Napoleon and his Family: The Story of a Corsican Clan, Vol III

This edition is published by FRIEDLAND BOOKS – www.pp-publishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – friedlandbooks@gmail.com

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 1929 under the same title.

© Friedland Books 2017, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

NAPOLEON AND HIS FAMILY

The Story of a Corsican Clan

by

WALTER GEER

Vol. III — MOSCOW-ST. HELENA — 1813-1821

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

ILLUSTRATIONS 7

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE: JANUARY-DECEMBER 1813 8

THE CAMPAIGN OF SAXONY 8

CHAPTER FIFTY: DECEMBER 1812–NOVEMBER 1813 19

THE KINGS DETHRONED 19

CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE: APRIL 1813–JANUARY 1814 30

THE KINGS IN FRANCE 30

CHAPTER FIFTY-TWO—JANUARY-DECEMBER 1813 41

LAST YEAR OF THE EMPIRE 41

CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE: JANUARY 1813–JANUARY 1814 49

THE DEFECTION OF MURAT 49

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR: JANUARY-MAY 1814 60

END OF MURAT’S DREAM 60

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE: JANUARY-APRIL 1814 68

THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE 68

CHAPTER FIFTY-SIX: MARCH-MAY 1814 80

THE FAMILY DISPERSED 80

CHAPTER FIFTY-SEVEN: APRIL 1814–MARCH 1815 90

HORTENSE AND EUGENE 90

CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT: MAY-DECEMBER 1814 100

THE FAMILY IN EXILE 100

CHAPTER FIFTY-NINE: MAY 1814–FEBRUARY 1815 109

NAPOLEON AT ELBA 109

CHAPTER SIXTY: 26 FEBRUARY–20 MARCH 1815 119

THE FLIGHT OF THE EAGLE 119

CHAPTER SIXTY-ONE: MARCH-JUNE 1815 130

THE HUNDRED DAYS 130

CHAPTER SIXTY-TWO: JUNE 1815 140

THE ENIGMA OF WATERLOO 140

CHAPTER SIXTY-THREE: MARCH-JUNE 1815 154

THE FAMILY AT PARIS 154

CHAPTER SIXTY-FOUR: 20 JUNE-15 JULY 1815 162

THE SECOND ABDICATION 162

CHAPTER SIXTY-FIVE: JUNE 1815–JULY 1844 174

JOSEPH AND JULIE 174

CHAPTER SIXTY-SIX: 1815-1846 180

THE ETERNAL CITY 180

CHAPTER SIXTY-SEVEN: 1815-1860 188

THE AUSTRIAN GROUP 188

CHAPTER SIXTY-EIGHT: 1815-1837 195

HORTENSE IN SWITZERLAND 195

CHAPTER SIXTY-NINE: JULY 1815–MAY 1821 207

THE TRAGEDY OF SAINT HELENA 207

CHAPTER SEVENTY: MAY 1821–DECEMBER 1840 225

AFTER THE CURTAIN 225

EPILOGUE: 1769-1821 239

THE PERSONALITY OF NAPOLEON 239

I — THE LEGISLATOR 239

II — THE WORKER 251

III — THE MAN 263

APPENDIX 278

A—Bassano to Reinhard 279

B—Jérôme to the King of Württemberg 279

C—Joseph to Napoleon 279

D—Joseph to Napoleon 280

E—Napoleon to Joseph 280

F—Joseph to Napoleon 280

G—Louis to Napoleon 281

H—Napoleon to Louis 281

I—Madame Mère to Louis 282

K—Louis to Madame Mère 282

L—Louis to Caulaincourt 282

M—THE MAUBREUIL AFFAIR 283

N—JOSÉPHINE’S ESTATE 284

O—HEALTH OF NAPOLEON DURING THE HUNDRED DAYS 284

P—A PLOT TO RESCUE NAPOLEON 287

Q—AGREEMENT WITH DR. STOKOE 289

R—NAPOLEON’S WILL 290

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 293

ILLUSTRATIONS

Napoleon—1814

Duroc, Duc de Frioul

Pope Pius VII

Prince de Talleyrand-Périgord

Cardinal Fesch

Augusta of Bavaria

Fouché, Duc d’Otrante

Comte Bertrand

Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence

Félix Bacciochi

Eugène de Beauharnais

Saint Helena (relief map)

Longwood (view)

