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Carnap, Rudolf - Frege's Lectures on Logic

Carnap, Rudolf - Frege's Lectures on Logic


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Publications o/tlzeArclzive C!

/Sdelllijic PlztlMOpl,y
Ht/ill/all Library, UmiJer.Jity (!fPit&Jburglz
Frege's Leaures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes, /9/ a-/9/4,
edited by Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
Carnap Brought Home: The View (rom Jena,
edited by Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein
F r e g e ~ s Lectures
on Logic
Carnap's Student Notes
Translated and edited, with introductory essay, by
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
Based on the German text, edited,
with introduction and annotations, by
Gottfried Gabriel
", ,.
.. "', \
Opell Court
Chir<Jgo and LaSalle, Illinois
Publications ofdie Archilie ofScientificPhilosophy
Iltllman Library; Univer,sity rifPituburgh
Steve Awodey, Editor
James Lennox
University of Pittsburgh
Richard Creath
Arizona State University
Michael Friedman
Stanford University
Dana Scott
Carnegie Mellon University
Mark Wilson
University of Pittsburgh
John Earman
University of Pittsburgh
Gottfried Gabriel
University ofJena
Wilfried Sieg
Carnegie Mellon University
Gereon Wolters
University of Constance

,l\ C4
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Copyright © 2004 Canis Publishing Company
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Printed and hound in fhe United Statt"s of AmNica.
Lihrary ufCongreSJi C.. (Ju...
Frege, Gottloh, 1848-1925.
(Lectures. English. selections)
Frege's lectures on Logic: Carnap's student notes, 1910-1914 I
[J"anslatt'd and edited, with introductory essay hy Erich H. Rcck
and Steve Awodey; ba.sed on the German text, edited, with
introduction and annotations by Gottfried Gabriel.
p. cm. -Wull circle)
Incilldf"s bihliographical references and index.
ISBN - ISBN 0-8126-9553-4 lpbk. : a(k. paper)
I. L'gw, symbniJc lind 1113them,ltical. I. Catnap, Rudolf,
Reek, Erich H., 1959- III. Awodey, Steve, l%lJ-
1\. Gabrwl. Goufrieri. 194:l- V. Title. VI. Series.
B324.'1. F22F.52 2004
To Anna Lucile andKlara Liese/oue
Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begrifftschrift
Gottfried Gabriel
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
Erieh H. Reek and Steve Awodey
Carnap's StndentNotes:
Begriffsschrift 1(1910-1911)
Appendix A:
The Ontological Proof of the Existence of God
Appendix B:
Numerical Statements abollt Concepts
Begriffsschrift II (1913)
Logic in Mathematics (1914)
Literature Cited
Frege's Lectures on Logic
Carnap's Student Notes, 19
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is generally acknowledged to be one of the founders
of modern logic, arguably even its main source. Frege presented his pioneering
logical system for the first time in Begrifj<schrift (1879), Later an expanded and
modified version appeared in Grundgesetze derArithmetik, Vols. I (1893) and IT
(1903), Together with his second book, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884),
a series ofimportant anicles, including '<'Funktion und Bcgriff' (J891) and
""Ubcr Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892a), these texts are all well known today, and
are of continuing influence in philosophy, logic, and related areas. They have.
indeed, hecome classics of analytic philosophy, and and
eth-eentury thought generally (d. Beaney 1997).
Until rel'cntly, very huh; was known ahoul post-1903 views on
lObric. induding any rnodifieations or his logical system in real'tion to Russe1l's
antinomy., ofwhidl ht' was informc·d in 1902 when (;rllndW'St>lze, Vol. II., was in
press. Even was known ahout tht.' dasses Frege reguhlrly taught on logic at
the University of Jena. It is true tha.t Rudolf CCirnap., in his "Intellectual
Autobiography" (1963)., had mentioned auending several ofthese classes dur-
ing his student years in Jena, 1910-1914, and bad described them generally. But
it took the rediscovery and reconstruction of Carnap's lecture notes, in the early
19905, for more specific and complete information to become available.
German transcriptions of parts ofthcse notes, edited hy Gottfried Gabriel., were
snbsequently pnblished as (Frege 1996),
In the present volume we make available., in English, the full set of notes
taken hy Carnap in Fregc's IflhrlC classes, supplemented hy a translation of
Gabriel's introduction and annotations it>f the German version. CaTnap"s Ice-
lUre notes are from three classes: ·"Begrill...<;chrift {" (1910-11) (with two
appeudices), "Begriffssebrifl II" (1913), and "Logik in der Mathematik"
(1914). In OUr own introductory essay we provide additional information about
Frege's Lectures on Logic
Frege's work as a lecturer qu t' .
.' b ' 0 109 extensIVely not only from Carnap's later rcc-
o ecUons, ut also from tho f h
eriod' . se 0 ot er students of Frege's during the same
, we summanze and analyze th f C '
special focus on the' e 0 arnap s lecture notes, with
we discuss the infl preCIShe nlature of the lOgIcal system contained in them; and
uence t e ectures had on C II'
history oflogic more generally. arnap, as we as theu place in the
Alarge part ofthc credit for makin C '
available in the present' . d g arnap s notes from Frege's lectures
lorm IS ue to Gottf . d G b . I .
When they prepared the German ve' ne a ne .and hIS co-workers.
especially oftwo kind' . rSlon they faced consIderable difficulties,
5. typesettmg Frege's u al <Ii .
and transcribing Carnap' . d nusu, two- menslOnal notation;
5 annquate sho th d .
aspects. see Gabriel's imrod . ) 'tV7 r an notanon (for more on both
r ucnon . we are much bI' d Pr
lor allowing us to make use of th I . 0 1ge to ofessor Gabriel
. h e resu ts of hIS effo t . I <Ii . .
W)t electronic versions ofth ryp r s, me u ng provIding us
'h' . e eset texts. We are al fut· .
lor IS editorial assistance to GR' so grate to Richard Rles
. ' eorge eisch for hi hi'
[fOnw files, to Myra Awodey £ h s e p prepanng the elec-
Call1!;, for his help with the tor PI o.tographs o.f Carnap's notes, and to Andre
'l'l' rans aUons and hIS h' .
,w IJroJeet was SUpported financiall h NEH ent USIaS:lC support overall.
KZ-20n'i-OI. y Y CollaboratIve Research Grant
Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift
Gottfried Gabriel
In the present volume, three lecture series ofFrege's are published in English
for the first time: two on "Concept Script [Begriffsschrift]" from the winter
semester 1910/11 and the summer semester 1913 and one on '''Logic in
Mathematics" from the summer semester 1914. The hasis of the present edi-
tion arc lectnre notes takcn hy Rudolf Carnap when he was a student in Jena.
The originals are in Car nap's papers in the Archive of Scientific Philosophy at
the Hillman Library, University of Pittshnrgh.' The German originals of the
two lecture series on BegrijjsJ'chriftwere published in the journal Ifistoryand
Philosophy of Logic in 1996, edited by myself with the assistance of
Christopher von BUlow and Brihritte Uhlemann.
The lecture series on '''Logic
in Mathematics" has never been pnhlislwd. and appears here for the first time
in any I:mguage. It follows Fn.·ge's own for this course (Jllite closely, as
published under the same titk in his PostlwmOlls Writings (Frcge 19H3. pp.
Frege 1979, pp. 203-50k\ Its thus has a plHticular docu-
mentary value in connection with ongoing investigations abont Frcge's influ-
ence on Carnap, In preparing the German original of this text, Christopher
1. The signatures at the Archive of Scientific Philosophy (ASP) are ASP/RC 111-10-01.
ASP/RC 111-10-02, and ASP/RC 111-1(}.()3 respectively. The present publication, like that
of the German originals. is by permission ofthe ASP, which reserves all rights. Apart from
Carnap's notes there also exist some notes about the lecture course "Begriffsschrift I" by
Carnap's friend Wilhelm Flitner (see the introduction by Reck andAwodeyhelow).
2. Additional details on the text of the German original and its transcription from
Carnap's shorthand. as wdl as other editorial matters. are to found in the original
place ofpuhlication of the first. rwo lecture cuur:<;cs in German 1996). The
introduction omits editorial details, but is a slightly amended and aug·
mented translation of my introduction to that Iibid., pp. -iii-xvi).
3. Note that the translations from Frege's writings here do not always follow the published
English translations for which page references are given.
6. This was in a letter to Frege of 16 June 1902 (Frege 1976, pp. 211£.; Frege 1980. pp.
BOL). Frege's suggestion for a way out in the afterword to Basic Laws II is dated
"'October 1902," 'TIlis volume appeared before the end of on 28 December 1902
Frege wrote Russell. ""You will have received the second volume of my Basic Laws" (Frege
1976, p. 237; Frege 1980, p. 154) .
7. data were gleaned from Krei..,er (2001), pp. 280-84. In Scholz's to the sci-
entific Nachlass of Goulob Frege there are, among ahout d(';velop-
rnent of the "'Lecture on Begriffssehrift," outlines from the IlJ07. Cf. Vemart ( IlJ76),
p- 95. Also mentioned there is the "proof that is no mhre than one limit to 11 func¥
lion whose argument increases to positive infinity'" in ""Begriffsschrifl II" (p. lOJff.l.
The date briven there - 5 July 1913 - would make it appear that thiS proof was workedout
specifically tor the lecture course "Begriffsschrift II."
course was not always held, however. The only inlcrruption occurred in the
winter semester 1902/03, following Russell'5 communication of the antinomy. I,
This might have represented Fregc's desire to give himself a break while he
assessed his logicist program. The continuation series, "'Bcgriffsschrift II," was
only offered once, in the summer semester of 1913, i.e. the time Carnap heard
it. From the summer semester of 1913 Frege offered '''BegriffsschrifC' every
semester to the end of his teaching career (summer semester 1918). It was some-
times canceled due to illness, however. Although Frege was on leave. according
to the lecture list. in the summer semester of 1914, Carnap went to his lecture
"'Logic in Mathematics" in this semcster.
The construction of the logical system in the two lecture courses on
""BegrifIsschrifC corresponds to that in the Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Frege
1893/1903). Thc rules of inference introduced agree right down to the notation
employed (cf. Basic Laws I, §§14ff. and the ovcrviewin §48),ln the Basic Laws
Frege introduced additional inference rules beyond modusponens, used in the
so as to shorten the proofs (d. the explanation in Bar;ic Laws I.
§14). Also taken over from the Basic Laws, in the lecture course, is the corre-
sponding reduction in the number of basic laws. The individual basic laws and
the ""theorems directly following from them" (cf. the table in Basic Laws 1,
Appendix I) arc even given the same "'code numbers [Ahzeichen)" (d. Basic
Laws I, §§ 14 and 18) in "BegrifI<sehrift II" by which thcy are then adduced in
proofs. Of special importanec is the fact that Frege completely omits the valu(.,'-
range function as well as, accordingly, the description function. Basic laws V
and VI are thus eliminated. In fact only basic laws I-Ill appear in the lectures.
There is no obvious reason why basic law IV should have been left out. It is used
ill Rasic Laws "'to prove the equality of truth-values" as e.g. in the case oflaw
(IVb) of double negation (Basic Laws I. §51). Basic law IV makes particular use
of equality as a relation b<-,tween as o,?/ect.r. But truth-values
an' treated throughout the leetures as and admitted as arguments of the
identity relation (Pl'. 7:i. 87. and 96). the omission of basic law IV could well be
a merely organizational matter. Otherwise it would have to be suspected that
Frege was already heginning to have douhts about lhe objectification of truth-
values at this date. (This line ofthought is pursued by Reck and Awodey in their
""Frege's Lectures on Logic and their Influence.") There is evidence ofachange
Gottfried Gabriel
von BUlow and Brimtte Uhl ' "
Ki 1
0- emann were onCe agam of aSsIstance andWolfgang
cnz er also took part. •
The lecture Courses on B 'U i" h if' f '
ebrl;/JJsc Tl tare 0 special value because they
acument rege's pr - f £
antinomy A t f esenhtatton 0 ormallogic after Russell's discovery ot'the
. par rOm t esc lectures 0 r ly 'd '
Fre ' . ' U on evI coee on thIS consists of
any direct clues ahout the construction of the for-
cal for 0.£ number and of other mathcmati-
least hints for the int at, t . e gtve supplementary insights, or at
principle themes in study of Frege: the
teoees to the whole sentenc; . e Context of the relanon of parts of sen-
(p. 87).4 concepts (and ) applied at the.l
of sense but not of reference
• not concept-extensIOn) h '
expressions (p 74)' th '. _ s as t e reierence of concept
. , e omISSIon of any dis . f' di
the reference of expressions of the form HthCeUSSlOn 0 lll" rect sense (p.
evaluation will be left to furth' "eoneept F (p, 66), A detalled
er lllvestIgauons (A fi '"
laS heen taken by Reck and Ad' .' lfst step 10 thIS dIrection
· . wo ey In then HF 'L '
t I'U Intlut·n(·c ") In the f II . rege s ectures on Lomc and
, " , 0 owmg, the 10m I d h ' O'
hf' In tht' fi:m:ground. o-ca an mat emaucal aspect will
, 'I'ht·!t'ctUrt'S also ofinterest because th d
I,rt'g'l"!'> illl'a!'> WI'ft' I.lhsnrlH'd hy on" f th . ey .emonstrate how thoroughly
'I _ " 0 e pre-emment -
p II o!'>ophy of scinH'I' This t 'III representattves of ule
• ., 00. WI )e touched 0 h Th
WlTl' !'>Il ckc'i.'iiv(' for the eurly Carnap-th' . n ere. e lena years that
('OIHt'xt or III'o-K
ntianisJtI Lb. h" e bernreen lOgic and life in the
, :; '. . , (' f'nsp lto,mphle. and the C
1II11l{ -wIll of eour.'il' only hI' I'ull ' I d yerman youth move-
h' - . . y reVl'a e to us whe C' '"
t Is pt:'flOd and other doeu1llents h' I ' n arnap s diancs from
, I I . ave leen I)roperly , 'd '
a rear y eVldellt thm onel' aga,',) th'" scrutInize . But It is
'1 - -- e eOlltlnental" f'
p 11 osopher art' coming to light. roots 0 an "analytie"
I. The Lectures On "Be r'lf '" '
Development of h
the, Context of the
glc an IS Philosophy of Mathematics
In the44ye '
ars, 10 toral. of his tcachin ..
semester 1874 to summer jg career at the University oflena (summer
h semester 918) F
OUr (per week) lecture course 'th h '. announced a onc-
from that of 1883/84 t e n.de Begnffsschrift" every winter
. Begnlfsscnrift" in the wintf' . dore thiS, Frege had already lechlred on
!J("ni 1'1 . r semester 1879/80 - .
• on 0 lIs Rf'griffssc!Jniji (Freg' 1°791 .10 conjunction with the pub-
t () . DUl'tolak f '.
4 'l'f . ," C () partIcipants the
. h' JU,;tlflcation for th" .
1'o.,t!lUflWII.,· flrilillg.1 (Fr dlSt:usscd in "Notes for L d .
.r;. This nHllhina"·,, fefge p. 275; Frege 1979 p 255) U Wig Darmstaedter" in
'h"! no actors! C, ".
.... ht't"ll thl:' sub'ect f. . n arnap s early develo me . .
J. U <I separate paper ,nl In hts lena years has rnean-
Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift: J
4 Gottfried Gabriel Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift
of view along these lines in the last published writings. Thus in defining the
conditions under which two thoughts have the "same truth-value," the cate-
gory of object is not applied to truth-values. It is especially noteworthy that
Frege's formulation at this point (on the basis of his new theory of compound
thoughts) corresponds to basic law IV: ·'1 now want to say that two thoughts
have the same truth-value if they arc either both true or both false. I maintain
therefore. that the thought expressed hy "A' has the same truth-value as that
expressed by "8' if either 'A and B' or else '(not-A) and (not-8)' expresses a true
thought." (Frege 1923, p. 51; Frege 1984, p, 406), Frege thus carries out in the
lectures what he emphasized to P.E.B. Jourdain regarding Russell's antinomy
the resulting "In my fashion of regarding concepts as func-
tIOns, we treat the prInCIpal parts of Logic without speaking of classes, as I
have done 10 my Begriffsschrift, and that difficulty does not then come into con.
sideration" (Frege 1976, p. 121; Frege 1980, p, 191),
. 15 nm,the only respect in the late FTege occasionally appears to
reconsuler advantages of the Begrifftschriftover the Laws. Thus in a
lett,:r to H, Dmgler of 4 July 1917 (Frege 1976, p. 41; Frege 1980, p, 28), he
ttw presentation of the concept of following in a
with to that in the Basic Law.,>. At the
01," In he even returns to his earlier terminolo call-
Inl! tht· "hOrizontal" "eontent strok.e" In substance th h h gy,
. . . . , oug, t e concep-
tum or fht' Ha,w' {.o1Os dommates' the horizontal,'s und t d . I
f . , , eIS 00 as a specla
t11ll'tlOl1 of IIrst level, whosc value for the argument "th IT '" h d
" e ue IS t e true an
lor othN ohJects as arguments the false (d. ""Begriffsschrift I," . 73).
I he coot.en: of I" corresponds to what under
the characteristIc headIng What may 1regard as the Result of m Work? n as
regc1983 p,200'Frege1979 p 184) N h
\ ",
, . . " ,.. onet e ess there IS
a notlceable dIfference between "Begriffsscbrift I" and th f h'
mous writi ,( "I d . ose 0 IS posthu-
ngs ntro ucllon to Logic" and "A brief Sluvey f \' I
D ''') . h' 0 my oglea
woctnnes 10 .l
h Frcge goes about actually spelling Out the "results" of his
These belong not to formal logic but to /informal) suh!:itantivf>
10gIe (what would 10 German be called "inhaltliche L('gt'k"j" A full t ( "
hi' '. mellt 0
e Interrupted by his death - Frege embarked on only with the I ulrical
Inz'estlgatlOns ("'Thought· " .... N . "'" ... I'J
. . , . s. eganon, Compound Thoughts"). Their
philosophical onentatIon toward a transcendfntal PI, t' h '
. - . .... . a omsm rever erates In an
ap OrisUe remark III Begnffsschrl'f't I"· '"L . , I
. omc IS not on y trans ' b
even trans-human." g o· -aIlan, ut
.. glo!'sed his elaboration of his substantive logic later with th d
I arn trYlOg [(l hrinrr in tht' harvest of my J'f' " (I II' e wor s,
t" • Ie etter to ". Dmgler of 17
" .. This distin('tioll is hPrf' to Iw I' h
,. ,. .. on y In t f' sense th' t "C I" l' k
IIl'of' 0 II Ilrrnalism. f II' h. . - .. a lorma OITlC ma es
. •• '=' . IIrma ogw-t e "Beonff h 't'" . '='-
tuI .. lo.,.;cl'· .(., '=' sse fl t -IS of course a "content-
r:>- .f'. I IS Interpreted not ('
(·tT',u.al cOlltt:'nt" (sefHit' and re-fert'nce) .' . a ormal calculus), as a "con-
II. nus remark is also of interest in th . t· slgnfF
Is throughout.
e con ext 0 rege s pohtlcal diary (Frege 1994).
Novemher 1918; Frege 1976, p, 45; Frege 1980, p, 30). What parts ofthe formal
logic, lhe count toward this "'harvest"? The substantive IObric is
devoled to the philosophical analysis of the "basic" logical categories, Thus
another of the posthumous writings on suhstantive logic (from the
bears the characteristic title ""My basic logical Insights." Frege begms II WIth
the words, "The following may be useful to some as a key to the understanding
of my results," but oue should not conclude from this that there are no .... results"
in the realm of formal logic. I think we can rightly claim that the text.
"Begriffsschrift I," supplemented by certain parts of "BegriffsschriftU;' rep-
resents an inventory of what Frege regarded, after the faIlure of the 10gtCIst pro-
gram, as the result of his work in the field of formal logic. This is in accordance
with his statement that his logic is "'in the main" independent of the problems
in set theory (Frege 1983, p, 191; Frege 1979, p. 176), since for him, as he
already puts it in '''What may I regard as the Result. of my Work?;' "'the exten-
sion of a concept or class is not the primary thing for me." .
This conjecture is also confirmed by Frege'05 form of presentatIon. In con-
tra'it to the otherwise highly reflective style of Frege's considerations about
Russell's paradox, culminating in self-criticism for the careless of
concept-extensions (dasses), 10 the presentation in the posthumous wrltIngs on
substantive logic is characterized by what one might call a "dogmatic"
dure. This i!:i even more thc case in these lectures, which avoid any themattza-
tion or critique of past errors - the antinomy is not mentioned - and instead are
concerned to exhibit wbat can be regarded as unquestionably !:iccure.
It seems
that Frege even expressed this attitude in his lccturing style. He trumped the
user-unfriendliness ofthe traditional style of dogmatic exposition at the lectern
hy actually turning his back on his students. Car nap describes the lecture
course "'Begriffsschrift [" as follows:
He seldom looked at the audience. Ordlnarily we saw only his
hack. while he drew the strange diagrams of his symhohsm on the
hlackboard and explained them. Never did a student ask a question or
make a remark, whether during the lecture or afterwards. The possi-
bility of a discussion seemed to be out of the question. (CaTnap 1963,
We can only speculate whether Frege would have embarked on a exposition
of the formal part of his logic once he had completed the substantIve part. But
if he had done this, we can now say how it would have looked. It would have con-
tained the following fragIOent of the Basic Laws: 11) the basic laws 1-1II (and
perhaps IV); (2) all tbc inference rules witb the exception of those that drop out
10, Apart from the rele.... ant writings after 1906, especially the letter to R.
Honigswald of26 April to4 Mny 1925. ,
11. Carnap confirms this in his autobiography; "I do not rememher, that he I cve,r
discussed in his lectures the problem of this antinomy and the questlon of pOSSIble mudi-
fications of his system in order to eliminate it" (Carnap 1963, pp, 4f.).
14, Especially given his unreliahle in the uriginal. unpublished version of
Car nap's Autobiography." ht> notes that this was a reason for giving up stud-
ies in less systemntie s6ences: "I would soon give up studies in these other fields, partly
because of II love of systematization, connection, and general explanations, and also
because of the fact that my memory is quite unusually bad. (Once a psychologist told me
that I should take this fact as a blessing in disguise, because a too great familiarity with
old ways of thinking is for many an obstacle to finding new ways, andmy sometimes total
forgetting of old ways might free me from this obstacle.)" I am grateful to A.W. Cl!TUS for
providing this quotation. The manuscript is in the Carnap Papers (Manuscript
Collection 1029) at the Special Collections Department of the Young Research Library.
University of California at Los Angeles.
15. ASPIRC 086-13-05 (letter to'T.W. Bynum of 4 April 19671. quoted by C. Parsons (1976.
p. 274. note 27). See also Bynum (1976, p. 284).
1&. This is thp vit>wtakt>n by T.W. Bynum (1972, p. 48), relying on Carnap, wbowrites, "k,
late Hs 191;l-14 he was presenting lind defenlling bis hlgistic [!'oie! programml' in
at Jerm University, '" Also on p. SO, is it widespread myth that Russell's Paradox had
left him a disappointed and broken hut actually, at least until lC)14, he helieved his
logistic programme had ht*"n carried out successfully," This interpretation was already
questionedby Parsons (1976. pp. 274f.). The present puhlication eS6entially cc)rrohorates
Parsons's conjectures.
pp, 137-39), He also does not seem to have regarded the question
whether geometry is included or not as Olle of any importance. it may thus have
seemed natural
tor him to project both these views onto his teacher as well.
In any case Carnap later repeated the claim that Frege never gave up his
logicism, even when he was specifically asked about this. I;; Meanwhile this
claim has heen refuted by the publication of the Posthumous Writings. But
Carnap's Obstinacy is easier to understand when we look at the lectures trans-
lated here. Apparently Frege's silence ahout the antinomy, in the lectures, led
Carnap to the premature conclusion that it presented no problem for him.
fact, though, Frege had already quietly drawn the consequences and eliminated
value-ranges. On the other hand, the lectures confirm a conjecture that was
already suggestedhy some passages in the Posthumous Writings -that Frege did
indeed withdraw value-ranges, but continued to regard attributions of number
as statements about concepts. And this deserves our attention, particularly with
respect [Q the newly awakened interest in f'rege's philosophy of mathematics
(as manifested, e.g., in the recent writings of C. Wright, M. Dummett, G.
Boolos, and R,C, Heck),
At the end of "Begriffsschrift I" Frege returns, in the section "numerical
statements about a concept," to an analysis he had tentatively put forward but
then rejected as a definition of cardinal numhers in Foundations ofArithmetic
(Frege 1884, §§55ff,) - representing attributions of number of the form "the
number II uelongs to the conceptF" as second level concepts. Carnap seems on
the uasis ofthe lecture to have taken this conception as the core of Frege's logi-
cism (Carnap 1930a, p. 21). He even takes over this idea himself in his presen-
tation of lObricism. and repeats it even as late as 1964 in evident agreement
(Carnap lYY3, pp,
original ohjection to the analysis from the Foundations of
Arithmf'lti.: picked up again here amounts, as is well known, to the fact that the
Gotdried Gabriel
because of the elimin.t' f I ' ,
lOTIO va ue-ranges (specIfIcally rul II, t' B " La
I §48) d(3) II ' e ,c, G;lC WI
, , ; an a the laws derived from basic laws I-lll (d h IV) b
usmg these rules. an per aps y
cept thde fact that Frege systematically avoids any mention of con-
-extenslOns an value-range i h' I ' ,
anal f' 5 n 15 ectures, It IS astonishing that in the
ogous case 0 expressIons of the form "'the conce t F" h '
in t ti h P e seems to persIst
ng t ese as (""Begriffsschrift I," p. 66). Thus he regards "'falls
as an expressIon of a first 1 1 1a' .
whose value ('or ob)'e t - Ie I.e. as a two-place function
.' C5 as arguments) IS al hal'
backwards from the insi ht . a trut -v' ,ue. TIus seems a step
language is heregw'lty f
" m Ube, Schoenflies" from 1906, that
o a counteneit" by", .... b'
1979 I 12 commg ano ]ectfromaconccpt
cis-ion o£linguistic expregessl' ,,' Pak' 7!). Frege emphaSIzes that this "impre-
. on m es It appear "th hi' ,
Uon is a third element. at t e re aUon of subsump-
1983, p, 193, Frege ;pon the object andthe concept" (Frege
way of talking wh' p h )h', ut Frege himself gives credence to this
, ., en e t mks he ea e .
Ingu1sucully in categorl'al di n xpress somethmg uscd meta-
'. seourse. such as "th la' ,
t he F" in th h' ere tlOn of an object a falling
, , eo lect language f' I I '
nbjl'ct (I and .. h as a lfSt- eve relation between the
> . eet t e coneeptp"
('an say On the hasis of the 1 t . ,
('OI1('('ptHlIl of the relatio b tw I ures published here about Frege's
n e een ogle and h .
ll'tWI'I'n logie and arithmet" , C, mat emaucs. paTticuIarlv
. c. arnap s statement th F
program even after Rus 'ell' d' at rege retained thc 10lTi-
k . . s s Iscovery of th .
S epucal sluprise fn,m the start Car a d f' . e antmomy was greeted with
hi' . n p e lllItely " ,
t f' el'turc course "Begriffssehrl'ft I" h mamtams. WIth relation to
.. ' d' , t at at the e d f h
In Icatedthatthenewlomc towh' hh h d' not e semester Frege
. t\'. , Ie e a Introd d
nmstructlOIl of the whole of mathem' f "(C uce us, could serve for the
re'll, ,I ' h a ICs aroap 5) B '
a ) (. e could construct the wholp. of m . , p. : u.t If Frege
geometrY-Wlth the help oflol71c th' Id I athemancs_l.e. mcludiTw
, M t\'-' IS cou on y m ' h "
In athematics" (p. 135), that in arithme '. can, In t e sense of"Logk
arc logical. 1:\ This says nothing yet the methodsofproot'
this is a mat[er ofthe nature ofth ' e nature of the two disciplines
. e (Uwms Carna 1m F' , ,
109 about this as he sub I ... p ew rege s way of think-
, "sequent y ",te d d h 1
Mathematics" himself' wh F . net e eeture course "'Lome in
, ere rege exph·tl 'h ty
on the represemability of mathe.n t: I' del y'. ng t at the outset, casts doubt
I ,. . a lca 10 uenon th ,,,. f
, HI purely lomcal terms "Ber II" d ' ' e In erence from n to n +
'. nou 1 In et " .
('a law. Wi[h that, Frege had fri u IOn IS t.reated here as a nonlo
" 1 fh' ,"-
gr,lIll. n matht'maticc ar'th ' onent 0 IS own IOJncist pro-
, _ ' ". I mt"tl(.' as well ' 0·
Insofar as inlt'rt'llCt>S OlTur in h th C· as geometry, there is logic only
Russdl',!oi til rnl of Ii, 0,,, on the other hand, adopted
'AT' , .' .l. (lilt t lat Included . .
(to.g. Carnal) 1(22) and .' . , geometry) from his earliest
mamtalllcd It to h's },
I:.! S .\.. .. I ast years (e.g. Carnap
•• ,} ,",0 Introdl!{'tion to L . "
n, S"t" also Frt>ge's 0 ogtc, Frt"gc 1983, p. 210' Fre!e 19
),20'lt') . wn notes for this lecture Co IF' g 79, p. 193.
. . . . urse rege 1983 21 f
,pp. Frege 1979,
Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift 7
Gottfried Gabriel Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift 9
numbers understood this way can't be regarded as independent objects. For this
reason Frege finally ends up introducing the cardinal numbers as concept-
extensions and thus as logical objects (Foundations, §68). Once this ronte was
impassible by the antinomy, the question remained uppermost in his
the numbers could he understood as objects at all. Fregc puts his
hnger on thIS problem most precisely in the "Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter":
Since a statement of number based on counting contains an assertion
about a concept, in a logically perfect language a sentence used to
make such a statement must contain two parts, first a sign for the
concept about which the statement is made, and secondly a sign for a
second level concepl. These second level concepts form a series and
is a rule in wilh which, if one of these concepts is
gIVen, we can speCIfy the next. But still we do not have in them the
numhers of arithmetic; we do not have ohjects, but concepts. How
tan we get from these concepts [0 the numbers of arithmetic iu a way
that tannot be faulted? Or are there no numbers whatever in arith-
lUetic? Could it he that the numerals are dependent parts of signs for
th"s" s""und I"vel concepts? (Frege 1983. p. 277; Frege 1979 pp.
25h[)D •
idea of introducing numhers as ohjects corresponding, as it were, to con-
of level one is, revived in a different form by Frege, despite
about it at thIS POint (1919), in his very late attempt to justif
anthmeuc on the basis of the .... geometrical source of knowledg "H
h' b . . . c. ere c
repeats ,.IS, aSlc VIew; ....A statement of number contains a.n assertion about a
p: 2QB; Frege p. 278), He points out, furthermore,
appears In mathemaut·s as an ohjett, e.g. the numlwr :r'
. ' p. 90,. Frege 1979, p. 271). And he concedes that it "seems" tharth(' IU
Ical source of knowled " '.. I:'
ge on Its own (:annot yield us any ohjeers" (Fregv
r299; Frege 1979, p. 279). What emerges from this is that ahhough 11<;
attempts to the numbers as logical objects. ht: still regards them
as empIrIcal source of knowledge is explicitlyelimiuated, "since
lOgl; mIte III the full sense ofthe word can now from this source" only the
SOurce of knOWledge remain, i.e. those of
· . b
on Its own the logical source of knOWledge cannot vie1d
nUIll t'rs en er we wIll appeal t th· J.
Even thou h ' .0 e geornetncal source ofknowledge" (ibid.).
l'(' . g these new are couched in an attitude of 0 en-ended
i ... as we can see from expressions like .... attempt" "seems
) y. It 1.'; dear that the main preoccupation is still the qu'estion t:e idea
17. Cf. nlso tIll:' to the scientific N hI
to it: a lost docu;"'ent in the of Frege (V?,raart 1976, p. lOl).
tamed diSCUSSion of "second 1. I ss (dated after 1918 by H Scholz) con-
IAnzahlen]:' As Scholz uses that to the numbers
own. • 'W€ must VIew these expressIOns as Frege's
that a statement of numher contains an assertion about a concept can he made
compatible with the idea t.hat numbers arc ohjects. Frege's answer is that we
must overcome the "kindergarten-numbers [Kleinkinder-Zahlenl," which
derive from what is countahle and thus, as we would now say, from concept for-
mation on the pattern of sortals. This understanding of numbers was
mental for Frege from the time of the Foundations (§54): "Only a concept that
precisely delimits what falls under it and permits no arhitrary subdivision can he
a unit with respect to a finite numher." This point of departure is now ahan-
doned, ali "no hridge" leads from the "'kindergarten-numbers" to the other
kinds of numher: "1 myself at one time held it to be possible to conquer lhe
entire number domain, continuing along a purely logical path from the kinder-
1 have seen the mistake in this" (Frege 1983, p. 296; Frege
1979, p. 276).
For this reason Frege now takes the opposite route and, starting from the
complex numbers, tries to get to the other nnmbers by specification. An
appraisal of this new approach, especially an analysis of its deeper motivations
in the face ot'the alternatives, has never been undcrtaken.
The denial of the propOSition that numhers are logical ohjects, to begin
with, can lead to the following contrary positions:
(1) Numbers are not logual objects, but objects of another kind;
(2) Numbers can be ohtained 10gicaBy, but nOl as logical o!?jeets;
(3) Numhers can neither he obtained logically, nor are they objects.
The third position, which seems to have been Wittgenstein'5, Frcge never held.
In his last writings he takes the first position. What ahout the second position?
We know from Frege himselfthat even before the discovery ofthe antinomy he
harhored "slight doubts" about the introduction of (Frege
lQ76, p. Frege 1980, p. 55). Even after the puhlication ofthe Foundations
oj Arillllneti(' he considered the possibility of a logical constructioIl of arith-
meti(: without Understandably he returned to this strat-
eb'1' after the discovery of the antinomy. The direction he took at lhis point
agrees with that indicated in "Begriffsschrift 1" and the "Notes for Ludwig
Darmstaedter" in that both refrain from introducing cardinal numbers as inde-
pendent objects. In "'Begriffsschrift 1" Frege Teplaces his definition from Basic
Laws by a value·range-free presentation, without even mentioning his failed
attempt (assuming that Carnap's notcs cover all the essentials). Thus Frege
seems to have been considering a construction of arithmetic at this point in
which arrrihutions of number are expressed hy means of second-level concepts,
avoiding concept-extensions. The result would have been a logicism without
W, Cf. the ahstract for the Nachlass item N 47 in t.he Ind.-x to the scil'ntifi(: Nachhl5s
(Veraart 1976, p. 95). The deei.'iion in favor of WilS taken with Frege's
introduction of value ranges, 1889 at latest. Cf. in the abstract for item N 90 (ibid., PI"
10M.) the considerations on "A short I'!xposition of thl'! Begriffs.,;chrift at its current (10
November 1889) standpoint."
24. That Carnap went to these lectures is confirmed by his diary, No notes have been
found, to date. As these courses are not mentioned in the (published) autobiography, it is
to be assumed that whatever notes Carnap had ever had were no longer availablp. to him.
Nothing has shown up 50 far in the Carnap papers in Pittsburgh (ASP) and Los Angeles.
25. Fritz Kanter was a student friend of Carnap's at Jena. It appears from other indica-
in this same note and from Carnap's diaries that he was in fact only away for a
month; the summer semester began on 21 April 1913.
26. This is especially plausihle given the timing of the note, i.e. at the.end
he with II" after It tWO-Y"ar llltf'rrllptlOn since
I'"; the meeting I""for working on to
rt-'vit-'w tilt-' .. flf the previous courst" in preparlltion for Tf·ft-'rfmce
to Frege's publisht'd huoks would have been an obvious mea'Hln' un sueh !HI (I
am grateful to A.W. Carus for pointing this out.) .
27. This dissertation, suhmitted in 1921. was puhlished unchanged the followmg year
(Climap 1922).
ture courses "Analytical Mechanics [" (winter semester 1912/13) and
"Analytical Mechanics II" (summer semester 1913),2'1
Carnap did not just go to the lectures, hut studied Frege's writings as well.
In Carnap's papers there is a shorthand draft of a playful communication of20
March 1913 from Carnap to Kurt Frankenhcrger. annotated with the remark.
"To Frankenberger, when he showed up neither at Kanter's nor at my place (for
working on Freg
), and I was about to leave for tvvo months." 25 The note is writ-
ten in Frege's logical in its form it asks for the conclusion from one
definition and two premises that, translated into ordinary amount to:
The definition is a stipulation that a certain sign means presence ofa
person A atplace b at time z.
The first premise asserls: Places where RudolfCarnap is at time z are
neither places where Kurt Frankenberger is on 18 March at 10 a,m.,
nor places where Kurt Fran.kenberger is on /9 March at 3p.m.
The second premise asserts: AUp/aces where RudolfCarnap is dUT'
ing Ihe timefrom 21 March to 22 April are differentfrom jena.
The symbolic represcntation, which is not in accordance with Frcgc's rules,
lellves it to the addressee [0 draw the correct conclusion (indicated by a question
mark after Frege's judgment stroke), perhaps in the sense of a reminder to pay
Car nap a visit before his imminent departure. Usc is made, in this note, of
Frege's way of representing lhe elementhood relation (cf. Basic Laws I, §34)
and thus of the value-range function. As the latter makes no appearance what-
ever in the lectures. Carnap must have acquainted himself with it by reading
Basic Laws afArithmetic on his own.
A more thorough study ofthe text, he
says. he undertook only after the First World War ICamap 1963, p. 6).
In Car nap's papers (ASPIRe 081-28-01) there are also shorthand notes on
Frcge's two pllpers on "The Foundations of Geometry" (Frege 1903). which
Carnap took down while he was working on his dissertation at the University of
Jena.27 This book. contains many references to Fregean considerations and
Introduction: Frege's lectures on Begriffsschrift
Carnal' tells us ahout his reiatiollshi to Fre e i " . , 21 .
lllllltt'd mainly to a of Frege's gWitn IS
from a note in Camap's pap . h' 'h es. y thiS IS so we can gather
, ers In w Ie he responds [() b 'bl
lurthernmtacts with Frcge' ""I 0 I l' d' J a query a out POSSI e
that year in Buchenbach F
Yb lve ThIn ena umilJuly 1919; after August of
. rei ueg. ere I wrote D R I
slOnally came backto Jena for a few da s. Wh di er aum. only occa-
he was after all very wtthd YWh Y d I nm seek Frege out? I was [00
. rawn. en I thawed 0 tit . h .
Clfcle, it was too late "22 IC ld u a er III t e Vienna
. arnap wou anyw h [.
even ifhe had tried as the laue h d d ay nm ave ound Frege in
Th ' . r a move to Bad Kleinen in 1919 )
e notes puhlIshed here were robabl h b . .
about the content ofthe lecture' l' h
t e aSls for what Carnap says
. . s n IS auto lOgraph ltd'
at that later time" Carnap annotated tl . h y. n: u ylllg them again
. tern Wit dates headi" 2"-1 Th .
rence ot these notes has hee 1m f . .' ngs, etc.' e
" .., n own 0 SIllCC the edito . fF '
denee mqUlred about the p . 'b'l' h . . rs 0 rege 5 correspon-
. OS51 11ty t at Car nap m' h h' I ..
possession (d. FrcD"c 1976 16·1 A' 19 t ave etters III hiS
, p. . ccordmg to a ha d' l'
courses attended durilw his stud' .. ' j', . n VoITltten 1St of lecture
h I
ItS In ena and Frelburg C' k
t e t lrt't' ("ourses f()r which th .,. ' arnap too not only
t" nOlt: s are translated hert' but also F ' I , . rege s cc-
19. Cf. in thi.... l'olllu·l'tinn also ttw It'l t' , "
PI" lih-iHI. I r to K. ZSlgmonrly l Frt-'ge 197flo, pp. 269-71' Frege
:-0. Shll
tl'd from P.T. (l'Jhll. I. 12B. '
21. Lllrnllp (lIltd.I'II. 4-h)' ,. I, I . ,
. ... .\1 tit. thrt-'t'''artlcll' t-' "8 ..
l rp {(l t-' ldt'nllt"'d f II . (. t""' an s In II " h
. n owmg .arnap's . . 0'" • t e other tw"o
major of the army" as the ""friend" Kurt Frankenh'erger
. • H8R-flO_OI ,e m.
23. St'l:' below. s('{'tion '111.
II. Carnap as a Student of Frege
Gottfried Gabriel
if we follow Fregc in assuming the reduction of the concept of
to that of relation to be unproblematic. which would guarantee the
character ofthc of coordination (Basic Laws I, §§38 and 66).
The Frege dId not pursue this strategy further would seem to be
that he dId not. In the end see any way of getting by without the conception of
as obJcc:s. despite the use of quantifiers in I"
he persists 10 the numbers as arguments of first-level functions
851. and 10 Begnffsschrift II" (p. 124) they arc explicitly said to belong to
t. e of obJ:cts: "Numbers are, after all, objects." 19 Frege's tergiversa-
questIon are well encapsulated in a story told by Wittgenstein:

