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Statutory Construction Review

Statutory Construction Review

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

Footnote No.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill.5 People of the Philippines v. in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee. 1925) Chapter I. d FACTS: Republic Act No. and lastly. d . scope. 121” does not embrace. L-22945 (March 3. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. expressed in its title. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble.” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature. Footnote No. to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses.R. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine. and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. 25c. No. 7a. In Section 3 of the same act. Page 12. “A bill shall embrace only one subject. L-24396 (July 29. 37. 1968) Chapter I. 37. and consequences of the law. 203 G. Page 12.R. which may be enacted into law.46 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v. it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). cannot embrace more than one subject. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Respondent is empowered. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. When there is doubt as to its validity. which shall be expressed in its title. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. 121”. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. National Power Corporation Case No.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. No. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. Buenviaje Case No. 8 G.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.

language of such precision as to mirror. 1994) Chapter I. 81 G. which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice.6 Cordero v. the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover. Cabatuando Case No. 291 G. Act No. No. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. d .R.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. 37. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 7675. fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. L-14542 (October 31. Footnote No. Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. 7675.R. LATIN MAXIM: 20a. Abalos Case No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. will be regarded as valid. L-114783 (December 8. Page 12. and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be.A. No. Footnote No.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. 1199. a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. 1962) Chapter I.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. No. d FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII. Hon. Page 12. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion.

LATIN MAXIM: d . Page 13. which is Cotabato. it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law. No. section 3 of the Jones Law. section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing. is invalid. 14019 (July 26. now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917.51 FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas. payable every three months. L-28089 (October 25. Rizal adopted its Ordinance No.7 Ayson and Ignacio v. now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. No.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. “An Act amending the Administrative Code. 11 G. prompted by the upcoming elections. violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. 1919) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan v. which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province. Commission on Elections Case No. are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government.’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality. It does not violate Paragraph 17. which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. 1967) Chapter I. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive.R. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title. section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. 148 G. which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents.” It does not violate Paragraph 17. in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. after payment of a fee of P50 annually. and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur.R. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. 13. Footnote No. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. Page 13. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 51d .8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A. 4122. The controlling purpose of Act No. He failed to pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage.R. He pleaded as a defense that the company. and liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness. and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. 169 G. the latter owed the company a balance of P275. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Reyes Case No. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly. costs. having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage.R. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad.50 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements. entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section. After applying this sum. Footnote No.47 with interest. The cases were dismissed. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him. as provided by Act No. v. and need not recite the details of the Act. with interest. 37 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 4122. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with. 1972) Chapter I. 4122 is valid and enforceable. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. L-32613-14 (December 27. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature. 43263 (October 31. 208 G. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. No. HELD: Yes. Page 13. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents. 1935) Chapter I. Ferrer Case No. 1700. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. to which the Government appealed. No.” is valid. HELD: Act No. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. Footnote No. 9d.

and both Resolutions No.9 Del Rosario v.R. and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. et al. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act.R. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. and for Other Purposes. possession. Case No.” ISSUES: 1. and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. 51d FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution. the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only. which was “an Act to regulate the importation. Page 14. pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. At the time of the enactment of Act No. HELD: No. acquisition.” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 230 G. 1957) Chapter I. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. 33 G. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. 1 of both Resolutions. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. 1907. No. 50 . 46a. 9d. Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. W/N Act No. 55 FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. HELD: No. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969. Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention. and transfer of firearms. use. Carbonell.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention. Footnote No. whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. 36a. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. No. 1780 on October 12. and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject.” did not include weapons other than firearms. L-32476 (October 20. L-9659 (May 29.

Footnote No. it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it. Page 19. (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail. trial and judgment of treason cases. 38a . ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. Page 16. L-239 (June 30. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. Footnote No. No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time. 210 G. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. FAO No. L-14432 (July 26. and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Apolonio Carlos Case No. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No.R. 4003.R. 37–1. 37–1 was valid. (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution. Leoncio Lim. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 1960) Chapter I. the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration. the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law.10 People of the Philippines v. LATIN MAXIM: 37. guilty of treason. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.83 FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant. 204 G.63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. the accused in violation of said order. FAO No. No. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. 37. Leoncio Lim Case No. 1947) Chapter I. Although FAO No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37–1 was invalid. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: In March 1954. challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. HELD: No.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title.

PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. 1972.June 30.June 30. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1972. 1974. 1973. L-34526 (August 9. ISSUES: 1. 1995. without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB. v. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. as provided in the Act. Case No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1. Garcia Jr.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1.11 KMU Labor Center v. availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. 57 G. No. 1973. Central Bank Case No. PBOAP. No. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP.R. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. 1972 to June 30. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law. the basic law prevails.R. 2. 115381 (December 23. HELD: 1. 2. 1972. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . 1988) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 68 G. 1973.June 30. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation.

HELD: Petition was dismissed.40. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.R.494.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. 3 as So Ching was contending. instead of Administrative Order No. 2. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. HELD: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 30. 35. W/N Administrative Order No.12 China Banking Corp. Honorable Estenzo Case No. 1996) Chapter I. in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989.R. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. The Commission. No. Page 19. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company. plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. 46a . 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 59 G. and its president.A. Furthermore. 2. 3135 is the governing law. 2. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3. After 5 years. in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent. No. ISSUE: 1. 3135 was the governing rule in their case. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. 1993. therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3. CA Case No. 1960) FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. 121158 (December 5. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec. or any of its rules. No. Respondent. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees. On April 28. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R. 2. ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply. They were appealing that Act No. ISSUE: 1. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. Footnote No.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. So Ching. L-14740 (September 26. cannot amend an act of Congress. v. 1. Act No. 140 G. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. Administrative Order No. Thus.

referring only to an appointive position. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT. unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. 141 G.98 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan Case No. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. ISSUE: W/N Respondent.” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. L-15807 (April 22. 1963) FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. Page 23. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings. exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.R.13 Grego v.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains. No.” “and internal organ fees. Incidentally.” “meat inspection fees. Since Respondent was reelected. No. 125955 (June 19. 120 G. which has a technical meaning. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees. it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.” “corral fees. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. 1997) Chapter I. 24. Footnote No.R. Commission on Elections Case No. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. in the issuance of Ordinance No. this does not fall under the scope of the term. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees. 1981. 655. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31. who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. 37 . The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. 46c rd FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No.

On the second issue. the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement. 73 G. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v. . CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy Case No. then from 1982 to 1985. Reyes Case No. and hence. res judicata does not apply. that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price.R. 87047 (October 31.R.600. No.400. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof. 11a. On the compromise agreement. No. and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. and hence.14 National Housing Authority v. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6. LATIN MAXIM: 1.600.00. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. 26.00 pursuant to PD 42. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1. 49439 (June 29. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired. the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent.000 sq/rn.00. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. ISSUE: 1. After it expired. 85 G. whichever is lower. and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. 1990) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25. x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. The petition for Certiorari is granted. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments. but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises.

And E. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 50 FACTS: Petitioner. an “Iglesia ni Cristo”. 40b . 115044 (January 27. Case No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. HELD: R. license or permit.D. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union Case No.O. 1995) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victoriano v. to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling.R. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions. No. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. 2. Then President Aquino issued an E. 74 G. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments.A. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution. but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P. Alfredo S. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. 1974) FACTS: Executive Order No. The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.D.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union.A. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P. provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. In 1998. 6c. No. Lim v. ISSUE: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Felipe G. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2.15 Hon. 44. ISSUE: 1.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. No. No. Pacquing. No. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise. as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. 37. L-25246 (September 12. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. 169 expressly repealing PD.R. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R. 0. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. 169 G. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai.

HELD: No. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties. 39a . 287 G. No.R. Carpio Case No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. and on the day from which it should be counted. 9a FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13. No. unless otherwise provided. Tuvera Case No. the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed. 1929) FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. Page 37. the ownership would vest in the Defendants.159 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v. 13 of the Administrative Code.16 Tañada v. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule. with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time. declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. 55 G. August 13. which cannot in any event be omitted. the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount. therefore. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. L-63915 (December 29. and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land. In computing any fixed period of time. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. 31025 (August 15. Without such notice or publication. Footnote No. 1986) Chapter I. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. 1928. Publication in full should be indispensable. the Defendants appealed that by that time. the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. 1928. The court. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.R.

1921 was one day late. the court. 1912. On Feb 28. However. By various orders of the court. with government as the purchaser. in this case. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. HELD: Sec. Lichauco Case No. 9. “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”. the principal was arrested. No. in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal. it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. The sale here of the property must stand. there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. 25c . set aside the order of forfeiting the bond. 1912. the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof.R. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided. inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court. L-17986 (October 21. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. and finally occurred on July 8. As a result. 56 G. 1921) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.17 Guzman v. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.R. as amended by Act No. if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday. No. The term “month” must now be understood to refer to calendar month. 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila. the sale was postponed from time to time. the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. 8223 (March 4. On July 13. On July 10. the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. 88 of the CCP. to pay the Plaintiff. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec.S.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7. Paniaga Case No. and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. it shall be excluded. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. 2588. and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. 1914) FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. v. 161 G. 1912. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. or to deposit in court. LATIN MAXIM: 6c HELD: The payment made on August 11. and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. on application of the sureties. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named future date.

Agrarian Court dismissed petitions. The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28. while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday. reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. No. 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. 11a. stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. Page 47. Moreover. 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. 37. April 11 and April 12. claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. L-25327 (May 29. 12a. Footnote No. 9c.R. L-25326 (May 29. Section 3 of Act No. The date March 28. 98382 (May 17. injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Hidalgo Case No. 1993) Chapter I. Footnote No.195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. 9a. 1969 falls on a Friday. For failure to pay the obligation. In Concepcion v. Page 52. No. 30b. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. the section would have expressly said so. CA Case No. 43 . 9b FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 238 G. 1970) Chapter II. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy.18 PNB v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. Then. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises. 36a. 124 G. No. the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. 1970) and G. Andueta. respectively.R. the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication.R.19 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans. a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.

28. did not own property of the assessed value of P500. 37 . 2. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. Footnote No. 20a. Both qualifications are under a single head. Footnote No. 1898. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. and of the statute as a whole. No. 9c. Page 53. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof. L-41106 (September 22. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. 300 G. 13. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. Evidence showed that the Appellants. 12a. 24a HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter. v. Petition denied.19 U. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. 1911) Chapter II. LATIN MAXIM: 10.22 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 36a. 11a. If the property qualification is actual/market value. except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro.R. FACTS: Respondent. 1977) Chapter II.R. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. 6160 (March 21.S. Eduvala Case No. In the statute. Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations. Navarro Case No. from voting. Page 52. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. No. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. 149 G.

25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction. No. 1935) Chapter II. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517. Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. San Diego Inc. 1931. Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area.E. A few years later. Yulo Case No. 26 G. said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land. No. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Petitioner. 3899). v. as well as unjust eviction. No. 3899). 255 G. Albay. L-42293 (February 13. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. Footnote No. Esteban T. as further amended by Act No. 1986. the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65.R. 80223 (February 5. Shortly thereafter. 27 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao.20 Regalado v. While it may depart from its source. In her defense. 3899.R. CA Case No. On November 16. 1993) Chapter II. Page 55. Page 56. Villar assumed office. LATIN MAXIM: 1. On December 17. PD 1517.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. 25a . 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. Act No. 1934. Footnote No. 203 of the Administrative Code. 46a FACTS: On March 3. amended further by Act.

in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 1942. payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. Footnote No. Page 56. David Case No. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.21 Araneta v. L-6355-56 (August 31. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. 9a FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Dinglasan Case No. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v.R. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. 84 G. Page 56. by the Legislature. said proclamations were also terminated. to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. L-2044 (August 26. No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. 98 G. 1949) Chapter II. 8. No. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public. That when Congress convened again on Jan.33 FACTS: Executive Orders. 1. Through the separation of powers. such a task must be done by the Judiciary. 7a. HELD: No. 1953) Chapter II. 6c. 671 (Emergency Powers Act). were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. Sec. 24a . HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. While Art. Footnote No.

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. 47 G. with the exception of Floresca. Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and wanton negligence. if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts. 46a.R. the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather. Thereafter. No. the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. Salazar Case No. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Therefore.26 Floresca v. in a concurring opinion. charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s Compensation Act. However. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion. then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. 1990) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining operations. a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. 1990. 17. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Furthermore. 48 . The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Philex Mining Corporation Case No. No. L. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically. 92163 (June 5. the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. However. 40 G. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.30642 (April 30. recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 40a FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10. Petitioners. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine.

theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent.D. No.R. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints. the decision against him was invalid. No. Page 67. 278 G.74 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling. 162 G. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No. especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 3a. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. 65097 (February 20. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.65 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. 6b.D. Page 63. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 7a .27 Manikad v. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner. Under RA No. Tanodbayan Case No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. RA No. the use of “sole” in P. 1956) Chapter II. 1984) Chapter II. Cebu. 7a. Footnote No. even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. Section 7 of P.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. L-10662 (December 14. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. 35 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga. Hermosisimo Case No.D. Hence. HELD: No. 1716-A refers to police authority. Footnote No.

24a FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. Macarandang. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. Footnote No. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. Mapa Case No. 211 G. admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions. 46c .R. invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. Page 69. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. 35. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. No.87 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. Defendant. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. Moro Macarandang Case No.R. 7a. 30a. LATIN MAXIM: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. No. HELD: Yes. 6c.28 People of the Philippines v. 1959) Chapter II.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. 1967) Chapter II. L-12088 (December 23. Page 69. 213 G. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. L-22301 (August 30.

R. The check was deposited on January 3. L-2934 (November 29. 1993) Chapter II. in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense. No. HELD: No. Sometime in September 1948. No. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. postdated November 30. Page 69. 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank.29 Co v. 7a. Sarmiento Case No. It was dishonored two days later.91 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. Footnote No.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. LATIN MAXIM: 1. According to them. 37. At the time of the issuance of the check. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. 46a FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail.R. an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566. Que v. 1951) FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1. 1984. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. 24a. 65 G. should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. 1983. 2a. 100776 (October 28. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public. 43 . the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT. CA Case No. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. 150 G.

Eleven days later. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled. in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. Commission on Elections Case No. 1941. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. ISSUE: W/N said Act no.” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No.R. No. L-16197 (March 12. Ramirez Case No. which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land. and binding to all future owners of the same. LATIN MAXIM: 36a.8 FACTS: On September 15. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.” LATIN MAXIM: d . and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner. 37. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. 149 G. a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation. “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain. Footnote No.R. 1920) Chapter III. 48634 (October 8. and for other purposes. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties. The land involved is a private agricultural land.30 Sumulong v. d FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years. 56 G. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands. Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga. Page 79. cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. 2874. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. No. 1941) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Capiz v.

or rebellion. reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed.D. P. pointed. insurrection. viz. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P. ISSUE: W/N P. Footnote No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. No.31 Eugenio v. but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. 9. Legislative intent is the controlling factor.D.D.D. 109404 (January 22. 957 will be given retroactive effect.R. Sec. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”. It failed to state one essential element of the crime. two lots. Applying P. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. connected with or related to subversion. No. 1978) Chapter III. No. b2 . erred in applying P. HELD: No. 9. or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of.D. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P. 104 G.D.D. 9. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.16 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner. Drilon Case No. “The intent of the statute is the law.D. 1996) Chapter III. the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Purisima Case No.D. Petitioner claims that the Exec. No.R.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. L-42050-66 (November 20. organized lawlessness or public disorder. 221 G. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. Nos. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. Footnote No. it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P. Page 76. Page 81.

1980) Chapter III.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Nos. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage. 25a. ISSUE: Whether or not P. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.R. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court.D. HELD: The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. thus bringing the case at hand. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Page 82. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P. declaring that P. the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. Echaves Case No. which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. 772. Footnote No. has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. 36b . No. According to Respondent. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did.22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. L-47757-61 (January 28. City of Cebu Case No.D. L-14526 (March 31. Hence. Footnote No. 4 G. the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently. through its ordinance.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. 36b FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. Page 77.D.D.23 FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.32 People of the Philippines v. 1965) Chapter III.R. both fall within the scope of the power granted. 207 G.

taking part in the election is meant. on the other hand. defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings. Case No. 10201 (September 23. Inc. converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code. Footnote No.28 FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. 11e. No. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. “Sec. He appealed that the existence of a semi-colon. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. 80 G. not capacity to assume office. that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the quarterly payment made. No reason is shown why. does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. 105 G. 36d FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion. No. the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. Footnote No. Aquino Case No. Tarlac. Four days after the proclamation. 9d. The Respondent contends. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. Aquino claimed that age requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. 11a. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section. Page 83.” LATIN MAXIM: 11a. 1957) Chapter III.R. 36b . The Supreme Court said that.R.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. TMX Sales. after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the election”. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription.33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment). Page 83. 36b. 83736 (January 15. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. 1992) Chapter III. provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements.

separated by the comma. 519. or heading.S and therefore an alien. a citizen of the U. No. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation.34 US. allowed by the law of his own state or country. 26. Petitioner.R. 33 FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila. and which might be proved. allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. is covered by Sec. therefore was not a viable defense. is covered by Sec. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature. 636.” The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court. v. Footnote No. 636. 25a. “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses. and in this connection. 131 G. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. being a US citizen. No. disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks. 1918) Chapter III. Page 86. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. 12767 (November 16. it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. 1913) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. of a section being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country. separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts.38 FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner. 37. attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized. may be proved. but Petitioner contends that Sec.R. or inserting others when necessary. which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject. L-8327 (March 28. thus an alien. or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. 42a. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”. The epigraph. The will duly probated. Hart Case No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. 48 . If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will. Sec. defendants are acquitted. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. LATIN MAXIM: 11e. 159 G. Inasmuch as defendant had.

Footnote No. and suggests that the law is applicable only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. After conviction. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous. Judgment was reversed. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. 7a FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. his conviction for murder is not different because it involved homicide. Mendoza Case No.43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself. 231 G. he was punished with the maximum period for murder. He was consequently charged for murder. which are mere catchwords or reference aids.R. in accordance with Art. No. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. 85472 (September 27. 160. Page 87. LATIN MAXIM: 50. No. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the text. d .112 G. heading. They were tried and convicted.R. 160. L-38076 (November 4. there is no need to resort to the preamble. Yabut Case No.35 People of the Philippines v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. not create doubts. or from the Spanish caption. HELD: No. According to him. 1933) FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. consulted to remove. HELD: No. While serving sentence. 1993) Chapter III. he killed another prisoner. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question.

and defendant was never in jeopardy. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English. 110 G. the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . because the complaint was not signed by the offended party. HELD: No. but it was denied and he was convicted. Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del primero de Marzo. and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. Quintanar Case No. Subsequently.S. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The English and original text says: “on and after March 1. No.” HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. 1761. 1933) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. v. 1908”. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. After trial. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy.36 People of the Philippines v. 5654 (August 27. 162 G. it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law. Manaba Case No.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo. in violation of Sec. On appeal. 1910) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. 32 of Act No. the “Opium Law”. The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling. Art. 36a FACTS: Defendants. No. L-39037 (October 30. Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter. 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. on the night of March 1. it shall prevail over its translation.R.

R. the judgment. However. Even if there was a new judgment. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). 175 G. not destroyed. drawn in part from American and English precedents. 51 and 52. The preference on Mata was based on Art. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. 7896 (March 30. 496. 1914) Chapter III. LATIN MAXIM: 9c.49 FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure. which it does not harbor. are a term exceeding three years. However. Sec. The only exceptions.60. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons. until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken. 39 G. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. 496. No. and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. China Banking Corporation Case No. in the duration of Mata’s judgment. orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure.37 Employees’ Club. ISSUE: With these two cases. or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered.666. 49 . should prevail. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. only real rights can be registered. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Footnote No. Act No. But the English enacted by the Legislature. Page 88. 1934) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION McMicking v. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because it is not a real right. strictly. it is simply reversed. rent to corresponding years paid in advance. v. And likewise.R. Inc. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. there was yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17. or the Torrens system. is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. No. Lichauco Case No. 49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. 40188 (July 27. which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment execution is. Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment.

on the day following the accident. not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. L-72873 (May 28.57 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. 1962. are still considered dependents under the Act.54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vda. HELD: Although there was no written notice.R. if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself. 9a. W/N Art. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. Footnote No. HELD: Yes. Page 89. 17 FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12. ISSUE: 1. 7a. W/N there was a valid notice. Racquel. 1961. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. No. with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. No. While Art. they were lawfully wedded. 1987) Chapter III. the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. Footnote No. 12a. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed. 11d. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8. 2/5 of the lot. and unmarried. there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. However. De Macabenta v. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale. 9c.38 Alonzo v. 156 G. to the posthumous daughter of the deceased. representing the portions bought. 1970) Chapter III. 2. which led to his death 16 days later. 11e. despite their obvious knowledge of it. 8. whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents.R. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale. 10. Page 89. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death. the Petitioners occupied after the said sales. 12a. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter. 37 . ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. By virtue of such agreements. the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice. 11 G. L-27489 (April 30. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No.

37 . ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. 37. the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. In 1953. HELD: Yes. No. said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to public policy.R.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance Company v. Frances. 8. No. In the case at bar. Case No. Otherwise. the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec.64 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In 1947. and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. 1983) Chapter III. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land. 48 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. In this regard. 290 G. HELD: No. et al. the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants. 9b. in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction. Therefore. Page 90. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No.R. v. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. LATIN MAXIM: 4. represented by his widow. 36a. L-7747 (November 29. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. 125 G. with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. 9c. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company. Footnote No. et al. but because Sergio Nicolas died. 34382 (July 20.39 Tinio. must. no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. 1955) Chapter III. together with the fruits of the land as damages. In 1943. he was substituted by his heirs. Page 91. 11a. and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. such as Plaintiff Company. 38b. prove legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. Engaging in a stevedoring business. 28 FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40. Page 93.000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15. he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. 1462 of Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1923) Chapter III. Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and sent a check of P1. Under the provisions of Sec.800. Again. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law. again due within the next three months. doing business in the City of Manila. No. In a previous law RA 2073.800 to Petitioner. 9c. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25. one may consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. He now executed a new promissory note. 2992). the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work. 5b. Petitioner filed a complaint. However.40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. No. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 37 . Footnote No. the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. 113 G. 36a. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. which was cashed.71 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. 4. 154 G. 1462 of Act No. Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1.422. when the intent of a law is ambiguous. the Internal Revenue Collector. the intent of the framers is clear. Trinidad Case No. 2711.850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15. Thus. 1922) Chapter III. 18316 (September 23. Page 91. consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports. As a rule of construction. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. Therefore. with its gross receipts from the said business amounting to P242. 9c. After three months.R. the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor. 19864 and 19685 (October 17. HELD: No. 2711.000 to Respondent.000. at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo.R. and with this note. 281. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation. On the same day. which had been paid under protest. Martinez Case No.33. 2711. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921. Footnote No.800. and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. unlike the previous law. Therefore. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times.93 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. 11a. the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. the sum of P2. 1462 of Act No.000.81. he must give back P11. with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only a month later and with a check for only P600. since only the interest is forfeited.

a corner of approved public. or location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands. 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna. L-34135-36 (February 24. L-9144 (March 27. disclaimed such consent. Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie points. a clear disregard of their agreement. 297 G. private or mineral land survey. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping Petitioner’s claims. along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling. Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey. HELD: Sec. Page 94. and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v. b2 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. looking at the legislative history of the statute. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records.R. a junction of known rivers or creeks. Army Corps of engineers. No. 1915) Chapter III. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. a kilometer post of public road. Page 95. 19 and 20 are constitutional. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Petitioner prospected 183 claims. 2 of the Mining Law (C.41 US v. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Upon reaching the witness stand. 22a. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid. Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. 36b . nevertheless. Footnote No. No. a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads. 31 G. a known public or private structure.R. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Nos.102 FACTS: Defendant.A. De Guzman Case No. 33. Petitioner however. it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. However. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. 137) provides: “For the purpose of this section. 47 par. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid. or other government agencies.” An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Consequently. Footnote No. 30a. Luna Case no. the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice. Bureau of Mines. Finally. 1981) Chapter III.

