Sherman Invades Georgia
4/5
()
About this ebook
Related to Sherman Invades Georgia
Related ebooks
The 1865 Stoneman's Raid Begins: Leave Nothing for the Rebellion to Stand Upon Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Battle of Pickett's Mill Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsBloody Angle: Hancock's Assault on the Mule Shoe Salient, May 12, 1864 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5A Journal of the American Civil War: V6-1: North Carolina: The Final Battles Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Hood's Defeat Near Fox's Gap: Prelude to Emancipation Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA Journal of the American Civil War: V5-3: The Antietam Campaign Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsTwo Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA Long and Bloody Task: The Atlanta Campaign from Dalton through Kennesaw to the Chattahoochee, May 5–July 18, 1864 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsLincoln's Bold Lion: The Life and Times of Brigadier General Martin Davis Hardin Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5They Came Only to Die: The Battle of Nashville, December 15-16, 1864 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsBlue-Blooded Cavalryman: Captain William Brooke Rawle in the Army of the Potomac, May 1863–August 1865 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsStaff Ride Handbook For The Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863 [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsStorming Vicksburg: Grant, Pemberton, and the Battles of May 19-22, 1863 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsGettysburg's Bloody Wheatfield Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5To the Bitter End: Appomattox, Bennett Place, and the Surrenders of the Confederacy Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Strike Them a Blow: Battle along the North Anna River, May 21-25, 1864 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings"No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar": Sherman's Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, March 1865 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA Journal of the American Civil War: V4-1 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA War Without Rifles: The 1792 Militia Act and the War of 1812 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsBentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman and Johnston Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5War in the Chesapeake: The British Campaigns to Control the Bay, 1813-1814 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Richmond Shall Not Be Given Up: The Seven Days’ Battles, June 25-July 1, 1862 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsGeneral William Dorsey Pender: A Biography Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsAttack at Daylight and Whip Them: The Battle of Shiloh, April 6–7, 1862 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings"Happiness Is Not My Companion": The Life of General G. K. Warren Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5That Furious Struggle: Chancellorsville and the High Tide of the Confederacy, May 1-4, 1863 Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory, September 14, 1862 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5
Wars & Military For You
The Art of War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The God Delusion Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Unit 731: Testimony Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Last Kingdom Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Wager Disaster: Mayem, Mutiny and Murder in the South Seas Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Killing the SS: The Hunt for the Worst War Criminals in History Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Hitler's Monsters: A Supernatural History of the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise of the Fourth Reich: The Secret Societies That Threaten to Take Over America Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World--and Why Their Differences Matter Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Last Stand of Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Sun Tzu's The Art of War: Bilingual Edition Complete Chinese and English Text Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Helmet for My Pillow: From Parris Island to the Pacific Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Making of the Atomic Bomb Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5SEAL Survival Guide: A Navy SEAL's Secrets to Surviving Any Disaster Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/577 Days of February: Living and Dying in Ukraine, Told by the Nation’s Own Journalists Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Heart of Everything That Is: The Untold Story of Red Cloud, An American Legend Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Unacknowledged: An Expose of the World's Greatest Secret Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5A Daily Creativity Journal Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Raven Rock: The Story of the U.S. Government's Secret Plan to Save Itself--While the Rest of Us Die Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5
Reviews for Sherman Invades Georgia
3 ratings1 review
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Not what I expected, but interesting nonetheless. I had a couple of books on The March to the Sea, and expected this to be the third; instead it concerns Sherman’s initial advance into Georgia (i.e., the beginning of the Atlanta campaign). What’s more it’s not a conventional military history. Author John R. Scales is a retired US Army general; what he does here is take current Army staff and operational doctrine and applies it to 1864 – as if Sherman was in possession of (and followed) Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations and Field Manual 100-5 Operations.
