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Sherman Invades Georgia
Sherman Invades Georgia
Sherman Invades Georgia
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Sherman Invades Georgia

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A longtime Special Forces officer with a Ph.D. in systems engineering presents a new perspective on one of the legendary campaigns of the Civil War, General William T. Sherman's invasion of Georgia. Unlike most Civil War books that either treat individual battles and campaigns in a historical sense and give short shrift to planning, or study campaign planning with snippets from various campaigns to document specific features, General John Scales's book takes advantage of modern planning techniques to fully examine what went into the Georgia campaign. He has limited the information in his book to that possessed by General Sherman at the time, as documented in his correspondence during the campaign and not in his after-the-fact reports and autobiography. Laid out in chapters that follow the format of an "estimate of the situation," this book doesn't simply recount the facts or attempt to provide a definitive history —other books do that —rather it offers a narrative of the campaign that illustrates a logical decision-making process as formulated in modern times. Published in cooperation with the Associations of the United States Army, the book serves two audiences: military professionals can use it for training purposes and Civil War buffs and interested laymen can gain a sense of the uncertainty that real commanders face by not having all the records of both sides at hand.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateSep 23, 2013
ISBN9781612515229
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  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
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    Not what I expected, but interesting nonetheless. I had a couple of books on The March to the Sea, and expected this to be the third; instead it concerns Sherman’s initial advance into Georgia (i.e., the beginning of the Atlanta campaign). What’s more it’s not a conventional military history. Author John R. Scales is a retired US Army general; what he does here is take current Army staff and operational doctrine and applies it to 1864 – as if Sherman was in possession of (and followed) Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations and Field Manual 100-5 Operations.
    After introductory chapters describing the organization of Civil War armies and a description of the situation in North Georgia in early May, 1864, Scales invites the reader to work their way through the modern US Army Military Decision Making Process:
    * Analyze the mission
    * Examine the current situation for factors that could affect mission accomplishment
    * Develop courses of action that could accomplish the mission
    * Analyze each course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages
    * Compare the course of action with each other and against the desired outcome
    * Make a decision
    Thus, the reader is invited to examine General Grant’s orders to Sherman and restate them as a mission statement, then break them down into subtasks in order of priority, and two facing pages of the book are devoted to a blank table for the reader to fill out. Having done that, the reader is then invited to examine the Confederate situation, with the emphasis on Confederate capabilities rather than trying to deduce Confederate intentions (again with handy tables for the reader to fill out). Next comes the analysis of Sherman’s courses of action. Sherman’s orders constrained him to attack, but the actual mode and direction of attack was up to him. The reader is again given a table to fill out with courses of action; then Scales presents his own solution, with nine possible attack courses: frontal attack, penetration on the right of the Confederate line, penetration on the left of the Confederate line, single envelopment on the Confederate right, single envelopment on the Confederate left, double envelopment, a shallow turning movement, a deep turning movement, and a very deep turning movement. The next table presents the potential Confederate capabilities to respond to each of these actions, and finally a choice of action. (Interestingly, Scales decides Option 4 – single envelopment on the Confederate right – was the best choice, while Sherman actually chose Option 7 – a shallow turning movement around the Confederate left. Scales notes Sherman correctly decided that a Snake Creek Gap would not be strongly defended and McPherson’s Corps could get through it and get into the Confederate rear. (Scales notes that Sherman may have had information about the Confederate defense that didn’t make it into his memoirs or official reports; he also notes that the Confederate strengths and positions he initially gives to the reader are those that were available to Sherman, not the actual numbers determined after the campaign).
    The actual outcome of this operations work is given relatively minor coverage; McPherson did find Snake Creek Gap virtually undefended. Unfortunately for the Union, McPherson didn’t press his advantage; he was killed in battle a few days later in the campaign and never had a chance to explain. Scales suggests McPherson had just been promoted to command of a corps and may have been cautious while he was getting used to the position; he also acknowledges that McPherson (and the whole Union army) was short of cavalry and therefore couldn’t send out cavalry patrols to see what the Confederates were doing. He moved slowly to avoid the risk of having the entire Confederate army fall on him, and thus the Confederates were able to withdraw to another defensive position.
    The last chapter is a “staff ride”, with directions to various sites on the battlefield that illustrate what Scales has been discussing. This is intended as an exercise for military planners – much of the “ride” is intended to take place in a classroom rather than the field (and Scales provides a list of places in the area with appropriate facilities).
    I learned quite a bit here. Scales gives some gentle criticism of “armchair generals”, noting that the capabilities of military units – especially logistic considerations – are often assumed to be much greater than they actually are. In particular, Scales goes into considerable detail about Sherman’s supply situation. The railroads serving Sherman could deliver two days of supply per day – in other words, all the supplies the army used that day, plus one day extra. Thus it took considerable time for Sherman to build up enough supplies to go on the offensive, and a considerable amount of his resources were devoted to keeping his rail lines protected from raiders. Once a Civil War army started to move, Scales estimates it could go three days before having to halt and resupply (he doesn’t comment on the later March to the Sea except to note it was an aberrant situation). The supply situation strongly affected Sherman’s options; he couldn’t do some of the deep turning movements that were proposed because he would run out of food and ammunition on the way.
    This is a relatively short book, and a good part is taken up by the aforementioned tables for the reader to fill out. The references are military manuals plus general histories of the Civil War (which for the broad scale that Scales is using are all that is needed) plus USGS maps of the area. Contemporary photographs; extensive maps (including the maps that were available to Sherman).

