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"Insurgents and terrorists retain the resources and capabilities to sustain and even increase current level of violence through the next year." This was the secret Pentagon assessment sent to the White House in May 2006. The forecast of a more violent 2007 in Iraq contradicted the repeated optimistic statements of President Bush, including one, two days earlier, when he said we were at a "turning point" that history would mark as the time "the forces of terror began their long retreat."

State of Denial examines how the Bush administration avoided telling the truth about Iraq to the public, to Congress, and often to themselves. Two days after the May report, the Pentagon told Congress, in a report required by law, that the "appeal and motivation for continued violent action will begin to wane in early 2007."

In this detailed inside story of a war-torn White House, Bob Woodward reveals how White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, with the indirect support of other high officials, tried for 18 months to get Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld replaced. The president and Vice President Cheney refused. At the beginning of Bush's second term, Stephen Hadley, who replaced Condoleezza Rice as national security adviser, gave the administration a "D minus" on implementing its policies. A SECRET report to the new Secretary of State Rice from her counselor stated that, nearly two years after the invasion, Iraq was a "failed state."

State of Denial reveals that at the urging of Vice President Cheney and Rumsfeld, the most frequent outside visitor and Iraq adviser to President Bush is former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who, haunted still by the loss in Vietnam, emerges as a hidden and potent voice.

Woodward reveals that the secretary of defense himself believes that the system of coordination among departments and agencies is broken, and in a SECRET May 1, 2006, memo, Rumsfeld stated, "the current system of government makes competence next to impossible."

State of Denial answers the core questions: What happened after the invasion of Iraq? Why? How does Bush make decisions and manage a war that he chose to define his presidency? And is there an achievable plan for victory?

Bob Woodward's third book on President Bush is a sweeping narrative -- from the first days George W. Bush thought seriously about running for president through the recruitment of his national security team, the war in Afghanistan, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the struggle for political survival in the second term.

After more than three decades of reporting on national security decision making -- including his two #1 national bestsellers on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush at War (2002) and Plan of Attack (2004) -- Woodward provides the fullest account, and explanation, of the road Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and the White House staff have walked.
Published: Simon & Schuster on
ISBN: 9780743293259
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State of Denial is the third in a series of books by reporter Bob Woodward about President George W. Bush and his handling of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. I have not read the others and did not have any particular interest in doing so. State of Denial focuses on the period that led up to Iraq until just before the surge. That's what I wanted to know more about and Woodward certainly delivers.The book follows the distinct narrative style Woodward is known for. There's a lot of information packed in, but the clearest star of the story is Donald Rumsfeld. The book certainly doesn't portray him in a positive light. Unimaginative, arrogant, and fussy are the best words to describe this portrait of the former Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld enters Washington with a plan to streamline the military without their cooperation. I say without not because they refused, but because Rumsfeld did everything he could to ensure they would not be onboard. He seemed to bully everyone, even those that agreed with him. He micromanaged, yet seemed paralyzed by important decisions. These are the insights State of Denial provides, and while Rumsfeld comes out the worst, all the major players are addressed in full.The bigger question is whether or not any of it is true. Woodward, true to his history, does not cite sources. He relies on extensive interviews with key players. Woodward claims he does not accept anything as true without multiple source confirmation. He has a reputation that backs him up. But nevertheless, given the nature of this book, there are people who will disbelieve its contents and Woodward doesn't give them a compelling reason not to.I believe it is mostly accurate however. And for this reason, I strongly recommend this book to anyone looking to see the decision making that led to the Iraq War and its mishandling. The hard truth seems to be mistakes were less about evil intentions and more about apathy and incompetence at the highest levels.more