After introductory chapters describing the organization of Civil War armies and a description of the situation in North Georgia in early May, 1864, Scales invites the reader to work their way through the modern US Army Military Decision Making Process:
* Analyze the mission
* Examine the current situation for factors that could affect mission accomplishment
* Develop courses of action that could accomplish the mission
* Analyze each course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages
* Compare the course of action with each other and against the desired outcome
* Make a decision
Thus, the reader is invited to examine General Grant’s orders to Sherman and restate them as a mission statement, then break them down into subtasks in order of priority, and two facing pages of the book are devoted to a blank table for the reader to fill out. Having done that, the reader is then invited to examine the Confederate situation, with the emphasis on Confederate capabilities rather than trying to deduce Confederate intentions (again with handy tables for the reader to fill out). Next comes the analysis of Sherman’s courses of action. Sherman’s orders constrained him to attack, but the actual mode and direction of attack was up to him. The reader is again given a table to fill out with courses of action; then Scales presents his own solution, with nine possible attack courses: frontal attack, penetration on the right of the Confederate line, penetration on the left of the Confederate line, single envelopment on the Confederate right, single envelopment on the Confederate left, double envelopment, a shallow turning movement, a deep turning movement, and a very deep turning movement. The next table presents the potential Confederate capabilities to respond to each of these actions, and finally a choice of action. (Interestingly, Scales decides Option 4 – single envelopment on the Confederate right – was the best choice, while Sherman actually chose Option 7 – a shallow turning movement around the Confederate left. Scales notes Sherman correctly decided that a Snake Creek Gap would not be strongly defended and McPherson’s Corps could get through it and get into the Confederate rear. (Scales notes that Sherman may have had information about the Confederate defense that didn’t make it into his memoirs or official reports; he also notes that the Confederate strengths and positions he initially gives to the reader are those that were available to Sherman, not the actual numbers determined after the campaign).
The actual outcome of this operations work is given relatively minor coverage; McPherson did find Snake Creek Gap virtually undefended. Unfortunately for the Union, McPherson didn’t press his advantage; he was killed in battle a few days later in the campaign and never had a chance to explain. Scales suggests McPherson had just been promoted to command of a corps and may have been cautious while he was getting used to the position; he also acknowledges that McPherson (and the whole Union army) was short of cavalry and therefore couldn’t send out cavalry patrols to see what the Confederates were doing. He moved slowly to avoid the risk of having the entire Confederate army fall on him, and thus the Confederates were able to withdraw to another defensive position.
The last chapter is a “staff ride”, with directions to various sites on the battlefield that illustrate what Scales has been discussing. This is intended as an exercise for military planners – much of the “ride” is intended to take place in a classroom rather than the field (and Scales provides a list of places in the area with appropriate facilities).
I learned quite a bit here. Scales gives some gentle criticism of “armchair generals”, noting that the capabilities of military units – especially logistic considerations – are often assumed to be much greater than they actually are. In particular, Scales goes into considerable detail about Sherman’s supply situation. The railroads serving Sherman could deliver two days of supply per day – in other words, all the supplies the army used that day, plus one day extra. Thus it took considerable time for Sherman to build up enough supplies to go on the offensive, and a considerable amount of his resources were devoted to keeping his rail lines protected from raiders. Once a Civil War army started to move, Scales estimates it could go three days before having to halt and resupply (he doesn’t comment on the later March to the Sea except to note it was an aberrant situation). The supply situation strongly affected Sherman’s options; he couldn’t do some of the deep turning movements that were proposed because he would run out of food and ammunition on the way.
This is a relatively short book, and a good part is taken up by the aforementioned tables for the reader to fill out. The references are military manuals plus general histories of the Civil War (which for the broad scale that Scales is using are all that is needed) plus USGS maps of the area. Contemporary photographs; extensive maps (including the maps that were available to Sherman).
Book preview
Sherman Invades Georgia - John R Scales
An Association of the U.S. Army Book
NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS
Annapolis, Maryland
The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 2006 by John R. Scales
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
ISBN: 978-1-61251-522-9 (eBook)
The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:
Scales, John R.
Sherman invades Georgia / John R. Scales.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Atlanta Campaign, 1864. 2. Sherman, William T. (William Tecumseh), 1820–1891—Military leadership. I. Title.
E476.7.S325 2006
973.7’371—dc22
2006015638
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).
14131211109876987654321
First printing
To infantrymen,
who die when generals fail
their war on the map.