42 Baga v. 1991) Chapter III. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. RA 390 Sec. The Civil Code does not prevail. 27 G. HELD: No. the Court revealed that the records of Batasan. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore. PNB Case No. No. 43. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code.103 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 88 G.R. it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. 50. not covered by the said law. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. 24b. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. Petitioner alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. Page 95. 17. b2 .R. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. Footnote No. 26. RA 390 provides that a guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. However. Footnote No. CA Case No. Thus. and is therefore. 87416 (April 8. the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank. Vol. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.110 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. L-9695 (September 10. 1956) Chapter III. b2 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. Page 96. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. No.

b2 FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the collection of a sum of money. 106724 (February 9.R. 89 includes the members of the PC.R. Footnote No. 185 G. Tan Kim Liong. Thus. Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. 38b. In other words. Case No. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 35. He refused to disclose the sought information. 1973) FACTS: RA 6975. by invoking RA 1405. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor. b2 .43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman. 11e. 12a. Indeed. The trial court declared the said corporation in default. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 21 G. they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). HELD: No. citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. No. No. 27. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. 1994) Chapter III. ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. Furthermore. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. Had it been otherwise. a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier. Jr. 30b. RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current Petitioner Bank. otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept.” laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. 11a. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). Ortega Case No. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. 43. of the Interior and Local Government. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. Page 96. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. L-34964 (January 31. Hence. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.110 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v. 12b.

It is deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. v. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. said court modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund.111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan. Guingona. v. 1961) Chapter III. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on the automobiles. this request having been denied. 118910 (November 16. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law. association or joint venture” with others or “by itself. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration. After the hearing. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and. HELD: No. 36b . Footnote No. No. 67 G. lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. Hence this appeal. No. 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments.” LATIN MAXIM: 34. 15000 (March 29. 173 G. races. Acting CIR Case No. Inc.44 Mayon Motors v.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes.R. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B). Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority. it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. lotteries and other similar activities. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169. Morato Case No. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes. as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.R. controlling in the interpretation of the law. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan. but also the phrase “by itself. et al. HELD: No. Page 96.

A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory. as amended by P. 48886-8 (July 21.133 FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. 444. 34. HELD: The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion.A. 26 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan.. 77 G. it is obvious that the private ports are not included. 1 of C. Nos. Sec. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 30a . 71 G. No.O. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. HELD: No. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. 25d. known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work. and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. 2. shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. Page 101. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec. Iligan City. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only. given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime. No. the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest. Sec. Sec. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. it being enough that he “cease to work. 1957) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Customs v.D.R. provides that “when the work is not continuous.” and may rest completely. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer.D. Footnote No. 1993) Chapter III. as amended by P. 9265 (April 29. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only.45 Luzon Stevedoring Co. ISSUE: 1.R. 72. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Inc. four hours overtime). LATIN MAXIM: 6c. v.

This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. Within three months. No. the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. 1993) Chapter III. 106719 (September 21. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. who were employees of the national center for mental health. carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission.46 Buenaseda v. Page 106. LATIN MAXIM: 27. 9 .R. Footnote No.R. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act. v. 1980) Chapter III. Footnote No. 47 G. 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Page 104. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense. 40 G. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. Case No.146 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. In response. while Sec. Sec. 13(8) of Art. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. and how these statutes are interpreted. L-46908 (May 17. Secretary Flavier Case No. the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. HELD: Yes. it is the duty of the broker to do so. No. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself.141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Carolina Industries Inc. 28 FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing. as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading.

The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. R. 282 G. for P132. owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila. The injury was attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. for P68. R. No L-15290 (May 31.149 FACTS: Mariano Zamora. Page 106. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. being of American origin. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora. HELD: Yes.00 on March 5. Gsell Case No.00 on Feb.000. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora.000. 1916) Chapter III. 176 G. 1951.959. Footnote No. They also purchased a lot located in Q. 9. 1944. 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. No 10765 (December 22. 1951.00 on January 19.00. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken. representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. to pay the sum of P235.000. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora.47 Zamora v. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred.C. HELD: No.00 and sold it for P75. filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. 1963) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. 1944 which they sold for P94.

and Felix Case No. holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2.R. 17 G. Posadas Case No.246. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. for lack of jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action. on the ground that the amount of two notes. 93 G. L-6884 (March 21. L-31088 (December 3. but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action.203. the additional income tax for the income from her paraphernal property. No. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. Cruz Timber Co. Sta. 7a . It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax. was in excess of its jurisdiction.125 and P1. 1956) FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56. returning the sum of P56. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action. in accordance with law. which the Defendant. and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property. collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income tax.59 to said plaintiff.000. according to the complaint. one against the Plaintiff.075. not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the complaint. No. without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual declaration.72. v.R. HELD: No.48 Ossorio v. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. The jurisdiction of a court depends. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Rueda Corp.

1929. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance.R. is valid and sufficient under Sec. the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places. Case No. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. and 15th of February. 33637 (December 31. 1929.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: Yes. 1931) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. b2 FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. 8 G. 9th. No. upon the land itself. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states. 7a. 99 G. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. No. 692 of the California Code.49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Kette and Sellner Case No. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. the sheriff on January 30.000 was in force. 1930) FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10. 1929 and the sale took place on February 19. “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof.R. at the market. 32124 (March 27. to wit. In pursuant thereof. more particularly on the 2nd. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. and on the municipal building of Pasay. and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec.

R. 9a. L-22405 (June 30. Educ. Footnote No. 1922. LATIN MAXIM: 1. However. we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. is substantially the same as that contained in Sec.156 FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23. Due to the failure of J. However. Respondent. and deducted from the bank’s clearing account the said amount. are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Guerrero. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. v. The prohibition contained in said law against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person. 2252. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US’s own postal statutes. These are also in line with Sec. Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office notified the Bank of irregularity. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the Bank of America. 1971) Chapter III. neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero. 135 G. 30587 (December 4.50 Reyes v. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument.000. or to any of his co-Plaintiffs. Soriano Case No. No. No. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure. Rader and J. in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner’s account with the same amount. He managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. b2 FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. 235 G. b2 . the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due.R. Plaintiff Guerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Northcott to pay said amount of P12. Northcott. Therefore. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. LATIN MAXIM: 2b. and on June 29. Wells Case No. as amended by Act No. Page 107. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. the former endorsed the mortgage deed.000. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but was denied. in the absence of any special reason justifying departure from the policy or practice. E. Co.

It was also contended that the phrase “or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees. he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for cancellation. to pay him the sum of P4. No. L-29019 (May 18.000.00 under the WCC. 1972) FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v.000 as moral damages. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation benefits under other laws. 29. LATIN MAXIM: 17. HELD: Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. 39. with legal interest from the date of the decision. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a result.00 plus attorney’s fee of P600. 132 G.900 and pay the sum of P5. generally. 28 G. 40b . Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No.900. ISSUE: W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. L-8257 (April 13. of the national.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws.51 Cruz v. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees.000. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. No. 7a FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6. Defendant Belizo was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4.900 which he paid in check. It is difficult to construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received. the P3. The court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and. provincial or municipal government” in Sec. The claim for damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. 38b.R. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. upon his failure to do so.R. for P4. without deducting the P3. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence. HELD: The resolution of the WCC is modified. Furthermore.000. Pahati Case No. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. 19b. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect in the title. considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC.

Moreover. Garcia to Congress as part of. it cannot be extended. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. the language of which is plain and unambiguous. The term of the court in which the case was tried expired on May 30. Moreover. 48 FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Petitioner’s claims for refund of the margin fees P102. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appeal—the preparation of the papers for transmission to the Supreme Court. L-1449 (November 30. 1903. since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt. No. 27. after the right to remove the case has been secured. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin. given the physical impossibility to comply with it in many cases.R.R. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 41 G.234. But that period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers. Hipolito et al. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period.52 Garcia et al. Two days after. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions. 53 G. Case NO. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601.00 for 1959 and P434. not for the purpose of creating it. and in order to balance. As a matter of fact. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609. 19b. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk’s office.246. 7a . Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 1989) FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1. which was denied on July 23. they excepted to the judgment and presented a motion for a new trial. is a police measure or a revenue measure. 70037 (July 7. v. entitled “An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks’ Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange”. No. at least two cases had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. which on August 5 was allowed and signed by the court. The Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May 21. v. there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute. it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to extend the term. Therefore. 1903) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal. The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become important. the budget for 1959-1960.92 for 1960. considering when the law was adopted. HELD: RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country’s international reserve. On July 28. LATIN MAXIM: 11a.

53 Commissioner of Customs v. pursuant to the provisions of Sec. C. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry was correct. they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner. b2 FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents. and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon. Director of Lands Case No. 141. unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other. 26 G. HELD: No. a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes thereon since 1947. that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. in cases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupation. No.R. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided. namely. Thus.A. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 102 C. and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. The policy in the disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. No. 38a. L-15816 (February 29.A. In the present case. either expressly or by implication. until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. without the record disclosing in our opinion.R. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight. If anyone should be given prior right of entry at all. No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . and of facts which affect their derivation. 1975) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 141). it should be the actual occupants who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. No. Case No. validity and operation. 100 G. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer. to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. 33. it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President. or the Special Import Tax Law. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394. To the contrary. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. 1964) FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code. 36b. L-28329 (August 17.

L-28997 (February 22. and after usual admissions and denials. Since there was a new legal provision to be construed. Hence. Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law. Sec. HELD: No. it was not. he was charged for violating Sec.000 for land taxes to the government. Nos. being a lawyer. while not conclusive. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office. taxes had been paid for. Enrile Case No. should be followed unless clearly erroneous. 32. Under these circumstances. who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility. the same can only be filed by a qualified person. we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. No. 1933) FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. they chose to follow the principle that a public office is a public trust. in April 1932. this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions. The Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor. By September. LATIN MAXIM: 2a FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October 16. 92 G. and being a new position created under RA 4040.R. one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate. 1932. 107 G. such a contemporaneous construction. to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner. that Respondent. interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief. even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes.54 Orencia v. is more qualified than Petitioner. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. And in this case. the answer was not in doubt.R. he was a delinquent in the payment of P2. Hernandez Case No. among others. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23. on the condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation. 42b . The Chief of Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. HELD: For Respondent officials. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. Certainly. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. 1931. is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. At this time. Respondents filed their answer. the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. However. has an ambiguous aspect. one which admittedly. and he has been performing functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as such until RA 4040. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and public office.

In accordance with RA 3208. 1 of RA 3802. Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose. there is no obligation of Respondent Corporation. applicant shall cease its operations. This can be seen in Sec. This is a petition seeking to set aside the ruling rendered. BOC gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. In the case at bar. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. the price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the lots is at least P120. LCH Project 3. other stations or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. 1986) Chapter III. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision. v. 266 G.R. 236 G. which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. In January 1979. and operate. In 1977. 36b . Footnote No. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. For mandamus to lie. 1988) Chapter III. now NTC. In 1971. Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication. 73603 (June 22. in reference to Sec. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners. aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes.55 Sagun v. subject to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities. there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is being offered. Page 112. Page 112. Moreover. No.. L-60548 (November 10. clear and certain. apart from its principal station in Makati. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.R.180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Global Communications. Footnote No. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct. Petitioner’s rights should be well-defined. Relova Case No. Thus. low cost housing for those who are unable to provide themselves with this. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. the lots located in Block 330. Petitioners decided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq m. However. No. an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. which was in violation of RA 3802. Manila was designated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes.181 FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent. maintain. 9a FACTS: In 1976. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation Case No. before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. HELD: No. under RA 3802.

HELD: Yes. Page 112. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended.183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. 37. Page 113. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. Sugar Central Agency v. 11d . and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. in and by which millions of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves. HELD: No. 241 No. Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid. wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed or levied upon.416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United States in a wharf on Pulapandan. Footnote No. Footnote No. 24 No. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act. 43 FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.186 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund. free from import duties. shipped 5. 38b. 4.56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Under the law in effect at that time. offer two options to an importer. Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. provided the articles mentioned are exported within three years from importation. Collector of Customs Case No.629.124. 4. it is non-extendible. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so “would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government. Commissioner of Customs Case No. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government. 6 1927) Chapter III. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties. Defendant collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf.42 which the Petitioner paid under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. 5b.” Dissenting Opinion: Historically. the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1year period. 27761 (Dec. The first gives him the privilege of importing. LATIN MAXIM: 3a.

CA Case No. the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983. No. L-22753 (December 18. rice. To carry out this function.190 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramos v. RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation. 38b FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for additional compensation for overtime work. that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). HELD: No. Not a matter of right. be granted to RCA workers and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. under law. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. 164 No. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. HELD: While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts. unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation. ISSUE: W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created – for the said obligation. Footnote No. a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the price of palay. and not for profit. and corn. Also. There has been consistent administrative interpretation by the Office of the President as to what may. which was possessed with a distinct and separate corporate existence. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. 1960) Chapter III. Page 114. 4 of RA 309. 37. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 6g. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. they are merely an office directly under the President. 38b . 1967) Chapter III. Footnote No. Page 115. Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC. it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. night work and work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act.193 FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. Thus. 253 G.R. Games and Amusement Board Case No. 11a. it is entitled to great weight and consideration. L-12727 (February 29. as amended by RA 983. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run.

L-28153 (January 28. 94.R. HELD: No. suspension. 30a. the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. After the trial. Page 115. possess full and final authority in disciplining. 267 G. 38b . No. 38b FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila.195 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. the President transferred them under herein Respondent.P. Thus. the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. On appeal. No. Buenviaje Case No.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. 6c.58 Salaria v. 1971) Chapter III. Under RA 51 and E. A formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. Page 115. particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families.O. 305 G. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. the Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U. including those of the Philippine General Hospital. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is final. 1978) Chapter III. 970 was issued by the President stating that “except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction. CA Case No.193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION University of the Philippines v. a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. Thus. independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. Memorandum Circular No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. namely. 20c. L-45642 (February 28. Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service Commissioner. and removal of the civil service employees of the University. 9b.R. personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case. Footnote No. or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.

As such. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-43760 (August 21. 94. Company.59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. 46505 (November 7. ISSUE: 1. 1939) FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. 128). 94 is in accordance with law. 2a. The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate.A. At that time. contemporaneous construction is given weight. HELD: Yes to both. No. etc. the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. which is 432. They were asked to pay P992. the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. whose admission price exceeds P0. W/N Regulations No. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. Also. which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. their receipts were P15. The partnership charged admission fees of P0. imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters. which they refused to pay. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. 1976) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Everett v. which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act. No.40 (Sec. 43 G. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . During the first Quarter of 1937. No. 120 G.50. 39a FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queen’s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937. 1458. 1&3 of C.R.70 per seat. CIR. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec.40 but not more than P0. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code.41. Bautista Case No. cinematographs.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Bureau of Labor Relations Case No. Inc.R. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of the law. 881. Sec. 1458 of the Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed.

Later. 2 and Policy Instruction No.60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. 40c FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. However. 62 G. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for reconsideration. there has been an agreement to a P22.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1. if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous. PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor supporting the PAI Management. 9 are valid. 1977 regarding the increase. Inciong Case No. No. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. HELD: No. Moreover. NLRC Case No. At this point. provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 1988) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. on May of the same year. ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P. 1123 has been passed.R. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. L-52415 (October 23.D. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpretation by PAI Management. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that will retroact from April 1. 119 G. IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. ISSUE: 1.D. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. There was no formal agreement on April 2. PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.R. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. 37. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. CBA stipulated a P22. Moreover. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 17. Management argues that since on April 2. In the case at bar. Sec. L-50320 (March 30.00 increase. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . P. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P. the same must be declared null and void. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. No. 1977. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. And also. (PAI) on April 2. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE). W/N Sec. 1977 and was signed on September 7.00. 1977. IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct.00 will be given the difference. 1123. 1977. 1123 granted a P60. 2.D.

and death. sickness. In a previous case contested in the Philippine Assembly. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. 6b. Footnote No. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act. The conclusion to which was. HELD: Yes. However. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain. 316 G. It would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality. LATIN MAXIM: 6a.61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances. 9a. or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act.214 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The same was the case and decision of the Executive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. 432 of the Election Law. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties. waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late payment of remittances. therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them. 3a. L-26712-16 (December 27. Nevertheless. there is no room for interpretation. he is a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate. one of the qualifications is that he/she who is running should be a “duly qualified elector therein”. 1969) Chapter III. 7a. waive. his hometown. 6c. Page 206. 293 G. Page 118. 1928) Chapter III.R. Footnote No. Abaño Case No. It is sufficient that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. “qualified elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter and need not be register. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. He is qualified to run for local office.206 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Yra v. it has no legal authority to condone. The reason of the law is “to develop. “qualified electors” and “qualified voter” the law means what it says. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. upon knowledge thereof. 30187 (November 15. 11a . No.” Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Fernando Ma.R. old age. claiming that the assessed penalties were inequitable. However. Laurel. Social Security Commission Case No. 26 FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. it is not least to disregard the forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases. establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people… to provide employees against the hazards of disability.

3a. 2113 were enacted and ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command. HELD: Yes. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation. The regulations were approved on September 16. impost. the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Footnote No. b. 121 and 127 of the Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance. “When the provisions of Act No. ISSUE: 1. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. Before the Governor-General gave his order. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Footnote No. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18. the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press. the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. Sec. Inc. and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. Pursuant to Sec. 134 G.62 Interprovincial Autobus Co. 1924. 2113 and Sec. Petitioner asked for a refund and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in their favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. v. No. 1918) Chapter III. there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 4 FACTS: Petitioner. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax. L-13862 (April 15.222 & 227 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: McCulloch Dick Case No. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. 69 of the Administrative Code. the same provisions of stamp tax.223 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No.R. Page 120-121. The regulation (Sec. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had.R. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Petitioner.. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value of the goods transported. W/N the Court of Appeals’ decision is erroneous. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. or any penalty in relation thereto. No. Page 120. 4. 1939. 129 G. assessment or tolls. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 9a . L-6741 (January 31. 1956) Chapter III. CIR Case No. bills of landing and receipts were re-enacted. the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force.” In the interpretation of reenacted statutes. 2.

No. stating that it was exempted from withholding tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor. applies to municipal officers in general while Sec.222 and 224 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Laxamana v. Ltd. 21 does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. Footnote No. thus subject to income tax. such action is confirmatory to an extent that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office. Plaintiffs stated that since Sec. Also. 1952) Chapter III. This took place within the Philippines. 21 of the Revised Election Code. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Sec. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. However.63 Howden & Co. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. which was taken from Sec. This principle is not applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. 4. Footnote No. Baltazar Case No. on behalf of Plaintiff. a domestic corporation.. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code.R. entered into reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. HELD: Yes. v. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. 50 . by virtue of Sec. 1965) Chapter III. HELD: No. the vice-mayor shall assume office. Only the tax rate was amended. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Page 121. the Provincial Governor. 9 G. By virtue of Sec. upon re-enacting Sec. Respondent should assume the vacated position. L-19392 (April 14. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. Finally. 144 G. Hence. the incorporation of Sec. (CIC). The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished letters. Page 120. No. L-5955 (September 19. 38b. 1291 and 2343.225 FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions without substantial changes. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance premiums and. 21 of the Revised Election Code. the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. 4 FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted. A special provision overrides a general one. 53 and 54 were “substantially re-enacted” by RA 1065. the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. paid income tax on the premiums. 2180 in Sec. said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative approval by re-enactment.R. 2180.

Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts.R. 20a.226 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NPC v. 49 . the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. they must be given great respect. Province of Lanao del Sur Case No. No. was not subject to item-veto. Footnote No. With the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). In the present case. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the tax exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes. Page 122. the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. 6c FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt status was revoked by P. 5a. the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. Furthermore. 187 G. since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT.R. Page 121. this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. 38a. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. 1931. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence. 2. 9a. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status. 3a. the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. It is clear from reading Sec. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the vetoed Sec. but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes. including its exemption from payment of RPT. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges. Pangasinan. ISSUE: 1. HELD: Yes. 5b. the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder.232 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen. 96700 (November 19. 3899. Also. 2b. 1936) Chapter III. Thus. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Note however. No. Furthermore.D. Hence. 7 was valid. However. but its privileges were only suspended.64 Bengzon v. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to pay. Secretary of Justice Case No. 37. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance. that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against. Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions. 1996) Chapter III. the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void. L-42821 (January 18. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace to gratuities. He relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisions of Act No. 32 G.

65 J. Tuason and Pili vs. 1978) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J. HELD: OCT No. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates. 26.R. L-21064 (February 18. 40c . 1970) Chapter XI. Tuason v. No. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the estate. Sec. Tuason & Co. Tuason. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. Tuason. Alcantara vs. allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. The law does not distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be. as long as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. It has a broader scope. 24a. Footnote No. L-33140 (October 23. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova Case No.M. The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. Land Tenure Administration Case No. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. 135 G. v. 735 is valid. 1914 in Case No. 37. 8. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. 735. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The Constitution clearly states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated.M. No. Page 434. 64 G. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735 is valid. Under Art. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No.R. improper venue. 5b FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. “The Congress may authorize.7 FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. laches and prior judgment. 4 of the Constitution. The question is one of constitutional construction. The validity of OCT No. upon payment of just compensation. HELD: No. prescription. 9c. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs.

Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election. who is the Director of Post. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. Act. 5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This proposal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the November 1971 elections relying on Sec. 4052. Also. No. 4 G. ISSUE: W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. 37 . 1 of Art. L-34150 (October 16. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No.” ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. 7a FACTS: Respondent. In this case. announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 154 G. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. 6 of the Constitution. Ruiz Case No. the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. 1 of Art.66 Tolentino v. 45459 (March 13. Art. 1937) FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. Commission on Elections Case No. No. who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. 13. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. 1. HELD: There was a violation. 1. 1971) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aglipay v. no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter.R. seeks prohibition of such because it violates Sec. Art.R. 36a. Petitioner. “An election” only means one. 15 of the Constitution: “The Congress in a joint session assembled. HELD: Act No.

Page 437. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. Abra and the city of Baguio. No. 1922) Chapter XI. 11g. COMELEC Case No. cities.12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ordillo v. Page 435. Ang Tang Ho Case No 295 G. The Constitution is something solid. Ifugao. only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. municipalities and geographical areas…” From this. Sec. ISSUE: W/N Act No. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone. the law is dealing with private property and private rights.O. No. it can be derived that the term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. The provisions of R.A. 7a. 93054 (December 4. This power is exclusive to the legislative. Defendant will not be charged. Out of the provinces.24 FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “there shall be created autonomous regions… consisting of provinces. no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. 192 G. which are sacred under the Constitution. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. Mountain Province. Resolutions and memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region.O. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R. HELD: Art. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor General. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. 1990) Chapter XI. In fixing the price. 28 . HELD: The act is unconstitutional. legally and validly constitute a region. No. X. Footnote No.S. v. 53 follows Act No. 25a. 17122 (February 27. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are. Footnote No. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet.R. Kalinga-Apayao. As known.67 U. permanent and substantial. E.R. No.A. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.