ast tIme I saw Frege, as we were waiting at the station for my train I said
to 1m, 'Don't yo r d 'f . . '
. t?' H u ever III any di ficulty III your theory that numbers are
o )Jec sere r d '"'"5 .
't" . "2U P Ie, omctlmes I seem to see a difficulty-but then again I
f. on It.
2) Two pages headed "'Numerical statements ahout concepts" (in
shorthand, underlined).
3) Tbe one-page draft of a note to Knrt Frankenberger described
On the first page of this additional material Carnap notes (in shorthand)
"Perhaps this belongs with part II [i,e, of 'Bcgriffsschrift']," The fact that the
content of pages 3 and 4 of this manuscript can be fit seamlessly after the notes
on "Begriffsschrift 1" argues against CaTnap's guess, which apparently, given
the numbering, refers to the entire manuscript. The refutation of the ontologi-
cal proof of the existence of God helongs into the same context, the disdnction
uetween first- and second-level concepts. That these items belong together is
reinforced by the very similar presentation in The Foundations ofArithmetic
(§§52f,), For these reasons itcms (1) and (2) above were placed at the end of
"'Begriffsschrift I" as Appendices A and B respectively. Item (3) is substantially
reproduced in this introduction (section 2 ahove).
If we could be sure Carnap was not mistaken in placing page 5 with the
other parts, there would be an argument against our procedure. For the date of
pagc 5 (20 March 1913) might then casl doubt on it, According lO Carnap, he
attended the lecture course '''Begriffsschrift I" in the winter semester 1910/11.
But a placement ofthese fragments in ''"Begriffsschrift II" would still be rather
unlikely. as the summer semester of 1913, in which CaTnap wok this course,
only began on 21 ApriL In any case, the fragments bear no obvious relation LO
t.he content of "Begriffsschrift II." Doubts about Carnap's guess arc further
strengthened by the fact that page 5 is a loose sheet whose format is quite dif-
ferent from that of the others.
In his lel.:turc notes Carnap frequently ignores Frege's painstaking distinc-
tion between ohject-Ianguage use and metalinguistie mention. In some cases he
uses colons in place of Iluotatioll marks; in many more, though. all indication is
omitted. We have only interpolated quotation marks in (:ases where it seemed to
us indispcns<lble for the avoidance of misunderstanding; see the notes for
The distinction. important to Frege, hetween the notation for actual proofs
(as transitions from premises recognized as true to a conclusion recognized as
true) and the uotation for valid deductive schemata (by enclosing the latter in
single quotation marks; cf. Basic Laws I, §§14-17) is consistently omiued by
Carnap. In the Basic Laws this same means is employed lO distinguish the
''"analysis'' of the ideas motivating the proofs from the synthetic "construction"
of the proofs themselves. This distinction is also omitted in the notes. We have
made no attemptlo reconstruct these distinctions in the text prt:sented here.
Every effort has heen made to present the notes on the page in an order and
configuration that reflects the original notes, as this conveys important infor-
mation about the intended interrelation of the proofs. A,;; a rule Carnap put the
main line ofargumenton the left side ofthe page and, across from it on the right
" . Gottfried Gabriel
dIstInctIons, Later notes (from th 1 ,.
with some comments ofh' e year 943) on Sense and Reference," along
. IS own, aTC part ofhis w k " ' ,
n thIS book of C or on ".J.eamng and NecessUl'.
, course. arnap en d h :J
took the reference of co courage [e (erroneous) idea that Frege
have found in his own to,be extensions (classes). He could
cepts themselves aTC the r Sc c. egfrI sschnftI," p. 74)thatfor Frege the con·
Clcrence 0 concept w d F F
tewell-known table th t h h . or s. or rege reproduces here
ae ad already IOclud d ' I
ay 1891 (Frege 1976 96' F e 10 a etter to Hnsser! of 24
te ',.. ' p, ,rege 1980 p 63) addi th I
nees In Indirect speech" I . ", ng e co umn on sen-
' ' t IS noteworthy that th I'" ,
now CIt empty, In partI' uI h" e space or mducct sense IS
c ar, t IS calls Into . C
0) that Frege's theory f questIon arnap's objection (1956,
h . 0 sense and reference ("
as It there) "leads to . fi . sense and nominatum" as he
an In mIte number of entities." ,
III, The Text
The manuscripts translated b '
I I' ere are wrltte . h
lu lItliully hy Carnap Tb . n In t e Stolze-Schrey shorthand
II "" ' emanuscnptof"B 'f"
lilt (l HegritI'ischrift II" 53 ' . egrl Jsschrift I" has 29 pages
"I " pages (mcludingtw ' '
,II!,"]£, In Mathenlatics" ha 32 o gaps In the text), and that of
an' I s pages, The page 'th' all
' I1IHn consecutiVely in th h d ., s W] In three manuscripts
shaky lines differ noticeably from the fan writIng of Carnap's old age whose
The manuscriptof"B 'ff e urn hand of the notes '
writing) "R C egn sschrift I" bears the I b 1'('
. . .arnap. Univ. Jena. W.S. 1910- a e In ordinary hand-
Apart from tbe word "B 'ff h' 11, FREGE BegrifIss h '/'t I"
(i I . egn ssc nft" these len , .
nc Lhe "I") in Carnap's later hand were all SUbsequent additions
writin e '''Begriffsschrift Ii .. bears th . .
, C g) Frege, Begnffsschrift II S -S 1913 R e lahel (m ordmary hand-
In arnap's I t b . " " Carnap " Add '
. " aer and.arethewords"PartII[n- ,,' edto thIS tith-.
manuscnpt contains minor comments . .Beyond that, the entire
hand; for specifics see the notes Th and clanfIcatlOns in Car nap's lutf"f
n?t Carnap's numbers and other prob-
I;SOs) of autobiography. in .the c0'!lposition (in the mid-
rer. as vanous nores and I '. . t IS possIble that th
. etters In hIS pa ey are even
by queries arising, in 1963 f they may have been oeca-
papers and letters ' rom t e pubheatIon ofFrcge' h
"B' . s post umous
egrlffsschrift I"
,. I was sllElpIen d"
(l{' I.' that aho' 'I d lente uy material f I
I ' . In( II es the Ie-crure- J ...., '. rom t le manuscript fas-
P {rIlt'nt consist" f' f'· lOtes lor Lome In Math '
I ..., t) IVt' pag· f b" emaucs "Tl '
1'1fI4l). and ('oBtains the I'(lll su lsequently numbered (in Ca·' ,
OWlng: rnap sater
I) Two pagt's headed ""B 'f '
h ' egn fsschnft" d "
t e eXIstence of Goo" (in ordinar an ontological proof of
y handwTlung, underlined).
Introduction: Frege's lectures on Begriffsschrift 13
original transcriptions, both in content and in their presentation. For the
extremely lahor-intensivc task of establishing this corrected text, t.he assistance
of Dr. Brigitte Uhlemann at the Philosophisches Archiv in the University of
Constance. whose knowledge of Carnap's shorthand is unsurpassed. was
utterly indispensable. The original German text of Carnap's notcs was made
intu a usable computer file by Christopher von BUlow, who abo helped in the
reconstruction of formulas left incomplete by Carnap.
I am grateful to Richard Nollan and Gerald Heverly at the Archive for
Scientific Philosophy for their support, as well as to Professor Jiirgen
MittelstraB and Professor Cereon Wolters, who gave me access to the copies of
the Carnap papers at the Zentrum flir Philosophic und Wissenschaftstheorie at
the University ofConstanec, Professor Peter Schroeder-Heister participated in
a first reading of the original transcriptions. Professor Friedrich Kamhartel
also supported this work, as part of our collaboration in bringing out Frege's
posthumous papers. Finally I want to thank Professor Marco Ruffino for the
very stimulating discussions that greatly benefited the final draft of this intro-
duction, and Andre Carus for his help in translating it into English as well as
making valuable suggestions for the revision of the text for the English edition,
Gottfried Gabriel
side, the corresponding parenthetical remarks, substitutions, and variants. The
substitutions indicated not presumably Car nap only WTote down
that Freg: specIfIcally wrote on the board, and not those he only men-
tIOned In explanauon. Reconstructions ofthe steps omitted in Carnap's lecture
not.es. where possible, are supplied in the editorial notes. The separation of the
fro,m commentary, which in the notes is sometimes empha-
Sized by a vertIcal IS reproduced in the text here by leaving sufficient space
to the separation ObVIOUS. Insofar as these lines also serve the purpose of
h,racketmg or highlighting parallels or comparisons between formulas expres-
SIOns etc they /" h '
.' ,., appear l,nes In t e text. We also reproduce other graphic
deVices, arrows for pOinting to particular things mentioned. Where this was
not reas.ons or because the page would have become too
1.5 m?icated m the editorial notes. Horizontal lines in Carnap's manu-
where a line of thought come to an end are represented here by
IIlsertmg extra space between the texts so separated.
In the Stolze-Schrey shorthand ""not" is Wfl'tten" " As th b I
, I -. e same sym °
WI liS,"cd b,y Russ:1l the negation sign, its application to schematic
us IS u rcae y <jU8SI-logl 'al d '1 d
. , . c an east y rea able. The transcription undoes
t lis so Wt' hHv(' ,.'st." 'I 't I' ,
, ," CI I 'y Inse'tlOn of a byphen ("not-A") F 'h' . If
"'llr('ss' II 't . regc Imsc
, . {,Ii liS )etween the negation and the " 11 b
Plitt it r •• A" ( . h propOSItIOna etter y
'rl ·gl wit out a hyphen) into parentheses (cf "Compound
IOUg Us . '
In editing and presenting the text we ado ted the .
m:Jterial.s are to be regard d "1 . .p. standpolilt that these
ondaril 'C e prImarl yas an editIOn of a Frege text, and only sec-
or a :ext. But we made no effort to alter their character as a set
tcnt Oh . •. w
h1(,h °fne would not expect to be entirely uniform or
. VIous mist' es 0 Caruap' II
as well as th' . s were genera y corrected without mention
. 0 er minor textual tnt r 1 f b' .
notes to the ori' Ie" a IOns. w ose rationale is in the
either All other interwntions arc'
within square brackets. mes or, III the case of Interpolations, l'llt'lost.d
Tht' starting point or this edition were tran " .
Nollan of the Archive of'S· .f' . sCnptlOns ohhe lectures by Richard
Clentl Ie Phtlos h . P'
dWl'kt'd proofread alr'lins' til .. I 'hOP Y m Ittsburgh. These were
. t"<, e ongHUl s orthand ' ,,'
'Ions IWrt· arp has"I' .". a (' . manuscnpt. The transla-
o 7{'rnl<lJl It'xt th t d '
o a eparts quite SUbstantially from the
2R: F
. ordinarily lIses capitol Gret"k. I tt ." 0 •
e lor prOpOSitions.
Introduction: Frege's Lectures on Begriffsschrift
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
In Gottfried Gahriel's introduction to this book, essential background infor-
mation for Frege's lectures has heen provided and a philosophical discussion
of their content, significance, and influence initiated. In the following second
introduction, we will supplement this groundwork in three respects: by pro-
viding a fuller impression of Frege as a lecturer, based on several student
reports (Section I ) ~ by summarizing and analyzing further the logical content
of Fregc's lectures (Section II); and by directing attention to some especially
significant aspects of their influence on CaTnap and, through him, on the
later development of logic (Section III). In the interest of independent
readability, a small amount of overlap between the two introductions has heen
I. Reports on Frege's Lectures
1. Teaching at the University ofJena
Gottlob Frege's teaching career at the University oflena began in 1874. He was
26 years old at the time. He continued to teach at lena until his retirement in
1918, at the age of 70. I From [he list of classes offered by Frege over the years,
it is apparent that he lectured on a wide range of topics in mathematics. at hoth
introductory and advanced levels: from the Differential and Integral Cakulus.
Differential Equations, Fourier Series, and Complex Analysis. through Analytic
1. For a concise chronologyofFrege's life and works, sec (Beaney 1997); forthe first hook-
length biography ofFrege, see (Kreiser 2001),
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awoder
aod Synthetic Geometry AI b
Mathern u· Th h ' ge fa, and Number Theory, to the Foundations of
a es. e tree classes h f£ d
Mechanics I and II d e 0 most often, however, were Analytic
classes were at the c' oao °foh
enntled '"Begriffsschrift." The former tv.'o
reo IS eeture h" . 1 . I .
ofcourse closelyreIat d h" S Ipmc asSIca mechamcs; thelatterw'ds.
, e to IS research i 1 . O· .
class '''Begriffsschrift'' al h d n ogle. ccaslOnally, the mtroductol)'
teaching Career. Z so a a more advanced sequel, at least late in Frege's
Until recently, very little was k
COntent of his classes, includin DOwn ahOll.t Frege as a lecturer, or about th€
maties. The rn . . g those on lOgIC and the foundations of mathe·
am source of mformatio r. h h
Autohiography" (Carna 1963 -w .0 or ot Carnap's "Intellectual
clear from this source thPt F ) e wIll quote extensIvely from it below, It is
' t· r
Is presentation and styl .' d . mos engagmgteacher, in terms 0
At the same time ·th
, meed. he was rather introverted. remote and dn.
,WI respect to th . ' ,
extremely stimulating and h h elf Caruap found his classes
. wat elearnedmth d I·
Su )sequent work Both a em eep y mfluenced his 0\0,'11
. spects are f d "f
tions to three other repo t b F
Irrne 1 we compare Carnap's recollec·
r s a Out rege con ' h
ot cr reports_ hy Wilh 1 Fl' eernmg t e same period. As these
, " em ltner, Gersho S hi· .
stcill-ure less widely k . m e 0 em, and LUdWIg Wlttge.·
nown. we WIll quot th I
with Cur nap's th . e ere evant parts of them as well:
· , ey constItute all th' ,
[ IS connection First h e eyeWItness reports we have In
. ., owevcr, to Carnap.
report on Frege's lectures
art I, §1, of his "Intellectual Autobio ra h" .
Carnap recalls his relation h' F g P y, entitled "My Student Years,"
s Ip to rege as a student as follows:3
From 1910 to 19141 studied at the U· ..
Freiburg/LB First I mversitles of Jena and
. concentrated on philo h
later, physics and philosoph . sop y lind mathematics'
·1 yweremymaJorr Id I h '
o ecture COurses I'll d Ie s. n t e selectioo
10 owe only my 0 .
about examinations or a prol· . I wn mterests without thinking
eSSlOna career Wh I· .
ecture course I dropped ,·t d d' . en dId not hke a
. h " an stu led the b'" I .
III t e field Instead [ JIg I' su Ject }y rcadmg books
. '" reat yenJo d th d
In COntrast [0 the endless c ' ye e stu y of mathernatif·s
h·f ontroversles a h ".,
P 1 osophy, the results in math . mong t e vanous schools of
h ' ematIcs could b
t cre was no further comrov B . e proveu exactly and
rec' d fr ersy. ut the most f . C 1·
eIVe om universitv lect' ."d· rUUm Inspiration I
of h'l 'J Ires w not corn f·
P I osophy proper or math' e rom those in the field
emaHcs proper, but rath fr
, cr om the lec-
2. Sp,., (Krt,jsf'r 2001) 1 '
Fff'gt' lit th{' Pr' 280-R4. for a mnn' cll'taile..l,-> I .
.'"\' "" "J (l It'na . _ \I, ,.omp II -t f
, . i' art'nal ins\' ..". j . II "IS from u' , s 0 COUTses bv
•. , . I In )f1W'}·,' - IlIVersHy'..I_ - .
llh']I"I'tual A .l." R IS rOJn the or,· .. I .
utll"logrnph ... h , unpubl h d
Pt"('ill! Collt'l'tions Of" y. In ( f' Carnap Pap/'rs (M. _ e version of Carnap'5
at Lt)S Angl:"lt's Tho n, PtlIr.t
,lf'nt of the Young "LnohlsCnpt Colleetion 1029) at the
' '·aertaq dh" .... , IfaryU' ..
y t e pl'rmission of th C. uote, ere IS In Box 2. fold CM' of Californill
e arllap heirs. er 2. section B, and is quoted
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
tures of Frege on the borderlands between those fields, namely, sym-
bolic logic and the foundations of mathematics.
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was ar that time, although past 60,
only Professor Extraordinarius (Associate Professor) of mathematics
in lena. His work was practically unknown in Germany; neither
mathematiciaus nor philosophers paid any attention to it. It was
obvious that Frege was deeply disappointed and sometimes hitter
ahout this dead silence. No puhlishing house was willing to bring out
his main work, the two volumes of Grundgesecze der Arithmetik; he
had it printed at his own expense. In addition, there was the
disappointment over Russell's discovery of the famous antinomy
whieh occurs both in Frege's system and in Cantor's set theory. I do
not remember that he ever discussed in his lectures the prohlem of
this antinomy and the question of possible modifications of his sys-
tem in order to eliminate it. But from the Appendix of the second vol-
ume it is clear that he was confident that a satisfactory way for
overcoming the difficulty could be found. He did not share the pes-
simism with respect to the "foundation crisis" of mathematics some-
times expressed by other authors.
In the fall of 1910, I attended Frege's course "Begriffsschrift"
(conceptual notation, ideography), out of curiosity, not knowing any-
thing either ofthe man or the subject except for a friend's remark
that somebody had found it interesting. {But the very idea of a sym-
bolic notation for concepts seemed attractive to us. Thus we went,
and} We found a very small number of other students there. Frege
looked old beyoud his years. He was of small stature, rather shy,
introverted. He seldom looked at the audience. Ordinarily
we saw only his hack, while he drew the strange diagrams of his sym-
bolism on blackhoard and explained them. Never did a student
ask a or make a remark, whether during the lecture or after-
wards. The possibility of a discussion seemed to be out ofthe ques-
tion. {And I never heard that a student ever went to Frcge's office in
order to talk to him. But my friend and I became very much inter-
ested and had our private discussions on this new form oflogic, We
were fascinated to learn how the connections between sentences
were reducible to two simple ones (negation and conditional) and
represented by simple configurations oflines. We amused ourselves
by sometimes using or misusing the notation for profane purposes.}
Towards the end of the semester Frege indicated that tbe new
logic to which he had introduced us, could serve for tbe construction
of the whole of mathematics. This remark aroused our curiosity. In
the summer semester of 1913, my frit'nd and I decided to attend
Frege's course "Begriffsschrift n." This time the entire class con-
sisted of the two of us and a retired major of the army who studied