This was the third of four books journalist Bob Woodward wrote about the Bush Presidency and its conduct of the War on Terror and by this time the luster had well and truly worn off. The picture that emerges is an interesting one. The President actually does not come off as badly as one might imagine. He has a hands-off approach in which he delegates a great deal to his team. He sees his role as that of setting broad goals and leadership as providing moral support and resolve. The problem seems to be that when the people around him aren’t functioning well, he seems to lack the insight and incisiveness to understand where things are going wrong and who is responsible.The major problems seem to lie in the Pentagon. Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) comes across as petty, petulant and more interested in bureaucratic territory-marking and trying to prove a point to his subordinates in uniform. Douglas Feith (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy) , who was ostensibly responsible for Post-war planning in Iraq appears to be an utterly incompetent toady. Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense) seems to be an ideologically-driven academic with a naïve faith in impractical socio-political theoretical frameworks which never really quite matched the reality of what he thought they described. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard B. Myers seems to have been a ‘yes man’, deliberately picked by Rumsfeld because of his submissive demeanor, and who is faulted for not pushing the warnings, questions and requests of his uniformed subordinates further up the chain of command more assertively. Tommy Franks' behaviour is frankly bizarre. After leading the army to Baghdad and declaring victory, he flies off to vacation and then retirement with narry a care about the mess he had left behind. Finally there is Paul Bremer, who was picked to replace Jay Garner as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority seems to have been responsible for several dreadful decisions such as the De-Baatification programme, the disbanding of the Iraqi army, and the shutting down of state-run industries, which helped to push a chaotic and disorderly Iraq into open revolt against the American occupation.A couple of things that come across strongly which still surprise is that firstly the repeated claims by members of the government that no one could have foreseen the problems that would be encountered during the occupation was patently false. Plenty of people foresaw the problems and spoke out about them, but they were mostly sidelined or ignored. Secondly its frankly amazing how once things were very obviously going wrong, how unwilling or unable people were to try and deal with the problems. It was as if by refusing to acknowledge that things were not going well they thought it would simply go away. It was extraordinary behavior by people who had pushed hard for war and sent thousands of young men and women into harm’s way and now wanted nothing to do with the mess that they had created.Bob Woodward's account if based on numerous interviews with White House, Pentagon and State Department insiders, as well as others. Certainly people will try to spin events to make themselves look better and their bureaucratic opponents worse, but he seems to have done a fairly good job of noting different interpretations of events and conversations, where they occur. In his own words, Rumsfeld comes across as unhelpful, prickly and obfuscative, which seems pretty much in keeping with his character as portrayed. Its worth keeping in mind that Bush and Cheney refused to be interviewed for this book (unlike for the first two books about the presidency by Woodward).All in all its an interesting account, though of course these kinds of books can never be called completely comprehensive when they are written so close to the events they are describing. Still, its an insightful look into what was happening at the top of the U.S. government in the period 2002 to 2006 with regards to the Iraq War.more
Bob Woodward, the legendary Washington Post reporter who helped to break open the Watergate story decades ago, offers his third (of four) glimpses into the Bush administration in "State of Denial," which focuses on the period between mid-2004 and the end of 2005. Woodward taps into his range of sources throughout Washington, evidently including several high placed Pentagon people, and a number of on-the-record interviews with several of the principle people to construct this look at the Iraq war.As usual, Woodward uncovers the details of many behind the scenes conversations and attitudes. The power struggles between the State Department and the Defense Department, hinted at in other reports and books, take center stage here. Unlike most of Woodward's other books, though, "State of Denial" has a clear villain, long-embattled Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld (whose resignation was accepted in the months after this book was published). Rumsfeld is portrayed as an aging power-seeker who evidently does not play very well with others, but one who cannot seem to accept the responsibility for the authority he seeks (and Woodward believes, he is tacitly granted by the president with regards to Iraq).This is not to suggest that others look particularly good in the book. As might be expected of reporting that chronicles a period in the war in which all the signs pointed towards failure, there's a lot of finger-pointing. The 'state of denial' of the title seems two-fold -- there is the obvious public sugar-coating about how the war in Iraq is going by virtually everyone in power that Woodward finds was prevalent even behind closed doors. But the 'state of denial' also seems to describe the key military and political players' refusal to accept ultimate responsibility for much of what was happening and would happen in Iraq, which led to a giant effort with little accountability for any of those leaders.Without accountability, little forward progress could be made towards improving security or infrastructure in Iraq. For months at a time, including during this period when insurgent attacks were skyrocketing in frequency and potency, there was little change in the American strategic effort. (In hindsight, Woodward is describing a vacuum into which a leader with a solid vision and the means to enact it might be successful, which may be what happened under Gen. David Petreus' leadership and the military surge in Iraq after the period Woodward chronicles in this book.) More than some of his other books, Woodward is an active narrator and interviewer in these pages, asking questions that he believes were not seriously considered by top officials. At times, he apparently believes it was his role as interrogator to push those he was interviewing to see alternative possibilities, rather than simply eliciting their view of events. This self-portrayal seems to be Woodward's guiding assessment of the situation, that the leadership was out of touch with reality, needing to be forcefully guided toward a more accurate view of the war. As such, the book can seem partisan at times, though I don't believe it is meant to be.Opponents of the war will find much that confirms their suspicions. Proponents may be frustrated by the performance of certain key players. Regardless, the book is a must-read first look at the George W. Bush administration's darkest time in Iraq, a fly-on-the-wall account of meetings where decisions seem to be as often avoided as made and of personalities that seem at odds with the necessities of the times.more