Contents
Preface
Purpose
Organization
Focus
Acknowledgments
PART 1. THE CIVIL WAR AND OPERATIONAL ART
Chapter 1Organizations and Operations in the Civil War
Organizations
Operations
Summary
Chapter 2Combat Functions
Intelligence
Mobility
Logistics
Communications
Battle Command—Staff
Chapter 3Decisions, Campaigns, and Styles of Warfare
Consideration of the Classics
Military Decisions
Campaign Planning
Styles of Warfare
Chapter 4Setting the Stage—May 1864
Brief Summary of the Situation
The Union Political and Command Environment
PART 2. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
Chapter 5Mission
Example
Sherman’s Mission
Chapter 6Sherman’s Considerations
Characteristics of the Operational Area
Analysis of the Enemy
Analysis of the Union Position
Assumptions
Deductions: Relative Combat Power
Chapter 7Enemy Capabilities
Attack
Defend
Retrograde
Likely Course of Action
Sherman’s Opinion
Chapter 8Sherman’s Courses of Action
Mission
Reader’s Courses of Action
Author’s Courses of Action
Chapter 9Analysis of Courses of Action
Selection of Enemy Capabilities
Wargaming
Advantages and Disadvantages
Chapter 10Comparison of Courses of Action
Example Decision Table
Significant Factors
Decision Tables
Conclusion
Chapter 11Decision and Concept of the Operation
Concept of the Operation
Reader’s Concept of the Operation
Author’s Concept of the Operation
Sherman’s Concept of the Operation
PART 3. THE REST OF THE STORY
Chapter 12Ground Truth
The Confederate Political and Command Environment
Confederate Combat Power
Johnston’s Intentions
Chapter 13What Actually Happened
Recapitulation of Sherman’s Plan
Actual Outcome of the Plan
The Balance of the Campaign
Chapter 14Conclusions
Issues
Epilogue
Appendix AOrganization of a Staff Ride
Read-Ahead
Classroom
Terrain Orientation
Possible Training Locations
Organization
Tour
Conclusion
Appendix BMilitary Symbols
Glossary
ReferencesGovernment Publications
Books
Periodicals and Proceedings
Maps
Index
Figures
Figure 1.1Field Army
Figure 1.2Infantry Corps
Figure 1.3Infantry Division
Figure 1.4Infantry Brigade
Figure 1.5Infantry Regiment
Figure 1.6Infantry Company
Figure 1.7Battle of Missionary Ridge
Figure 1.8Battle of Fredericksburg
Figure 1.9Battle of Chancellorsville
Figure 1.10Battle of Gettysburg
Figure 1.11Battle of Chickamauga
Figure 1.12Second Mannassas Campaign
Figure 1.13The Perryville Campaign
Figure 1.14Modern Example: Desert Storm
Figure 1.15Typical Defensive Positions
Figure 1.16Delays
Figure 1.17Peninsula Campaign
Figure 1.18Beauregard Withdraws
Figure 1.19Johnston Retires
Figure 2.1Extra Wagons Needed for Supply Away from a Railroad
Figure 4.1The Situation in the West
Figure 9.1Branches and Sequels
Photographs
Photo 1.121st Michigan Regiment
Photo 1.2Union Infantry Regiment
Photo 1.3Union Artillery Battery
Photo 1.4Union Cavalry Regiment
Photo 2.1Union Signal Tower
Photo 2.2Union Tripod Signal
Photo 2.3Map of Northern Georgia
Photo 2.4Union Commissary
Photo 2.5Wagon
Photo 2.6Railroad Engine
Photo 2.7Riverboat
Photo 4.1Major General Sherman (Union)
Photo 4.2Major General Thomas (Union)
Photo 4.3Major General McPherson (Union)
Photo 4.4Major General Schofield (Union)
Photo 6.1Ringgold, Georgia, in 1864
Photo 6.2Railroad tunnel at Tunnel Hill, Georgia, 1864
Photo 6.3General Johnston (Confederate)
Photo 6.4Lieutenant General Hardee (Confederate)
Photo 6.5Lieutenant General Hood (Confederate)
Photo 6.6Lieutenant General Polk (Confederate)
Photo 6.7Major General Wheeler (Confederate)
Maps
(Maps are in two sections: blank maps are on pages 95–100, and maps with solutions or information not available to Sherman are on pages 151–160)
Map 5.1Lines of Operation
Map 5.2The Campaign Area
Map 6.1Wagon Road Network
Map 6.2Confederate Dispositions
Map 6.3Union Dispositions
Map 7.1Confederate Attack Options (Reader’s View)
Map 7.2Confederate Attack Capabilities (Author’s View)
Map 7.3Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Reader’s View)
Map 7.4Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Author’s View)
Map 8.1Sherman’s Options (Reader’s View)
Map 8.2Sherman’s Options (Author’s View)
Map 11.1Details of Dalton Area
Map 11.2Author’s Attack Plan (A4)
Map 11.3Sherman’s Actual Plan of Attack
Map 12.1Actual Locations of Johnston’s Army
Map 12.2Positions of Possible Reinforcements
Map 13.1The Actual Campaign
Map A.1Map, Ringgold to Rocky Face
Map A.2Map, Crow Creek Valley
Map A.3Map, Mill Creek Valley
Map A.4Map, Resaca
Tables
Table IEstimate of the Situation Outline
Table 3.1Operational Modes
Table 5.1Worksheet for Eisenhower’s Tasks
Table 5.2Worksheet for Sherman’s Tasks
Table 5.3Sherman’s Tasks
Table 6.1Extract from the Farmer’s Almanack
Table 6.2Composition and Strength of the Union Army
Table 6.3Relative Combat Power
Table 7.1Confederate Attack Capabilities (Union View)
Table 7.2Confederate Attack Capabilities (Author’s View)
Table 7.3Confederate Defend Capabilities (Reader’s View)