Last Days of Napoleon

Facsimile of Napoleon’s Will

Berthier, Prince de Neuchâtel

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE: JANUARY-DECEMBER 1813

THE CAMPAIGN OF SAXONY

Napoleon Recovers His Energy—His Prodigious Labors—Court Life Resumed—Efforts to Save the Dynasty—Plans for a Regency—Attempts to Placate the Pope—Visit to Fontainebleau—A New Concordat Signed—Pius Breaks the Agreement—The Empress Made Regent—Opening of the Campaign—False Reports Regarding the Emperor—Napoleon’s Growing Weakness—Indecisive Victory at Dresden—Napoleon’s Illness—Its Deplorable Consequences—Fruits of the Victory Lost—Discouragement of the Emperor—His Fatal Tarry at Dresden—His Torpor before Leipzig—Return of the Mysterious Malady—Caulaincourt’s Vivid Narrative—The French Army Overwhelmed—Napoleon Returns to Paris—Hostility of Public Opinion.

ALTHOUGH Napoleon may have shown signs of mental and physical prostration during the Campaign of Russia, he had entirely recovered his energy when he reached Paris on the 18 December. At no epoch in his later career, except perhaps during the Campaign of France, in 1814, did he display more activity than at the close of this year of 1812, and during the first months of 1813: never were manifested more strongly his prodigious power of work, his faculties of organization,—his genius, in a word. Besides dictating a hundred letters every day, he saw all of his ministers, received their reports, and gave them his orders, not only for the measures of national defence, but for the most delicate questions of internal policy. The day following his arrival at the Tuileries, he worked with Cambacérès, Savary, and Clarke, without intermission, from nine o’clock in the morning until long after midnight. During the first week, besides presiding over the daily meetings of the Council of State, he held a grand review of 40,000 men in the court of the Tuileries; visited the annual Salon in the Louvre; hunted twice, in the parks of Marly and of Versailles; and held two large receptions in the Throne Room of the Château.

Etiquette at once resumed its full sway; the mode of life of the sovereigns and of the Court was precisely the same as in previous winters: on Sundays, there was the usual diplomatic audience before the Mass, the grand reception afterwards, and the regular family dinner in the evening. The Emperor hunted frequently, not only to keep himself in good physical condition, but also to give the lie to the reports in the English papers, which from day to day announced his declining health, and approaching death. To read the statements in the Parisian journals at the same time, no one would imagine that there were no longer any French armies beyond the Elbe, or that the Allies were preparing to invade the Empire.

During the first weeks following his return to Paris, Napoleon gave much time and thought to measures to assure the future of his dynasty. The Malet conspiracy,{1} based upon the false reports of his death, had been sufficient to reveal the structural weakness of the Imperial edifice. His first formal declaration, in his address to the Senate two days after his return, was all consecrated to this subject:

The glory and the power of France, he said, "are close to my heart; but my first thoughts are for that which can perpetuate internal tranquillity and render my people immune from the strife of factions and the horrors of anarchy. It is against these foes of popular welfare that I have founded, with the will and the love of the French, this throne to which are now linked the destinies of the Fatherland.…Our fathers had for a rallying cry: Le Roi est mort, Vive le Roi! These few words sum up the principal advantages of the Monarchy."

In this statement he strikes the key-note of his future program. When the Malet conspirators announced the death of the Emperor, not a voice in Paris was raised to cry: Vive l’Empereur! No one had thought of his son, the King of Rome. All of his efforts to insure the perpetuity of his dynasty had been in vain: the painful sacrifice of Joséphine, the Austrian marriage, the birth of an heir to his throne.

Up to this time, the Empress Marie-Louise had had no more part in the government than the Empress Joséphine. He now decided to bring the Empress out of her seclusion, have her invested with the regency, and have his son solemnly crowned as the heir to the throne. Within three days after his return, he ordered made a thorough research of French history, since the reign of Charlemagne, for the records of the coronations of heirs to the throne, and of the appointments of regents. These reports were printed in small brochures, for the benefit of the principal dignitaries of the Empire, and were later published in the two official journals, for the information of the general public.

The most important step of all, however, was to effect a reconciliation with Pius the Seventh, and persuade the Supreme Pontiff to issue from his captivity to crown the Empress and the King of Rome at Notre-Dame. This ceremony, Napoleon believed, would consecrate his dynasty in the eyes of all Europe, and assure tranquillity at home as well as peace abroad.

