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Law on Transportation

Law on Transportation

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LAW ON TRANSPORTATION

I. CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER 1. Definition Article 1732 NCC, De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals Planters Products Inc vs. CA

168 SCRA 612 (1993) 226 SCRA 76 (1993)

2. Characteristics Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Co. 31 Phil 1 (1915) US vs. Quinahon 31 Phil 189 Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 339 (1999) First Phil. Industrial vs. Court of Appeals 300 (1998)

315 SCRA

SCRA 661

3. Distinguished from Private Carrier Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship 23 SCRA 24 (1968) San Pablo vs. Pantranco 153 SCRA 199 (1987) National Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 283 SCRA 45 (1997) 4. Government Regulation of Common Carrier’s Business KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386 (1994) Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. 241 SCRA 334 (1997) 5. Governing Law Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Llyod 132 SCRA 529 (1984) Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC 150 SCRA 464 (1984) National Development Co. vs. Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 593 (1988) II. CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS A. VIGILANCE OVER GOODS 1. Extra-ordinary Diligence Required of Common Carriers (Article 1733, NCC) a. “Registered Owner Rule” Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SCRA 388 (1987) Benedicto vs. IAC 187 SCRA 547 (1990) Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 273 SCRA 562 (1997)

b. Kabit System Santos vs. Sibug 104 SCRA 520 (1981) Lita Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 148 SCRA (1987) Teja Marketing vs. IAC c. Boundary System Magboo vs. Bernardo 148 SCRA 347 (1987) 7 SCRA 952 (1963)

347

2. Liability of Carriers for Loss, Destruction and Deterioration of Goods; Exceptions; Presumption of Negligence Articles 1734-1735; Articles 1739-1743 Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC, supra Ganzon vs. CA 161 SCRA 646 (1985) Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals 196 SCRA 570 (1991) Sarkies Tours Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 280 SCRA 58 (1997) Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs. Court of Appeals 274 SCRA 642 (1997) Yobido vs. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 (1997) 3. Commencement, Duration and Termination of carrier’s responsibility over the goods (Articles 1736-1738, NCC) Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of North America 12 SCRA 213 (1964) Lu Do vs. Binamira 101 Phil. 120 (1957) American President Lines Ltd. vs. Klepper 110 PHIL 243 Servando vs. Phil. Steam 117 SCRA 832 (1982) Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, supra Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 207 SCRA 498 (1992) Macam vs. Court of Appeals 313 SCRA 77 (1999) 4. Stipulations Limiting Carrier’s Liability a. Articles 1744-1745, NCC; Degree of Diligence Reasonable time in the delivery Case: Maersk Line vs. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA (1993) b. Articles 1749-1750, NCC; Amount of Liability Ysmael vs. Barretto 51 PHIL 90 (1927)

108

CA 305 SCRA 14 (1999) Gatchalian vs. Inc. vs. vs. 1745. SAFETY OF PASSENGERS 1. vs. vs. CA 281 SCRA 717 (1997) Korean Airlines Co. Valencia 104 SCRA 65 (1958) 189 SCRA 158 . Accomodation Passenger Lara vs. Jaymalin 112 SCRA 629 (1982) A. Intermediate Appellate Court (1990) 209 SCRA 67 189 SCRA 605 192 SCRA 9 B. NCC) Case: Sweet Lines vs. Court of Appeals. 42 PHIL 205 (1921) c. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 544 (1990) Everett Seamship Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (1990) Pan American Airlines vs. vs. CA 234 SCRA 14 (1999) Fortune Express. NCC) Nocum vs.E. Void Stipulation (Art. Heacock Co. Court of Appeals 285 SCRA 450 (1998) H. ‘Utmost Diligence’ Required of Common Carriers (Article 1755. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Passenger’s Baggages (Article 1754. Rapadas (1992) British Airways vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 153 SCRA 552 (1987) Citadel Lines. NCC) Quisumbing. CA 180 SCRA 83 (1989) Negros Navigation Co. Teves 83 SCRA 361 (1978) 5. Inc. Inc. Co. IAC (1990) Bustamante vs. Macondray & Co. Laguna Tayabas bus. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991) Del Castillo vs. Philippine Airlines 17 SCRA 606 (1966) Ong Yiu vs. vs. Inc. CA 193 SCRA 603 (1991) B.. Court of Appeals 297 SCRA 496 (1998) British Airways vs. vs. supra Alitalia vs. Ltd. CA 83 SCRA 386 (1978) Mecenas vs.Shewaram vs. Sr. Court of Appeals 91 SCRA 223 (1966) Sea Land Services. vs.

& MRR 110 PHIL 346 (1960) Villa Rey Transit. Court of Appeals 31 SCRA 511 (1970) Pan American World Airways vs. LTB Co. Exceptions (Articles 1756-1758. Court of Appeals 188 SCRA 216 (1990) Fortune Express Inc. Court of Appeals 179 SCRA 95 (1989) Mallari Sr.. Recovery for Physical Injuries Soberano vs. vs. supra III. IAC 153 SCRA 521 (1987) Gatchalian vs. contributory negligence PNR vs. DAMAGES (Article 1764. Court of Appeals Pestaño vs. vs. Res Ipsa Loquitur Layugan vs. 884 (1955) Maranan vs. Carrier not an insurer against all risks Necessito vs. Presumption of Negligence: Liability of Carriers for death or injury to passengers. Commencement. Al Ammen Trans 139 SCRA 87 (1985) 101 Phil 1046 (1957) 6. Paras 104 Phil. NCC) Cariaga vs. vs. NCC) Bayasen vs. Perez 20 SCRA 412 (1967) 5. Inc. Duration and Responsibility La Mallorca vs. Injury to passenger due to acts of co-passenger or stranger Bachelor Express. Passenger’s duty to observe diligence to avoid injury. Negligence or intentional assault by carrier’s employee Gillaco vs. vs. 97 Phil. De Jesus 17 SCRA 739 (1966) Aboitiz Shipping Co. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991) 1. Court of Appeals Isaac vs. Actual/Compensatory Damages (Arts. 2203. Court of Appeals 324 SCRA 147 (2000) 3. Court of Appeals Calalas vs. 2199. Manila Railroad Co. CA 294 SCRA 19 (1998) D. MRR & Benguet Auto Line 18 SCRA 732 (1966) . Inc vs. Sumayang 103 SCRA 197 (1981) 304 SCRA 27 (1999) 332 SCRA 356 (2000) 346 SCRA 870 (2000) 4.C. CA. 75 (1958) Japan Airlines vs. NCC) A. Court of Appeals Cervantes vs. IAC 167 SCRA 363 (1988) Termination of Carrier’s 2. 2201.

IAC. Alliance Transport 148 SCRA 440 (1987) Marchan vs. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 476 (1990) PAL vs. 266 (1959) Lopez vs. Mendoza 24 SCRA 888 (1968) 2. 2232-2233. 523 (1957) Fores vs. . supra. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. CA 106 SCRA 391 C. Pan American 16 SCRA 431 (1966) Ortigas Jr. CA 122 SCRA 958 (1983) PAL vs.Marchan vs. Moral Damages (Arts. Mendoza. Court of Appeals 121 SCRA 769 (1983) Pan American World Airways vs. supra TransWorld Airlines vs. Damages in case of death De Caliston vs. NCC) Cachero vs. Lufthansa 64 SCRA 610 (1975) Phil. vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab 101 Phil. 2229. 2216-2217. CA 185 SCRA 110 (1990) B. NCC) Prudenciado vs. 2206. 2219-2220. CA 165 SCRA 143 (1988) Armovit vs. Exemplary Damages (Arts. Miranda 105 Phil. Esguerra 117 SCRA 741 (1982) Sweet Lines vs.

. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional. the general community or population. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability.SUMMARY OF CASE DOCTRINES De Guzman vs. episodic or unscheduled basis. and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier." i. without regard to whether or not such carrier .e. and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. Court of Appeals Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both.

with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. Planters Products. would be offensive to sound public policy. its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. provided the charter is limited to the ship only. Indubitably.has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew. Fisher vs. in the ordinary course of business. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship. The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such that it is within the power of the State to impose such just regulations in the interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper. the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives without qualification or conditions may have the effect of subjecting any person or locality or the traffic is such explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary prejudice or discrimination. a stranger to the crew and to the ship. operates as a common carrier. be the property of the charterer. chosen and hired by the shipowner. US vs. notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience. that a common carrier becomes private. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient reason the discrimination for such is reasonable and necessary. a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship. Quinahon . the ship captain. transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. Yangco In construing Act 98 for the alleged violation. YSC has not met those conditions. as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. the manning of the decks. Hardly then can the charterer be charged. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such. the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum". although her holds may. that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. vs. Inc. CA It is not disputed that respondent carrier. for the moment.

and there was only “one shipper. It does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. American Steamship Agencies. Loadstar Shipping Co. First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. undue and unreasonable discrimination which the law forbids. The NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the common carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. It is however not believed that the law prohibits common carriers from making special rates for the handling and transporting of merchandise. when the same are made for the purpose of increasing their business and to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits. Inc. it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route. i. a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or . It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently. and this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. Under American Jurisprudence. The law of equality is in force only where the services performed in the different cases are substantially the same and the circumstances and conditions are similar. It is only unjust. Inc.There is no pretense that it actually cost more to handle the rice for the province than it did for the merchants with whom the special contracts were made. The definition of “common carriers” in NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by land. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods. and transports the goods by land and for compensation. to all persons who choose to employ its services. vs. petroleum products.e. Home Insurance Company vs. one consignee for a special cargo.” The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. sea or water is erroneous. that is. episodic or unscheduled. Absolute equality is not required in all cases. occasional. there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. water or air. for hire as a public employment. There was a clear discrimination against the province which is prohibited by the law. CA Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC. (De Guzman Ruling upheld) Respondent’s argument that the term “common carrier” as used in Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving vehicles or vessels either by land.. CA Based on Article 1732 NCC. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC.

