Dieppe: Shadowy Verdict

DIEPPE: SHADOWY VERDICT

by

Barry Daniels

Copyright 2015 Barry Daniels

Smashwords Edition 2018

ISBN 9780463308424

Table of Contents

Introduction

Part I: The Raid

Chapter 1: What Happened at Dieppe?

Part II: The Questions

Chapter 2: What Was the Need for the Raid?

Chapter 3: Why Were There No Bombers?

Chapter 4: Why Not a Battleship?

Chapter 5: Were the Germans Forewarned?

Chapter 6: Why Was a Frontal Assault Used?

Chapter 7: Who Was to Blame?

Part III: What Happened Elsewhere?

Chapter 8: The Mediterranean and the Pacific

Chapter 9: Normandy

Chapter 10: The Channel Ports

Part IV: What If?

Chapter 11: Fire Support Scenarios

Chapter 12: Tactical Scenarios

Part V: Shadowy Verdict

Chapter 13: Lessons Learnt

Chapter 14: Casualties of War

Timeline

Glossary

Appendix A: What is a Regiment?

Bibliography

Introduction

...when our lives have faded, history will pronounce its cool, detached, and shadowy verdict. Winston Churchill

In 1978 I became a reservist with the King’s Own Calgary Regiment. It was there that I learned of the raid on Dieppe and the Regiment’s participation in that raid. It was the first regiment of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps to report ready for duty in the Second World War. It was the first regiment of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps to go into combat. It was the first armoured regiment of the British Empire to use the Churchill tank in combat and it was the first armoured regiment to make an opposed amphibious landing. It was an impressive list of firsts with three of them stemming from a single action of short duration.

Over the years as I came across material relating to the raid or the regiment I read it. Then one day I ran into Brian Villa’s "Unauthorized Action", an account which charges Admiral Mountbatten with launching Operation JUBILEE without proper approval from the Chiefs of Staff. That began a more intensive look not only at JUBILEE but at all operations relating to the Canadian Army in World War 2 and also amphibious operations. By comparing the various operations I learned that successful operations with casualties similar to JUBILEE were considered near disasters. And I learned that the Canadian Army was a late comer to combat in WW2.

The date of August 19, 1942 is the most traumatic day in Canadian Military History and yet it is a date that stands firmly in the middle of the Second World War. By that date Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, had had at least a division in combat for a year. The Australians and New Zealanders had suffered through the battles for Greece and Crete each suffering over 2,200 casualties. The Australians had also helped to defend Singapore where nearly 1,800 were killed, over 1,300 wounded, and 18,000 became POW's, of which 8,000 died in captivity. The New Zealanders also took part in the fighting in North Africa, notably in Operation CRUSADER where 879 men were killed and another 1,700 wounded. The South African 2nd Division made up the bulk of the garrison at Tobruk when it was surrendered in June of 1942 and over 25,000 South African troops became casualties. None of this makes the trauma of Dieppe any less for Canadians but it does help to put it in perspective.

It was not that Canada was unwilling to fight, the Royal Canadian Navy was actively engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic, the Royal Canadian Air Force was doing its part around the world, only the army was sitting still, a dagger, pointed at the heart of Berlin as Lt. General McNaughton, the senior Canadian officer in Britain put it. But in 1942 Canadian senior commanders, politicians and other people of influence were beginning to feel that the dagger needed to draw some blood and were pressuring the British to include the Canadian Army in some operation and for 1942 that meant raiding.

Raiding should have been excellent for the Canadians, after all, it was Canadians who had invented trench raiding in the First World War. An experimental raid against a difficult target should also not have been a problem, in popular Canadian history a Canadian force had never lost a battle, even the ones they were supposed to lose like Vimy Ridge. Canadians could win battles others couldn’t as demonstrated at Passchendaele. Dieppe should not have been as bad as it was! And so the blaming started, the plan was made before the Canadians became involved so it was a bad plan. The action was unauthorized, it should never have happened. But what popular history has overlooked is that at Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele the Canadian Corps got all the artillery they demanded, at Dieppe they were given none. Even more importantly it overlooks the fact that there were limits to the size of a successful raid, which was also demonstrated in the days just before the main battle of the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge.