4. Car nap's unpublished recollection concludes: {Besides logic there was only one
mathematics in which I attended a lecture course by Frege. It was rather remote fr
lOgic, a year's course in Analytical Mechanics.}
3. Other reports: Flitner, Mholem, and Wittgenstein ..
Carnap is not the only student of Frege's who later descrihed attending hIS
tures, in particular his lectures on ""Begriffsschrift." Another such student IS
Wilhelm Flitner, a good friend of Carnap's from their student years, and suhse-
(luentlya professor and leading scholar in education. In Flitner's autobiography,
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodq
of the new ideas in mathematics as a hobby. It was from the
major that I heard about Cantor's set theory, which no professor
had ever mentIoned. {The fact that the audience was so small was
also due to the time: the lectures were at seven o'clock in the
mo.rmng.} In this small group Frege felt more at ease and thawed out
a bit more TIl ·11 . .
w . Sil no questIons or discussions. {But Frege
ould not .restnct hImself to explaining the advanced parts of his sys-
tem of lOgIc only, also occasionally made polemical remarks
about other conceptIons. Especially he criticized the formalists
those who declared that numbers were mere symbols among th'em
Prof J TIl h· ,
.: omae, IS colleague at Jena, with whom he had had a
polemIcal in the Jahresbericht der deutschen
Mathemaukerverein;nung(1906_0B) Wh h d h·d
, en e rna e suc 51 e
remarks, he would sometimes turn his head a bit away from the
so that we saw him at least in profile and then with an
tromc smIle he would make some sarcastic comment on th'e oppo-
[.,.J Alt.hough his main works do not show much of his witty
there eXlsts.a delightful little satire Ueber die Zahlen des Herrn
S '( (t
. In thIS pamphlet he ridicules the definitions which H
.c had given in an article in the first volume ofthe first ew-'
Uon of the large Enzvklo lid' d .
(Sl'hub '.' F Ie er mathematl.Schen Wi.ssenschaftefl.
, ert s was replaced in the second edition by
an excellent contrIbUtion by Hermes and Schol ) F .
that Schubert discovered a new " ,z. rege pomts out
call th '. 1 pnnclple. whIch Frege proposed to
e pnnclp e of the non-distinction ofthe distinct' d h
hmis could be in a way
os amazmg conclUSIOns
ous Frege vari-
bI' . 'care not contamed In h'
pu e.g" a definition of the continUity of a fu t'
the Iinnt ofa function, the distinction between nf TIC lon, an of
and uniform conver 1 0 mary convergence
the help of the .w
expressihle with
first rime. {The dedi III hIS system oflogic for the
one stmctIon and h
shown to be based on the difr . some Ot el' ones were
terence In the ord . h' h
fiers appear, which is of course II 1m er 10 w IC the quanti-
. ' ,we owntoday)H I
emonStratlon of the 10"'; al . k' ' e gave a so a
. mlsta e In th 0 t I .
eXiStence of God. e n 0 o@cal proof for the
Frege gave quite a number of ex .
apphcatlOns of his s\tmhor,' I . amples ofmtcresting
I Ism III mat lemaucs h II.
('IISS general Tlhilosoph· .. I II .... e usua y dId not dis-
t Ita pro) ems It IS ..d I· .
w saw (he great phil . h· I' ' l;VI ent rom hiS works that
. osop lea Importa . f h .
which he had created h t h d.d nce 0 t e new Instrument
· , u e J not COnv I .
lO IS students. Thus, although I . eya c. ear Impression ofthis
was mtensely Interested in his sys-
Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence
tem of logic {and admired his great ingenuity in constructing it},
I was not aware at that time of its great philosophical significance,
Only much later, after the first world war, when I read Fregc's and
Russelrs books with greater attention, did I recognize t.he value of
Frege's work not only for the foundations of mathematics, but for
philosophy in generaL {Even after the war, Frege remained unknown
among the German mathematicians and philosophers. Heinrich
Scholz became later the only one in Germany who worked for the dis-
semination of Frege's ideas. In other couutries, a few logicians made
his name known, but not many read his works. Russell and
Whitehead called their readers' attention to him. On the occasion of
the foundation of the Association for Symbolic Logic in 1936,
Whitehead called Frege the greatest logician of the 19th century.
Polish logicians were influenced by the study of Frege's works, and
recognized their importance.}
In the summer semester of 1914 I attended Frege's course,
Logik in der Mathematik. Here he examined critically some of the
customary conceptions and formulations in mathematics. He
deplored the fact that mathematicians did not even seem to aim at
the construction of a unified, well-founded system of mathematics,
and therefore showed a lack of interest in foundations. He pointed
out a certain looseness in the customary formulation of axioms, defi-
nitions, and proofs, even in works of the more prominent mathemati-
cians. As an example he quoted Weyerstrass's definition: "A number
is a series of things ofthe same kind" ("'" ... eine Reihe gleichartiger
Dinge"). {On this he commented with all impish smile: '"'According
to this definition, a railroad train is also a number; this number may
then travel from Bt'r1in, pass through jena, and go on to Munich,"}
He in part icular the lack of "lttention It) certain fundamen-
tal distinetions, e.g.• tilt' distinction Iwtween symhol and the sym-
bolized. that bt·twt't'n a logieul concept and a mental image or act.
and that between a function and the value or the function.
Unfortunately. his admonitions go mostly unheeded even today.
(Carnap 1963, pp. 4_6)'
6. Compare (Scholem 1994), pp. 110-11, for a closely related report.
}e'wish scholar, most famous for his studies ohhe Cabala and Jewish mysticism;
and the friend is Walter Benjamin, equally weB known as a philosopher, liter-
ary theorist, and cultural critic. In the second chapter of his book Walter
Benjamin: Die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (Scholem 1975), entitled
"Growing Friendship (1916-1917)," Scholcm writes about his time as a stu-
dcnt at the University of lena (while Benjamin was a student at the University
of Munich), He gives tbe following evaluation of his classes and teachers,
including Frege:
[Benjamin and Il didn't really have teachers, in the good sense, at the
university; we educated ourselves, each in a very different way. I don't
remember one of us ever talking with enthusiasm about an academic
leacher later, and if we had some praise, it was for eccentrics and out-
siders, such as the linguist Ernst Levy, on Benjamin's side, and
Gottlob Frege, on my side, (Scholem 1975, p, 32, our translation)
Several pages later Scholem comes back to the same topic, now in more
detail, and particularly in connection witb his teachers in philosophy:
Philosophy Rt lena annoyed me considerably. I despised Eucken, who
looked unreal-pompous, and talked the same way. After one hour of
lecture by him I didn't return. Bruno Bauch, however, was a must
and, as far as Kant was concerned, also interesting for me. For I read
a lot of Kant during that six-month period. Bauch's big monograph
on him had just appeared, in which his break with Cohen, soon to
take on such hitter forms, was prefigured, [... ] Over the course of the
semester, I also hecame acquainted with the polemic in Kant-
Studien, started by a lady, against Cohen, which announced a nation-
alistic ilnd slight. hut still recognizable anti-semitic shift ofa part of
In contrast. I was nttractt.. d (0 two very opposite teachers. Tbe
one was Paul F. Linke, an unorthodox Husserlian, who induced me to
study large parts ofHussel'l's Logicallnve,ltigation,}', which Benjamin
only knew vaguely from his time in Munich. The other was Gottlob
Frege. whose Foundations ofArithmetic I then read, besides related
writings by Bachman and Louis Couturat (The Philosophical
Principles ofMathematics). I attended Frege's one-hour lecture
Course on "Begriffsschrift." Mathematical logic was of great interest
to me then, since discovering Schroeder's Lectures on the Algebra of
Logic in a used bookstore in Berlin. These and similar attempts to
arrive at a pure language of thought inspired me greatly. In Bauch's
seminar we read the logic of Lotze , which left me cold. My final
paper for the seminar was a defense of mathematical logic against
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awode-
Erinnerungen /889-/945 (FJi 1986) ,
In th £ h h tner. he, too, reflects on his time in Jena
e OUrt c apter, entitled "Student Years 1909-1912" h "t b t
rege and Carnap: • e WTl es a on
[Carnap's] interest in loo-ical bl I d h'
. o· pro ems e 1m to the lectures of an
alssocIate professor [AuBerordentlicher Professor] who then
a most completely u 1m 'Go I b
mend d F n own. tt 0 Frege. Ernst Abbe had recorn-
o .e rege to faculty [to become associate professor] in 1883
pomnng to Frege s excellen 1 . al' " '
Siegfried Cza ski h d t lOveStIganons; Abbe's successor
as the m t' p a hIm- as we knew from his children-
OS Important thmker at the University of lena
evenheless Frege stru I d .
•"TT f:" gg e to even have his lectures take place
es acmor collegium" was then th ul . .
iog as a th' d Fer e, With the lecturer connt-
had to he several semesters the lecture would have
he enlisted me and la tt adrnadPhnot found a second hearer. Therefore
, a en e t e extrao di 'I f '" ,
lecture course on "Begriffsschrift'" r nan y .ascmatmg lOgIcal
Julius Frankenherger's broth h' and the followmg semester
physics, played the role of
majored in and
became the foundat' rh' IPerson, For Carnap, these lec-
, IOn 0 IS ater philos h' h '
as the t . op y, e saw Frege s
- mos Important de I ',.
Aristotle and Leih - I ] ve opments In lOgiC SInce
During his time as a student Ca
Fregc; likewise, I only exchan ed a spoke a word with
at his door when I had t d Jig wmslgmflcant words with him,
. • 0 ever somethin 0 'd
Sity one didn't dare to add F g. Ut51 e of the univcr-
ress rege In ·t f h
our neighbor on the For tw ,Spl e 0 t e fact that he was
except when he walked :ve:gth' °F
sa,: the not very tall man,
d h
e orstweg bndg 1 k.i d
an a and on his back, and then disa . ,e, ng ownwards
lectures he rarely glanced t b' d ppearmg 10 hIS house. In his
a lsstu ents'hew I'
cerned with the symbol h • as exc USIVely con-
, S e wrote on the board d l' ,
totally Introverted manner th h 11 an exp Blned In a
"l . , us w 0 y focused on th b'
o oglc," (Flitner 1986 pp 126 27 ' e su Jeet matt",
Oh . ' , -, our translatIOn)
Vlously report confirms the ima e
unchansmatic teacher. It also 'vesa g of Frege as a shy, introverred
fillIng his logic classes. In a more:beat .sens
ohhe diffiCulties he hadin
:em and his friends, especfally C;m, )( intellectual excite-
nanly faSCInating lomeaI lecture. ,,?ap, enved trom Frege's '"'extraof'
A h
' d course ,1
t Ir report about F .
. 'I' rege as a lectur f
,'lI\O again two people who hecame er,. roughly the same period,
dud Fl!tller. Tht' amhor of that rel)( t frtends as students, like Carnap
)r 1S .l"ershom S h I
c 0 em, the weB-known
5. For marl:" on the lack of
Carnap's NUhla· . Contact be[Ween
ss qUoted In Gabriel's introduction Carnap, see the note frorll
• egtnnmgofsection 3 (p.lO).
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
7. 1995) mOTe on Eucken, including his relationship to Frege.
e. This IS noteworthy In connection with the infamous anti-Semitic remarks Contained in
Frege:s from the years 1924-25 (Frege 1994), For 8 general discussion of
s see the editors' to (Frege 1994) and Chapter 6 of
I 2001 I. further hackgmund, mcluding the political leanings of Bauch and
orhe.r philosophers at the time, compare (Sluga 19931.
"'I' add that t.hNe is rellson for douht about the accuracy of some aspects of
,.. Tt'pon (as pOlTlted out to us hy Gottfried (;ilhrif'lj. For example, other record5
llIdll'llh' that ht' o;tl.lrtt'd to tllk,' dasst's at Jr-nA only in I(H7/18 (when was ill or 01"1
1",llH" "dow). !l11l alTt'lidy in 19Ifl/17; nlsa, in Schoh'll1's diary from the pf'riod.
i:--dHI!"ln20Illtl, I1llt tlWlIllOnt'llllt all. On ttl!' other hllnd, the latter hook
l'nUtllll\ 111'< 'itlllh'1l1 pllpl>r (Ill for Haut'h"s Sf't' IScholem 20001 109-11,
10. onl?-: OIhN Ilnh's f,tlllt1 Frt'gt"S It'ClUTf'," kno\\-"Tl til us come from his
t..·r tit at th,' LJlllvt>rsity of ll'na, 1874/75, thus II llIueh earlier period. These urt'
u on Analyti(' recorded hy the sturtcnt R. Schropfer, See
rt'gl lJ1\J I. pp, ,J44 -64; compare also (Kreiser 2001), p. 276.
Lotze and Bauch, whose ouly response to it was silence. The philoso-
phy of language aspec' of a concep' scrip' wholly purged of mysti-
cism, as well as its limits, seemed clear to me. I reported on it to
Benjamin. who asked me to send him the seminar paper. At that lime
I oscillated between the poles of a mathematical and a mystical sym-
What I liked about Frege, who was almost as old as Eucken and,
like him, wore a white heard, was his entirely unpompous manner,
which contrasted very favorably with Eucken's. But in Jena almost
nobody 'oak Frege scriously. (Ibid,. pp, 65-66)
Rudolf Euckcn, the person compared so unfavorably to Frege, was then a well-
cstahlished professor of philosophy at the University ofJena. 7 Beyond that com-
parison, what Scholem's report reveals is that not only Carnap, but also other
pt-rccptive students-with very different interests and backgrounds-were fas-
hy Frcgc's lectures, in spite oftheir off-putting style. Note, moreover.
thut Scholl'Tn does not group Frege with Bruno Bauch and other Neo-Kantiam
whll hq!;ulI 10 display Overt anti-Semitie tendencies at the time.8
As St'holt'lIl's remarks ahout Frege occur in a chapter eovering the year
1<) Ih -17, it IIppl'iUS that he •• Begriffssehrift" during that year.
thlls a It'w yl'nrs lIftl'r Carnal' and FlitnN.'J No notes taken hy Scholem in thaI
f'\ass n;ist, as far as we know, nor do we know of any other notes by students in
('lasses from this general period. III On the olher hand, it is possiule to
l'ompan' especially Carnap's and Flitner's reports concerning the
1<)10-14 with information from another well-known philosopher: Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Wiugenstein did not llttend any of Fregc's classes, but he visited
him several limes between 1911 and 1913. The relevant information can hI:
found in repons by two ofWittgenstein's students. whom he later told ahout
meetings with Frege.
The fIrst such repon is by M.O,C. Drury, who recounts
description of his fIrst visit with Frege in Jena, in 1911, as follows:
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awode)
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
h If 't went to visit Frege I had a
that w :n look like. I rang the
very clear Idea 10 my mmd as to w at , •
I ld h'm I had come to sec
hell and a man opened the to,., , .d To which I
Professor Frege. "I am Professor Frege, the sal.,
Id I
ly "impossible!" A, ,his first meeungwlth Frege my
cou ou y re , bi . e the floor wah me.
own ideas were so unclear that he was a e to Wlp
(Drury 1984, p, 110) , ' ,
P Ceaeh conveys Wlttgenstem s
In a related, perhaps hetter known repon, eter ..-
later recollections as follows:
. d bjections to his theories,
I wrote to Frege, putting torwar some 0 1 re Frege wrote
• C I my great p easu ,
and waited aIlXlously lor a rep y. .I'
and asked me to come and see him. I' d heard the
' fh ys'schoo caps an
When I arnved I saw a row 0 0 . 1 d 1 t had had a
' , ' h 'd n Frege, I earne a er,
nOIse ofhoys playmg m t e gar e .. d then his wife; he
sad married life - his children had died young, d d good
I h \
. he was a.l'..ln an
had an adopted son, to whom e leve .
'h II 'h
at er, a small neat man Wit
I was shown into Frege's study. Frege was h 'h talked He
d d the room w en e .,
a pointed heard, who aroun
I felt very depressed; but at
uhsolu'ely wiped 'he floor wlth me, h d []
. "so I c eere up....
the end he said "You must f h t Fregc would never
I had several discussions WIth hIm a ter.t I st3rted on some
' hI'" ld mathematics, 1 .
talk about anythmg ut oglc al , I" d then plunge back
- nethmg po Ite an
other suuject, hc wnu say SOl d n ohituary on a col-
, l' d h matics He once showe me a .
Into 0b'1C an mat e. d ',hout knowing what It
' 'd" rusedawor WI
league who, It was sal , neve hould be praised for
. h ,t that a man s
meant; he expressed astulllS mLn
this.[ ... ) "I'ng at the station lor
, I Fr. as we were wal h
The last time saw rege, tOO d difficulty in your t e-
, 'd h' "0 't you ever III any
my tram. I sal to lin . on ")" re lied "Sometimes I j'eem to see
ory tha, numbers are obJccts. P,,, (Geach 1961, pp, 129-30)
a difficulty- but then agaIll I don t see It. d f
. . d Frege referred to at the err 0
The final meeting between Wlugenstem an ,
Geach's report, most likely took place in 1913,17' 'dl'mpression of Freg
as a
. h more nuance h
Fromthesefourreports.anc er,. I 'h'lscarecr.ln1910-ll,w en
f F
elatIvely ate m
teacher emerges, alleast 0 rege r
'" (;llsn in KI'I'k 20021, ac.fU'
- '. ftl'n Iluntl'd llncritll.tJly .. M< '.lfO'tl' Ilwd
. ,.. . thlll wlk -II
. . 'Whllt' It trUl ' l.iI two 1'1'1 f rl'n.
<Illy some mISinformation, _. FTI'g" Illtt>r <I' nptf 'I'
hildrf'n ul their OWIl. II f' nnn' tli,tal
young ti1l' two did nut have any c' . his I. nr I
AJfl'f'd'anrt Toni Fuchs, the first of which grew up In·· '.
4 their contact, 'WI' (Krf'iser 2001), pp. 497-50. , . h F ,ge until 1920; for more on '
12. Wittgenstein kept correspondmg WIt re
I Reck 2002).
II. The Logic in Frege's Lectures
Carnap, Flitner, and Wittgenstein were in contact with him, he was already
years old. Apparently his age showed in the classes Carnap and Flitner
although Frege was still able to "'bounce around the room" when WittgensteJn
visited him, as well as to "wipe the fioor with him" intellectually, In 1916-17
when Scholem was in his class, Frege was 68 years old, with his health growing
increasingly fragile. In fact, Scholem may have been in the very last class Frege
taught at Jena, in the winter semester 1916/17. His classes during the summer
semester 1917 were cancelled due to bad health; in the winter semester 1917/1B
he was granted a leave, perhaps also for health reasons; and his classes in the
summer semester 1918 were again cancelled because he was too ill to teach. At
that point he retired. 13
So far we have reviewed several repoTts on Frege and his lectures at the
University of Jena, in particular his lectures on "Begriffsschrift." In the nel1
section we will turn to the Content of these lectures. To assist the reader unfa.
miliar with Frege's technical work, we will begin Section II with a brief expla'
nation of his unusual notation; after that, we will summarize and analyze the
logical system contained in Carnap's notes, along the way comparing it to the
systems in Frege's earlier Begriffssthrift (1879) and Grundgesetze del
Arithmetik (1893/1903),
is 'Written:
P-HQ --> R)
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
, ' I' formula with dif- .. Wlthm a comp ex ,
This negation can occur at any pOSItlOn . . F'nally the universal
' f d'f£ rent pOSIuons. 1 ,
ferent meanings resultmg rom I e

. . .. I dash attached to the
The negation ----, P of a formula P is indicated by a vernca
horizontal content line:
by a diagram ofthe form:
P " fQ
r resenting the "dependence 0 on
The vertical line may be thought of ep ". ., of the formulas to their
P, the horizontal lines as representmg the content
right. Thus the complex formula:
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awode,
I. How to read Frege's conceptual notation
The two-dimensional notation employed by Frege has some virtues, but also
many drawbacks. It leads to a diagrammatic representation of the logical struc'
ture of propositions, which makes certain basic inferences quite perspicuous.
At the same time, the emphasis on the display of relatively trivial information
with Frege's aversion to defined s}TI1bols for logical operatioml
leads to rather baroque diagrams that are anything but perspicuous.
TbiS fact clearl.y prevented Frege's system of notation from catching on even
among those, lIke Carnap, who took the trouble to learn it. The disadvantages
Frege's ,notation also contributed to the poor reception his works ini-
ually receIved, despIte the many important logical advances concealed just
beneath the elaborate formalism.
The basic idea behind Frege's notation is to represent a conditional state-
then Q
again (Kreiser 2001), pp. 280-84. for some of the details in the last para-
. ..., h variahle .r) is written:
of a formula <p (posslhly ('ontaHung t e
. .... , ., tl ' Ig to right of
The scope of the IS Y 111
.. .' the usual sense.
which is a variable-bmding operatlon III '. bl to express all of the other
Combining these basic clements, a die.. ction and existential
. ". ., h s conJunctIon, sJun. Q) ,
famihar lOgIcal operatIons sue a .' . P & Q' written as -,( P ---4' -, In
I h
nctlon IS
quantification. For examp e, t e conJu
the form:

