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The Invisible


Neapolitan Crime Families

across Europe

Felia Allum


For Mirabelle and Amadis






1. Local Motives, Global Choices

2. Functional Mobility

3. Camorra Clans in Germany and the Netherlands: Hof, Hamburg, and Amsterdam

4. Camorra Clans in France: La Seyne-sur-Mer, Paris, and Villeneuve-Loubet

5. Camorra Clans in Spain: Granada, Tarragona, and Tenerife

6. Camorra Clans in the United Kingdom: Preston, London, and Aberdeen



Works Cited



This book is the result of both an academic and a personal journey, at times lonely, at times full of joy, but always full of questions. Along the way were many encounters and exchanges, some planned and others fortuitous. There were people who looked at me and passed by without stopping, and there were those who looked at me and stopped and took an interest. It is some of them I would like to thank here, for their support, kindness, and friendship.

I thank the University of Bath for the sabbatical that I was given in 2010–2011 and also the two Knowledge Transfer grants (2012) that allowed me to organize workshops with practitioners, policymakers, and academics. In particular, in May 2012 I was able to invite an antimafia judge and put him face-to-face with the British police. Sabbaticals are essential to any researcher, especially those who have to go into the field. They also make us better teachers, as we can present our research firsthand to our students. After eight years at Bath, that sabbatical year allowed me to return to studying the Camorra close-up.

I am particularly grateful to Roger Eatwell and Sue Milner, who believed in me and my research project right from the start despite attempts to block it by others. I thank Adalgisa Giorgio, who has also been the most supportive, efficient, and caring of colleagues. She looked after me and protected me while tirelessly giving herself to her research, students, and university. I also thank my undergraduate and postgraduate students who have since 2011 listened to my explanations, stories, and analysis. They have been patient and engaging.

In collecting material across Europe, I encountered many obstacles but I also came across some caring interlocutors, in particular Charles Duchaine, Nicolas Bessone, Solange Moracchini, Ursula Toettel, Jose Daniel Baena Sanchez, Joan Queralt Domenech, Stephan Pruss, and Laura Requena Espada. In the United Kingdom, Stan Gilmour has been a constant and helpful listener and adviser. I also thank Tim Gray, Lewis Benjamin, and Jon Murray, who made time for me. I thank Simon Erkins (Fladgate LLP) for his legal advice and Felicity McMahon for her thorough libel read of my text.

The last twenty-four years has seen a new wave of antimafia activism, especially in relation to the Camorra, where everyone is an expert. I rarely came across antimafia protagonists but I do know of silent heroes: the hardworking antimafia judges, the busy flying squad and conscientious Guardia di Finanza in Naples who work body and soul to fight the Camorra, often with few resources. Sincere thanks to them and their staff: Sergio Amato, Federico Cafiero de Raho, Stefania Castaldi, Luigi Alberto Cannavale, Rosario Cantelmo, Rosamaria D’Antonio, Marco Del Gaudio, Michele Del Prete, Vincenzo D’Onofrio, Pierpaolo Filippelli, Fulvio Filocamo, Luigi Landolfi, Piero Lupi, Raffaello Magi, Paolo Mancuso, Catello Maresca, Alessandro Pennasilico, Vittorio Pisani, Barbara Sargente, Luca Semeraro, Maurizio Vallone and Mariella Vecchi.The time they gave me and the discussions we had have been invaluable in helping me to understand different aspects of this criminal phenomenon. I also thank the five state witnesses who agreed to be interviewed by me in Italy. Their time and clarifications helped me in my thinking process.

Armando D’Alterio and Franco Roberti have always answered my questions with care and attention, and I thank them very much for their time. Special mention also of Carmine Iuliano, Sergio Bergamasco, Emilio Fiora, and Tommaso Solazzo, who were helpful, kind, and attentive to my nonstop barrage of questions. There are also two passionate unassuming judges whose constant professionalism and great dedication I came to admire. Their encouragement during this research was invaluable. I thank Giuseppe Borrelli, whose time and documents were invaluable at critical junctures, and Filippo Beatrice, whose interest, enthusiasm, and critical observations kept me on my toes. Because of him I was able to make my own sense of it all and walk alone; without him the project would have been much more problematic and challenging than it already was … thank you. Colleagues, friends, and family have provided time, support, and laughs along the way: Susan Carrée, Isaia Sales, Alan Pearce, Marisa Iorio, Annarita Criscitiello, Luigi di Prisco, Katrina and Mike Sartorius, Justine Wittenberger, and Rex Jackson-Coombs. I also thank Anna Hamilton, Aviva Mirels, Mario Lauria, and Antonella Giustino, but more specifically, Fabrice Allum and Andrea Lauria who helped me escape from my traveling camorristi, from time to time, by taking me to watch Reading, l’ Olympique de Marseille, and S.S.C Napoli play football. My deepest thanks to my parents and Matilde Lauria for their constant support and love.

