The China-India Nuclear Crossroads

Peace

Introduction

Lora Saalman

The differing status of China and India as nuclear weapons powers has long impeded constructive interaction between the two in both the civil and military nuclear realm. China’s internationally recognized status as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) under the nonproliferation regime sharply contrasts with that of India, which remains marginalized despite efforts to integrate it into the system. This strategic asymmetry has contributed to an atmosphere of Sino-Indian rivalry, exacerbated by ongoing territorial disputes and respective ties to third parties, namely Pakistan and the United States.

Despite these differences, there are numerous arenas in which the two countries exhibit overlapping nuclear policies and practices, from no first use to fast-breeder reactors. This book explores the convergence and diver-gence in Chinese and Indian perceptions of their own and each other’s nuclear programs. It provides firsthand Chinese and Indian accounts of how each country’s nuclear pursuits affect and are affected by the other. This book does not seek to validate or contradict these views. Understanding perceptions and misperceptions is integral to moving forward on confidence building measures and cooperation. The volume also intentionally concentrates on bilateral Sino-Indian nuclear dynamics, placing the United States and Pakistan in the role of intervening variables.

Prior to delving into the often-ambiguous realm of perceptions, it is useful to establish a baseline of facts or assessments of China’s and India’s extant capabilities. This introduction will focus on military-oriented nuclear systems. Exactitude is impossible, of course, in light of the relatively low levels of transparency of these two countries. This, in turn, is partially due to each state’s belief that opacity helps preserve force survivability, enabling credible minimum deterrence.¹ Drawing on open Western sources, the exposition here represents a good faith effort to provide details on these programs prior to exploring how each side perceives them.

The original version of China’s 2010 Ministry of Defense white paper notes that China …will continue to maintain its nuclear forces at the lowest level needed to maintain the requirements of national security.² Instead of explicitly stating China’s nuclear force posture to be minimum deterrence (zuidi heweishe), this phrase suggests that the lowest level (zuidi shuiping) needed to meet these aims is fungible and potentially contingent upon other countries’ postures. A 2011 U.S. Department of Defense report takes this assessment one step further by describing China’s significant investments to maintain a limited nuclear force, also referred to by some PRC writers as ‘sufficient and effective,’ to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging retaliatory nuclear strike.³ This ambiguity of Chinese posture and intent is found in writings within China and abroad.

Nonetheless, some public assessments are regarded as useful. The Federation of American Scientists and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimate China’s total inventory of nuclear weapons at 240.⁴ In terms of delivery vehicles and modernization, China’s nuclear capabilities remain largely focused on increasing survivability vis-à-vis one potential adversary, namely the United States. However, many of these systems have implications for other powers with which China has unresolved disputes or tense relations, including India.

Overall, China deploys a total of approximately 120 land-based, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Among these, China’s nuclear arsenal is reported to consist of 55 to 65 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the longest range of which are the silo-based, 13,000-km range DF-5 (CSS-4) and the 11,200-km range DF-31A (CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2).⁵ There have also been indications of possible development of a new road-mobile ICBM, capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).⁶

In addition to these aforementioned capabilities that have implications for the United States, China also possesses a number of delivery systems that could affect its neighbors’ security. These include the solid-fueled, road-mobile, 7,200-km range DF-31 (CSS-10), the 3,100 km range DF-3A (CSS-2), the 5,400 km range DF-4 (CSS-3), and the DF-21 (CSS-5), which depending on its variant can reportedly range between 2,150 and 3,000 kilometers.⁷

Among these, a 2011 U.S. Department of Defense report indicates that to strengthen its deterrent posture relative to India, China has replaced liquid-fueled, nuclear-capable DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles with more survivable solid-fueled DF-21s.⁸ A 2008 report released by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists further suggests that the DF-31 will replace the DF-3A and DF-4 as China’s main weapon for regional targeting.⁹ Such missiles are of concern to India not only in terms of range and payload, but more broadly for their potential to lead to arms racing.