A lot can happen in four years. In 2006, when this book was published, we were all learning just how much had been hidden related to the war in Iraq. In 2010, it is no where near as shocking. However, it is well worth the visit back a mere four years to remind ourselves how we wound up in this mess.Woodward does his usual thorough job investigating how Iraq turned into the problem we all see today. And, if his past reviews of the Bush administration seemed to paint a somewhat favorable or neutral picture (which, to me, they did – that is, they did not seem to go for what looked to be an exposed jugular), this description has no such qualms. The entire administration is seen as a back-biting, bickering, game-playing, power-mongering group of clueless bureaucrats and generals who cannot come together to provide any direction other than attack. Rumsfeld is enemy number one in this description, but most of the supporting players have their chance at ignominy also. We also see the individuals who try to get the issues raised, but they are voices crying in the wilderness.It is well researched, and Woodward has the facts. Of course, he also has the power to make the facts tell the story he sees. Is that story the actual truth? It is very hard to tell. But Woodward has the floor, and the facts and figures he presents are very persuasive to the jury.more
Rereading this in 2010 one wonders how the person reading it in 2020 will feel. I am wondering...how was Rummy still in place almost 2 years after the rush to Baghdad. If this were a novel one would be expecting the final page to point to his removal. Doesn't happen, does it ? Why did Bush and his SecDef give Bush such access in the early years ? Yes, it is a good book, and will always be must reading from a man with especially good credentials for writing about the White House and its occupants.more
This enlightening and extremely well-written book examines how the BushAdministration avoided telling the truth about Iraq to the public, toCongress, and often to themselves. It answers the core questions: Whatreally happened after the invasion of Iraq? Why? How does Bush makedecisions and manage a war that he chose to define his presidency? And isthere an achievable plan for victory? This is the third book Woodward haswritten on the Bush presidency. It follows "Bush At War" (2002) and "Planof Attack" (2004), and these three books will very likely take their placeas the definitive narrative of the entire debacle that is known as the BushAdministration. Woodward's no-nonsense, tell-it-like-it-is writing stylehasn't changed since the Watergate exposure and it is my belief that thesethree books provide what is likely the most complete account and explanationof the road that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, and the rest of that bunchhave taken this entire nation down for the past 8 years. I cannot recommendthis book highly enough. IMO, every American should read it. 5more
If you wanted to be a fly on the wall in the discussions at the White House and Department of Defense in the Bush adminsitrations, then this is as close as you will get. In sometimes tedious detail, Woodward describes the reaction of the Rumsfeld and Bush to the degeneration of Iraq following the US invasion. Several important changes happened to the structure of government during these years not the least of which was the dominance of the Secretary of Defense over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. As a result, a potentially critical voice was filtered through Rumsfeld's point of view. Bush is portrayed as being more interested in keeping a team of egos together than defining a path forward. A long read and I sometimes felt that the "granularity" was sometimes a bit much.more
i listened to this on my thanksgiving drive cross country. kinda boring but i think i absorbed some of it. probably more than if i had waited around to read it, considering it's been on my list forever.more
Fascinating behind the scenes glimpse of the dysfunctional White House, the power games, and Bush's inability to lead or make decisions. Overwhelming impression of a weak cheerleader. Woodward missed the predominant role of Cheney, undoubtedly because he was beholden to him. Woodward is a fauning despicable suckup, a far cry from what he used to be, but this was well-written and very engrossing at least.more
Erstwhile tool-for-hire reveals some trade secrets of our shit-kicker imperium.more
Fast, engrossing, dare I say, journalist, read - stories well told as they happen, with little commentary. Whereas Fiasco (a worthy book to read in parallel) focused on the problems of the military in Iraq, State of Denial details the political machinations that got us into this mess. While most of the juicy tidbits in the book were well publicized in the press, I think the underlying themes of the book were a little ignored. As a collective entity, the upper echelons of power in Washington (including the military) were consumed with a careerist ethos which lead them to prioritize maintain their personal power over all else. Consequently, when given the oppotunity for face time with the president, the universal reaction was simply to tell him (and his merry band of gentleman) what they wanted to hear - i.e., mision accomplished, all going smoothly. The way it is presented by Woodward, Rumsfeld did his best to create an atmosphere where everyone knew not to question his wisdom, Bush on the other hand, simply failed to ask probing questions and invited dissenting opinions into his inner sanctum. In fact in the book details on two instance where Bush exposed himself to dissenting opinion - both of which could not be avoided - meetings with Republician senators and hospital visits with wounded troops and their families.State of Denial, like Fiasco, appears to cover to 2006, but in reality, 2003 and 2004 are covered in detail, 2005 and 2006, in precis.more