Alessandro Colletti has been a reliable friend who always responded to my requests. I am extremely grateful to him for all his help and that of Gianna Caratelli, who produced the social network graphs in his book.

Adele Lauria and Julia Molinari have in different ways kept me going and feeling positive in moments of self-doubt: Adele, on my many trips to Naples, where she looked after me and my girls; Julia during our many summers on the beach discussing academic English, qualitative methodologies, and the psychology of traveling camorristi.

Some of my ideas have been presented in earlier publications: Italian Organized Crime in the UK, Policing 6, no. 4 (2012): 354–359; Italian Organized Crime in the UK: Continuing the Debate, Policing 7, no. 2 (2013): 227–232; Understanding Criminal Mobility: The Case of the Neapolitan Camorra, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 19, no. 5 (2014): 583–602.

I thank Roger Haydon for believing in this project and Emily Powers, Karen Laun, and Susan C. Barnett for being so efficient. I would also like to thank Mary Petrusewicz for her sterling editorial work and rendering my text readable.

Lastly, I thank Mimi, Ami, and Stasha for their patience, support, and love over the last five years. In particular, Mimi and Ami for indulging me in my relationship with Naples, the Camorra, and Italy. They too have become mafia experts and, aged eleven and nine, they can explain the Camorra to anyone. Thanks to Stasha for just being there.

Since this text analyzes what appears to be criminal behavior, I have sought to change names and identities and used initials to designate certain individuals in order to tell their story. It is in no way my intention to harm the reputation or accuse individuals of criminal behavior, rather it is to tell the story of various Camorra clans and their presence and activities in Europe. It would have been easier to systematically change all the names of clans and individuals and would have given me greater freedom to tell their stories. But I decided against this approach because I hope that this analysis will contribute to the historical understanding of Camorra clans in Naples, Campania, and Europe. All the individuals referred to in this text as criminals have been convicted in the first instance, primo grado, by the Italian judicial system. However, in many cases their final appeals have not yet been heard and so their convictions have not yet been confirmed at the highest level, terzo grado, and therefore, they must be considered innocent.

In addition, please note that the use of the term accomplice is to be understood in a more academic sense rather than implying blameworthy (and potentially criminal) conduct. In other words, by accomplices, I am interested in identifying the type of people who offer help to clans and the nature of this assistance. This has been defined as complicit, collusive, and compenetrative (Sciarrone, 2014). It varies in shape and form and is still relatively understudied. In this book, it is about what they could have exchanged with clans and the nature of that relationship, it is not about implying blame but understanding the general dynamics, if there are any. In other words, in this book, individuals’ involvement or contact with camorristi and their associates does not necessarily imply guilt and should not do so. I have made my best endeavor to ensure that all ethical guidelines were respected and that URLs for external websites are correct and active at the time of going to press. A note about translations: all foreign-language texts have been translated by the author and double-checked by a qualified translator. The approximate currency exchange rates during the time of my research were as follows: 1 dollar: 1,500–1,800 lire, 1 pound sterling: 1,784–3,115 lire, 1 dollar: 1.220–0.6254 euros, 1 pound sterling: 1.7510–1.0219 euros. For lire these are the minimum and maximum values of the exchange rate between 1980 and 2000; for euros these are the minimum and maximum values of the exchange rate between 2000 and 2013.






The Camorra is a puzzle and should be studied as such.

It is a line that cuts through us at times without us even noticing (FB)

When the sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh hung out with members of the Black Kings street gang from the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago during the 1990s, he knew he was frequenting some of the most deprived parts of the city where gang members controlled many illegal deals and scams: extortion, gambling, prostitution, selling stolen property, and countless other activities. It was clear outlaw capitalism (2008:37).