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Sherman Invades Georgia - John R Scales

An Association of the U.S. Army Book

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

Annapolis, Maryland

The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2006 by John R. Scales

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

ISBN: 978-1-61251-522-9 (eBook)

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

Scales, John R.

Sherman invades Georgia / John R. Scales.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Atlanta Campaign, 1864. 2. Sherman, William T. (William Tecumseh), 1820–1891—Military leadership. I. Title.

E476.7.S325 2006

973.7’371—dc22

2006015638

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

14131211109876987654321

First printing

To infantrymen,

who die when generals fail

their war on the map.

Contents

Preface

Purpose

Organization

Focus

Acknowledgments

PART 1. THE CIVIL WAR AND OPERATIONAL ART

Chapter 1Organizations and Operations in the Civil War

Organizations

Operations

Summary

Chapter 2Combat Functions

Intelligence

Mobility

Logistics

Communications

Battle Command—Staff

Chapter 3Decisions, Campaigns, and Styles of Warfare

Consideration of the Classics

Military Decisions

Campaign Planning

Styles of Warfare

Chapter 4Setting the Stage—May 1864

Brief Summary of the Situation

The Union Political and Command Environment

PART 2. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Chapter 5Mission

Example

Sherman’s Mission

Chapter 6Sherman’s Considerations

Characteristics of the Operational Area

Analysis of the Enemy

Analysis of the Union Position

Assumptions

Deductions: Relative Combat Power

Chapter 7Enemy Capabilities

Attack

Defend

Retrograde

Likely Course of Action

Sherman’s Opinion

Chapter 8Sherman’s Courses of Action

Mission

Reader’s Courses of Action

Author’s Courses of Action

Chapter 9Analysis of Courses of Action

Selection of Enemy Capabilities

Wargaming

Advantages and Disadvantages

Chapter 10Comparison of Courses of Action

Example Decision Table

Significant Factors

Decision Tables

Conclusion

Chapter 11Decision and Concept of the Operation

Concept of the Operation

Reader’s Concept of the Operation

Author’s Concept of the Operation

Sherman’s Concept of the Operation

PART 3. THE REST OF THE STORY

Chapter 12Ground Truth

The Confederate Political and Command Environment

Confederate Combat Power

Johnston’s Intentions

Chapter 13What Actually Happened

Recapitulation of Sherman’s Plan

Actual Outcome of the Plan

The Balance of the Campaign

Chapter 14Conclusions

Issues

Epilogue

Appendix AOrganization of a Staff Ride

Read-Ahead

Classroom

Terrain Orientation

Possible Training Locations

Organization

Tour

Conclusion

Appendix BMilitary Symbols

Glossary

ReferencesGovernment Publications

Books

Periodicals and Proceedings

Maps

Index

Figures

Figure 1.1Field Army