When Napoleon took possession of the Papal States, Pius had gone to Savona to live; but, prior to the Russian campaign, the Emperor had ordered him removed to Fontainebleau, on the pretext that he was in danger of falling into the hands of the English, whose ships were cruising off Genoa.{2}

Since his excommunication by the Pope, three years before, Napoleon had had no correspondence with Pius; but he now took the first step toward a reconciliation by writing the Holy Father, on the 29 December: Perhaps we may be able to attain the object so much to be desired of putting an end to the differences which divide the Church and the State; for my part, I am very favorably disposed, and it will all depend upon Your Holiness.

The Pope responded by sending Cardinal Doria to see the Emperor, and Napoleon followed the matter up by despatching to Fontainebleau Mgr. Duvoisin, the Bishop of Nantes, who reported that the outlook was very favorable. Then, on the 19 January, after a visit to Marshal Berthier, for a hunting party at Grosbois, the Emperor suddenly decided to go himself to Fontainebleau. This move seems to have been made on the spur of the moment, for no relays of horses had been ordered, and no preparations had been made at the Château, where most of the rooms were closed for the winter.

No one had any idea of the real objects of Napoleon’s visit, not even Marie-Louise whom he brought with him. His great desire for a reconciliation with the Papacy is shown by the extreme concessions which he made, amounting to a complete reversal of his former policy, and the restoration to the Pope of his previous rights and privileges as the Supreme Pontiff. The new Concordat{3} was signed on the 25 January; and two days later the Emperor returned with Marie-Louise to Paris, well satisfied with the success of his mission.

The date of the Coronation was set for the 7 March, and all of the allies and vassals of the Emperor were informally invited to be present; but the announcement was not made official, as Napoleon had already received warnings which made him hesitate. The Italian cardinals, who were included in the amnesty, on rejoining the Pope had regained their influence over him, and he was wavering. It was therefore necessary to act prudently.

The text of the Concordat was finally published in the Moniteur on the 14 February, the day that the Emperor opened the session of the Corps Législatif; but he did not venture in his address to make any allusion to the Coronation.

On the 23 March, it was formally announced that the ceremony was postponed, on account of the imminence of the war; and the following day, in a letter to the Emperor, the Pope withdrew his approval of the Concordat.{4}

But the matter had gone too far for Napoleon to abandon entirely his projects; and, on the 30 March, Marie-Louise was invested with the title of Regent at a kind of fête of the Court held at the Élysée. No one was present except the members of the Imperial family then in Paris, the ministers, and the grand dignitaries of the Empire. Such was the feeble outcome of the grandiose scheme which had so largely occupied the mind of the Emperor since his return. Instead of the solemn ceremony at Notre-Dame, which was to have rivalled the Coronation, Marie-Louise took an oath to carry out faithfully the orders which the Emperor might give her during his absence. In place of an altar, writes M. Masson, there was a green carpet; in place of a nation, a Court; in place of the Army, half a score of women in evening gowns!{5}

The first week in March, Marie-Louise had persuaded the Emperor to move to the Trianon, where she always preferred to reside. The party was a small one, comprising, among others, Duroc, Caulaincourt, Hortense, and Catherine. There were no entertainments of any kind, and the palace had never been so sad and quiet. The Emperor dined when he found time, often not before eight o’clock, and then, overcome with fatigue, dragged his wife off to bed at nine. On the 23 March they returned to the Tuileries, for the close of the session of the Corps Législatif, but went a few days later to the Élysée, where the Emperor could work more quietly, and could also secure a little exercise by promenades in the gardens.

At four o’clock on the morning of the 15 April, Napoleon left Saint-Cloud to put himself at the head of the Grand Army. By almost superhuman efforts, during the winter of 1813, he had raised, armed, and equipped a new force of 360,000 men. The nucleus of his army consisted of 30,000 veteran troops withdrawn from Spain, with the addition of 80,000 men enlisted as a Home Guard in 1812, and 250,000 young conscripts. With this motley force, on the second day of May he defeated the Allies at Lützen; on the 8th, he entered Dresden as a victor, and Saxony returned to her alliance with him. On the 20-21 May, he again defeated the enemy at Bautzen; but neither of these battles was decisive, as the Emperor did not have the cavalry to follow them up.