P 'I'f t forms of
. . d' ted by several dl eren
The application of rules of inference IS III . lca. I I I d with the names of the
f I
omeumes a)e e
horizontal lines between ormu as, s
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodq
other formulas being invoked F . . .
rule (see below): . ormstance, an apphcatIon ofthe transposition
Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence
Universal generalization is indicated by a "sagging" line:
Finally, a vertical line (the "judgment stroke"):
We shall follow Frege's custom of using speciallencrs .'T, y, X; Y, etc. for vari-
ables involved in quantification. Atomic formulas are the following:
is added to the left-most end of a formula to indicate that its content is asserted
as true, for instance when it has been derived from the axioms. Frege applies his
inference rules only to such derived formulas; there are no conditional deriva-
tious involving formulas without the judgment stroke.
for a propositional letter P
for individual letters a, h
for Fa predicate letter and a, ... , h individual letters
for a a higher predicate letter and F, ...• G predicate
F(a, .. , h)
a (F. _.. ,G)
Propositional letters: P, Q. ...
ludividllalletters: a, b, ...
Predieate letters: G, .
pn'dieafe letters: a. p....
FUllctionleuers:'/: K· .
.f·, y, ...• X, Y. ... ,
2. SwnmaryofFrcge's logical system
The system of logic presented in the lectures is a hybrid fragment ofthe systems
presented in Frege's published work; like Crundgesetze der Arithmetik it uses
several ditIercnt rules of inference and fewer axioms, but like Begriffsschrift it
makes no use of the theory of extensions of concepts or the description opera-
tor. Thus it is essentiallywhat we would now call a system of higher-order, pred-
icate logic, similar in many respects to the system of Whitehead and Russell's
Principia Mathematica (1910/1913), bmwith "simple" rather than "ramified"
We begin by summarizing (in modern notation) the system presented in
the lectures, before relating it more precisely to Fregc's other logical systems, 14
The logical language is much like the usual one of predicate logic; it con-
sists of the following kinds ofsymbols:
P .... ....
When convenient as in the £ -
di ' , ' oregOIng w hall
tIonal SIgn -7 associates to th . h' e S use the convention that the con-
ten more simply as P .... Q R
, so the formula P .... (Q .... R) ean be writ-
remi '. -7. e rule of Detach ' ,
. ses, IS wrItten with a sin Ie h' . ment, WhICh reqmres two
oked. Thus if we have labeled by the formula being
(II -I'
is indicated by writing a "flattened X" .
In place of the horizontal line:
W,' "un int,'r Qfrom p .... Qb D
Y etachment, by writing:
(I):: __P_
If We have already labeled.
(2) TQ
then the inference from P to Qf
rather than a double colon- rom (2) by Detachment is with a' I
. . SInge
Applications of the other n I
li1Ilo....'jngstvlt>s t',· It'S (Sf'l' bf'low) are ff'('orde.rl, I
. ." () JrWs; II ana ogously, using the
- - - -- -- (Negation) 14. In doing so, we disregard some specific features of Frege's system, as
relating to the use of distinct letters in quantification and the theory of propositIOnal
For our purposes. it is sufficient to use different sorts of letters in this way to
indicate different syntactic types. A more elaborate system of notation, say,
involving numerical subscripts as in Alonzo Church's "A Formulation of the
Simple Theory ofTypes" (1940), would be required for a more rigorous presen-
tation. Frege's own convention was lOuse different styles ofletters, labeled with
appropriate styles ofvariables indicating their argument types. No types higher
than those indicated here OCcur in the notes, but the further extension is obvi-
ously intended. Note that the equality sign = occurs only between individual let-
lers. Function symbols with appropriate arguments are permitted in place of
individuals as arguments, as in/(a) band F(g(a), b).
Occasionally, functions of propositions are also considered, as iuf(a::::: b).
A special case ofthis is the "horizontaf' function:
';Ix F(.r) -4 F(a)
';IX a(X) -4 a(E)
Axiom III: gla" b) -4 g(';IX(X(a) -4 X(b)))
Axiom II:
Axiom I:
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
. d l' ·1·k l+a'anda<3are
'f' 'uall arl'thmetical [unctlons an re anons 1 e
peCI IC, us y ,
also often used in atomic formulas. _ f th t given in the
The system of deduction is essentially a fragment 0 11 : tbree
If' f enee and the.o owmg
Grundgesctze. It consists of severa. 0 10 . duality respectively.
axioms for propositional and quanuf1canonallogtc an eq ,
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
sometimes called the ·'content stroke," which represents a function that can be
applied to any arb7llment cp to yield the value true if and only if the argument is
true, andjalse otherwise. Thus, e.g., the expression:
elt'nottOs true, and the expression:
Formulas are built from the atomic formulas by means of (the horizonti.ll
and) the propositional operations:
Aspecial case of (III) is the more familiar:
--> ';IX(X(a) -4 X(b))
and another case is:
--> -4 X(b»
W d . f 'ndiscernibles." The func-
Thus (Ill) yields Leibniz's Law of 1 enn,ly I ,'thin auycontext.
. . . I' It' Its applIcatIon w .
tlOnal formulation lOVO Vlllgg perm s . kinds: those involving a
The rules of inference arc broken down lOto n;o mulas to draw a couclu-
'. . I those that use twO lor
smgle formula as premise, am " . ,
!jion. The of the first sort lire liS follows:
and the (universal) quantifiers:
';I.r 'I' (x)
for an individual variable x
for a predicate variable X
. f mberofconditions P, Q, .- ..
and similarly for any reordenng 0 any nu
In principle: higher predicate letters could also be quantified, but this does
nm happt'n In tht'. notes. In addition to this primitive notation, Frege often
rh.(' ('ompit-x corresponding to the other familiar logical opera-
tions. hkt,:
existential quantification

.. . g one could instead inrN tbe
d · . h dit,'onal posloon, e, .
an SimIlarly for any at er con
Erich H. Reck and Ste'o'e Awodey
Th.is rule is also taken to allow sirnullaneous cancellation of double negatl'ons
as In e.g.: .
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
P-4 Q
Thus a more general instance might look like this:
and similarly for negated Q, etc.
Fiually, there is the following rule:
and similarly in the presence of additio al d.i .. , .
n con nons III any pOSIuons.
P-4 Q-4 R

V.I 'I' (:t.)
wltt'n'.1" lUay 1101 <lln'ady OlTUf in (a)"" '. '.
Ins. qJ , simIlarly for functIOn and predicate let-
where X m<lY not already oeCUT in cp (F) Th" .
generalization: the side cond,'t',( typ" I IfS IS the customary rule of uniVer!illl
. ms lea 0 natu ' I d d .
reqUired htTC. T<l e uctlOn systems not
There arc also three "forms of inference" involving t .
wo prcmlst:"s:
P-4 Q
(Detachment) _
<lnd similarly in the presence of additi ill ..
on COndItIOns, e.g.:
Q P-4Q-4R
P--.:. R
A ft'l:lt.t'd rule is tht> f{)lIowin . . " , .
t'OndHlons: g Hch tan also be apphed in the case of several
This rule, like the others, can also be applied in the case where there are several
other conditions P present.
This completes the description of the logical system presented in the
notes. We now briefly analyze it, comparing it mth Frege's published systems.
The system of the notes, consisting of three (groups of) axioms and seven rules
of inference (together with rules of substitution and change of bound variables)
can be shown to be a complete system of deduction for this fragment of predi:
logic, which is of course sufficient for all of predicate logic by suitahle def-
InItions. It differs from the system of Bt·griffsschrift by the addition of several
new rules of inference (beyond Det<lchment), in place of a number of the
axioms. The currerH axioms [a, IIa, and lib also occur in BrgrilJ}'schrif
(lb is
derivable). a.I) do two axioms whidl an' ofaxi0111 III. hut the
rClJlilining axioms of Ht,fJ,r{!I.\·...("!Jr[/i can now he ,.
Tbt, system is esS('ntially tlw "logic.,I'· fragment of the 111
Spe(;ifinllly. it omits from that system the three axioms
mg propositional etluality (IV). extensions of COIH'epts (V). and the descnpuon
operator (VI), which we now briefly describe.
This says thatPis either Q or -,Q, and is used in the Grundgesetze (§51) to prove
"propositional extensionality":
(PH Q) -4 P= Q
The famous theory of extensions provides a term {.r: qJ} of individual type ,for
every formula qJ. Since the term {x : qJ} is supposed to represent the extenswn
Axiom V: {x: I'} = {x: 'If} .... 'Ix (I' .... 'If)
of the concept represented by q>. these terms are plausibly governed by the
The well-known contradiction of Russell arises quite directly from this axiom.
Finally, in Grundgesetze Frege also employed a description operator lX.f/',
which was supposed to denote the unique individual satisfying the condition
expressed by ({'. if there is one, thus formalizing the definite artide, as it occurs
in "the x such that cp." This operator is governed by the axiom:
Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence
lion disjunction. and exclusion ("neither-nor") in .the nowh-fambliliar way. The
, , , .. d t atment usmg trut ta es.
exposition IS qwte SImIlar to a mo ern re t _
- - d h ent and cut are nex con
The rules of exchange, tranSpOSItIon, etac m . ' as s-
sidered in turn, These arc justified by their preservatlon .of truth, under y.
. - . f h h I of the formulas mvolved_
tematlc conSIderatIon 0 t e trut -va ues ,
Next, general inferences having a common form, like:
1>2--> 1
3> 2 --> 3' > 2
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
Axiom VI: a =(IX_x =a)
By omitting these three axioms and the corresponding machinery of proposi-
tional equality, extensions ofconcepts, and definite descriptions. the logic
scnted hy Frege in the lectures may be characterized as the inferential part ofhis
mature system; i.e, it is that part involved in drawinglogical inferences, without
tht· constitutive or constructive part, involved in building up logical objects.
Lik... modern systems of logic, it can he applied [Q reasoning about various dif-
ti.'n'nt domains, hut it has no domain of ""logical objects" of its own to reason
ahouL One might say, tentatively, that Frege has cut his system back to a tool for
logical inference about other domains, rather than a self-sufficient theory of a
domain of independent logical objects.
3. Outline orthe lectures
We now briefly outline the contents of the two logical lectures Begriffsscllrift I
and II, to he called Parts [ and II respectively. The third lecture Logic in
Mathematics is related to the Nachgelassene Schriften item by the same natTle
(Frege 1983, pp. 219-70), and should he compared to it.
Pan I contains an exposition of the conceptual notation. motivated hy
informal considerations and linguistic intuitions. It makes no mention of
axioms or formal deduction, hut instead focuses on expressing mathematical
and other statements in the conceptual notation, A few rules of iuference arc
given, and some simple arguments are formalized, but the systematic treatment
of is given only in Part II, Part I also inclndes a number of topics
familIar from Frege's writings, including the doctrine of sense and reference,
and the classification of entities into objects, functions, concepts, relarions,
second-level functions. etc,
Tht:' first few pages of Part I give tbe basic concepts of COmenr and judg-
IOt'Itt srrokes. ,and the notation for rht> ('onditional and negation as operations
011 sentt'IIn's. f1wse are explained in terms of the possible truth values ofthe
l1t'1lt sentences, i.e, negalion ---.P swaps true and false, and the condi-
tional P Q the case wbere P is true and Q is false, It is then sho\'\o'J1
how lhese ran be combined to express the truth-functional operations conjunc-
. h'd of a concept as a function.
are considered. These are used to motIvate tel ea . b- d on
. - - pts relatIons, etc. ase
The Fregean doctnne of objects, functlons, d U ,'versal quan-
d t d ntIues IS presente, n
the notions of saturated an unsatura e e t Thus
- . of a general statemen .
tifieation is introduced as a way to permIt negauon b - Iy by using
. h . al inference a oye SImp
whtle one can adequately express t e gener
variables to express generality.

- h eralized negation:
negatIng that statement expresses t e gen
2 2
for all x, it's not the case that I > I >
rather than the intended:
it's not the case that for all.r,.r > 2 .r
> 2
. . .. 'h-I, t I he as:
The U1llwrsal qUllntJlwr t (, atter (
---."iX" (.l' > 2 ;1.
> 2)
. , b comhined with the other logical
Frege then shows how the quantlfler can e h ther classical forms of
operations to express not only existence, e dO .. one"), and particu-
. d . Y·· d egauve ( an n .
JU gment: umversal af umatIve an n.. ") He arranges these 1Oto
I aff- - - (" "and some not . h
ar IrTIlaUve and negatIve some . B §12. He t en
., " . done 10 egn '.1'-
the classical "Square of OppOSItIOn as IS <Ii _ - hed role assigned to
l h the stmgnlS
remarks that these forms do not re y ave,. I distinc[ion between subject
them in traditional logic, and that the ..
and predicate "'does violence to the nature ofthFlll
., ow-classic pbilosophi-
'. , . f me of rege s n C'
ThIS leads lOtO an expOSItIOn 0 so" H d' usses sense and reter·
I d . - - I f- . es of Part L e ISC . d' -t
ca In the flOa Ive pag direct and m trec.;
- f· . and concept. f
cnce, concept and object, unction h f- t rule of inference 0
s for t c us
reference. Interestingly, he a so argue
'1e>O 3d>0 '1'1 >d (-e < A -f(a) < e)
'1e>O 3d>0 '1a (x- d < a <.r+ d -> - e <f(a)-f(x) < e)
The statemt'nt "A is tht'limit of/Tor positiv.. argum"nr' . . . I" . "
. . '-..... s Inereaslng to In may
IS as;
(a- b)+b=a
,(a> a)
,(b> a ) & > b) -> a = b
V,'>U3d>OVa>d(- ,'<;1-f(a)<,,)
& V" > U3 d> 0 Va> d (-,' < lJ -f(a) <,,)
, , f occu ies nineteen pages in the note-
from eleven listed premIses. The proo .' - h 'ddJe of it. It is clear that
i' . fight 10 t e mt
hook, with the second gap 0 lour pages .,
several intermediate steps of the proof are e remarks ahout rigor in
These detailed examples are followed rsOtmtion for achieving it.
mathematics and the importance of no a f functions in mathe-
d d
di Ion of the nature 0 I
There follows an cxten e scuss . h ' . 's no ahout symho s
, h ' that ant melle I. . h h
mattcs. Frege concludes y saYlOg h mselvcs conclude Wit t c
h . . 's The lectures ted '
t an hotany is about mlcroscope . , h' h I recommen to YOlilor
' , questions, w Ie .
words, .... I have now suggcste vartous
further reflection,"
This occupies five pages. 'd' I 'h()ws that limits are
, h (. II . lTl10le late y. s
second example, whlc 0 ows
. . .. (,... I'the formula:
uUlclue. a proo IS glvell 0
(Vx>O (b+x>a & a+x>b)) -> a =b
from the premises:
Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
. b k At this point the lectures
There follow five hlank pages 10 the note 00 '. d
may have included the two examples of the
b ) J
d .ng from w at wows, '
numerical concepts (see a ove, u gt .. f 'tion of
. I ' I d d the hegmmngs 0 an exposl
must In any case have a so mc u e. . III f llowed hy
deduction. For the notes the entirely
formal deductions of the sort ill Frege s axioms I and II are invoked
absent from the notes up to thiS pOlnt. M?reove,' marks like '"earlier we
in the course of the suhsequent deductlons with re
had. , .." , . . from axiom III (notably,
After deriving some propertIes of Identity Ii ' of
- . ) F e turns to twO app cations
Leibniz's Law, and. symmetry, The first is a detailed proof of
"how one can denve proofs usmg our h ' ter than the other
' , h . equal If eac IS grea
the proposltlOn that two num ers are
when increased hy an arbitrarily small amount:
Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodl!f
He concludes the lectures with a discussion of the hierarchy of objects, con-
cepts, relations, and second-level concepts. The universal quantifier is cited as
an example of a second-level concept, as is the property of heing satisfied by
exactly one object, which is expressed in conceptual notation.
Between Parts I and II, two notcs have heen included which, from their
content, seem to belong ronghly there. The first of these notes labeled (by us)
Appendix Ais an analysis ofthe ontological argument for the existence of God.
It uses conceptual notation to clearly make the point that existence is not a
characteristic of the concept "'God." but rather a feature of it- to u.se Frcge's
terminology. By analogy, a house may be made of stones and mortar (its charac-
teristics), but not of spaciousness and comfort (its features).
The second note is also of considerable interest. as it deals Vlith numbers.
It hrieny indicates how the number ofa concept is a feature ofit, and thus a seC-
(mel-level concept. Fregc considers the example "'two tall towers" in which the
towers are both t.all, hut are not hoth two. He also considers some other types of
second-level concepts.
Pan II is occupied with several different topics, including some further
of the ex.pression of mathematical concepts in conceptual notation;
development of a system of formal deduction; and several extended ex.am-
pies of it.s use, There is also an extended discussion of rigor in mathematical
arguments and definitions, the use of variahles, and the nature of functions.
There are two gaps in Part II of the notes. one of five pages and one off(H1r. The
contents of these gaps is, however, not difficult to infer.
Part II hegins with a brief summary of the "'semantics" of the coneepw
notation. and senses of sentences and their parts, i.e. names and
functional expressions. The bask language of horizontal, negation, condi-
identi,ty, and quantification is recalled, Two examples ofthe expression
01 mathematIcal concepts are then given: continuity of an analytic function at a
point, and the limit of a function for positive arguments increasing to infinity,
statement ':r is continuous at the point x" is expressed in conceptual
notatIOn as:
Grundgesetze ("Absorption"), which states that the horizontal function - ({I is
:0.. . .11' ... > _
38 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodf!1 Frege's Lectures on Logic and Their Influence
III. The Influence of Frege's Lectures
I. Frege's logical innovations
AE, our summary in Section II shows, a number of the most central features of
modern logic are already treated at some length in Frege's lectures. We find not
a systematic treatment of propositional logic, including the interdefina-
hlhty of the propositional connectives and their truth-functional specification,
but a comple.te we now call first-order logic, including the
analysIs of predicatIon, the theory of relations, and the basic ideas of
unIversal. and quantification. Equality is treated as a hasic, fir5t-
and it."i relation to higher-order quantification through
s L,aw IS presented. Also on the higher-order side, we have a system
types, prcsented as a natural hierarchy of different kinds of
types inductively hy the typcs of their arguments.
Fmally, IS treated by means of a formal system, with axioms
and rult's ol1l1rcrente that are deductively complete for the first-ordcr prcdicate
calculus: and the rigor orinformallolTica! and th '1 £' 1 d
•. " . 0" rna ematlca prools JS re ate to
I ht, st ru tly ehara,cter or such deductions, which can be used to represent
.hun. Most of llws(" tOllles are treatt'd in a qUI'te mode ' h 'ht
, '. : '. . rn way, Just as t ey mIg
hl ItIUIl logw course today.
" reOllnding how of modern logic was already in Frege, the
as Of, hIS continued serious engagement with logic
after ht. learm.d of Russell s antInomy and duriug a p 'd' h' h h b
lished nothin on h . > , , ' ' CrIO In W lC e pu -
, ." . g t e suhJt.<.t. Particularly noteworthy in that respect is the

lOgIcal system [)f(.:'sented in the Icdures, in which, as pointed out in
eellon 1I the apparatus fI "I'" , ,
.' . 0 °h
<.a III ercnc(' IS retamed hut the ('onstructive
mac mery resp hI" h h •
, - e or t e t cory oflobric:al objeNs has ht'ell disnlrt.ll"d, The
resu hug system, hke modern 't . r I I' ,
,sysems 0 (t'( lwtIVC logiC, has no domain of its
own, ut can he apphed to reasoni "1 I I ' '
' ng a )out ot ler (Omalns, As Carll a}) himself.
per aps recallIng Frege's lectu £ I " ,
later: res. ormu <lted thIS POlllt of view some
The ' , ,
proposulOns oflogIc and mathematics [ ] are l' " T
cance for science since the .d' h "" .0 great slgm I-
TO ., '. Y31 10 t e transformanon of [scientificI
po.slUofns,.[.,,] LOgIC and mathematics are not sciences with a
omam 0 ohJects of thei [1 Th '
"·d al" b' rown. ... e assumptIon of·'formal" or
leo Jeets, as opposed to the .... r al" b' f
t:'nces. is dropped (Carna leoJecrs 0 the empirical sci-
. p 932. p, 433. ollrtranslation)
2. Frf."gt"s innuencf" on Carnap
It might rt:>asonably be asked h 'f '
. w at, I any mfluence F 'd .
('Ially the later ont:>s c()uld h h'd' rege s octrmes.
, ,ave a on the subs' ltd I 'I '
l'n then l-'Vt'n his earlier . e( uen eve opment of oglc.
WrItten works were not or widely appre-
ciated until much later. Indeed, many of his contributions seem to have been
rediscovered "independently," and to have entered the discipline through other
sources, snch as Russell, only to be recognized much later as having also been
contained in Frege. Afurther important aspect of these lectures is that we know
through them that Carnap, in particular. was already acquainted with many of
these topics directly through Frege.
One specific case of Frege's indirect influence on modern logic through
Carnap appears to be the general adoption of higher-order logic with
types, as opposed to ramified types, in the late 1920s and early 30s. As thIS
eage ofthe theory has not heen generally acknowledged (even by Carnap hIm-
self), we take this opportunity to briefly make the case. IS .
The first thing to note in this connection is that Carnap's textbook
der Logistik, pnblished in 1929, hut completed and circulated as early
1927, seems to have heen the first systematic treatment
with simple types. If! The other frequently cited sources, Leon ChWlstek, s
"The Theory of Constructive Types I" (1924) and Frank Ramsey s
"Foundations of Mathematics" (1925), actually contain much less detaIl
was already in Frege; and Hilbert and Ackermann's Grundzilge lheoretl-
schen Logik (1928), occasionally also mentioned in this used
ramified types until the second edition of 1938. Perhaps more Importantly,
Carnap's Abriss and related works were familiar to Godcl (see below), whose
"Uber formal unentscheidbare Siitze dec Principia Mathematica und ver-
wandter Systeme I" (1931) is generally reCob'llized as one ofIhc sources
of the modern theory, Finally, given his familiarity with hIerarchy of
objects, concepts, higher-level concepts, etc., especially m the form, con-
tained in the 1910-1914 lectures it is reasonable to assume that Carnap s use
of simple types; in Abriss, Alybau, and was from that
Sourr.e,17 also that, un(ler simply-typed
lngit' was neVl'r just a dt'vic'(' lor avoiding contradi<'tion for Cllrnap. hut was III
very mIltm: oflogic, It-ndillg it 1111 inht,rt'nt plmlsihility that other
lions -
A h
" . . tl 'I Frcgt>'s lectures are hiS
not er rangt: OllSSUCS ot'eurrtng prOlllll1Cn y n . .
semantic doctrines of sense and reference; intension and extenSIOn: names
and objects; individuals and concepts and extensions; Thes
, • 'fl t'a! book Meanmg an
lSSues also form the backbone of Carnap s m uen 1
15 21 f
ecent very different
, Compare (Kamareddine. Laan. and Nederpelt 200 or a r ,
aCCOUnt. , . ik com are (Reck 2004),
Hi, For more on the relevant history and role ofAbnss der Logtst, th
modern sources
To be sure. in the Abriss Carnap cites only Russell and that, despite
f .type theory, relegating Frege's works to the catei?ory 0, 1 ble insights for the
hlJlng superceded by more recent logical theory. snll va u; be explained by the
presem" (Carnap 1929. p, 107, our translation)., system of type
fact that one's own parents always seem old-fashlOned. '. menu (The
n . I· t d type-theore
argu .
otaUon did not lend itself well to more lca. e r; h positional calculus.)
same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about hiS notanOn or t e pro
W.lnthiss{'ctinnwt"drawheavily (A '
and 2004)' ('ompa" al' l wdodeyandCarus 2001), (Awodl"Vand Reck2002),
.' . at elntro U't' Ie .,
19, Carn'lp did puhlish 1 C IOn to arnap 2000),
" some re ated . t' l' ,
Jnt>lgt>nt!lcht> BegrifffO" (1927' "B . ar es, In partIcular "Eigentliche und
, 'k" 19' "ertch. uber U I h '
IOnl/ltl ( .,\Ob), and "Vb E . n ersuc ungen zur allgemelnen
I k
' er xuemalaxt " Ie '
JOO mllnuscnptwBsonlyrecentl redis orne. arnap and Bachmann 1936). }iIS
Y covered. edued, and publisheda6 (Carnap 2000).
(1947), in which he "developed a semantic method int1uenced by
Fregc''i distinction between the nominatum ("Bedeutung," i.e., the named
entity) and the sense ("Sinn") of an expression" (Carnap 1963, p, 63), Here,
however, we probably have less a case of the specific influence of Frege's lec-
tures than of his more general influence on Car nap, since these topics were also
in Frege's published writings.
. Fmally, ,It seem.s that Frege's influence on Carnap extended beyond tech-
nwal and phIlosophical logic to also include what may be called the ""scientific
temperament" that he passed on to analytic philosophy:
From Freg: I and clarity in the analysis of con-
and expresslOn.[".] Furthermore, the following con-
ecptJOn, which derives essentially from Frege, seemed to me of
paramount importance: It is the task of logic and of mathematics
the total of knowledge to supply thc forms of concepts.
statt:ments, and Inferences, forms which are then applicahle every-
wlwr,c, also to non-logical knowledge. It follows from these
('onsHlerations that the nature oflogic and mathematics can be
only if close altention is given to their application
Ifilloll-iogwal hdds, especially in empirical science, (Ibid" p. 12)
3. From Frt'gc to (;(j,dd, via Carnap
WI' {'onclude this essay hy callI' , tt" '
, . ., ' ng a entlOn to a particularly noteworthy case ot
Frege S InnuCnCt' which Ie-Ids trl K C"d I d
. .., , , . un 0 e an some of the most imj)ortallt
early results In modt:r I . IH A
-I. .', . n ogIe: s recent scholarship has established, during
t Ie ate 19205 Car nap was aettv I, d' I '
. , e yengage In ogIcal research on axiomatie sys-
[ems adndl9v2a8rulUs 1,lotlOns of complctt·I1eSs. finished a hook manllscript
aroun , which ht, circulated I h 'I
All . A' ," un( er t e tit e Untasudwll/-ff'n zur
gkememen xwmallk, hut never published. 1'1 A.... will nnw indh"lt(' (his
wor apparently had some inn > >, h ' •
t I
'a1 . uenCe on t t: young Kurt C{.del. WhO.... subs(>'
quen oglt" results In turn contrihlll 'd (' • , , '
, t. to .,aenap s dt'('ISlOtI to ahandon hIS
project around 1930. . ..
Much of the background for C ' '
th 'd ' . arnap s A,nomatik consists of Fregean
emes an assumptIOns HIS goal h
approach to th r d.' • owever, was to combine a Fregean logicist
e loun anons of mathe . . h H' .
developing a "theo of' , manes WIt a dberuan formalist one by
303) in which ry laxlOmauc systems of arhitrary form" (Carnap 1930. p,
, variOUS ogIcal and mal' al ' d
systematically As he "h' et oglc questIons could be addresse
. . put It In t e Introduction to the Axiomalik:
40 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
Frege's lectures on logic and Their Influence
In l.,.] recent investigations into general properties
terns such as completeness. monomorphy (categorieity),
consistencj', etc,. [.,.] it has become increasingly clear that the mam
difficulty [... ] lies in the insufficient precision of the concepts used.
The mostimportaut requirement [.,,) is, on the one hand. to estab-
lish explicitly the logical basis to be used in each case, [, ..1; and on the
other hand, to giveprecise definitionsfor the concepts used on .that
basis, In what follows, my aim will be to satisfy those two ,
rnems and to [, ..1derive a number oftheorems ofgeneral axlOmall
(Carnap 2000, p, 59. our translation, original emphases)
At the time, Carnap was one of a few logicians engaged in research of this sort,
and he discussed his results wi th Fraenkel, Godcl and Tarski, among others.
Despite some interaction, however, Carnap's basic viewpoint was decidedly
Fregean, compared to that of those influenced by the Hilbcrt schooL TI?,us" fO,r
instance, no distinction was made hetween what we would now call the
language" of the axiomatic systems heing investigated and the
' , ' ' d I'k F ge he worked W1thm
emg used to conduct the investlgatlons; mstea , I e re, .'
Olle "universal" language. Yet again. Carnap wauted to such an
approach with tbe use of the axiomatic method, rather than the lat-
teras "theft." as Russell had done. Here one can perhaps discern the
' d h " ntial role oflogl
o the later Frege ofthe lectures, who emphaSIze t c mlere .
"f h d b t - wilh HIlbert (as pre-
arnap also adopted Fregc's posluon rom tee a e .
, • ., M h ''') that an axIOm system
sented III the lecture notes for" LOgiC 111 at ematlCS ,
'dh' . I .cal research project
eterrnllles a highcr.ordcr concept. lndee , IS enure °6r:L
can he seen as an altcmpt to reconcile the two sides of that dehate. 'd
, I' ' . matic systems cons! -
s.pecific logit'al nntions and properties 0 aXlO , . .
. I" ,. lomcal consequence.
ered by Carnap indud(' sueh modern-sotHH mg topH.S as r;- . '
, '<1 1'1' d cOInplettness.
('onSi,'ilt>IHj', catq.{oridty. deel n II Ity, an, t"' , h' ,
. ,.' h h t wei to l)roVI' an 1 ,It uny
tht. "tlwon'ms of W'IH·r:.,llIXHHIJUW'S t at t' r .' II '
,.' . I I '1syswm IS IOhr:LCU YcOnl-
(:fHISlstt'nt aXiom IHIS II mudd. lUll t tat UlIllXIO
. h
_' '... . ' I' "fn I)oint owcver.
p etc Just lilt IS calq!;Ol"lt'al. As IS dt'ur rom u mo( I . , II
" .' I k d rt'ventcd him from rea Y
t e mathemaucal JIl \e wor e P . ... h' If
" ' h 'dequately. Carnap Imse
prOVing these conjectures, or even staung t em a "with
. .' h through diSCUSSIOns
eCame aware of the deficienCies In hIS approac
Tarski in 1930 and somewhat earlier, with Godel. U' 'ty of
, 1 dent at the mvers!
In the late 1920s. Kurt Code! was a doctora stu f h Vienna Circle.
V ' B h e memhers 0 t e
lenna. where Carnap was teachlllg, ot w rc d' of mathematics.
' I' d foun allons
an they often met privately to dISCUSS oglc an '"M talooik .. and
• 1928 I' t e course on e t:I ••
oreover, Codel attended Carnap s ec I d h manuscripl of his
he was one of the few people to whom ClfCU d important tht,-
A,riomatik. Cbdcl's work in logic from that time . III laled to Carnap's
I re ogulla e as re
orems. the contents of which are c car y c, '<Ii tation from 1929).
' f fi d r lomc (hIS sser
XlOmatik: the completeness 0 lIst-or e b·
42 Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey
and the incompleteness of axiomatic systems of arithmetic (Gode1 ]931). In
addition to the well known and less direct influence of the Hilbert school on
G6del's work, Carnap's very direct influence thus seems unmistakable. And
indeed, Codel himself refers to Carnap explicitly in the former work, and
irnplicitlyin the early public statements ofthe results from the latter.:
in later years, he identifies "Carnap's lectures on Metalogic" alongside Hilhert-
Ackermann as his two main early inOuences. 21
Thus we have found a clear historical and conceptual path from the texts
presented in this book to the celebrated logical results of Godel-who 3.':1 a
student in Vienna attended the logic lectures of Carnap. who in turn took down
these lectures on logic by Frege in lena.
20. See fGi.idel 1986) p 62 f 3.
2(03). •. • n..• compare also (Awodey and Caru5 2001) and (Goldfarb
21. See (Awodt'y and Cams 2001).
____....... \MIIi

