The Bristoe Campaign: General Lee’s Last Strategic Offensive with the Army of Northern Virginia October 1863

THE BRISTOE CAMPAIGN

General Lee’s Last Strategic Offensive with the Army of Northern Virginia October 1863

Adrian G Tighe

Copyright © 2011 by Adrian G Tighe.

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Rev. date: 07/18/2019

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CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgments

Prologue—Late Summer 1863

Chapter One—Situation September to October 8

Decisions Made

Chapter Two—October 8-10

Lee Takes Up the Offensive

Chapter Three—October 11

Brandy Station

Chapter Four—October 12

Meade in Confusion

Chapter Five—The Night of October 12 to the Evening of October 13

The Veil Is Lifted

Chapter Six—The Night of October 13 and Morning of October 14

Auburn, an Opportunity Lost

Chapter Seven—Midday to 2:30 p.m., October 14

Milford—An Unexpected Opportunity

Chapter Eight—From 2:30 p.m. to Dusk October 14

Bristoe—An Opportunity Bungled

Chapter Nine—The Evening of October 14 to October 15

The Aftermath

Chapter Ten—October 16 to 18

Return to the Rappahannock

Chapter Eleven—October 19

Buckland Races

Chapter Twelve—October 20 to 31

The Close of the Campaign

Chapter Thirteen—Related Activities in the Valley during the Campaign

Chapter Fourteen

Epilogue

Appendix One—The Future of Key Participants

Appendix Two—Orders of Battle

Appendix Three—Strengths and Campaign Losses

Appendix Four—Theory Regarding Stuart’s Location on

the Night of October 13/14

Appendix Five—Weather in the Campaign Area, Reported by Diarists and Included in Letters

Appendix Six—Establishing Ewell’s and Hill’s Routes of March

Appendix Seven—The Mystery of the Flags

Appendix Eight—Medals of Honor Awarded During the Campaign

DEDICATION

In memory to the fallen soldiers of the Civil War whose commitment to their cause contributed so much to their nation’s history.

List of Sketch Maps

Overall positions, September

Overall positions, September 12

Union advance on Culpeper, September 13

Afternoon of September 13

Union advance morning, September 22

Stuart’s retreat and the repulse of Davies

Union withdrawal on September 23

Situation, October 8

Lee’s initial plan

Confederate movements on October 8

Confederate advance on October 9

Confederate start positions on October 10

Morning of October 10

Midday on October 10

Positions at dark on October 10

Union cavalry advance across the Rapidan, October 10

Positions at dark, October 10

At the Rapidan Morning, October 11

Fitz Lee in pursuit

Culpeper Morning of October 11

Brandy Station, October 11

Brandy Station, October 11

Lee and Meade’s plans for October 12

Movements on October 12

Meade’s right flank morning, October 12

Meade recrosses the Rappahannock

Buford approaches Culpeper

Skirmish at Sulphur Springs, October 12

Skirmish at Jeffersonton, October 12

Positions morning, October 13

Third Corps skirmish

Positions at dark on October 13

Stuart’s encounter at Auburn, 7:00 a.m.

Auburn, October 14, 8:00-9:00 a.m.

10:00 a.m. on October 14

Hill’s positions morning, October 14

Midday on October 14

Hill catches the Fifth Corps, 1:15 p.m.

The Second Corps appears, 1:30 p.m.

Hill wheels to attack, 2:00 p.m.

The situation develops, 2:15 p.m.

Heth’s assault

Heth repulsed

Situation at 3:00 p.m.

Situation at 4:00 p.m.

Situation at 5:00 p.m.

Final positions on the Union left, 6:00 p.m.

Positions at noon on October 15

The Trains escape afternoon, October 15

Union probes on October 16

Union and Confederate probes on October 17

Positions on October 18

Kilpatrick pushes forward to Buckland. Early morning, October 19

Buckland Mills Morning to midday

Fitz Lee approaches Kilpatrick’s flank midday, October 19

Buckland Mills Confederate attack afternoon, October 19

Union follow-up, October 20 to 24

Positions, October 25 to 30

The Lower Valley

The Valley and West Virginia

Final positions, October 31

List of Photographs

All photographs courtesy of the Library of Congress, unless otherwise stated.

Confederate Commanders

J. E. B. Stuart

Fitz Lee—Wikipedia

J. D. Imboden

A. P. Hill

H. Heth

J. R. Cooke—Wikipedia

H. H. Walker—www.Findagrave.com

W. W. Kirkland—Wikipedia

R. S. Ewell

R. E. Rodes—Wikipedia

R H Anderson—Wikipedia

James B Gordon—Wikipedia

C Posey—Wikipedia

C M Wilcox—www.aphillcsa.com

W T Poague—Wikipedia

D G McIntosh—www.Findagrave.com

Union Commanders

A. Pleasonton

J. Buford

D. McM Gregg

J. Kilpatrick

G. A. Custer

H. E. Davies

J. Newton—Wikipedia

Colonel Webster Seventh MD

W. H. French

G. Sykes

J. Sedgwick

G. K. Warren

A. Webb

F. E. Heath

J. E. Mallon—http://library.Morissville.edu/localhistory. Morrisville State College

S. S. Carroll

Meade with his staff at the Wallack House, east of Culpeper, in September 1863

Warren, French, Meade, Hunt, Humphreys, and Sykes at Culpeper, September 1863

General Custer’s cavalry capture three Confederate guns at Culpeper, September 14, 1863, sketch by Edwin Forbes