However, if he had hung around Nunzio De Falco or Michele Zaza during the late 1980s when they lived in Spain and France, he would not have realized who they were. On the face of it, they were respectable, law-abiding citizens. Nunzio came from the Casertano region and lived in the north of Italy near Como for many years; he moved to Granada in the south of Spain in 1986.¹ There, he became the manager of an Italian restaurant, lived in a villa on via Pedro Antonio Alarcon, and had many friends among the immigrant Italian community. Michele and his family moved to Villeneuve-Loubet, near Nice, in the south of France, in 1988.² There, he was a retired businessman who enjoyed his fortune and visited many French and Italian friends. On closer inspection, however, these Neapolitans were not the hardworking Italian immigrants or cosmopolitan businessmen they might first appear to be. They were in fact alleged bosses of the Neapolitan Mafia, the Camorra, who had moved to Europe and were continuing their criminal activities in a new setting. But is this proof of the criminal migration of the Camorra?

By February 1992, alarm bells had started to ring. The Italian national police directorate, Criminalpol, had already acknowledged the existence of Camorra groups abroad, some of whom engaged in drug trafficking and money laundering, and now started to draw attention to the fact that they were expanding across borders. France, the United Kingdom, Austria, Portugal, Holland, and even Scotland were all identified as host countries where drugs and recycling [of money] also signify the need to reinvest capital and have unsuspecting front names: pizzerias, restaurants, pubs, clothes shops, and where there was an attempt to infiltrate the economy and business at other levels.³

In 1993, the Italian Ministry of the Interior elaborated on Camorra expansion across borders, noting that drug-trafficking Camorra groups had specialized in large-scale money laundering activities and had chosen European regions with a high circulation of capital as their operating bases (for example, Switzerland and the Côte d’Azur). The Ministry highlighted a more recent phenomenon, the implantation of new Camorra settlements in Europe (MI1: 291). In 1994, it made a distinction between Western Europe, with its drug-trafficking routes, and Eastern Europe, where the Camorra’s occupation of illegal markets … (in particular in the Czech Republic) tends to assume features of criminal ‘colonization,’ developing not only illegal traffics but also controlling prostitution and the sale of counterfeit goods (MI2: 109).

More than twenty years later, the true extent of the Camorra’s presence in Europe is still unclear. Has there been a much feared ‘mafia-on-the-march’? Are there more than just thinly spread mafia-bridgeheads (Van Duyne, 1997: 202) in Europe? Paoli and Fijnaut in 2006 argued that the fear of the expansion of the Italian mafia to the whole of Europe and its becoming a model for others … [has] proved to be unfounded (304). They believed that Italian mafia groups may have representatives and, less often, branches only in those countries—Germany, Belgium and France—that attracted consistent migration flows from southern Italy since at least the 1950s. In no European country except Italy—nor in northern or central Italy itself—do Italian mafia groups control a significant portion of local illegal economies or exercise a systematic influence over the legal economy or political system (305). They concluded that Italian mafias had not infiltrated civil society, the economy, or political systems beyond southern Italy.

Today there is evidence to suggest that during the postwar period, Italian mafias have moved out of their territory of origin, even the Camorra (see Sciarrone, 2014). In the 1980s, the boss Antonio Bardellino was believed to be living in Brazil. In December 2006, the French daily Libération reported that ninety drug traffickers had been arrested across Europe: According to Madrid, this network’s principal aim was to supply clans trafficking in Italy and was composed of representatives of the most important Neapolitan clans, Colombians, Spaniards, Marseillais, and Bulgarians. The operation recovered more than six tons of hashish and one ton of cocaine.

In 2011, a European Parliament report suggested that transnational organised crime in Europe is not the expression of the transplantation of foreign mafias (EP1: 14). It argued that it is not because a diaspora exists in a country that this diaspora will automatically serve as ‘soldiers of crime’ of a mafia and it is not because drug trafficking exists that we can infer a mafia exists (15). It concluded that the evidence suggests that the migration of some mafia-type groups can take place, but that it is rare and highly localised (14; my emphasis). The academic literature has also analyzed the presence of the mafias abroad, labeling it diffusion and contagion (Sciarrone, 1998), colonization (Massari, 2001: 15), entrenchment and expansion (Armao, 2003), transplantation and expansion (Varese, 2011), cosmopolitanism and not localization or immobility (Morselli, Turcotte, and Tenti, 2011), functional diversification (Campana, 2011), settlement-infiltration-imitation-hybridisation of Italian mafias (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014), and criminal expatriates (Soudijn and Huisman, 2010). But are these terms helpful in explaining the Camorra’s migration in Europe?