An informative overview that pulls together the motives, policies and key characters that have shaped the war. Unfortunately, people who have paid close attention to ongoing developments might not find as many "wow factors" in this text as those who haven't followed current events. I also made the mistake of reading a book highlights article in a weekly magazine prior to tackling the larger work. The digested version hit on all the key themes. Still, Woodward's work is thorough and accessible.more
Informative, reavealing, and frightening, I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in what is wrong with government in general and the Bush administration specifically. Occasionally Woodward seems to make the same point more than once, but this book is a call for change. Regime change right here at home.more
Read all 17 reviews

Reviews

State of Denial is the third in a series of books by reporter Bob Woodward about President George W. Bush and his handling of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. I have not read the others and did not have any particular interest in doing so. State of Denial focuses on the period that led up to Iraq until just before the surge. That's what I wanted to know more about and Woodward certainly delivers.The book follows the distinct narrative style Woodward is known for. There's a lot of information packed in, but the clearest star of the story is Donald Rumsfeld. The book certainly doesn't portray him in a positive light. Unimaginative, arrogant, and fussy are the best words to describe this portrait of the former Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld enters Washington with a plan to streamline the military without their cooperation. I say without not because they refused, but because Rumsfeld did everything he could to ensure they would not be onboard. He seemed to bully everyone, even those that agreed with him. He micromanaged, yet seemed paralyzed by important decisions. These are the insights State of Denial provides, and while Rumsfeld comes out the worst, all the major players are addressed in full.The bigger question is whether or not any of it is true. Woodward, true to his history, does not cite sources. He relies on extensive interviews with key players. Woodward claims he does not accept anything as true without multiple source confirmation. He has a reputation that backs him up. But nevertheless, given the nature of this book, there are people who will disbelieve its contents and Woodward doesn't give them a compelling reason not to.I believe it is mostly accurate however. And for this reason, I strongly recommend this book to anyone looking to see the decision making that led to the Iraq War and its mishandling. The hard truth seems to be mistakes were less about evil intentions and more about apathy and incompetence at the highest levels.more
This was the third of four books journalist Bob Woodward wrote about the Bush Presidency and its conduct of the War on Terror and by this time the luster had well and truly worn off. The picture that emerges is an interesting one. The President actually does not come off as badly as one might imagine. He has a hands-off approach in which he delegates a great deal to his team. He sees his role as that of setting broad goals and leadership as providing moral support and resolve. The problem seems to be that when the people around him aren’t functioning well, he seems to lack the insight and incisiveness to understand where things are going wrong and who is responsible.The major problems seem to lie in the Pentagon. Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) comes across as petty, petulant and more interested in bureaucratic territory-marking and trying to prove a point to his subordinates in uniform. Douglas Feith (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy) , who was ostensibly responsible for Post-war planning in Iraq appears to be an utterly incompetent toady. Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense) seems to be an ideologically-driven academic with a naïve faith in impractical socio-political theoretical frameworks which never really quite matched the reality of what he thought they described. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard B. Myers seems to have been a ‘yes man’, deliberately picked by Rumsfeld because of his submissive demeanor, and who is faulted for not pushing the warnings, questions and requests of his uniformed subordinates further up the chain of command more assertively. Tommy Franks' behaviour is frankly bizarre. After leading the army to Baghdad and declaring victory, he flies off to vacation and then retirement with narry a care about the mess he had left behind. Finally there is Paul Bremer, who was picked to replace Jay Garner as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority seems to have been responsible for several dreadful decisions such as the De-Baatification programme, the disbanding of the Iraqi army, and the shutting down of state-run industries, which helped to push a chaotic and disorderly Iraq into open revolt against the American occupation.A couple of things that come across strongly which still surprise is that firstly the repeated claims by members of the government that no one could have foreseen the