Carnap's Student Notes
What follows are notes, taken by Rudolf Carnap, in Frege's 1910-1914 courses
and the foundations of mathematics at the University of lena, trans-
"ated .mto English by the editors. The notes consist of three parts:
Begnffsschrift I," "Begriffsschrift II," and "Logic in Mathematics." Their
from transcriptions, supervised and edited by Gottfried
abnel, from material contained in Carnap's Nachlass. The first two parts are
by editorial tootnotes from Gabriel'5 German version, also
ted into English. Apart from our treatment of footnotes, we have adhered to
the typog h"" ." d " b
. rap Ie conventIons ()f the German verSIOn; see the Ultro uctlon y
(above) for details. However, we follow CaTnap's original page breaks.
tturd part, "U)bric in Mathematics," is published here for the first time,
either in (' " E " d'" f F '
... erman or III -,nghsh (although a relate text. conSISting 0 rege s
OWn lecture notes, was published in his Nllrhp,t'/assenen Srhriften). We adopt
the same tv<) h" "" h" I" h I" " "
.J t ograp Ie tor t IS text as or t e orcgOlng ones.
University ofJena
Winter Semester 1910-1911
Begriffsschrift I
judgment stroke
Only thought.
not yet as a fact.
-,3>5 negation
3 < 5 the same as - 3 < 5.
condition stroke

] > 2

This may at first seem counter-intuitive. since
we know the individual sentences, or their
falsehood. But as far as logic is concerned.
it dot:sn't mallcr whether we can survey the
makes mote scnsc:
I" and "Begriffsschrift II," editorial footnotes will be
margins.' the by. brie! as well as numbe.rs in th.e
flotation "11 coununghnes 10 the deSCrIptions, each formula m Freg
5 Begriffsschrift
Nates. be counted as one line. eN will be used as an abbreviation for Carnap 's
exception of footno'te 99, all notes are from the German version by
° h °d 10 f "Tho ° b
Underst d. rig t 51 e. mes 2-3: "Only the thought, not yet as a act, JS IS to e
thus 0. f In the ,sense "not yet asserted as a fact"; since 2+3 -= 5 is 0. true thought and
pende to Der Gedanke (1916) p. 74: "Afact is a thought that is true"-inde-
nt yof whether it has been recognized as true and asserted by us,
4 cases are possible:
1: A true, B true
A andB
III: A false, B true.
not-A and B
IV: A false and B false
neither A nor B
Frege's Lectures on Logic
Thus, only means that case III is ruled OUl; doesn't say
anything about the truth of individual sentences.
I) A is true, B is true.
II) A is true, B is false.
III) A is false, B is true.
IV) A is false, B is false.
Winter Semester /910-1911
T not {A false, B true}
Case III cannot OCCur.
II: A true and B false
A andnot-B
not lA false, B true}
not (A lmc, B truel
A ornot-B «
not-A ill" nol-11'
L not: A false, B true; --c;:::: .,;
not !A f<llsc. H raise)
.1 "r !lIme <",-
" no! lA true, B lalscl
not-A or IJ
"or"and "and" are-doubly
. I eN otonlythewor s ..'
n ,n) but also the correspondmg SIgns In
underhned (here represented by boldface.
lJegriffsschrift notation.
2 3

not (not-Maud r)
Winter Semes[er 19/0-1911
Let us replace Mby:
not ( not-A and B)
Frt!ge's Lectures on logic
Ican also regard L
as upper tenn to rand cJ. or L
as upper tenn to .1 ,
not ( and 8 and T)
B and rare interchangeable.

L LJ not (not-N and .1)
We call A the "upper term"; Band rthe lower terms. not-N
( oot-A and Band T)
»The lower terms arc interchangeable. «
not (not-Maud rand,j)
not ( not-A and B and rand,1)
Let us replace M by L For not-M Wl' get: not-A and B. is the upper term; rand ,1 are the lower
!trolS. I can', B as a lower term
nnl (nol-A ,md nanu rimd .1): H, I: ,I lll'
Ilol ( not-I) lind ["ami, 1 )
r - LH
not-A and B
lower Icrm[ sI
nut \ nul (not-A lind H)und "und .11·
) mllY not he br\lkcn up.
Winter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Leewres on Logic
4. . h kind of transition.
say "thus" without specifymg t c
simp y
not-B or A
nol (not-A and nol-8 and not-n
··'05ults by transposition." shall mean:
nltlrht'r A 1Ior B nor r
In ordinary language we
Here we arc more preClse.
A andBand r
A andB and r
A or B or r (non-exclusive "or")
lS not ( not-A "'d not-B and not-F)
Instead of I, [put ---r-c= B
(-) and ,1

of let us pill
I I-r- r For.l
'-r- ,1
, L, /"
Tht'!W\l .1ft'
S{' we CUll wnte:
Rho Iranl'pll",Uinn
6 7
. (in the
3. Top of the page, second line: In eN, above the word "or" in shorthand UlTI"
phrase "Ilon-€xclusive 'or"') the same word occurs again in ordinary n01:aUon, pres
ably to highlight this case and make it easier to recognize.
. for "'uans--
27) Frege's Slgn endieu-
f Grundges
I, p. two lines are perp
4. Second half of the page; Elsewhere (c
is smaller., and the
. . .. I the fiattene , d
POSlnon" (contrapOSH.lOn , . the premise aD
1ar to each other. We follow CN. missing both 1D
. dgment suokes ..
5. Bottom of the page: In CN, the JU f "transpmiloo
in the conclusion of the second example 0 a
... fIIIIIi
Wimer Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Lectures on logic
Can of COUrse <llso be applied backwards:
lIere, 100. we use the flattened X:
is simply lett out.

The intemlcdiate
t J. form into the upper
. the lower !cnllS in nega e 'fthe lower
We can :'Ilw'ays tum anyone of . . lower teml: the rest 0
. ated tom) tOlo a
term and the upper term In neg
terms remain unchanged. E.g.:


- II
We know thai the lower terms
are interchangeable. therefore:

The main point is: »In a transposition the upper term negated takes
the place urthe lower ham, and the lower
term negated, the place of the upper [enn. «
Another application of transposition (according lu the same principle)'
The case or severallo,.'er tenns:

6. Bottom of the page last Ii 'C'''h of
th I .' ne. H as, erroneously, ".1" instead of"r" in the lowest
e ower terms In the formula furthest to the right.
Winter Semester 1910 191!
Frege's Leewres on Logic
Besides transposition there are also less simple inferences.
From these two propositions it obviously follows:
We can regard 2 terms together as the upper term:

not ( not-A and B )
case 1[1 is ruled out.
B is true
II and IV arc ruled out.
A is true
case I
If we only Want 10 h.
ave one lower Ie
nn, we proceed as follows:
We write (the propositions arc labeled for later use):
Now we ICllhc III \"
. (p mes be Inc upper
Thus we n h
Ow I11/C onl 1
YWIt' uwer tefm: II amll't1",1 ,'1.

Irl :---

IIi( :---
I-B (fJ
I-r Ir
Or we write:
Or we write briefly'

More Intricate F -
arms oj Inference:
Inter Semester 1910-1911
Frege's lectures on Logic
\\!lIat can b . t'
e In erred from th"
Possible cases:
A true
B true <
B false
(A f
> Af
rt <
(B f
If r t:
If A l
Ruled out:
Thus it follows:
Fusion of iJcl1ticallowcr tcnns:
7.Topofthe .
oomb;ned i page, ,econdhne, left ,ide, The b.-cke" indicate rbat rhree term' have been
terms "r" nto one upper term (in relation to the remaining lower term "T·'). The lower
fl, S ave been exchanged without comment.
. arne line as i . . .'. '.
C'undge",ze I n 7" nght "de, (E) ,e,ult' f,om (0) hy applymg tran,po""on, ","c, ("f,
, p. 28.1ert column, bottom halO.
Winter Semester 1910-1911
Instead of alilhat we write briefly:
Frege's Lectures on Logic



» if we have two premises
[with the same upper term]
such that a lower term of one
occurs negated in the other,
then we draw the inference:
leave the upper term alone and
take as lower terms the lower
tenus of the premises except
for that term which occurs
both affmncd and denied. «
Yel a third fonn of' f
1Tc m",nc, - with the ""m, upper term
L.2= What follows
.1 (¢ E ('7 from this'?
>< (a),
We write:

-.-- -
9 80 resents the inference
b' " ttom urthe page, last line but one: Frege usually rep . eriod at the beginOlng
y -, _. _. _ . _. _" typographically in such a way that there eN.
and at the end (cf. Grundgesetze I, p. 30. right column). We fa
Winter Semester 1910-1911 frege's lectures on logic
Inferences Involring "e /.
v nera uy.
always true:
>- 2
Both terms fals'"
'--- . ".
' > 2 h- 3' > 2
2>2 • L
. J > 2 .
the lower term fal,c,
both true.
( 21" 4
(-I) 4
0 4
2 4.
One c?mponent ehangcs, namely the nne referred to by the tencr of generality. It is
an object. The other componcnt refers to a concept: square root of 4. This conccpt
alv.ays "saturatIOn" by an object. The COI/('CP' is il/Ilced ol"complelio
The form is always true
a" >- 2anda > 2 arc notrcall ..
we replace the letter b' Y prOpOSitions; rather the be .
propositions." y a proper name (e.g., I or 2 propositions when
or . \\ e call them "quasi-
sin 1
sin 2
sin J
sin 4
In ordinary language we sa .. .
y something" instead of a.
sill 2 is an irrational we call it the "valuc" of the function for the argument 2.
Here we have a conslant component as welt and one that varies: an ohjeet. Here, too,
the constant component "sin" is unsaturated. incomplete. Thefimctio
is in need 01"
;s the vallie nf our function for the :ugumcnt 2.
---" ,
'varying cnnstant function: ( ):.
2 4
4 II>
if something .
squared IS 4, then its 4
power IS 16.
in 2" - 4 . ,
(i _4 " cI complele lhought.
IS 1101 a COIll I t h
thus",' peet
. f/lla.l/"propfI.\'itilJr/" .
L 2: Ih
2' - 4
! t"ouxht.\·.'
In Contrast we have:
Every square '
onl a ' Toot ot 4 is the 4
TOil '
Y combmatlt)n of 2 . t 01 In, su
(oncept\' n t 1'2
., 0 0
nl\ls 111\· hUl\'linli IS 1.:11IHpkted by II\\' , . .
shullld 1101 "011//1.\'" till" vlllm' Ill' Ill\' hllKti(lll with the fUll\'Il\lll ltse!t,)
lOT "'m'
.. op of the page, line' 6-6, Acco,ding to f,ege', di,rincri
he""een m caDng
! ndeutendenl" and" f . [b . h d n}"leuers itshouldnotsayherethatagen-
erallet "" . re ezetc ?e
e •• . ' ..
leT a m the expreSSiOn "0
", 4' (above) refers.
11. Tup of the page line 7' In eN the object name is used instead of the
name "square root 4 Frege's conception- For more on thlS
;" Na'hgdamne Sch;'!,en (f«ge 1963, p, 2551; compa« abo the cone>pondi,;g
emarks on the eoncept "square root of 1" in the present text (p. 19 belOW)'fP.-hesu,mab
lunap' bh . ... t f 4" by means ateSlgn or
th a tevlated Frege's spoken expreSSion square rou 0 .
e square root.
Winter Semester Frege's Lectures on Logic
It suggests itself. then, to regard a concept as a function as well.
I-c w(n)
Instead of "Wlsaturated"' or "in need of completion" we can also say: "of predicative 13.
If we say: "All square roots of 4 arc 4
roots of 16," then "square root of 4" seems not to
he prcdicative; but it only seems that way, since we really have the following:
;'If something is a square root of 4, then it is a 4
root of 16."
Consequently we should not link logic too closely to everyday language; logic is not only
trans-arian, but even trans-human.
<P(a) takes the place of does n t" d'
. ' . 0 1Il !Cate" aq . ' '..
tums mto a real proposition if ' . uasl-prOposltlOn In which Q occurs; it
, we replace a With an object. Likewise for 'P(a).
2 = 8 can be decomposed in different ways into a saturated and an unsaturated
2' ;' = 8.
3; 2;'::: 8.
8; 2' = p
(-2) is a square rool of 4

something unsaturated
i= I
is obviously false; it would say: Everything is a square root of I.
(-2JfaJls under the concept"
: ::;quare rool of4 ..
• ' I something self-sufficient
ThIs bnngs about
the connection.
would not be true either: Nothing is square root of 1.
Thus in order to negate generality, let us make use of German leners:
) falls under (
even requires a
douhlc completion

is false: Everything is square root of I.
is true: Not cverything when squured is I.
is flllsl,:: whcn sqUlIrcd is 1
Thus I need 1(1 it:
of the page: In eN t .
the. WIthin the bracket • he thLrd. cUdy bracket d •.
means of additional und i- tJ:te expressIOn "square oesn t Include the definite article
er lnmg, root of 4" is highlighted further by
h-tr-r- a. - 1: It is false, that nothing is a square rool of 1,
/9 or existt:ntiul propo.\'ition: is a square root of l.
13. Top of the page, first two lines: In eN, the quotation marks are missing.
Winter Semester 1910-1911 Frege's Lectures on logic
Earlier \\If;: had:
is not true, thus:
We can also write:
n .4 == 1
f 1 is a}'<1 root of I."
"At least one square root ,? "(= at least one)
(particular affirmative) some
. . h hi which Ilcrc the judgment stroke IS not neccssat)'; we can also leave It as a mere t DUg ,
is not possihle with letters of generality.
Vi is an (not a concept), is not in need of completion.
is false, thus:
hy contrast. is unsaturated.
is a nonsensical notation.
. 3
root of 1,"
t of 1 IS not a
"At least one square roo "
. ) "some not
(particular negative
\h' havc allowl'd ourselves III he misled hy ordinary usc of language:
If SOlTll'lhing j"" square Toot of 1, it is +I or 1:
\ Jopposite
-.... contrad(leWry

-&,- <1>1.\



. - L 'f'(d)
If something is a square rool of I. it is not a 3"1 mol ur 2
Or: No :>quare rool of I is a )'d rool of 2.
(univer,\"ul negaril'{' judgment)
20 21
14. Top of the page, lines By "letters of generality [Allgemeinbuchstaben 1." what is
meant are Roman letters. The "earlier" refers to p.16, middle of the page, where it says.

In th,· ju(lg1nt'nt stroke is missing, contrary to Frege's (only emphasi-,.edl rule
It mU.'5t hf' the-.re wht'n expressed hy means ofa Roman Compare
(ynuul/l.l"w·(U I. p. 31. on thiS lSSllt'. especially note 1.
Winter Semester 1910-1911
Frege's lectUres on Logic
all contrary no


some _ contmry __ some not
-r&.-n-r- <P(o)
. . '-'- 'f'(o)
says therefore:
There is at least one object,
that is both tP and If'.
we can also write:

So the particular affirmative judgment
affirmative does not.
.' t the general
contains an existentIal Judgmen ,
Instead of X( we have:

'C'::: <P(o)

There is at Jeast one X.
[taot for us We give their
The 4judgments: all, some, no, mme not are oot that IrnpO basic elements.
. But we have even rno
ronn to make a connection with ordinary OgIC.
tufe of things.
· d es violence to t e oa
The distinction between subject and pre Icate 0
E,g" the four concepts in
. t/Jand If'and Xand il.
II . The'e ,·s "' least one object thai IS
are a Interchangeable· ,
e.g.: '1:': <P(A)
says: A is a 'Pand A is n m.
22 23
15. Top of the page, first line; In eN thewo" .
of the two diagonals in the logical 5 • uare;..d contradictory" takes (as usual) the
reasons. q - e present form was chosen for typographIC

__ ....__
. "object" instead of
e bottom: In eN, 1£ says sub'eet_predicate
:6. half of the page. third line {r.o
:ththe replacement of the J
Pl'edicate"; but in the text we are dealing f rion strUcture.
of the sentences by their argument- unc
Winter Semester 1910-1911
There is a ditlerence between 3:> 2 and 1001--998> 2; in spite of the fact that 3 ,md
(1001-998) have the same value, they have different senses. It is only by an
Frege's Lecwres on Logic
't t kc the truth value:
As tbe rnt:aning of a st:ntence we mus a
investigation that we find out they arc identical. The two sentences:
"The Morning Star is not luminous"
word sense
thought -
. is true
. ". since what is
' .dea with rca lty "
d d
" spondence a an I .1
Trutb cannot be efme as carre .' h cannot be dcfincu,
. h h t is suhJectlVe. Trut
objective cannol be compared Wit W a .
analyzed, reduced. It is something simple, basic.
'The Evening Star is not luminous"
have different senses. The thought
'The Morning Star is the Evening Star"
Truth is not. as. everyday language suggests. u
b something
property of a thought. ut
is the result of a special insight; in contrast, the sentence:
"The Evening Slar is the Evening Star"
is true in and of itsclC The tliftcrcllcc between the names thus cI1rrcsponds to a
. , . h Howing fundion: .
Our bonlOntallmc stands lor teo function is the frue.
th '0 the value of the " the False.
,; If I talo: as its argument the True, e" ",," " "
"" .>
true IWr lalse,
or somethIng that IS nCl
difference between the senses. S{) 11 naml,: docs nol ,iust express the denoled. We
uistinguish, consequently, between the "mc.tning" lind the ..scn.... t.' .. Ill".1 pnllK'r n.\lllL'.
The sign expresses a sense.
proper name;
Winter Semester 1910-1911
proper name sentence
concept word sentence in indirect speech
s. of the n.
thought s. of the c.
meaning: object
truth value concept thought
The proper name expresses the sense of the etc.
The sign n:f(:rs to a meaning. The proper name refers tu the object.
"A believes that the Morning Star is a planet."
In this case we couldn't just substitute in "Evening Star"'; inuccu. fhe thought here IS
precisely lIot the sense, but the meaning.
f ~ ' s Lectures on logic
nsaturated part:
3 into a saturated an an u
We can divide the sentence 4 >
4 ,; > 3
proper name; concept word.
~ · · t ·
We can divide thi:; agatn to o.
3 ~ > C
5-1> 3
5-t ';>3
~ r
_ ~
functionl ., -'"
(not a concept)
17. 'Top of the page, lines 1-3: In eN, the horizontal lines ofthc table are not drawn.
18. Middle of t ~ e page. lines 4-5 from top: In eN. quotation marks" 'I" are sometirn
used for abbreVIatIOn.
Winter Semester 1910 1911 freze's Lectures on Logic
I1Je capifal afEngland
r A... _
England; the capital of ?
(analogous to
I-( level function: argument object
a •
-.-v-r a'
I' I

(-I)' I

2' - I 3'
2r>J level functiun: 2'''J len:l C\lnco:pt
Ifwe want to ex.press that at most Otlt' ohJl:ct falb under a concept, we \loTit..::
!hese 3 have something
III common:
another example:

,,-+ 1 -- 2
II + 1 0=- 2
e.g.. positive square root of 1:
;2 has value: 1, 4. 9 .;" -= 1, has the value:
the Trut:, the True
the False. '
.;' > 0

2'''' len'!lim("l;fln:
argument: Iimctinn
.wlfi,l/i,'/f ('Ofll""f!f.\
(I and
I" lew/limclioll:
argulllent: ohwrt
I i.I'1f /" /1'\'1'1 ('olln'f"
11:'11 Imd,'rlhi... nllll,:cpl)
'-- J 29 -------------'
.. '
xx &#'*111\ _
I AppendixA
Wincer Semester 1910-1911
frege's Lect.um on LOglc
Thl! Ontologficul/ PrrJ/!/ot!ht' of (in"
"(jlxl" is somelimes a l.:oncept name. a prllr
"exists" is either a 1" concept .; Ii\CS
or a 2
<l lc\'cl concept There is a
alUl cOnnCCll.':J wIth a propcr narnl.':l
C\\slcncc lh.tr,t":·
h J fCJlurl..'
"[Ht'rkmal] Om: first ddines the concept ··Goo. ' but includes existence as a charactenstll .
in the detinition.
I Ih'
rJ.thl..'r. JNhng II 1 l.. •
Therefore in the onr<!loglull p,"""t \l..e LlrL'.
features the e,)neerl ··ti,'>d" h,n ("
A concept is composed of characteristics:
r1l1QCIU.:e Ullmot he ITlrhrde([ ,1\ ;I l'hmal'll'fl"tll
-'1'1 ... )
- I
--- l(
I •
'"' 0
1 I 'M.juarc root uf I
2) Ilumhcr
19. Top of the page, lines 3-5: What is probably meant is that the expression ..
against its logical nature, combined with a proper name here, not with a concept
'"41(;)." .For t.his
also (unsmntg). See the examples "Africa eXlsts and e also
magne eXists 10 Uber dte Grundlagen der Geometrie II (1903). p. compar.
'-Uber Begriff und GegensLand" (1892b), p. 200.
. s thc
bracket indtcatt; nee is a feature
f · -t curved te ""elUSte
20 , lao The us Th The no
. Top of the page, first tOTmu. concept. us .
combination of the characteristics,of the on the left. 1 ce of the questton
belongs nlore under the sign for eXIstence eriod takes the p a
21. Five lines from the bottom of the pag .
.••~ ... ' t - . . . ~
I Appendix B
Winter Semester 1910-1911
Numerical Statements about a Concept:
The number ofuNeusfallinR under the concept is 0,
f¥'s lecrures on Logic
:3>2: i>2; Pc;'; qJ(S'.';). . is
. '- = fthis functIOn
the value 0
. . if for 2 argumen s
This function expresses a relatIon, I tion to each other.
t od in that re a
the two arguments s a the True, we say:
If2 things fall under the cuncept.
then they are identical.
There is at least one ubject that falls,
under the concept.
t'>ods in
. t nly one s ...
for each obJed." 0g relation.
the correspon In
The number ofobjects falling under the concept is J.
The numerical statement concerns the kind of satisfaction; it is a 2"d level concept
indicating the features of a concept.
"'. II ", be adiectives of
In everyday language we take "two" and "tall III 'two ta towers 0
equal Slatus.
we have relations as argumenls.
Above we had concepts as arguments.
,,]"d I vel (:oncepts.
Thus there are 2 OJ e
But: each tower is tall . fact a concept):
nd level function (In •
1here IS y(t another kmd of2
_ ,,(2).
not: each lower is Iwo,
Plato already realized thai the attrihute "one" docs not apply In the nut fhe
concept; for example: the conccp' "chairs in the auditorium" the feature (11"
22. Top o:the page, line 3, Ifwe follow F,ege', u'ua! rep,e,entation (d. p.
29; also Grundgesetze I. §22). the upper part of the formula look like thHi:

Thi, <one, pond, al,o to the ,ep«oentation of the one-'<>-one ,elation on p. 82
(eompart> also. Grundlff'snu I. p. We are probably dealing with a mistake in Ca.rnap
hott'S. hpn'. thiS representation ?Ccurs nOWhere else in Frege. It is. however.
logieally <o"ee' a?d ean be "an'fo,medtn,o Frel!"', '-'p'e'en'atio
, ,inee "6";, a bound
variahll" in Frt'ge s syntbohsm snd can, for syntactic reasons alone. not occur free In
"fP(;;)"" (compare GrufJdl!oest'tr."I. § 17),
bcr 2 as
rt of the num
f I ttlke a prope Y
rhe value of the lundlun IS the 1 rue I
e.g., I
w points from the statement
Summer Semester 1913
Begriffsschrift II
The meanings of the parts of a sentence are not parts of the meaning of the sentence.
However: The sense of a part of the sentence is part of the sense ofthe sentence.
The meaning of a sentence is its truth-value.
lfa sentence has no meaning, but only sense, then we arc not in the realm of science, but
of fiction.
Asign expresses its sense, refers to its meaning.
(E.g., the meaning of a proper name is the object it names,)
I) S . .
. orne signs arc m n('('d o!I'omplcfioll (e.g. 0= ).
lfsunnJ. . . . f" .' 't"I'/lin the case of two
, .... a then the Slit{l crs to a (on<
arguments, a rt'!,jfjO/r).
More generally: .Iimctivn.
2 J Th . f I entation are called proper
. osc parts of a sentence that arc not 10 need 0 supp em
they refer to objects.