What the raid on Dieppe demonstrated above all else is the difficulty of conducting war. When Dieppe is compared with other amphibious operations and even some land battles it becomes obvious that victory was a difficult thing to achieve. Throughout the war there would be bad plans and hasty plans, there would be overoptimistic expectations of success and belittling of the enemies ability to defend. When we examine what happened elsewhere in the war we learn that war is hard and that even in success there are casualties. Victory may make the statistics easier to bear but defeat makes them even more bitter. At Dieppe the Canadian Army learned a lesson its soldiers had always known, they were just men with a difficult job to do, and it took a lot of effort at the command level to make sure the men at the sharp end were given a reasonable chance to do that job successfully.

We will examine that effort and compare it with the efforts of other commanders in other operations. We will look at what happened and why, at what was the same and what was different. Then when we are done we will make our shadowy verdict.

Part I: The Raid

The plan for Operation Jubilee was that six battalions of Canadian infantry would capture the port of Dieppe, which was believed to be defended by a garrison regiment of two battalions. At most, there were believed to be 1,500 German soldiers in the Dieppe area. With the addition of a tank regiment, an attached company to the Royal Regiment, with engineers and signallers, there were a little less than 5,000 Canadian soldiers participating in the assault. This provided slightly more than the doctrinal 3-to-1 ratio considered necessary for a successful assault. With the addition of Commandos the odds should have been almost 4-to-1.

There were five areas to be assaulted. At the eastern edge was Yellow, divided into Yellow I and Yellow II beaches. This was the responsibility of No. 3 Commando. At the western edge was Orange, also divided, into Orange I and Orange II beaches, this was the responsibility of No. 4 Commando. The rest of the beaches were assigned to Canadian units. The inner eastern area was Blue Beach, assigned to the Royal Regiment of Canada. The inner western area was Green Beach, to be assaulted by the South Saskatchewan Regiment. The Dieppe beach itself was divided into Red Beach on the east and White Beach on the west. The Essex Scottish were assigned Red Beach and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry were assigned White Beach. Two squadrons of the Calgary Tanks, B and C, were to support the landings.

At Green Beach the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada were to exploit through the South Saskatchewan Regiment and assault inland to what was believed to be a divisional headquarters, they would be supported by a squadron of tanks. No. 41 Royal Marine Commando were to land near the harbour and take possession of German landing barges. In reserve were the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, they were to land after the town was captured and provide cover for the withdrawal.

Thirty minutes had been allowed for the capture of the flanking headlands. The main landing would take place thirty minutes after the flank landings. Two hours were then allotted for the capture of Dieppe. After the attack on the divisional headquarters all Canadian units would retire on Dieppe harbour and re-embark, the raid would conclude five hours from landing.

What the British and Canadians did not know was that Dieppe was defended by an over strength infantry regiment of three battalions. In reality there were slightly more than 6,000 German soldiers defending Dieppe. Instead of a 3-to-1 ratio, the Canadians were attacking at slightly less than 1-to-1.

Chapter 1

The Raid

"For the duration of single tide they were resolved to take the Nazi Fuhrer by the forelock, and at the worst to sow some seeds of fear that might grow to disturb the enemy over all that 'iron held' coast of France." At Whatever Cost, R. W. Thompson

The Plan

The plan for the raid began in April 1942 and it was named Operation RUTTER. The original goal for the raid was fairly simple, see if it was possible to capture a French port before the Germans could destroy the port facilities. It was also thought this would provide a useful rehearsal for later and larger landings. This latter thinking made the Chiefs of Staff want to use Army troops, as these were the troops who would be making these later landings.

The inclusion of the army changed the original plan. Combined Operations had planned a flanking assault with no frontal assault. This raid would be allowed fifteen hours ashore. The army general assigned to the operation was Lt. Gen. Montgomery. He believed that the time allotted was insufficient to allow an envelopment of the port by flanking movements and he changed the plan to a frontal assault supported by flanking landings. The plan at this stage used airborne troops, both parachute and glider, and was to be preceded by an aerial bombardment of 150 heavy bombers. This plan was approved and the Canadians were invited to conduct the raid.

The objectives given the Canadians were fairly straightforward:

"(a) destroying enemy defences in the vicinity of DIEPPE

(b) destroying the aerodrome installations at ST. AUBIN

(c) destroying R.D.F. stations, power stations, dock and rail facilities and petrol dumps in the vicinity.

(d) removing invasion barges for our own use.

(e) removal of secret documents from the Divisional Headquarters at ARQUES.

(f) to capture prisoners."

The parachute troops were to capture the divisional headquarters and the surrounding coastal and anti-aircraft batteries. The bombers were to bomb both the town and the aerodrome. This would later be changed to the dock area. Intelligence reports indicated that there were two companies of infantry guarding the Dieppe area.