Recovery can’t be had. PANTRANCO Considering the environmental circumstances of the case. the conveyance of passengers. The contention of private respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private carrier. The Court does not see any reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just for the purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen.chartered to a special person only becomes a private carrier. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water service under the guise that it is a mere private ferry service. does not transport cargo or shipment for the general .separating the land. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied. PANTRANCO does not deny that it charges its passengers separately from the charges for the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen. CA In the instant case. for loss or damage to the cargo against shipowners. It carried passengers or goods only for those it chose under a special contract of charter party. trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service. which are small body of waters . not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo trucks is absurd. as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. It is a private carrier that renders tramping service and as such. Indeed evidence to this effect has been submitted. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when crossing rivers or even lakes. As a private carrier. unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said owner or its managers. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. however. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved. San Pablo vs. as distinguished from agents or employees. a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of the highway. it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. National Steel Corporation vs. when as in this case the two terminals. Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions of law. Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not be considered as a continuation of the highway. PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it did so as a private carrier and not as a common carrier.

private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC. The object and purpose of such procedure. Samar Mining Company. vs.” By its terms. KMU vs. statistics and such other means necessary. public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence. or conversely. one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. Nordeutscher Lloyd The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld. the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner. among other things. the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility. Tatad vs. while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. Inc. public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. Garcia In law. empirical data. in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. There is no doubt that Art. is to look out for. The said article contemplates a situation where the goods . The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. and protect. Consequently. are determined primarily by stipulations in their contracts of private carriage or charter party. including their respective liability for damage to the cargo. real and/or testimonial.public. Garcia “The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case.

the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. the carrier. the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Under said article. storm. the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However. Intermediate Appellate Court 1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. a special law. the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. and the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent. earthquake.” However. Common carriers are responsible for the loss. Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity. Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734. In sales. supra. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. Thus. is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code. actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller. or to the person who has a right to receive them. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. the Court said that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination. unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. (2) Under the Civil Code. By the same token. and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or heard of. the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee. destruction. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines. in all matters not regulated by said Code. according to all the circumstances of each case. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods.had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier. lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. . common carriers. there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. destruction or deterioration. As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734.

Alday The court has held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. However. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage. particularly Articles 826 to 839. during or after the occurrence of the disaster. This . cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease contract had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. Gelisan is not without recourse because he has a right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount he may be required to pay. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel. although not effective against the public is valid and binding between the contracting parties. under the provisions of the Code of Commerce. the shipowner or carrier. CA Significantly. Benedicto vs. including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. This is due to the fact that the lease contract in question.And even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil Code. The claim of the petitioners that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to 3rd persons. the transfer is not binding upon the public and 3rd persons. It is a settled rule in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a Franchise is transferred or lease to another without obtaining the requisite approval. Gelisan vs. it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss." and that the carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before. Intermediate Appellate Court The prevailing doctrine in common carriers make the owner liable for consequences having from the operations of the carrier even though the specific vehicle involved may have been transferred to another person. The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent. National Development Company vs.” This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish satisfactorily. a term broad enough to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract.

As to solidarity. The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged transferee. Intermediate Appellate Court Unquestionably. direct and solidary. as the registered owner/operator and grantee of the franchise. Lita Enterprises Inc. and joint and several or solidary with the driver. Inc. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. like petitioner Philtranco. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. the parties herein operated under an arrangement. Santos vs. whereby a person who has been . the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof.doctrine rests upon the principle in dealing with vehicles registered under Public Service Law. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. is directly and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to SIBUG. direct. the latter. the injured party. Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. PHILTRANCO Service Enterprise. Thus. This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service Commission. 2181. vs. comonly known as the "kabit system". as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle. as the kabit was the true owner as against VIDAD. Sibug Although SANTOS. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary. private respondents are not required to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier. Court of Appeals We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. It would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter. 2194. contrary to petitioner’s claim. Since the employer's liability is primary. for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. vs.

1956. he is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation. 1734. the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier. In any case. the intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void.granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. Ganzon’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss. Consequently. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract. and upon their receipt by the carrier of transportation. Intermediate Appellate Court The ruling in Lita Enterprises Inc. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense. such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery by the carrier to the consignee or persons with right to receive them. Moreover. void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. According to Art 1738. By the delivery made during Dec. but will leave them both where it finds them. there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner’s employees. The defect of in existence of a contract is permanent and cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Ganzon vs. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government . To exempt from liability the owner of a public vehicle who operates it under the “boundary system” on the ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to abet flagrant violations of the Public Service Law but also to place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers. Teja Marketing vs. CA Petitioner Ganzon failed to show that the loss of the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art. IAC is upheld. therefore. The fact . The owner continued to be the operator of the vehicle in legal contemplation and as such. the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and. vs. destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Magboo vs. Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. 1. Bernardo The features which characterize the boundary system are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between the parties from that of employer and employee. The order of the acting Mayor did not constitute valid authority for petitioner to carry out. The petitioner was not duly bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap of iron.

its failure to collect the freight charge is the common carrier's own lookout. the carrier cannot escape liability. In the instant case. is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof. actually or constructively. common carriers. Where the common carrier accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it placed in the vehicle by its own employee. in our area. Thus. defendant appellant's employee even helped Fatima Minerva Fortades and her brother load the luggages/baggages in the bus' baggage compartment. receipted or paid for. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Court of Appeals In a contract of private carriage. the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies. declared. Court of Appeals The heavy seas and rains referred to in the master’s report were not caso fortuito but normal occurrences that an ocean-going vessel. These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide for. the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer. and the carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had admittedly carried in this case. Neither was this required of the other passengers. in the ordinary course of a voyage. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy.that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board did not impair the contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody & control of the carrier. exempting the . Sarkies Tours Phils vs. Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs. Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. by the carrier to the person who has a right to receive them. without asking that they be weighed. and this liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals Under the Civil Code. No such evidence exists of record. and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered. particularly in the month of September which. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of the ship's hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship. It is responsible for the consequent loss of the baggage.

The liability and responsibility of the carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on their actual delivery to. private carriage does not involve the general public. Yobido vs. resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five day’s use. and they cannot be loaded directly on the vessel and lighters are sent by the vessel to bring the goods to it. Court of Appeals The explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous event. their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. good customs. is a good delivery and binds the vessel receiving the freight. Insurance Co. where there is a contract to carry goods from one port to another. Thus. or receipt by. and if actually no goods are received there can be no such contract. public order. or public policy. the lighters are for the time its substitutes. a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. Indeed. the liability commencing at the time of delivery to the lighter and. so that the bill of landing is applicable to the goods as soon as they are placed on the lighters. similarly. There are human factors involved in the situation. Moreover. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code. A common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from the accident. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used is of a brand name noted for quality. . where it is the custom to deliver in that way. having failed to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence. petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. morals. the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Consequently. the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Compania Maritima vs. Hence. We stress that in a contract of private carriage. of North America The receipt of goods by the carrier has been said to lie at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver. such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law.shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. the carrier or an authorized agent and delivery to a lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel. the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

Lu Do vs. destruction and deterioration. or to the person who has a right to receive them. the issuance of a bill of lading is not necessary to complete delivery and acceptance. The bill of lading is juridically a documentary proof of the stipulations and conditions agreed upon by both parties. Even where it is provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of the bill of lading. A bill of lading is not indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. Steam The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by .Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper. then it can be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established. Servando vs. Klepper With regard to the contention of the carrier that COGSA should control in this case. although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and asserted in the bill of lading. Phil. contemplated in Article 1736. Binamira While delivery of the cargo to the consignee. vs. 1736-1738.” This means that the law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code. and not merely with the formal execution of a receipt or bill of lading. because in such case the goods are still in the hands of the Government and the owner cannot exercise dominion over them. Therefore. we believe however that the parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have still to through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actually turned over to the consignee. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that “the laws of the country to which the goods are transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss. Ltd. The liability of the carrier as common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for transportation. said section is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code. actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier. the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws. NCC governs said rights and obligations. American President Lines. Art.” Art. “in all matter not regulated by this Code. Under 1766 of NCC. the same is of as moment. This is a situation where we may say that the carrier losses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for what may happen during the interregnum.

as between the shipper and the carrier." Saludo. . . . . and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an airway bill estops the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill." a further reading and a more faithful quotation of the authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than a contract between the shipper and the carrier. that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question. however. if he adheres. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. vs. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. that is. . Court of Appeals Except as may be prohibited by law. It should be pointed out.Article 1736. fire . Jr. for that matter. morals or public policy. We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. Court of Appeals. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. he gives his consent. where the same issue was resolved in this wise: “While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket.. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. public enemies. there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events. the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment therein the following stipulation: Clause 14.. . and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. the execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. (However). are contracts not entirely prohibited. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. There is no law which requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or. war. Between the consignor of goods and receiving . there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading. when no goods have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the true facts . . the loss is chargeable against the appellant. . . Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. and that they did not sign the same. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. that the former should precede the latter.

