MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCHAugust 17, 2011Global EconomicsDangerously Close to Recession
Exhibit 3
US GDP Growth: Critical Period Ahead in 4Q11/1Q12
US GDP growth-10%-8%-6%-4%-2%0%2%4%6%
Q 1 - 2 0 0 6 Q 3 - 2 0 0 6 Q 1 - 2 0 0 7 Q 3 - 2 0 0 7 Q 1 - 2 0 0 8 Q 3 - 2 0 0 8 Q 1 - 2 0 0 9 Q 3 - 2 0 0 9 Q 1 - 2 0 1 0 Q 3 - 2 0 1 0 Q 1 - 2 0 1 1 Q 3 - 2 0 1 1 Q 1 - 2 0 1 2 Q 3 - 2 0 1 2
QoQ%, SAARYoY%MS fcast
Source: BEA, Haver Analytics, Morgan Stanley Research estimates
Europe’s woes to continue:
The ECB’s past rate hikes and,more so, the sovereign crisis and the additional fiscal policytightening as well as the banking sector funding stress itproduces, will take an additional toll on growth, in our view.Our European team now sees euro area GDP broadlystagnating later this year and in early 2012. Thus, it won’t takemuch to tip the balance towards recession, especially as afinal resolution of the debt crisis (in the form of fiscal transfersor common bond issuance) is likely to be very slow in coming.Against this backdrop, our European team has slashed itsalready below-consensus 2012 euro area GDP forecast from1.2% to a mere 0.5% (see page 7). In our view, despite theproblems in the US, the euro area is clearly the weakest linkin the global chain.
Exhibit 4
Euro Area GDP to Stagnate in 4Q11/1Q12
Euro Area GDP growth-12%-10%-8%-6%-4%-2%0%2%4%6%
Q 1 - 2 0 0 6 Q 3 - 2 0 0 6 Q 1 - 2 0 0 7 Q 3 - 2 0 0 7 Q 1 - 2 0 0 8 Q 3 - 2 0 0 8 Q 1 - 2 0 0 9 Q 3 - 2 0 0 9 Q 1 - 2 0 1 0 Q 3 - 2 0 1 0 Q 1 - 2 0 1 1 Q 3 - 2 0 1 1 Q 1 - 2 0 1 2 Q 3 - 2 0 1 2
QoQ%, SAARYoY%MS fcast
Source: Eurostat, Haver Analytics, Morgan Stanley Research estimates
Dangerously close to recession, but not our base case:
While we think that the US and the euro area will bedangerously close to recession over the next several quarters,we are not making recession our base case, for threereasons. First, companies are sitting on a pile of cash anddisplay healthy profit margins. Second, the decline in oil pricesfrom the peaks earlier this year should act as a partialstabiliser, lowering headline inflation over the next 6-12months and supporting household real disposable incomes.Third, we expect the major central banks to lend additionalsupport, with both the ECB and the Fed cutting interest ratesand possibly implementing additional non-standard easingmeasures (for details, see pages 6-7).
Why this is not 2008:
Initial conditions are better now. Backthen, household, corporate and bank balance sheets weremuch weaker, employment in the US was already falling andunemployment rising, monetary policy was tight, and theLehman collapse meant that the financial system, includingtrade finance, totally seized up. Against this, fiscal andmonetary policy have less (though not zero) room formanoeuvre now. So, while a freefall of the economy similar to2008 looks very unlikely, policy also has less potential for ashock-and-awe response, if needed. Surely, we should nottake too much comfort from saying that this is not 2008 – afterall, the recession that followed was the deepest since theGreat Depression. However, it is important to point out that aplausible recession scenario in 2011-12 would be muchshallower than the 2008-09 experience. To get a 2008-typerecession, one would have to assume a major Lehman-typepolicy error, such as the default of a European sovereign,which could bring the whole financial system down. While thisis not impossible, we currently attach a very low probability tosuch an outcome. We will elaborate more on bear and bullscenarios in the coming weeks as events evolve.
EM policy-makers to cushion the blow:
The currentslowdown in EM growth, caused by a run-up in inflation andthe monetary policy response, now looks set to be prolongedinto 2012 by the weaker DM outlook. However, with inflationat or close to a temporary peak, some policy easing in EMlooks likely to provide a cushion for growth. EM policy-makersshould be able and willing to help their own economies avoida hard landing, but they won’t be able to bail out the world, inour view. Absent the kind of tail risks that were present in theworld in 2008, and having barely emerged from a battle withinflation and overheating, EM policy-makers at this point willlikely signal that they want to use just enough policy stimulusto help their own economies. In fact, given the constraints onDM policy-makers, EM policy-makers should really be ready
3
Add a Comment