1950) Chapter XI. 7. in effect. 12. As a contemporaneous construction. Sec. unless otherwise provided by the Constitution. allows members of the Cabinet. Sec. 4. The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. Art. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”. 9a. 1 of the Constitution. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution.33 and 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Civil Liberties Union vs. Vice-President. Reading Art.R. 1991) Chapter XI. Sec. one of who is the city engineer. 13. particularly during the Marcos era. b2 . rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. citing Sec. Vice-President. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The two provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. Petitioner contends that under the Constitution. Footnotes No. Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. and their deputies and assistants shall not. This runs counter to Art. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President. it is clear that Sec. par. No. all officers or employees in the unclassified service are protected by the above provision. According to Lacson vs. 89 G. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. 284 is therefore declared null and void. the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the sense they have in common use.R. until he resigns or is removed for cause. 4 protects those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: “policydetermining. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. Sec. L-3045-6 (August 31. Pages 443. Romero. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President.O. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. and that Respondent’s appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments. 83896 (February 22. their deputies and assistants. Page 440 and 450. Footnote No. 450 and 454. Mallare Case No. 177. E. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 2545 of the Revised Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein. Executive Secretary Case No. 12 of the Constitution which reads: “No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. This is confirmed by the enactment of C. Furthermore.68 De los Santos vs. Nos. 41. he can not be removed against his will and without cause. 51 and 71 FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioner’s removal from the same office which would be the effect of Respondent’s appointment. 9-B. hold any other office or employment during their tenure. members of the Cabinet.” Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer “belongs to the unclassified service”. this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. HELD: No. 2. the Members of the Cabinet. but notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. No. Sec. The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated. LATIN MAXIM: 39 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which. 7. 64 G. 7. rights and privileges.A. HELD: No. 7. Art.

to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable. HELD: No. 1989) Chapter XI. Fox. which does not follow the Masangkay ruling. 78780 (July 23. No. Sec. 1987) Chapter XI. 3. LATIN MAXIM: 3. According to Perfecto vs. and Bernas). Footnote No. b1 . 20a FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries. the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. income taxes are part of the diminution of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. the minimum and the medium. 8 of the Constitution mandating that “during their continuance in office. their salary shall not be decreased”. 217 G. as the alter ego of the people. 10. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art.R. 8 of the 1987 Constitution. have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec.e.R.69 People of the Philippines vs. Page 447. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Footnote No. The penalty for murder under Art. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Meer.42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Nitafan v. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. No. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIMS: 1. In the case at bar. 6c. Meer. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that “…any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal. that is. L-38969 (February 9. Muñoz Case No. Concepcion. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. contrary to the provision of Sec.” ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods. to wit. and that would be reclusion perpetua. 190 G. Art. Endencia vs.46 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. 10 Art. even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. Page 446.

LATIN MAXIM: 6a. The Supreme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935. “if the judgment of the court. is mandatory. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. 9a. Page No. however. 286 G. Respondents alleged. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners. Respondent’s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aratuc v. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a. that six members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives”. even in a doubtful case. 1957) Chapter XI. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Footnote No. Consequently. 1973.R. Upon nomination of the Citizens Party. Footnote No. No. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department. et al Case No.” Hence. L-10016 (February 28. the other Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. This highlights the 1973 Constitution’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari. Lopez.62 FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel. 11a FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa. 25a . and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET. the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari. COMELEC Case No. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel. 6b. 9b. 19 G. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts.R. No. it may be rejected. 451. Then. 1979) Chapter XI. L-49705-09 (February 8.70 Tañada v. Page 452. Lopez. and Primicias. HELD: No. Cuenco. Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. HELD: No.

and to be informed of such right…. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtoto v. 36b. is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. 9a. 98-5-01-SC (November 9. his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. 2. The prohibition is for public policy purposes. Art. 35. to prevent “midnight appointments” – which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. Art. On the one hand. who has not been informed of his right to counsel. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. b FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. 20. the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively. 15. Footnote No. 17. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution.79 FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 1975) Chapter XI. 1973. L-37201-02 (March 3. No. Art. Yes. 38a.R. within 2 months before the election. except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake.M. Nos. 46a . Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible. Page 457. 15. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. 59 A. Sec. but this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections. 7. which occurs only once every six years. 8. No. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. 23. Sec. 1973. ISSUE: 1. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days of such vacancy. During the trial. such confession is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution. 159 G. 20 Art. 2. HELD: No. HELD: 1. Manguera Case No. the appointments were void. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. 50. W/N Sec.71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. 1972 is admissible as evidence. On the other hand. Conversely. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb.

children born of Filipino mothers before January 17. Sandiganbayan Case No. No. 9a.72 Filoteo v. 42a . 1996) Chapter XI.R. No. Footnote No. 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative). ISSUE: 1.82 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. LATIN MAXIM: 8a.80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Co v. without the presence of a counsel. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should. Nos. as a natural born Filipino citizen. On May 30. 1 par. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: Yes. 1982. by such argumentation. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively. 1991) Chapter XI. Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened). W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. 4 Sec. House of Representatives Case No. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. Jose Ong. Under of Art. 46a FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr. 79543 (October 16. Page 457. even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. They need not perform any act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957.R. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution.. ISSUE: 1. Upon the capture of his co-accused. 5a. be admissible. when he was only 9 years old. Page 457. 2. Electoral Tribunal. 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. he was pointed out as the mastermind. he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. elected representative of Northern Samar. Accordingly. When Petitioner was captured. HELD: 1. is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father. 106 G. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution. Yes. 3 of the Constitution. who was born on June 19. Footnote No. Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. 66 G. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 2. Jr.

Page 458. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the requirement of CA approval. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle. Footnote No. The word “also” in the second sentence of Sec. 32.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Domingo v. by the President of “heads of executive departments. ambassadors. Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. 7 only provides for the appointment. 24b.R. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trading”. and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. b FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 24a . 112371 (October 7. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. other public ministers and consuls. Nos.R. No.73 Sarmiento v. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 16 Art. 16. Art. 37 G. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of the first group. for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle. 1987) Chapter XI. 80519-21 (December 17. HELD: No. Sec. 277 G. Mison Case No. Commission on Audit Case No. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 7a. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988. 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. 16 Art. 39a. 1998) FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

No. Public service is a service for public use. Respondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in Sec. there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. Page 124. notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term “public service” introduced by Act No. Public Service Commission Case No. although it is not a common carrier.3 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Luzon Brokerage Co v. justify her dismissal. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use.R. 36b . 76 G. No. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. thereby. 3108 by Act No. 82511 (March 3. Footnote No. Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. On appeal.74 Globe-Mackay v. 1992) Chapter IV. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. L-37661 (November 16. she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. ISSUE: 1. On May 9. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such.R. the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. Moreover. 13 of the Public Service Law. 2. 1932) FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the intent either. Also. 1932. NLRC and Salazar Case No. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. 3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business. 3316. ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 112 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. HELD: The omission from Sec. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages.

75 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROUND 2 .

his rights. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. On January 15. the Board approved Resolution No. No. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P. The word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term. and authority must cease. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. It does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. HELD: 1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. In this case. People v.R. Court of Appeals Case No. etc. On March 15. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. Barros.A.4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.D. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31. the term of office is not fixed by law. 115008 (July 24. R. Nos.R. 1984) Chapter IV. Petitioner’s term of office is deemed expired.76 Aparri v. L-30057 (January 31. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. 1996) FACTS: R. 1866 states that. He was convicted of 2 offenses. G. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P. People v. the Board approved Resolution No. Page 124. but by the Board.D. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Tac-an. HELD: No.A. 6c FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. 1960. Tiozon. but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”. Footnote No. 15 G. which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. duties. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense.” ISSUE: 1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President. Quijada Case No. 1962. 1962. Caling.

and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta. No. whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment. Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven.77 Baranda v. he does not fall under RA 7309. …” 2. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning.D. If the instrument cannot be registered. 25a . Thus. 109445 (November 7. Page 125. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot. due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. among other things. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. 77 of P. No. 2. on appeal to the CA. of Justice Case No. which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. 1994) FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1. ISSUE: 1. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. Office of the Secretary. after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired. Dept.5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basbacio v. L-81163 (September 26. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. 30 G. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. Lot No. G. 1988) Chapter IV. Gustillo Case No. However. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son. and imprisoned. 4517.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: RA 7309. HELD: No. he is not. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. stating the ground therefore.R. ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment. Footnote No.R. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. In the case at bar. “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The Court. 11a. he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing. convicted.

Therefore. ISSUE: 1. The project was eventually cancelled. et al. Sandiganbayan. Gen.R. HELD: No. HELD: Yes. 43575 (May 31. 1935) Chapter IV. 5a. Socrates v. directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. NPC Board approved. subsequent to the approval of Act No. extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality. not thereafter. it is mandatory. no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment. Under the act. 1933. Tayabas. 3899. Joint Venture was disqualified after the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder. 288 No. acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice. Luciano. one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex. Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect. evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. were “downgraded” thereby ineligible as bidders. 1934. The judge of First instance. v. petitioners were suspended from office. Sandiganbayan. 124067 (March 27.” For this. No. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission. Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated. a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1. Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in “one way or the other. his transfer is not a new appointment. regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it.11 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC’s Mindanao project. The lowest bidder. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tanada v. No. with the consent by the Philippine Commission. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information. 7a Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. assigned to Alabat. shall be suspended from office. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Urban Consolidated Constructors. 2. G. the committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. he was transferred to Perez. 7a . but for reasons not on record. Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project. Yulo Case No. Page 127. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Later in his service. Sandiganbayan Case No. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. Footnote No. Mariano. Hence.78 Segovia v.

LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 129 G. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest. However. Although Sec. No. HELD: Yes. 7a. 36b FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communications system. no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. HELD: No. governed by the Public Service Commission. and not just specific provisions. Atty. which is necessary under EO 546 for any public service to operate.R. where the law is clear. 46a. though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases. 30. ordered Petitioner to stop operating. authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. Petitioner. Respondent. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. In 1980. you have to look at the entire Act. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. L-68729 (May 29. Petitioner was created under RA 2036. Petitioner claimed that under the law. P. L-3629 (March 19. recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). the delegation is unlawful. radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. 6c. Plus.79 Eliseo Silva v. owner of another ice plant already in the same area. opposed Respondent’s application. because it didn’t have a certificate of public convenience. After which. after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by Kayumanggi. Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon. and Samar. the Commission nor the Court may not disregard. National Telecom. Under it. 32 of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony. or interpret the law any other way. Respondent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. Case No. 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience. the Respondent.R. to be able to operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. they need such certificates to validly operate. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. 8a. Sec. Under EO 546. Com. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Belen Cabrera Case No. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates. Mindoro. in applying the law. No. Thus. the reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. 1987) G. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. which replaced the PSC. 146 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radio Communications of the Philippines v. circumvent. 49 .D. claiming that public convenience did not need another ice plant.

vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. 992. L-61236 (January 31.R. 217. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. who died intestate without any issue. 1367 amended Sec. ISSUE: W/N Art.D.D. but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-employee relations. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. P. Hon. No. 6c. Thereafter. Pascual-Bautista Case No. 1992) Chapter IV.16 FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. 198 G. the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. 7b. In the process. this Court ruled that “Art. 36b . They may have a natural tie of blood. Page 127. HELD: In Diaz v. Sec. 84 G. IAC. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. However. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual. full blood brother of their father. 7a. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes. But again P. adopted or spurious children. legitimate.80 National Federation of Labor v. Additionally. BP 130 amended the same section. which states that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. 1691 amended Sec. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. No. 7a FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual.” Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Thus the law is clear. In the Labor Code. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”. the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide. Footnote No. Eisma Case No.R. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. acknowledged natural. Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 84240 (March 25. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction.

which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms.R. 201 G. Amigo Case No. the death penalty had been abolished and hence. At the time of appellant’s apprehension. 19 (1). 7b FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years. L-22291 (November 15. the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659. Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. and to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N Sec. HELD: Yes. 116719 (January 18. Footnote No. the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879”. exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. 115 No. LATIN MAXIM: 46a .” LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Santayana Case No. 1976) FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. Page 127.81 People v. HELD: In People vs. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS. the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. No. and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 19 (1). Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 1996) Chapter IV. Muñoz.

82 National Marketing Corp. The complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. et al. and on local legislation. 1965. the month of February in both had 29 days. or hierarchy of values. defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA. Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 90 G. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. Tecson Case No.26 FACTS: On 14 November 1955. 1955 expired was considered to be December 21. HELD: NO. Miguel D. the sum of P7. which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. 43 .R. HELD: NO. Art. it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. it could have provided for a subtitle therefore. No. expired on December 19. 1965. unlike in the other modes of initiative. Page 129. If Congress intended R. 1997) Chapter IV. Commission on Elections. considering that in the order of things. 184 G. (NAMARCO) v. 1960. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from December 21. 7b FACTS: On December 6. Footnote No. Page 127. from December 21. the primacy of interest. so that ten (10) years of 365 days each.R. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution. 1996. 1960 and 1964 being leap years. L-29131 (August 27. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2.18 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santiago v. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint.200 plus 7% interest until the amount was fully paid until May 25. However. No. On 21 December 1965. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. 1955. 2. on statutes. Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. or an aggregate of 3. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Footnote No.. 1969) Chapter 4. it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No.650 days. "When the laws speak of years . Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial case. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). Case No. 127325 (March 19.A.. 13 of our Civil Code.

Also. 39c FACTS: On July 15. 1991) Chapter IV. his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day. who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968. Commission on Audit Case No. Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4. L – 54718 (December 4. which was approved by the Minister of Education.83 Villanueva v. as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Leyte. Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase. W/N the contract was null and void. 9a. which was being utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. 1980. 95398 (August 16. to shoulder the construction cost of the building. it was highly inequitable for the Court to compel the Petitioner. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the approval of the Minister of Education. HELD: No. the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. 1986) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mario R. 2. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Melchor v. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. 177 G. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. The school accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a witness to the contract. LATIN MAXIM: 8a.35 FACTS: On January 25. and that assuming it was effective. HELD: No. ISSUE: 1.R. During construction. The chief accountant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. Also. Consequently. entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of one of the school buildings. 9a. 1983. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect. but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality. Page 133. COMELEC Case No. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. For this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. 12a . No. Footnote No. 170 No.

and interest of P2. 9c. the original owner incorrectly declared the size of the land. only 3 years. 11. 11a. 26. FACTS: In 1907. Page 134. from 1901 – 1907.R. Apparently. L-9337 (December 24. Instead of obeying the writs. 1959. Soon after. a period of 6 years. 1914) Chapter IV. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. 50 HELD: No. Court of Appeals. Footnote No. Thus. Petitioner refused to comply. 86 G. Footnote No.82. 9a. fees. 096. No. He also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. the Court issued two more writs on May 6. on Oct. 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory.38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Jesus v. LATIN MAXIM: 6. he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. or a period of 3 years. Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the Torrens system. 1963. 11e . L – 26754 (October 16. 38b. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. From this period. So. 11 months and 24 days elapsed. For this reason. Petitioner paid the taxes. City of Manila Case No. 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. 11d. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was time-barred. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. Consequently. Hence Private Respondent’s motion for execution was not time-barred. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision dated Oct. the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 – 1910. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. No. 1963 and another on Feb. the date when Private Respondent’s motion for execution was filed. HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. 649.R. 50 G. From Dec. and Exequiel Magsaysay Case No. Page 134. 1956.41 FACTS: Petitioner was ordered. Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. 1958 and April 14. 26. to Dec. the Petitioner filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales. Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. 6.84 Mateo Casela v. 1970) Chapter IV. Petitioner was awarded P1. asking Private Respondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. 11. the time during which the writs of execution could not be served. 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. 1964. 17.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-1910. Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes. 43. to vacate the premises and remove his house.

The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec.85 Federation of Free Workers v. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. No. On September 27. therefore. LATIN MAXIM: 8. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.R. The purpose of the PD is to protect wages and income. The increase was set at May 1. 42 FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. Inciong Case No. as well as the rules issued on the same day. the company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allowance. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. 513 if there are other adequate remedies available. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Paredes Case No. 83 G. 9a. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 1988) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Morales v. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. 1977. ISSUE: 1. their recommendations will be respected by the courts. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure. only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay. While the Motion was still pending. 1930) FACTS: In April 1977. HELD: No. 1977. 2. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion. L-48848 (May 11. 45 G. L-34428 (December 29. Moreover. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such incapability may happen anytime within the year. Sec. No. the application was not a strict rule. No. the company was able prove their financial situation by giving financial statements.R. Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. that action should be finished first. ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec.

L-8639 (March 23. 11a.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. 9c. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. 1992) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. 9. Par (d) Sec. 37. 3 of RA 7166. b2 . HELD: No. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Guia v. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. No. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. 12. 39b FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. they should be allowed adoption.R. COMELEC Case No. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections.R. 125 G. 30 G. LATIN MAXIM: 2. 36a. 37. Republic of the Philippines Case No. No. Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. 26.86 Prasnik v. 335. 104712 (May 6. 8a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. 36b.

500. The act. 1989) Chapter IV. And on the basis of such administrative complaint. No. 9a. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. 6d.R. the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. 1973. Page 136. With regard to prescription. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5185. 49 . of RA No. Petitioners’ contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. 2. 27. 6c. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. l969) Chapter IV. Surigao del Sur. the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. 78687 (January 31.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sarcos v.87 Salenillas v. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. No. For failure to pay their loan. L-29755 (January 31. 5. Footnote No. the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. 276 G. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Castillo Case No.119 of the Public Land Act. 68 G. was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent. Angeles. For foreclosure sales. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. 9b. otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”. LATIN MAXIM: 9b.R. Court of Appeals Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 48 FACTS: On December 4. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. Page 135. 7a. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. the elected Mayor of Barobo. 36b. 26. ISSUE: 1. vs. 42a FACTS: Petitioner. the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2. Footnote No. constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit. to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government.

Inc. But when the same was lifted. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. 6a. a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. No. 7 G. a new doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. l993. l993. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. No. 9a. 69 G. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. On May 10. 93177 (August 2. and then required to submit written explanations as to their absence. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Comendador v. 10 . However. 122165 (February 17. Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner. 61 FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders. tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. 1991) Chapter IV. the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. On May 6. Page 142. Footnote No. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. 5a. Page 138. In connection with their prosecution. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. l993. De Villa Case No. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine. l997) Chapter IV. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. On May 5 and 6. Footnote No. the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. 49 FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9. ISSUE: 1. Renato S. 3.R. v. l993. ISSUE: 1. all the line leaders did not report for work.88 Ala Mode Garments. so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolished. The reason being. the right to peremptory challenge was revived. the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may be referred to them. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 2. they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. NLRC Case No. 7a. l989. Despite their explanation. R. 6c. During their trial.

‘the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. No. To support this. the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and imposed additional duties. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. In this ruling. the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby. HELD: Yes.R. The duties were paid and the shipment released. under Sec. Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Cervantes Case No. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 1971) Chapter IV. L-28771 (March 31. the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. 9c FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Footnote No.89 Matabuena v. No. 11 of same Act. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. During this period. however. the court did not engage in judicial legislation. After the death of Felix Matabuena.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. there is indeed a disparity between Sec. Footnote No. Thereafter. Inc. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. Page 144. 36a . It merely rectified an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the Legislature. Provision says that “the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.R. 9a. it is not the letter. However. Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code.76 FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent.69 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez & Sons. 16a. 151 G. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other. his sister. sought the nullification of the donation citing Art. 172 G. Page 143. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Customs. The court. v. 1957) Chapter IV. Under the rule of statutory construction. 16c. L-9274 (February 1. but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. 7 and 11 of same RA. Later the two were married.

whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum. 36b. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5. Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due.R. the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount. 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July. Footnote No. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. 36a. the said section in the California Code reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”. 12a. the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts of law”. it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper since there is no showing that. 36f. 994 with interest. No. of Internal Revenue v. L-7806 (July 12. ESSO Case No. On August 10. 12a. Phipps Case No. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. 1964. claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment. such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion.78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Com. 11d. In Spanish. if uncorrected. 27 G. 11a. Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. ISSUE: 1. Spanish translation of said Sec. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. which arises from the moment that payment is made. However. 36d.” The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construction. Thus. Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18. which. and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. as provided by law.90 Lamb v. 9d. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 37 FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. 1989) FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. 11a. Since the amount of P221. in respect of which no interest could be charged. 2. 143 G. On its face. … it may if there is no other plain. Page 144. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund.” ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. 1912) Chapter 4. Moreover. Statutes should receive a sensible construction. 1964. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367. 12b . this evident typographical error. It protested the computation of interest. 222 of Act No. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. 11d. 8b. “there is no plain. Having been paid and received by mistake. a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. No. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced.R. 1960. However. 11e. would render the law nonsensical. L-28502-03 (April 18. 1961 to April 18. arguing that it was more than what was properly due. 1964. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221.

Sec. Jose. 15. a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. Footnote No. Villanueva Case No. 2 but Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. Also. 1992) Chapter IV. there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property.97 FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to property in amount of P2. POEA. 1961) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. There is absurdity in Sec.362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The Labor Code provides that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how to compute it. 106 G. 11 . R. The case was considered beyond the court’s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. 11d. 100285 (August 13. Duque Case No. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. 11a. 116 G. if given jurisdiction. R. which also declared itself without jurisdiction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. held that jurisdiction was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 12. LATIN MAXIM: 5. According to Accused. and if the same be not known at the time.636 fine for the damage to property committed. The Justice of Peace. L-15014 (April 29. Page 149. it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. “Institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”. ISSUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. Moreover. 38 HELD: Yes. Angeles et al vs. a similar case. FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency. from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”. since the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance.91 People v. It must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. 2 of Act No. since such fine cannot be less than the amount of the damage. would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2. 3326 provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. and even applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace.

The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50. No. 9d. 11a. it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. 3 as an analogous provision. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Oscar Perez. Sec. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Court of Appeals Case No. 142. 306 G.R.92 Bello v. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A.112 FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance. Court of Appeals Case No. L-38161 (March 29.A. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger. R. They dismissed the petition. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. No. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cesario Ursua v. 15 G. 36. 12. Footnote No. 12a. 9c.A.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. 11a. Likewise. ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C. 11g. 11h. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 112170 (April 10. At the Office of the Ombudsman. HELD: Yes. No. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. and in favor of the accused. No. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50. he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez. 9e. defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute. Page 152. 1996) Chapter 4. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. had to attend some personal matters. 41a . 8b FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision. C. Sec.

No. HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. suppress the mischief. he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. page 156 FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. 111107 (January 10.114. No. and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school. L-1715 (July 17. 245 G. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed. Court of Appeals Case No. 36a FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for exemption. Footnote No.R. equipment… which are illegally used…” ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec.93 Paat v. 68 of P. The drafters of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situation. 95 G. 19a . and secure the benefits intended. 68a.16.D. He insists that only the Court can do so. citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1948) Chapter 4. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object. it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the entire period of residence. Republic Case No.R. 705. Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the aforementioned provision. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pritchard v. HELD: No.

113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank. such is the law and stood firm on the policy. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election. No. page 156 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Demafiles v. since there is a possibility of fraud. despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. garnishment or any other process of any court. 245 G. 2. Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. stating Art. HELD: RA 4970 reads “the first mayor. In light of this. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. However. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit. No. As. 43. 39 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh. LATIN MAXIM: 15.R. where foreign investments were minimal. LATIN MAXIM: 2. the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. 1967) Chapter 4. in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws. vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. Comelec Case No. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis. justice would be undermined. 94723 (August. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election. Footnote 126. No. which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment. 91 G. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Footnote No. L-28396 (December 29. considering that they were reelectionists. 10 of the Civil Code. 35.18. stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent. 21.94 Salvacion v. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency.114. Central Bank of the Philippines Case No. China Bank responded by invoking Sec.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. 26 .” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation. 3. 1997) Chapter 4. Hence. stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed.R. a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.16. page 159 FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. Galido then asked for reconsideration. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. shall be incompetent to act on the said body. as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424. the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427. there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. In order to pay for moral damages. ISSUES: 1. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. 14.

24.R. 26. decided in favor of the Private Respondent. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. The 1935 constitution’s section 1 article 12 states that “A civil service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law. 38b FACTS: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: • “Sec. 7a. 38a. be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years. when the owner. agency. P. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of persons”. Mejia Case No.95 National Housing Corporation v. 56 implements the said provision. 43.” While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that “The civil service embraces every branch. 48 . when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things. or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 6. irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder. 119407 (July 7. Furthermore.R. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.” ISSUE: 1. 118940-41 and G. and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. 1997) FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner. L-64313 (January 17. would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. No. 7. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. including every government owned or controlled corporation. Nos. 807 Sec. subdivision and instrumentality of the government. Respondent Court however. and not frustrated murder. 14. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall. cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping. If the crime was frustrated murder. 111 G. The killing. HELD: The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder. driver. No.D. the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service. despite past decisions. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder.” Clearly. the Labor Code states that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law.R. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons. 2. 26. Juco Case No. 86 G. In addition to this. whether it is homicide or murder. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Private Respondent was terminated. Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned.

which took effect on Jan.146 FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18. L-37251 (August 31. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. 7125. 37 . Civil Service Commission Case No. 49 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. 1. which. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent. 20b. Respondent Corporation paid the tax. however. 2. HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. 11e. R. that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. 12a. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. regardless of age. temporary. 1981) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chua v. 20a. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: • Sec. 43. but protested the Ordinance. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. Page 164. 88979 (February 7. filed an application on January 30. 1992) Chapter IV. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Case No. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. 1969.96 City of Manila v. 38b. 23 G. 60 G. denied the same. Inferentially. casual and emergency employees. No. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law. imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. No. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua. effective beginning the third quarter of 1972. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447). Coverage. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. 1989 with Respondent Administration. Footnote No. believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. 1949. 20a. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular.R. the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No.

