2
the Principle of all things or the “Great Ultimate” (
taiji
), which is thus both one and many—apoint which has raised many difficulties for Western interpreters of this doctrine, as we shall see.These Confucians critique Buddhists for understanding Li as nothing but Emptiness (
kong
,
sunyata
), and thereby overlooking the specific Li of each thing. On the other hand, theycritique Lu-Wang Confucians
2
for understanding Li directly as mind, for in the Lu-Wangunderstanding things have no “fixed Li” of their own, but rather are given their principles by thehuman mind, which is itself the only Li. Finally, Qing Confucians such as Dai Zhen (1724-1777)and Duan Yucai (1735-1815) critique both the Cheng-Zhu and the Lu-Wang Neo-Confucians for understand Li as an omnipresent universal principle of all things (whether Mindor the one Principle), whereas its real, original meaning, they claimed, on the basis of classicaletymological studies, was of the differentiated, particular forms of individual things, the “cuts”between them, not the bridges over these gaps. Li for these Confucians refers only to themultiplicity, not the unity, of individual principles. It is less known that a controversy about theunity and multiplicity of Li also emerges within Tiantai Buddhism, with Siming Zhili (960-1028)asserting that
both
Li and its opposite member, events (
事
shi
), to which it is normally opposed,
2A general retrospective term for an opposing trend Neo-Confucian, named after Lu Xiangshan (1139-1192) and WangYangming (1472-1529).
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