Table 7.4Confederate Defend Capabilities (Author’s View)
Table 7.5Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Reader’s View)
Table 7.6Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Author’s View)
Table 8.1Attack Courses of Action (Reader’s View)
Table 8.2Attack Courses of Action (Author’s View)
Table 9.1Enemy Capabilities Chosen
Table 9.2Enemy Capabilities Not Chosen
Table 9.3Enemy Capabilities Chosen (Author’s View)
Table 9.4Enemy Capabilities Not Chosen (Author’s View)
Table 9.5Advantages and Disadvantages to the Union
Table 9.6Union Advantages and Disadvantages (Author’s View)
Table 10.1Sample Decision Table
Table 10.2Possible Significant Factors
Table 10.3Decision Table
Table 10.4Decision Table (Author’s View)
Table 12.1Composition and Strength of the Confederate Army
Table 13.1The Campaign
Preface
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 was one of the most interesting and important campaigns of the American Civil War. At its beginning, the Confederate Army in the West—the Army of Tennessee—was strong and capable, though outnumbered. By the end of the campaign, the Army of Tennessee had been forced to evacuate Atlanta and could neither attack the Union Army successfully nor protect the agricultural center of Georgia. The Union Army had occupied northern Georgia and the city of Atlanta, the rail hub of the Confederacy. Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, the Union commander, had accomplished this result with relatively few casualties, using his superior numbers to maneuver the Confederate Army from successive strong positions. The choices he faced at the beginning of the campaign are the subject of this book.
PURPOSE
I intend for this book to serve two audiences: military professionals, and persons interested in seeing one of the premier campaigns of the Civil War from a new perspective.
First, military commanders and staff will be able to use it for study and as a source book. Military units often conduct staff rides,
the purpose of which is to train the unit staff by using a real military battle or campaign as a vehicle for study. To facilitate this usage, I laid out the book in chapters that follow the format of an estimate of the situation,
a logical decision-making process formulated in modern times. The estimate of the situation is a clear exposition of the planning factors that a commander should consider before making a deliberate decision—a decision for which he or she has the luxury of time to weigh alternatives and to make detailed plans. It is similar to, but not identical with, the Military Decision-Making Process
that evolved from the commander’s estimate. The following table is an outline of the commander’s estimate.¹ Later in the book are blank forms for readers who might desire to formulate or evaluate their own approaches using the estimate format. However, it should be understood that Civil War commanders did not use the estimate-of-the-situation process for decision making at all because the process had not been invented yet. Their decisions were taken in an informal and often undocumented manner.
Another purpose of the book is to provide a different perspective of the campaign to the Civil War buff or interested layman. By using a modern planning format and explaining the unavoidable military jargon, I hope to make very complex matters a little more understandable. Additionally, I limited the information in the book as far as possible to that information possessed by General Sherman, as documented in his correspondence during the campaign, not in his after-the-fact reports and autobiography. In this way I hope to give the reader a sense of the uncertainty that real commanders must face. This approach is in contrast to that used by modern historians and armchair strategists, who have all the records of both sides at hand.
TABLE IEstimate of the Situation Outline
1.Mission
2.The situation and courses of action
A.Situation analysis
1.Geostrategic context
(a)Domestic and international context
(b)Characteristics of the operational area
2.Analysis of the enemy
(a)Broad courses of action
(b)Political and military intentions and objectives
(c)Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations
(d)Possible external military support
(e)Centers of gravity
(f)Specific operational characteristics (strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors, and combat efficiency)
3.Friendly situation—same factors as used for enemy
4.Assumptions
5.Deductions—relative combat power
B.Course of action development
1.Attack
2.Defend
3.Retrograde
4.Reinforce
3.Analysis of opposing courses of action
4.Comparison of own courses of action
5.Decision
One thing this book is not is a definitive history of the campaign. Participants and historians have written many volumes about it and new books appear periodically. A listing of some of these appears in the reference section.