problems that would be encountered during the occupation was patently false. Plenty of people foresaw the problems and spoke out about them, but they were mostly sidelined or ignored. Secondly its frankly amazing how once things were very obviously going wrong, how unwilling or unable people were to try and deal with the problems. It was as if by refusing to acknowledge that things were not going well they thought it would simply go away. It was extraordinary behavior by people who had pushed hard for war and sent thousands of young men and women into harm’s way and now wanted nothing to do with the mess that they had created.Bob Woodward's account if based on numerous interviews with White House, Pentagon and State Department insiders, as well as others. Certainly people will try to spin events to make themselves look better and their bureaucratic opponents worse, but he seems to have done a fairly good job of noting different interpretations of events and conversations, where they occur. In his own words, Rumsfeld comes across as unhelpful, prickly and obfuscative, which seems pretty much in keeping with his character as portrayed. Its worth keeping in mind that Bush and Cheney refused to be interviewed for this book (unlike for the first two books about the presidency by Woodward).All in all its an interesting account, though of course these kinds of books can never be called completely comprehensive when they are written so close to the events they are describing. Still, its an insightful look into what was happening at the top of the U.S. government in the period 2002 to 2006 with regards to the Iraq War.more
Bob Woodward, the legendary Washington Post reporter who helped to break open the Watergate story decades ago, offers his third (of four) glimpses into the Bush administration in "State of Denial," which focuses on the period between mid-2004 and the end of 2005. Woodward taps into his range of sources throughout Washington, evidently including several high placed Pentagon people, and a number of on-the-record interviews with several of the principle people to construct this look at the Iraq war.As usual, Woodward uncovers the details of many behind the scenes conversations and attitudes. The power struggles between the State Department and the Defense Department, hinted at in other reports and books, take center stage here. Unlike most of Woodward's other books, though, "State of Denial" has a clear villain, long-embattled Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld (whose resignation was accepted in the months after this book was published). Rumsfeld is portrayed as an aging power-seeker who evidently does not play very well with others, but one who cannot seem to accept the responsibility for the authority he seeks (and Woodward believes, he is tacitly granted by the president with regards to Iraq).This is not to suggest that others look particularly good in the book. As might be expected of reporting that chronicles a period in the war in which all the signs pointed towards failure, there's a lot of finger-pointing. The 'state of denial' of the title seems two-fold -- there is the obvious public sugar-coating about how the war in Iraq is going by virtually everyone in power that Woodward finds was prevalent even behind closed doors. But the 'state of denial' also seems to describe the key military and political players' refusal to accept ultimate responsibility for much of what was happening and would happen in Iraq, which led to a giant effort with little accountability for any of those leaders.Without accountability, little forward progress could be made towards improving security or infrastructure in Iraq. For months at a time, including during this period when insurgent attacks were skyrocketing in frequency and potency, there was little change in the American strategic effort. (In hindsight, Woodward is describing a vacuum into which a leader with a solid vision and the means to enact it might be successful, which may be what happened under Gen. David Petreus' leadership and the military surge in Iraq after the period Woodward chronicles in this book.) More than some of his other books, Woodward is an active narrator and interviewer in these pages, asking questions that he believes were not seriously considered by top officials. At times, he apparently believes it was his role as interrogator to push those he was interviewing to see alternative possibilities, rather than simply eliciting their view of events. This self-portrayal seems to be Woodward's guiding assessment of the situation, that the leadership was out of touch with reality, needing to be forcefully guided toward a more accurate view of the war. As such, the book can seem partisan at times, though I don't believe it is meant to be.Opponents of the war will find much that confirms their suspicions. Proponents may be frustrated by the performance of certain key players. Regardless, the book is a must-read first look at the George W. Bush administration's darkest time in Iraq, a fly-on-the-wall account of meetings where decisions seem to be as often avoided as made and of personalities that seem at odds with the necessities of the times.more
A lot can happen in four years. In 2006, when this book was published, we were all learning just how much had been hidden related to the war in Iraq. In 2010, it is no where near as shocking. However, it is well worth the visit back a mere four years to remind ourselves how we wound up in this mess.Woodward does his usual thorough job investigating how Iraq turned into the problem we all see today. And, if his past reviews of the Bush administration seemed to paint a somewhat favorable or neutral picture (which, to me, they did – that is, they did not seem to go for what looked to be an exposed jugular), this description has no such qualms. The entire administration is seen as a back-biting, bickering, game-playing, power-mongering group of clueless bureaucrats and generals who cannot come together to provide any direction other than attack. Rumsfeld is enemy number one in this description, but most of the supporting players have their chance at ignominy also. We also see the individuals who try to get the issues raised, but they are voices crying in the wilderness.It is well researched, and Woodward has the facts. Of course, he also has the power to make the facts tell the story he sees. Is that story the actual truth? It is very hard to tell. But Woodward has the floor, and the facts and figures he presents are very persuasive to the jury.more