Figure 1.2Infantry Corps

Figure 1.3Infantry Division

Figure 1.4Infantry Brigade

Figure 1.5Infantry Regiment

Figure 1.6Infantry Company

Figure 1.7Battle of Missionary Ridge

Figure 1.8Battle of Fredericksburg

Figure 1.9Battle of Chancellorsville

Figure 1.10Battle of Gettysburg

Figure 1.11Battle of Chickamauga

Figure 1.12Second Mannassas Campaign

Figure 1.13The Perryville Campaign

Figure 1.14Modern Example: Desert Storm

Figure 1.15Typical Defensive Positions

Figure 1.16Delays

Figure 1.17Peninsula Campaign

Figure 1.18Beauregard Withdraws

Figure 1.19Johnston Retires

Figure 2.1Extra Wagons Needed for Supply Away from a Railroad

Figure 4.1The Situation in the West

Figure 9.1Branches and Sequels

Photographs

Photo 1.121st Michigan Regiment

Photo 1.2Union Infantry Regiment

Photo 1.3Union Artillery Battery

Photo 1.4Union Cavalry Regiment

Photo 2.1Union Signal Tower

Photo 2.2Union Tripod Signal

Photo 2.3Map of Northern Georgia

Photo 2.4Union Commissary

Photo 2.5Wagon

Photo 2.6Railroad Engine

Photo 2.7Riverboat

Photo 4.1Major General Sherman (Union)

Photo 4.2Major General Thomas (Union)

Photo 4.3Major General McPherson (Union)

Photo 4.4Major General Schofield (Union)

Photo 6.1Ringgold, Georgia, in 1864

Photo 6.2Railroad tunnel at Tunnel Hill, Georgia, 1864

Photo 6.3General Johnston (Confederate)

Photo 6.4Lieutenant General Hardee (Confederate)

Photo 6.5Lieutenant General Hood (Confederate)

Photo 6.6Lieutenant General Polk (Confederate)

Photo 6.7Major General Wheeler (Confederate)

Maps

(Maps are in two sections: blank maps are on pages 95–100, and maps with solutions or information not available to Sherman are on pages 151–160)

Map 5.1Lines of Operation

Map 5.2The Campaign Area

Map 6.1Wagon Road Network

Map 6.2Confederate Dispositions

Map 6.3Union Dispositions

Map 7.1Confederate Attack Options (Reader’s View)

Map 7.2Confederate Attack Capabilities (Author’s View)

Map 7.3Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Reader’s View)

Map 7.4Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Author’s View)

Map 8.1Sherman’s Options (Reader’s View)

Map 8.2Sherman’s Options (Author’s View)

Map 11.1Details of Dalton Area

Map 11.2Author’s Attack Plan (A4)

Map 11.3Sherman’s Actual Plan of Attack

Map 12.1Actual Locations of Johnston’s Army

Map 12.2Positions of Possible Reinforcements

Map 13.1The Actual Campaign

Map A.1Map, Ringgold to Rocky Face

Map A.2Map, Crow Creek Valley

Map A.3Map, Mill Creek Valley

Map A.4Map, Resaca

Tables

Table IEstimate of the Situation Outline

Table 3.1Operational Modes

Table 5.1Worksheet for Eisenhower’s Tasks

Table 5.2Worksheet for Sherman’s Tasks

Table 5.3Sherman’s Tasks

Table 6.1Extract from the Farmer’s Almanack

Table 6.2Composition and Strength of the Union Army

Table 6.3Relative Combat Power

Table 7.1Confederate Attack Capabilities (Union View)

Table 7.2Confederate Attack Capabilities (Author’s View)

