Executive Summary:

Al Qaeda is now best seen as a “Movement” and is currently highly unlikelyto be anything more than a loose coalition of terrorist groups. Lacking central operating authority, adiffuse mission and ideology combined with an inconsistency in strategic plans, the original AlQaeda leadership has lost control over the agenda that drives the Movement as a whole. As eachsub-group in the Movement pursues its own plans, rifts in the Movement have begun to show.

Analytical Confidence: High

From Single Group to Movement

Al Qaeda has undergone a drastic transformation since9/11. Though initially weakened after losing its safehaven in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda inspired existingterrorist groups and new self-generating cells to rallyunder bin Laden’s symbolic banner. Al Qaeda has now become a franchise in which disparate groups take upon themselves its ‘global jihadist’ mantle.

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Lack of Central Operational Authority

Though the original Al Qaeda ‘Proper’ (AQP)continues to attempt to reconstitute itself,

it has lostcentralized operating authority over the Al Qaeda‘Movement’ as a whole. Many emerging groups cannotreceive direct orders from AQP because they have veryfew or no direct ties to it.

•

Example: Though AQP’s Al-Zawahiri attempted to take credit for the inspiration of theLondon underground bombings,

leaked reporting from investigations of the incident by theBritish government indicates that the attackers conceived and conducted the operationcompletely independently from AQP leadership.

Even in cases where direct ties remain between AQP and other groups in the Movement, AQP doesnot dictate attack targets and methods to the other factions. Thus, while the other factions mayconsult or receive support from AQP leadership, each group carries out its attacks independently.

•

Examples: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) likely continues

to enjoy a relationship of mutual benefitwith AQP, but it has likely never been subservient to it and has chosen its own targets.

•

Though the East Turkestan Islamic Movement has loose ties to AQP and has attempted aglobal jihadist-type attack in Kyrgyzstan, it functions beyond AQP’s control.

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Footnotes are embedded with a direct hyperlink to each information source. Thus, these footnotes can be accessed using theelectronic version of this document or accessed and printed athttp://mciisodnichallenge.blogspot.com/2008/09/reference.html. In-text hyperlinks lead to additional data visualizations or articles that explain concepts with which the reader may not be familiar.

Al Qaeda Highly Unlikely A Cohesive Organization With Strong AndCentralized Control, Intent And Direction; Command Likely To ContinueTo Degrade Over The Next 6-12 Months

A video presentation on the Origins of the Al QaedaMovement can be accessed on the electronic version of this document by clicking

here

Although jihadists have immortalized many of Al Qaeda’s operational techniques online,

their interpretation and execution are not universally consistent or controlled. For example, jihadistgroups operating in Iraq andCentral Asia utilize tactics thatdiffer starkly from those of AQP.

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Examples: While AQP triesto avoid killing Muslimcivilians, Al Qaeda in Iraq(AQI) has done so regularlyand with exceptionalviolence.

•

While AQP tries to cooperatewith other jihadis, the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan has been difficult or hostile toother terrorist groups, even attimes targeting them for murder.

Inconsistency of Strategic Plans

The Movement follows no single road map to achieve its diverse goals. Instead, though groups mayswear allegiance to AQP, in practical terms they each interpret its directives differently

and pursue their own agendas, as evidenced by the pattern of their attacks.

•

Examples: Even since swearing its allegiance to Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb almost exclusively targeted installations of the Algerian government,

which thegroup seeks to overthrow.

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The 2004 Madrid train bombings were not a part of any strategic vision from AQPleadership. Instead, the attacks were a result of that cell’s assumption that influencing a localelection to sway against US policy in Iraq would benefit the global jihadist cause.

The lack of a common strategic plan is also evidenced by the conflicts between factions in theMovement. AQP strongly disapproved of AQI’s tactics, as evidenced by al-Zawahiri’s letter to al-Zarqawi which was recovered after the latter’s death.

Clashes over affiliation with the Movementhave also arisen within individual groups, such as the tension in recent years that has:

•

Divided members of JI,

•

Caused splits in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,

and

•

Inspired splinter

or other rival groups that sometimes fight in outright opposition to AQI.

Diffuse Mission & Ideology

Though it is bound together by devotion to general ideals of global jihad, there is no single intentdriving the Al Qaeda Movement. First, no central authority in the Movement manages the contentand flow of global jihadist propaganda. Instead, each group has adopted and adapted theAl QaedaPropaganda Modelfor its own purposes.

Even among individual factions, there is increasinglylittle unity in the dissemination of ideology.2

Attacks conducted under the direct command of AQP leadershipaccount for only 29% of all the Movement’s major attacks.