And this possibility is not limited to ballistic missiles; China’s arsenal is also reported to contain the nuclear-capable cruise missile Dong Hai (DH-10), which is reputed to have a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers and to consist of both ground- and air-launched nuclear-capable versions.¹⁰ Improvement of the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China’s nuclear forces suggests that India could be looking at new challenges in its near vicinity.¹¹ In addition to newer capabilities, China retains older nuclear-capable bombers such as the Hong-6 and Qian-5. Yet, while such systems may have some bearing on India’s security, they would be unlikely to be the delivery vehicles of choice.

Even more so than its land- and air-based deterrent, China’s pursuits in the naval arena are increasingly drawing attention for their impact on its nuclear posture and capabilities. Beijing’s efforts to produce a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, if armed with nuclear-tipped submarine launched ballistic missiles, would provide it with greater survivability, second-strike capability, and new nuclear mating practices.

While not necessarily targeting India, such advances offer China a larger deterrence footprint and leverage, particularly given the location of one of China’s nuclear submarine bases along the southern coast of Hainan Island.¹² This base, which incorporates submarine tunnel facilities and can hold attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced surface combatants including aircraft carriers, would facilitate rapid deployment to not only the South China Sea, but also to the Indian Ocean.

While the operational status of China’s one Xia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and two variants of 1,700 to 2,500-km range JL-1 (CSS-N-3) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) remain questionable, two second-generation Shang-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines are already in service and are meant to replace the older Han-class (Type 091).¹³ But these are not the systems with the greatest implications for India. Instead, it is the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN that appears to be advancing and reportedly has appeared at the Yulin naval base, closer to India’s maritime sphere of influence.¹⁴

The Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN is destined to carry the JL-2 (CSS-N-4) SLBM with an estimated range of 7,400 kilometers, which would give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear capability.¹⁵ While the JL-2 SLBM requires further tests, it is nonetheless a major part of China securing a second-strike capability, particularly among regional rivals. Furthermore, China is also anticipated to add five third-generation Type 095 SSNs, with better quieting technology that will improve its ability to conduct surveillance and interdiction of surface vessels with torpedoes and antiship cruise missiles.¹⁶

In sum, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s pursuit of platforms such as nuclear-powered submarines and its first aircraft carrier suggests that China is seeking to support additional military missions beyond Taiwan. Much like Indian concerns that as Mainland China’s relations with Taiwan improve it will re-purpose some of its land-based ballistic missile systems to target India, there remain questions that this shift of maritime priorities further afield equates with challenging Indian interests in the Indian Ocean. Prior reports on China’s interest in the Gwadar port in Pakistan and more recent articles regarding Chinese cooperation with the Seychelles on a refueling base contribute to these concerns.¹⁷

While these projects are purportedly civilian in nature, they none-theless could lay the groundwork for future military activities and deployments. This potential dual-use role suggests that should China seek a greater blue water combat capability, it may be increasing its logistical ability to do so. So while China’s nuclear developments predominantly continue to target U.S. developments and force adjustments, expansion of its range and efforts to bring the Indian Ocean into greater reach have implications for India’s own military development and nuclear force structure.

Whereas China seeks to deter the United States, Russia, and India, New Delhi develops and deploys capabilities to deter China and Pakistan. However, Indian threat perceptions do not allow a neat separation between potential adversaries. India expresses concern over two-front scenarios in which China and Pakistan work in tandem to exert pressure on India. The Federation of American Scientists estimates India’s total inventory of nuclear weapons at between 80 and 100, with approximately 70 assembled nuclear warheads of which about 50 are fully operational, as suggested by a report from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.¹⁸

Unlike China, whose delivery vehicles are dominated by land-based and increasingly sea-based ballistic missiles, India’s mainstay is currently based in aircraft, namely the Mirage 2000H, the Jaguar IS/IB, and MiG-27 most likely to be assigned to nuclear missions.¹⁹ With in-flight refueling capabilities on the rise and India’s stationing of other aircraft, such as the nuclear-capable Su-30 MKI near the Sino-Indian border, aircraft are likely to continue to exert a good deal of influence in terms of both conventional and nuclear deterrence.