The main focus of this book is to examine the so-called criminal migration of the Neapolitan Camorra. What exactly does the Camorra look like when it moves abroad? How do camorristi behave? Do they move abroad because they want to become legitimate or do they play a waiting game until it is safe to return home? What illegal and legal activities are they involved in? What tactics do they employ?

I answer these questions by presenting original research on the presence of camorristi in Europe. I analyze and compare the behavior of various types of camorristi who travel abroad and I touch on the nature of this movement: the organizational structures, members, strategies, activities, roles of women, and relationships with other criminal groups; the support systems that clans develop; and finally, the international response to this transnational phenomenon.

This study is located in political sociology and a wider multidisciplinary context where I seek to examine the local and global dynamics of criminal migration. I have three aims: First, to analyze why, how, and what Camorra clans, associates, and camorristi have been doing when they move to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain between 1980 and 2015.⁵ Second, to explain the nature of the Camorra’s mobility between Naples and Europe. Lastly, to emphasize the complexity of the phenomenon and the apparent lack of information about Italian mafias abroad, which often lead to exaggeration or underestimation by the authorities and the media.

Roberto Saviano in his novel Gomorrah (2008) gave the Neapolitan Camorra international recognition as a mafia to be reckoned with. Previously, it had lived in the shadows of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the ferocious Calabrian ’Ndrangheta. The Camorra is the third-largest Italian mafia and is predominately active in Naples and the Campania region. A mafia⁶ can be defined as a criminal association interested in social, economic, and political power. It combines elements of both a traditional secret society and an efficient business (Sciarrone, 1998), which makes it difficult to define and explain.

The secret-society dimension lies in the way clans seek physical control over their local territory, developing a criminal ideology by exploiting cultural values (including violence) and using their social capital for their moneymaking agenda. They establish a clearly defined Camorra value system, which must be respected and they seek to govern civil society, the local economy, and the political system. The business dimension is observable in the Camorra’s organizational structure as an enterprise that allows it to operate in legal and illegal markets (see Sciarrone, 1998; 2014). In the words of Paoli, mafias are functionally diffuse entities (2003: 143) because they have social, economic, and political power.

The term Camorra is the specific label given to describe the many different Neapolitan criminal families, clans, alliances, and confederations active in Naples and Campania (Sales, 1988). In 2010, it was believed that there were roughly 32 clans in the city, and 45 in the province of Naples (QN13). In 2014, it was estimated that there were over 160 clans in Campania⁷, with over 50 clans in Naples city alone (DIAc: 102–126⁸).

A brief history shows how the Camorra differs from the other two mafias in its origins, historical development, and organizational structures, but resembles them in its criminal activities and its relationship with civil society, the legitimate economy, and politicians. In the postwar period, the Camorra radically changed. Beginning in the 1950s, there were unsophisticated, arrogant, independent criminals, guappi, who commanded their city districts and in the hinterland there were agricultural mediators and cow thieves.⁹ By the 1990s, they had become efficient criminal entrepreneurs who were present both in the illegal and legal economies (see Sales, 1988; Behan, 1996; Allum, 2006). Today, the Camorra has become a powerful criminal force capable of controlling sectors of the European and Italian drug, counterfeit, cigarette, and waste-management markets as well as investing in many legitimate businesses in Naples, Italy, and Europe and winning many local and national public contracts.

