Background: The politics and the problems contributing to insurgency and thenature of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958
Historically Manipur began as an independent princely state with very littleinfluence from the Indo – Aryan Culture of the Ancient and Medieval IndianCivilizations. Vaishnavite Hinduism was her only connecting thread with India beforethe British conquest in 1891. Even then she remained a titular monarchy. Finally whenIndia won her independence in 1947, the sudden departure of the British created a political vacuum in the entire North-East region. Consequently there was muchrambling over the sharing of these territories among the new Asiatic Powers, viz India,China, East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), and Myanmar.
2
It is not hard to noticethat the opinions of the local inhabitants were never taken into consideration when thedivisions were taking place. This was true for most other erstwhile princely states,which were under colonial rule.Meanwhile in 1947, Manipur, in the image of their colonizer Great Britain, hadestablished itself as a monarchical socialist democracy and had drafted and passed theManipur Constitution Act in 1947 and elections were held. However, in consonancewith the beliefs of most present day secessionist groups, in 1949 at a meeting inShillong, officials of the Indian government made the Manipuri king sign the merger agreement under duress. “The agreement was never ratified in the Manipur LegislativeAssembly. Rather, the Assembly was dissolved and Manipur was kept under thecharge of a Chief Commissioner. There were protests, but the carrot and stick policylaunched by the Indian Government successfully suppressed any opposition.”
3
Nehruand his home minister Sardar Patel would have never imagined that their callousapproach to nation building would sow the seed for the present day militancy in theregion.
2
2
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre,
Armed Forces Special Powers Act: A Study in National Security tyranny
, updated December, 1995,<http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/armed_forces.htm>
3
Ibid.
Leave a Comment