The railroad at Culpeper, photographed in 1862

The center of Culpeper

The Army of the Potomac retreating across the Rappahannock on October 13, 1863. Sketch by Alfred Waud

The Union army crossing the Rappahannock on a pontoon bridge night of October 12/13 October 1863. Sketch by Edwin Forbes

The Rappahannock Railroad Bridge

The destruction of the Rappahannock Bridge after the Army of the Potomac had crossed. Sketch by Alfred Waud

Union Infantry crossing the ford near the Rappahannock Railroad bridge. Sketch by Alfred Waud. Harpers Weekly November 11 1863

J. Minor Bott and family

J Minor Bott’s house near Brandy Station

Brandy Station taken in 1864

Rappahannock Station

Kelly’s Ford. Sketch by Edwin Forbes

Beverly’s Ford. Sketch by Edwin Forbes

Bridge over the Hazel River

Catlett’s Station, October 1863

The engagement at Auburn—Taken from Simons, Chaplain Ezra D

The 125th New York at Bristoe—Taken from Simons, Chaplain Ezra D

Rhode Island Battery at Bristoe Station—Sketch by Alfred Waud. Harpers Weekly November 11 1863

Destroyed bridge at Cub Run, near Catlett’s Station

Destroyed railroad bridge near Catlett’s Station

Destroyed railroad tracks near Catlett’s Station

Modern-day view of the Rapidan River, near Liberty Mills—Author’s collection

Modern-day view of Robertson’s River, near Madison—Author’s collection

Modern-day view of the Hughes River—Author’s collection

Modern-day view of R. E. Rodes’s approach to Auburn—Author’s collection

Modern-day views at Bristoe—Author’s collection

- The view of the Union artillery near the Brentsville Road

- The view from Poague’s second position, looking toward the Union lines at the embankment

- The view from a Confederate perspective of the approach to the embankment, as seen by J. R. Cooke’s brigade

PREFACE

John Esten Cooke, of Major General J. E. B. Stuart’s staff, described the Bristoe campaign as one of the liveliest episodes of the late war and in my view, he was absolutely right.¹

In reading and studying the battles and visiting the battlefields of the Civil War, over more than twenty years, I had increasingly begun to look at the periods between the major campaigns. Some of the smaller actions seemed to be well recorded, although the numbers of books available for a small campaign would never match the volumes available for campaigns such as Gettysburg or Antietam. The Bristoe campaign was a small and seemingly unimportant event in the scheme of the Civil War. Sandwiched as it is between Gettysburg and the Wilderness, Bristoe and also Mine Run for that matter, it receives scant attention. In reading the various descriptions of the battle, which usually amounted to a one-page summary in most books, or even a cursory there was some manoeuvring in October, that didn’t amount to much in others, the Bristoe campaign seemed to be poorly covered. There has been only one serious study of the campaign by Henderson, the Road to Bristoe Station, together with a chapter in Douglas Southall Freeman’s R. E. Lee and Lee’s Lieutenants and additionally a proportion of Palmer’s Lee Moves North. While the latter are easily available, the first is out of print and difficult to find, and a rare book always commands a price premium! So I contacted the publisher of that work to see whether reprints would be forthcoming, only to find that they would not. So I began to study the campaign, from all sources, which steadily grew and grew, and the research expanded following a visit to Washington where I managed to take a few hours to study the Bristoe battlefield itself and other key points as far south as James City. I decided to write this book after this visit, as I had realized that Lee was attempting a serious strategic maneuver, which should not be simply dismissed. It was not the series of skirmishes with no objective that some had portrayed, but was an attempt to seize the strategic initiative and change the course of the war. The fact that it failed and that there was no major battle as a conclusion, probably causes it to be overlooked. Its importance, however, should not be underestimated. The impact on the individuals most involved, such as Stuart, Kilpatrick, Warren, and Hill, was quite marked and their personal traits, frailties, and failings highlighted by the campaign’s conclusion.

There were additional interesting features to the campaign which are never referred to, namely; that there were seven Medals of Honor awarded on the Union side during the campaign, or that 73 percent of the Confederate losses came from North Carolina, or further, that the Union cavalry performed in an almost-textbook fashion. The failure of the campaign was a hugely significant event, and in my opinion, it was the turning point of the war. From this point on, Lee was on the defensive and the Union forces were gaining in strength and confidence. Bristoe was the point during the war when the initiative swung irreversibly from the Confederacy to the Union forces. Lee was never again to launch a strategic offensive with the Army of Northern Virginia. Meade, in his dogged, but uninspiring performance, thwarted Lee like no other general had done before and fulfilled Lee’s prediction from July that he would not make mistakes. The arrival of Grant the following spring was only to build on the change in the strategic situation.