Regino Veridiano II Case No. ISSUE: The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drugstores. 1988) Chapter IV. Petitioner contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC. Page 169.97 Solid Homes Inc. RULING: The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore. 20c. the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently. Teresita Payawal Case No. 29. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. v. 116 G. Page 170. L-55230 (Nov. No. 38b . 1980. 280 G. On May 7.164 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Richard Gordon v. 8. 1989) Chapter IV. Footnote No. Before such order was promulgated. Footnote No. gave rise to the closure ordered by the FDA. 50 FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. 84811 (Aug.171 FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount.R. ISSUE: 1. wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription. the Mayor however did not. FDA approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore.R. 2. a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however. LATIN MAXIM: 1. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. No. the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction). Upon knowledge of this. LATIN MAXIM: 20c.

3a of RA2264). Petitioner came to the court on mandamus. directly or indirectly. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? 2. then held by the Petitioner. The position. 2747.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. which were repealed by Act No. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 32. The legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. 37.R. which can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo Case No. 2938 approved on January 30. grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. en C. 1921. 6b. such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try. was abolished. 9a. 20a. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 37. Further. No. Page 176.202 FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the ’60-’61 salary appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. however. Footnote No. Footnote No. L-21905 (Mar. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action.98 Eufronio Llanto v. 35 of Act No. a co-partnership. 155 G. 38b . The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense. S.178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 31. Concepcion Case No. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no.R. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. Page 171. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 19190 (November 29. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. 49 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion. 1966) Chapter IV. 205 G. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not. HELD: In the interpretation and construction. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. wherein the Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. ISSUE: 1. petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. it is not void. No. 2938. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 25 of Act No. Such action was. the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. The question raised is purely one of law. convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law. 1922) Chapter IV. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act.

99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo
Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.” Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b

100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe
Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a

FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits and render the ‘option’ under the law meaningless and nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: “There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage” ISSUE: W/N the words “products of the Philippines” excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43

102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut
Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the transfer of Appellants’ empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50

FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43

163 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Malanyaon v. Page 188. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. With the filing of this suit.1981) Chapter V. Footnote No. Inc. Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation. In People vs. managing editor and reporter. 160 GR No. should do was intervene in Case No. The Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record.. unlike the right to bring a new action.. a daily newspaper. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides. “Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law. R. He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency. and Printers. 7a.103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v.52 G. Inc. and while the case was pending. 11531.000. respectively. L-56028 (July 30. 25a. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Page 188. of the Daily Record. 36a. Salico (84 Phil. No. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension”. Footnote No. Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No.. 11531. 12263.. Manila Herald Publishing Co. but if he is acquitted.000 damages. 25a . against Aproniano G. Respondent Judge declared that the suit. HELD: No. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff. was "unnecessary. docketed as Civil Case No. the right to intervene. 1951) Chapter V. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused.51 FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit. and Printers. Borres. The case was dismissed due to his death. 722). Inc. Lising et. in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45. " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. in case No. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court. 12263. asking damages aggregating P90. L-4268 (January 18.000 bond. HELD: Yes. al Case No. Ramos Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. 36b FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). editor. 30. the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No.

He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. he has not yet been previously convicted. the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution. 9a.104 Rura v. he was guilty on each of those dates. when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his record. Hence. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 30a. 139 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Krivenko v. ISSUE: How should the word “previously” be construed? HELD: The word “previously” refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. Page 189. 1947) Chapter 5. he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. b . L-360 (November 15. R. Only a single decision was rendered. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa. bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted by the war. the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of “public agricultural lands”. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that “residential lots” are included in “agricultural lands”. 25a. In 1945. 48 FACTS: Petitioner. aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. Footnote No. Footnote No. Soon after. No. Register of Deeds Case No. 1985) Chapter 5. 139 G. The fiscal invoked Sec. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. Page 190. ISSUE: W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Lopena Case No.53 FACTS: Petitioner was accused. 5a. only agricultural lands may be alienated. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural. HELD: Under the Constitution. 2a. tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. The trial court denied his application on the belief that since the crimes were committed on different dates. the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed C. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision. which includes residential lands.R. 7a.60 G. 9 of the Probation Law.A. It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. for under the Constitution. which disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from applying for probation. In addition. L-69810-14 (June 19. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. an alien.

Respondent Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. 7227. A review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. 10. Case No.105 Chang Yung Fa. VI of the Constitution). they should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word “immigrant” is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Government Code of 1991. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 32 of Art. the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum. L-7785 (November 25. No. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its definition. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 192 FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C. Page No. No. Gianzon. 109 G. 11a. RA 6735. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. 19 G. 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. 9c. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and referendum. 111511 (October 5. 1993) Chapter V. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be limited to two years. 9a. ISSUE: W/N the word “immigrant” only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. Petitioners contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”.67.R. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum (Sec. v. the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. etc. COMELEC Case No. 50 . other than a nonimmigrant. et al. and De la Cruz.A. Also. Serye 1993. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines. 36b FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.R. includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiative. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. No. etc.

73. “The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision. While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the fishpond.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. 197 FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. Page No. Footnote No. order. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Quezon. dela Paz Case No. ISSUE: 1. 36a FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes worth P362. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. 1974. he comes within the term “manager”. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. And obviously. order. ISSUE: 1. or the court on motion.R. 1988) Chapter V. 1990) Chapter V. HELD: Yes. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. Footnote No. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. should provide otherwise. It is therefore. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. ruling. award. decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. 12a. Sec. L-45302 (July 24. after hearing. The law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. No. L-44143 (August 31.81. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. order.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. order. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award.” The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same. Page No. decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court. logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. on motion. the ordinance is constitutional. 31. or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. No. 218 G. Nazario Case No. shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3. HELD: No. decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case. 1 Ordinance No.R. the word court refers to the trial court. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. and on such terms as it may deem just. Accordingly. its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words. 2. ruling. 195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent.106 Motoomull v. the Government never shared in the profits they generated. 37 . 6c. the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes. As the actual operator of the fishponds. after hearing should provide otherwise.” He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. 180 G.

ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. 1988) FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23. Equitable Banking Corporation Case No. HELD: Yes. 26 . 106 G. 49 FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45.107 People v. 1993.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction. 1996) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. he had already waived his right to make his application for probation.982. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. 25a. No. Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. 12 G. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. its operation extends to “clearing checks and other clearing items. 1992. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC’s jurisdiction. Evangelista Case No. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation. 24b. the term “checks” refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities. LATIN MAXIM: 6. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. However. Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial. including nonnegotiable checks. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount.” Clearly. 26.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check. 25b. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 84332-33 (May 8. 74917 (January 20. after PD 1990 had taken effect.R. No. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC. Philippine Clearing House Corp.R.

The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds. mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties. Case No. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. residential or mineral. 261 G. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land.90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Velasco v. La Union on December 4. al. 1903) FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Petitioner who was to extract. 7a . year. Upon violation of the terms of agreement. 905 (February 12. L-12560 (September 30. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N Sec. No.. 308 G. including mineral lands. Book III. Lopez Case No. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same. stating the place. leaving a last will and testament. HELD: Yes. month. 1958) Chapter V. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed. Chapter I. Title II. whether agricultural. Page 199. day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud. 26 FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan. Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: “The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish. we should not distinguish. et. shall be void.R. 1895.” (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such formalities aren’t met.” (art 695) “Any will. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code. the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. most importantly that the hour is not stated. 1. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land.108 Robles v. No.R. Zambales Chromite Mining Co.

not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent. he was entitled to repurchase the land. Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products. 1969) Chapter V. and should abide by the conditions of the times.” The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. Footnote No. 119 of C. 1961) Chapter V. Footnote No.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Oliva v. vitamin concentrate. Plaintiff offered to repurchase.R. as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title. but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. Therefore. books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. No. transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors … shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. No. However. Page 200. Feb. Because such items will be used for toothpaste. not two (2). poultry feed. 29. 39a. For every importation. b2 . No redemption was made within that time. Petitioner. namely: food products.A.96 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. No. In July 30. 38a. Gimenez Case No. 50. it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601. 30a. L-14787 (January 28. b. the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. Inc v. under RA 720. 191 G. L-23196 (October 31.A.109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. 1951. The “stabilizers and flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products.R. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: No. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act. Page 199. 4 1963. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those Petitioner imports. the property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. the land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan. the Court had already decided that Sec. they should be unified. and industrial starch. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class. Under such law. it was also provided that: “Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost. 5 of RA 720. Lamadrid Case No. On May 31 1963. 141. 67 G. No. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 36 FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. 119 of C. the Exchange Tax Law. the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer. 141 of Sec.A. LATIN MAXIM: 26. therefore. HELD: No. claiming that under C. the law must be seen in its entire context. cattle. is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not subject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent.

Page 200. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Intermediate Appelate Court Case No. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. Footnote No. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation. However. the employee cannot avail of the privileges under the Social Security Act. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan. Case No. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. L-72005 (May 29. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. Inc. fell ill. Welfare and Retirement Plan. Page 200. The Social Security Act. 100 G. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. The rule therefore. 1962) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 2b. 234 G. During the pendency. would be to enable the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. 38b FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc. the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. 1987) Chapter 5. No. Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. having been enacted for the welfare of the employees. San Miguel Brewery. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. 5. 3a. cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. 26. No.R. Footnote No. 36a . They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its Health.99 FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employment. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. which was granted. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released.R.97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine British Assurance v. the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act.110 Escosura v. is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. Respondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay.

and should have either won or lost. No. b2 . 11a. he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. 24a.R. As a result. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 251 G. 37. B2 FACTS: On March 22. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person. having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. Sec. Where the law makes no distinctions. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. 13 of Resolution No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Thus. Commission on Elections Case No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”.111 Ramirez v.000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Page 201 . Footnote No. respondent and filed a criminal case. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”. 7a. HELD: Yes. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. No. insulted and humiliated him. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. one does not distinguish. 1962) Chapter 5. 7a. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. 9a. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same. 1992. R. 115245 (July 11. not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. Court of Appeals Case No. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense.100 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilar v. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest. 242 G. Three days later. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". in a confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed.100 FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent. Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10. Page 201. the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Footnote No. 26. 1995) Chapter 5. but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

Inc. Footnote No. 9c. 116356 (June 29. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14. Roño Case No. 1985) Chapter 5. 7a. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. v.290. Court of Appeals. Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint. Administrative or Executive Acts. Court of Appeals Case No. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Page 203 . 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. R. R. 5a. HELD: No. the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14. 273 G. ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. 28. 68709 (July 19. 36b FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorney’s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between January 14.106 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Eastern Shipping Lines. 38 G.18. Despite repeated demands. 1998) FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. 1987 to July 22. 37 49 . 9a. he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. No. The Court’s holding clearly debunks Petitioner’s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan elections. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Later. should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of candidacy. No. 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703. 1984. He was not successful in the said elections.112 Sanciangco v.

A.R. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No.113 Castillo-Co v. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.R. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.110 FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. L-33487 (May 31. Emilio A. 129952 (June 16. 214 G. Director. No. and disparate meaning. different.A. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. 7a FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. They are two separate offenses. Barbers Case No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. and Jesus Guerrero. specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. Page 204. The word “or” is clearly disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union. The items purchased were “reconditioned” instead of brand new and included other irregularities. G. Footnote No. 46 of C.A. HELD: No. 1971) Chapter 5. C. 37. placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension. The word OR in C. No. No. Each act possesses its own distinctive. 15b . Gonzales III. Martin Case No. ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. 7a. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage.

like the other prohibited games of chance. ISSUE: W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. and even the local officials angrily denounced the project. must be prevented or suppressed.D. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. In Basco v. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 1994) Chapter V. Pryce Properties Corp. 1869 and the LGC.” Since the world “gambling” should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. No.D. Case No.. 130 FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. Footnote No. Page 208. Various civic organizations. 9c. 24a FACTS: PAGCOR. 1869. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC). 111097 (July 20.. 50 .R. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. No. 28. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar. 11e. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtajas v. Amusements and Gaming Corp. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. religious elements. Case No. 15a. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling and other prohibited games of chance. 49 G. 1896. 158 G.114 GMCR v. the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.R. 38. women’s and youth groups. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. 37. created by P. 126496 (April 30. Bell Telecommunications Inc. Under the LGC.D. Inc. On the assumption of a conflict between P. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. Casino gambling is authorized by P. Phil. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority vote. the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. 7a. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino.

The Tax Court held that the term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition. and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. Page 210. namely. Footnote No. 72 G. 25a. manager of Respondent Company. 1962) Chapter V. L-22443 (May 29. in relation to Art. 224 G. 28. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture.R. which is any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries in general. It has also been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. Santiago Case No. malicious. 211 FACTS: Charles Butler. Footnote No. Radio as a means of publication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver. or libel. HELD: The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation.R. 1971) Chapter V. No. 28. 43 FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel. 358 of the Revised Penal Code. L-17663 (May 30. b2 . 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. 9c. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation. under Art. Philippine Acetylene Company Case No. may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec. of the same Code. No. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax." The accused delivered false. 353. 11d. Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. all of which have a common characteristic. under Art. In granting the exemption. 355. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 11h.115 Commissioner of Customs v. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co. and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and general definition. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. their permanent nature as a means of publication. 135 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons.. 11a. Page 136. The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated. imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it to the company’s plant in Manila. while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver.

36b. LATIN MAXIM: 28. v. 28 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals.). the spirit of the law is preserved. Par. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. 80774 (May 31. HELD: No. 3 “all money claims of workers. said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. Page 211. 45 G. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. Footnote No. overtime compensation. No. The unifying element of pars.R. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. 19650 (September 29. (2) chance. said contest is not a gift enterprise. or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications. Palomar Case No. 36e .” it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. HELD: No. Page 137. Inc. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. ISSUE: W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law. par. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 1966) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 2 (terms and conditions of employment). NLRC Case No. Footnote No. 3 refers to “all money claims of workers. No. par.R. or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. 138 FACTS: Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. Hence. The scope of par. 1 (unfair labor practices). There was no fee or consideration required to be paid. 4 (household services). gift. 272 G. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled “Modified Grande Pasteurization Process” and claimed entitlement to the cash award. Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. There being no element of consideration in said contest. par. enterprise. 5 (prohibited activities). chance. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery. Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief. 211 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Miguel Corp. 1988) Chapter V.116 Caltex (Phil. SMC denied utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner. v. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement…” While par. and (3) prize. 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.

and misfortunes” are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. Soc. What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not judicial. Footnote No.” The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils. or from the negligent failure of the ship’s owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea. L-41315 (November 13. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy. The phrase. from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship. results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea.R. the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. fire. The words “all other perils. Page 213. men of war. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. losses. in the ordinary course of events. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. and misfortunes…” The trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. Sec 6 of R.R. enemies. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. No. A loss which. 1986) FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. Of Camilon Case No. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company. 36 . jettisons. Oil Industry Commission Case No.… barratry of the master and mariners.A. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. HELD: No. pirates. not against perils of the ship. and of all other perils. 30. Union Ins. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. Thus. Plaintiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Perils… of the seas. 141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25. 122 G. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap. 1919) Chapter V. ”to set the conditions” means the right to prescribe rules and conduct. losses. 31. The rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. 114 G. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. 13983 (September 1. No. thieves. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action.117 Gotiaco v. rovers.

an agency of the PCGG. Page 217. hence. 123248 (October 16. pursuant to RA 6231. and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative. vs. 38 . referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. 29 FACTS: Acting on information received.” ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board. business associate. similar to the immediate family member.158 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. dummy. Hard liquor. was unable to produce his supporting evidence. Thereafter.” and “Ginebra San Miguel” stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner’s liquor product bearing the label “Sonny Boy” for commercial sale and distribution. Inc. 43 G.118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises. HELD: No. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. LATIN MAXIM: 28. is not prohibited by law. although regulated. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as “Ginebra San Miguel”. because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. 1997) Chapter V.c. for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. white flint bottles with the mark “La Tondeña. despite several postponements. colonel. 26. which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income. Footnote No. 257 FACTS: La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Migrinio and Tecson Case No. the 350 c. No. relative. Hon. agent. of the Philippines vs. both retired and in active service. HELD: The words “other lawful beverages” is used in its general sense. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel. ISSUE: W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700.c.R. Inc. 30.. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. a retired lt. as amended. Court of Appeals Case No. it is within the purview and coverage of RA 623. the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment. a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c. Private Respondent. Applying the rule in statutory construction. or nominee in EO 2. 36b. without La Tondeña’s written consent. the term “subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife. together with his supporting evidence. and in violation of Sec.

302 Chapter V. provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of this Act. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife. Nos. the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. Footnote No.119 Commissioner of Customs vs. ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband. 71 G. Sto. Page 220. the rule must give way. 1993) Chapter III.133 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION United States vs.R. the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. 48886-88 (July 21. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. 29 . He was prosecuted under Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 101. using the principle of ejusdem generis. dirk dagger. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond. such that if the intent is clear. Footnote No.172 FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2301 of the same code. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. 1780. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent. and are not as stated by Respondent Court. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. In this case. Nino Case No. The trial court ruled that. among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. HELD: No. kris or other deadly weapons.

RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Social Security Commission Case No. No. Estenzo Case No. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. which are directly or indirectly. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. Footnote No. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. HELD: No. or which are pursued for profit or gain. 1980) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities. HELD: No. 1961) Chapter V. The Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable. Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--. not interpret it.be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain. 29 FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings.R. No. Page 221. 263 G. and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations. otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade. 7a. undertaking. wholly or partially. 32 . LATIN MAXIM: 6d.R. L – 35376 (September 11. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit.175 Rep. G. business. industry. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. 30. the job of the judiciary is to apply laws.120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. v. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. L-15045 (January 20. operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161.

Petra had 2 legitimate children. No. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. 18. E. L – 38268 (May 31. 1979) Chapter V. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent. he is considered an acknowledged natural child. 1899. No. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabilities or obligations of the decedent. Almost 1 year later. Rufino Case No. G. and had begotten a natural child by a priest. The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the estate of Francisca.R. v. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. Since Vicente was born in 1905 after the said law was enacted. Aurea. Petra. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child. 45a . Rafael and Josefa. The liabilities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement. repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. 181 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters. which was promulgated on December. Page 223. Footnote No.121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Case No. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. 97 G. Pascuala. 1915) Chapter V.R. 49 FACTS: Vicente A. but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. 180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Empire Insurance Co. 130 G. 30a. 9351 (January 6. 68. LATIN MAXIM: 29. Vicente. 35. Footnote No. Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. Page 223. and Aurea have since died. Petra and Pascuala. HELD: Yes.

Furthermore. No. Also. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisition of citizenship. Flor Case No. However. now held by Defendant. R. as a result of said election. The petition was later granted. 1905) Chapter V. not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag. R. No. 200. Art. Ilocos Norte. 49 of a special law that provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it. 254 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of the said enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 30a . it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. the children are considered Filipino Citizens. was entitled to the office of Municipal President of Laoag. the children are now considered as Filipino citizens. G. the right to bring such action. Galang Case No. and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said office? HELD: No. or for any other reason. Nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he. Art. 1958) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acosta v. 5 G. Art. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. He and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adoption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. 187 FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. Footnote No. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization. as the case may be. 2122 (September 13. 199. Page 224.122 Ching Leng v. L-11931 (October 27. (3) since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office. (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter. Art.

ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz’s testimony? HELD: No.R. in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. L-2783 (November 29. the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 1950) Chapter V. Page 225. No. declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance. L-25811 (April 3. Council. as provided in Sec. Thus. which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case. Cruz Case No. Attys. Bucana and Poblacion. Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao. Among these were barrios Agdao. 3 of RA 3590. barrio Poblacion. Thus. Sec. which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: On August 29. also called barrio Central. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said barrio. there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City. cannot be determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. which did not include the Petitioner. Subsequently. asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio. amending the charter of Davao City. R. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City’s Treasurer. Page 225. contract or other written instrument. Lerum and Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was correct. will. declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city. LATIN MAXIM: 30 . 55 G. pursuant to RA 2370. 1962.123 Lerum v. 146 G. is not included in the enumeration. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590. Footnote No. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. 1968) Chapter V. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Barrio v. 193 FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Footnote No. Under Sec 1.” The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony. 732. the assailed order is affirmed. or who is interested “under a deed. No. City Treasurer of Davao Case No.

312 G. the city was able to collect P5. 20c. Page 226. 1968) Chapter V. Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4.254. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. 30. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. 5. No. Tongoy. are owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. which should not apply. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. Thus. Footnote No.R. No. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent created by law. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority. LATIN MAXIM: 27. 35.R. 44 FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court’s judgment declaring Ordinance No. 1. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. 3. LATIN MAXIM: 7a.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva. 30. The Petitioners. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. By virtue of the ordinance. which is not among the exceptions listed in Sec. No. Page 225. Footnote No. as provided in the Tax Code. such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumerated therein. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3. Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. etc. No. the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected.124 Vera v. City of Iloilo Case No. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Yes. 55 G. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed. L-26521 (December 28. Par. the ordinance is valid. RA 2264 confers on local governments’ broad taxing authority.L-31364 (March 30. 2. even without its having been presented under Sec. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government. Fernandez Case No. No. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests. 4. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that “no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax”. penalties. 197 FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental. before the inheritance has been passed to the heirs. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under Sec. 1979) Chapter V. 193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villanueva v. 11 as illegal. Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax. 5. 42 .824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964. ISSUE: 1.

primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. He is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. his position is not among those expressly declared by law as highly confidential. where the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits. Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service. the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders disqualified to avail probation. it would have included them in the enumeration. he can only be removed for a cause and after due process. through Administrative Order No. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes.R. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge. In addition. 1986) Chapter V. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision. Hon. to said position. The nature of functions attached to a position determines whether such position is highly confidential. Footnote No. L-43182 (November 25. In a motion for reconsideration. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. Mr. 3. and appointed Mr. co-Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Court of Appeals Case No. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Samson v. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes. 275 G. the Respondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. 36b FACTS: Petitioner Samson. 200 FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. Liwag.D.R. Besides. as enumerated in the probation law (P. 30 .125 Santo To v. Cruz-Paño. being permanently appointed. No. 1983) Chapter V. Footnote No. 270 G. terminated the services of Respondent. which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. the legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated. Page 226. except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydetermining. Talens’ termination was illegal. 9. declaring the order null and void. for otherwise. and that Santo To was not a penitent offender. No. the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. Talens asserts his position was not covered by the said act and. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. L-55130 (January 17. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Talens. Cruz-Paño Case No. 968) Sec. Page 226. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. the mayor of Caloocan. as Assistant Secretary. Talens. despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. because of lack and loss of confidence.

11g. Since P. Moreover. it was contended that Centeno violated P. President of Tikay. 30 FACTS: In 1985. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. Martin Centeno. be extended to others.126 Finman General Assurance Corp. HELD: No. by interpretation or construction. However. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company. On October 18. The 1987 Constitution treats the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently from each other. 11i. 30.D. 1564. since this is a criminal case. the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan.R. No 100970 (September 2. 54 G. Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. 1988. 27. 107 G.” ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P. 203 FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries. which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development. 48 . Footnote No. it may not. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company.000.500. this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result. Villalon-Pornillos Case No. 202 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centano v. chairman of the group. and the latter solicited P 1. approached Judge Angeles. and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Page 228. 25. Page 228.R. No. Furthermore. 1992) Chapter V. this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. the latter denied the claim. vs.D. 1994) Chapter V. penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15. The term “charitable” should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for “religious” purposes. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters. 113092 (September 1. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. Court of Appeals Case No.D.