On the first day of the battle of Bautzen, the grand marshal, Duroc, received his death-wound almost by the side of Napoleon. His body was taken to Dresden, where the journey of the cortege through the city gave rise to rumors that Napoleon had returned, seriously wounded, and that the matter was hushed up so as not to alarm his troops. Crowds gathered in the streets to watch the least ray of light in the windows of that part of the Château which he had previously occupied. When Napoleon finally returned to Dresden, at five o’clock on the morning of the 10 June, there were persons who declared, with the greatest assurance, that he was replaced in his carriage by a wax manikin! As the arrival of the Emperor was not announced until some hours later, by salvos of artillery and the ringing of bells, these stories, for the moment, were credited by many persons.{6}

The truth is, that Napoleon went to bed on his arrival, as he had not slept well for several nights. His lever was held at ten o’clock; and at noon he received the King of Saxony. The following day, the lever was at nine, and at ten o’clock, Napoleon, on horseback, reviewed his troops in the large field of Dresden, the Ostrawiese: even the most skeptical were then forced to admit that he was not in the last extremity!{7}

During this campaign, Napoleon no longer displayed the activity of Austerlitz, Jena, and Eckmühl. He had begun to feel the inroads of age: Time had not been kind to this superman, who, in forty years, had lived several human existences. His suite had not failed to remark that he was more and more subject to attacks of overpowering somnolence; and that, if his mind retained its lucidity, his force of will declined. Heedless, and fearful of fatigue, writes Marmont; blasé above all; indifferent to everything; no longer believing the truth unless it was in accord with his passions, his interests, or his caprices; with a Satanic pride, and a great disdain for men, his mind was still the same—the most vast, the most extended, the most profound, the most productive that ever existed; but without willpower, without decision, and with an instability which resembled weakness.{8}

This weakness became more and more manifest during the final months of 1813. The victory of Dresden, on the 27 August, was the last of Napoleon’s great successes; but a sudden indisposition robbed him of the fruits of this fine feat of arms.

The operations around Dresden took place under a driving rain; and Napoleon, like everyone else, was drenched to the skin. The Emperor returned to the city, his valet de chambre relates, in a terrible state, his clothing wet through, his castor hat drooping upon his shoulders, his boots full of water, and he himself shaking with fever. He was put to bed, and later in his bath, where he had an attack of nausea.

It appears that, in going to Pirna with his troops, in pursuit of the vanquished enemy, Napoleon had an attack of stomach trouble. He was then urged by some of his staff to abandon the pursuit, and return to Dresden. Through articles which have been published in recent years, we know today, in the fullest details, what followed:

Daru, who was a member of the Imperial general-staff, writes M. de Pasquier,{9} by some accident found himself about a league in the rear of the head of the pursuing column. As he rode to the front, he was surprised to meet the Emperor retracing his steps toward Dresden. None of the officers whom Daru questioned was able to give any explanation of the reasons for so sudden a change in Napoleon’s plans. Two days later, on his return to headquarters, Daru heard that there were grievous reports in circulation regarding the corps of Vandamme. When he entered the Emperor’s cabinet, he at once inquired of Napoleon what he was to believe. Everything that is most sinister, was the reply; the corps is destroyed, and my Bohemian expedition has become impossible.

Then Napoleon explained his abandonment of the pursuit by stating that, during the march, he had been attacked by such violent pains in his abdomen that it was impossible for him to proceed, and that he was forced to return to the rear. However, he added, it was no more than an indisposition caused by a wretched ragout, in which they had put some garlic, which I can never endure; but I had reason to believe that the trouble was more grave. In reality, the Emperor feared that he had been poisoned, and this was the reason that he yielded to the importunities of the officers of his staff.{10}

There was lack of concord in the advice given the Emperor by his entourage: while Caulaincourt urged him to return to Dresden, other general officers favored Pirna, only a league distant; the Young Guard was already there, and from that point the Emperor, while finding the repose of which he had need, could have controlled the movements of his troops to better advantage than at Dresden, situated at a greater distance from the operations.{11}

Napoleon therefore left to Mortier and Saint-Cyr the task of supporting Vandamme, who would never have taken such great chances except in the expectation of seeing the Emperor come to his aid.