Researching and writing this book has been an enjoyable experience, and I am constantly amazed at how helpful people can be when they are approached for seemingly irrelevant details. I would also highlight the work done to protect parts of the battlefield and thank the hard work and efforts by those involved to establish the battlefield park at Bristoe. I could suggest other parts of the campaign to protect, such as at Auburn, James City, Buckland, and Sulphur Springs, but these would all be difficult to establish and unfortunately, infrequently visited.

In addition to the narrative, I have added some appendices to cover the usual aspects in such a work as this, such as OOB, but in addition I’ve included some interesting elements from the research, such as points of dispute or the weather in the region. I think these, too, will be of interest to most readers of the Civil War era, or at the very least, explain my theories on a few key points. The most controversial is probably the appendix covering the flags captured at Bristoe, where I have attempted to add to the debate on the identity of the regiments involved.

I hope you enjoy reading this work. Have it in your hand as you follow Lee’s route northward, or Warren’s retreat through Auburn, and certainly when standing on the hill at the battlefield park, overlooking the railway embankment near Bristoe Station.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is a long list of people and organizations to acknowledge. Most importantly I wish to acknowledge everyone that places original material online, for the public to read and use, as this will ensure the maximum accessibility for the future generations. To the private collectors, I request that you add material or release the universities to display the material for public consumption. It is the duty of every good citizen to use all the opportunities which occur to him for preserving documents relating to the history of our country (letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Hugh P. Taylor, October 4, 1823). Of special note in this context is the great work done by Cornell, ESU, OSU, MSU, and Archive.org.

Second, I would like to thank and praise the libraries for maintaining books and manuscripts relating to the period, especially those that I visited during the course of the research. Bull Run Library, Manassas. Library of Congress, Washington. UCLA Young Research Library and Southern Regional Library. New York Central Library, Mid-Manhattan. Stewart Bell Jr. Archives, Handley Regional Library. Virginia Tech, Special Collections. Culpeper County Library. Fauquier County Library, Warrenton. Chicago Public Library. Perkins Library Duke University, Durham. UNC Southern Historical Collection, North Carolina Collection, and Davis Library. UNC Charlotte Murray Atkins Library. The Eleanor S Brockenbrough Library at the Museum of the Confederacy. Virginia Historical Society. Thanks also to Frances Allshouse of the Old Jailhouse Museum in Warrenton, who helped with both contacts and information on a number of matters related to the region and events. The staff at the US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, were also extremely helpful and supportive.

The route that Lee’s army took during the two outflanking moves have been unclear, or missed out altogether, in many books that touch on the topic, due to the very limited reports of the Confederate generals. Whether this was to protect the best routes through the region, or that it was simply seen as unimportant, is unknown. However in understanding Lee’s approach march to Culpeper and Warrenton it is very important, as this goes to the very heart of his intentions, and just how wide was the outflanking maneuvers. In this regard I would like to thank Jane Volchansky of the Madison Historical Society in helping locate to the positions of certain houses in the area which were mentioned by J. E. B. Stuart as being on Lee’s route as he approached Culpeper. The location clarified both Stuart’s and Lee’s position at a time and date, that most writers had been unable to clarify. This was important in understanding the decisions taken by Lee and Meade in real time, which reflected on the later movements in the campaign. As a part of the second outflanking maneuver, the location of Hill’s Mill was also an important feature, so many thanks to Kathy Ellis of Culpeper County for the history and location of that Mill.

In locating relevant primary source material, I must thank Robert G. Evans, author of The 16th Mississippi, G. Ward Hubbs, editor of Voices from Company D, and Donald Pfanz, author of Richard S. Ewell: A Soldier’s Life. Their books provided me with inspiration, while their help and support with the materials gave me the motivation to complete the book. Donald Pfanz also deserves special thanks for both his hospitality at Fredericksburg and also for the excellent work undertaken by his team in preserving Civil War records and battlefields.

I have adopted certain naming conventions throughout the book, both for people and places. For example, I have stuck with Bristoe Station throughout, rather than Bristow. I have used Jeffersonton, rather than Jefferson. Fayetteville, rather than Hurleyville. Sulphur Springs, when it could be several different names. Modern place names have not been adopted, so James City, instead of the modern Leon, Three Mile Station, rather than the modern Casenova, and Warrenton Junction instead of Calverton. I have been determined to include every place named in the text on a sketch map. There is nothing more frustrating than to see a reference to a place or location, not shown on the maps, as it makes the text meaningless. In this regard, the campaign requires the knowledge of locations to track the movements and without this the true importance cannot be understood. So I have endeavored to find every place named and include them in the sketch maps—if I have missed any, then I sincerely apologize to the reader. In regard to the sketch maps, so essential to understanding the detail of the campaign, I have made them as accurate and comprehensive as possible, although there are some variations in the maps of the time, from which I have derived my sketches. However, any errors or inaccuracies in these sketch maps are entirely my fault. In using the names of people I have used the convention of differentiating people with the same family name. So I have always referred to Fitz Lee so as to avoid confusing him with R. E. Lee, or I have made sure that it is clear which person is referred to by noting their formation or army. For example, there were two Owens, Colonel T. Owen, commanding a Confederate cavalry brigade and Brigadier General J. Owen, commanding a Union infantry brigade of the Second Corps. Both feature in the action, so these have been extended where necessary by using their initials and referring to their serving on the Union or Confederate side. Likewise, two Greggs in the same division on the Union side, four Joneses and two Cookes on the Confederate, each of which will be easily distinguishable. Thankfully, there aren’t too many such issues, and I hope it will not frustrate the reader where simple differentiation is used.