Only when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss. if it is shown that the consignor knew of its terms. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. In order that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise. absent the excepting causes under Article 1734. it must appear that the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed on its face. CA The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. and in the absence of fraud or mistake. However. of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. recitals in a bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. This rule applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents. such receipt comes within the general rule." There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him. Thus.carrier. he is estopped from thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. and acceptance under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of . Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. where a shipper accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to be found on the back. And. Macam vs. unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu. in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier. the liability of the common carrier commences. and the shipper is held to have accepted and to be bound by the conditions there to be found. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier. the fact must outweigh the recital. there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession. As between the consignor and a receiving carrier. custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them. and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance.

delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his "people. bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. When mangoes and watermelons are in season. was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. Philippine Airlines . Shewaram vs. his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week. 1736 had. petitioner nevertheless. From the testimony of petitioner. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee." In transactions covered by a letter of credit. there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability. unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time. other than the consignee. The goods are released to GPC. In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment. Barretto Limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason for less than 1/8 the actual value of the goods is unconscionable and therefore against public policy. In the case before us. we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. Ysmael vs. In this regard. CA While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. conformably with Art. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers. and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery. unless such exemption is just and reasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made.the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which. the right to receive them was proper. Maersk Line vs. we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3) years already. there was not a single instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes.

in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. the award based on the alleged market value of the goods is erroneous. is binding. unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value. embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. The passenger is considered not having agreed to the stipulation on the ticket. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion". and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". Furthermore. In this case. Court of Appeals While it may be true that the passenger had not signed the plane ticket. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Citadel Lines. vs. the liability of common carrier to the consignee is governed primarily by the Civil Code. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the passenger was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. It is provided in a clause in the BOL that its liability is limited to . CA Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading. Applying the Civil Code provisions (Article 1749 and 1750) the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the common carrier for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said rule unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional charges is valid and binding on the consignee. a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss. Inc. A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. Ong Yiu vs. vs. IAC Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by the laws of the country of destination and the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines. he gives his consent. if he adheres. are contracts not entirely prohibited. Inc. destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid. Sea Land Services. as manifested by the fact that he did not sign the ticket. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances.It can not be said that a contract has been entered into between a passenger and the common carrier.

vs.US$2. vs.00) Yen. had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. if paid. The consignee also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of lading. without any objection. Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s journey to PAL. The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was overruled although it is recognized in the Philippines. as its subcontractor or agent. Hence. When an action is based on breach of contract of carriage. CA In the bill of lading. Everett Seamship Corp. the first and second kinds of stipulations . However. The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that the common carrier has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by the shipper. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence. the carrier made it clear that all claims for which it may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums. stating that BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani(the passenger) to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation. The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation. CA The contract of transportation was exclusively between the passenger and common carrier BA. the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL. Macondray Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous air transportation. it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.E. Heacock Co. British Airways vs.00/kilo. H. And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. Its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100. and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss. since the latter was not a party in the contract. According to an almost uniform weight of authority. the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies. the shipper.000.

. (2) Knowing fully well that it would take no less than fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine. on which Condition No. he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value does not conflict with any sound principle of public policy. petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental. “we are leaving already”. will not cause inconvenience to.are invalid as being contrary to public policy. and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and then recover a larger value in case of loss. as was done in the instant case. but the third is valid and enforceable. and when plaintiff-appellees wanted to leave the port and gave up the trip. it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets. much less prejudice. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first. under Condition No. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of petitioner in that: (1) Defendants.Appellants did not give notice to plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the vessel. 14. and names his valuation. understandingly and freely. 14 is Printed in fine letters. We find and hold that Condition No. vs. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu.appellants instead made announce ment of assurance that the vessel would leave within a short period of time. Upon the other hand. defendants. Sweet Lines Inc. he cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he thus places upon his property. the ends of justice. instead of enhance. 2220 of the Civil Code. since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who. TEVES Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the country today. (3) Defendants.appellants did not offer to refund plaintiffs-appellees’ tickets nor provide them with transportation form Tacloban to Catbalogan.appellants employees would come and say. Under Art. will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. Hence. and second. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature. defendants. The condition will thus defeat. under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry. If a common carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates and if the shipper makes such a choice. moral damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. petitioner. Condition No.

the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage. Firearms. upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket. Hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in- . The passenger ticket complies with Article 3. The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. In the case at bar. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line. The provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. The passenger. vs. Inc. Firearms and grenades are brought to the plane surreptitiously. PAL could not have been faulted for want of diligence. vs. private respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages. he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. PAL was not negligent so as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations.Quisumbing Sr. Rapadas The Warsaw Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. although there is an occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal. hand-grenades. which provides: (c) a notice to the effect that. dynamite. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining hijackers. the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. and explosives are introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth. was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. Pan American World Airways. particularly for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board the plane. The hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Court of Appeals The highjacking-robbery was force majeure.

tardily. do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and employees. There can be no doubt that Dr. to comply with a contract of carriage. which is absurd. in bad faith. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers. as in the case at bar. The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability.luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Alitalia vs. inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. Otherwise. but beyond this. from the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when. entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. She is not. she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference. and Dr. In the case at bar. having gone to Rome. of course. but without appreciable damage. the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. In other words. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers. an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal. it is true. Nocum vs. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety. her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila. Certainly. belatedly. which gradually turned to panic and finally despair. not to speak of his own. Intermediate Appellate Court The Warsaw Convention's provisions. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search. As already mentioned. no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline. constitutional boundaries are already in danger of . allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary. but safely.

being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Mecenas vs. CA The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of Capt. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel after collision, did not cause the collision by themselves, such failures doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life and, moreover, were indicative of the kind and level of diligence exercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels. The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban not only of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry. Under these circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises. Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. CA The Duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel. (Same Ruling with Mecenas)

Korean Airlines Co., LTD. vs. CA

The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Fortune Express Inc. vs. CA Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was already a warning by the PC. No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life.

Gatchalian vs. Delim The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them that it was normal. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver. Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. A cursory examination of the purported waiver will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. Del Castillo vs. Jaymalin Common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It appears proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge the conductor

might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. Phil. the injured person is entitled to recovery. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. Valencia . Lara vs. would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. In this he failed. Therefore. CA The doctrine. since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. IAC The principle about "the last clear" chance. the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants. and an injury results. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. Bustamante vs. the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney.should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. All premises considered. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. As the doctrine is usually stated. stated broadly." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. In other words. assuming such calculation to be correct.

" the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. "The rule is established by weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation. he has no remedy against him. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment. adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel. cannot be charged to JAL. hence. Paras While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers. and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law. when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event.The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. In this connection. the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier. and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care. while the carrier usually has. Thus. It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new . CA Accordingly. the carrier cannot be held liable. JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. In this regard. whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred. A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence. the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure. Japan Airlines vs. Pinatubo eruption. Corollarily. Necessito vs. and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. 1991.

It is clear therefore that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. CA The liability of the carrier for the child. it affords reasonable evidence. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. making the employer of the driver liable for the negligence of his employee. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination. persists. an employee of the private respondent. And. that the accident arose from want of care. after alighting from the car.passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. La Mallorca vs. who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus for her safety under the contract of carriage. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. under the circumstances involved. what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. Layugan vs. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. vs. But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient. Aboitiz Shipping Co. the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano. It follows that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable. aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. IAC Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter. CA .

Moreover. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier. as in the instant case. Once created. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. in case of death or injuries to passengers. petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. Further. When the accident occurred. the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has. Under Art. his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. pursuant to Art. unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Mallari Sr. without fault on account of the manner of handling the . such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. under Art. was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of a passenger of the jeepney. CA Clearly. unless there is proof to the contrary. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers.. the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes. 1756 of the Civil Code. for example. 1755 of the Civil Code. and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. 2185 of the Civil Code. vs. from petitioner's vessel.The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Under Art. it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. CA It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads. 1759 of the same Code. which he had every right to do. a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Bayasen vs. after reaching his destination.

car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. Cervantes vs. CA Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said agents, acted without authority when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. Calalas vs. CA It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. The driver of jeepney did not carry “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers

than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. These are violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore, there is no assumption of risk by the passenger. Pestaño vs. Sumayang In the case at bar, Pestaño, as a professional driver operating a public transport bus, should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby. Maranan vs. Perez The basis of the common carrier's liability under NCC for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the

second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. Art. 1759, evidently follows the rule based on the second view. Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude. PNR vs. CA When a train boarded by the deceased passenger was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train, the common carrier is negligent. Likewise when the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge, there was negligence. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. If the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, be required in the absence of such emergency. By placing his left arm on the window, petitioner is guilty of contributory negligence. It cannot however relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. 1762). It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury. Bachelor Express Inc vs. CA The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such

the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus. In this case. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount. vs. as a young "training assistant" and when the deceased’s potentiality and capacity to increase his future income was not considered said liability may be enforced upon finality of the decision. such as a four-year rule. Cariaga vs. no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption. Inc. the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running. of a purely arbitrary standard. 2201 of the Civil Code. an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. which are those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. Bachelor was negligent. the bus was speeding from a full stop. in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. also. Pan American World Airways vs. which is the annual salary of deceased at the time of his death.184.that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. LTB Co The income which deceased could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category provided for by Art. IAC . it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure.00 a year. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. not only relevant. and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law. However. but. in the case at bar. CA Life expectancy is. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. When the liability of common carrier had been fixed at a minimal rate of only of P2. LTB had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith. LTB could not be held liable to pay moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. Villa Rey Transit.