The above reports are confirmed by an ardent Royalist, who was in the ranks of the Allies:

The next day, writes Comte de Rochechouart, torrents of rain, which will always be remembered by those who took part in the battle, began to fall, and lasted without intermission for three days. I do not give the strategical details of the second day, so unfortunate for the allied armies. Instead of the victory they had every reason to expect, they experienced a crushing defeat. We began that famous retreat which soon became a rout.…A few days later we learned the reason of the sudden check in the pursuit of our disorganized army. A violent attack of fever, brought on by a chill, had compelled Napoleon to return to Dresden instead of going on to Pirna. The absence of orders from French headquarters had prevented the advance, which might have been decisive. Vandamme alone went forward, believing he was supported, and he was crushed. Napoleon accustomed his generals too much to receive all of their orders from headquarters, and to have no initiative.{12}

The return of Napoleon to Dresden turned his brilliant victory into an indecisive action—the prelude to the catastrophe. From that time on, every chance became perversely against him; and we enter upon the history of this Campaign of Saxony, which tells only of reverses, during which the most consummate ability was paralyzed by the inevitable drawbacks of a position badly chosen at the outset, and which he obstinately continued to hold until the end.{13}

A very curious explanation of Napoleon’s decision to remain at Dresden is given by M. Pasquier.{14} After a conference with General Sébastiani, who reported to him that his officers were generally of the opinion that he must change his line of operations if Austria joined the Allies, the Emperor said: They are right, and my decision is made. I shall retire on the Saale; there I shall bring together nearly three hundred thousand men, and, with my rear based on Mayence, my right flank covered by the extremity of the Bohemian Mountains, I shall present to the enemy the bull’s horns.

Having dismissed the general, Napoleon sent for Daru, and directed him to prepare at once the orders for the retrograde movement. Unfortunately, at that moment Maret entered the Emperor’s cabinet, and said, in reply to Napoleon’s usual question, What are they saying?—They say that Your Majesty cannot remain here, but must take a position in the rear.…They forget that the great Frederick, with forces much inferior to your own, held out in this same position for a whole winter against the combined armies of Austria and of Russia.

This unfortunate appeal to Napoleon’s pride made a vivid impression on him, and led him to return to his original plan of operations. Talleyrand was quite right when he said: There is only one person more stupid than Monsieur Maret, and that is the Duc de Bassano!

At this time Napoleon was overcome by discouragement, and he began to lose his former faith in his star. Later, at Saint Helena, he said: The star grew pale; I felt the reins escape from my hand, and I could do nothing: a thunderclap alone could have saved us.…There was nothing to do except to fight, and every day, through one fatality or another, our chances grew less. Treason began to appear in our midst; the majority of my officers were overcome by fatigue or discouragement; my lieutenants became slack, gauche, unskillful, and consequently unfortunate: they were no longer the men of the early days of our Revolution, nor those of the moments of my success…The older generals were tired of war: I had gorged them with too much consideration, with too great wealth. They had drunk of the cup of pleasure: now they asked only for repose; they would have bought it at any price. The sacred fire was extinguished: they wanted to be marshals of Louis Quatorze.{15}

At that hour Napoleon must have recalled the words of the great Corneille:

"J’ai servi, commandé vaincu quarante années,

Du monde dans mes mains j’ai vu les destinées,

Et j’ai toujours connu qu’à chaque événement,

Les destins des États dépendaient d’un moment."{16}

The final weeks of the campaign of 1813 do not exhibit the great captain to advantage. Having undertaken a defensive, for the first time in his career, his efforts seem to have been paralyzed. To the admirers of his genius, it is amazing to see Napoleon moving all around Dresden without attacking the Allies seriously. He remained more than a month In the Saxon capital, almost inert; at most he held several reviews within a radius of four or five leagues from the city.{17}

In a Note on the General Situation of My Affairs, which Napoleon dictated on the 30 August, he reviews the military outlook. In this memorandum,{18} which has been a puzzle to strategical students ever since, he suddenly throws aside every principle which he had laid down and so often demonstrated in his brilliant career. Victory, he had said, belongs to the armies that manœuvre; again, the force of an army is in its mass multiplied by its speed; and neither of these maxims did he put into use.

On the 4 October, Napoleon again drew up a review of the situation in which he apparently seriously considered the impossible scheme of abandoning his communications with France and wintering in Dresden! Then he suddenly changed his plans completely, decided to give up his base at Dresden, and fall back on the Rhine. Having drawn up a brilliant program, in which one again recognizes the old commander, Napoleon once more became a prey to the most extraordinary irresolution, and remained inactive.