The literacy of the period, together with the lack of maps of some country areas, led to errors for some place names and spelling mistakes on others. Many of these are quite endearing and generally work phonetically, so I have not corrected spelling when directly quoted, I have however inserted clarification or corrections where needed.

Special thanks to Ken Gilbert, of Dallas, a self-termed mule who delivered numerous papers, books, and wrote checks on my behalf, without whose support I could not have completed this work. He also supported me with comments on the contents and flow, which helped bring me back to details I had overlooked.

I must also give credit to my daughter, Charlotte Tighe, for reading and correcting my manuscript, as well as asking some valuable questions such as why is that important, why is that relevant, what impact did that have on events, who was he, and is there a better source. This ensured that sections were both readable and relevant to the story, while also that they passed the critical eye of a history graduate and edits proposed with a teacher’s constructive care.

Finally, I would like to thank my son William and especially my wife Pauline for letting me take the time to pursue this area of study, and for encouraging me to visit the battlefields. I’m not sure the flowers delivered periodically or the chocolates did the trick, but they can’t have harmed my cause!

PROLOGUE

Late Summer 1863

The Confederate Army

General Robert E. Lee wrote, and then sent a letter, from his camp near Orange Courthouse, Virginia, on August 8, 1863, to the president of the Confederate States of America. The letter offered his resignation to President Jefferson Davis. I therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfil the expectations of others? In addition I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced the past spring.²

Lee’s disappointment in his performance during the recent campaign in Pennsylvania was clear in his letters to the president. He could feel his failing strength and was clearly still suffering from the illness that struck in April 1863. He put this down to rheumatism, but later analysis seemed to support the conclusion that it was either a heart attack or acute pericarditis (enlarged heart).³ Lee was to suffer from the illness throughout the Bristoe campaign, and it must have had an impact on his decision making, primarily due to his lack of mobility and reduced energy.

President Davis replied quickly, on August 11, rejecting Lee’s request. Lee was prepared to take any position to serve the Confederacy, if the president decided that public opinion so demanded.⁴ However, the president had limited options in seeking to replace Lee and his reply reflected that problem, where am I to find that new commander who is to possess the greater ability which you believe to be required.⁵ The armies of the West struggled to contain the Union forces. The loss of Vicksburg, the threat to Chattanooga, together with the less-than-stunning performance of Lee’s direct subordinates, all featured in the considerations. To change the command to Johnston, Beauregard, or even others, such as Richard Taylor, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill, would not have been an improvement on Lee, as Davis well knew. So Lee would have to remain in place in Virginia, but the problems in the West would need further thought and decisions by the president.

Lee proceeded to throw himself into the preparations for the coming months. Following the Gettysburg campaign, the army had retired to Virginia, initially staying west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, but then moving east and settling south of the Rappahannock, near Culpeper around July 25, before moving below the Rapidan on August 3 where he set up his headquarters at Orange Courthouse. Here, supplied by rail, Lee’s army now recuperated rapidly from its exhaustion by the campaign of Gettysburg.⁶ The army was spread along the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers, from Sulphur Springs, through Orange all the way to Fredericksburg. The region had been stripped of food over the last two years of the war, so the spread of the troops helped the supply situation, especially for the horses. There were enough rations for the moment, keeping the army well fed, with supplies of clothing and shoes also improved with deliveries from the stocks in Richmond.⁷ While we were in camp, we drew more clothing and shoes. We also drew plenty of our Pennsylvania beef.⁸ However, with a campaign possible before winter, the need for shoes and blankets would increase. His priority was to rebuild his army, in numbers, organization, and supplies. In view of the perilous position of the Confederacy and the unsuccessful summer, the president declared that August 21 be a day of fasting and prayer. Lee issued instructions for the day to be observed by the army and they responded enthusiastically.⁹

As the summer wore on, many slightly wounded troops had recovered from their wounds following the Gettysburg campaign and had returned to the army. The ranks were kept fairly well filled by constant recruiting, wrote Longstreet’s staff officer, G. Moxley Sorrel.¹⁰ Our ranks were considerably recruited. This was a result of previously sick and wounded from the battle of Chancellorsville (May 1863) returning to the army.¹¹ Another wrote, The army was very much strengthened by the return of wounded and sick soldiers to duty.¹² However, the additional recruits were not always as effective as the veterans, A member of Thirty-fourth NC, Scales’s brigade wrote of them, mostly men between forty and forty-five years, who, with rare exceptions, made poor soldiers, and fell far short of filling the places of those who had been killed or disabled.¹³ The strength of the army had risen from around 49,500 on July 20 to 56,300 by the end of August. This was a far cry from the 65,350 Lee had at the end of May 1863 and reflected the heavy losses sustained at Gettysburg.¹⁴