In view of it nature.757. or when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid. who sustained the bodily injuries. MRR In case of physical injuries. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is. but it is malice nevertheless. Self enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant. defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. It is to be observed however. It will be observed that the defendant companies offered to settle the case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5.76. rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum of P76. just and demandable claim. Defendant having breached its contract with plaintiff in bad faith. The Soberanos. as the name implies. that in the complaint." Now. plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the kind of damages they . to provide an example or correction for public good . nor counterclaim of error for the same by the respondents. Soberano vs. nor proof. having found bad faith on the part of defendant. An award of attorney's fees is also in order. not her husband Jose. In this case it was Juana Soberano. Bad faith was also present. Mendoza It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer. moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin. it should be imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contract in the future by defendant and other airlines. plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable. Attorneys fees may only be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest. The fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in order to accommodate a white man in an airline owned by an American firm with a reputation for bumping off non. since the body of the complaint sought to recover damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's employee and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages. unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary.000.By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight. however. it is not error to have awarded exemplary damages.Caucasian to accommodate whites is very regrettable. Marchan vs.

000. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. not of his beneficiary. Since the civil liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is subsidiary and. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code.00 paid to the herein petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance. among others. the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P 10. there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. whichever is shorter. the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant driver. the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right. . arises from the same culpa. foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive. Court of Appeals The deletion of the P10. the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary.000. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. . in effect. Even in the absence of local statute and case law. If the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved. at bottom. and the reason is obvious because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages. However. De Caliston vs. the P5. The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which Dalmacio was responsible. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition. For the settlement of the issue at hand.000.are trying to recover against the defendant's carrier. therefore. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises. their determination depending upon the discretion of the court. as established by authorities. resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. On the other hand.00 awarded for loss of pension is unjustified. to compensatory damages. Philippine Airlines vs. it need not also be alleged. CA 185 SCRA 110 Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is.00 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one year if she did not die. the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased.

and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract. because defendant's failure to meet its responsibility was not the cause that compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interests. specially of paragraph 2 thereof. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of said Article because the Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees. But the exceptional rule of Art. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. Lopez vs. on which point this Court agrees. The one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the driver of defendant's taxicab but he was not made party defendant to the case. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased". that entitles the spouse. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. does not maintain his action against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused but on an alleged breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets . 2206. in the present case. The present case does not come under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Pan American As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs.Cachero vs. serious anxiety and mental anguish. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. Fores vs. Therefore. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab While under the law. plaintiff. employers are made responsible for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The present action was instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant amount for moral damages and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to such demand. wounded feelings. therefore. Miranda The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. the latter suffered social humiliation. 2220. However. as required by Art. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. the defendant taxicab company has not committed any criminal offense resulting in physical injuries against the plaintiff. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for moral damages as his case does not come within the exception of paragraph 1 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

only to be found among the tourist passengers. after having contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly confirmed and validated. A passenger contracts for first class accommodations for many reasons peculiar to himself and pays a higher price therefor. inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. vs. contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. which he has to take in order to be able to arrive at his destination on his scheduled time.00 is appropriate. For the moral damages sustained by him. who may not be discriminated against with impunity.issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stopovers. when in truth such was not the case. the breach appears to be of graver nature. and it is certainly not for the airplane to say later. We have uniformly upheld the right of a passenger to damages in all cases wherein. therefore. Lufthansa It is Our considered view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage. he is transferred over his objection to economy. but his aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers. since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino. Ortigas Jr. Esguerra . that economy class is anyway just as good as first class. such as in this case. And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez was going to the United States to attend a private business conference of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company. and in fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore. after it deprives him of his space in order to favor another passenger. What worsened the situation of was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping Ortigas as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given first class accommodation at the next stations. But in the instant case. they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them.000. the proper arrangements therefor having been made already. class. A consideration of the attorney’s prominence as well as comparison of the defense counsel’s fees could well establish the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees. A written contract for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such. Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. an award of P100.

Armovit vs. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration. even if he was sick. CA Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy. and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. This being the case. CA 106 SCRA 391 There was gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is welltaken since there is an award of actual damages. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code. The Court of Appeals found that the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. even if death does not result. Philippine Airlines vs.Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. the private respondent was a practicing lawyer. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the accident. More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances. At the time of this unfortunate incident. Nominal damages cannot coexist with actual or compensatory damages. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. CA The gross negligence committed by private respondent(Northwest Airlines) in the issuance of the tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of departure and without changing or correcting the error when the tickets were presented for re-confirmation and the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages. no moral damages are recoverable. both vehicles were in their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the community. particularly as to their convenience. Trans World Airlines vs. he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. having tumor on his . In other words. as in the instant case.

Respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the right along Taft Ave. she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering. The dizziness. Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: “In quasi-delicts. private respondent warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. applying the provisions of Article 2220. her fears can be more real and intense than an ordinary person. as the name implies. Being a doctor by profession. Otherwise stated. coming from Ayala Boulevard. Prudenciado vs. considering that the traffic was clear. it was raining that time and the roads are slippery. private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice. to provide an example or correction for the public good. justifying the recovery of moral damages. As to exemplary damages. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures. And therefore there is causal connection between the accident and said aftereffects. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-employer relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment. serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness. . Alliance Transport Dra.nose. when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet. he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision. Much more. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence. headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. One month prior to the crash-landing. Failing to notice petitioner's car. 2219(2) is applicable.” The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease. The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and can lead to some.

respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to different establishments in Pangasinan. his helper and the cargo. since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui.150. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendaña is a junk dealer who was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Petitioner argued that private respondent. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held responsible for the value of the lost goods. Petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines).00. 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent. such loss having been due to force majeure. in Urdaneta. respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates. . Tarlac. while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada. respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. On the return trip to Pangasinan. by armed men who took with them the truck. Inc. For that service. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner. being a common carrier. Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. its driver. the claimed value of the lost merchandise.I. He utilized two six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. Petitioner commenced action against private respondent demanding payment of P22. Pangasinan. should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material. respondent's driver and employee. and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the law. plus damages and attorney's fees. CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER DE GUZMAN vs. contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from its warehouse in Makati to petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta.

without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry. (2) Act of the public enemy in war. Whether or not respondent is liable." i. It would follow. storm. Yes. (4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers. 2. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public. No. Held: 1. Issue: 1. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier. that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. 4 and 5 of the preceding article. a sideline to his scrap iron business. The hijacking of the carrier's truck does not fall within any of the five categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods. and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience. and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. if the goods are lost. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability. destroyed or deteriorated. Whether or not respondent is a common carrier. 2. whether international or civil. 3. would be offensive to sound public policy.. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience. 2. Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss. CA reversed the decision and held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual occupation”. episodic or unscheduled basis.e. and (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Article 1735 also provides as follows: In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. . unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. lightning or other natural disaster or calamity.The RTC ruled that private respondent was a common carrier. the general community or population. earthquake.

Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. in other words. for the cost of the shortage in the and the diminution in value of that portion contaminated with dirt. violence or force. may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent.therefore. (CSCI). The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage. threat. KKKK. however. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: PPI purchased from Mitsubishi metric tons of Urea fertilizer which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel owned by KKKK from US to La Union. if not irresistible. PLANTERS PRODUCTS. that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Japan. private respondent should have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk. the standard of extraordinary diligence required private respondent to retain a security guard to ride with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper. PPI sent a claim letter to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA). armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. INC. Petitioner argues that in the circumstances of this case. the resident agent of the carrier. In these circumstances. unjust and contrary to public policy: (6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves. a time charter-party on the vessel was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner. We do not believe. Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel. Article 1745 provides in relevant part: Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable. then tied with steel bonds. The survey report submitted revealed a shortage in the cargo and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating was contaminated with dirt. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper. however. is dispensed with or diminished. A private marine and cargo surveyor. vs. This presumption. violence or force. Prior to its voyage. in Tokyo. that the hijacking of the carrier's vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735. Accused acted with grave. In the instant case. or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat. was hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped. SSA explained that . they were all presumably inspected by the charterer's representative and found fit to take a load of urea. provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable. that in the instant case. covered with three layers of tarpaulin. the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids.

its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. and that they had nothing to do with the discharge of the shipment. although her holds may. The defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy governing common carriers does not apply to them because they have become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charterparty. with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. American Steamship Agencies. . relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. for the moment. as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. Held: 1. Issue: 1) Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party. 2) Whether the shipowner was able to prove that he had exercised that degree of diligence required of him under the law. PPI filed an action for damages. and the defendants considered private carriers. it ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time charterer-party. operates as a common carrier.. Even if the provisions of the charter-party are deemed valid. a stranger to the crew and to the ship. the burden of proving that the loss or damage was due to any of the causes which exempt him from liability is shifted to the carrier. provided the charter is limited to the ship only. the ship captain. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship. After that. notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff. stating that “common carriers are presumed negligent. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew. all that a shipper has to do in a suit to recover for loss or damage is to show receipt by the carrier of the goods and to delivery by it of less than what it received.” CA reversed the decision. v. the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a presumption of negligence do not find application in the case at bar. in the ordinary course of business. that a common carrier becomes private. the manning of the decks. a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship. transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. Indubitably. Inc. be the property of the charterer. it was still incumbent upon them to prove that the shortage or contamination sustained by the cargo is attributable to the fault or negligence on the part of the shipper or consignee in the loading.) Not necessarily. Hardly then can the charterer be charged. common or private he may be. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum". It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such. the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened. It is not disputed that respondent carrier. stowing. Accordingly. This they failed to do. at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charterparty is concerned. trimming and discharge of the cargo.they did not respond to the consignee's claim because it was not a formal claim. chosen and hired by the shipowner.