ORGANIZATION
The book is organized into three distinct parts, each part containing several chapters. Each chapter has footnotes with supplementary information and endnotes containing sources. Additionally, the book’s supplementary materials include a list of references for those who wish to pursue further research, a glossary, an appendix suggesting how to use the book for a military staff ride, and an explanation of military map symbols as used in the illustrations.
The first part of the book, chapters 1 through 4, constitutes a brief introduction to the Civil War and operational art. It also describes the strategic picture and acquaints the reader with Civil War organizations and techniques. Even readers with extensive knowledge of the campaign will find the section valuable in setting the stage.
The second part, chapters 5 through 11, is the most important. Placed in the perspective of late April 1864, just prior to the opening of the campaign, it develops an estimate of the situation
that General Sherman might have formed at the beginning of the campaign, had he been a modern general. This part is based on the facts available to him then. In each of these chapters the reader is given the information available to General Sherman and general guidelines as to what a modern military planner would do with that information. Immediately after each set of guidelines are blank forms that the reader can use to formulate his or her own estimate. The final section of each chapter presents my school solution
—one element of a possible estimate of the situation. Additionally, the section gives what General Sherman thought—if I could find any evidence of it.
The last part of the book, chapters 12 through 14, contains a brief description of the actual situation (as opposed to the perceived situation) and what happened when General Sherman executed his plan. The controversies surrounding the actions of generals and their subordinates—frequent in this campaign as in every other Civil War campaign—are listed but not emphasized. The section illustrates that no plan survives contact with the enemy.
FOCUS
A real difference between this book and most similar books is its concentration on campaign planning rather than on one or more battles. In military terms, the book deals with planning, not execution, and with the operational
level of war rather than the tactical level or the strategic level.* I emphasize the art of war on the map,
to use Jomini’s term, as opposed to the war on the ground.² The reader will find little discussion of individual engagements or even of the movements of specific units. Studying Civil War battles can be very interesting and informative, but their direct relevance to modern combat is limited. On the other hand, the planning and conduct of an entire Civil War campaign can have pertinent lessons for modern military commanders and planners.
The decision to concentrate on General Sherman’s point of view (with apologies to my ancestors, uniformly Confederate) is dictated by his preponderance of combat power and possession of a clear mission coupled with wide latitude in execution. He had enough freedom of action to provide the scope for us to fully explore the modern campaign planning process.
Like much of the rest of book, the conclusions and lessons are mine. Analyses and the school solutions
given are my opinions—feel free to disagree with them. They will have served their purpose if they provide fuel for further thought. If you enjoy the book and learn a little from it, its primary purpose will have been served.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Several of my colleagues assisted me in the preparation of this book. Army Colonel (now retired) Bob Butto, a companion senior service college fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made several valuable suggestions. Mike Cantagallo, a CSIS intern, performed much useful research as well as other chores. The other military fellows, particularly Marine Colonel (now retired) Sam Hall, provided a great deal of encouragement as well. My friends and relatives Michele Wassel Hood and Becky and Warren Gaylord gave me meals and a place to stay during my battlefield wanderings. My family also greatly encouraged me, putting up with frequent physical and mental absences. My mother-in-law, the late Mrs. Louis Gaylord, was very helpful in proofing an early draft and my son Richard practiced his driving by chauffeuring me around the area.
Special thanks go to Mr. John A. Hixson of Fort Leavenworth (my apologies for not knowing his rank) who made some very insightful and helpful comments on the original manuscript and pointed out useful avenues of inquiry and references.
Much of the credit goes to those soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines with whom I served for over 32 years. Their patriotism, ability, and enthusiasm were key to any success I experienced and any lessons I learned.
Of course, the responsibility for any errors is mine alone.
END-OF-CHAPTER NOTES
1.Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995), B1–B3.
2.Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1854), 79.
* Current military thought defines the three levels of war as strategy, operational art, and tactics. Quoting The Joint Officer’s Staff Guide (Armed Forces Staff College, 1993), the strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Actions at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan
(I-39). The tactical level of