I frqe'$lectures on logic
1;1 [eve-! function
(the arguments are objects)
Summer Semester 1913
2r.J lewl function
lthc argumcnts an: 1-, le.... el functionsl
COlh.:ept of the true:
concepl ofth...
; == ;,. identity rdation
We wan( to express the cool'inuit} of an analytic funl:tion al a particular point.
.h thatlhl" fclatwll hold:,-
for every t' there eXIsts <l SlIl.:
In the interval from x - d fo x -t- dlhe differ-
ence berween the ....alue of the function and
the value at x can be made arbitrarily small.
." ,
I'his is supposed to hilid ti,r SUllie I' II.

if'{l\I) (/'1'1'
· , "

""', Lectures on Logic
FOI" every a > dthe difference A - fj)(a) must be < e in absolute
v!ilue; and for every positive e there has to be such a number d.
toWHn!s infurity (A lim
';=' 00
Let the number A be the limit of a function <P(;) for positive arguments jnG'1'essing
I'T' A - <P(a) < e
L..=A- iP(a»-e
Summer Semester 1913

Example. The function is continuous at 1:

A -a>(.) > - e
4 5
is. the same as u =' h; the tv.'o are identical. i.e., whateVcr holds of
the one also holds of Ihe other:
I Frege's lectures on logic
I Ais identical to B if c¥erything that holds. for A also holds for B: and conversely.
Summer Semester 1913
I-r- g (-&c Ira»)
L fIb)
g(a = b)
Ipp. 6-10 in
This contains e.... erything that can be said about identity.
E.g., as g we can take -';:
L---.::: b)
(H,);- - - - - - - - - - - - --
In- fla)
L:::: fIb)
(17 h (ltta
Earlier we had:
I ifM,(f(fJ))
» Everything that's tnle for all 1·lle....el functions
is true for anyone of them. «
We now apply this in the form

, ,(,,)

Six lin., from the bottom of the page. right column' The :::J:i: ::-::rc
I gpages lsee above), In terms of content, compare Crundg
I, § . e
IIWhas the label "lIb."
26. Last line, right column: In Nc' the judgment suok.e in this formula is rnissing.
Frege's lectlJres on Lolric
. • 95
Now we usc lhe introduction of German letters; we can
do so jfwc let the cavity immediately follow the
Judgment stroke.
I-r: flu)
Summer Semester 1913
I-n-r- Ila)
L::= fib)
I-rr fib)

>< (lIIe

fib) (lIId
Imtc:ld of h I Cllliid also have written a everYWhere
in III and a . {
I- l/ -- {/ (Ilk

In III. instead of _ t=
., for g we can take
27 Tl,
. led line fro h ." "d f 0_·"
reekl mt e topofthepQue' On the use of the Slgn an 0 "".1lJ,J.
ettel"s( Ih --,:l" as a els). cOlnpa
Grundgeset:;e 1. p. 66f.
Summer Semester 1913
, lnjo'l1.e<tures on Logo<
I '
I lfil- - - - - - - - - - -
"'1-111 ( --r- <J l (
J.:(u) gtl'tl

t ft g(<J11
tlllh <l /'
I /5
We had Ig
a) = (--.- a)

(- Ill"" t-r- a)

(lg), --- - - - - - - - - _

In IIIc we replace I'I.¢. ) by .; '" a:
I Want to replace a by - 11. and b by -.- U"

is considered to be a lower in fIg) that coineideswith the upper term in (IIle). The
derivation of (lUg) dIffers from the onf: in Grundsest!tze 1 fp. 67) .
. . .. formed in 28. SeVen lines from the top of the page: WIth respect to the subsutuuons per .'_;: ,"
(IIIe), the funcrionletter "f" has, in additioll, been replaced by the fUDcnon name
The horizontals have been fused (cr. Crundgesetze I, p. 67). In eN. the judgment Ii
in (IIIe) i .. missing.
29. Eight lines from the top of the page: In the ttansition u!>iog (Ig) the formula
Summer Semester 1913
! _
We now give some applicatiuns: show how one can cunduct with our notation.
E.g., we want to prove the propusition
Here we want to make use
of the proposition:
I-- (a-b) (A


1(0 C.a>b
Instead of a" a b) + b:> a

r t+b>o
r: t- a> b
t:> 0 (lla
We also use:
.... a>O (H
l-r--a-b>O (T
• La>b

r tl-b>Q

e t+h>a
h-- u>a
. _
(Ib)" -------------


t r+b>a
t> 0
We had IIIe
We use it here by replacing
j(¢) by ¢> a
a by (a-b)+h
b by a
lIIe then assumes the form

(0 b)+h>a
We had Ib:

• H 1,>0
t -I (j.> b
r" 0
We now write il in fonn:

(a -- h) + h a
(0 b)t-a>b
16 17
of the page, second line: In eN, the jUdgment sO'oke in the sentence to be proved
IS mISSing.
31. Middl: page: In eN, the brackets in the expression "(a _ b) + b >a" in (IIId ao.
(a) aTe compare. however, the form in which (a) is used. In eN, the label (IX) IS
duuhly underhned.
IP) ------
(8):: b>a

I LecOJres on Logic
And we use:

This is supposed to mean
a and h arc real numbers, smce
it is only for them that> is
supposed to be defined.
• L(b-a)+a>b

(h -a) + h > a
(h - a) + u::. h

h u>O
t r+h>u


, t+h>a
(Ll): --- _
Summer Semester 191]
/8 /9
. "ssing·
32. Top of the page, first formula in the right column: In eN, the judgment stroke 15 nu
f h ( )
" . "Theinfer-
33. Bottom0 t e page: a Is Invoked by replacing ""a" by "b" and "'b" by "a.
cnce involving (ld) comes about as fOllows: In the missing part (see above)., (Idl was
apparently deduced in the foem
This corresponds to.the representation of lId) below as well as in Grundgesetu I, § 49.
(ld) is then invoked In the Conn ,
(b'-a) +" > b
(b- a)+ b > a
thuHeplacing "b" by" -rIb-a) + b) a." In eN, the jUdgment '''oke i. mi..ing in the
sentence deduced by invoking (Id).
forIl1u I C'1I.1 this
t but-o
.. In
nokein thelasd"d" by"! + a
b "1 + b" an
34 Bottomof the page' I:r"t. C:!i;as been xi
Also, when Invokmg (In erections in the e .
replacement is effected by eor
Summer Semester 1913
I frege's Lectures on logic
Here we also have to
assume as known"
I-- I > 0 (E .
f I> 0
This is the expression for .'
the hmll ofaIIJnction as the argument goes to infinity.
, • b
r + a::> f(b)
'li-;--,-------- a" b
t>o -feb)

.. > 0
b r > 0
,> b- feb)
,+ b > fIb)

_______ '>0


( I
only nceded the sim
. rk ,I H.
If both u and harc r '. .
Th I . ,m,t, a' th, ",gument go", to po"t;vc ;nHnHy. then 0 and b cn;nc;de.
a IS I;.'hal w(' W(/'" I(J 1'/'0I '('
35. Top of the 20
36. Botto f
Ih, poge m \the pag" In CN. the jUdgmen"troke i, mi"ing in the<eeond fo,mula on
tom"" becan" Fteg
only 'ketehed the p,oofh
withon' ,pelling
out. The
lodgment 0 then have th"tatn' ofan "analy,i,." E\5e
• hnwevet, Fteg
IUk, in G moke m ,uch ca"'"' well (fo> ""ntenc",")- N> no exception i' at i>Vue hete
ood p. 94), the judgmen,,(toke ha' hee
added. Likewi" fm the "C·
u a on the next page.
37. Bottom of
"'ond f the page again, In CN, the tepte"ntarion of the lowe" loWe< letm in the
n) th, i only hinted at. Catnap ptovide> (with "fetenee to the lOWe< te<m ahove
. nstructlo ,. h' . 1 h . . h' . I"dd,d' .. . n, t e ..me. m,tead of a , b." In h" atet andwnung. t e m,(tueU
tie tefe' and on,tead nfo, D." Again in hi' latet handwtiring lin par
"'" with deie-
m"n ,enee tn hoth diteerion,). thi. temark folloW", "Note the diff"enee!" What he
5 IS the difference between free and bound variables: cf. the next note.
Summer Semester 1913 Irejo\ lectures on logic
Earlier we already used:
l- (p+ q)+ r=p+ (q+ r) (H

J:--n (Z
We also "",ant 10 use:
(' t (r
(Ic): _

t: : :
f' '" m
___.__ (0" I d I If . ,.
J-c i.' • (e + h) )- LJ
e+(e+h»(a m)+m
(Z) .----------------------
t-rT- e+(e+. b»a
L e>(a-m)
(lib): - - ---- - - - -- -- -- - - -- - --

e+ b>m
(1"+1')+ h=e+(e+b)
A l- (a m) j m (l
Here we need the proposition:
IL I L....!-. e+b>a
.. e+a>b
• el2
e/2 + a >/(111)

el2 >
e/2 + b >l(.)
We also need an intermediate proposition:
e -"a m
t' h "m
(' .> h m
(' Ie II -'"
Top of page: In eN, the followin re. . .
In Carnap 5 later handwriting: "Dis . g to the rust formula on thIS page.
been used for the fraction d and " .. For graphic reasons. "eI2" has
. ked by a line of dashes
39. Top ofthe page' In CN the inference involving gIlC)d;e:::e I. § 14. The formula
of a a; (a - ml + m, and b: a.
(HIe lIS used after making the 6ubsUt.Uo
.jl ). . . ns C • d' e + b.
aki the subsotuO
40. Top of the page, next line: (Z) is used after m ng
i'IJ: a- m. and 11 : m. . ked by a continuous
. . (IlIa) 15 mar u1 (III I
Middle of the page: In CN. the inference I. p. 26f. The fo:m a a
(instead of a line of dashes); but compare Cru + e) + b. and b : e + Ie b).
IS Used after making the substitutions ): >a. a. endy deduced the
4.2 . th :-ht column was h substitUtions:
.' The third formula (Ie) in e i:(i5 used after making t e
1Jl.1SSmg pan; cr. I. § 49. (
61:(e+r.) 1" b>a. P: (e+e) +a> b.
__..t ....··•...

e>a m
e! b>m
e> b- m
e-+a>m (15'
I- el2 +el2 = e

+ e12) + b > a
(ei2 + el2) + a.> h

d b>U
el2 + b
t-/2 > h -f(d)
<'12 + a >/(d)
Summer Semester 1913
I- e12+e12 =-- e


We Ib to have the Conn:
I-r-- el2 > u - fed)
el2 .- a >((d)
We suppose hill) ha ....e Ih<: llmn"
Frege's Lectures on Logic

,,;2 >a-f(d)
ei2 + a >f'(t/)
e/2 > h-/(t/)
(Ib, Id)e: 0.0 ••••• 0.

f'-'2 > a-f(d)
('/2 + a >,/.,(<1)
e:2 .> n f'(d)
('/2 + h> I(dl

L- ,,12+0>((;)

el2 +a >j(d)
» el2 > {/-f,(D)
el2 .j 0 > (I)
.... v J
We suppose Ila to bc in
this fonn (and similarly
again with hand n).
l'il I (/
/'/2 . ,/
1,;2 j /I
, ((d)
- I(d)
24 25
43. Top of the a .
p ge. fust line' (y). .
44. Middl f h . IS Invoked afte I'
eo t epage: (HIe). rrep aClng"b"by"a" and "a" by '"b."
f(¢"I: IS used after makin ..
¢tb>a gthesubstltunonsa:el2+el2,b:
';+a >b
45. Bottom of th -
epage: (oj is invoked f
a ter the sub· .
stltutlons e: e/2 and m:f(d).
.. ,..

46 Wh
r· ole page' I h' . rom the fact r.: t"e form of (ld) invoked here, the additional negation stroke comes
47 T at b has heen replaced hy" --r- el2 >a - I(d)."
. oPofthepa . I . replaced b· thge. n the fIrst transition involving (Ib) and (ld), the highest lower term
terrn or lId) h e lower term of (Ih) and the lowest lower term is replaced by the
4ft B . e [wo new lower terms are identical and are, thus, "fused."
. Ottorn f h "pieced b e page' In the ,econd tran'ition involving lIb) and (1d), "u" i, H," to be
""If, 'he I:we 'clat"e to the p,evioU> fMm of (Ib) 'nd lId). By mean' of ,he ,,'mition
"" "pl"ed I" lowerte,mi, ,<,placed hy 'he lowe, teem of (1bl and the lowe' teem ahove
thus, "t'used:/
the lower term of (Id). The twO new lower terms are identical and are,
(II., II.)::
Summer Semester 1913
el2 +a > fib)
el2 > b-feb)
el2 + b >f(b)
Frege's Lectures on Logic
b> m
el2 > a -feD)
el2 + a >f(D}
b> m
e/2 > h -feb)
el2 I b >/('o)

We use the sentence:
: Lm>O
r- h t since
I have lo addt a.' h
e somethmg ot er
m can
than a number.
We also use: l-n-
L: b>c

in the form: m + 1 .> m

::. 0
m n
el2 > a -fib)
el2 + a >f(b)
b> m
el2 > b-j"(b)
el2 + h >j(bl
(l.) m>n:
/) f-c
m+ 1 >m
49 Top orthe page; The form of (lIa) invoked here results from
lila): Io---flu)

by "/( by the function (listed in the right column)
ell ."
L...= t.':'2
<l ;. If; 1
;: > In.
The second time (llal is invoked, "a" is replaced by "b" and "m" by "n,"
Is on the
50. Bottom of the page: In eN, the two generalized lower terms of the last formu b dr. to
. I· ." 1 b "refer a page are not gIven exp 1C1uy. nstea.d, arrows and the words "same as a f tthe
the corresponding lower terms in the previolls formula (top of the page). SImilarly 0
two genera.li..zed lower terms of the rUst formula on p_ 27.
Summer Semester 1913
Frege's lectures on Logic
II >- n )
el2 > a -f(b
('/2 +0 >(t1)
b>m ...)
el2 >
f hccase m>n
That takes care 0 I
.. () oecomc5:
By transposition c


(' "0

m+ J >n
.tt b>m

m + 1 >n
m+ I >m
in (he form:
in the li'flll:

.• I>m
m .... ! ·>m

m+ [>n
m= n
- Lb."

m II
II 'm
-:. m I J • 11/
n I I . 1/
b b>m
(I): ---------- _

m + I >n
(Ira) . _
29 .... befo," the
eplaced by n
" "has been r
. . (I) twice here, m he rest
54. Top of the page' In mvokiog d g,"phicolly f<om t
second time. r ula here is comes bpfore.
eN the last lorm dd ndum to w .'is. Bottom of the page: In , nstitute an a e
ofthe proof, thus appearing to co
f (Ie) invoked
51. Top of the page, right column: In eN, the two lower terms of the form 0
hm a<e only hinted at. c
. g sUlr
52. Middle, right column: The form of (lIa) invoked here results from the followm
stitutions; a: m + 1 and

. I r ternl
53. Bottom. nght column, In the 'entence dedueed by mean, of Icli. 'he owe m
,. m > n" still appears. The transition is thus meant in the sense that this lower tet was used twice in (.1).
Summer Semester 1913
(2.) n >m
! rrege's Lectures on Logic
Ie): _

n + 1:> n
I) . _

n -t 1 :> 11

Ila) : - a _

n + 1 >m
30 31
[PI'. 31-31 in CVareempryl
56. Top of the J?age. right column: In eN . cd
here are only hmted at. • the two Imver terms in the form af(Ie) mvok
. hoW to reconsttuct the
.d nee concerning . I he case m >n abo .
57. the empty pages: For gul a sODding deductlon or t
llaUon of the deduction, compare the cor,re Iso missing.
The initial part of the subsequent deductIon 15 a
Frege's Lectures on Logic

el2 > a-((iI)
el2 + a >/(1I)
e+b:> a
e+a:> b
ei2:> b -fib)
,/2 f b >(b)
el2 > b -f(b)
el2 I- h >f(lI)
e/2 > a -f(D)
el2 + a >((ll)
Summer Semester 1913
Frege's Lectures on Logic
T1a: I-r-:----./(a)

b is limit for function
going to mhnlty.

e/2 > b . f(b)
e/2 + b >I(b)
ell> 0
rrrr, e > a -!(It)
__-====== €I> ()


h-r-------,nro e + b > a
el2 > ()
L----=__• t > 0
b> (I .
'-- 11>0
([Ia): - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - -- - -- ---
e/2 + a >j(b)
_---'====. > 0 e/2 >0
t>a- f(ib)
t +o>/(b)
b >.

• b (b)

¢> 0
el2 a
• •
lIa: 10-",·
ell> b -fIb)
e/2 + b>f('b)
e12::. 0
t + a >f(lt)

el2> b - fib)
el2 -to b >/(It)
e + I.J:::' h This" has nothing
e/2 ;.. () to do with that R.
:; :; ,j\:\} )
L__.::===== a- 0 already lillishcl!
t- ()
(IIa) ,------- _
58. Top of the page, first line' Th
·erepreset' , .. "[m
ere on, more and more J'ust sk h n aOon In conceptual Dotanon In eNIS, ro
t k
· .. etc ed and conta" . . . h' dg-
men stro e IS mIssIng in the fi fi Ins some mIstakes. In addinon, t e JU
lI'st lye formulas ( [th d -. I
59 Bon f hoeeductIOn In the left column.
'. omo t epage.rightside:There 11." . ..
cerntng the last formula means th rnar TIns Dhas nothing to do ......ith that 0 co
from the scope of the "0" in th I at the scope of the "0" in the upper term is different
e Ower term Ie[ G .. "
. rundgesetzeI, p.13); similarly for 6.
·ouS page, right column), "a"
. "' (lIa) here (c . preYl
. O. Middle of the page: "When lllVO...... ng
lsrcplaced by "b." .. _ I" 't" concerning the lowest lower
. Th emark a 15 Iml ..f the remark (';on-
fiI. Bottom of the page, right Side: e Ie mented along the hnes \) .
term of the second formula has to be s pp
f:l;rning the lower term above it.
Summer Semester 1913
frege's lectures on Logic
This is the proposition we wanted to prove.
11), --- --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - --
IL, • b t> b -fib)
I ' L ,+ b >f(b)
I.- b>1l
tab t>o-J(II)
'""' \ I' L ,+a>IIO)
L-- b>Q
'ntcnce that occurs in it contains
The deuuction is so complicateu because every sc 'Th" .' impOrlant for
., . , '. • assumptions in mmd, IS IS
all of Its condltlOns; one does not Just keep ,
the rigor of proof.
I-r- e/2 > 0
. L e.>O
We proved carlkr'
It It ! II ,((
It I (f > II
r ·0
t> b -fib)
t + h:>l(b)
t>a -((b)
r ta 'Itb)
II .' II
Q.> ()
t ' ()

'Tr-------,-,n-- e + h > a
e I- a> b
./Torr- t> b -fib)
'+ b > fIb)

.> 0
d C >0
'"'IT'--'T,,:rrTT-r , > a -fib)
__ .> 0
Summer Semester 1913
Mathcm<uics is a deductive science. Not all propositions arc proved, however; there <Ire
some basic propositions in mathematics. I f one wants to find out what these axiums are,
proofs have to be without gaps. Every proposition used in a proof has to be recognizilble
as such. That is very hard to do in everyday language; since everyday language is not
logically perfect enough for that purpose. In particular, the forms of inference used are
not exhibited clearly; we just say "thus" or "therefore." the corresponding rule of
inference is not indicated. Consequently it is easy to use "therefore" in cases where we
are not dealing wilh a gap-free proof. For ex.ample, in geometry we somelimes rely on
intuition; One is then only aware of the fact that the result is evident. says "therefore," but
does not know the reason for the evidence.
Frege's Lectures on Logic
. s are always mix.ed together:
In a mathematical lecture two thing
I) the pure inferences
Our conceptual notatiun avoids this logical deficiency of langu<lge. It also avoids the
verbosity of everyday language
We make several modes of inference explicit:
introduction of a (icnnan Ictlcr:
( )
( i
( I"
( 1
2) the commentary on them.
mathematical rigor.
.a1 to negatively influence
This mixture has the potentt upcrfluo
f" ordsare
. etc understanding 0 It, W
notation. assummg a compl
J " , . I , ~
In conceptual
Summer Semester 1913
frege's lectures on LogiC
In our proof we used the assumptions:

1 (/1
These lower terms don't seem to be necessary; note. however, that in conceptual
notation the [etters do nor juS! refer to numbers. but to objects in generaL these lower
terms are supposed to replace the assumption that we are dealing with numbers. For the
function'; > (can only take the value True if both [arguments] are numbers. Our
conceptual notation is thus different from arithmetic and analysis insofar as it does not
just deal with numbers. 11 is determined exaer(l" (in mathematics) where the limit
fiesh,. What u numher is, what can be indicated by a letter (the realm ofnurnbers
is constantly cxtendclI: negative, rationaL complex). One does not know how far the
realm of numbers may he further cXlcnllcd, As a cllllscquenl:c the Sl,.'flSe of all
propositions is inllcterminatc. l'tIT as soon as the realm Ofll1l11lhers i.'< oh:nded. the
Propositions that Were already proved nel'" no Illn,Lter hold. This is Sll nlT;lIlSC I ha .... e
provelltltc .I('1He, not Ihe form. Anll thcI('1/sl' has 10 he proved III onln III
preserve thc validity IIfp
nsiIiIlIlS.l1\)uplt. havl'rlm.. held 1I11llllin' :J1lI1 lllnrl'tHI!ll'il
!'wm. lakinll: it to he whm i .. essl'Iltiul

l' 'nl
d . n
" 1 (q + r)
1'11- 0
I' ,·0
. Lm>O
In t r
l-r- '"l I' e:
= e d")
•( L () :.j could have adde
62. Bottom of the page: In eN, the whole paUg?aph inserted here is marked as a paren- thetical remark.
Summer Semester 19 t] Frege's lectures on Logic
. bol for a function from the
. now distingUish the sym
But in this composite symbol we can . n in the two cases and what
e can distinguish whalls comma
symbol for its argument.
is different.
Different: 1, 2, ... .
h . rwo functIOns..
'. we have built this function out oft o ~ e .. t
We can, in a certam sense, say that ..' d We can conSIder dlfferen
. the way Just mdlcate . . flhe
But that is only to be understood m d tennine the values 0
. two functions. We can e n
values for the samc argument In the . h 0 different cases, we ca
Th by companng t e rw . n
functions and add them together. en, t which is in need of samratlO ,
. his common componen , .' .
" a common component. r th n >ay: This functIOn IS
'J r one can e
. . I abbreviated lorm .
we caB the new function. n . two functIOns.
. of addition, out of those
compuscd, by the operation
, function of 2 arguments.
. addition. but for any
The !i:lmc holds nol only tor
(I + I') + (2·1)
(l + 2') + (z.ll
I + .;2 + 2'; Common:
We can add thcse rwo numbers:
Here functions are essentially the same as in analysis. but with an extension: not only
numbers, but any object at all can be argument and value of a function; especially truth.
values (concept and relation). "In general it is not wcll understood what a function is
really SUpposed (0 be." This shows itself in various things people say. They talk, for
ex.ample, about the SUm of two functions (f(x)"!"- g(x). But really we cannot talk about
sums of functions. Only in the case of numbers is it defined what the sum of the numbers
is, and numbers are, after all, objects. In the"!"- sign we have the sign for a function ofm'o
arguments. It is, in fact, a function we can call a 1'I level function of two arguments.
That is to say: in each ofthc argument places only names for objects can be put, not
functions; indeed, functions are fundamentally different from objects, including numbers.
Thus it is impossible to have the argument place for a proper name occupied by a
function name.
Let's look at a special case, say:
We combine them to:
I +x
How should we understand this'! We cannot add timctions. W ~ ' alwHys h:IVC tn
distinguish the function from ils value for a cer1ain argument Fur instancc, Iherc is thL'
value of the function for the argument I.
63. Three lines from the bottom of t:h. I ues-
tion mark. e page: 11 eN, a period takes the place of the q
__1 ,. J .#! .,.j.. _
Summer Semester 1913
thus, e.g.
lien: I can again think .
01 this as composcJ f
case!i and one that \arit;:s I, 2. 3 . II a componl,.'n! that is the same in all three
Fr!ge's Lectures on Logic
We have thus obtained a new function. but it isn'f the function of the funclion 2,';'
since the first tllnction is a 1-, level function.
Then again. it is possible to have a function of a function:
We can say that I is the limit of the function as the argumto=nts go to infinity.
2-1- 4'
Similarly, I is the limit of the function
\\'hat Slays the same'
Strictly speaki .
fun ng H is ....TO
ction of a function - ng to say: the sum or the produci of functions. Also wrong: a
E.g., our functions:
Similarly, I is limit of the function
3( - s+1
+ 5
as the arguments go to oc.
as the arguments go to 00.
As an argument for the
argument " first function we can take h
. e.g.. t e value of the 2
for the
Or the valu!;: of the 2nd
unction for lh
c argument
I j 12'2)'
Or Ihl" vlIllle Ol'lhl' .,n,1 f
... 1Ifidiun lilt th
(' lu",Ulllclll
I I (2.])'
mun component is:
Here we have a common unsaturated component. \Vhat varies, however, is lhe fw:Jction .
It is de· k ·1· h fi .
a CllClency of en'l:rJay lanRl/lIge that we have to tal as I t e unctIOn were an
Wl'. havl'. thus. II levd lilOdion who!'lc llrguml"nts arc 1'I1evc1 functions. III such a
case Wl' ran talk ahl1ut a lilll\;ti(lll of 1I function.
lhl' nWitakl' is illwl1YS lil the Vllille of the fUlll'liol1 with the functiun itSl'lf.
128 129
Summer Semester 1913
Frege's lectures on Logic
One speaks, for instance, of variable quantities, variables. What is that? With the
symbol I we refer to a dctenninate or, as One says, ··constant" number. Likewise for Lhe
sign 2. But how do We refer to H variable number? For that we have letters; but do letters
refer in the same way to variable numbers as these symbols do to Constant numhers? Do
We have ditferent variable numbers x, y, z, just as we have different constant numbers 1,
2,3? No, we don't know how they are different; we cannot say anything about that
AbDUl the COnstant numbers [we] can say: There arc integers, real numbers, prime
numbers. etc., classes which have certain properties in common. Do we have for variable
Ones something like, e,g., the between prime numbers and non-pnme
nUlnbers? No, we don', really have that. We don't know how they are dirrerent. We
know what the sum of two numbers is; but not what the sum of two variables
x I- y is. Nowhere is illaid down how we arc supposed 10 add 2 variable numbers.
to the value of a
lIy one re ers
, . b ut functions. Genera .
This is all connected to what I Said a 0 . . ,ha'y is a functlOo,
. 1 d' to thUlkmg
. then mls e 10
function of .. with}": }' =1(x), and one IS a variable number; a
. . all neither a constant nor . ,
letter v docs not refer to anythlOg at , . in itself. Rather, It IS
'. , ,= I + ..2 does not refer to anythmg x
combination of S1gnS such as. J '0 which the leners
with a sense 1
b' er Mit· a sentence e mucb
to be understood as part of a Igg, I .thmeticallanguag
he whole. In our usua an . us
andy arc used to confer generality to t ryday language, th .
Much is left to eve
b Id be exprcssed. thought
is not expressed that really S ou . d all by itself, some
. . own as though It express
, eraHty
lhe fonnula y 7"C 1 T Y! 150 wnnen d The letterS of gen
. I' componellt.
d that It IS on y a lily on the
In itself it does, however, not a . only confcr genera
, hin in themselves, they used to
occurring in it do not refer to anyt g _ b + ac the letters are
(b+c)-a ,
whole. For example, if we have the sentence a dd' if a h, c are numbers.)
Id have to a . ,
(A tually one wou h whole
make thc sentence general. e e can see what t e
I t
his case w
. an thing. n . 'e we have
But c g nalone doesn't express y h Ie thing; for Instant,; ,
' . " do not have the w 0
b. Ordinarily, however, we
rcsscd in words.
conditinns that arc only cxp ,
f the f'nd of the
ints rom
eN an arTOW
h page: In •
bottom of t e .. above.
66. Four hnes from .the"a(b + c)" ab + oc
brack.et to the equatlon
64. Top of the page, line three: In CN, a period takes the plaee of the Question mark.
65, .Sixth from the. top of the page: In CN, a question mark takes the place of the
penod after !lay about that."
Summer Semester 1913
Letters also have this task of expressing genemlity in analysis. But that is not always
easily recognizable.
lncidcntally, it also happens that letters arc used to exprcss what we did by "there exists":
For example, it happens that in an algehraic proposition aile wants to express existencc.
Yet no clear distinction is made hetween these two ways of using letters. It is only
through our conceptual notation that we are made aware how completcly different the
Iwo usages arc.
The point where things are usually unclear is that one doesn't distinguish between the
expression "function" and "value ofa function." Similarly. one writcs/instead ofl{.t).
From a logical point of view that is to be rejected. What is unsaturated appears then to be
And then there is a usage of letters in Analysis that Pcano h<ls called "aprm
For example. in
r' ,