Rereading this in 2010 one wonders how the person reading it in 2020 will feel. I am wondering...how was Rummy still in place almost 2 years after the rush to Baghdad. If this were a novel one would be expecting the final page to point to his removal. Doesn't happen, does it ? Why did Bush and his SecDef give Bush such access in the early years ? Yes, it is a good book, and will always be must reading from a man with especially good credentials for writing about the White House and its occupants.more
This enlightening and extremely well-written book examines how the BushAdministration avoided telling the truth about Iraq to the public, toCongress, and often to themselves. It answers the core questions: Whatreally happened after the invasion of Iraq? Why? How does Bush makedecisions and manage a war that he chose to define his presidency? And isthere an achievable plan for victory? This is the third book Woodward haswritten on the Bush presidency. It follows "Bush At War" (2002) and "Planof Attack" (2004), and these three books will very likely take their placeas the definitive narrative of the entire debacle that is known as the BushAdministration. Woodward's no-nonsense, tell-it-like-it-is writing stylehasn't changed since the Watergate exposure and it is my belief that thesethree books provide what is likely the most complete account and explanationof the road that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, and the rest of that bunchhave taken this entire nation down for the past 8 years. I cannot recommendthis book highly enough. IMO, every American should read it. 5more
If you wanted to be a fly on the wall in the discussions at the White House and Department of Defense in the Bush adminsitrations, then this is as close as you will get. In sometimes tedious detail, Woodward describes the reaction of the Rumsfeld and Bush to the degeneration of Iraq following the US invasion. Several important changes happened to the structure of government during these years not the least of which was the dominance of the Secretary of Defense over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. As a result, a potentially critical voice was filtered through Rumsfeld's point of view. Bush is portrayed as being more interested in keeping a team of egos together than defining a path forward. A long read and I sometimes felt that the "granularity" was sometimes a bit much.more
i listened to this on my thanksgiving drive cross country. kinda boring but i think i absorbed some of it. probably more than if i had waited around to read it, considering it's been on my list forever.more
Fascinating behind the scenes glimpse of the dysfunctional White House, the power games, and Bush's inability to lead or make decisions. Overwhelming impression of a weak cheerleader. Woodward missed the predominant role of Cheney, undoubtedly because he was beholden to him. Woodward is a fauning despicable suckup, a far cry from what he used to be, but this was well-written and very engrossing at least.more
Erstwhile tool-for-hire reveals some trade secrets of our shit-kicker imperium.more
Fast, engrossing, dare I say, journalist, read - stories well told as they happen, with little commentary. Whereas Fiasco (a worthy book to read in parallel) focused on the problems of the military in Iraq, State of Denial details the political machinations that got us into this mess. While most of the juicy tidbits in the book were well publicized in the press, I think the underlying themes of the book were a little ignored. As a collective entity, the upper echelons of power in Washington (including the military) were consumed with a careerist ethos which lead them to prioritize maintain their personal power over all else. Consequently, when given the oppotunity for face time with the president, the universal reaction was simply to tell him (and his merry band of gentleman) what they wanted to hear - i.e., mision accomplished, all going smoothly. The way it is presented by Woodward, Rumsfeld did his best to create an atmosphere where everyone knew not to question his wisdom, Bush on the other hand, simply failed to ask probing questions and invited dissenting opinions into his inner sanctum. In fact in the book details on two instance where Bush exposed himself to dissenting opinion - both of which could not be avoided - meetings with Republician senators and hospital visits with wounded troops and their families.State of Denial, like Fiasco, appears to cover to 2006, but in reality, 2003 and 2004 are covered in detail, 2005 and 2006, in precis.more
An informative overview that pulls together the motives, policies and key characters that have shaped the war. Unfortunately, people who have paid close attention to ongoing developments might not find as many "wow factors" in this text as those who haven't followed current events. I also made the mistake of reading a book highlights article in a weekly magazine prior to tackling the larger work. The digested version hit on all the key themes. Still, Woodward's work is thorough and accessible.more
Informative, reavealing, and frightening, I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in what is wrong with government in general and the Bush administration specifically. Occasionally Woodward seems to make the same point more than once, but this book is a call for change. Regime change right here at home.more
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