Lee worked hard to refill the ranks by encouraging volunteers and incorporating conscripts, this was especially important, as desertion had increasingly become a problem. He wrote to the president on August 17, The number of desertions from this army is so great and still continues to such an extent, that unless some cessation of them can be caused, I fear success in the field will be seriously endangered.¹⁵ Desertions were pretty numerous at this time.¹⁶ Though it was believed that most deserters went home to their farms and families, rather than over to the enemy. The government and the army reacted to try to stem the desertions, with legislation to impose a fine of $300 and imprisonment for one year for enticing a soldier to desert although some states started earlier than the summer of 1863 in prosecuting deserters.¹⁷ The amnesty issued by the president had some effect in causing soldiers to return, as did the system of furlough instituted by Lee. However, there is evidence that some troops took advantage of these to absent themselves either temporarily or permanently.¹⁸ This led to increasingly severe penalties and more frequent executions, but Lee had to act firmly, as the spirit of the army was being destroyed. When desertions occurred and penalties were not harsh, it had a very negative effect on those that remained with the army.¹⁹ By 1863, the level of desertions were a drain, both in terms of the deserters themselves, but also the troops used to either find them or break up the larger gatherings of deserters. By September of the same year (1863) Lee had despatched several regiments of North Carolina troops and a squadron of cavalry to rid Wilkes County, North Carolina, of its organization of deserters by capturing them.²⁰ The problem was insoluble, no amount of legislation, or either severe or lenient punishments, would work. The only thing that could have addressed the problem significantly was a string of victories, which seemed unlikely by the fall of 1863.²¹

While concerned with his own logistics and organizational issues, Lee still had a strong and active enemy, fresh from victory, sited opposite his lines. During that last week of August, Confederate scouts noted the movement of troops from the Army of the Potomac, by steamer, northward. This was the withdrawal of troops to the New York area, where riots caused by the draft required an increased military presence to maintain law and order. Lee traveled to Richmond near the end of August to discuss this event and other presidential suggestions—including the idea of Lee going to the west during the winter. That region was a major concern to both Lee and the president, following a string of disappointments, and it was clear that decisive action was needed.

While in Richmond, the situation in the west was discussed and it was decided, by President Davis, to send Longstreet with two divisions to Tennessee in support of Bragg (Longstreet had only two divisions in his corps at this time as Pickett’s depleted division had escorted the Union prisoners to Richmond and remained there afterward). Lee was really only a sounding board for Davis’s thoughts and had little influence on the actual decision, as he generally tried to keep troops once they were in his command.²² However, following the cooling of the relationship between Lee and Longstreet after Gettysburg, Lee may well have promoted the idea of a temporary separation. The hopes were that a quick offensive with veteran troops would change the strategic situation for the better. Longstreet was in agreement with the suggestion and in fact seemed to have been agitating for it to take place. "I do not see that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much by offensive operations (in Virginia), unless you are strong enough to cross the Potomac. Further, I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps, and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here."²³ It has been speculated by numerous writers that Longstreet sought command, and that following his disagreements with Lee at Gettysburg, would be happy with either outcome—commanding in Virginia on the defensive, while Lee went west, or taking command in the west. The use of the interior lines to achieve a strategic maneuver, while holding the enemy in the east, held the prospect of significant success. Whether Longstreet would be the deliverer of that success was a different question.

The decision was taken on September 5, and so on September 6, Lee confirmed by letter to the president that arrangements were being made.²⁴ In the same letter, it would appear by Lee’s response that Davis had asked for Lee himself to go to Tennessee and take command (to replace Bragg). Lee was gracious in the way he avoided that particular outcome.

The first contingents were under way on September 9, departing from Meadow farm, close to Orange Courthouse, led by elements of McLaw’s division, followed by Hood’s division and Porter Alexander’s twenty-six pieces of artillery. The transfer being organized by Brigadier General Lawton, Longstreet’s quartermaster general.²⁵ Some minor alterations were planned to the corps during the transit through Richmond. G. Anderson’s brigade was to be detached to Charleston, South Carolina, as was Bryan’s (Semmes’s) Georgia brigade. The potential desertion of troops was given, by Lee and Longstreet, as the reason for their detachment. The brigades of M. Jenkins and H. Wise were to be taken from Richmond (and replaced by the retention of Picket’s division) and added as part of McLaw’s and Hood’s divisions, respectively.²⁶ Longstreet had also requested Brigadier General J. R. Cooke’s brigade; however that brigade joined Lee and played a key part in the battle at Bristoe Station.²⁷ Lee brought Cooke’s brigade to Gordonsville, initially to protect the railroad, while he also sought the return of troops that had been left at Richmond in the spring, before the march to Pennsylvania.²⁸