for we have observed that the growing concern for safety in the transportation of passengers and /or carriage of goods by sea requires a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws. as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss. In construing Act 98 for the alleged violation. and not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. as was the case at bar. the steel pontoon hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids. the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives without qualification or conditions may have the effect of subjecting any person or locality or the traffic is such . respondent carrier has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration. by clear and convincing proof. It was shown during the trial that after the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship’s holds. powder or other explosives" from any and all shippers who may offer such explosives for carriage can be held to be a lawful act. Held: No. Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the board of YFC to accept for carriage "dynamite.Respondent carrier's heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance Co. SC agreed that the bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage. is misplaced for the reason that the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a stipulation in the charter-party exempting the shipowners from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent. FISHER vs. F. with a variable weather condition prevalent during its unloading. 2. Fisher. more particularly. Moreso. adopted a resolution which was ratified by the stockholders declaring classes of merchandise which are not to be carried by the vessels of the company and prohibiting the employees to carry dynamite. Also shown. the rules governing common carriers. The Collector of Customs suspended the issuance of clearances for the vessels unless they carry the explosives. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. the rule in the United States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo is not a common carrier.C. a stockholder of YSC. the RTC’s statement on the requirements of the law was reiterated. then covered with 3 layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with steel bonds. SC held that respondent carrier has sufficiently overcome. Clearly. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship’s boom. At any rate.) Yes. In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped. v.YANGCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY Facts: The board of Yangco Steamship Co. does not find application in our jurisdiction. American Steamship Agencies. was that the hull of the vessel was in good condition. foreclosing the possibility of spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel. powder or other explosives. filed a petition for prohibition. the prima facie presumption of negligence.

(PGAI) for P4 Million.COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On November 19.986 sacks of rice belonging to Ilocos Norte Provincial Government from Manila. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient reason the discrimination for such is reasonable and necessary.(MIC) against various risks including “TOTAL LOSS BY TOTAL LOSS OF THE VESSEL”. however ignored the same. on its way to Manila from Nasipit. There is no pretense that it actually cost more to handle the rice for the province than it did for the merchants with whom the special contracts were made. . The law of equality is in force only where the services performed in the different cases are substantially the same and the circumstances and conditions are similar. There was a clear discrimination against the province which is prohibited by the law. The vessel. 1984. the vessel sank off Limasawa Island. Absolute equality is not required in all cases. On November 20. undue and unreasonable discrimination which the law forbids. and charged the provincial treasurer 10 centavos for each sack instead of 6 centavos which they have been regularly charging for the unloading of the same kind of merchandise and under virtually the same circumstances and conditions. INC. when they unloaded in the port of Currimao 5. The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such that it is within the power of the State to impose such just regulations in the interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper. The goods were insured with Manila Insurance Co. MIC paid the insured in full settlement of its claim. LOADSTAR received on board its M/V Cherokee goods(certain types of wood) for shipment. was insured by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance. vs. in turn. As a result of the total loss of its shipment. They were convicted.. 1984. LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO. QUINAHON Facts: Defendants were charged for violation of Act 98. YSC has not met those conditions. when the same are made for the purpose of increasing their business and to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits. Agusan del Norte. hence they appealed to the higher court. It is however not believed that the law prohibits common carriers from making special rates for the handling and transporting of merchandise. the consignee made a claim with LOADSTAR which. US vs. Inc. Issue: Whether or not the defendants as common carriers caused prejudice to the Ilocos Norte Government.explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary prejudice or discrimination. It is only unjust. Held: Yes. As the insurer.

On February 4. CA was also mentioned. American Steamship Agencies. especially where. The trial court rendered judgment for MIC. petitioner paid the amount of tax for the first quarter under protest. Loadstar being the party insured. v. Petitioner argued that as a pipeline operator with a government concession engaged in transporting petroleum products via . which appears to be purely coincidental. There was no charter party. it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route. and this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic. The records do not disclose that the M/V Cherokee. The doctrine enunciated in the case of De Guzman v. where the Court held that a common carrier transporting special cargo or chartering the vessel to a special person becomes a private carrier that is not subject to the provisions of the Civil Code. 1985. In support of its position Loadstar relied on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. but only a general provision to the effect that the M/V Cherokee was a general cargo carrier. In 1995. install and operate oil pipelines. Loadstar claimed force majeur. as in this case. episodic or unscheduled. one consignee for a special cargo. is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common carrier to a private carrier. Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC. Held: No. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under RA 387 to contract. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement. Loadstar fits the definition of a common carrier under Article 1732 of the NCC. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case. Respondent treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year in 1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code. PGAI averred that MIC has no cause of action against it. prompting Loadstar to go to the CA which affirmed the decision. petitioner applied for a Mayor’s permit in Batangas City. alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of Loadstar and its employees. PGAI was later dropped as a party defendant after it paid the insurance proceeds to Loadstar. on the date in question. This case however is not applicable in the case at bar for the simple reason that the actual settings are different. MIC filed a complaint against Loadstar and PGAI. and there was only “one shipper. To avoid hampering its operations. the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper. Issue: Whether or not Loadstar is a private carrier. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs.” The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. CA decision is hereby affirmed. it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers. occasional. undertook to carry a special cargo or was chartered to a special person only. Further. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC. The first pipeline concession was granted in 1967 and was renewed by the ERB in 1992.

for hire as a public employment. water or air. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently. owner and operator of the vessel. Facts: A Peruvian firm shipped fishmeal through the SS Chowborough consigned to the San Miguel Brewery and insured by the Home Insurance Co.pipeline it is exempted from payment of tax based on gross receipts. paid SMB P14. water or air. The definition of “common carriers” in NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by land. i. It is clear that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local government unit the imposition of business tax against common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called "common carrier's tax. Held: No. and transports the goods by land and for compensation. INC. 587 of the Code of Commerce makes the ship agent civilly liable for damages in favor of third persons due to the conduct of carrier’s captain and that the stipulation in the charter party exempting owner from liability is against public policy under Art. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay a local tax based on gross receipts since it is not a common carrier. (De Guzman Ruling upheld) Respondent’s argument that the term “common carrier” as used in Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving vehicles or vessels either by land. . Based on Article 1732 NCC.e. petroleum products. that is. to all persons who choose to employ its services. not the shipowner is responsible for any loss or damage of the cargo. Respondent refused to make reimbursement on the ground that petitioner is not a common carrier engaged in transportation business by land. It does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle." Petitioner is already paying 3% common carrier's tax on its gross sales/earnings under the National Internal Revenue Code. The lower court absolved Luzon after finding that it observed the required diligence but ordered ASA to reimburse Home Insurance. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES. To tax petitioner again on its gross receipts in its transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the Local Government Code. sea or water is erroneous. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY vs. declaring that Art. ASA appealed. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods. there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. 1744. When the cargo was delivered to SMB there were shortages. Home Insurance Co. NCC. Home Insurance filed for reimbursement from Luzon Stevedoring and American Steamship Agencies. alleging that under the provisions of the Charter Party referred to in the bills of lading. the charterer.000 after its demand. The cargo arrived in Manila and was discharged into the lighters of Luzon Stevedoring Co.

Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied. and Epitacio San Pablo and market conditions in the proposed route cannot support the entry of additional tonnage.Samar that will provide service to company buses and freight trucks that have to cross San Bernardo Strait. As a private carrier. It operates passenger buses from Metro Manila to Bicol Region and Eastern Samar. unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said owner or its managers. which is interrupted by a small body of water. Such being the case there is no need to obtain a separate certificate for public convenience to operate a ferry service.1980 it requested MARINA for authority to lease/purchase a vessel for its project to operate a ferryboat service from Matnog. a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. PANTRANCO claims that it can operate a ferry service in connection with its franchise for bus operation in the highway from Pasay City to Tacloban City for the purpose of continuing the highway.Issue: Are the provisions of the NCC applicable? Held: No. as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. that it proposes to operate a ferry service to carry its passenger buses and freight trucks between Allen and Matnog in connection with its trips to Tacloban City. The BOT granted authority to PANTRANCO to operate a private ferry boat service. PANTRANCO Facts: PANTRANCO offers PUB service for passengers and freight. Recovery can’t be had. for loss or damage to the cargo against shipowners. It wrote the Chairman of the Board of Transportation (BOT). On March 27. PANTRANCO nevertheless acquired the vessel.This was not given due course because the Matnog-Allen run is adequately serviced by Cardinal Shipping Corp. . Issue: W/N a land transportation company can be authorized to operate a ferry service or coastwise or interisland shipping service along its authorized route as an incident to its franchise without the need of filing a separate application for the same.Sorsogon and Allen. the said proposed ferry operation is merely a necessary and incidental service to its main service and obligation of transporting its passengers from Pasay City to Tacloban City. a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only becomes a private carrier. The NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the common carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. as distinguished from agents or employees. to which the petitioners opposed. Under American Jurisprudence. SAN PABLO vs.