Training of the Canadian formations began on 20 May. They were training for a rigid assault schedule. The landing ships would arrive at their anchoring positions offshore at 3:00 am. The flank landings would occur at 4:50 am on Yellow, Blue, Green, and Orange Beaches. At 5:10 am four destroyers would begin a bombardment of Red and White beaches. By 5:20 am the Royal Regiment of Canada at Blue Beach would have secured the east headland overlooking the harbour, while the South Saskatchewan Regiment at Green Beach would have secured the west headland overlooking Red and White Beaches.

In the thirty minutes given them before the main assault went in, the Royal Regiment were required to capture four light anti-aircraft batteries, one heavy anti-aircraft battery, one field artillery battery, a barracks, and whatever machine-gun posts were helping to defend these positions.

At 5:20 am., thirty minutes after the flank landings, the landings on Red and White Beaches were to occur. There was to be no waiting for success signals from either Blue or Green Beach. The landings on the beaches in front of Dieppe were to take place assuming success on the flanks.

At 7:20 am., the city of Dieppe was expected to be in Canadian hands and the Fusiliers Mont-Royal were to land.

The Royal Marine Commando would enter the harbour and seize German landing barges. The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Winnipeg) would land on Green Beach and advance to attack the aerodrome at St. Aubin. Engineers would land to destroy dock facilities.

On 5 June a conference was held at which it was decided that heavy bombing would be more of a hindrance than a help, and the participation of heavy bombers was dispensed with. The first rehearsal (Yukon) was held on 11-12 June. It was a dismal failure on the part of the navy, with issues both as to landing in the right place and on time. A second rehearsal was held on 22-23 June which was considered satisfactory. The raid was now scheduled for July 4th. With the troops aboard the Landing Ships a conference was held. It had been discovered the 10th Panzer Division had been re-positioned closer to the coast. The operation was shortened from a two-tide 15 hour operation to a single tide 6 hour operation. Weather at that time was unsuitable for either the airborne landings or the naval landings. The result was that the raid was cancelled.

Combined Operations had now cancelled three operations (BLAZING, MYRMIDON, RUTTER) in a row. A success in launching an operation was needed. The impetus for such a success came from the renewed German offensive in Russia with the Russians calling for the immediate establishment of a Second Front or some action that would draw off 40 German divisions. The Americans supported the Russians in this call. With the recent retreat in the desert, the British needed some successful action to prove their willingness to fight. The only plan that had trained troops and landing craft crews available was RUTTER. It was decided to relaunch the operation, but substituting sea-borne Commandos for airborne troops. The plan was renamed JUBILEE and set for August 18-19.

Embarkation

On the night of August 18th, 1942 thirteen groups of boats and ships, troopships carrying landing craft, Landing Craft Tank (LCT), Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM), Landing Craft Flak (LCF), Landing Craft Personnel (LCP), with their escorting destroyers, Motor Launches (ML), Motor Gun Boats (MGB), Steam Gun Boats (SGB), French Chasseurs and Sloops, 237 vessels in all, left their ports in England. They headed for five assault areas centred on the town of Dieppe, France. Aboard were the combat elements of the 4th and 6th Brigades of the 2nd Canadian Division, the 14th Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment or Calgary Tanks), Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos, No. 41 Royal Marine Commando, plus elements of the Royal Canadian Engineers, Artillery and a company of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada).

The plan was to land units at five locations centred on the French port of Dieppe. The Commandos would land on the outer flanks at Berneval (Yellow Beaches I & II) and Varengeville (Orange Beaches I & II) and eliminate the coastal batteries at those locations. The Royal Regiment of Canada was to land east of Dieppe at Puys and neutralize German batteries overlooking the Dieppe harbour from the east headland. The South Saskatchewan Regiment would land west of Dieppe at Pourville and take out the gun positions overlooking the beach at Dieppe from the west headland. At Dieppe the Essex Scottish and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry would capture the town itself with the aid of two squadrons of the Calgary Tank Regiment. Once the town was secured the Fusiliers Mont-Royal would land and secure a perimeter for withdrawal. The other two squadrons of the Calgary Tank Regiment would also land and move to raid an airfield behind Dieppe. At Pourville the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada would land and move to join the Calgary Tank Regiment.

As the Canadian units receive their orders the friction of war begins to take its toll on the operation even before a soldier sets foot on a ship. The Essex Scottish, tasked with the capture of Red Beach, believing they are going on