However, Longstreet changed his mind somewhat and retained Bryan’s brigade, instead sending Wise’s brigade with Anderson to South Carolina.²⁹ Longstreet left Richmond on September 14 and his corps arrived in time to play a decisive role in the battle of Chickamauga on September 20. Although the follow up to the victory was not as robust as it should have been, the transfer of such a large part of Lee’s army, to arrive in time to deliver a decisive blow should not be overlooked. It was a huge logistical effort that was carried out efficiently and with great effect. The modern age of warfare had seen the Confederate forces use the railways for a second strategic maneuver to achieve a decisive result on the day of arrival.³⁰ It was a transportation epic which showed, like Bragg’s movement in 1862, what could be done when concerted action was concentrated on an objective.³¹ Despite the fact that the entire corps had not arrived, those that did arrive, played a key role in the victory. This was thanks to a combined recognition of the need for the strategic move and also the railroad itself in being able to deliver them. The support of the railroads had not always occurred in the past, so its success on this occasion was all the more important.³² The move required the use of sixteen different railroads to transport the two divisions for a total of 835 miles.³³

Throughout August and September, General R. E. Lee was preoccupied with the logistical issues faced by the Army of Northern Virginia. His letters sought weapons, food supplies, and clothing throughout this period. Additionally, the increasing desertion rate gave him additional problems. A system of furloughs was introduced in an attempt to limit the desertion rate, though judging by the comments made in later correspondence this had limited effect. The scarcity of forage, however, had an immediate military impact. Lee was forced to reduce the number of batteries with the army and to spread the cavalry more thinly than his preference. Although not stated, the departure of Longstreet’s command in September may also have been supported by Lee, as it assisted greatly with the supply situation in Virginia.

Lee wrote, Nothing prevents my advancing now but the fear of killing our artillery horses. They are much reduced, & the hot weather & scarce forage keeps them so. The cavalry also suffer, & I fear to set them at work.³⁴ The area of Fauquier, Prince William, Culpeper, and Madison counties had been stripped bare. It is reported to have been devoid of supplies, with much of the population having left the much fought-over region and taken what little they had with them. Robert McAllister wrote, The whole country is a barren waste. You cannot imagine the distress of the inhabitants in this part of Virginia, starvation stares them in the face.³⁵

The departure of Longstreet’s command removed close to one-third of Lee’s combat infantry. This would place Lee in a tight spot if Meade took advantage of this reduction by launching an aggressive campaign aimed toward Richmond. One veteran in Lee’s army recorded that it has weakened this army smartly by sending Longstreet and his forces off. But despite this comment, there was still no fear of the Union army.³⁶ Fortunately for Lee, although Meade would seek to take advantage of this situation, Lincoln, for once, would hold Meade’s advance back at a critical point.

There was one further hangover from Gettysburg that Lee was unable to address at this time and may have weighed on his offensive strategy. Neither A. P. Hill nor R. S. Ewell had shone during the recent campaign in Pennsylvania, both having risen from divisional command following the death of Stonewall Jackson in May. Hill had maintained his reputation for impetuosity, while Ewell seemed to have lost confidence without Jackson’s guiding hand. Both had made mistakes on the first day at Gettysburg and had then delivered little over the second and third days of the battle. For Lee, this meant that he had two unproven corps commanders with which to cope in addition to any moves by Meade.

The two corps themselves consisted of three divisions each. Fortunately, the divisional commanders were little changed from Gettysburg. Ewell had Early, Rodes, and Johnson, who were capable commanders with some experience. Both Early and Rodes were forceful and aggressive generals and would rise further in the Confederate army during the course of the war. Hill’s corps consisted of the divisions commanded by Anderson, Heth, and Wilcox. Although each had significant experience at brigade command, and Anderson and Heth had commanded their divisions for some months, they had not yet shone in these positions. Wilcox was new to divisional command, having taken over from Pender who died following a wound sustained at Gettysburg, but had a proven track record as an active and aggressive commander. The cavalry corps, under J. E. B. Stuart, consisted of two divisions, the first under Wade Hampton and the second under Fitz Lee. There were no command doubts in the cavalry, although a number of changes would be made at brigade and regimental level, both before and during the coming campaign. However, command was not an issue, whereas the availability of sufficient horses and fodder was an increasing concern.

The Union Army

General George G. Meade was also preoccupied during August and September, with similar issues, though suffering substantially more political interference than Lee. While Lee was consulted by President Davis, Meade meanwhile merely received messages from Lincoln and Halleck prodding him to greater activity.

The Army of the Potomac had undergone little change since the Gettysburg campaign. Its leadership structure was still depending on a temporary appointment basis and would remain so throughout the Bristoe campaign. Meade’s preference for professional soldiers was clearly evident as he made changes to remedy the casualties and problems of the last campaign. It was clear during the closing stages of the Gettysburg campaign that Meade had looked to Humphreys, Sedgwick, Warren, and Hunt when it came to decisions in the field.³⁷ It was also clear, due to the lack of confidence exhibited, that Meade was missing having Major General John Reynolds to both advise and support his decisions. Speaking at a sword presentation by the Pennsylvania Reserves in September, Meade is reported to have said, This reunion, gentlemen, awakens in my heart new sorrow for an officer which it vividly recalls to my mind, for he commanded the division when I commanded one of the brigades. He was the noblest as well as the bravest gentleman in the army. I refer to John F. Reynolds . . . When he fell at Gettysburg, leading the advance, I lost not only a lieutenant of the utmost importance to me, but I may say that I lost a friend, aye, even a brother.³⁸ Meade was nurturing the development of Major General G. K. Warren, with high hopes for him in the future, but at the moment none of the other corps commanders replaced Reynolds in Meade’s confidence.