This refers to a completely dctennined numher, namdy Wh1..'lhl'f I writc down 1/.1
or that expressiun tnakci'i on difference. This (J Ls thus a pSClJdU.V'lfi,thk
Frege's Lectures on Logic
We have here the
. . "ariablc" aUoget er.
As I said, it is better to aVOId the cxpresslOn v
h· h we can write as follows:
as a particular example of the general case, w IC
b 2 Thus we (lre dealing
. functions· above, e.g., Ya .
We can then replacef(a) by vanous, W have to
. , 1'1 level function as argument. e
with a 2
level function, WhICh takes a . t variable to fill
besides usmg an apparen
.. W d 't know w a 0
indIcate thiS clearly. e on . bl One also writes
. uld not be reCOb'1l1Za c.
. ·t the function wo
the argument place; withOut 1

nly differentiate functions, not
. . h a function, since one ean 0 .
Here, too. we arc dealmg WIt .. the letter.t, ObVIOusly
. ·nvolved IS we use
what the function I
numhers And tn make clear . For here we can infer a
. t- h",· '" de I- (1(.
. ,. " ,·\·lettcrthanlll(d
this IS a dJifercnt us\,: () t Ie I_ •. ith numbers.
lacing the etters w
' gencrnl one by rep
particu1<lr sentcm;c from I c
67. Two lines from the bottom ofth , h pre--
vious integral. epage; In eN, an arrowpoints from "This' to t e
JI.. _
Summer Semester 1913
Above how .
, c\er, we cannot write:
dl ~ 2 1
rrege's Lectures on Logic
These are th
, en, a couple of cases I wante .
Roman letters. d to mentIOn. in connection with the US<lge of
because we d .
are eatmg wilh a 2
I . I " .
. . e"e ,unctIOn.
mdlcated cl I .
ear y, which it isn't in this case.
The I,\ level function has to be
We are confronted wilh peculiar questions. The solution will always consist in leaming
to distinguish between the/unction itselfand its value; as well as in always distinguishing
between the symbols and what is referred to by the symbols. Some people think that the
v .
anous other things in Arithme .
always cianI'" 1 tIc depend on this issue as welL Indeed, O[]e should
':J, a ways ask the foIl .
symbol 0 . . OWing question anew: Is what I am confronted with a
, r IS It lhe meaning of the symbol' .
fonned by llsin " e.g., an Integral: Is the mtegml a symbol,
g the stroke J. or IS it the meani .
power series. ng of a combmation of symbols? Is the
a groups of symhols. or is it Iha .
Regardless of wh' h t to whIch such a group of symbols rcfers'!
IC alternative one <lece ts ." .
Usually thO '. p .• peculiar dIfficultIes <In:: encountered
IS IS swept und h .
er t e carpet Or I' k d
determinant or i . . a e elcrrnin<lnts: b this symholl·· I the
• S It a symbol for who t' "
determinant r .. a IS called the detcnnilwnf! In a sncciili case the
Clers to a nu b . o·
mer, Just like
68, Fourthline f
"d12/dl = 2'1 " rom the top: In eN an
. ' arrowpoints fro <.<.' • •
69. Lines 3 6 • d 7 rn In thIS case" to "[he expressIon
•• n fromth b
question mark. e ottorn: In eN .
• a penod tak .
es. In each case, the plac.e ofthe
symbols are what arithmetic is about. But that doesn't work in the end. One contradicts
oneself continually. Instead, the symbols are just tools for inquiry, not what the inquiry is
about just as the microscope is a tool for botanical inquiry, not what that inquiry is about.
I have now suggested various questions, which I recommend to you for further reflection.
____t J
Summer Semester 1914
Logic in Mathematics
Logir does not play th ' .
b . ' ,arne role .0 olher sci,nces "' it doC' in mathemarics. At
cst In law (definiti )
ons , but very differcnt subject matter.
Are the infcrences in mathe· .
matlcs purely logical? Or are therc specifically
mathematical inferences b
in£ t at are not govemed by the general laws of logic" (F..g., the
erence from n to n + I.) B - ...
00s ut here, too, there" a general law on wh"h Ihe mferenec "
ed: "If the number one h .. ..
as a ccrtam property tp and ,f It holds genendly tor this
propcny ({J that _if a ...
, POSitive whole number [n] has it, its successor (n-\-I) also has it, then
each [positive) h I woe number has the property rp."
(a+ b) + m --l-
a _(b + m) is to be proved by Bernoulli's induction. We conceive of the
ProPOsition as a ro
. p pert)' of the number m, llssuming a and h to be given.
We have to prove that
(0 I M -'" n + th I n)
(tl + h) • (n I) iJ + (I' +(n 1- 1))
(0 I (h ! n)) t I
also holds;
acc\lrding 10 the proposition:
c t (1II-1ll (c I 11I).1:
We apply the proposition:
"h, any onc can repln
a nurnher
by \Jnc identical with iI"·
of pag" The following example (Ihe "a"oeiati
law"l i' "p.,ated by
'''pondi e" 'Om the mam text in eN, As it i' mentioned, but no"pelledo
in thce
explain text, F"ge probahlydevelOped it freely in hi' lecture, Thi' would
of "te y e followmg outline of a proofi"omew
in the note'· It con'"''
of ,u,tJ:t"e
tramfmmation of"(a' bl .(n' 1)" ioto"a' (b·(n· I) )." Fo' a "iriei,m
11 .' a proof," compare L, Wittgeo"ein, Ph;lo,"phi,al R,"wck>, 119751, p, 194[.
.. Flvelinesfr h h .. .. h
"ght ar.. : ,om t e ottom, ught "d" In eN, the pa"nthe'" 00 the .xpr""on on t e
',,, b);' m,mng, The propo,ition "c • 1m' 11 ' I' • m) • 1" i' u"rl loy replacing "c" hy
I" re' 1m <t, Th"horter arco
i' ,uppo"rl to indicat. tho' the exp"",i"n "I In • hi • n I
su tsfrom "(a'" b) + (n + 1)"
""Thee, Ii " , ..,,,"
""'1'1' n" from the bottom, ngh",d" In"(n • b) • n) d rhe expee,,'on 1n • b) • n
" • Ih the expee"ion "n • (b • n I" in a"oroanee with the a"umpt'on "I n • b 1• n "
line, left,id" In eN, the ",oond parenth"i' behind "n" i' ,"i"ing and. in,te
Car '. an addinonal parenm"i, behind "1." The longe' arrnw on the left, wh"h on
""pnap' nnt" abo begin. at me level of the lower line, i' ,uppo"d to indicate thar the
of ,;,""wn:'(a • (b • n I) • I" ",ul" by ,uh,riturio
(cf. note 721 from theright hand.
e pteV10us line.
premise is the general law above.
We conclude: If the numher 1 has this property, then every positive [whole] number
has the property. From this proposition and the proposition that the nomber 1 has the
property (as above: (a + b) + 1 = Q + (b + i) it follows that every positive whole number
75. has this property.
We get
again applying the proposition:
136 Summer Semester 1914
a+«b+n)+ 1) (a+(h+fl»+];
(a+h)+(n+l) al«b+n)+1);
(a+ b) I (n+ I) = a+(b+(n + 1));
Thus what holds for n also holds for n + 1. This is the first premise. The second
Thus every mathematical inference is analyzed into a general mathematical theorem
or axiom and a purely logical inference.
We distinguish: inferences frum 2 premises and inferences from] premise.
From 2 p"mis," a new truth followse A
From Ih" and a 3'" a new one follow, ag"n
We ean al", d<aw a ""'elu,ion from ,u'l une ""mi'", I
c.g., if II rrupositilltl holds for C'very positive whuk numher (Ull! we SlIY tlwl it 1111.S alst)
holds for the number 2.
lectures on Logic
. . ore and more, endlessly. But we can
The manifold of mathemattcal truths gro..... s m JI d it
ber of truths gets smaller and sma eT an
also trace the inferences back; then the Dum . . We will
h ps also definltlons.
finally has to come to an end. Axioms and postulates; per a
look at that in more delilillater. . . I es those
. ths in a chalO of tn erenc ,
"Theorems" we only caU the most Importanl tN
that arc used as premises in several directions:
t 'onvince (in the
in Euclid) less the purpose 0 c .
Sometimes a proof has (also already , . but to establish a logical
, ld beheve anyway).
case of simple propositions whtch wc WOll . 't ro of truths
. . '1of mathcmatlcs a sys C ,
connection, Euclid envu>loned as the Idea " ake the number of bastc.
. ., The aspiratIOn IS to m .
mterconnected hy logical mferences. fwhich all ofrnathematlcS
.' . to find the kernel out 0 .'
unprovable truths as small as pOSSible, I urety logical mferences.
. . necessary to draW on y P
can be developed. For that purpose It IS th logical laws, on the one
Iy between e
-) separute S arp
One must (sec the example K OVI,; h ther
. . "dtheorel11s used, on teo '
hand, lind the m.lthenmtleal aXlOl11S an rIf ' i1l10 procricl?
n t 1I"/1i<'h ht' did 1I0t 1'11/, /I .l
TillS ,dcill, III \\'hiC"JI ":lIdid fl.Win'd II
.. ldfllt'tlli//it'st
he,'lIlllmo.I'/ .'/lIil'dl' /0.1'/ ill "WI'(' rt/t ("t "
74. Second line, right side- In eN an srrow . f h . n "c +
(m + 1) '" (c + m) + 1" pOInts rom ere back to the equauo
75. Ten lines from the top: End of the examplo ( f 7
. " c . note 0).
'ble fork originating in
. diagram illuscrates a PO
. . . The followmg
6. SlXhnes from the top. 'nts
the theorem to which the arrow pOl '
Summer Semester 1914
Every mathematician works in his own area without attending to how to integrate it
into the whole system. Thus the disorder.
It is not just a matter of extending the chains of inference further and further and
increasing the manifold of Imths more and more. but <'Ilso of going backwards and
discovering the basic truths so as to develop out of them the system o/marhematic!i,
[n mathematics we do not, like in the other sciences. just have to make claims
convillcing, but their logical interconneUion is also import<'lnt How one thing follows
from another. Today too much weight is put on showing that a claim is evident; nol
enough on which web of inferences that supports it.
Thcf(ml1da(irms consist of axioms, postulates. and perhaps definitions.
Axioms are truths that do not need proof and that within the system, ure also not
proved. (But that is not enough: sinee Euclid already proved various things that did not
seem to need prooL,
I) trulhs; an untrue system is a contradiction in
2) belonging to a it is possihlc for there to he scvcf:ll systems of
lIlathl'matics. E.g., A H ('/)HF; possibly A could he proved from Hand ( ... F. or
alsll IJ from A and ( ... f·; then We have lhl' choin' or whdher In lakl' ,.j as an ,1.l(lOltI
nnd IJ as a Iheorem Of "ict' \.I'I".\"(f.
frege's lectures on Logic
d "'J" "derived sentence
"'Axiom," "theorem," not: "basic sentence [(mm saL, . .
b tht: sensually perceptible sign
[Lehrsatzl" Since we want to understand a sentence to e .
f I Th ught is not meant 1tI a
whose sense is a thought. Only this thought is tlUt: or a se. 0 .
is independent
" sense of the Pythagorean Theorem, e.g.,
psychological scnse h..:re! ...
from the various subjective thoughts. .
... . antee that an object with ccrtam
Postulates are really also aXIOms, they guar
. Is· not meant as !I.
, a I,· ne through any two pom . ,
properties exists. (E.g., in Euehu:
construction. )
.. f si s can he replaced by a simple sign.
Definitions are supulatlOnS that a group 0 go
Thus we distinguish:
I) tht: "defining group of signs"
2) the ·'defined sign" which is new.
. the parts orthe
hI· to the particular sIgns.
(To the sentence corresponds a thoug , -l
Id have to adu In
r h h
hI) Tht:rcforc we wou
scntcm:e, correspond parts 0 t e t oug .
_ .' ....,. as the roup of signs has a sense.
conncction with dclltlltlOns. wsof"r g b h nCW simple
. • .. I re lace thc group of signs Yt e .
It". in accmdann.' With the delltlltlon, p . tly a definition
'Inn l'S nnl the thought- (tltlsequcn
sign, thcn it is only the sentence thaI c , g., _ I only for
. . [I ,·k Jes b,stmmll'rl Uln.,.,.
. 1 1 " f clmncctlons r
is mIl rl'<.,l1y necessary lor I lC \J
lhc case Ill" c'Iprcssioll
... n" is underlined three time5.
'l" the word "deClnl
77. Nine lines from the (Op: In
Summer Semester 1914
A definition is introduced by I
means 0 a sentence th t' h .
identisch ist] I th a lS t en Identical lderdunn
. n c subsequent Construction f til .
as a premise for' fi 0 e system that sentence is used fonnally
III ercnces, although not contentu Ii .
the whole . , a y. from the sentence that contains
group of sIgns the fonnally s I
Imp er sentence can b d . d b
law of identity. c enve y means of the
Frequently something is smuggled into a .
recognized h mathematical definition that should he
as a I corem or axiom first.
Definitions are logically superfluous,
but psychologically valuable.
Dejinitions don',· . h
Just e1p to construct but als .
order to reduce th ,0to what IS complex, e.g., in
e number of axioms. Such an an I .
only feci that on ' h,," a YS1S cannot be proved right; one can
c as hit the naIl on the head .
M . ,and It can prove itself fruitful
ore preCIsely' we ' .
. construct the system again b .
Occasion"lly hI' YUSlOg the result of the analvsis
.. walsfi d' .
xc In a definition is the se I'
use fbr a h'l . . nse 0 a sign that has already been in
W Ie Oncc' .
. . annut prove that, thou h· j h· . ' .', .
Stlpulation bu,' . g , t as to be eVident; It lsn t an arbitrary
, an aXIOm.
LctAbcthcoldsi '1'
. . gn, et s assume that a c '. .
with A, If we don't k ertam complex sign coincides in sense
nuw that fur SUre w
that B is t h . ,e proceed as follows: We stipulate arbitrarily
o ave the sense l'lh
' . u c complex si If' ,
sense of A h' gn. the I' definition was correct then the
as to coinCide with that olB W '
. cavOld th .
system by using B If e sign A and rcconstmet the whole
. that reeo t '
, ns ruetlOn succeeds .... .
IOtroduee the sign If " " we can. tor pragmatic reasons, also
agam; we Just have to re '. . .
had 1Io sense before th d . , gard II as newly IOtrnduced. as if it hadn't
e efimtlon.
frege's Lectures on Logic
Objection: How can it really be doubtful whether the sense of a complex sign
coincides with the sense of a sign that has already been in use for a while and whose
,ensc has long been fixed. Well, suppose it is the case, but we only "sec it as if through a
Some definitions in mathematical textbooks are never cited or used later on, not even
implicitly; they arc pure ornament ("ornamental definitions"). Already in Euclid: e.g., u
line is length without breadth, etc.
Given the way in which mathematical texts are written today one can never see
whether a defmition is (implicitly) used or not. Each proposition should really carryall
its premises explicitly with it.
Sometimes things are called "definitions" which really aren't. If in algebra the 3
numbers x, .1', z occur in 3 equations, thcy are not always detennine(] completely thereby:
It is possible that several such systems of) numbers satisfy the equations
Thus: If the expressions "point," "line." "plane" occur in several sentences. their
sense is not necessarily detennined It is not clear whether se\-'cral solutions are
possible, or none at all. That is. then. no definition.
When an "empty sign" in a sentence has no sense, the whole sentence also has no
it docs not express a thought, only a task: to find a sense for the empty sign in such
a way that the whole sentence acquires a sense and becomes troe.
______1 ,,1-. ,ill
Summer Semester 1914
frege'!i lectures on Logic
Here we have a l:oncepl with two characteristics; thereby I have not uclcnnillcl1 an
object. but a concept; evcn if in this casc only 1 tlhject fulls under it.
An object falling under a concept is. lIncr all. nol the mcaning of the sign f(H
2"d (Thomae?):
3'd Wrege?):

, ]"eg some
• ,. 1/5 [WorrdefinitlOnen, ."
, b" mi1Jaj de/ml
. . ly
One talks reprovmgly a out no . , . expreSSIon can on
. . But thIS reprovmg
. . h F gean definitions. sense
people in connectIOn WIt re but must also have a ..
I consist of words.
mean: What gets defined must not on y . d 't give proofs for groups
' .. Since we on
. ltd in mathem
. of that
This however is oftcn v\o a e 'bl to get a clear grasp
." . and it must be POSSI e . ell
of signs but for the sensc thcy have, . t giving definitlOnS as w .
• . . more careful attention a
sense. MathematiCians should pay b' gs
f similar t m .
A number is a group 0
, ,"3"
A number is the stgn. . . ed by the senses; I
. that cannot be perceIv
A number is somethmg . 3 in them is not
. S' so what IS
, Ik about 3 axtOm ,
can. e.g., a
pcrceivable by the sen!ies. ry different system!i of
. . , nee tions. From them three ve
Thus three very dItferent (,,:0 p . not present so far.
tem IS thus, ber noW
arise nile sys, be too' this num
arithmetic would havc to· 'Idbe a num r, .
railroad tram wo
According to Weierstrass a
. Herlin.". , tic' as if the differences
cnmcs radng along !rom '. 'usl
onthnte ,
. . h whole there \S J •
One always ads as 1\ 01\ t c
'11l;ant l1etails.
resided only in •
Hereby an object. namely 2.
is determined.
We give 2 sentences
X i!i a prime number. }
Increased by 2, x is l1ivisible by 4.
If a concept is given to us, we don't know yet ifan object falls under it. It is
possible that an object falls under the concept, but also that no object under it. It is
false that a proper name is a concept [word] with only one object falling under it. In the
sentence: All humans are mortal, its sense does not include; Cato is mortal; for that a
further premiM: and some inferences are necessary. More precisely, the sentence would
fead: Ifsomething is human, then it is mortal. lfwe move from the general to the
particular, we get: IfCato is human. he is mortal. To this we add a 2
premise: Calo is
human. Only from both of them we get: Cato is mortal. As this is not directly contained
in the sentence: All humans are mortal, the concept docs not denote [hezeichnet nichtj the
object falling under it
We have to distinguish: Whether we replace an old group of signs with a new SIgn or
whether We assen something about something.
An example for the r
kind ufdefinition:
Carnap adds as a
. thIS sentence. I .,
. I connection WlthlHeiterknt Jm Zelltrum '
he bottom. n the center
78. Three lines from t '. "laughter 10
comment in the left marg:tn.
Summer Semester 191-4
Mathematicians are not concerned about that in any further way, The formulations
of propositions in the different systems of arithmetic <lgree; it is then left to the
philosopher to analyzlo: their sense. A self-respecting mathematician will nol bother to do
that. "At most he will occasionally, in an unguarded moment, drop a definition in
passing, or at least something that looks like a definition."
At bonom then: is the realization, I assume, that the content of the thought is
the main thing. But perhaps the different conceptions ofnwnber do, implicitly, coincide
at bottom? While everyone misses the mark slightly in his or her definition. Then,
however, the proper sense has to become manifest in proofs. Yet in them no use is made
of the definitions when inft=rring corresponding laws. It is for that reason, too, that the
different definitions do not stand in conflict with each other; Lhey lay heside each other.
like the animals in paradise [sie liegen neheneinander wie die Tiere im Paradiese].
E.g., according to Weierstrass: A row of books in a bookcase has to be a number,
the express train at 5: 14 as welt. If I now multiply those numbers with each other. I have
to get another number. But how, then, do I find it
From Weier.\'trass's lectures: "According to our definition a numerical magnitude
[Zuhlengrr)jJe] results from thl': repeated positing of similar clements." Thc definition
says Ihis: "We can form the idea OLI row of similar things, Things arc to be counted as
similar if they cuincidt= in a certain wmplclI. of characteristics. Such a row is, theil, what
we mean by a numerical magnitude." Does the sentence above rt'ally Itlliow from Ihis
definition? Accurding to the delinitioll it is nolthe idea 1lt"t11i: row, but the row itscJfthat
is the numerical Su, c.g., a railroad lrain is supposed Itl resull from lhe
repeated positing of a railroad car?
lectures on logic
d d as a unit and
" de can itselfbe regar e
. copt ofmag
U f
Further it says: "Now the can '.h ] the concept a
j ' to (bcelc ne
·bbbb'" Let reer"· h neept
be posited repeatedly: t=.g.,. . h r the sign: h b b b, t e co
. t repeatedly. or rat e . ]
magnitude Ifl now posit thlS concep .50 instt=ad, to [posit a
. . ew results. probably one I , . that
doesn't change at all, and nothmg n . , d h to stand for the express tram,
, d But even It I regar the
determinate single magmtu e Or erhapS, contrary to
ositing it repeatedly. p led into the
[rain does not get changed by P . 't In that case we are
.' . of the train that IS mean. different
formulation above, It IS my Idea .. ent people would have
, d b'ective; then dlfter . bout the
realm of the psychologICal an su j tly not be talking a
ld const=quen ,
. . ·d s and they wou ,
numbers, smce different I ea.,
same thing.
. ration? know that? Is it an
How do we get to mulllp IC, b" HoW do we
d that contam
all these . the roW that
' There IS now a magmtu e thuS obtalOlllg
resident Wilson, ] (hiS
W, POSit repeatedly elatlvum ), m
a:uom? Ex-ample d appeUatiVUm lApp
S Wilson (concept wor , h we mean the sum
conlams all the presuient peatedly "By a )( t ng
• name) appears re . b an a_times POSl I
row president Wilson (proper .' merical magnItude y .
.. "We obta
thiS nu b b_lim
• if h Islhe
consisling of ,1 terms of h. . . " But whal is meant y .. suddenly
, " sltmg
k . eHexerE-'I].
of fl, <IS well as hy a h_tlml:s po. em
, 'ie' I1l JWltt s '·a_tlmes
railnmd lrain'? There S flO . everyday usage, II say
t 'arowilnd,as
the number has ceased ttl )C
79. Five lines from the top; Here Carnap adds in the left '. '"I hter on the left
[Heiterkeit /inks]." margm. aug
80. Seven lines from the top: What is meant is "the din d di. f the cOll-
f:t:"ptofnumher." e.rentun erstan ngsa .
81. TWdve.lines from the. top; Carnap adds the marginal com ent: '"The old mall
waxes poetic! [DerAlte ll.!lrdpoetuchfJ" m
tis "'b"·

1-46 Summer Semester 1914
hIp.'s lectUres on logic
This sleight of hand is cleverer than the usual: the performer doesn't just deceivc the
audience, but also himself -the pinnacle of art. In other scicnces such sleights of hand
83. arc not popular at all; hut in mathematics they are, so to speak, presentable.
Occasionally Weierstrass also talks about <'I "set," as well as about the "value" of <'I
numerical magnitude. Here hc probably means what is usually meant by number. "A
numerical magnitude is determined if it is declared which clements it contains and of
each of them how oRen they are included." If one knows what ';how often" means, then
the number has indeed been defincd.
Before that the concept of number is extended in order to make division always
possible. Now a number is no longer, as before, supposed to consist of similar, but of
dissimilar clements. The definition, however, was: "Each ofthc repeating clements of
the row are called the unit ofthc numerical quantity." Out ··the unit" is a proper name: so
it can't mean each one of them.
Thus the actual number is, contrary 10 the initial definition, brought in through the
back door as a "sct," "value," or as a "how often."
Three lines the top: In connection with this whole paragraph Carnap comments
In the left rnargm: "laughter in the whole house {Heiterkeit im gan.zen. Hause]."
to this questlOn, "
thin" of va ue
. , t ibuted some '" h difficult
Weicrstrass would ha\e l:on r d.dn't even sec t e
'allv thought about \ .
intelleclual powers. had he rc - , " as a system.
I .d 'a1 of mathcmatll,;S .dentica1,
roblem in it. He was lal,;king t 11.: I C t things that afe non-
. conncc 5
f -quality 0= a so
Wcierstrass thinks the sign 0 e
. \ ,. I + h '" h + lJ. therthey arc
and gives as hiS ex-amp \;. , . .ome respect, ra
. t similar III S would
But: l 3 .., =:- 'i hoth sides arc not JUs . . ( .. ee for that task we
n -r - -' tas\<. of addlllg sm . the
, .. we don't mean the 1 f oIl1 completlllg
identical: since by ·'3 -j .. er that reSll Is r
. +') l- 4)_ but the numb . res ect to a new
not have to add a number. (3 fi dO\ltlater\lllth p
. S Just as we may, e.g·. III Iready kneW
task and that is the same as - .. . .d ntical With one we a
d n10untatn that it IS I C
mmet or a newly dlseo\,ere
before and called something else. \It the sentences have
"') is the same, b has cognlll\ e
S nd'iO=]-+-- d entence
The meaning of 5 0= - a - - Thc secon S
. haitI different senses heliocentriC VieW of
thought ('Im/ntt [Gt'Jdllkt'l/In ' ., d .·thc founder of the h I say:
"Copernicus ail . ee between w en
content [Erkcnntnisillhtl/
]. .. till a dirte
,.' 1e man: but thcre: IS S ..... steml" and
h 1
"mcan tht.: s.Ul t·the solar s,
tcsnarsystcm ,·.vicwo
. • 11' the hc!llll,;Cn
. 'cS.
"C\lpcrnicu:- is thc hmndcr {I . h'wc different "ens
Tho:-": scntences '
·'Copernicus is l 'npcrllJl,;IIS.
Summer Semester 1914
Frege's Lectures on Logic 149
A proper name has
1) a meaning: the thing abollt which something is said;
2) a sense that is part of the thought.
The name Scylla has no mean', I "
lng, on y a sense. Mount Aetna is higher than
Vesuvius." Here it is not the m .. . .
oUntam Itself, with all Its masses ofmck that is part of
the thought; rather somethin invi "bl '
g 51 e has to be part of the invisible thought: the sense of
the name Aetna. Similarly 5 and 3 + 2
have the same meaning, but ditferent senses.
We define concepts r I t'
, e a IOns, and (what is most difficult) ohjects. A concept is in
of supplementation al . .
E.g. ' ways has predlcallvc character.