2. 11d. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. Notified of the decision on September 7. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. L-5558 (April 29. Footnote No. they filed for an appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that same year. 1978) Chapter V.R. Avila Case No. 12. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. L-30375 (September 12. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. Page 229. Petitioners filed their appeal just in time. the papers were actually received by the court on September 24. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. 9c.127 Escribano v. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22. Rule 27 Sec. 208 FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato. 161 G. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. Thus. the Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal was late and dismissed it. Thus.74 plus interest for usury. 11e. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. when they were actually received by the court. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. ISSUE: 1. 1951. Page 229. No. De Aquino Case No.R. The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. when they were deposited by registered mail. 37 FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1. wherein the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. HELD: Yes. No. 205 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manabat v. or Sept 24. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days. 12a .261. Footnote No. 101 G. However. pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 1953) Chapter V.

the bladed weapon he was carrying. Plaintiff should not have his license restored. Page 229. was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. the prohibition against fan knives. Footnote No. 1930 Chapter V. which is less lethal than a bayonet. HELD: No.R. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. “balisong” or clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. HELD: No. Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet. 48468-69. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Case No. would be punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. CA Case No. March 29. the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 115 No.128 Gomez v. 126 G. 30a . November 22. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. 1989 FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored.209 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Primero v. It would make no sense if possession of a fan knife. The subsequent Opium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or remove said prior laws. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9. 32441. Nos.

36b. 1939) Chapter V. There is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they are automatically made ex officio members of the board. the Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. CFI of Laguna. 1987 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Roldan v Villaroman Case No. which held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio members. the same should be made extensive to the whole. 142 Oct. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. 229 FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board members or are merely ex-officio board members. Page 234. the rule in the interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found in a law. Judge Roldan. 262 G. LATN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. 33. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Case No. 46825 (October 18. During the trial. No. Respondents then instituted a certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. Moreover.129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc.” This ruling is in conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. 23. denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas. Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. HELD: No. 9c. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing with the trial.R. Footnote No. b2 . but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision. impugning the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. 6d.

Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable. but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale. And under the same charge during all the time referred to. which is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction.” and (b) “previous association with the enemy. Page 234. Director of Prisons Case No. HELD: No. The word “and” is not meant to separate words. To hold that the People’s Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all.D. 38b. improvements. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. Footnote No. improvements. P. 78585 (July 5. 6d. and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans. No. 33 . she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29. 1944. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities. No. other than those provided in Clause 20. no further written commitment was made by the developer.” When she. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent. L-278 (July 18. except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P. 231 FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution. except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.130 Herras Teehankee v. making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. and infrastructures for the lots.D. Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law. 42a FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. and since the language used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject. HELD: Yes. 1946) Chapter V. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled. 122 G. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved. Petitioner contends that P. Hon. the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. she was detained by said Government under that charge. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Japanese. 11g. Page 234. within 3 years from the date of the contract. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. 37. and.R. 170 G. The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities. 230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Antonio Mapa v. 35.D. 1989) Chapter V. 7a. Footnote No. but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case No. along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case. 12a. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. 26. and infrastructures”.

The concluding part of Sec. On February. as Appellees contend. 1963. Page 236. should mean “the nomination or designation of an individual”.” ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District. the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. Upon receipt of a copy of this order.R. appointee’s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. 6. 7a. he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. 8a 11g. “provided”. 7a. 24a.131 People of the Philippines v. 1920. Hence. 227 G. Page 234. the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment”. his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1. 9c.R. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis. They invoked Sec. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late. Footnote No. which was denied. 1914. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. 37 . HELD: Yes. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. The word “appointed” in the proviso should be given its meaning in the ordinary sense. forty-eight days from July 24th. which states that “nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district. 1921) Chapter V. 1963. Fermin Mariano Case No. but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. L-16808 (January 3. and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Teodoro Tamani Case No. 155 of the Administrative Code. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10. HELD: Yes. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. No. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state’s separation of powers. L-22161 (January 21. and thus. The power to appoint lies on the appointing officer. Footnote No. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso. effective July 1. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis of Sec. 1974) Chapter V. the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”. 1963 through the counsel’s wife. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. although it did not start with the usual introductory word. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. They hold these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign. not 47. 240 FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14. while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. 34 FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judicial District. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. 12a. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. 1963. L-22160 and G. retire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. Nonetheless. 9a. 232 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Andres Borromeo v. 25. 38 G.

Pangasinan Case No. they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants. NLRC Case No. No. P350 of which was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city government.) In Mercado.000 to P18. 20 G. HELD: No. and not to other sections thereof. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business. 2 of Art. Moreover. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but the Respondent City refused. 33. 251 FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. 1994) Chapter V. The provision calls for casual employees. NLRC. Page 240. 109328 (August 16. as a general rule. and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees. b2 . the proviso in par. 33 FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of P18. 2 G. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art.R. the latter provision. The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached. Page 240. and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. as the NSC and NLRC ruled. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision. the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. 43. 250 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arenas v. City of San Carlos.132 ALU-TUCP v. Moreover.000. this provision does not apply to them. No. 280 of the Labor Code.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. should be strictly but reasonably construed. 6.000. but more so because provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone. Once that “project” is done. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12. Footnote No. 1.R. the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor.00. 1978) Chapter V. exceptions. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations. LATIN MAXIM: 1. their services will no longer be needed. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers. Sr. vs. L-34024 (April 5.48. whether a proviso or not. Footnote No. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Since Petitioners were considered project employees. is given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.

According to the Code of Civil Procedure. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i. 1630 did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readings were done on the same day. 292 G. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and obligations to the Defendant Corporation. Footnote No. Secretary of Finance Case No. The President had certified S. while Zoilo’s mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed the mortgage. because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. The said firm. VI. LATIN MAXIM: 49 . Isabel Palet. was a general partner in the firm. 272 FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. Page 245. Footnote No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. and in so doing. there is no longer a need to be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. was heavily indebted to the Defendant corporation. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Case No. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903. 1915) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 33 FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs. At the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents. 115852 (August 25. etc. 126 30 Phil. printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency." in Art. 1994) Chapter V. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment. the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause. No. Aldecoa & Company.e. however.133 Tolentino v. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. No.R. an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. In other words.. Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid. 266 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ALDECOA v. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. In order to mortgage these properties. and to mortgage certain real properties of her sons. she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. has been constitutionally passed. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor children. (March 23. No. 228. Page 243.

The term “agent” used in par. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 1969). The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. Mrs. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving police service and personnel. Aisporna. 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for the same grounds. 36d. ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec.R. Page 248. On appeal. 189 of the Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aisporna v. 2 to the agent in par.134 Ocampo v. Hon. 8 FACTS: On September 11. and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. 228 which fixed curfew hours. and not separately and independently. grave abuse of authority. 6d FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. Roberto Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct. and commission of a felony. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 189. 189. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 36c. 2 of the same section. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Bello. maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted her husband. HELD: The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act (September 8. 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. No. Sec. 1982) Chapter VI. a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment. 36b. Buenaventura Case No. L-39419 (April 12. Footnote No. On March 17. 9c. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. The power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. Court of Appeals and People Case No. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the policemen. 88 G. however. According to Commission v.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent. L-32293 (January 24. No. 37 . the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the ordinance was to attend a birthday. and that she did not receive any compensation. 6 G. 28. which is considered as a wholesome assemblage. 6c. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions wherever possible. Sec. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts.

Footnote No. 1986) Chapter VI. Sec. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. Also. Footnote No.R. L-69809 (October 16. Rufino. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. v. In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Laconico called the Appellant. 11g. Page 252. 20 FACTS: Atty. that is. 37 . 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. When complainant Pintor called up. Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. 32 and Sec. 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radiola-Toshiba Phils. 108 G. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of RA 4200.R. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 36a. That same day. 1 of RA 4200. 48. 75222 (July 18. No. held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. 249 G. b2 FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4. the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment.135 Gaanan v. Inc. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device. Furthermore. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. However. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. 1991) Chapter VI. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. Atty. 36c. 30a. HELD: No. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Under the circumstances. Intermediate Appellate Case No. there is no conflict between Sec. HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. No. Page 249. 1 RA 4200. 36d. Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. 79. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 29. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions.

The intention of the legislature must be ascertained. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. as required by Art. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. 223 of the Labor Code. 6d. not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law. El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale.R. El Hogar Filipino Case No. sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. 109835 (November 22. 000 and a surety bond of P50. as used in the Usury Law. an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that. Page 251. 1993) Chapter VI. as required by the POEA Rules. 21 FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage. 7a. No. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word “void”. in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money. 37 . 1925) Chapter VI. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION JMM Promotions v. From the very context of the law. considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond. 223 of the Labor Code. but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof. 37 FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30. Lopez and Javelona. Footnote No.136 Lopez v. Footnote No. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond. 25a. 12a. They contended that the court erred in holding that the word “void”. No. the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. HELD: No. 136 G. L-22678 (January 12.R. 000 and posted a cash bond of P100. 36a. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. in whose favor the loan was made. 152 G. NLRC Case No. as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. in using the word “void”. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear.000. as compared with the whole. the legislature. as used in the Usury Law. Page 251.

1762. 36a. has been repealed by the implication in Sec. L-19628 (December 4. However. the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle. to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure the custody of their three minor children. 36c. 23 FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. 36d. Concepcion Case No. and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. 1762 of the Administrative Code. Page 252.000 as attorney’s fees. 1956) Chapter VI. After the issues were joined. 3052. and P2. that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal separation case. 36a. Page 252. provided it did not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. a monthly allowance of P2. P300 for a house. Apostol Case No. The judge refused to reconsider the order. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. the legislature’s intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. Footnote No. which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. 38b.R. 1770 of the Administrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 17 G. 1762. Sec. 37 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. however. A recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one another. while Sec. L-9667. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant. 1762. 27. Sec. and the return of her passport.000 for herself and said children. Sec. 1762 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. the determination of the custody and alimony must have been given force and effect. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition.300 for support for her and the children. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 3052 – Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1762. 1922) Chapter VI.137 Araneta v. Footnote No. being a special law having special contingency not dealt within Sec. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. As such. No. Note. it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art. except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. 1770. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. is of a general nature. HELD: No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lichauco vs. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect. 1762 of the Administrative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: No. a monthly support of P5. 147 G. 103 of the Civil Code. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec.R. 50 . (July 31. as amended. as amended by Act No.

Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. 38a. Before the arraignment of the accused.3540 (July 30. which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively. 87 of RA 296. 51 G. 1 day – 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. No. Footnote No. the CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135. 4 mos. 1950) Chapter VI. the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. 36d. 50 FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period – 2 yrs. the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction.R. 31 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 220 G. 35 FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. 40b. L. which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist. L-2860 (May 11. 37 . Page 256. No. the latter is paramount to the former and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage. Footnote No. Hence. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property.R. Banco Filipino Case No. Page 257. LATIN MAXIM: 36c. 1951) Chapter VI. Palmon Case No. as when general and special provisions are inconsistent. the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. Sec. known as the Public Land act. However.138 Cassion v. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years. 38b. thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135.

HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include “sedition. 179 G. 17222 (March 15. Aruego. 2. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 60 of the insolvency law. and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of said Defendant. b2 FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion. Sec. which is “imminent danger of invasion. Footnote No. L-4221 (August 30. which is not under the Constitution. 36c. 20b. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition. b2 . Imperial and National Bank Case No. 37. Pres. Footnote No. No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 36e. Also. 1952) Chapter VI. provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every other. Plaintiff asserted that since the insolvent had been declared as such. and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. all civil proceedings against him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Montenegro v. Page 257. the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. while Art.” Art. Moreover. the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger. Quirino issued Proclamation No. “Sedition” should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. 57 G. 36f. 36d. every section. insurrection or rebellion. insurrection. as posed by Prof.R. 15a. In an earlier case. Three days after. insurrection or sedition. Castañeda and Balao Case No. No. 1921) Chapter VI. during the Constitutional Convention. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law. the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause.R. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. Maximino’s father then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. W/N Proclamation No. Thus. 7 only provides invasion. rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is imminent danger. 39 FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff.139 Chartered Bank v. Page 258. 60 as stated in the other provision of the same law.

. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term. rather than the letter of a law. 36b. deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. 27. 20a FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras. interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. 7160. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. L-37684 (September 10. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context.R. 1996) Chapter VI. no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Footnote No. (b). (a) and par. 37. 14. 12a. as provided in par. oil and other petroleum products. 2 of RA No. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress. distributor of gas. Footnote No. 74 of RA No.R. 196 G. diesel fuel oils. inoperative or nugatory. in excluding gasoline. 50 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. HELD: No. the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law.140 Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund. No. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. lubricating oils. Since Sec. and petroleumbased products. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax. The evident intent of Sec. with the exception of gasoline. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance. to a refund. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paras v. and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. determines its construction. 1975) Chapter VI Page 259. Thus. No. v. In interpreting a statute. The spirit. but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. COMELEC Case No. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. 2264. 11d. who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 259. 11e. 25b. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006. 16 G. Arabay Inc. 38 . 123169 (November 4. meaningless. which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. no recall may be instituted.

Since the city mayor under Sec.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Niere v. NO. but also those coming from other municipalities. this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines. entity. CFI of Negros Occidental. 30a. 2a.R. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. 21. Footnote No. whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. L-30324 November 29. Private Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City. Footnote No. 21 of RA 4858 (the City Charter). Page 262. House Bill No. L-33169 July 30. 138 G. No. not only in Bago City. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that by public market. 1973 Chapter VI. the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. Bago City. 188 G. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. 2. 1982 Chapter VI.141 Javellana v. 21 is without authority to appoint the city engineer. who. 32. it could have easily re-phrased Sec. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public. 38b. which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to vendors. it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not.R. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market.60 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago. No. it is a substantial amendment. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city department. originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec. 2. 21 of the City Charter to that effect. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not. under Sec. shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments “all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Branch II Case No. NO. which became RA 4585. ISSUE: 1. 40c FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Kintanar Case No. 6d. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person. 21 of said RA. b2 . 29. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership. HELD: 1. or corporation other than the local government. but during the period of amendment in the Senate. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. Page 262. 9711. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment. After the enactment of the Decentralization Act.

The grant made by Act No. 63 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born. 11a. of Chinese parents in Dumaguete. each has. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Negros Oriental n October 6. No. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources. Section 7 of C. No. or temporary occupation.142 Uytengsu vs. 1954) Chapter VI. 6c. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. In the case at bar. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. 1927. Residence indicates permanency of occupation. No. together with all the improvements. 2. 307 G. L-6379 (September 29. he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. distinct from lodging or boarding. 25a. After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines. if included. not legal residence or domicile. and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. 37. No. 1951.L-41012 (September 30. HELD: 1. ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. 1951.R. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used interchangeably.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Lodge No. a meaning distinct and different from that of the other. Then Petitioner sold the land. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. Hence. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila.R. 7. Later.R. as amended. Hence. notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. 165 G. 1360. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which. No. Page 263. had to be postponed. 37 FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. he filed for naturalization. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. 36b. 1976) Chapter VI. ISSUE: 1.A. the original date of hearing the case. Footnote No. which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. 9a. is required. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. would defeat the policy of legislation. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Forthwith. he went to the United States to further his studies from the year 1947-1950. Page 264. 43 . No. Republic of the Philippines Case No. 1950. 2. originally scheduled to take place on July 12. Court of Appeals Case No.L-41001 and G. in strict legal parlance. On July 15. 176 v. in order to unravel the legislative intent. Footnote No.

10 G.L-23800 (December 21. 50 FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The very next day. Page 266. 1974) Chapter VI. 3 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. par. a separate and independent civil action for damages. 14 that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18.A 183. there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. increase or modification of substantive rights. 1947). in the case at bar. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City. Sec. 12 of RA 183. Such interpretation. 1965) Chapter VI. or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. Footnote No. 12 of the Pasay City Charter. 1960. give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art. 37. 5. 71 FACTS: RA183. X. Marave Case No. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec. Footnote No. 67 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abellana v. Page 265. On the strength of Par. Repeals by implication are not favored.5 of the 1973 Constitution. 49. No. the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm. 7 of Rule 123. in turn. particularly a procedural rule.L-27760 (May 29.143 Almeda v. which found Petitioner guilty as charged. 12a. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI. alter. as amended. provides in its Sec.R.R. the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. 14 of the City Charter. 14 of R. Thus. the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal. 33 of the Civil Code. Lastly. Florentino Case No. RA 2709 amended Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. No. At this stage. unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.2 As stated in Art. appointed Respondent Florentino to the position. purportedly under Sec. it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. literal construction of the law is not favored. 37 . Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. 2 of Sec. does likewise.

L-36049 (May 31. No. was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. Footnote No. 78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Naga v.144 Yu Cong Eng v. or have a duplicate in any of these languages. It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. 9c. 38a. Spanish. this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. There is a presumption against implied repeal. pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 317 G. Page 267. tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication. The Naga City government. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. 83 FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a language other than English. He and other Chinese merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law. Footnote No. 63 G. Agna Case No. it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English. it did not. City of Manila. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 11e. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1a. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No.R. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in Chinese. 1925) Chapter VI. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. 38b ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Spanish. RA 2264 only applies for entirely new tax provisions. 1976) Chapter VI. 6d. or a local dialect. claimed that under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264). ISSUE: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts written in Chinese. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. Trinidad Case No.R. 37 . Yu Cong Eng. a Chinese merchant. or a local dialect. Sec. a subsequent provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. 2309 of the Admin Code. FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. This liberal interpretation is reasonable and it upholds constitutionality. 2309). L-20479 (February 6. Page 268. then the Courts shall do so. on the other hand. If two laws can be harmonized.

ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. No. Footnote No. The plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively composing the new province. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. L-10202 (March 29. 152 G. and not just the areas constituting the new province. which will get also affected. were not included in the plebiscite. facts need not be stated to prove it.R. LATIN MAXIM: 12a FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional barrios. 37 . Page 268. Municipality of Binangonan Case No. No.145 Tan v. and not just the new areas. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional? HELD: It is unconstitutional. 112093 (October 4. 118 G. 84 FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Government v. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authority and that this legislation was not for the public good. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and for the public good. but the final bill only limited it to the latter.R. COMELEC Case No. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in all units affected. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units. including the parent province. The parent provinces. 1916) Chapter VI.

7a . that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. His estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25. which consisted of the aforementioned lots.R. Court of Appeals Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. ISSUE: 1. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. 13. 1996) FACTS: On July 27. HELD: 1. an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. Del Rosario Case No. 107797 (August 26. the law has always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. 105 G. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition). Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. and Macario. 26. total area of Lot 26 to his son. & 27). No. 1144 of the same Code? 2. information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M. Art. There was no double sale. Hence. as held in previous cases. W/N the term “month” in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days. Civil Code). Hence. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. 1953. and a 149-sq. Macario sold the 405 sq. 1391 of the new CC or Art. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10 years. Venancio. Tomas. Thereafter. 38b. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code. W/N there was a double sale. 6c. 2. L-7234 (May 21. Eventually. 46a FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. the term month used in Art. mts. Venancio sold Lot No. 2. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo. It turned out. and a sister. Thus. 13 of the CC. out of the 749 sq. 90 and Art. or from the day following that in which it was committed. 1953. Bartolome. done with evident bad faith.R. m. however. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed. an “extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs of Enrique. ISSUE: 1. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. Marcela. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed. Anselmo. 91 of the RPC. mts. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done. In accordance therewith. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was. the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed.146 People v. the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. instead of the civil/calendar month. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions. HELD: 1. 26. Art. 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salvatierra v. 2. 1144 of the CC prevails. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. m of Lot 26. the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. Art. G. resort must be had to Art. No. therefore. a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. Hence.

W/N the will is valid 2. No. 1967) Chapter VI. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. local material should be given preference whenever available. No. 1930) Chapter VI. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 38a. practicable and usable. HELD: 1. and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof. 42 G. 199 G. practicable and usable. mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. 38b . L-27275 (November 18. 2. 138 and RA 912. one of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases.A. 36. C & C Commercial Corporation. During the pendency of the case. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. 104 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C & C Commercial v. 1 of RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this case: C. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term “government” under RA 912.R. a special administrator of the estate of the deceased was appointed by the court. Page 274. it would be logical to suppose Sec. Yes. 37. during her lifetime. 107 FACTS: Labitoria. 35.” NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term “Government” as used in the said law.147 Pasno v. Footnote No. 38b FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempted from RA 912. 31581 (February 3. The said law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced materials is in relation to the “construction or repair work undertaken by the Government. works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First policy). LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term “government” found in RA 312. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis. filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and testament. Accordingly. When Labitoria died. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. ISSUE: 1. Page 273. an erroneous date will not defeat a will. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ravina and Ravina Case No. Davao and Iloilo. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. NAWASA Case No.R. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. However. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. which should give preference to local materials that are available. The CFI ruled in favor of the special administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands.

L-21516 (April 29. Respondent maintained that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950. d FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congress in 1913. heat. 14205 (September 30. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. Butuan Sawmill. Where the general act is later. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter. No. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Railroad Co. v. while the other as the law of a particular case. and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran. 50 . the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. No. 41 G. the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms. Rafferty Case No.148 Butuan Sawmill. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a private contract. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation. 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. On the other hand. Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. Inc.R. Footnote No. v. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. together with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission. Footnote No. considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do so. LATIN MAXIM: 37. HELD: No. Inc. Where there are two statutes.R. HELD: No. 1919) Chapter VI. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill. the earlier special and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the general as a general law of the land. City of Butuan Case No. Page 279. 168 G. the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11. unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. On the other hand. LATIN MAXIM: 25. Inc. Page 277. 50. supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts and circumstances. Agusan. 1966) Chapter VI. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have modified or altered the charter. unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise. However.

People of the Philippines Case No. orderly and honest conduct of elections. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v.W. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers.R. and that if the landing was made. 157 G. No. either tacit or express. to the landing of the alien. 9. Page 277. Almond Case No. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. 2 of Art. The word “permit” implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to investigate. Sec. and. 87 G. HELD: Sec. R. No. L-61998 (February 22. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent. prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the COMELEC. 37. 48 . 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. 2517 (June 2. is an alien of East India who is afflicted with trachoma. Sec 184 of the Election Code.” while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punishable under the same Code. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power “to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. agent or person in charge of the vessel. Almond.D. 1606 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. officer.149 De Jesus v. it was made without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent. the Court of First Instance (now RTC). 11e. which deals specifically with election offenses. must be favored over provisions of P. 50 FACTS: The complaint alleges that R. COMELEC registrar of Casiguran. HELD: No. At the same time. 41a. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officers. coincidentally. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6. was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan. 1983) Chapter VI. 1906) FACTS: The Petitioner. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power is to insure the free. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 38.

Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. 12891 (October 19. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the contemplation of the law. 23 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.150 US v. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing near a grove of buri palms. LATIN MAXIM: 25. Footnote No. He had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position. 37.R. Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent. 298 G. No. Estapia Case No. 1917) Chapter VII. HELD: The term “cockpit” as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants. 28 FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper.S. 1 of Act. Abad Santos Case No. 1917) Chapter VII. including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. No. Page 290. 12262 (February 10. 294 G. The prosecution argued that the term “cockpit” should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. in violation of Sec. Page 289. LATIN MAXIM: 41a. 48 FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5. 480. No.R. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. v. 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. unless the law clearly so provides. 48 .

151 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROUND 3 .