Table 7.3Confederate Defend Capabilities (Reader’s View)

Table 7.4Confederate Defend Capabilities (Author’s View)

Table 7.5Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Reader’s View)

Table 7.6Confederate Retrograde Capabilities (Author’s View)

Table 8.1Attack Courses of Action (Reader’s View)

Table 8.2Attack Courses of Action (Author’s View)

Table 9.1Enemy Capabilities Chosen

Table 9.2Enemy Capabilities Not Chosen

Table 9.3Enemy Capabilities Chosen (Author’s View)

Table 9.4Enemy Capabilities Not Chosen (Author’s View)

Table 9.5Advantages and Disadvantages to the Union

Table 9.6Union Advantages and Disadvantages (Author’s View)

Table 10.1Sample Decision Table

Table 10.2Possible Significant Factors

Table 10.3Decision Table

Table 10.4Decision Table (Author’s View)

Table 12.1Composition and Strength of the Confederate Army

Table 13.1The Campaign

Preface

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 was one of the most interesting and important campaigns of the American Civil War. At its beginning, the Confederate Army in the West—the Army of Tennessee—was strong and capable, though outnumbered. By the end of the campaign, the Army of Tennessee had been forced to evacuate Atlanta and could neither attack the Union Army successfully nor protect the agricultural center of Georgia. The Union Army had occupied northern Georgia and the city of Atlanta, the rail hub of the Confederacy. Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, the Union commander, had accomplished this result with relatively few casualties, using his superior numbers to maneuver the Confederate Army from successive strong positions. The choices he faced at the beginning of the campaign are the subject of this book.

PURPOSE

I intend for this book to serve two audiences: military professionals, and persons interested in seeing one of the premier campaigns of the Civil War from a new perspective.

First, military commanders and staff will be able to use it for study and as a source book. Military units often conduct staff rides, the purpose of which is to train the unit staff by using a real military battle or campaign as a vehicle for study. To facilitate this usage, I laid out the book in chapters that follow the format of an estimate of the situation, a logical decision-making process formulated in modern times. The estimate of the situation is a clear exposition of the planning factors that a commander should consider before making a deliberate decision—a decision for which he or she has the luxury of time to weigh alternatives and to make detailed plans. It is similar to, but not identical with, the Military Decision-Making Process that evolved from the commander’s estimate. The following table is an outline of the commander’s estimate.¹ Later in the book are blank forms for readers who might desire to formulate or evaluate their own approaches using the estimate format. However, it should be understood that Civil War commanders did not use the estimate-of-the-situation process for decision making at all because the process had not been invented yet. Their decisions were taken in an informal and often undocumented manner.

Another purpose of the book is to provide a different perspective of the campaign to the Civil War buff or interested layman. By using a modern planning format and explaining the unavoidable military jargon, I hope to make very complex matters a little more understandable. Additionally, I limited the information in the book as far as possible to that information possessed by General Sherman, as documented in his correspondence during the campaign, not in his after-the-fact reports and autobiography. In this way I hope to give the reader a sense of the uncertainty that real commanders must face. This approach is in contrast to that used by modern historians and armchair strategists, who have all the records of both sides at hand.

TABLE IEstimate of the Situation Outline

1.Mission

2.The situation and courses of action

A.Situation analysis

1.Geostrategic context

(a)Domestic and international context

(b)Characteristics of the operational area

2.Analysis of the enemy

(a)Broad courses of action

(b)Political and military intentions and objectives

(c)Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations

(d)Possible external military support

(e)Centers of gravity

(f)Specific operational characteristics (strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors, and combat efficiency)

3.Friendly situation—same factors as used for enemy

4.Assumptions

5.Deductions—relative combat power

B.Course of action development

1.Attack

2.Defend

3.Retrograde

4.Reinforce

3.Analysis of opposing courses of action

4.Comparison of own courses of action

5.Decision

One thing this book is not is a definitive history of the campaign. Participants and historians have written many volumes about it and new books appear periodically. A listing of some of these appears in the reference section.