The influence of the Sicilian Mafia has been fundamental in this economic transformation, but the Camorra has remained a visible, violent, and territorial criminal association, as several conflicts have demonstrated: from the first Camorra war (1978–1983) between Raffaele Cutolo’s Nuova Camorra Organizzata (NCO) and the Nuova Famiglia (NF), an alliance of Sicilian-sponsored criminal families¹⁰ (see CD1; Behan, 1996; Allum, 2006), to the more recent faida di Scampia (2004–2005) between the Di Lauro clan and the Amato-Pagano families, and in 2012–2013, the war between the followers of the Di Lauro clan and a splinter group, the Vanelli-Grassi group (i girati).¹¹

Today each clan is a small loyal family unit held together by its Camorra value system and a common fund that pays members a regular salary,¹² creates social cohesion, and supports a collective sense of identity and belonging. Each clan physically controls a specific local territory and, by doing so, governs the illegal and legal economic activities. To accomplish this, it seeks relations with local businessmen and politicians and alliances with other rival clans to guarantee complete hegemony over its territory. Clans are by nature territorial and have deeply embedded roots in the local community, which produces their inherent strength and power base.

Compared with Cosa Nostra and the ’Ndrangheta, the Camorra has always been considered less dangerous because it is more visible, territorial, and amateurish. Indeed, the Sicilian state witness Tommaso Buscetta once remarked, the Camorra, I don’t even want to talk about it, I don’t deal with buffoons who are so stupid they even enrol policemen (Falcone and Padovani, 1993: 99).

And yet when camorristi move abroad, things change: they become less attached to a specific territory and focus purely on economic activities. They do not migrate as clans but as individuals who manage to camouflage (Beatrice, 2009: 478) themselves so efficiently that it becomes difficult to recognize them as a threat to foreign societies and economies. In our changing globalized world, where trade, travel, and communication are based on velocity and borders dissolve, nation-states are having trouble keeping up with the growing internationalization of people’s lives and businesses. As a result, legal, judicial, and police loopholes, financial gaps, and loose international communities appear that are being exploited by skillful mafia groups.

The danger may not be as visible as violent mafia murders, frenzied shoot-outs, and puddles of blood on the pavement, but the virtual invisibility of camorristi stems from their capacity to hide their origin and invest their illegal cash in legal European economies. Their presence abroad distorts national economies and legitimizes their native criminal activities without their being identified by European authorities for who and what they are. Camouflage allows these camorristi to exploit and manipulate the existing differences between countries, systems, and cultures in the new global economy. As Robinson pointed out, criminals create wealth by purposely functioning beyond sovereign reach (2000: 18).

Franco Roberti, Italy’s chief antimafia prosecutor, has always insisted that in order to understand the Camorra today, it is fundamental to analyze the link that clans cultivate between the global and the local, as it is this which expresses the true face of the modern Camorra (2012: 241). An analysis of that relationship structures this book and explains why my approach encompasses Camorra activities both local and global.

My analysis is based on the notion of globalization and the interdependency it creates. The era of modernity¹³ we live in is inherently globalising and universalising, writes Giddens (1990: 63, 175), who goes on to define the term globalisation as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (64).

The world has become a smaller place. Modernity and globalization have introduced changes that have increased opportunities for citizens to improve their lives. But a darker, more somber and obscure side has also multiplied the opportunities for skillful businessmen and criminals. Within this context, the Schengen agreement, the single currency, sophisticated technology, cheap travel, flexible banking regulations, a market for luxury goods at cheap prices, and a demand for drugs are all transformations that have created a greater interdependency—an interdependency that the Camorra exploits.

Three recurring notions encapsulate the Camorra’s main features abroad: functionality, liquidity, and invisibility. These three concepts, which I analyze throughout this book, highlight how, within the context of globalization,¹⁴ the Camorra has had the capacity to learn, adapt, and manipulate situations to its advantage. The Camorra does not migrate unchanged, but becomes functional, liquid, and invisible abroad. As I discovered, its structures, values, and tactics depend on its location and markets. But the link, the umbilical cord (Bianchi and Rio, 2013: 26¹⁵), between Naples and these new territories remains fixed at all times, there are no peripheral branches or independent enterprises abroad. In simple terms, clans outside Naples, rather than migrating and becoming independent, interconnect their territories in a functional cycle. Like many international organizations, there exists a great interdependency between territories.

Let me preview some of my findings to explain what I have identified. First, the motives for the movement of Camorra bosses and their top associates¹⁶ were never purely economic. My findings confirm the main literature in this area showing clear common push and pull factors (Sciarrone, 1998; 2014; Varese, 2011). However, I did observe a hierarchy in the importance of pull factors. The presence of an immigrant community or friends living abroad determines the initial choice of location. This is very different from other criminal groups, such as Albanian organized crime members, who do not move as active criminal entrepreneurs but develop into them once they are in a new setting (see Arsovska, 2015).