108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights. holding that his common-law relationship with the victim’s grandmother aggravated the penalty.” HELD: Yes. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The offended party’s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth.A. No. is guilty of violation of C. Atop Case No. Page 290. Footnote No. Sec. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts. No. 138. 12 years old. 138. a German citizen. No. 108. whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter. entitled “An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights. HELD: 1. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. descendant. and Von Arend. 4 of C. voluntarily. 2. 9a . 47027 (February 4.S. would fall within its scope. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article.152 People v. One of such legal provision is Art. ISSUE: 1. however. 138 may be prosecuted under C. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C. which requires Philippine or U.” Under Act No. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 113 G. franchise or privilege. 108. 4 of Act No. any legal provision. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: Appellants Padilla. Padilla Case No. 1 of the same Act applies punishment provided therein to “all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enjoyment of a right. acting jointly and conniving with each other.A. no other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. 4. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. No. 1998) Chapter VII. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed.A. 138. franchise or privileges. It is contended. Footnote No. No. illegally. Page 291. ascendant. 108. Private complainant Regina Guafin. 15 of the RPC encompasses only “the spouse. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. and criminally evaded the provisions of Art. and to death for the third.R. Nos. The scope of the relationship under Art. natural or adopted brother or sister. 6c. is the granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos. 2. franchises or privileges. legitimate. The trial court erred. 138. No. the common-law wife of the Appellant. The very title of Act No. and relative by affinity in the same degrees. as well as any alien profiting thereby. a Filipino citizen.” Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused.A. 1941) Chapter VII. 30 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape.A. of Act No. the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. 124303-05 (February 10.R. that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. 202 G.

from said funds. was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 2. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. HELD: No. not only his guilt. par. 68 of the RPC. L-2873 (February 28. did willfully. misappropriate. he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. 80 as amended. to indemnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Footnote No. 2 of Art. unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. benevolent or charitable institution. 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. ignoring the Appellant’s minority. No. 68. has given rise to the controversy. LATIN MAXIM: 7b. 1959) Chapter VII. to pay a fine.897. in that. embezzle. that he “willfully. being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. from said funds. L-13371 (September 24. HELD: Yes.” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison. and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded. the sum of P13. 223 G. Footnote No.” thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. the Appellant pleaded not guilty. 38b . He was sentenced to be imprisoned. 2 of the RPC. 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.R. par. “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. 68.897. 1950) Chapter VII. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer. misappropriate. namely.153 People v. he thereby admitted. which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par.” ISSUE: W/N the Appellant. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. misapply. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. 43 FACTS: The lower court. Upon arraignment.77. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. but also all the material facts alleged in the information. Page 292. The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the crime. Garcia Case No. 41a. Page 293. the sum of P13. accountable for the funds collected and received by him. but always in the proper period. Salazar Case No. and as such. to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification. 209 No. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public or private. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. When he entered the plea of guilty. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. RA 47 which amended Art. sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years. as it now stands and Art. 11e. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant.77. 41 FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age. and to pay the costs.

154 People v. Terrada, et. al.
Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
US v. Toribo
Case No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48

FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48

FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, “An Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle.” It appears that in the town of Carmen in Bohol, there aren’t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the State’s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37

155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52

FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isn’t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient that they had “actual” knowledge. Statutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC
Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office…or within six months immediately preceding or following an election.” ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily “to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government.” Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a

157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.
Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64

FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43

FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43

158 Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43

FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person. HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43

160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Although separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43

FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institution’s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an “independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor’s tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contractor’s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43

117. 50 FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1. then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree. and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem. Page 301.08. Footnote No. 256 G. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P. 213. 84 FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. 43. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used.D.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. their debt even decreased to about P12. 1929) Chapter VII. In case of doubt. Page 301.000.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as “manufactures of wool. Insular Collector of Customs Case No. On the other hand. the particular enactment must be operative. 621. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such.R. HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par.161 Manila Railroad Company v. 30264 (March 12. They applied for tax amnesty under P. 197. the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. 1991) Chapter VII. 26 . not otherwise provided for. Under par.” Upon appeal. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to P17. LATIN MAXIM: 8. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. 23. No. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. Footnote No. 167 G.D. 8-72 was null and void.R. No. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. because Revenue Regulation No. L-69344 (April 26. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. HELD: Yes. under par. If Revenue Regulation No. 84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No.283.D. Due to this. vehicles for use on railways and tramways. 141 of Sec. 8-72 was null because P. 197 of same law. manufactures of wool. 213 and 370. however. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.

R. 108524 (November 10. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. 1994) Chapter VII. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. In fact. 3 G. The law frowns on exemption from taxation. the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. insulating oil is different from insulators. the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. b RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages. including distribution. it is not an agricultural food product. 85 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Footnote No. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. thus it is not exempt from VAT. No. Page 301. 103(a). L-23623 (June 30. HELD: No. 85 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. 103(b). 8th Edition. 1977) Chapter VII. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. v. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. Page 301. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. copra was classified as a food product under Sec. although copra is from coconut. No. Manila Electric Company Case No. hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. 43. Footnote No. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91. copra per se is not intended for human consumption. Under Sec. Brady. b . Under Sec. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. and 80% of the coconut plant is edible. 42a.R. Department of Finance Secretary Case No. 82 G. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating.162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders.

the PCSO. HELD: The law refers to “gross receipts” and not “gross income”. 7a. Case No. Footnote No. the lessee. L-46881 (September 15. No. HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P. or the operator. Respondents argued that they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available under P. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P. singly and not all at one and the same time. thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers. as the case may be. the White Cross. 370 took effect. 1988) Chapter VII. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. are corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. 1956) Chapter VII.163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. 370. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. 68 G. 97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec. 43 . the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are subject to the 20% amusement tax.D.D. the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P. Case No. of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax. the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive conjunction “or”. Manila Jockey Club Inc. Footnote No. In the instant case. 370 which declares tax amnesty.D. lessee. 102 FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc.R. 25a. but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward. 104 G. or operator. Castañeda Jr. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage of P. 1(a)(4) of P. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 27 FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a fiscal or special prosecutor. Page 304.R. The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. Page 306. Where the disclosure was not voluntary. L-8755 (March 23. the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth.D. 370. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor.D. This clause is plain demonstration that the “gross receipts” refer to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charged.D. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.

170. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 123. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article. In 1958. but the cost of wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. Page 306. in the determination of the value of such finished article. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 103 FACTS: Act No.164 Zamora v. 43 . No. the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 259 G. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case.R. 82 and 551. v. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. 9d. This rule is not without its exceptions and limitations. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax.R. it is disregarded in Act Nos. and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. Petitioner prays that the word “land” in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean “land including buildings and improvements thereon”.17 because materials purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. Inc. HELD: No. 9f. ISSUE: W/N the word “land” should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon. City of Manila Case No. Page 306. L. 7a.25602 31 (February 18. so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative intent. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into flour and sold in 1959. While some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification. 175 G.275. Footnote No. 1970) Chapter VII. 1907) Chapter VII.55. the law must be taken as it is. b2 FACTS: In 1957. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Flour Mills. part of which was not used in the business that year. 27. Sec. and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901. Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains. It is a remedial statute. No. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23. nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. 3433 (March 2.

and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. Court of Appeals Case No. which she shares with her father’s other heirs. 1994) Chapter VII. L-14322 (February 25. said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. notwithstanding noncompliance with Art.R. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. 1960) Chapter VII. Thus. No. correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the house and lot. 9a FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu. as amended. otherwise it is entirely void. The CA. 117 G. cannot be admitted to probate. Sec. Page 309. the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. In case of alterations. 814.165 Ajero v. This requirement is mandatory. 618 of Act No. Art. Footnote No. HELD: Yes. On appeal. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed. as amended. cancellations or insertions. 618 of Act No. but not its probate. 61 G. the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. 7a . and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. 7a. citing Sec.R. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.” Accordingly. Page 309. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate. No. and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will. 190. 190. HELD: No. It was also opposed by Dr. Footnote No. but not its entirety. 6c. 117 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late Annie Sand. we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. 5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy Case No. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law. for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. 106720 (September 15. LATIN MAXIM: 1. however. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses.

1990) Chapter VII. we cannot agree. Defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff. and damages. v. the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. But. Page 310. regular homeward route. 626 was valid. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm.D. he claimed for disability benefits under P. it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off. because the reliever did not come on time. Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. 1962) Chapter VII. W/N the scope of the term “action” falls under RA 1994. 2. No. On June 18. Inc.L. he sustained injuries. LATIN MAXIM: 9a . 626 but was denied by the GSIS. On his way home. 1 G. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office. ISSUE: 1. 123 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lazo v. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P. 1986.166 A. HELD: 1. 2. L-17750 (August 31.” and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. For injuries sustained. In the case at bar. Pending this. and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. Page 310. it is significant that the liberality of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. HELD: No. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. he met an accident and as a result. 70 G. the Petitioner rendered full duty.D.R. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. 123 FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for overtime work rendered. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was “separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants. No. 78617 (June 18. With this limited and narrow interpretation. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Footnote No. The Petitioner contends that the phrase “action already commenced” employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. Ammen Transportation Company. Borja Case No. Footnote No.R.

Hacienda Danao–Ramona. No. 284 of the Labor Code. employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. NLRC. The court held such contention untenable as the issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. The prohibition is general. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert. HELD: From the foregoing facts of record. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P. 9d . L-48605 (December 14. for another ten years. 1981) Chapter VII. 2 G. employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. The applicable law on the case is Art. and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land. HELD: Yes. 71813 (July 20. it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code.” The court further stated that the purpose of Art.167 Villavert v. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code.D. 626. Petitioner dismissed the two Respondents. computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic. No. It is renewable at her instance. the worker’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier. Page 310. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights. because when she leased the farm land. which she opted to do. 1987) Chapter VII. neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the lease. 9a. Without such law. in Negros Occidental for a period of ten years. as amended. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. 313 G.R. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. with the GSIS. Moreover. It was stated in the said case that “the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. During the existence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abella v.R. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC which affirmed the denial. Footnote No. Page 310. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. Footnote No.

221 of the Labor Code. 9d. Page 310. Footnote No. Page 310. died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. L-64204 (May 31.. thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. 36 No. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. According to Art. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment. 1981) Chapter VII.and ulcer-like symptoms. ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. HELD: Yes. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. he was treated for Epigastric pain. 40b FACTS: Nazario Manahan. L-44899 (April 22.R. 1985) Chapter VII. the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be applied. it was still paid. HELD: No. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment. herein Respondents. ECC. a logging company. the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice.” The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even though the payment was late. Jr. 9d. 79 G. Footnote No. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. the widow of the deceased. The latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made. However. entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters. The claimant. The security guards. it is well settled that in case of doubt. No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 9a. 124 FACTS: Petitioner. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. the case should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. 40b . Moreover. ISSUE: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manahan v. Again she was denied by the GSIS. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late.168 Del Rosario & Sons v. filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation. GSIS denied such claim. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency.

Petitioner claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Sec. for the reason that instead of receiving 60% of his total share. Footnote No. The net produce was to be divided equally. Altar Case No. and one of them happens to be insolvent. However. reasonably and liberally for the employee and dependents. The purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. 40 . ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent.494. the award would only be partially satisfied. Being a remedial statute. the tenant shall receive 50% only. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 12a. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. No. 9d. The WCA should be construed fairly. Page 310. 9c. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No. though not specified. owner of first class agricultural land. 7 of the Tenancy Law. which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3. L-1916 (April 30. Page 310. Footnote No. the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which. It was taken to the Court of Industrial Relations. L-12164 (May 2. HELD: No. they claim that because the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partners. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. which he argues to be an exhaustive list. 36. 7 of the Tenancy Law. 38. who was killed in the line of duty by criminals.R. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation. Art. 1949) Chapter VII. which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. HELD: No. are similar to those expressly mentioned.40 to the claimant in lump sum. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sibulo v. No. 9c. it should be construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. The contract was disapproved by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. 125 FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard. the liability of business partners should be solidary. 279 G. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. which declared the contract illegal as against public policy as contemplated in Sec. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly.R. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary. 75 G.169 Liwanag v. 7 of the Tenancy Law. 36. the compensation should be divisible. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases. 1959) Chapter VII. other provisions of law show how their liability is solidary. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.

12a . 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vicente v. Footnote No. No. Court of Appeals Case No. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. the Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant. especially the humble rank and file. Afterwards. 11b. 126 FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform. 168 G. At the course of his employment. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to “income benefits” under the GSIS retirement program. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. No. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. 12. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation.R. But assuming that they were.170 Guerrero v.1986) Chapter VII.” The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. Pending appeal. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only “permanent partial disability”. 32. which ordered his reinstatement. Later the Petitioners ordered Benitez out. which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reform’s decision. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. The application was supported by a physician’s certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total disability. 127 G. Footnote No. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the suit was a share tenancy agreement. 1991) Chapter VII. He shared 1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. Page 310. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. the decisions lost their validity. So at the age of forty-five. Page 310. 38 FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. 85024 (January 23. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Petitioners appealed to the CA.R. L-44570 (May 30. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision.

Manila Hotel Company Case No. as amended by RA 611. 86020 (August 5. 83 G. brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel Co. 128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Corporal v. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. Footnote No. 1957) Chapter VII. During the course of her work. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect. On her 5th pregnancy. 1954. who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30. Art. she had several pregnancies. 43 . she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a “hilot”. HELD: No. v. HELD: No. Her husband. An hour later. Page 311. Page 311. 1954. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 46a FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative Code. approved on June 15. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. No. 266 of the Administrative Code. 131 FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of his wife’s death was non-work-related.R.R. as later amended by RA 1081. et al. she suffered complete abortion. she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. 283 G. Footnote No. that is to say. herein Petitioner.171 Tamayo. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. L-8975 (June 29. it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. 1994) Chapter VII. 15 days before they were separated from the company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. No. On her 4th pregnancy. But said agency denied..

a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is the one to be adopted. 1922. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Furthermore. The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones. 3030. HELD: The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the statute makes no distinction. 7. 1989) Chapter VII. pursuant to Sec. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. should the circumstances warrant. Page 320. 168 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. ISSUE: W/N Act No. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. 37.R. Moran Case No. 222 G. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance. No. 216 G. 74226-227 (July 27.172 People v. Reyes Case No. 167 People v. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. it was increased to 6 months. 1923) Chapter VII. Art. the SC contends that Art. Nos. the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes. Furthermore. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. Hence with regard to Art. Also. it makes no exception. Footnote No. Under this. Moran. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. Page 320. it is also presumed that the purchaser has examined the instruments of the record. the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed. the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. This should also apply to criminal cases. 1961. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 48 . 46a. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9.R. always susceptible possible challenges. 48 FACTS: On June 1983. HELD: Act No. 22 should still apply to special laws. However as the deed was registered on May 26. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 17905 (January 27. as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. 22 and 7 of the RPC. When the decision was published. 71 of Act No. as stated in People v.

GSIS approved his retirement gratuity under C.A. which should all be construed together. 173 FACTS: Respondent Gasilao. the difference of P75 plus P22. Petitioner expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844. and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein. Footnote No. 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the government. Page 322. 186. 1969. Bautista Case No. 1968. he was awarded with the full benefits of RA 65. as amended by RA 6389. on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under C. that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits. 1969 up to January 15. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. 1969 to January 14. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C. 37 G. 1957 up to August 7.A. as amended by RA 1616. 186 and in the light of its provisions.R. in case of ambiguity. Page 321.173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. the judgment of the lower courts is modified as. starting from December 18. and P20 per minor from January 16. No. the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. However. 186. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. 1971. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an employee.A. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C. as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim for gratuity under RA 3844. 38b . ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao’s pension. No. The difference from June 22. and RA 3844. 40b FACTS: Petitioner. and then P100 plus P10 per minor. 1957 to August 7. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees. all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should. 1968. Sec. 186. sent a letter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department. There is nothing in RA 3844. No. 1982) Chapter VII. Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and only after January 15. No. No. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22. 1971 up to December 31. 145 No. be construed in relation to C. it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. No.A. But. Footnote No. HELD: Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. from June 22. 1955 at the rate of P50. an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms. for P100 a month and an additional P10 per minor. 1975) Chapter VII. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision. 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each minor. effective December 18. as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds.A. as amended by RA 6389. 186. due to the lack of funds. L-37867 (February 22. as amended by RA 6389. Later.A. increased to P100 from June 22. 1971. a veteran. Conrado Estrella. one under its provisions and another pursuant to C. 9 and RA 1920. HELD: No. L-36153 (November 28. on June 22. Granting such pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. as amended by RA 6389. After finally complying with all the necessities.50 per month for his wife. 1971. as amended by RA 1616. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension. RA 5753 was approved. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms Case No. 170 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Legaspi v.

plus 3) longevity pay (which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 1989) Chapter VII. 1990) Chapter VII. 6484-Ret. Page 323. plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA). more so. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation. No. in the same manner as it has done since 1978. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. BP 129). Page 322. in Vol. requiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. 43c . The basis was the copy of P. As provided in Sec.M.D. However. No. not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. No. 60 A. of which 10 years. 41 provided that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. 74 of the Official Gazette. 09-9-019-SC (October 4. 1 dated February 25. No.” They fall into three categories: XXX 2. 40b FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termination of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino.D. P. 2 months. resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. 1 of RA 910. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910.23 years. 40b. 1438 must be followed. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security. for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. No.A. Since 1978 however. 74 of the Official Gazette.D. pursuant to Proclamation No. 1. This is definitely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that. (May 15. should have rendered “at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both. the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement benefits with their lifetime annuity. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.D. ISSUE: Which version of P. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. 1438 which was published in Vol. 30. Footnote No. which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. being remedial in character. not only for those who have retained their vigor but. 1438. and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. 177 FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). 174 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Re: Application For Retirement Under R. 1438 was published in Vol. GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary. 128 A. Britanico of the IAC Case No. which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement. 74 of the Official Gazette. COMELEC).174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. 30. 42. retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. as amended by P.M. Justice Britanico served the government for 36. Footnote No. 1986.

M. Furthermore. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. 1962) Chapter VII. The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it. 6789-RET (Jul 13. 1990) Chapter VII. The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. 11b . Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. 37. Moreover. 42a FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. 130 G. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal bond. Montesclaros. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations. 181 FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges. as amended. 1146. HELD: Yes. Paredes and Gerochi. a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties. 9e. it should suffice. it did. Footnote No.R. namely Pineda.175 Re: Gregorio G. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. id est courtesy resignations. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the SC. The judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. No. Montecillo. The CFI dismissed the complaint. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. even if indeed 2 sureties were needed. integrity and dedication to the public service. Pineda Case No. 9e. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee.D. the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. Arrieta Case No. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. Page 325. Footnote No. asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 9d. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. No. the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. 178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramirez v. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court. HELD: No. 29. According to the Rules of Court. 132 A. Page 323. it would suffice that the court approves such. in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P. the defect in the appeal bond. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day. de Lara. there are ample reasons behind each grant. L-19183 (Nov.

By such rigidity. and/or additions. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest. she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement. L-6970 (Jan. 9d. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Thus.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. Footnote No. The decision of the CA is affirmed. the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided. Page 326. mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. L-77154 (June 30.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. No. Page 326. alterations. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. Such bond was therefore rendered without force and effect. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes. 35 No. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. 1987) Chapter VII. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. 30. The court issued a writ of execution against Petitioner’s property. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. the Respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. 181 FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner’s predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. 11b FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes. Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial justice. which was granted. 1988) Chapter VII. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. 9d. fortified by jurisprudence. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Del Rosario v. applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No.176 International Corporate Bank v. private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. 18b . Meanwhile. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff. Hamoy Case No. Private Respondent made a money market placement. The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. HELD: Yes. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves. 1290 of the Civil Code. Footnote No. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her other obligations to Petitioner. The debt of P6. 63 G. 18a. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible.R. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures.

39 of the Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final order. The 30-day period fixed by P. 902-A was modified by Sec. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gimenez v. The Court rules. may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). 6 of P. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: Yes. 5b. thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review. that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. Page 326. 7a. an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA. 1986) Chapter VII. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. Footnote No. 22(b) of the Interim Rules. L-73146-53 (August 26. The SEC is not a court.177 Lacsamana v. 22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. 181 FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC. 52 No. awards of decisions of any court. 24a. 1984) Chapter VII. Sec. It is an administrative agency. is still in force. 902-A. for the guidance of Bench and Bar.D. 69 No. However. 27 FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as follows: … (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. 37. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. Repeals by implication are not favored. the organic law of the SEC. Page 326. Securities and Exchange Commission Case No. The SEC denied their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. save in exceptionally meritorious cases. HELD: No. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 38b . a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared the case terminated.D. L-68568 (December 26. The SEC ruled that the 30-day period provided for in Sec. ISSUE: W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case. resolutions.

R.R. There was substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff’s office the Defendant’s counterbond. 1946) Chapter VII. 1936) Chapter VII. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. 9a. Footnote No. 183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case and Nantz v. Page 326. 190 on how appeals are perfected. “… The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace …. LATIN MAXIM 6d. In lieu of such bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Internal Revenue). However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with the requirement. On the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner’s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. 6d. With such. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petitioners. Page 327. The fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. L-44970 (March 31. the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. 7a FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. No. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none. 76 of Act No. the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office. 9d . HELD: Under Sec. 49 G. 36 G. HELD: Yes to both issues.178 Blanco v. 187 FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. Case No. Jugo Case No. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. L-832 (October 14. Due to unfortunate circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy.

Footnote No. No. 1920) Chapter VII. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9d FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale. No. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. which had been effected in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana). Page 328. Raymundo Case No.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. 192 FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her brief.179 C. having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. L-45155 (July 31. Page 327. Mirasol and Nuñez Case No. 91 G.R. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. or assignee as such. Viuda de Ordoveza v. 41 . It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. Any ordinary creditor. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief.R. on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. 65 G. HELD: Yes. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. 14881 (February 5. 189 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Javellana v. was attacked in this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in other litigation. to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. Under the Rules of Court “the court may. 1936) Chapter VII. HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property.

000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec. independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. as used in insurance contracts..000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. LATIN MAXIM: 3.” HELD: The terms “accident” and “accidental”. L-16138 (April 29. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional. Capital Ins. No. 1961) Chapter VII.. causing Eduardo to fall. have not acquired any technical meaning. Inc.R. Part I of the provisions of the policy. and Casualty Co. Equitable Ins.180 Del Rosario v.000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2. Page 328. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1. and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head. the father of the insured. unexpected. Footnote No. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured. father of the insured. ISSUE: W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or disability caused by accidental means. therefore. Page 328. Case No. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured. caused by his participation in a boxing contest. not covered by insurance. 34 G. The failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death. ISSUE: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. 25a. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. left. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario. Petitioner. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3. 156 G. as indemnity for the death of the insured. 38 FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy.000 to P3. Inc. L-16215 (June 29. & Surety Co. 1. intracranial.000. 1963) Chapter VII. Case No. 192 FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. filed a claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. was not accidental and. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1. Simon de la Cruz. No.000. Footnote No. with his head hitting the rope of the ring.R. binding itself to pay the sum of P1. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De la Cruz v. 30a . The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage. filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy.

the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found. L-16138 (April 29. HELD: No. Footnote No. opportunity. entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct. Under ordinary circumstances. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff.R. As the terms of the policies are clear. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand. a resident of Pampanga. the term "may be" connotes possibility. L-28742 (April 30. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Capati v.181 Ty Vs. 9c FACTS: Plaintiff. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty. 1982) Chapter VIII. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. Page 330. a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. it does not connote certainty.R. 2(b). Fighting his way out of the factory. an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue. 7a. Page 328. which is not disputed on appeal. On December 24. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 25a. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. which issued to him personal accident policies. was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand. 8 FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. Plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. First National Surety & Assurance Co. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. Ocampo Case No." In addition. 1953. among which being the eight above named Defendants. express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof. the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy. Case No. Footnote No.. No. 156 G. b . However. permission or possibility. 46 G. Hence. at the election of the Plaintiff. a resident of Naga City. Inc. No. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. All that was found by the trial court. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies. Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides. 1961) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties.

must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only.182 Chartered Bank v. 36b undated memorandum of FACTS: In the trial of People v. 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Guiao v. Gopez. except in the cases determined in Sec. 2709 states that. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full. involving the installation of a new postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. not merely directory. unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier." effective October 1. 1 is mandatory. 1968.R. Page 333. 1987) Chapter VIII. 1968. Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 9a. the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1. Sec. the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. regardless of location. namely. 58 G. No. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein. No.” A perusal of Act No. L-6481 (May 17. Figueroa Case No. 9a. 36a. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in the information. they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. National Government Auditing Office Case No. Footnote No. Page 331. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 121 G. an amended information was filed. the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. 2 of this Act. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 17 FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. L-38513 (March 31. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons. 1954) Chapter VIII. HELD: Yes. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private.R. 25a . On 1968. “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Footnote No. and two new accused were included. ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory and permissive in nature. After the reinvestigation.