1974.Held: No. PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it did so as a private carrier and not as a common carrier. This was affirmed by CA but modified the award of damages. stating that the vessel was seaworthy and that there is no proof of willful negligence of the vessel's officers. the MV ‘VLASONS I’ to make one voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor Manila.separating the land. which are small body of waters . In the instant case. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when crossing rivers or even lakes. Considering the environmental circumstances of the case. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On July 17. Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of the highway. it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water service under the guise that it is a mere private ferry service. plaintiff NSC as charterer and defendant VSI as owner. PANTRANCO does not deny that it charges its passengers separately from the charges for the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen.18 but defendant refused and failed to pay. the conveyance of passengers. Issue: W/N VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or as a private carrier. Indeed evidence to this effect has been submitted.145. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. The Court does not see any reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just for the purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen. when as in this case the two terminals. Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not be considered as a continuation of the highway. not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo trucks is absurd. Held: It is a private carrier. trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service. Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions of law. The cargo was discharged and unloaded by stevedores hired by the plaintiff. hence the appeal. Plaintiff filed with the defendant its claim for damages suffered due to the downgrading of the damaged tinplates in the amount of P941. RTC ruled against the plaintiff. nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. It carried passengers or goods only for . When the vessel’s 3 hatches containing the shipment were opened by plaintiff’s agents. entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel. however. The contention of private respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private carrier.

the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. that VSI “shall not be responsible for losses except on proven wilful negligence of the officers of the vessel. Fernando. the burden of proof was placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement. 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme for provincial bus services in the country. unless the same was caused by its lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy or to ensure that the same was “properly manned. circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant petition. the rates to be approved should be proposed by public service operators ii. carrying and safekeeping the cargo. dated June 26. further provided that the shipowner shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the cargo arising or resulting from unseaworthiness. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner. Consequently.those it chose under a special contract of charter party. NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by VSI’s wilful negligence or failure to exercise due diligence in making MV Vlasons I seaworthy and fit for holding. finding the MO not legally feasible submitted a memorandum to DOTC Secretary Orbos as it contravenes the Public Service Act for the following reasons: i. LTFRB Chairman. affirming the RTC decision in favor of defendant and dismissing the complaint is Affirmed. including their respective liability for damage to the cargo. It is clear from the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier. does not transport cargo or shipment for the general public. allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. there should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected parties in the territory affected iii. death and suffering caused by the July 16 earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be politically unsound. the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC. KMU vs. GARCIA Facts: The following memoranda. are determined primarily by stipulations in their contracts of private carriage or charter party. private carriage does not involve the general public.” The NANYOZAI Charter Party(an internationally recognized Charter Party Agreement). Hence. . which was incorporated in the parties’ contract of transportation. The CA decision.” In view of the above. viz: (a) DOTC Memorandum Order 90-395. a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates The chairman added that to allow bus operators to charge fares 15% above the present LTFRB fares in the wake of the devastation. equipped and supplied. It is a private carrier that renders tramping service and as such. Ineluctably.

announced a fare increase of 20% percent of the existing fares. (b) DOTC Department Order No. or a corporation or copartnership. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the oppositor(s). Petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. dated March 30. and Perla C. availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing. Fare Range Scheme: The 20% fare increase imposed by PBOAP without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect.085 per kilometer.92-587. and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24. 1992. the Court found that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order No. private respondent PBOAP. Presumed Public Need: A CPC is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation services for public use as required by law. 94-3112. 1994. providing guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act. defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. 1994 in Case No. LTFRB dismissed the petition hence the present one. 92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. as amended. Among the salient provisions of which include: “In determining public need. 92-587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. laying down rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. the said administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. association or joint-stock company constituted and organized implementing . It was opposed by Philippine Consumers Foundation. The said increase was granted by LTFRB.Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines. 92-587. Sometime in March.” (c) DOTC Memorandum dated October 8. Inc. the following requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted. 92-009. Issue: Whether or not the assailed orders/circulars are valid. Inc. Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable. 1992. 92-587. to wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines. the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. 92-587. Held: While the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the transport sector is recognized. (PBOAP) filed an application for an across-the-board fare increase of P0.

Part IV. represented by Secretary Garcia. provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. Thus. is to look out for. 1992. DOTC. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. signed into law the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum dated October 8. at least 60 % of its stock or paid-up capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC. (a private corporation organized under the laws of HongKong) in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium. Then President Aquino. After prequalifying the bidders for the construction of the said transit. it was found that out of all the applicants. the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators. Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the terms of the BOT Law. and private respondent entered into a supplemental agreement—“Revised and Restated Agreement to Build. public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. TATAD vs. entered into an "Agreement to Build. real and/or testimonial. and (iii) the applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. The existence or non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence. GARCIA Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA referred to as EDSA Light Rail Transit III (EDSA LRT III). The guidelines states: “The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. the same being merely internal communications between administrative officers. . statistics and such other means necessary. in a public hearing conducted for that purpose.under the laws of the Philippines. (ii) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation. empirical data. LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. among other things. It is understood that there must be proper notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC. while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. The object and purpose of such procedure. While adopting the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC. 92-009. public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. and protect. Ltd.” By its terms. DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation. DOTC sought the approval of the President but the same was denied. only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the requirements.

during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC. not a public utility. Issue: Does the fact that EDSA LRT Corporation. in their capacity as Senators and taxpayers. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. Clearly.). v. It will have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD Facts: The case arose from an importation made by plaintiff. a foreign corporation. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. own the facilities and equipment of the LRT III mean it also own the LRT III as a public utility? Held: No... or conversely. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public. Public Service Board.. (represented in the Philippines by its agent.F. question the constitutionality of the two agreements between DOTC and private respondent. vs.. private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by way of lease for 25 years. a foreign corporation. INC. 18 duly issued to consignee SAMAR MINING COMPANY. SHARP & CO. Ltd. C. Petitioners.. they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding public. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility. Secretary Garcia and private respondent on the other hand. the ownership of EDSA LRT III which is a public utility. In law. rolling stocks like the coaches. They contend that it grants EDSA LRT Corp. INC. Ltd. there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks. contend that the nationality requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply to private respondent. what constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public. one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. does not own EDSA LRT III as a public utility. It is DOTC which shall operate the EDSA LRT III. private respondent. private respondent and DOTC agreed that on completion date. INC. rail stations. . In the case at bar. As ruled in Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co.Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" so as to clarify their respective rights and responsibilities and to submit Supplemental Agreement to the President. Therefore. SAMAR of one crate Optima welded wedge wire sieves through the M/S SCHWABENSTEIN a vessel owned by defendant NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD. Ltd. terminals and the power plant. SAMAR MINING COMPANY. EDSA LRT Corp.

The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination. 2. There is no doubt that Art. loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship’s tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship’s tackle to be discharged. 22 SCRA 674 (1968). 18. A careful perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers was looked into by the Court particularly. and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or heard of.) “The carrier or master. public order or public policy their validity was sustained.” (Par. Article 1736 and 1738.” (Par. 16) Finding the above stipulations not contrary to law. . transhipped or forwarded. morals. UNITED STATES LINES. the consignee at the port of destination—Davao. hence the appeal. only up to the “port of discharge from ship”—Manila. shall be considered solely the agent of the shipper and consignee and without any other responsibility whatsoever or for the cost thereof. Germany. Section 1. The said article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier. last subpar. states: “The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay. the importation was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL. The stipulations in the bill of lading in the PHOENIX case which are substantially the same as the subject stipulations provides: “The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are not in its actual custody. good customs. while the freight had been prepaid up to the port of destination or the “port of discharge of goods”—Davao. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. nor received by. M/S SHWABENSTEIN.. Bill of lading. LTD.Upon arrival of the aforesaid vessel at the port of Manila. in making arrangements with any person for or in connection with all transshipping or forwarding of the goods or the use of any means of transportation or forwarding of goods not used or operated by the carrier. No. paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. the goods were to be transhipped by the carrier to the port of destination or “port of discharge of goods”. The goods were however never delivered to. Thereafter. Issue: Whether or not the various clauses and stipulations in the Bill of lading is valid. 18 sets forth in the page 2 thereof that the goods were received by NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD at the “port of loading at Bremen. xxx” The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The carrier undertook to transport the goods in its vessel. vs. Held: Yes. The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld in PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO.

during the same period. The 128 cartons were insured for their stated value by respondent Nisshin and the 2 cases by respondent Dowa. Under said article. as applied to the case. there was. sometime in or prior to June. with appellant acting as agent of the consignee. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES. the M/S ASIATICA. 69044.Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. At the hiatus between these two undertakings of appellant which is the moment when the subject goods are discharged in Manila. ceases to be responsible for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from that point onwards. its personality changes from that of carrier to that of agent of the consignee. into possession in the name of consignee as the latter's agent. Japan for transportation to Manila. Upon such delivery. actual delivery of the goods from appellant as carrier to the same appellant as agent of the consignee. Inc. the carrier.R. Thus. Inc. vs. No. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT Facts: In G. . from possession in its own name as carrier. there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. in effect. and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise. the appellant. as erstwhile carrier. a vessel operated by petitioner loaded at Kobe.. Plaintiff-appellee's complaint is DISMISSED.000 pieces of calorized lance pipes consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co. 18 and in conformity with the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers. The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent. or to the person who has a right to receive them. and 7 cases of spare parts valued consigned to Central Textile Mills. Appealed decision is REVERSED. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for with respondent. actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller. The actions of appellant carrier and of its representative in the Philippines being in full faith with the lawful stipulations of Bill of Lading No. Two undertakings appeared embodied and/or provided for in the Bill of Lading in question. 5. they incur no liability for the loss of the goods in question. the same vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation. Such being the case. Germany to Manila. The first is FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS from Bremen. the character of appellant's possession also changes. 1977. In G. and the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. This is the full import of Article 1736.R. INC. the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee. agency and contracts.. THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE SAME GOODS from Manila to Davao. 71478. No. In sales. The second. By the same token.