In terms of nuclear ballistic missiles, India has the 150-km range Prithvi-I, while longer-range missiles that have undergone tests reportedly include the 700 to 1,200-km range Agni-I, the 2,000 to 2,500-km range Agni-II, the 3,000 to 5,000-km range Agni-III, and the 3,200 to 3,700-km range Agni-IV, as well as the 5,000-km range Agni-V that was successfully test launched on April 19, 2012, and effectively brings Beijing and Shanghai into range.²⁰

Of the aforementioned systems, the Agni series, particularly the Agni-III, the Agni IV, and the recently tested Agni-V, has drawn the most attention in China for a number of reasons. In part this is because the Agni series has a maneuverable re-entry vehicle, MRV-Mk.2, with a claimed circular error probability (CEP) of approximately 40 meters.²¹ If true, this means that its high level of accuracy would allow Indian weapon designers to mount nuclear warheads with a smaller yield, greater accuracy, and larger range. With the successful test launch of the Agni-V, India’s ability to strike at the power centers of Beijing and Shanghai has led a number of Chinese experts to debate the political and security implications for China and abroad.

Another system under discussion is the intermediate-range land-attack cruise missile, known as the Nirbhay, which is reportedly under development by the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) in Hyderabad.²² The subsonic cruise missile, which is reportedly similar to the Pakistani Babur cruise missile, is earmarked to have a range of 1,000 kilometers and is proclaimed to be capable of carrying 24 types of warheads.²³ While it is unclear whether the missile will be nuclear-capable, much like reported Chinese cruise missile advances, this system would provide India with greater flexibility in terms of deploying its nuclear deterrent.

At sea, India has two naval weapon systems for the sea-based leg of its nuclear triad, namely the approximately 350-km range Dhanush and the 300 to 700-km range Sagarika missile.²⁴ While the former has been successfully test-fired on multiple occasions, its short range would require close proximity for effectiveness. Regarding the latter, the K-15 is a version of the Sagarika that has been test-launched and is due to be integrated with the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), a nuclear-powered submarine that has undergone a trial launch. While this system has yet to become operational, there are suggestions that it, in combination with the Russian nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarine leased by India, is destined to be a platform for completing India’s nuclear triad. However, given the current stage of development of the ATV and short range of the SLBMs, they are unlikely to threaten China in the near to medium term.

Despite the evident gaps, there remains crossover between China’s and India’s respective pursuits of capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and Pakistan and what they might mean for one another. Survivability, range, mobility, and flexibility are all part of Chinese and Indian nuclear deterrents that are based upon credible minimum deterrence, no first use, non-mating, negative security assurances in name. However, possible pursuit of a number of capabilities above, such as MIRVs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, would make it harder to achieve such policies in practice. And in making threat assessments shaped by Chinese and Indian policies and practice, just as much as capabilities play a central role, so do perceptions.

This book provides an overview of Chinese and Indian expert views of similarities and differences in nuclear posture and practice, and concludes with initiatives to enhance communication and cooperation in those arenas in which crossover is greatest. The chapters address key topics in Sino-Indian nuclear relations, with each containing paired essays, one by a Chinese expert and one by an Indian expert. In chapter 1, Arun Prakash and Yang Yi provide the historical context for understanding India’s and China’s current nuclear relations. Prakash forecasts the decline of U.S. hegemony and looks to a future in which China and India may be headed toward balance of power politics. He delineates the concerns attached to such potential rivalry, emphasizing that China is not viewed in nuclear isolation, given its support for Pakistan. Yang keeps his sights firmly fixed on the U.S. threat to China, detailing China’s pursuit of nuclear sub-marine advances to meet the maritime and deterrence challenges it faces. While describing these systems’ utility as second-strike vehicles, Yang emphasizes that India is not China’s target. He posits that India’s use of the China threat as an impetus for its nuclear program is damaging to bilateral trust, and he advocates increased exchange on nuclear issues.

In chapter 2, Pan Zhenqiang and P. K. Singh offer their assessment of where China and India stand on nuclear doctrine and strategy. Pan argues that the Chinese government tends not to use the terms nuclear doctrine or nuclear strategy, instead opting for nuclear strategic guidelines. However, he maintains that if a nuclear doctrine were to be ascribed to China, it would be encapsulated in the concept of verifiable no first use. Singh provides an overview of the conditions contributing to the evolution of what he calls a dynamic nuclear doctrine on the part of India. Singh cites the centrality of China’s decision to test nuclear weapons in 1964 in the wake of its border war with India and its strategic assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as integral to India’s decision to establish itself as a military, as well as civil, nuclear power.

