Metaphysical Doubts & Practical Evaluations

often, there are no formal philosophical work-arounds, especially when reality, at its margins, confronts us with epistemic, ontic and semantic vagueness, which some, perhaps in their inability to tolerate ambiguity or because of their anxiety when presented with paradox, try to overcome with metaphysics, saying more than we can possibly know, telling untellable stories and, finally, proving too much ergo, when analyzing a concept, for example, zygote, in order to determine whether or not it successfully refers to an ontologically identical reality as some other concept, for example, person, one must analyze --- not only the relevant descriptions of both concepts, but also --- the evaluations, norms and interpretations that a community of value-realizers uses when pragmatically cashing out each concept's value (iow, observing how this society actually behaves in all contexts toward that reality to which the concept is alleged to refer) this might better take us beyond the confusion introduced by the false essentialism-nominalism dichotomy, which arises both from the conflation of logical and efficient causation (e.g. sorite paradox) and from the weak modeling powers of our competing metaphysics (static vs dynamic, substance vs process), where a vague phenomenology of emergence will otherwise suffice to account for reality's dis/continuities and novelty, where a pragmatic semiotic realism might, at least, help further reduce the conceptually meaningless to the patently absurd (not a wholly formal philosophy, i know, but it must often do because, tutttutt, it looks like a reign of uncertainty) toward such ends, Hartshorne's notion of 'nonstrict identity' contributes much value, seems to me See Hartshorne, Metaphysics and The Law of Moderation by Daniel Dombrowski at

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