The respective respondent Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values to the consignees concerned and were thus subrogated unto the rights of the latter as the insured. Issue: (1) Which law should govern the Civil Code provisions on Common carriers or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? and (2) who has the burden of proof to show negligence of the carrier? Held: (1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss. In this case. destruction. Petitioner Carrier has also proved that the loss was caused by fire. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. Common carriers are responsible for the loss.” However. in all matters not regulated by said Code. (2) Under the Civil Code. common carriers. the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code. or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods. Thus. Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734. The burden then is upon Petitioner Carrier to proved that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734." and that the carrier has "exercised due diligence to . the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines. Japan. the Court said that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. destruction or deterioration. earthquake. as subrogees of the cargo shippers.Enroute for Kobe. it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. supra. Respondents filed a claim for reimbursement from petitioner. a special law. the respective Insurers. which it failed to do. the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. However. The RTC ruled in their favor to which the petitioner appealed. Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity. storm. have proven that the transported goods have been lost. lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. the vessel caught fire and sank. to Manila. And even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil Code. unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. according to all the circumstances of each case.

The vessel figured in a collision at Ise Bay. that the fire must have started 24 hours before the same was noticed. a total of 1. Inc. in effect.prevent or minimize the loss before. that there was "actual fault" of the carrier shown by "lack of diligence" in that when the smoke was noticed. the fire was already big. found. Consequently. and the extent of liability? Held: This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. Plaintiff (DISC) as insurer. 4(2). COURT OF APPEALS Facts: An agreement was entered onto between defendants National Development Company (NDC) and Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP) in accordance of which. unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. during or after the occurrence of the disaster. IAC (150 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) In the case at bar. and that after the cargoes were stored in the hatches.200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to Manila Banking Corporation. MCP and NDC interposed their appeals. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. the complete defense afforded by the COGSA when loss results from fire is unavailing to Petitioner Carrier. NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three oceangiving vessels including one with the name “Dona Nati” appointed MCP as its agents to manage and operate said vessel in its behalf. California and Tokyo. It is provided therein that: Sec. acting for and in behalf of Pan Asiatic Commercial Company. The RTC rendered a decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC. Manila and the People’s Bank and Trust Company.” This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish satisfactorily. who represents Riverside Mills Corporation. as a fact. Plaintiff filed complaint for reimbursement from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent respectively. Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or due to a collision which was found to have been . Philipp Corporation of the New York loaded on board the vessel “Dona Nati” at San Francisco. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. paid the respective claims of holders of the negotiable bills of lading duly endorsed to them. Issue: Which law shall govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters. Japan with a Japanese vessel as a result of which 50 bales of aforesaid cargo were lost and/or destroyed. no regular inspection was made as to their condition during the voyage. California. The E. The foregoing suffices to show that the circumstances under which the fire originated and spread are such as to show that Petitioner Carrier or its servants were negligent in connection therewith. Nor may Petitioner Carrier seek refuge from liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. v. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from (b) Fire. it has been established that the goods in question are transported from San Francisco.

flour and fertilizer. Defendant Bienveido Gelisan and Roberto Roberto entered into a contact underwhich Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice. it is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply. . But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code. It also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him. Significantly. such as Ise Bay. Vigilance over Goods GELISAN vs. including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. which deal exclusively with collision of vessels. CA decision is affirmed. ALDAY Facts: Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck. the shipowner or carrier. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage. the owner of the vessel at fault. Under the above ruling. Book Three of the Code of Commerce. so that no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at bar of Articles 826 to 839. CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS A. More specifically. It appears. shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert appraisal. however. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract. Japan. under the provisions of the Code of Commerce. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel. Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel. and it is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters. each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes. is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. sugar. which provides that if the collision is imputable to both vessels. that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code. a term broad enough to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. particularly Articles 826 to 839. II. The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent.caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels.

Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of fertilizers to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation and filed a compliant against Roberto Espiritu and Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI of Manila. is valid and binding between the contracting parties. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary waybill receipts. The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. IAC Facts: Private respondent Greenhills Wood Industries Company.. Gelisan should be held solidarily liable with Espiritu. cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease contract. The offer was accepted by Alday and he instructed his checker to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. a trucking operator had known Roberto Espiritu. had not been approved by the Public service Commission. North Harbor. Espiritu. On appeal. Issue: Whether or not Gelisan should be held solidarily liable with Espiritu. operates a sawmill in Quirino. however. being the registered owner of the truck. CA ruled that Bienvenido Gelisan is likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck. Held: Yes. With costs against the petitioner. Espiritu made two hauls of zoobags of fertilizer per trip. (“Blue Star”). a company in Bulacan 100. The claim of the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons. The CFI of Manila ruled that Roberto Espiritu was the only one liable. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper. private respondent bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue Star Mahogany. to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the Public Service Commission. It is settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval. did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. the transfer is not binding upon the public or third persons. Inc. Alday had a contact to haul the fertilizer of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4.000 board feet of sawn lumber with the understanding that an initial . Thus. Gelisan is not without recourse because he has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday. The Court ruled that the petitioner is DENIED. Sometime in May 1980. However. BENEDICTO vs.Benito Alday. adverted to. being the registered owner of the truck. since the lease contract in question. a lumber manufacturing firm. Inc.

the Manager of Blue Star called up Greenhills’ president. . a business enterprise engaged in hauling freight. the proprietor of Macoren Trucking. To permit the ostensible or registered owner to prove who the actual owner is. the IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Petitioner Benedicto is. Bulacan. even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred to another person. In the case at bar. contracted Virgilio Licuden. The prevailing doctrine on common carrier makes the registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the carrier. The cargo truck was registered in the name of petitioner Ma. informing him that the sawn lumber on board the subject cargo truck had not yet arrived in Bulacan. Still. On May 15. private respondent Greenhills filed criminal case against driver Luciden for estafa and also against petitioner Benedicto for recovery of the value of the lost sawn lumber plus damages before the RTC of Dagupan City. To effect its first delivery. 1980.delivery would be made on May 15. Benedicto is liable for the undelivered or lost sawn lumber as registered owner. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Benedicto. cruz in the presence and with the consent of driver Licuden. The trial court ruled against Benedicto and Luciden. would be to set at naught the purpose or public policy which infuses that doctrine. In this regard. Thereafter. a common carrier. for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. 1980. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law. private respondent is not required to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier. There is no dispute that petitioner Benedicto has been holding herself out to the public as engaged in the business of hauling or transporting goods for hire or compensation. the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof. private respondent’s resident manager Dominador Cruz. in brief. should be held liable for the value of the undelivered or lost sawn lumber. The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged transferee. the driver of a cargo truck to transport its sawn lumber to the consignee Blue Star in Valenzuela. the letter presented by petitioner allegedly written by Benjamin Tee admitting that Licuden was his driver. being the registered owner of the carrier. Blue Star had not received the sawn lumber and were constrained to look for other suppliers. had no evidentiary value not only because Benjamin Tee was not presented in court to testify on this matter but because of the afore mentioned doctrine. The latter then informed Greenhills’ resident manager. Luisa Benedicto. The Court ruled that the Petition fro Review is Denied. It would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter. Thus. supervised the loading of sawn lumber with invoice aboard the cargo truck. Held: Yes. On appeal.

it proceeded running. direct. but for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Also. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. Vidad was duly authorized passenger jeepney operator. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. So. the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The said defendant drivers stopped the Philtranco bus. Such fault or negligence. instead. direct and solidary. “the obligation imposed by Art. In the case at bar. Since the employer’s liability is primary. Held: Yes. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally pay the private respondent. its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. SANTOS vs. The court ruled that the petition is partly granted. and joint and severally or solidary with the driver. like petitioner Philtranco. prior to said date. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner of a public service is liable for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver. the police officer introduced himself and ordered the latter to stop. P/sgt. Thereafter. vs. 1963. Further. but the latter did not listen. is obliged to pay for the damage done. fell and was ran over by the bus. INC. As the bus was pushed. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that. defendant Philtranco driven by defendant Rogasiones Dolina Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner is still liable. petitioner Santos was the owner of a . SIBUG Facts: Prior to April 26. thereby bumped on the victim Ramon. As a result. CA Facts: The victim Ramon Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along Calbayog City. there being fault or negligence. Still.PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES. its engine started thereby the bus continued its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that. As the engine of Philtranco started abruptly and suddenly. the bus did not stop although it had already bumped and ran over the victim.delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi.delict. On appeal. the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver is primary. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. is called a quasi. Yabao who was then jogging approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig and signaled him to stop. “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Also in Calbayog City.

was the true owner as against Vidad. Although Santos. Sec. mortgage. an authorized public utility operator but is actually owned by Santos (the kabit operator). On April 10. Respondent Court held that Santos may not be permitted to prove his ownership over a particular vehicle being levied upon but registered in another’s name in a separate action. For the protection of Santos. Thus. which was to be a private document presumably to be registered if and when it was decided that the passenger jeep of Santos was to be withdrawn from the kabit agreement. Judgment was rendered in favor of Sibug. 1963. but he had no certificate of public convenience for the operation of the vehicle as a public passenger jeep. . 1964. It is true that Vidad had executed a re-sale to Santos. Santos had fictitiously sold the jeepney to Vidad. the jeepney under the “kabit system” which bumped Sibu can be sold at public auction to satisfy the court’s award. as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle. or rights. branch X affirmed Santos’ ownership of the jeepney in question. the injured party. without the approval or authorization of the Commission previously had. the latter. Santos. franchise certificates. private respondent Sibug was bumped by a passenger jeepney operated by vidad and driven by Severo Gragas. privileges. Santos then transferred his jeep to the name of Vidad so that it could be operated under the latter’s certificate of public convenience. which bumped Sibug be sold at a public auction to satisfy the court’s award. In the case at bar. filed a complaint for damages. and scheduled the public auction sale. but the document was not registered. On April 26. This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service commission. On October 14. Vidad executed a re-transfer document to the former. lessee or operator thereof. Sibug sought relief from respondent Appellate Court.passenger jeep. as the kabit. who had become the registered owner and operator of record at the time of the accident. as the registered owner/ operator and grantee of the franchise. Thus. Santos presented a third-party claim with the Sheriff. Held: Yes. the Sheriff of Manila levied on a motor vehicle. Issue: Whether or not a jeepney registered in the name of Vidad.(g) to sell. instituted an Action for Damages and Injunction with a prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. encumber or lease its property. The court ruled that the petition for review filed by Santos is dismissed. as a result. The next day. Santos became what is known as a kabit operator. registered in the name of Vidad. 1965. or any part thereof. 20 (g) of the Public Service Act provides: “it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner. alienate. is directly and primarily responsible and liable for damages caused to Sibug.