In chapter 3, C. Uday Bhaskar and Nie Hongyi compare and contrast India’s and China’s nuclear pledges and practices. Bhaskar cites atrophied mutual trust on the nuclear front to China’s use of Pakistan as a proxy. While arguing that India views itself as caught in a nuclear triangle with China and Pakistan, Bhaskar notes that a Sino-Indian bilateral declaration of no first use (NFU) would go a long way toward alleviating India’s concerns about Sino-Pakistan collusion. Nie underscores the internal and external debate over China’s policies of NFU and credible minimum deterrence, subscribing to the view that China continues to maintain both these postures and citing the national Great Wall Engineering project as evidence. However, he also notes that China’s concept of deterrence is not static, with the size of its arsenal affected by potential new threats, such as rapid conventional strike weapons systems and missile defenses. He details similarities between China and India in overall nuclear policy, but explains how potential cooperation has been stymied by India’s assumption of China as its imagined enemy and their unresolved border dispute.

In chapter 4, Li Bin and Srikanth Kondapalli revisit the similarities of credible minimum deterrence and NFU within China’s and India’s postures toward nuclear weapons. Li explores China’s and India’s NFU in practice, suggesting concrete means whereby both sides could bilaterally reaffirm and strengthen their NFU commitments vis-à-vis one another. By undertaking these measures, he argues that both countries would create a more balanced discussion platform, thereby mitigating the impact of their different statuses under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kondapalli details changes occurring in both countries’ policies. He describes China’s movement toward limited deterrence and increasingly sophisticated targeting practices, combined with shifts in operational doctrine toward conventional preemptive (changguixianfazhiren) strike. Kondapalli asserts that India also retains a malleable nuclear doctrine and has made qualifications on its own stance of NFU, in the event of a biological or chemical attack.

In chapter 5, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Yao Yunzhu explore the impact of nuclear doctrine and BMD on India’s and China’s views on strategic stability. Rajagopalan discusses the core differences between China’s and India’s BMD programs, arguing that China’s BMD pursuits are derived from its ASAT program, whereas India’s programs have evolved from BMD objectives to anti-satellite possibilities. She argues that China’s BMD program remains fixated on the United States, whereas the impetus for India’s program is Pakistan. Given China’s missile assistance to Pakistan and India’s increasing intercept range, she suggests that India’s BMD program may have future implications for China. Yao undertakes an evaluation of China’s nuclear relationship with the United States and compares it with that between India and the United States. She concludes that the NFU-based strategic stability between China and India is much more reliable and stable than that between China and the United States, which is based on asymmetric deterrence and mutual vulnerability.

In chapter 6, Li Deshun and Kalyan Kemburi seek new means of measuring deterrence in both theory and force structure, using China and India as case studies. Li inserts the variable of interdependence into his assessment of strategic stability. He argues that given the drastic changes in the international framework following the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet divide, indirect losses caused to one’s own country by engaging in a nuclear strike—whether economic, social, or environmental—must be factored into strategic stability calculations. He argues for a Sino-Indian strategic stability model that hinges upon reducing the importance of nuclear warhead quantity and enhancing strategic exchanges to reduce the chance of miscalculation. Kemburi applies theory to practice, by evaluating how changes to force structure affect deterrence, namely, with the increasingly central role of cruise missiles. He advocates that China and India should address these weapons systems in their strategic discussions and assessments of deterrence, in order to clarify whether or not they accord with claims of minimum deterrence.

In chapter 7, Swaran Singh and Fan Jishe provide their accounts of the political imperatives and shifting views within India and China on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Singh details the evolution of India’s move from support for a test ban under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to a more resistant position motivated in part by concerns that India has technical reasons to conduct further tests. He notes that a new shift is under way, with recent indications that India would be compelled to reconsider its stance if the United States and China were to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Fan creates a United States–centric framework for analyzing the past, present, and future status of