In the meantime, while the great captain waited and pondered, the Allies were employing against him his own methods. They had distinctly outmanœuvred him, and stood in full force upon his line of retreat. In this predicament, instead of trying to turn the enemy’s flank, so as to reach the Rhine, he decided to march on Leipzig, and accept battle there. It was a fatal error! In going to Leipzig, says Dodge, he deliberately committed strategic suicide. Any manœuvre was better.{19}

Napoleon finally left Dresden on the 7 October at six o’clock in the morning, and reached Düben on the 10th. He remained there two days, lodged in a small château. He passed most of his time, seated upon a sofa, tracing absent-mindedly capital letters upon sheets of paper, his mind undecided whether to march on Berlin or Leipzig. Meanwhile he paid no attention to the despatches which accumulated upon his table, and which remained without reply.{20}

A few days before the battle of Leipzig, Major Odeleben{21} saw the Emperor plunged in a kind of torpor: He was sad, uneasy, as if overcome by Fate;…he had not the strength to do anything. There was no movement in his antechamber, which formerly was so crowded. His usual assistants silently stood around him, vainly awaiting his commands.

On the first day of Leipzig (16 October), the brunt of the fighting took place around Wachau, about two miles and a half to the south-east of the city. Here Napoleon held his lines firmly; but, on the north, Blücher forced Ney and Marmont back to within a mile of the town. On the second day, rain fell without ceasing, and there was little fighting. The French lines were drawn back nearly a league, to a better position; but the Allies brought up large reinforcements, which gave them an overwhelming numerical advantage.

During the night of the 17th to the 18th, Napoleon had another return of his indisposition, which always came inopportunely, but this time above all. The scene, as related by the Duc de Vicence in his memoirs, is very dramatic:

The Emperor was prey to an extraordinary agitation. Every movement in the camp attracted his attention; his uneasiness became greater from moment to moment; his face was drawn, and of a livid pallor. Overcome by weakness, he dropped on a folding camp-chair, in the back of his tent. I feel sick, he said, placing his hand upon his abdomen; my head resists, my body succumbs.

Caulaincourt proposed to send for his surgeon, Yvan, who was always at his command, and who would hasten to his assistance.

I forbid you, Caulaincourt, cried the Emperor; the tent of a sovereign has the transparency of glass,…I must be up, in order that every one may remain at his post;…the enemy is there.

In vain the duc insisted; Sire, he said, grasping Napoleon’s burning hands, in the name of the safety of all, lie down, take some repose; I beg you, Sire!

But that cannot be.…It is impossible.…It is necessary for me to be up.

Sire, permit me to call Yvan.

No! I tell you. To a soldier who is ill, I order delivered a hospital-card;…who will give me the card of a poor soldier?

A groan issued from Napoleon’s chest, and his head fell on his breast. Never, writes Caulaincourt, "never will that scene be effaced from my memory."{22}

A moment later, the Emperor took the hand of his aide, which he pressed feebly. It will amount to nothing; see that no one enters. I feel better, he said, breathing with difficulty; I am better, my poor Caulaincourt. Then he took the duc’s arm, walked slowly around the tent, and little by little his face recovered its animation.

Shortly after this crisis, Napoleon, surrounded by his staff, gave his orders as usual, and sent instructions to all the army corps.

It is unnecessary to retell here how, through scarcity of ammunition and the defection of his South German auxiliaries, the Emperor lost the battle, in which his troops, although outnumbered three to two, covered themselves with glory, and maintained their positions to the end. In the words of one of his historians, in the battle of Leipzig the Emperor surpassed himself, for he triumphed over terrain, numbers, and treason.…A new victory would have crowned his efforts if the repeated orders he gave for additional supplies had been carried out.{23}

Passing over, as of slight importance, the military operations which followed, we rejoin the Emperor at Frankfurt, where he arrived at noon on the last day of October. He proceeded the following day to Mayence, where he remained until the night of the 7 November, and then set out for Paris by way of Metz and Verdun. He arrived at Saint-Cloud at five o’clock on the afternoon of the 9th; the following morning he held a meeting of the Council; and in the afternoon, a session of the Ministers. On the 20th, he returned to the Tuileries, to receive the oaths of the new ministers.{24}

During the final weeks of the year, Napoleon inspected the works going on in Paris, held reviews, and attended the theatre when he found time.

On the 19 December, the Emperor opened in person the session of the Corps Législatif: in his speech, he called on them for new sacrifices for the Patrie; but public opinion showed itself very hostile to him, and the session was dissolved on the last day of the year.