The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws.183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association. 38b. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. Court of Appeals Case No. During the pendency of the said petition. it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 102858 (July 28. b FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. Court of Appeals Case No. Page 334. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. Footnote No. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 95 G. Hence. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. Footnote No.R. HELD: It is mandatory. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. Thus. 153 G. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”. Inc. 9a . Page 334. HELD: No. 1997) Chapter VIII. 22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Director of Lands v. 117188 (August 7. v. No. 25a. it was found that the applicant had been in open. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. 23 FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.R. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. Later. 36a. he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. However. No. as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. 1997) Chapter VIII. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.

It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of P8. Respondent Judge. Case No.R. 25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr. L-35910 (July 21. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional". the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court. and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same. Footnote No. No. the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo. in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question. stated that. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock.184 Bersabal v. No. 34 G. 7a. 1997) FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. 30b. 1978) Chapter VIII. Page 335. 6b. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents’ preferred shares HELD: Yes. 51765 (March 3. Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court.” After receipt. R. Salvador Case No. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. 36a .000. Furthermore.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption. the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may". 133 G.

. unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. 30b.D. Nat’l Telecommunications Commission Case No.R. Inc. 94 G. v. 217 deals with matters so alien.. Consumers Foundation. Considering the multi-million profits of the company. 2 of P. v. 217 to the then Department of Public Works. innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning. No. 9d. 121 G. Transportation and Communications as mandatory.D. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable. Petitioner states that SIP schedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and. Consumers Foundation . the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must". illegal and baseless. 1984) FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. “The Department of Public Works. the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No.185 Phil. which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said Section 2. 9f.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Yes.D. Inc. L-63318 (November 25. 11b. 217 which provides. 12a FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent. 39c . Hence. Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated . 24. 6d. the consumers and the government itself. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P. therefore. LATIN MAXIM: 8b. 217 should be reconsidered.D.R. P. because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. L-63318 (August 18. No. Thus. 36.

”. and accordingly. the word “shall” is imperative. A.186 Diokno v. In the absence of an express repeal. 67(b) of the LGC. that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent. acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. According to Petitioner. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. the interest to be charged. it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds. If there was any repeal. Page 336. No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. it was by implication which is not favored. There is none in this case.O. 18. 34 FACTS: Petitioner.R.R. 26. et. for whose benefit the same have been issued. Page 337. it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The lower court sustained Respondent company. Case No. The first sentence of Sec. the rule is not absolute. 32 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Berces v.A. Respondent mayor was convicted. No. and 2) dishonesty. The Office of the President stayed execution. which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. 530(f). 26 . 33 G. 18. the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. 93 G. 1995) Chapter VIII. with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter.” In other words. suspended in both cases. Petitioner further contends that A. al. Albay for 1) abuse of authority. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case No. which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes. ISSUE: W/N R. 6 of A. 50 HELD: No. Footnote No.O. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. Sec. His basis was Sec. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. No. 1952) Chapter VIII. No. 112099 (February 21.” It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay execution. HELD: No. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi. to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders. 6. can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. Guingona. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds. However. Footnote No. the governing law is RA 7160. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. citing Sec. “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or directory. L-4712 (July 11. 2 of RA 304. It is true that in its ordinary signification. 7160 repealed A.O. No. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found. The modifier.O. the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304. 25a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No.

Page 337. Petitioner appealed to Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. 81 G. 123669 (February 27. Under Art. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed.R. Case No. National Labor Relations Commission. the Bouncing Checks Law. Alleging serious business decline. “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Footnote No. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fule v. 1988) Chapter VIII. Also. 26 FACTS: Petitioner. thus in violation of BP 22. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal. L-79094 (June 22. Because of the word “shall”. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. 1998) Chapter VIII. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. Inc. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. the Appellate Court. v. prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead. issued and made out check No. and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice. He was convicted by the trial court. No. and on appeal. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides. LATIN MAXIM: 9d . Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to work. he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. 48 G. 223 of the Labor Code. 37 FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers.R. Upon the hearing. in its language. No. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Court of Appeals Case No. Page 337. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. et al. Despite the reduction granted. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioner’s stoppage of operations. the rule is mandatory. Therefore. Footnote No. an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. Sec. Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days.187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. HELD: The CA erred. resulting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it.

consequently. While Art. but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings. statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. recovery of collection. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1983) Chapter VIII. acknowledged natural children. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Penid v. No. 101 G. Page 338. he is barred from doing so under Art. the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. According to Sec.R. a company which is not included in the Confidential Information.” Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation. Footnote No. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art.00 – defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Virata Case No.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a FACTS: Confidential Information No. this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. 174 G. invoking Art. L-44004 (March 25. Inc. No. 335. HELD: No. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. legitimated. or natural children by legal fiction” cannot adopt. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. 1954) Chapter VIII. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.00 to US $1. 338 meaningless and a surplusage. it must be noted that Art. 335 and Art. Page 337. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been falsely declaring their gross earnings – on the basis of a parity rate of P2. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. HELD: Yes. L-5387 (April 29. which led to further investigations and.188 McGee v. However. the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation … and results in the recovery of collection of revenues …. Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confidential Information. 9d . In jurisprudence. wants to adopt her children by her first husband. Art. Footnote No. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that “those who have legitimate. 338 which states that “a step-child. Therefore. Despite Art. an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo. by the step-father or step-mother” can be adopted. 4 of RA 2338.R. Inc. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. “In order to entitle an informer to a reward. under the laws of statutory construction. However. Now the Petitioners seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies – as provided by RA 2338. Republic Case No. In addition. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. Further. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. 338 should be considered in relation to each other. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child.

189 Pahilan v. 40b FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. 63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pimentel v. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. Page 342. 2. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballots which would have made him win. 64 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban. Camiguin. L-2327 (January 11. 110170 (February 21. 96 G. No. 2. Case No. 9d.R. Appellant’s name in the 59 ballots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor. 124 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. member of the provincial board or councilor. 1994) Chapter VIII. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. No. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. as provided by the Constitution. Within the 5-day period to appeal. 43 . Tabalba. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor. HELD: 1. No. 7b. HELD: No. Footnote No. ISSUE: 1. it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who. 1949) Chapter VIII. 9c. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any “notice of appeal” from Petitioner. Petitioner filed a “verified appeal” brief. Footnote No. et al. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.R. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor. Festejo Case No. No. Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. filed as of the date of mailing. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. W/N the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed. Page 342. and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail. is able to read.

28985. the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. OCT No. L-12182 (March 27. 1918) Chapter VIII. 75 FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. 264 G. and not Sec. Court of Appeals Case No. Baltazar sold the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central. Rafferty Case No. No. 44139. HELD: No. Casamayor sold the land in favor of Nemesia Baltazar. 1987) Chapter VIII. His attempted notification on December 25.000. In 1945. 1914. Footnote No. Page 345. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and void from the beginning. the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the petition of Baltazar. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. It was finished in all respects on February 15. TCT No. 40858 (September 15. was not given during the time fixed by statute. On the same day. 43 . ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. Footnote No. was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. consisting of 21. 1914. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. received by them on December 25. under Homestead Patent No. under the date of December 1. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during November. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment.R. the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. 121 which governs sale to corporations. Page 345.1676 hectares situated in Sagay. the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of Casamayor. In the latter part of 1913. 14-R. which did not present the documents for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds.190 Roxas v. The city assessor and collector of Manila. In 1951. which amounted to P3. sent Plaintiffs notice. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes. No. OCT No.A. 1839 was issued by said office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. 145 G. Negros Occidental. TCT No. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title.R. Apparently. 1914. in the name of Petitioner. 1915. LATIN MAXIM: 37b. Upon registration of said patent. The city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. applying Sec. 118 of C. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Furthermore. under protest. 75 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Serfino v. Since the grant was more than 5 years before. 19 FACTS: A parcel of land. 141. HELD: No. thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Building for the year 1915.

The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law.59. for election purposes.R. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. Hence. filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with respondent COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. The loan was to be released in installments. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Romualdez-Marcos v. As a minor. ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. including interests. once acquired. it is retained until a new one is gained. Page 347. LATIN MAXIM: 28. In spite of the being born in Manila. amounted to P13.983.84 FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved. Commission on Elections Case No. Although Mr. Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20. 119976 (September 18. 1953 when RA 897 was approved. As domicile. 7a. to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. Parenthetically. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. Footnote No. Private respondent Montejo. No. HELD: Yes. 1 FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. 1953. when she married then Congressman Marcos. Marcos has different places of residence. No. 6c. she did not lose her domicile of origin. 1995) Chapter VIII. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. 137 G. such corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates.000 for his outstanding obligation. 37. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent. R. when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20. 26419 (October 16. Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Leyte. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. Therefore. G. 897 (RA 897). petitioner was obliged.191 Quijano v. 110 of the Civil Code. petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14. and even if he had designated one. HELD: No. by virtue of Art. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. 39a .

43. filed an election protest on July 9. 1948) Chapter VIII. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. 1928. Footnote No. 247 G. The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. HELD: No. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. Footnote No. However. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court. 5b. The doctrine in Portillo v. Page 332. 130 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Querubin v.R. 1929 declaring appellee Portillo the winner. b2 FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. L-32181 (March 10. Decision was rendered on August 15. 7b. Sec.192 Portillo v. 18b. No. Salvani Case No. 9a. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction. 2. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. One year having already elapsed. 243 G. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within three months after filing.R. 1930) Chapter III. 14 FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. 7a. 39b . Salvani should be abandoned. Court of Appeals Case No. L-2581 (December 2. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. his nearest opponent. lost and filed an appeal thereafter. Appellee Portillo. 45. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. Page 101. No. this provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law.

in enacting RA 546. LATIN MAXIM: 5a.193 Nilo v. 1 thereof amended Sec. but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. 1971 removing “personal cultivation” from the grounds for ejectment. because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 1951) FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. Art. The legislation involves social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. to rule against the small landowners would be thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. to abolish all the pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof. Court of Appeals Case No. 59 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salcedo and Ignacio v. 46b FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA 546 was approved and Sec. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so. HELD: No. 46a. 4007. Page 89. L-34586 (April 2. 1968. Private respondent then filed for ejection citing “personal cultivation” on March 7. 1984) Chapter III. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. No. that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation. 9c. By virtue of this law. 4007. In the case of Camacho vs. 189 G. Carpio and Carreon Case No. Furthermore. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10. a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the President. No. L-4495 (June 6. 46. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress. whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception. however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitled to social justice. 138 G. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect.R.R. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. 49 . Footnote No.

50 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. and power. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code. instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises.R. L-36007 (May 25. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts. No. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application.194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. HELD: No. Inc. 4 of the New Civil Code. 9c.” thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. 78 G. the CA applying Sec. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. RA 3843 was passed. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. In applying Art. Pending the case. Upon appeal. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. 49 FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter carrier. Footnote No. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. 1988) FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. Case No.. 46. No. Borromeo Case No. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. heat. granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light. RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. held that the landowner’s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. 46e . 14 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gallardo v. 7 of RA 6389.A. R. all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 6389 eliminated this ground. L-23771 (August 4. Sec.R. HELD: It is valid. The newer law. Page 355. but made it “in lieu of any and all taxes. 7 of RA 6389. 1988) Chapter IX.

14880 (April 29. 20563 (October 29. Filipinas Compaňia de Seguros Case No. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. While the purpose of the amendment. the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement.R. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of Tax Appeals. 46e FACTS: Respondent. an insurance company. Page 355. 1968) Chapter IX. 46c.” it certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government. Petitioner assessed against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively. 46e . was engaged in business as a real estate dealer. expressly provides that said Act shall take effect upon its approval. and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. 41 FACTS: The case involves petitioner’s claim for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955. it also protested the payment of the ad valorem taxes. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. No. this took effect on August of 1956. 1960) Chapter IV.195 Cebu Portland Cement v. unless the contrary is provided. 52 G. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. Page 134. No. which imposes the new and higher taxes. HELD: No. and on January 1953. CIR Case No. As a rule. Respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955). 15 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. was not only to “accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms. In every case of doubt. 46c. unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.R. 76 G. Footnote No. laws have no retroactive effect. considering that RA 1612. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale of graduated rates. as mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill. producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. Footnote No. Since 1952. however.

Santos Case No. 126. in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. Magdalena de Ocampo. No. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. Ana. Page 351. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. 29 G. thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future. otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. 344 of the RPC. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted. 1932) Chapter IX. However.196 Laceste v. Page 363. 73 FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica.R. L-36378 (January 27. 7 of RA 6389 since. 46e . Pampanga containing 18. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Balatbat v. Art. LATIN MAXIM: 48 FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity. Lachica married the victim. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. 140 G.490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. However. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 20. 36(1) of RA 3844. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. No. HELD: No. Footnote No. 1992) Chapter IX. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus.R. 36886 (February 1. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. Conscience and good law justify this exception. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. 46b. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. Footnote No. pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. Court of Appeals and Passion Case No.

Page 369. 104 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. 20. Case No. 1951. L-7140 (December 22.R. No. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. HELD: Yes.A. Footnote No. Page 266. 1946 to March 14. the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1. Footnote No. 1955) Chapter IX. Zeta Case No. Where a statute was amended and reenacted. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. 46e FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre-war loan with defendant. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. Furthermore. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 20. 1955) Chapter VI. No. No. 72 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Jose v. L-7766 (November 29. strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect.197 People v. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 401. 46e . At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C. 232 G. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. 271 G.R. but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act. The lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. LATIN MAXIM: 11b. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff by the defendant.

those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners. a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 1983. Sumilang Case No. On appeal. No. L-49187 (December 18. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. 129 is now in full force and effect. as appellants.198 People v. HELD: No. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11. Being procedural in nature. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed. Based on the records. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause. denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs. Footnote No. 111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Palomo Building Tenants Association v. 46e FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. Sumilang. 226 G. No. However. both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. Ruled in Alday vs. the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. BP Big. 764 [19461.R. Page 371. 77 Phil. Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss. HELD: Yes. and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. L-68043 (October 31. as principal defendants. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. 1946) Chapter IX. 97 G. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No.R. Camilon. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.

(c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. 1989) FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages. 15. 46b . 7960 (December 8. Sec.D. 772. 1 of P. otherwise known as the Anti– Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court. 1989) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ocampo v. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence. Court of Appeals Case No. Inc. 89 G. 86675 (December 19. or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. No. (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force. v. exemplary damages. LATIN MAXIM: 45a. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that “after prosecution has rested its case.” ISSUE: 1. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Sec. intimidation. 78 G.R. petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. HELD: Yes.199 MRCA. 772. Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. while being informed of P. 2. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. No.D. HELD: Yes on both counts. Court of Appeals Case No.R. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting.

R.R. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. Page 372. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Court of Appeals Case No. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws. Footnote No. 90501 (August 5. No. Page 372. being without malice. 91856 (October 5.) Inc. 33 of the Civil Code. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aris (Phil. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 315 G. 46e FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. and the contested provision “is then a police legislation”. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art. 1990) Chapter IX.200 Yakult Philippines v. HELD: Yes on both counts. 119 FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence. 21 G. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1991) Chapter IX. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. 223 of the Labor Code. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. 46e . respectively. Footnote No. HELD: Yes. No. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. v.

1281 prevails. 61 of Act No.D. Court of Appeals Case No. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER. 1990) Chapter IX. the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. 12 of P. L-54305 (February 14. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles.D. Cadastral Act (No. No reference is made in Act No. No. 25 G. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. Pangasinan on two parcels of land. However. v. 44 FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City. ISSUE: Whether Sec. ISSUE: W/N P.201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec. 1281. HELD: Act No. Act No. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission. or. 926. 9 mining claims overlap. Page 12. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. During the pendency of this appeal.R. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. Page 373. No. 7(a)(c) and Sec. L-8243 (December 24. entered into a compromise agreement. seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan. Footnote No. 61 of Act No. 117 G.R. Sec. of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. 61 of Act No.D. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. Municipality of Binalonan Case No. HELD: P. Cebu. 1915) Chapter I. Footnote No. 1281. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. Cebu. lands claimed by the Government.D. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. at most. Due to the promulgation of P. 926. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Government of the Philippine Islands v. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City.

Court of Appeals Case No. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5. Page 376. by amending Sec. HELD: Yes.30. which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85). night shift differential pay. overtime pay. 111 amending Art. Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director’s authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers. 13 of RA 85. No. and dela Cruz. 38b.R. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. ECOLA. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Briad Agro Development Corp. This was clear from the proviso: “The provisions of Art. 39 G. was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. L-28774 (February 28. In its appeal to the NLRC. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage. However. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters. v. the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands. dela Serna. 13 of RA 85. a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. No. by force of Art. E. by RA 3147. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 217 of the Labor Code. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice. et al.O. 217 of this Code notwithstanding…” The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction. therefore. 13. Hon. among which was Sec. Footnote No. the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. 1989) Chapter IX.909. RA 3147 was enacted. 92 G. 13 of RA 85. However. legal holiday pay. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP. 83225 (June 29. Page 175. without the knowledge of the DBP. 1980) Chapter IV. v. HELD: The Court held that E.O. Then.369.O. 30b. 9. Case No.202 Development Bank of the Phil. which NLRC dismissed on the strength of E. 46e . 136 FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years.R. It is. were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. 128(b) of the Labor Code. 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay.

HELD: No.R. 46e FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. E. No. When private respondent returned to the Philippines. 37. claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. Months after.O. v. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction.O. a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. Footnote No. Jr. L-20901 (August 31. Footnote No. 134 FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. The lot was purchased by Santos. 99 G. Page 377. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E. No. HELD: It is a mortgage. Gaanan and Aguilar. Page 376. 37. another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. 1955. 1965) Chapter IX. creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad. 797 was passed. plus his contractual bonus. the daughter of the Duata spouses. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. Inc. he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. National Labor Relations Commission. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. in this case. the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage under Art. 104215 (May 8. 1691 and 1391. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. private respondent Duata. Furthermore.203 Erectors. and in order to secure the payment of the loan. these were P. 46a. 46e . 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial court. For convenience. the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. 21. ISSUE: W/N E.O. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessitated. Duata and the Court of Appeals Case No. the title was issued in Santos’s name. in executing the said private document. 140 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Andres. LATIN MAXIM: 35. intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. Art. On August 3. 17.R. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar. it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned. Hon. Upon appeal. 274 G. Santos denied the spouses’ ownership. No. 1996) Chapter IX.D. instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. and Burgos Case No. 46c. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase.

The latter refused to comply. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. Then by virtue of E. 1979) Chapter VIII. 5 and 6. and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant. 133 FACTS: President C. issued by President D. 27. 182 G. among others. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No.O. 5 and 6. the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. peace. Sr. Sec. Quezon. 353. HELD: Yes. It was then attacked of its validity. Quezon v.R. as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. is also curative statute. No. petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E.204 Municipality of San Narciso. prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. issued E. as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991. v. 27. Feati Bank & Trust Case No. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. to be devoted to banking purposes. 193 G. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. 2 of RA 1515. 1994) Chapter IX.O.O. ISSUE: W/N the E. defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. 174. 6c FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. Footnote No.O. LATIN MAXIM: 46e. Page 381. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health. Macapagal. good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. L-24670 (December 14. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Resolution No. No. 103702 (December 6. Case No. and any attempt to apply Sec. 5 and 6. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power. they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law. creating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos.R. Mendez. Garcia. contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations. safety. 46e . 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres. Page 312. 150 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ortigas & Co. Footnote No. 442(d) of RA 7160. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone.

No. otherwise it shall be barred forever. the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. 237 G.205 Billones v. Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process. To require PNB to go against the estate would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. 6. In this case. Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from their accrual. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased debtor. 3 FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. ISSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. Art. Moreover. HELD: No. However. 7-A of C. Court of Industrial Relations Case No. as amended by RA 1993. 1977) Chapter X. which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. increase of modify substantive rights. as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. 46e FACTS: On January 1963. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. PNB filed a case against all 4 signatories. By May. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. or all”. 35 G.R. 144. 1216. 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M. before the case was decided. or some. Page 387. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 144. Footnote No. 1965) Chapter IX. No. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors. Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. Sec. Thus. Page 372.A. ISSUE: W/N Sec. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. 6.A. L-46095 (November 23. No. Asuncion Case No. provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo. 7-A of C. Manuel Barredo passed away. 9c .R. the choice is left up to PNB to decide. 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish. No. Footnote No. L-17566 (July 30. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. As the statute shortened the period of action accrued. HELD: It would have applied. claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims.

90 G. People Case No. laws concerning this issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 1990 had repealed P. Ongsiako insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect.R. 49 FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1. 7b. the petition was denied because P. However. 7 G. No. later that same year.206 Ongsiako v. Gamboa Case No. 7a. HELD: No. 49 . Act 4054 was amended by RA 34.D. 1988) FACTS: In 1946. No.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a.D. 43. Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren’t. Because of this.D. However. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial. Because P. 968. 1950) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Amandy v. Where the law is clear and unambiguous. 36a. the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits should be followed. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy’s petition for probation. it must be taken as it is. 79010 (May 23.R. producing retroactive effect. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect. 25a.D. This act provided that the palay would be divided equally by the 2 parties. 968. HELD: Yes. 22a.D. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Petitioner then filed for probation alleging P. 9a. 8 of Act 4054. Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of Sec. 1990 was promulgated after P. Moreover.6 grams of marijuana. During liquidation. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been “sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years” are excluded from the benefits of the Probation Law. it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that “this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants… The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating. L-1867 (April 8. no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation. the former prevails. 968. he was given a sentence of six years and 1 day (the minimum time for his offense). 6b. In the past.

4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sec. 5b. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC. Land Registration Commission Case No. 197 G.R. 1995) Chapter X.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. Footnote No. No. When the parties met.0000.R.227. No.D. LATIN MAXIM: 11. Sec. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette.207 Parras v. private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7. otherwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year. Page 391. and (2) another for P12. 115213 (December 19. Court of Appeals Case No. 9a. 36b . LATIN MAXIM: 4. 2. they failed to reach an amicable settlement. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case. interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6. of the latter law. L-16011 (July 26. pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300. 114 of Act 496. 32. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P. 1960) Chapter X. Nevertheless. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. while admitting indebtedness. 38b FACTS: On several occasions. 1508. Private respondents in their Answer.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners. 410(b) and 412 respectively. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. 96 G. Page 390. It must be noted that P. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. the sum of P57. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Diu v.D. 28 FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office. but private respondents failed to appear. ISSUE: 1. otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". Footnote No.55. Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing. W/N petitioner can be exempted.862.

45 FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. 176 G. 173 of the Labor Code. 49 . Footnote No. 119 G. HELD: Yes. W/N Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. 1921. the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. it ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. The second sentence of Art. However. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 38. No. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine Government. the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareholders. 2705. However. two from the legislative and one from the executive. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Springer Case No. 1990. as amended. Commission on Audit Case No. as amended by Sec. Sec. 2. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7. Page 395. No. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal. expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. 37. 4 of Act No.R. on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). 1927) Chapter I. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 1992) Chapter X.208 Government v. 2 of Act No. ISSUE: 1. 103982 (December 11. and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. as amended by P. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company. 2822. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. HELD: Petition was granted.D. During the election of directors. as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 699 of the RAC … whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.R.” LATIN MAXIM: 30a. 38b FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 30a. 38b. 32. is unconstitutional and void. 9a. L-26979 (April 1. Footnote No. 166 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mecano v. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. however. three members of the government appeared.

