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 THE MONEY TRAIL
Asset Forfeiture
1.
"Criminal forfeiture is an action brought as a part of thecriminal prosecution of a defendant. It is an inpersonam (against the person) action and requires thatthe government indict (charge) the property used orderived from the crime along with the defendant. If the jury finds the property forfeitable, the court issues anorder of forfeiture."For forfeitures pursuant to theControlled Substances Act (CSA), Racketeer Influencedand Corrupt Organizations (RICO), as well as moneylaundering and obscenity statutes, there is an ancillaryhearing for third parties to assert their interest in theproperty. Once the interests of third parties areaddressed, the court issues a final forfeiture order."Civil judicial forfeiture is an in rem (against the property)action brought in court against the property. Theproperty is the defendant and no criminal chargeagainst the owner is necessary."Administrativeforfeiture is an in rem action that permits the federalseizing agency to forfeit the property without judicialinvolvement. The authority for a seizing agency to startan administrative forfeiture action is found in the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1607. Property that can beadministratively forfeited is: merchandise theimportation of which is prohibited; a conveyance usedto import, transport, or store a controlled substance; amonetary instrument; or other property that does notexceed $500,000 in value.
Source:
 A Guide to Equitable Sharing of Federally Forfeited Property for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,U.S. Department of Justice, March 1994, from the web at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/07federalforfeiture/index.htm
last accessed May 23, 2007.
2.
3.
"In a civil forfeiture action, the government need only
 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that the propertyis subject to forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture, which isapparently much less common than civil forfeiture(Hyde, 1995), usually accompanies criminal chargesand is more difficult because of the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard (Warchol, Payne, andJohnson, 1996:53-54). Civil forfeiture may thus bepursued more frequently because of the lower standardof proof. In fairness, however, criminal forfeiture maybe preferred sometimes because restrictions exist ondivulging the amount of assets forfeited (Clingermayer,Hecker, and Madsen, 2005)."
Source:
Worrall, John L. and Kovandzic, Tomislav V., "Is Policing For Profit? Answers from Asset Forfeiture," Criminology and Public Policy (Columbus, OH: American Society of Criminology, 2008), Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 223.
4.
5.
According to a 1998 article published in the Universityof Chicago Law Review, the ability of law enforcementagencies to financially benefit from forfeited assets, andthe provision of large block grants from Congress tofight the drug trade "have distorted governmentalpolicy making and law enforcement." The authorsbelieve that "the law enforcement agenda that targetsassets rather than crime, the 80 percent of seizuresthat are unaccompanied by any criminal prosecution,the plea bargains that favor drug kingpins and penalizethe 'mules' without assets to trade, the reverse stingsthat target drug buyers rather than drug sellers, theoverkill in agencies involved in even minor arrests, themassive shift in resources towards federal jurisdictionover local law enforcement - is largely the unplannedby-product of this economic incentive structure."
Source:
Blumenson, E. & and Nilsen, E., "Policing for Profit: The Drug War'sHidden Economic Agenda," University of Chicago Law Review, 65: 35-114(1998, Winter).
6.
 
7.
"We did not seek to determine whether forfeitureactivities ultimately reduce crime or affect drug-relatedarrest patterns. However, we found some evidence thatpolice agencies engage in forfeiture practices thatmaximize their potential for revenue generation.Specifically, we found that significantly fewer equitable-sharing payments are collected in generous forfeiturestates, which is consistent with the policing-for-profitallegation put forth by forfeiture's critics (e.g.,Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998)."
Source:
Worrall, John L. and Kovandzic, Tomislav V., "Is Policing For Profit? Answers from Asset Forfeiture," Criminology and Public Policy (Columbus, OH: American Society of Criminology, 2008), Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 237.
8.
9.
"Forfeiture was especially controversial during the1980s and 1990s (Hyde, 1995; Levy, 1996), but in2000, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA)(Pub. L. No. 106-185) was passed. One major featureof the legislation was improved: due-processprotections for property owners. And before CAFRA in2000, the burden of proof fell on property owners. Thisprocess all changed with CAFRA. CAFRA did not,however, alter the burden of proof for civil forfeitureproceedings. It just shifted it from property owners tothe government, and it did not change the lawgoverning the disposition of forfeited assets (Worrall,2004)."
Source:
Worrall, John L. and Kovandzic, Tomislav V., "Is PolicingFor Profit? Answers from Asset Forfeiture," Criminology and Public Policy (Columbus, OH: American Society of Criminology, 2008), Vol. 7, No. 2, p.224.
10.
11.
"In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, monies were available undera permanent indefinite appropriation to finance thefollowing: "(1) The operational costs of the forfeitureprogram, including handling and disposal of seized andforfeited assets, and the execution of legal forfeiture
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