Desertion was also impacting the Union armies, but for very different reasons than on the Confederate side. Despite the victory at Gettysburg, July, August, and September recorded the highest months for desertion in the Union army during 1863, with around 5,500 per month.³⁹ Meade, however, was more able to replace those deserters, and his strength did not diminish significantly during that fall.

The army under Meade amounted to 76,200 at the end of August, even with the detachments to New York.⁴⁰ There were conscripts en route to reinforce the army and a steady return of wounded and sick to the army. The value of the conscripts was in question and the army did not value their addition; in an example contained in a letter home, a member of the Thirteenth MA wrote, Well, here I am back safe and sound to the regiment, but not to the regiment I left, for two thirds of the men are conscripts, and a rough looking set at that.⁴¹ The same writer confirmed this view when a month later, after the Bristoe campaign closed, that the conscripts that go to make up the company are of little account and not to be relied upon in battle.⁴²

As for the army organization, the First Corps was still led by Major General John Newton, who took over on the second day of Gettysburg following the death of Major General John Reynolds. He took over following the temporary appointment of Doubleday, who was subsequently removed from the field army. Meade had decided quickly upon learning of the death of Reynolds that he wanted Newton to move from his Third Corps division to take over the First Corps. This undoubtedly had repercussions, when Doubleday began a campaign against Meade and Newton in Washington, though fortunately this did not feature strongly in the coming campaign. The strength of the corps was much reduced from July 1 strength and a large number of recruits, of questionable value, were added in September and October. One regiment for example, the 143rd PA had suffered considerably at McPherson’s farm on July 1, received 363 recruits to bring it to a strength of only 530 men.⁴³

The Second Corps had played a significant role in the eventual success at Gettysburg. At their heart, they were a confident and veteran corps, well tried and tested and under strong corps, division, and brigade leadership. However, the casualties from Gettysburg were being replaced by questionable conscripts. Dr. Perry of the Twentieth MA wrote, This army is so demoralised by substitutes and conscripts that it seems to me it is in a critical condition.⁴⁴ Major General Winfield S. Hancock, however, was wounded at Gettysburg and this meant a request for leave of absence to recover from his wounds. This left a vacancy in corps command, which Hays had covered during the follow-up after Gettysburg. The filling of that vacancy would have an impact on both the campaign and the reporting of that campaign thereafter due to the personality of Gouverneur K. Warren.

Brigadier General G. K. Warren did not know it yet, but he had already reached the peak achievement of his military career. He was in the right place at the right time at Gettysburg, and his part in the protection of the left flank at Little Round Top was a significant factor in the final victory. There is no doubt he deserved the praise that he was given for his role on July 2, 1863. He was ordered to report to Washington on August 3 and on August 8 was appointed major general to date from May 3, 1863.⁴⁵ He was technically without a role, but only for a few days. On August 12, he was appointed to command of the Second Corps as a temporary assignment.⁴⁶ Meade had personally proposed both the promotion and appointment to the Second Corps when he wrote, The very valuable services and most efficient assistance rendered me by Brigadier General G K Warren induce me to nominate him for the commission of Major General, to be assigned to the 2d corps.⁴⁷ Like Meade, Warren was known to be a supporter of George B. McClellan, he had always been one of McClellan’s staunches partisans.⁴⁸ McClellan, the former commander of the army still had many supporters in the army, but had few in Washington following both his outspoken political views and his poor military performances.

The Third Corps had been led into a meat grinder on the second day at Gettysburg and its shattered ranks and depleted leadership reflected the ordeal that they had suffered. Maj General Dan Sickles had been severely wounded that day. It is probably fortunate for Meade that Sickles was wounded as this allowed him to remove him from command. Though in contrast to his view of the wounded Hancock, Meade did not want Sickles back. Major General William H. French (previously commander of the garrison of Harpers Ferry and before that a division commander of the Second Corps) was appointed to (temporary) command of the Third Corps; clearly Meade did not wish to retain Major General David Birney who was appointed the temporary head of the corps at Gettysburg. The troops of the corps were steady and experienced, but the leaders questionable.

The Fifth Corps was a strong corps that did not suffer significant casualties overall at Gettysburg, though some units were exceptions to that rule. Holding the Little Round Top on July 2 would forever be one of its finest achievements and its leadership had emerged pretty well intact and with reasonable reputations. Major General Sykes remained in command, but his performance would be uninspiring during the Bristoe campaign. In fact, he and Warren would exchange some heated correspondence regarding the battle at Bristoe Station. It would appear that either Sykes didn’t care what happened to Warren—perhaps through jealousy or that Sykes was simply careless at a critical point in the campaign. Warren had stepped in at a crucial moment and directed elements of the corps on the second day at Gettysburg, thus building his own reputation, and a favorable consideration by Meade, which may have irritated Sykes.

The Sixth Corps, under Major General Sedgwick, was also strong in numbers and reputation. Its brigades had been used to plug gaps at Gettysburg, rather than be used as a complete corps, though few regiments had suffered significant losses during the battle. He was a popular commander with his troops, who called him Uncle John.⁴⁹ Meade, during the coming campaign, would look to Sedgwick as his effective second in command, trusting him with command of more than his own corps at times during the campaign.