It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. 4. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. No. one Chan Sam. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel. 49. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. 33281 (March 31. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. No 12330 (January 25. 9c. 49 FACTS: The petitioner. par. 50 . 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ynchausti & Co v. 1312 of the Administrative Code. 20 G. any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 1917) FACTS: The accused. Stanley Case No. Thus.209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor’s reports. 2614. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict between Act No. Concepcion and Lee Voo Case No. Art. this should be done. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. In issuing the order of release the respondent judge relied upon Art. a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business. 174 G. The Philippine Legislature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs.R. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. Sec. 2614 was not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code. when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together. Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. sought to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement. On the other hand. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. none is presumed to be intended. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal. 2614 being specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. The converse proposition equally holds true.R. was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be committed to an asylum. 1048 of the Administrative Code. of the Penal Code. 8. Likewise.

where Sec. Whether or not an Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by an examination of both statutes.D.D.D. et al. and object of both. 451. entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232. R. under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture. HELD: Yes. The Government appealed. Under P. and thereafter. 451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. v. Laya Case No. Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations. 11338 (August 15. 39b . No. Tantoco Case No. 451. Hence. However. purpose. and in the light of the reason. 3(a) of P. P. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisions relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. 49 FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in Sec. 1916) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fabros. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P. HELD: That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. there was a repeal. which was granted to them. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. which the Court thereby lifted. 25 valid. 1987) FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. 451. Then Minister of Education Jaime C. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the United States Congress. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that Act No. 70832 (December 18.210 U. LATIN MAXIM: 4. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No.D.R. No.S.D. four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P. The Education Act of 1982. 44 G. relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. v. while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 164 G. 25.

127 G. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. and this is certified by the National Economic Council. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Feliciano Case No. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land Registration Act. refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors. The assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. 1931) FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano. which was registered with a Torrens title. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has been made. series of 1964. The two laws. 1965) Chapter X. Case No.R. the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration.211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. thru a government agency which the President may designate. Inc. hence there was no repeal. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. 61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Brias de Coya v. v. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. although with a common objective. 39a . ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.R. against which they may enforce their credits. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties. wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice. she appointed her son to manage. 39a FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. et al. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. L-24022 (March 3. 30756 (September 22. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. No. Tan Lua. It was approved. we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of the insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. both such proceedings and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds. thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. At this. 70. according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property. In order to effect a repeal by implication. pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. Page 399. is legal and valid. the former from their commencement. 16 G. No. sell and encumber her properties situated in the Philippines. the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law.

50 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. Page 411. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code. and not by Sec. 49 . series of 1968. Subido Case No. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance. 9. disapproved the appointment. A subsequent statute. he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828. RA 5185. ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. 1974) Chapter X. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. L-31711. as noted.R. 62 FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. a negative response. 1963. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment.96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jalandoni vs. 4 of the Decentralization Law. Sec. Petitioner. to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Sec. There was. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. (the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense). (September 30. the provisions of Art. through counsel manifested in open court that under Art. Reyes. on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice. No. Endaya Case No. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-23894. saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. HELD: No. 1971) Chapter X. LATIN MAXIM: 1. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. As is clear from his well-written memorandum. was thus repealed by implication.212 Villegas vs. general in character as to its terms and application. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22. During the hearing of the libel case Cruz. Respondent still tried the case. No. appointed Manuel D. a 1908 decision. Respondent. (January 24. Footnote No. 137 G. 360 of the Revised Penal Code.R. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. 9. 314 G. Footnote No. directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. basing his action. Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner. In an Administrative Order. Respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. HELD: No. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category.

1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by subsequent statutes. The Court of Tax Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P. While we generally do not favor repeal by implication. LATIN MAXIM: 49 FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife. 2710 should be applied. HELD: Act No. The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide application.213 CIR vs. the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the miners because they are not directly convenienced. representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils. ISSUE: W/N Act No.33. Nos. sooner or later. Case No. Page 388. Footnote No.D. then the proviso in Sec.R. 1920) Chapter X. No. using RA 1435 as basis. 83583-84 September 30. Footnote No.64 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Valdez v. when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws. 79 G. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon conviction. the later must be given effect. for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. 231. Act No. 49 .50 and P424.303. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. It is inevitable that.R. 2710. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. HELD: Yes. 111 G. Tuazon Case No. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause. 2710 should be applied in the case. 9 FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974. and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistency.978. motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations as a mining concessionaire. 1991 Chapter X. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subsidize the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit. The respondent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery. Page 400. respectively. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation. L-14957 (March 16. Negative statutes are mandatory. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachronism. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. 436 and 711.

1932) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Torrente v. No.R. ISSUE: 1. vs. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. but it is not conclusive on the courts. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner. L-2340 (December 21. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. HELD: 1.R. a justice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest. 2. it is entitled to respectful consideration. Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. Due to contrary provisions. 1905) FACTS: In 1919. Castro. Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the Philippines. 155 G. only part of the price was paid. 58. so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. According to Standard Oil Co. the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish law. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run throughout the province. Sec. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property. discharging the petitioner from detention. LATIN MAXIM: 4. much less the archipelago.O. In 1920. On the last sale.214 Estate of Mota v. Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. LATIN MAXIM: 1 FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. The court however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. 42 G. 49 . HELD: Under the provision of Sec. No. No. 13 of G. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission. L-34581 (March 31. Concepcion Case No. In December of the same year. 2. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. wherever he may be in the Philippines. were illegal and void. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting parties. Grove Case No.

Sec. Teleron Case No.R. 7c. there was no longer any law punishing the act. The section also admitted no exception. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense. ISSUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a. were charged with the violation of Sec. 1976) Chapter IV. revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. L-26551 (February 27. filed for Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. therefore there can be none. Footnote No. 200 G. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. 30a. Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution. 195 G. Though the five were a minority. himself an aspirant for the office. Page 142. No. A subsequent statute. hence it was presumed valid. legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. 10.215 Pamil v. which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. 49 Minor Five: 6c. 39 of the ATL. HELD: Sec. The accused. 2175 was no longer operative. 61 FACTS: Respondent Fr. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. 47. Seven believed Sec. No. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective. 148 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Page 33. 1978) Chapter I. Footnote No. 43 FACTS: Almuete. al. Bohol. No such repugnance is discernible. 32. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant’s act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 49 . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The ALRC suspended the ATL.R. tenants of Fernando. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the two. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. Also. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque. the supreme law. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. HELD: The vote was indecisive. allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her consent. L-34854 (November 20. 37. et. The petitioner. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Almuete Case No. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. 7a.

On the other hand. Civil Aeronautics Board Case No. The defendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec.R.A. L-32979-81 (February 29. 71 G. A general affirmative act will not be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. Municipality of Zamboanga Case No. No. HELD: Authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. 226. No. 2625(d) of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment of Act No. No. 3422 repealed Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 37.216 Smith Bell & Co. v. under both statutes. 50 FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. 38b . 2407 of the Administrative Code.R. L-33318 (December 20. If the legislature intended its repeal. jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lechoco v. the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual. Furthermore. exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. Under RA 776. joint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 148 G. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2625(d) the Administrative Code. implied repeal of statutes is not favored. 3422. 146. it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressly repealing Sec. 13(a) and 14 of C. respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were. 1972) FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No.

petitioner ignored the provision that the City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act. 171 G.217 Villegas v. HELD: No. which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner. then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila. 50 .24040 (August 9. L-24012 & L. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Villegas v. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other body. 4 of the Decentralization Act be given effect. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila.R. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. 1965) FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. No. Subido. the construction will be against such repeal. RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law. HELD: No. 1973) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villegas v.R. 37 FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled. Enrile Case No. Furthermore. 38b. Subido Case No. 5a. 172 G. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplinary cases. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove. No. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. L-29827 (March 31. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. instead of to the President.

It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. He posits that Act No. 2238 provides no penalty thus. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. leaving issues… such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done… unless a different disposition is required by law. 77 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Marin v. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. 1916) Chapter X. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 82.218 U. v. Sec. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act No. No. Nacianceno Case No. Act No.” ISSUE: W/N Act No. 11 . 87 of Act No. 82. Repeals by implication are not favored. Page 411. The petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 38b FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix. 18 that states “all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. Footnote No.R.R. 1911) Chapter X.S. The construction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. Act No. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy. 301 G. 87 of Act No. 5939 (March 29. but the testatrix did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “When a devise or a legacy is made to a child… and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator. 100 FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. then Sec. 11002 (January 17. Palacio Case No. 82 continues in force. having died before the testator so as to pass to the heirs. 758 would have no value and might as well have never been written which is an absurd interpretation. 171 G. Page 406. 82 because of the clause in Sec. HELD: Yes. No.” The executor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein. Footnote No.

27. it is the exercise of “administrative control and supervision” over units of the INP that was transferred to the President. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. Yes. L-71855 (January 20. the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner. 105 FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. 1040 & 1012. ISSUE: 3.R. commenced a seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: 1. 1988) Chapter X. An altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. Averia Case No. 20c. On the same day. Chief.O. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff.” shot Lozano during the performance of duty. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pacis v.D. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. No. 4. . It has also caught the Supreme Court’s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the boat owner. Footnote No. filed a Civil Case for replevin alleging that the boat was stolen.O. 1966) Chapter X. Averia. L-22526 (November 29. 37 FACTS: Petitioner.O. Anacorita. 1040 is inaccurate. Petitioner contends that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P. Page 412. No. 49 W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat. 309 G. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. The allegation that P. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than just the interest of a public official. the alleged boat owner. 1012 that it is only the “operational supervision and direction” over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal government. Philippine Constabulary Case No.R. 1850 was repealed by E.219 Velunta v. 20c.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clear and precise provision of E. the Acting Collector of Customs. and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon. 194 G. 2. Marges. Footnote No. 1040.O. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. “with deliberate intent and with intent to kill. The fishing boat therein was transferred to the Provincial Sheriff. Under E. No. It is specifically stated under E. HELD: Yes. Page 413. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act.

by his own declaration. and Radio Corp.R. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. et al. it mentions that whenever a party has.R.220 Herman v. Sec. 49 . 1927) Chapter X. 110 of the Labor Code provides for “worker preference in case of bankruptcy”. 49 FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its remaining employees. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of the traffic department. 80593 (December 18. No. 108 FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Radio Inc. Two years after. as mortgage-creditor. his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wages. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding… such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid. In Sec.) agreed to merge.” LATIN MAXIM: 6a. intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief. Cruz. AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T.M. Hence. thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. Page 414. Case No. AMEX did not appeal but PNB. Radio Corporation of the Philippines Case No. 107 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. It specifically states that “In the event of bankruptcy… of an employer’s business. The petitioner herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation. 1815 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the employer. he cannot be permitted to falsify it. No. HELD: Yes. 239 G. act or omission. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compromise. 123 G. appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. Page 414. 1989) Chapter X. Footnote No. The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay. Footnote No. and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later expression of legislative will than Art. ISSUE: W/N Herman’s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. 26802 (July 15. Art. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: W/N Art. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures. San Andres Development Corporation.

1959. Petitioner contends that P. 1997) Chapter X. R. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P.A. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law. 8 of the Constitution. such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA 4917. it can’t repeal a specific provision impliedly. The COMELEC’s basis is R. Also in Villegas v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 10. 85 G. 50 . It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in character can’t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect.A. 20a. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. 5a. 8 of the Constitution provides that. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983. Sec. ‘The term of office of elective local officials. HELD: 1. Footnote No. No.D.D. from income tax. 10. the same having been scheduled in May 1997”. No. including all the retirement benefits given to officials and employees of private firms. 9a. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 127116 (April 8. the Supreme Court in Paras v. should be the one followed. 81 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. P. ISSUE: 1. Soon after. Commission on Elections Case No. 8 of the Constitution. Page 300. Court of Appeals Case No. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can’t be deemed to be applicable to the employees’ trusts.A. hence.D. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years.D. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax. HELD: Yes. 10. R.D. Subido. 6679. 1992) Chapter VII. 2. The deletion in P. 2. 73 G. shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. which shall be determined by law. W/N there was a violation of Art. Footnote No. 95022 (March 23. Furthermore. 43. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan. Sec. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposits previously given by P.R.D. What the term of office of barangay officials is. 105 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. P. 49 FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income. 1959 is a general law.R. except barangay officials.221 David v. No. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from income taxation. Sec. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away. Art. Page 413. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails.

notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constitution. 108725-26 (September 25. in relation to Sec. 50 FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. as amended. respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. Three years and six months after his suspension. If the suspension is otherwise extended. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. 13 of the 1987 Constitution. The said resolution likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action taken by PAL. 13b . 118 G. also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the RTC presided over by respondent judge. 34 of RA 265. respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. v. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days. 108 G. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265. A month after. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct.D. as amended by CB Circular 383. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this court. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. Leachon. Case No.” ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject criminal case.R. 772 was still effective. opining that P. which provide that. the respondent judge dismissed the case again. a law will always be presumed valid. LATIN MAXIM: 37. Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality. After presenting the evidence. Thereafter. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested. At the time the order was issued by respondent judge. HELD: Yes. PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. 772. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Airlines Inc. No. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. 9 and 10 of Art. P. after which period. the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case.R. the prosecution rested the cases. HELD: Yes. the employee must be reinstated to his former position. “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. 114307 (July 8.D. No. 1998) FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P.D. Upon his reinstatement. ISSUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension. the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension.222 People v. Jr.

the Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause. Opol. operate and maintain an electric light. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 31 G. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. Lantin Case No. Also. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. Customs took custody of the shipment.D. vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs.223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 1967) FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247.D.R. 50 FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. special laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms. 19. No. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction – on the basis of the Judiciary Act – and not the Bureau of Customs. However. provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. 127 G. Villanueva. 3570. No provision in P. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Joya v. and 6020 to install. No. HELD: No. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247. and Jasaan. 231) and pursuant thereto. however. The Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental. demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P. RA 1937 and 1125. whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. Inc. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company. heat and power system in Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan. the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment. 45355 (January 12. 3570 and 6020. In case of conflict. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of “all taxes of whatever authority” except 3% tax on its gross earnings. L-24037 (April 27.R. on the other hand. Case No. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does.

argues that RA 409. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited. the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120’s full conveyance of the property to the widow. has jurisdiction. 9 G. which are contrary to the Civil Code. while Act 1120 is a special law. under RA 409. he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. disposition. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. Art. 1956) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots. Respondent. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines. Sec. herein petitioner. because their houses were “public nuisances” built on public streets and river beds. it is the district health officer who should remove public nuisances. the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. and transmission of friar lands. was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. 16. 1928) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sitchon. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: Respondent Aquino. 147 G. Aquino Case No. et al. the City Engineer of Manila. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. No. 701 and 702. whereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila.224 Arayata v. and he started paying the Government for such. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition. L-28067 (March 10.R. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances. the latter prevails. Joya as administrator. demolished the houses of the six petitioners in this class suit. When a general and a special law are in conflict. L-8500 (February 27. No. The special law must prevail. v. Joya Case No. The Civil Code is a general law.R. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120. Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code. HELD: The City Engineer. grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. on the other hand. the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. His widow.

which is general in character. Philippine Trust Co. and 2) the Civil Code. 9c FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F.R. was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. 1967) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Trust Co. As further indication of this intent.225 Bellis v. Relying on Art. et. No. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. Art. 16. Art. HELD: Texas Law should apply. which is more specific. and Art. Thus. a citizen of Texas USA. 32280 (March 24.. par. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wife’s property. 1930) FACTS: Amos Bellis. A special guardian. Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements. Bellis Case No. who became mentally incapacitated. 2. 123 G. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law). Subsequently.R. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . par 2. 16. which did not provide for legitimes. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children. being the guardian. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent. No. which still subsists. v.. 14 G. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Procedure. the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. al. No. filed a motion. cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same. The defendant. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Tormo. It is thus evident that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals. Macuan Case No. which was later granted by the Court. After the execution of the decedent’s will. 1039 provides that the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent. Tormo. all surnamed Bellis. 2. ISSUE: 1. in the inventory of her property. died. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. in intestate or testamentary successions. her undivided half of the conjugal property. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. said half of the conjugal property. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership. M. which is claimed to be conjugal property. HELD: 1. referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. praying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belonging to his ward. L-23678 (June 6. Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife. which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated. the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children.

75 G. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal effect. Case No. The legislative franchise was valid. barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages. 8. 50 . the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act.755. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. 50 FACTS: Private respondent. L-7280 (January 20. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with Sec. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed. the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of the goods. the former being a special act while the latter is a law of general application. No.R. with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York. Page 415. Footnote No. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade. for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935 Constitution. HELD: Yes.R. it has already prescribed. Art. No. a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. and thus. HELD: No. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner’s assessment without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code. Court of Tax Appeal Case No.226 Tan Liao v. 153 G. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circumstances.00. American President Lines. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of the goods. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract. Relying on the ruling in previous cases. and thereby. Ltd. 44007 (March 20. USA to the port of Manila. pursuant to RA 808. the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and the corporation. 115 FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of P92. 1991) Chapter X. which included a tax exemption from the payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on its real property.

ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city. However.D. Regardless of their date of passage.R.227 NPVC v. claims and controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez. 1991) Chapter X. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes. Civil Service Commission Case No. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces. Also.D. since repeals by implication are not favored. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. 87119 (April 16. granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes whereas P. On the other hand respondent invokes P. Jr. 116 FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. No. 38b. The City Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. P. 87 G. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 37. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action. Petitioner contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case pursuant to P. a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law. HELD: Yes. 50 .R. 72477 (October 16. XXV Case No. the City Budget of Manila questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. Page 415. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies of the government including GOCC’s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. v. 150 G. No.D. 242 must yield to P. Presiding Judge RTC Br.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power.D. conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. HELD: No.

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. which is claimed to have repealed Sec.R. Footnote No. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R. HELD: No. 1961) Chapter VI. was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). When vouchers were submitted to the mayor. No. Lastly. the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor. et al. No.A. Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts. Also. there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court. 75 of RA 926. the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor. the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC. who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. 36d. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. Nueva Ecija. 32. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 1998) FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner. RA 1551 however. L-16950 (December 22. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan. 122068 (July 8. 118 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case No. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Valera Garcia v. His reason was RA 1551 has repealed Sec. a junior typist civil service eligible. 110 G. Municipal Trial. However. 50 HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed. . 9a. LATIN MAXIM: 37. b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. Pascual. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. Sec. he did not want to approve them. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondent’s acceptance of the case for the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.R. which is a law of special nature. Page 277. 38.228 Manzano v. 80 G. FACTS: Petitioner. Case No. 50.

83 FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. et al. 40b. entitled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila. RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. Ramirez Case No. 7a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 50 of Ordinance No. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. Footnote No. HELD: No.229 Lagman v. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. 4986.” Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. Moreover. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C. so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts. and null and void. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila.A. the Local Tax Code controls. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes. 11a. ultra vires.R.R.” ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional. c) Sec. 49. 49. b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment. City of Manila. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated. “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. 126 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Bagatsing v. Page 420. the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic. L-23305 (June 30. Page 268. Footnote No. 548 and the Public Service Law. No. 50 . No. L-41631 (December 17. 7522. the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. 28 G. and For Other Purposes. fees or other charges” in particular. 4986 is FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 1966) Chapter X. 17. In regard therefore. No. 1976) Chapter VI. and d) the ordinance would violate P. 141 G. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. Case No. illegal. 11a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.D.

Contemporary construction is strongest in law. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. B. the maxim rules. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. . Dura lex sed lex. Equity never acts in contravention of the law. Common error sometimes passes as current law. Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum. What is good and equal is the law of laws. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 8. Hoc quidem perquam durum est. 4.230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Latin Maxims Chapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION 2. Index animi sermo est. Things thus standing. Speech is the index of intention. si deficit lex. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. Littera scripta manet. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. When the language of the law is clear. Animus hominis est anima scripti. Ratio legis est anima legis. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. Jus ars boni et aequi. sed ita lex scripta est. 3. Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. but so the law is written. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. no explanation is required. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. 9. The intention of the party is the soul. does not by lapse of time become valid. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. Regula pro lege. 7. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate. Communis error facit jus. That which was originally void. Law is the art of equity. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Chapter III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. The law may be harsh but it is the law. The written word endures. OR DEPARTURE FROM. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. It is exceedingly hard. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. The best interpreter of the law is usage. In default of the law. Verba legis non est recedendum. The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. 5. Optimus interpres rerum usus.

it should be read as the general expression. An unjust law is not a law. False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. and not the intent to the words. ruat coelum . but the purpose of the law is general. An argument drawn from a similar case. . Nemo est supra legis. When the words used in a statute are special. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. The letter kills but the spirit gives life. 17. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. statum generaliter est intelligendum. cessat et ipsa lex. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ubi eadem est ratio. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning.231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. Like reason doth make like law. De similibus idem est judicium. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Legis construction non facit injuriam. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Where anything is granted generally. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. or analogy. Quando verba statute sunt speciali. inest haec exception. there is the same law 12. ibi est eadem legis disposition. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Qui haret in littera haret in cortice. 15. Where there is the same reason. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man’s work. debent inservice. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. 10. Fiat justitia. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat. ) 16. Cessante rationi legis. Where there is ambiguity. Let right be done. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Laws are to be construed liberally. ratio autem generalia. Nobody is above the law. cum de corpore constat. that nothing shall be contrary to law and right. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. the law itself ceases. When the reason of the law ceases. That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. the judgment is the same. Surplusagium non nocet. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. non e contra. The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret. the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. 14. Concerning similars. Verba intentioni. though the heavens fall. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. Falsa demostratio non nocet. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. 13. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. prevails in law. Benignus leges interpretandae sunt. si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above the law. Lex injusta non est lex. 11. exemption from rigid application of law is implied.

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. An action does not arise from fraud. Ex dolo malo non oritur action. The law does not require an impossibility. summa injuria. all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given. ibi remedium. What cannot. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according to their common and ordinary sense.232 18. Of the same kind or specie. . simper inest et minus. When jurisdiction is given. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. Ex necessitate legis. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. be done directly cannot be done indirectly. 21. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The law does not intend the impossible. ibi jus nullum. B. there is a remedy for violation thereof. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 23. Noscitur a sociis. there is no right. 29. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing. ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit. Ubi jus. Of things dissimilar. In eo quod plus sit. IMPLICATIONS 20. Verba mere aequivoca. Verba artis ex arte. Where the law does not distinguish. By the necessary implication of law. Where the parties are equally at fault. 26. the courts should not distinguish. summa est militia. 25. The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice. Extreme law is often extreme wrong. Jus summum saepe. A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used. C. In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. Ubi jus incertum. Where there is a right. 22. IN GENERAL 24. Cui jurisdiction data est. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. by law. The greater includes the lesser. Ejesdem generis. the rule is dissimilar. A general statement is understood in its general sense. Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum. prohibetur et per obliquum. 19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. talis intellectus preferendus est. si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur. the position of the defending party is the better one. General words should be understood in their general sense. Summum jus. A thing is known by its associates. Where the law is uncertain. Chapter V – INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. 27.

Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation. Of the same matter.233 30. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. The express mention of one person. 32. Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. With the necessary changes. EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. . thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.Times have changed and laws have changed with them. C. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. Pari materia. Referring each to each.Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Injustum est. Mutatis mutandis. nisi tota lege inspecta. B. Reddendo singular singulis. A person. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. 34. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. 33. 39. Argumentum a contrario. or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object. Chapter VI – STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. . 31. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. 37. de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. . Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. PROVISOS. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. or let each be put in its proper place. The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by itself. Expressum facit cessare tacitum.

et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in legibus. judex de praeterito. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. He who is first in time is preferred in right. Chapter IX – PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES A. there is no penalty without a law.A new statute should affect the future.Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. nulla poena sine lege. Strictissimi juris. IN GENERAL 46. Salus populi est suprema lex. . Renunciation cannot be presumed. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. for Janus has really no place in the laws. 42. . The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. The voice of the people is the supreme law. the judge for the past. The law aids the vigilant. There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. 43. not those who slumber on their rights. potior est in jure. unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis. B. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received. Leges quae retrospciunt. Favorabilia sunt amplianda. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. not the past. An act done by me against my will is not my act. non ad facta praeterita revocari. Laws should be construed as prospective. The law provides for the future. The law looks forward.234 Chapter VII – STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. not backward. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. not retrospective. B. Nullum tempus occurit regi. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. non respicit. Lex de futuro. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chapter VIII – MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. IN GENERAL 40. There is no crime without a penalty. Renunciatio non praesumitur. Follow the law strictly. Lex prospicit. 48. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. Nullum crimen sine poena. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. . Potior est in tempore. The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. 44. odiosa restringenda.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. REPEAL 49.235 Chapter X – AMENDMENT. aut quod plerumque fieri solet. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. When matters are obscure. . The law does not concern itself with trifling matters. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est. 50. it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often happens. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. REVISION. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur. Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. De minimis non curat lex. The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red). Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice. Generalia specialibus non derogant. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

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