because of the shorter timeline, Chaff S may be re-sown at rapid intervals to produce this desired effect. Historic image or photo of chaff components? active radar seeker in the missile head and/or the firing platforms operators. During any of these Chaff applications or disciplines, timing is of the essence. Of themall, the most critical is deterring a mis- sile during the deployment of Chaff S, just before the missile is about to impact. Improvements in the deployment and the understanding and use of calculable data for a successful Chaff S tactical deployment is the main topic of this article. Passive Countermeasures The tactical design of a passive counter- measure scenario combines technical infor- mation such as the estimated timeframe, the seeker tracking type (Leading Edge and Centroid), the track gate depth/pulse width, cloud design and geometry, and also separation characteristics between the ship and the deployed chaff cloud. Another important consideration is the wind com- pensation between different chaff firing times of a softkill countermeasure system, in order to increase its effectiveness against a modern seeker which may use a small track gate depth. Passive countermeasures, through the use of Chaff Sierra, are well-known engage- ments and have proven their effectiveness in many international trials. Improving effectiveness requires a thorough under- standing of many parameters, such as the defensive and manuvrability abilities of your own ship, and a detailed knowledge and understanding your Radar Cross Sec- tion (RCS) how will the attacking missile see you? The diagram below shows that signif- icant deviations between roll angles will occur, sometimes as much as 10 times higher. This diagram ignores additional types of radar propagation or ducting effects (which are highly influenced by environmental conditions), therefore it can serve only as an indication of how the attacking missile may see you. To have a more precise view, additional data of your own ships RCS distribution, the missile and seeker data, and the environmental data are essential. Compiled intelligence may provide you with the missiles known transmitting or operating values or ranges for: Frequency, Pulse Width, Pulse Repetition Frequency, and Scan time; the missiles speed; polari- sation; beam width; and launch ranges, including its attack profile. Advance intel may also provide the recommended coun- termeasure options. Known or estimated radar values can parametrically be reprogrammed into ones Electronic Support (ES) system, thus cueing its recognition and increasing the response timeline. Environmental data (sea state, wind, ship course and speed, and the desired turning rate) will assist in your countermeasure response. Using this data, a tactical decision to introduce a more accu- rate chaff countermeasure can be initiated, including different course-and-speed-alter- ations to minimize the RCS signature of your own ship, and optimize the separation of the deployed chaff cloud which should foil the missile from its intended target. Placing the chaff cloud at the right time and place can spoof the cloud into the mis- Issue 4, 2011 I www.frontline-canada.com I 21 RCS diagram for different roll angles at 0.28 in 9.0 GHz The diagram below shows an example of an RCS pattern diagram (for a given ship model) in different roll angles, at a transmitter/receiver elevation of 0.28 using a frequency meas- urement of 9.0 GHz (horizontally polarized). The measured RCS values show significant deviations between the 0 roll angle (blue line) and the +2/2roll angles (red and green lines). In some aspect angles (i.e. 290), the RCS at the 0 roll angle can be up to 10 times higher than in the +2/2 roll angles. Chaff is fired from the Port Bridge wing on HMCS Ottawa during a live fire exercise. siles radar seeker range gate in order to present a fictitious, but valid target to the incoming missile, thus deceiving it. Calculations Using passive countermeasures in the Chaff-S mode limits the effective time that chaff can be deployed and achieve it poten- tial mimicking bloom or equivalent RCS pattern, however, in most cases, an appro- priate ES sensor can detect this phase via changes in the missiles scanning tech- niques (changing from a fast sector scan to an audible fixed or steady scan tone). The distance fromwhichlock-oncan be attained strongly depends on the missile type, and may vary somewhere between 5 and 8 nautical miles, or in the case of Stand-Off Anti-Ship missiles, possibly well outside either ships Air Search radar range. The attack height of the missile, the missile seekers transmitting frequency, its polarization, the ships pitch and roll angle aspect to the missile while in a manuvre, as well as the calculated environmental data, will all impact the available time for an effective seduction to take place, which, one can assume, will be very short even without pre-detection or intelligence, The use of 3D RCS modelling (see figure) is one of the best possible methods of calculating this available data to enable one to effectivly deceive an anti-ship mis- sile during a seduction countermeasure. Summary It has been almost 70 years now since the first deployment in 1943 and, many mech- anisms have been created to increase the ability to effectively calculate and deploy Chaff. Although the composite make-up of the Chaff product has not changed much since then, it is still effective in producing the same desired effect, and remains increasingly important in defeating todays complicated threat in seconds. Dipl.-Ing. Peter Huber is an engineer based in Bischofswiesen, Germany. He is a retired Captain of the German Armed Forces and has more than 10 years of industrial experience in the development of tactical algorithms for passive countermeasure systems. Current activities focus on his dissertation at the Universitt der Bundeswehr in Munich with the topic: Mathematical Optimization for positioning of decoys in Anti Ship Missile Defence, as well as on the development of the ASM simulation software ASMD-CAT. FL Issue 4, 2011 I www.frontline-canada.com I 22 2/3 page AD