The cavalry corps remained under Major General Pleasonton, but was significantly improved when compared to a year previous. It had not yet reached its hard-biting peak, but was being molded into an efficient fighting machine under hard-driving leadership. The new style of fighting, with troops both dismounted and mounted, was already proving successful. The divisions led by Buford, Gregg, and Kilpatrick were confident, ambitious, and no longer cowed by the Confederate forces under Stuart. Despite setbacks during the Gettysburg campaign, especially at Williamsport and Hagerstown during Lee’s retreat from Gettysburg, their heads were still held high. Meade would need the cavalry to screen the army, protect the flanks of the infantry, and shepherd the trains during the retreat. He didn’t consider Pleasonton as being the tactical commander, preferring to leave that role to the division commanders. Although Kilpatrick’s weaknesses had not hindered his rise to command the division, his capabilities would be tested in the coming command and be found wanting. Gregg and Buford were both capable leaders, and although not self-promoting or overly aggressive, they were both capable leaders. They would serve Meade well in this capacity during the coming campaign, but they would not be used as a corps in a strategic sense, as they would be in 1864 under Sheriden.

Meade was concerned by his supply situation and did not like the line of advance through Virginia. He was especially concerned by the reliance upon the O&A Railroad, which was too far west in his view to be able to support an advance of more than a few days. The railroad limitations of the O&A and the RF&P (through Fredericksburg) together with the large number of rivers and significant runs that existed on the overland line of advance, did not meet Meade’s professional opinion of the best way to approach to the Confederate Capital. During the debates of 1862, Meade had clearly been in the McClellan camp, supporting the approach to Richmond via the James River line. However, he was too junior for that support to be recognized and to impact his steps toward army commander.⁵⁰ Meade was still a brigadier general at Fredericksburg, commanding a division, though this situation was corrected soon afterward, but it probably assisted Meade in achieving army command due to his low profile.

The president had applied a significant amount of pressure on Meade in favor of an advance. This followed his frustration with the slow follow-up to the battle of Gettysburg and what he saw as Meade’s failure to destroy Lee before he recrossed the Potomac on July 14 at Falling Waters. Although Meade was undoubtedly correct in asserting that the state of his army, its poor line of supply, and then the strong defensive position of the rebels prevented such a move, he was stretching some of those points to an extreme.

Immediately after Gettysburg, the Fifth and Sixth Corps were in good condition, the Second, Third, and Twelfth were worn, but still very capable, with only the Eleventh and First in no state to be used aggressively. The cavalry was in good condition, with only Merritt’s brigade being problematic. The supply situation was more of a problem, partly caused by the Confederates and partly by Meade’s own planning before Gettysburg. In June, he had redirected the army supply chain via Westminster in order to support his planned defensive position at Pipe Creek, while also keeping it at a distance from the advancing Confederate forces. This was a reasonable step for a campaign being fought in Pennsylvania or Maryland, but a significant restriction when moving into Western Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. This caused a slow start to the pursuit as supplies had to be brought overland by road to Gettysburg and then difficulties as the pursuing armies moved south and west, away from their base of supply. Logistics were a valid reason for Meade to quote to Lincoln, but partly of his own making, as he had moved the main supply base to a position that was perfect for Gettysburg, but useless for an advance to the Potomac River and beyond.

The failure to attack Lee at Falling Waters had a more complex thought process behind it. There is no doubt that Meade had his men, in numbers, in position and that Lee had developed a strong set of fortifications. The Confederate position was desperate, with their backs to the river, however their blood was up and they were ready for a fight. The fighting spirit of Lee’s army had not been broken and it was still a deadly force with high motivation, they were not shrinking back to Virginia with their tail between their legs. Kilpatrick and Buford had suffered a sting or two during the pursuit, but had equally inflicted some damage on the trains of Lee’s army. The decision not to attack could have been recognition that Lee’s army was prepared, but it may equally be of Meade’s lack of confidence in command at this stage of the war. He had been in command only fourteen days (from the day appointed to command on June 28 to the day his army arrived in front of Lee’s defensive line on July 11) and additionally had not sought command by espousing grand schemes of attack. He was not an arrogant man and did not seek glory. In fact, he remained quiet even after strong performances at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville—he did, however, seek recognition. This reluctance to brag made him stand out from the likes of the former commanders of the army, Hooker and McClellan, but it also led to him understating his intentions to Halleck and the president, thus reinforcing an image of low-activity levels.

Lincoln, in pressing Meade, also knew that at that particular time he had no successors in the wings. Reynolds, who had turned down the job before Meade was appointed, was now dead. The corps commanders generally had been uninspiring or disappointing. None had shone through, other than Hancock who was now wounded and unavailable, thus giving Lincoln no answer from within the Army of the Potomac. The return of Hooker, Burnside, or McClellan was unthinkable due to both failed previous military campaigns and their penchant for political aspirations. The difference between those three was that Lincoln recognized that Hooker and Burnside may still have some use, while McClellan was a liability. To transfer a successful