The two pan I
S can a so occur in other s
art . entences; they have a sense in themselves. The I>I
P IS something saturated the 2""
, IS unsaturated
We can say several things about .
" . one and the same object, also put together in one
sentence: S IS a .,"
, POSItive number and a yd root."
84 F ij
, our nes from the b
understandin f ottorn: This remark'
they still d g 0 the Conte:x.t princi 1 . If 15 revealing with respect to Frege's (later)
o so as a Contribution to th
e, the parts have senses "in themselves," then
e senSes ofwhole sentences.
If we consider this to be one sentence, I ean negate it as a whole; then there arc the
following possibilities: the I<l part is false or the 2
is false or both arc false. l"llUS Ihis is
different from the case where I ha"Ve both sentences separately.
Then we can define: The expression "0 is a positive 3,,1 root" is to mean the same as
"0 is a positive number and 0 is a 3,d root." We see: If we want to define a concept, we
have to indicate in general the place for the object (e.g., by means of a), since the concept
(predicate) is supposed to have general validity.
Ifboth concepts have sharp boundaries, i.e., for each object it is determined whether
it falls under the concept or not, then the composite concept also has sharp boundaries.
Another example: Suppose "(I is a prime number" is the expression to be defined:
"There is no whole number> I and < 0 such that a is a multiple of it." But, e.g., the
number 3/2 also falls under this concept; thus we have to add: "0 is a positi'o'c whole
number"; "a is > I." Thus we have 3 sentences; thus 3 suh-concepts that can be regarded
as characteristics of the concept prime number. (It does not matter that u is not in
subject position in the 1sl sentence.)
Analogously for the definition relation; the only difference is that we ne-ed 2
letters [Buchstahen]. A relation is contained in a sentence in which 2 proper names
uccur, e.g., J > 2. A relation name is doubly in need of supplementation
A rC{luin.:rnent for any dcllnition (whether of a concept or a relation): It has to hold
in gent'ral withollt qualilil:atinns; or if qualified, then 2 definitions ha\'c to hold; the tid
. .. I'· . . ', .. ,.. r. d Otherwise it can happen thaI
for the case III wtllch the staled qU<l Iheilhon Isn sa ISlie .
lhe sense of a group of signs is indctcmlinate, E"Vcry sentence, i.e., every complex of
signs (according to their rules), hilS to be either true or false.
"." ositive" is containpd in "'0
85. Middle of page: The emphasis is on "whole num er • p . '
). 1," thus superfluous.
. f h in tf'xt hy flngl/' Ilrack,-to;,.
66. Last line: In eN, this paragraph IS separated rom t f> rna -
('he scnll'nn' "(II 2) is a lIlullipk ofT' is in ill'ed nrslIpplc\llentation: it fomts a
" "\",,,.. ",' I (,', if Ilto so, I subs.um..: 16 under this.
P\ISSlllL- nSSl'ftillll wlnrh ..:Ill, ...
16 is congruent to 3 modulo 7,
16 is congruent to 2 modulo 7
a is congruent to h modulo 7
b) )
a IS a whole number
b IS a ...... holc number
is a mulliplcof7
16 is a whole numht=r
3 is a whole numher
(16 - 2) ;" multiple 7 J
16 is a whole number
2 is a whole number
then the whole thing is still right the sense of the individual sentence is independent of
whether it is true or hllse. We can, in addition, give a sentence assertoric force or not
(c.g.. in tidion). We nUl grasp a thought without asserting it as tn/C, without judging.
But if we write:
we gd:
E.g., if we apply the general definition
frege's Lectures on Logic
"\0 - 2 is a multiple of7"
"17 - J is a multiple of7."
The 'nllll vul/le remains unchanged. It is, to be recognized as Ihe mt=aning of
the sentcm::c.
Summer Semester 1914
In ordinary usage: 'The sentence (or thought) is Irue," it seems as ira property is
ascrihed to the sentence. We du nut seem 10 be dealing wilh a relation bdween the
sentence and its meaning (a thingl, hut with a relation hctwl'l'll an Oh.il'l"t 111\d this
property. However: n\llhing is added to lhe senSl' \.r"'i . r' hy 111<11 it is trill'.
Ifwe claim that the sentence "Aetna is higher than Vesuvius" is true, then the two
proper names do not just have a sense (as even names in fiction do), but also a meaning:
the real, external things that are designated lbezeichnet]. Now tht: whole sentence also
hus a me,ming, besides its sense. This meaning has to remain the same if we replace
some parts oflhe sentence with others with the same meaning, even if they have different
senses. E.g.,
Arithmetic signs, too, have to be defined in such a way that, no matter which object
(not only numbers) we put in the place that needs to bl: supp!cmentt:d, we get a detioitt:
87: Two lines from the bottom: The object would here be the sentence seen 8S a WTitten or
pnnted sentential sign,
152 Summer Semester 1914
Analogously to how (3 -- 2) is the value of the function (a - 2) for the argument 3,
we can say that
"(16 - 2) is a multiple ofT'
"(17 - 2) is a multiple ofT'
arc values of the function
"(a - 2) is a multiple of 7'"
for the arguments 16 amI 17.
What ajimclion is cannot be defined, it cannot be reduced logically to something
more simple; one c<Jn only hint at it. elucidate it.
What lor us is an argument is called "subject" in [traditionalJ logic, our concept is
l'allcd "predicate."
Frege's Lectures on Logic
The equality sign = does not stand for [hedeurt:t nich/] the copula, but for identity
apparently says that
2 is a square root of 4;
(-2)'(-2) - 4
says that
-2 is a square root of 4;
docs not say that
2 is a square root of 4,
2 is a positivc square rool of 4
rhe usc of limdillll in mathcmatil,:s is quite obscure. One talks ubout variables as if
there were nlllsl..lTll numbers (1,2. ck.l amI variable number".
If! replace x 2 by
4 2
5 2.
it is not as ifol1c thin" v<Jrics Sm" -. -. h . e.'" u 111 .my Vllflallon t c thing that .... arics would Iwvl'to
the saine: (like a monarch Whll <lges; in cuntrast to him and his
88. Eight lines fTOm the botton· Wh F
expression 1, at rege means, more precisely, is "the use of the
89. Last line: Comparc the corresponding passage in F '
(19fl3j, p. 236. _. < rege 5 Nachgclassene Sr.hriften
The signs indicating generaliry are used to confer generality to the sentence. They
have to be rcplaee<lble by proper names; and in doing so one makes the step from the
general to the particular.
Therefore a letter call not stand for [hcJclIleII] a "variable number·'; since there isn't
anything at all the lettcr is supposed to stand fnr---thcre arc no variable numbers. In pure
arithmcti..: time nol play ,1 rnle. lim, conscquenlly. docs variation. One talks about
vari.1hk "qll<lIItilil',<·; l'. j.;. , tilt' 111;1!!lIitndl' of a l'Od ilf il'On that over time a
.t;O/1 whl'!"e f indil·all's till' (l1'!l:lll11l'nt pllsilill11, BUI now we havc moved over to the
uPlilinl/ioli ot"llrithllll·tic Till· v:lriatioll dlll·S nllt bl.'hl1lg hl anlhll11.'lic proper.
Dnt: ntkn confusl's tht: valuc l)f the fUlll-tilll1 with the I"undion itself; the value is an
object and it isn't in lIceJ ofSUpp!clllcntatioll any more, There is a diHiculty here: The
expressions ';conccpf' and "function" arc logically objectionable. Since one c;'ln say ·"the
function," which is then a proper name and has to stand for an object_ The value of the
function is. indeed, an object, which is thus easily confused with the function itself.
154 Summer Semester 1914
x is the argume t f h not c function 1 + 2'(. Now, it looks as if this func!,·on the
argument in (l + 2,/' .' "'.,
. , so In the functIOn .g-.
But (I -I 2tl isn't th fu . c nctlOn of a function R h
a particular argument" e g (I 2 . at er, it is the value of a function for
, .., + '3) can be th .
If I designate th . . c argument jm the function ¢'c (I 2·3)'.
e posItIon of the argument by J; the I h
that is the v<lluc of this fu . ." n ave the function (I + 2·.gl: and
, nctlOn for the argument 3 Th' .
functions to form . IS IS how one can combine two
a new one.
A function of 2 argu . menls IS fundamentall d·j·j· .
F. _, y I erent from a Cu r r
,.g.• It I saturate one arg' . . nc IOn 0 I argument.
ument positIOn in "c; - (" I et a f .
only a second saturdtion I d ." g unction of one argument, and
ca s to an object.
One more thing concerning the eonfi . .
. uSlon of object and fi .
Its value: The value of th" _ unctIOn, or of a fum:tion and
e [unci IOn I !.; r. II
1 H ., or a arguments (at I •
. ut on..:: cannot say th I" ' , east lor numbers! is
at IS the funcllOn. Since e ' .
the point 2. we h'lve to I ' .g.. In order to differentiate say at
, rep ace the argument position wi h - •
(2+4:)) (I +2 2) _ I 2+k etc., so (I +(2+/i)-
Hut In "["th .
b ere IS no argument po 'it" h
y 2 + k. Thus even the f ," s I at could be replacetl
. uncllons which arc called "CI .• ..'
contused with their valu' h'h" msldnl 111 Analysis arc not to he
c. W II.: IS an object.
Frege's lectures on Logic
A function of2 arguments, e.g., .; - S. can be transformed into a function of one
argument in two ditTerent ways: either by a saturation (.; - 2) or by identifying the two
argument positions ';). Functions of two arguments that always have a truth value as
value are relations. Therefore we can transform the relation';:> ; into a concept, e.g., .;
> 0 (the concept of positive number). Or we form the concept .g>'; is an empty
concept nothing falls under it).
Functions have to be defined everywhere from the beginning; for instance, the
function.g _ ( also for objects other than numbers, e.g,: If both arguments are not
numbers. it is to be "the False." If a function is first defined narrowly and later
expanded, then this expansion changes the function; and if one still keeps using the same
sign. this ambiguity can easily lead to confusion.
In the development of mathematics one does, however, reach certain points where
one wants to expand the system. But then one has to begin from again. In any
CO". thm alwuy' hos to he a comptete .,yst,,,, at hand that;' lugicolly unproblematic.
E.g., une would h",e to proceed" folluwS' ,slong as the plus sigo + i, u>cd ooly for
pusitive whole numhers, \l1lC chooses a diflcr
sign for it. e.g·. ---... .
90. Six lines from th
2-:\}:.!," e top: In eN. an arrow points from the word "h .. .,
91. Two 1" f t At back to (1 +
. Ines rom the bOt[om' Fo
der Anthmetik. p 72 t' - r the expressio ' .. .. • ootnote. n constant," cf F •• . rege s Grulldgcsetze

Summer Semester 1914
Frege's Lectures on Logic
If A is true, then r is true
If r is true, then .:::1 is true.
If A is true, then t1 is true.
B is true.
A is true,
Continuing further:
But usually one docs
. t t in all the sentences.
The condition "If A is true" remainS cons an be d
h h
have to assume
'., . sentence, althoug t ey
not write down all the premises 01 a . . . A is tme I can still dra......
. '. 'fl Jon't prt:suppose the aXiom. '
implicitly <11' conditlOl1s, 1hus I . , , t ee
. - . If 4 is true, III ewry sen en .
condusiollS. alhcil alwilYs with the condItIOn. '
Then again, suppose I have:
we can conclude:
On the other hand, if A is not true we cannot infer anything.
If A is true, then B is true,
If B is true, then r is true.
then by means of the axiom:
If I have the sentence:
. Let's assume for the
One cannot develop non-Euclidean geometry y saymg:
moment that the parallel axiom is not true, so drop it.
But is it possible to draw a conclusion from a false sentence?
If A is true, then B is true,
2) a truth value, which is its meaning. The closed part ufthe sentence, a proper
name, stands for (bezeichne/l an object; in science it is necessary that this
proper name docs not just have a sense, but also stands for [bezeichnef] an
object. The predicative parts of the sentence stand for [bezeichnen] a concept.
Object and concept are quite different.
A sentence, e.g" 2 + 3 "" 5, has
1) a sense, which is its thought content [sein Gedanke]. By combining the words
which stand for [hezeichnen] parts (lfthe sense one can form a variety of
Axioms are true and unprovable; they have not been derived themselves, instead
everything is derived from them. An aKiom has to be true; and for that it is necessary that
no part of it is still indeterminate. (EKcept for general signs, which confer generality uf
content to the sentence.)
()e/inition.\· arc stipulations that a familiar complex. sign is ID be rerlaced hya simple,
new one. This new sign hus thereby acquired a definite me.ming, and tile st'n1cncc
hecome.s tautologieul. This talltological.selltenn' cun then he Ilsed;ls il prt'misc, lOll
Among the sentences we distinguish between axioms [AxiomeJ and theorems
92. Three lines from the top: According to Frege's al . 1 it should say
.. re [ d" k )" h' f usu t:ermlno ogy,
exp ss aus rue en ere Instead 0 "stand for [ber.eichnen]."
- - - - - ~ , . . ,
Summer Semester 1914
Frege's Lectures on Logic 159
We presuppose: If2 sides ofa triangle arc equal, then the opposite angles a.re also
In tn·,ngle the larger angle lies opposite to the larger Side. equal. [To prove:] ......... J

If / A > / B, Ihen not L B :> L A,
If BC' ','1(', then rwl L H' / A.
Thus: IfAe - BC, then L B -= LA.
II IfAC<BC, then LA > L B.
IV Ifa=b,thennoth>a.
V If a> h, then not h > a.
Ifa is not:> b, and if a is not = h, then b:> a. III
To prove: If L B > L A. then AC > BC
lfnot AC >BC, then or BC >AC
If AC =BC, then LB =LA.
If BC > AC then LA> L B.
If LB =LA,thcnnot LB >LA.
If AC - BC then not L H :> L A.
If Z is true, then E is true.
A sentence that is an axiom in one system can he a theorem, thus something to be
proved, in another.
A sentence that is supposed to be an axiom has to be true; a false axiom is self-
Ifan axiom is only posited hypothetically, It should really be added as a condition to
each sentence, a1 least implicitly. If we don't do that, the theorems derived from il
(ilppcaf to) have more general validity than they really do.
Similarly for indirect proofs. E.g., suppose we have to prove that E is true.
Assume I have the sentence: If E is not truc, then Z is not true; ifI then know that Z is
true, I can conclude that E is true, since the sentence abo.... e can be transposed to:
11'11111 .'Ie'
. JI(', iflltlt .-/(' IU',thclIl1ol.!B>LA.
If. /I ''/.-f, then 11111 (I(' /Ie.
[I' /1/ ·/A.ifnol AC ·>B(', then nol
L B > LA,
ddedin eN
. . of a roof, several arrows are a
93. First line; In the followmg outhne p
( I
to the lim'! -from (a) back to (II ; he third line after (1
II 'g(a)andfro
- from the line immediatelyfa OWln • after (fJ) to the line (r).
. f ( ) and from the line les L A and L R.
- from the second fme a ter a and b !Itand for the ang , _
. h' line the letters aLB"
94. Fifth line, right SIde: In t IS, 1 . "If AC> Be, then LA) - . B
C'II.T'tsayswrongy. lesLAendL .
95. Sixth line, left side: In 1 db stand for the eng .
. " his line, the letters a an . ents ACand BC.
96. Sixth line, nght Side. In t b and for the line segm
., he letters a and !'it
97, Seventh line: In thIS hne, t
Summer Semester 1914
Frege's Lect.ures on Logic
This is what was to be proved,
Therefore: If not AC :> Be. then not L B > L A
If L B > L A, then AC> Be.
A, J'
f.l, v
If L B > L. A, then not Be > AC
. .' AC>BC
If L. B > L A and If not Be then .
If L B > L A. then not Be =: AC
If L B ;. L. A. then AC > BC
(Here we have repeatedly used "transposition": antecedent [Bedingungssalzl and
consequent [FolgesafZ] are interchanged, but both in negated form. (The English
logicians call this contraposition.)
Thus here we have used the false Sentence "not AC :> He," too; but not in itself, only
as a condition in a bigger sentence so that nothing has been said about whether this
condition is satisfied or not.
The same proof can also be arranged in such a tonn that it looks like a direct proof.
We make use of the following sentences:
]') I[not LA >/.8, thennol Be >AC'.
2") !fllm LAc-LB, then not Be "-AC.
3') Ifoo! Bc" >AC andifnol 8e -A(', then AC >BC
4') If LIJ >L.A. thcnnol LA LIJ.
:'1') Ir / H ., L A, then not / A / H.
. f' therefore not as big as
The difference between an indirect and a direct proo IS
usually assumed. .
. d not draw any conclusions from a false
As we have seen, in an indIrect proof we 0 . as
the falsehood as a premise, but always only
assumption; sinee we do not actually have
the condition in a conditional judgment. .
. d cd t .ed to draw conclUSIOns from
Ncvertheless. in mathematics people have III e n
false premises. e.g., in non-Euclidean geometry. . ".
. 'ne the other is intersectcd by It, too,
"'If one of 2 parallel lines is Intersected by a Ii , . lIel
. t" I f one does not use thiS para
or' "'There is only one parallel line through a pOIn .
. . .
. , , cl what can be proved without It. t .
aXIOm for the moment and asks mer y . " It is
'd without lIS111g I .
i ich can c prove
nhjeclilmanlc. One learns. I en, w 1 ,.' that
1Illstead an aXIOm
if one mlOl cr ;IXIOll . ,
quile" different Imiller. IHlwevl'r. t
. .. rl' we have tn {lojcct· One can only lakc a me
Clllllradil.:ts it Against Ifllll pltllcdll I w.e it as IhL"
, "rt"ltl,.·c 11IIllufalscl.lI1c"!hulony .
Ihllll!J;hl hI Ill' Ihl' prt'lllisl' ill Ull mIL:. . ' . 11 dc-rivc-d sclllcnces.
" " 'Ildilion is thell CIIlTlcd III a
Clluditioli llllll:lllilliliull<li I Ills {;\ I
Summer Semester 1914
Frege's Lectures on Logic
As far as independence is cuntemed it matteN. e.g.. whether
the system
is also consistent.
E.g., 'Through a point there is more than one line parallel to a line." If one \vorks out
this geometry more and more d
, oes one eventually reach a sentence that contmdicts one
of the other axioms? In that case one w Id b
. ou e confronted with the same situation as in
an indirect proof One Vi Id I"
. ou app y transposition" and get the parallel axiom as a
conse4uence. However: How many inference' . . .
s are necessary to arnve at a contradiction?
Thus nothing has really been proven.
Do we really have to assume the axioms t b <'
o e true. Everyhody has to figure thai out
for himself. Ifsomeone else doesn't take the parallel axiom to be true, I have to assume
that he means something different by "point" thiUll or b "1· .,
, y me.
With respect to the axioms one wants to ir v
. 1 estrgate whether Ihey ilre consistent and
whether they are independent Ii
rom each other. Whoever takes the Euclidean axioms 10
he tnJC assumes, oftourse, that the are' .'.
Y wnslstenl. But whether they are independent is
lIT1portant to determine. sinte nne is su .,
. ,. pposed to make the numher of axioms as small <IS
In Hilbert's Foundations o(Geometry investigations are pursued that initially make
it look like the consistency orthe Euclidean axioms is at issue. But with respect to those
axioms such an invesligation is impossible. Or it is only possible by reinterpreting the
word axiom. Hilbert says frequently: certain axioms define this and that concept. Here
"axiom" is used in a way that is ditferent from our usage, as well as different from
traditional usage. Si!lee an ax.iom is allowed to contain only what is already detenninate
Hilbert says: "The points on a line are in a certain relation to each other that is
expressed by the word 'between '." This explanation is supplemented by the axioms:
I) Let A, B, C be points on a line: If B lies between A and C. then B lies berween C
anti A.
2) If A and (' are points on a line, then there exists a point B that lies between A
and ('.
.ll (liven three (ll'h/trmY puints 011 u line, only olle of them lies hetween the other
o " bl d to take the plaee of the foUowing
:>"8. Bottom ofpage; This pIcture IS presuma Ysuppose. l' d me that a is
axiom; "Assume that A B Care three points that do not lie on a mean assu AB'
. ' , C If h I' a meets the segment In a
ahneintheplaneABCthatdoesnotmeetA,B, = t e me S·C" ·n,"IDavid
. AC the segment m a pOI .
pumt, then it also meets either the seb'1Tlent or. . h h .. of thl'
.I . A_' 114 Startlng"'lt t f' Cl. "r."
1 bert, (;Fundlagen der n.J\.10m . h A-ionllI 4
. . . I" d under the same num er, J'Ul •
tex.t thIS axIOm replaces another axIom 15 e. . )
USes the latter axiom in his Nachge/a.Hene Schriften j 1983). p. 246.

. . ' ......._,
Summer Semester 1914
These arc pseudo-axioms; since the expression "between" is nut dctcnninatc yet. It
is analogous to presenting a number of sentences as the definition of a number, as
follo..... s:
- 4 II is still doubtful here whether a numher has been defined at all:
(/ < 6 whether there really is such a number, or perhaps several.
Thcsc "axioms" arc, therefore, really definitiuns, and not even uniquely determining.
This is further nbscun:d by the facllhal for us the word "between" is not new,
('llIlsCqUClltly it is hettcr to replace it by new words:
"A li...'s hl'lwccn Hand C"
Frege's Lectures on Logic
. Id fonnulate the sentence
If par stoud for [hezeichnet] a re atmn, we cou .
"If a parb
and a par c,
then b 0:= c. for any a. b, and c."
. . . her true or false. E.g.. it IS tme if we
lfwe replace par by a relation, thiS sentence IS ell
. . h' '":I"d level concept. namely Ihl::
replace par by .'=." Thus here we are also deahng Wit a
. h· h the identity relation falls.
concept of relations 10 W IC , e,g.,
.. d r" bUI "in:' so as tu
With respect to 2
level concepts we don't want to say un e .
If 1'1 level
. _ . b t also different from t c casc (
indicate that thiS case IS analogous to, U
I len: we arc dealing. with a 2
\Ill.' say
".-I pat Utar (''';
"lfHrat A lar(",then Bpat ("!lull."
"If a is a
h I f between three object\ (In
In "B pat A tar C· we arc dealing wit a rc a IOn
. . .,.", a fundion of three arg.unll:nls who..c
[traditional] logic: "relatIOn With 3 bases ), I.e, .
, lation as thaI stand.. to iI concepl I
value is a truth value. (It thus stands to an ordlOary re
then u -,-- h, for any a and h."
Here we have the 2
h:vcl concept "conct=pt of concepts under which only one object
99. Eight hnes hom the bottom: In eN. Carnap has WTitten in his handwriting "this
i!> right (.w richti/{I:' rt>pt>atcd rhl" word "pat." and drawn an arrow to an nfir
furtht>r dl')WT1.
More predscly. Hilbert's 1'1 Axiom says:
. . . the line detennincd A and C. If
. I If 8 IS a pOInt on
"If A is a point. if C is a pom . ..
tar C. then 8 pat C tar.--l.
e is different from A. and if B pat
th...... urd
L J a ('onllllt'nt (,n
eN this sentenCI' i .. mar ..#'
100. Ten lines from the top: In '
"in" in the previous
166 Summer Semester 1914
And this is su db' ppose to e satisfied whatever A, B, and C may be. The whole thing
has a sense only if pat and tar have a sense.
Later Hilbert not only .. lh .. uses e word hetween" with . a I teTcnt meanmg, he also
often uses "point" "I' ."" I " . . ' me, pane, ... differently from Euclid. What is unclear, then, is
this: he never says so ex.plicitly and h· • • , c never makes clear how else he understands them.
Often he lISCS the ex.pressions as indicating indefinitely J' '1 I , us as we usc etters.
Literature Cited
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The Gabelbarkeitssatz ofl928" Erkenntnis 54, pp. 145-72.
Awodey, S. and Reck, E, 2002, "Compleleness and Catcgoricity, Part I:
Nineteenth Century Axiomatics to 'IWentieth Century Metalogic"
History and Philosophy ofLogic 23, pp, 1-30,
Awodey, S. and Klein, C" eds. 2004, Carnap Brought Home: The Viewfrom
lena, Chicago: Open Court,
Beaney, M., ed, 1997, The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bynum, T, W, 1972, "On the Life and Work of Gottloh Freg
" in Frege,
Conceptual Notation and related articles. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 1-54.
__, 1976, "The Evolution of Frege's Logicism" in (Schiro. M.. ed, 1976),
Carnap. R. 1922. flu Raam: Ein Beitrag zur Wis.senschaft.slehre, Kant-
Studien. Erganzungsheft 56, Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
__. 1927, "Eigenlliche und Uneigendiche Begriffe" Sympo"ion 1, pp.
__, 1929, Abril'S der Logistik. Vienna: Springer,
__, 1930a, "Die ahe und die neue Logik" Erkenntnis 1, pp- 12-26,
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Erkenntnis 1, pp, 303-10.
__. 1932. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprachc dec
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__. 1947. MeaniflK (Jfl(i Nt.It's,'lit)'. Chit'IIp:0: tJnivt'rsit)' ofChi','ap;o ...
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______.''*'' iii.
168 Frege's Lectures on Logic Literature Cited
1993. "Interview mit RudolfCarnap" in Mein U7eg in die Philosophic,
W. Hochkcppel, ed., Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 133-47.
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Mosrerin, erls., Darmstadt: Wisscnschaftlichc Buchgescllschaft.
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