CHAPTER FIFTY: DECEMBER 1812–NOVEMBER 1813

THE KINGS DETHRONED

JOSEPH—The Spanish Dilemma—Napoleon Wishes to Withdraw—Obstacles in the Way—Decision to Maintain Joseph—Soult Recalled—Joseph Finally Retires from Madrid—Defeated at Vitoria—Soult Sent Back—Joseph Recalled—Napoleon Assumes All Blame—Joseph at Mortefontaine

JÉRÔME—Refused Permission to Come to Paris—Arrival of Catherine—Dismay of Napoleon—Reasons for Jérôme’s Course—Catherine Given Meudon—Jérôme’s New Army—His Visit to Dresden—Not Allowed to Divorce His Wife—Refused Any Command—His Loyalty in Question—He Leaves Cassel—The Capital Captured and Abandoned—Jérôme Returns, but Finally Leaves after Leipzig—Napoleon’s Indignation—Jérôme Retires to Aix-la-Chapelle

ON HIS return to Paris in December 1812, Napoleon was compelled to decide at once what course to adopt regarding Spain. It was out of the question for him to attempt again the reconquest of the Peninsula. Portugal and southern Spain were in the hands of the English and the insurgents; the six French armies held only the places which they occupied, and they were no longer secure even in their winter quarters. In Germany, the Emperor would be forced to meet in the spring by far the most formidable coalition that he had ever faced: Russia, elated with victory; Prussia, eager for revenge; Sweden, anxious to play a rôle in European affairs; the States of the Confederation, ready to throw off the French yoke; and, perhaps, Austria, prepared for defection.

For several years, Napoleon had wished to withdraw from the unfortunate Spanish enterprise, and put an end to the tremendous losses which were exhausting his resources; but, on every occasion, he had hesitated to take the decisive step in the face of Joseph’s claims to consideration as the chief of the Family. At any period prior to the Russian campaign it would have been feasible to send Ferdinand back to his throne and conclude with him an alliance, but now it was too late. With the English army well established in the Peninsula, it was hopeless to expect any fidelity from a Bourbon King. Nevertheless, the one hundred thousand veteran troops who would be released for service in Germany, and the hundred millions a year, which the war was costing, were certainly items not to be disregarded.

This course was advocated by Maret; but, even in this supreme crisis, Napoleon once more recoiled before the decisive step: he was unwilling to face the wrath of his eldest brother. Another serious obstacle also stood in the way: at a moment when, in violation of the Constitution of the Empire, he was making Marie-Louise the Regent of France, in order to secure from Austria the support of his dynasty, how could he recall to Paris the dethroned King of Spain, and disregard the claims of the prince the highest in degree in the order of heredity to be named Regent? His only excuse for disregarding that article of the Sénatus-consulte which excluded women from the Regency was the absence of the French princes, and their occupancy of foreign thrones. If, while recalling Joseph, he amended this clause of the Constitution, so as to exclude him from the Regency, it would be impossible to deprive his brother of the right to sit on the Regency Council, composed of the titularies of the grand dignities of the Empire. In that case, he would have to fear intrigues and opposition on the part of Joseph which would make it impossible for the Empress to exercise any authority, and which would destroy all the arrangements which he had so carefully made.

The first manifestation of Napoleon’s intention to maintain Joseph in Spain is to be found in his letter to Clarke under date of the 3 January 1813:

Advise the King, writing in code, that, under the actual circumstances, I think that he should establish his general headquarters at Valladolid; that the Twenty-ninth Bulletin will have made known to him the state of affairs in the North, which demand our care and our efforts; that he may even have Madrid occupied by an extremity of the line, but that his headquarters should be at Valladolid; and that he should take advantage of the inactivity of the English to pacify Navarre, Biscay, and the province of Santander.

Evidently the intention of the Emperor, which was not made entirely clear in Clarke’s letter to Joseph, was, to concentrate the French armies in the Peninsula at Valladolid, a base easier to maintain than Madrid; and to secure the communications with France, in case a reverse in Germany should make it necessary to recall the troops from Spain.

Once more, through subserviency to the Spirit of the Clan, Napoleon had violated his maxim that half measures are always dangerous. His pretence of maintaining Joseph on the throne of Spain, while really taking the first steps for an early withdrawal of his forces, was to lead to many unfortunate consequences. Notwithstanding the known incompetency of Joseph, he could not well be divested of the chief command; and Marshal Soult, the only military head there was in Spain, could not be retained in command of the Army of the South. Joseph and the marshal were at swords’ points, and any idea of co-operation between them was out of the question. To a somewhat lesser degree, the relations of the King were also strained with Caffarelli, the general at the head of the Army of the North.

