CollusionandcollisioninMuslimMindanaoFranciscoLaraJr.

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The eruption of violence and the declaration of martial law in Maguindanao exposes the dynamics of collaborationand conflict between allies who advance their interests in conditions of war. Without this backdrop the recentdeclaration of martial law will be perceived as baseless, unnecessary, and rife with hidden agendas. Why shouldgovernment declare martial law in an area which had been under de-facto military rule over the past two weeks?To follow this reasoning is to insist that martial law in Maguindanao constitutes an overkill given the arsenal of coercive instruments that the central state commands. Yet the imposition actually makes sense when seen throughthe prism of political economy – or the shifting power relations between Malacanang and Maguindanao, and between Ampatuan and the other warlord clans of Mindanao. In short, martial law possesses political traction even if the legalbasis does not exist.Prior to the massacre the Ampatuan clan was the “stationary bandit” in Maguindanao and the overlord of the ARMM.Witness the line of governors from the ARMM that showed obeisance to Andal Sr. and pledged their unwaveringsupport to his regime. It demonstrates the elite bargain purchased and coerced by the Ampatuan clan among theMoro elite, which transformed the regional authority into a powerful force unmatched by previous administrations.For the first time in the ARMM’s history, powerful governors marched in step with the overlord, condoning years of violence and corruption in exchange for a share in the licit and illicit revenues to be gained from a region that is partof the Philippine state only in name and location.Meanwhile, the ruling coalition bound itself to the dominant clan through an arrangement that brought huge revenuesand state-of-the-art weaponry to the latter in exchange for the votes and violence that secured the authority of theruling coalition. Collaboration facilitated electoral fraud and a subsequent cover-up. Collaboration enabled the state toharness the clan’s armed threat to ensure compliance among competitors and to protect the instigators.Collaboration provided the muscle that would stem any intervention or meddling by rebel forces and other armedgroups.But elite bargains are by nature extremely fragile, and fraught with complications. They are also confusing, especiallywhen the state engages in the same illicit activities which it should be suppressing. So when we see guns andammunition stamped with DND and AFP logos in the possession of ruthless paramilitaries, we are shocked by thecollusion between rulers and warlords who partake from the same bounty gained from the underground trade inillegal weapons. The key is to see the agents of both sides in the political divide, i.e., rulers and warlords, as rivalgroups vying for the same economic and political resources, alternately colluding and colliding with each other, facedwith the same incentive to gain more at the expense of the other.The arrangement approximates what the conflict scholar David Keen calls a ‘sell game’ (rigged game), where rivalscollude based on the shared aim to “make money” and to “stay alive”, or collide when one party undermines theother. The alliance can endure over long periods of time if each side recognizes the possibilities and limits of thegame. However, the game eventually ends when one, or both players "over-reach". This was the case in 2001, whenPresident Joseph Estrada’s "over-reach" led to Chavit Singson’s withdrawal from a bargain that came dangerouslyclose to his own annihilation. The Maguindanao massacre reflects the same "over-reach" that now dooms the