Second, clans have different configurations depending on their setting, while retaining the same overarching organization. It is not the activities that radically change but the internal organizational structures and behavior. Apart from extortion rackets, reserved so far exclusively for their local territory, the majority of Camorra activities are a continuation of their illegal Neapolitan operations. Camorra clans might be compared with multinational corporations or NGOs because of their extensive international presence, but they cannot be compared in terms of organizational structures and operational strategies.

In Naples, the Camorra is a family crime enterprise; in Europe it extends and becomes a network enterprise (Castells, 2000a: 171). Its presence reflects its interaction with its new environment: a context of light capitalism (Bauman, 2000: 126) that transforms it into an invisible liquid.¹⁷ For example, the Piccirillo clan was compact in Naples, whereas in England it became a loose team. The same can be said of the larger Nuvoletta, Polverino, and Amato-Pagano clans in Spain: same clan, different internal organizational structures.

Abroad, clans become pragmatic and mobile network enterprises. They adopt fluid network enterprise structures, have volatile identities, and functional and disengaged values that focus on precise economic strategies in relation to their activities and needs at home. For example, there is no need for one hierarchical leader, but rather a group of councilors who make decisions, and its business logic is based on profit maximization, rational calculations, short-termism, and a quick turnover of personnel. Clans are no longer interested in the means (violence, intimidation, extortion), but rather in the ends, seeking profit at all cost. This produces flexible, fluid, and adaptable operational structures.

Visible power and territorial control become less vital because for all practical purposes, power has become truly extraterritorial, no longer bound, not even slowed down, by the resistance of space (Bauman, 2000: 11). The Camorra is unpredictable and moves following different paths … seeking only to make money, without losing time to think about the modalities to adopt (FB). This method of operation is different from other organized crime groups such as the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta and Chinese groups. To colonize a territory would imply capital-intensive, cumbersome and unprofitable chores of administration and policing, responsibilities, commitments—and, above all, cast considerable constraint on one’s future freedom to move (Bauman, 2000: 188).

The Camorra’s family crime enterprise becomes a network enterprise abroad; thus they are the same overarching organization with different internal operational structures. However, this network abroad cannot be analyzed as a Camorra franchise, an off-shoot, or a semi-independent branch reproducing traditional Camorra activities and behavior such as extortion rackets or intimidation. No clan has set up its own headquarters abroad, cutting itself off completely from its Neapolitan home territory and recruiting foreigners. Camorristi abroad are an extension of the Neapolitan operation, not an unimportant periphery or merely criminal expatriates (Soudijn and Huisman, 2010). They should be analyzed as fully integrated bases involved in the necessary economic and criminal activities of their clan in Naples. In addition, no independent Camorra branch exists that motivates Neapolitan criminals to leave Naples,¹⁸ nor are there yet second-generation Neapolitans being raised abroad who become camorristi.¹⁹ The interdependency of territories is the new dimension I identified and is indispensable to our understanding of the Camorra abroad.

Third, rather than criminal migration, Camorra clans do something different. By moving abroad, they engage in a form of continuous mobility between their territories without establishing constrained settlements or moving away permanently, as criminal expatriates may do. I call this functional mobility because clans develop their criminal activities by connecting their center of operations, Naples, the casa madre, with different territories in a regular and functional commercial cycle. There is a clear interdependence between territories connected by fluid organizational structures. The pentito Michele Siciliano described this as a continuous loop (MS) between home and host territories where there was a feedback effect: an ongoing, two-way, reciprocal exchange of members, goods, and money between Camorra territories. In this way, clans connect their territories functionally as opposed to one-way expansionist mobility. They seek not to deplete the new territory of its resources but to set up a continuous two-way functional exchange for the long-term benefit of the clan. The host territory is used for the functional needs of the clan in Naples.

Lastly, for Camorra clans to have a persistent presence abroad they need to have at their disposal accomplices, professional facilitators, and enablers.²⁰ They form part of a gray undefined zone because to take advantage of the Camorra means to belong to the Camorra (LGv, 19/3/2003: 40). This support system in situ is quasi-invisible, undertakes a multitude of jobs, and