To meet this situation, on the 3 January the Emperor ordered Clarke to send the Duc de Dalmatie a congé to return to Paris. This was not intended as any reflection on Soult, as the Emperor reserved for him a high command in Germany. In the case of Caffarelli, whom he recalled near to his person, the Emperor confided to him the command, during his absence, of the guard of the Empress and the King of Rome—the best possible evidence that the general was not in disgrace.

With the departures of Soult and Caffarelli, Joseph was practically thrown upon his own resources: no money to pay his troops, and no more reinforcements were sent to him—on the contrary there was a continual exodus of officers recalled for service in Germany. The Emperor no longer wrote Joseph any letters, but sent his instructions through the Minister of War; and Clarke, a weak courtier, transmitted the orders in a conciliatory form: where Napoleon used the word command, the minister wrote advise. So, to guide him, in his rôle of commander-in-chief of an army of one hundred thousand men, Joseph had only his military ignorance, and the senile complacency of the incompetent Jourdan. Even the most optimistic could foresee only disaster—but Joseph had not returned to Paris!

At the conclusion of the disappointing campaign of 1812, of which he attributed the failure to Soult, Joseph had returned to his capital, the first week in December. Here he was determined to maintain the seat of his government, no matter what happened. At the end of the year, the Imperial Treasury was fifty-three millions in arrears in the soldiers’ pay, and Clarke could not obtain a sou from Mollien, who was at the end of his resources.

On the 6 January 1813, Joseph received at Madrid the Twenty-ninth Bulletin of the Grand Army, which clearly revealed the extent of the Russian disaster. All the French officers were overwhelmed with despair, and the Spaniards foresaw the approaching collapse of the Imperial domination. But Joseph still refused to modify his plans, and conform to the necessities of the situation.

On the 8 January, thinking that the Emperor must have returned to Paris, he wrote to ask permission to go there, even for twenty-four hours. But his object was not to discuss the means of national defence, or the assistance which he could render, it was only to air his grievances against Soult!

On the first day of February, when he had learned positively of the arrival of the Emperor at Paris, Joseph wrote him a long letter, containing the gravest charges against Soult—even accusing the marshal of complicity in the Malet conspiracy!{25}

A month after his return to Paris, the Emperor found time to devote more attention to the affairs of Spain; then, through Clarke, he sent Joseph orders, repeated by every courier, to withdraw the armies toward the frontier, establish his headquarters at Valladolid, and assure his line of communication with France.{26}

In his letter of the 10 February, to Clarke, Napoleon said: It is proper for you to advise the King of Spain…that I note with the greatest anxiety that he has lost two months as important as December and January, when the English could do nothing; and that he has not taken advantage of this opportunity to pacify Navarre, Biscay, and Aragon.…Why has he not maintained his communications, and why, after having knowledge of the Twenty-ninth Bulletin, has he not realized the necessity of being promptly in communication with France? There is not a moment to lose: Let the King set out for Valladolid, while having Madrid and Valencia occupied by his extreme left. Write him that the time lost is beyond remedy; that matters will turn out badly if he does not promptly put more activity and movement into the direction of his affairs. During the following two months and a half, these orders were reiterated at least ten times to Joseph, and as many to Jourdan.

Joseph certainly received not later than the middle of February the positive order to retire to Valladolid. On the 23d, he wrote that he would obey, and would leave Madrid himself on the first of March. At that date, however, he was still at Madrid; and on the 2nd he wrote the Emperor to protest against the abandonment of the capital; also to complain because all the French armies were not placed entirely under his orders. His letter ended with a veiled threat of abdication if his wishes were not granted. But, this time, the Emperor did not yield, and Joseph was forced to resign himself to retiring to Valladolid.

When Joseph finally decided, with great reluctance, to begin the execution of the commands of the Emperor, it was nearly two months after their receipt, and the situation had become gravely compromised. Wellington had arrived at Cadiz, and had been invested by the Cortes with the command of all the Spanish forces, with the title of generalissimo. He had repaired the roads, and assembled immense magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo: on the 13 May, he began his march. This news apparently did not reach Joseph until a week later, and then he allowed six days more to elapse before ordering the evacuation of Madrid. After waiting four days at Valladolid for the arrival of the convoy from Madrid, Joseph started for Burgos early on the morning of the second day of June, leaving orders for the convoy to follow. On the 12 June, against the protests of his officers, Joseph decided to abandon Burgos, after blowing up the citadel, and continue his retreat to Vitoria.

On the last day of June, at Dresden, the Emperor had with Metternich a final interview which left him in no doubts as to