ORGANIZATION

The book is organized into three distinct parts, each part containing several chapters. Each chapter has footnotes with supplementary information and endnotes containing sources. Additionally, the book’s supplementary materials include a list of references for those who wish to pursue further research, a glossary, an appendix suggesting how to use the book for a military staff ride, and an explanation of military map symbols as used in the illustrations.

The first part of the book, chapters 1 through 4, constitutes a brief introduction to the Civil War and operational art. It also describes the strategic picture and acquaints the reader with Civil War organizations and techniques. Even readers with extensive knowledge of the campaign will find the section valuable in setting the stage.

The second part, chapters 5 through 11, is the most important. Placed in the perspective of late April 1864, just prior to the opening of the campaign, it develops an estimate of the situation that General Sherman might have formed at the beginning of the campaign, had he been a modern general. This part is based on the facts available to him then. In each of these chapters the reader is given the information available to General Sherman and general guidelines as to what a modern military planner would do with that information. Immediately after each set of guidelines are blank forms that the reader can use to formulate his or her own estimate. The final section of each chapter presents my school solution—one element of a possible estimate of the situation. Additionally, the section gives what General Sherman thought—if I could find any evidence of it.

The last part of the book, chapters 12 through 14, contains a brief description of the actual situation (as opposed to the perceived situation) and what happened when General Sherman executed his plan. The controversies surrounding the actions of generals and their subordinates—frequent in this campaign as in every other Civil War campaign—are listed but not emphasized. The section illustrates that no plan survives contact with the enemy.

FOCUS

A real difference between this book and most similar books is its concentration on campaign planning rather than on one or more battles. In military terms, the book deals with planning, not execution, and with the operational level of war rather than the tactical level or the strategic level.* I emphasize the art of war on the map, to use Jomini’s term, as opposed to the war on the ground.² The reader will find little discussion of individual engagements or even of the movements of specific units. Studying Civil War battles can be very interesting and informative, but their direct relevance to modern combat is limited. On the other hand, the planning and conduct of an entire Civil War campaign can have pertinent lessons for modern military commanders and planners.

The decision to concentrate on General Sherman’s point of view (with apologies to my ancestors, uniformly Confederate) is dictated by his preponderance of combat power and possession of a clear mission coupled with wide latitude in execution. He had enough freedom of action to provide the scope for us to fully explore the modern campaign planning process.

Like much of the rest of book, the conclusions and lessons are mine. Analyses and the school solutions given are my opinions—feel free to disagree with them. They will have served their purpose if they provide fuel for further thought. If you enjoy the book and learn a little from it, its primary purpose will have been served.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several of my colleagues assisted me in the preparation of this book. Army Colonel (now retired) Bob Butto, a companion senior service college fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made several valuable suggestions. Mike Cantagallo, a CSIS intern, performed much useful research as well as other chores. The other military fellows, particularly Marine Colonel (now retired) Sam Hall, provided a great deal of encouragement as well. My friends and relatives Michele Wassel Hood and Becky and Warren Gaylord gave me meals and a place to stay during my battlefield wanderings. My family also greatly encouraged me, putting up with frequent physical and mental absences. My mother-in-law, the late Mrs. Louis Gaylord, was very helpful in proofing an early draft and my son Richard practiced his driving by chauffeuring me around the area.

Special thanks go to Mr. John A. Hixson of Fort Leavenworth (my apologies for not knowing his rank) who made some very insightful and helpful comments on the original manuscript and pointed out useful avenues of inquiry and references.

Much of the credit goes to those soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines with whom I served for over 32 years. Their patriotism, ability, and enthusiasm were key to any success I experienced and any lessons I learned.

Of course, the responsibility for any errors is mine alone.

END-OF-CHAPTER NOTES

1.Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995), B1–B3.

2.Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1854), 79.

* Current military thought defines the three levels of war as strategy, operational art, and tactics. Quoting The Joint Officer’s Staff Guide (Armed Forces Staff College, 1993), the strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Actions at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan (I-39). The tactical level of

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