000. the parties entered into a “kabit system”.000 and a monthly rental of P200 per taxi cab unit.700. but Lita Enterprises allegedly refused. failed to comply with his promise and so upon his own request. In the CFI of Manila. five Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs. Out of the total purchase price the defendant gave a down payment of P1. Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs. collided with a motorcycle whose driver. A criminal case was filed against the driver while a civil case was filed against Lita enterprises seeking for damages. vs. 1975. the period of paying the balance was extended to one year in monthly installments until January 1976 when he stopped paying anymore.00. one of said taxicabs driven by their employee. the spouses filed a complaint. The parties herein operated under an arrangement. The kabit system has been identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation services. The defendant. On Appeal. respondent Nicasio Ocampo decided to register his taxicab in his name. the concept of Kabit system being contrary to public policy and void and existent. INC. Florante Galvez.00 with a promise that he would pay plaintiff the balance within sixty days. petitioner Lita Enterprises was adjudged liable for damages as the registered owner of the taxicab. IAC Facts: On May 9. however. Thus. Hence. the court cannot allow either of the parties to enforce an illegal contract bu leaves them both where it finds them. the defendant bought from the plaintiff a motorcycle with complete accessories and a sidecar in the total consideration of P8. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. they contracted with petitioner. Thus. The CFI of Manila ordered Lita Enterprises to transfer the registration certificate. for the use of the latter’s certificate of public convenience in consideration of an initial payment of P1. The Court ruled that the decisions rendered by the CFI of Manila and IAC are hereby annulled and set aside. a writ of execution was issued and one of the vehicles of respondent spouses was levied upon and sold at public auction. TEJA MARKETING vs. herein private respondent purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corp. Issue: Whether or not the parties entered into a “kabit system” Held: Yes. whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. died from the head injuries sustained. the IAC modified the decision.LITA ENTERPRISES. the spouses Nicasio Ocampo and Francisca Garcia. Emeterio Martin. About a year later. CA Facts: Sometime in 1966. Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. Thereafter. The . commonly known as the “kabit system”.

per agreement. which he paid to said defendant. the plaintiff appears to be the owner of the unit. MAGBOO vs. The contract between Conrado Roque and defendant Delfin Bernardo was that Roque was to pay to defendant the sum of P8. Furthermore. as well as the insurance coverage of the unit. Thus. the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore.00. it appears to have been agreed further between. 000. As a result of the accident. for privilege of driving the jeepney. On appeal. it being their agreement that whatever earnings Roque could make out of the use of the jeepney in transporting passengers from one point to another would belong entirely to Conrado Roque. Petitioner Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian filed an action for the “sum of money with damages”. the parties operated under an agreement called “kabit system”. At the time of the accident. Issue: Whether or not kabit system applies in the instant case. the vehicle owned by the defendant Bernardo. the decision was affirmed in toto. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3. particularly for the purpose of engaging and using the same in transportation business and for this purpose said trimobile unit was attached to the plaintiff’s transportation line who had the franchise. Thus. that plaintiff would undertake the yearly registration of the unit in question with the LTC. BERNARDO Facts: The spouses Magboo are the parents of the 8-year old child killed in a motor vehicle accident. Held: Yes. This is a system whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. but will leave both where it finds them. so much so that in the registration certificate. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense. and that upon arraignment. The city court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. It also appears and the court so finds that the defendant purchased the motorcycle in question and the Court so finds that defendant purchased the motorcycle in question.00 of rits registration. the plaintiff and the defendant. the defendant gave to the plaintiff the amount of P82. The assailed decision of the IAC now the CA is AFFIRMED. The court ruled that the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.plaintiff made demands but just the same the defendant failed to comply thus forcing plaintiff to consult a lawyer and file this action for his damage.00 with . Conrado Roque pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced to a jail term. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract. said passenger jeepney was driven by Corado Roque. Conrado Roque was prosecuted for homicide thru reckless imprudence before the CFI of Manila. void and inexistent under Article 1404 of the Civil Code. for the registration of the unit for the year 1976.

Pursuant to their agreement. .owner is subsidiarily liable as employer in accordance with article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.00 from private respondents. CA Facts: In 1965. the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. Consequently.employee. private respondent delivered the scrap iron to the captain for loading. the jeepney. such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery.are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer. there exist an employer-employee relationship under a boundary system arrangement.000. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of breach of contract of transportation and in imposing a liability against him commencing from the time the scrap iron was placed in his custody and control have no basis in fact and in law. actual or constructive. the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. By the said act of delivery. Conrado Roque served his sentence but he was not able to pay the indemnity because he was insolvent. with the rest brought to Nassco Compound. petitioner is guilty of breach of the contract of transportation. by the carrier to the consignee. The fact that part of the shipment had not been headed the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier. Consequently. When half of the scrap iron was loaded. accompanied by three policemen. private respondent Tumambing contracted the services of petitioner Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles. GANZON vs. and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation. The features which characterize the boundary systemnamely.carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss.owner. the petitioner. prompting the Mayor to draw his gun and shoot at him. Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between a jeepney. albeit still unloaded. Bataan on board the latter’s lighter. Mayor Advincula demanded P5. or to the person who has a right to receive them. Thereafter. The gunshot was not fatal but he had to be taken to a hospital.owner and a driver under a “boundary system” agreement. The Acting Mayor. Held: Yes. ordered the captain and his crew to dump the scrap iron. the fact that the driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the amount of fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the jeep. the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier. which the latter refused to give. The Court ruled that the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Held: Yes. destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Article 1736. A receipt was issued stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. and that the gasoline consumed by the jeepney is for the account of the driver.subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

stressed concrete were shipped on board the vessel “Jupri Venture” owned and operated by petitioner. Razon in RTC.The Court ruled that the petition is DENIED. for the days. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. COURT OF APPEALS . “common carrier are bound to observe extraordinary vigilance over goods according to all circumstances of each case. The said cargo was insured by respondent operator E. heavy rains and rough seas were not caso fortuito. The complaint that was filed by the first Nationwide Assurance Corporation (insurer) against Eastern Shipping Lines and F. is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. These are conditions that ocean.going vessel. “if the goods are lost. such is not considered caso fortuito which would exempt from liability for the deterioration of the cargo. On appeal. particularly in the month of September. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. INC. Issue: Whether or not rains and rough is considered as caso fortuito which would exempt petitioner from liability for the deterioration of the cargo.” Further Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that. Art. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES. 1737 of the Civil Code provides that. from whom the consignee’s broker received for delivery to consignee’s warehouse.” In the case at bar.going vessels would encounter and provide for.wire stress relieved for pre. CA Facts: On September 4. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The coils which were wrapped in burlap cloth and cardboard paper were stored in the lower hold of the hatch of the vessel which were rusty on one side each and it was found that the “wetting” was caused by fresh water that entered the hatch. the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito. filed this petition. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of ships hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship. Manila was dismissed. Only Eastern Shipping Lines. vs. the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. thirteen coils of uncoated 7. It appears that while en route. SARKIES TOURS PHILIPPINES vs. or deteriorated. the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies. but normal occurrences that an ocean. The Court ruled that the petition is DISMISSED. which caused it to pound and roll heavily. Inc. Since. destroyed. Held: No. the vessel encountered very rough seas and stormy weather. Razon. for delivery to stresstek Post. 1978. in the ordinary course of voyage.Tensioning Philippines in Manila.

trial contact lenses. On appeal. demanded satisfaction of their complaint from petitioner. After more than nine months of fruitless waiting. respondents decided to file the case. Fatima asked the help of radio stations and even from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same route. but the driver ignored them and proceeded to Legaspi City. Whether or not petitioner is liable for the lost baggage’s of Held: The petitioner is liable for the lost baggage’s. by the carrier to the person who has a right to receive them. Thus. petitioner is held liable. Under the Civil Code.Facts: On August 31. In the case at bar. “common carriers from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance over goods transported by the. passport and visa. “unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification. actually or constructively. and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered. Her belongings were kept in the baggage compartment and during the stopover at Daet. it was discovered that only one bag had remained in the baggage compartment. one of Fatima’s bags was recovered. VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY INC. almost all the baggage was lost to the prejudice of the paying passengers. the cause of the loss was petitioner’s negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. Thus. 1984. which she turned down. Respondents. . the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.” and this liability “last from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of. who went to petitioner’s office. materials and equipment. through counsel. As a result of this lack of care. vs. Issue: Fatima. Fatima boarded petitioner’s De luxe bus in Manila on her way to Legaspi City. Petitioner apologized through a letter. Fatima reported the loss to her mother. CA Facts: Valenzuela hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brother Shipping Corporation whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the formers lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Isabela for shipment to Manila. Her brother helped her load three pieces of luggage containing all of her optometry review books. Some of the passengers suggested retracing the route to try to recover the items. Petitioner merely offered her one thousand pesos for each piece of luggage lost.

the left front tire of the bus exploded. YOBIDO vs. This stipulation is deemed valid as it is undisputed that private respondent acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. In the case at bar. morals. Thus. They also claimed that the bus was running as speed pr “60 to 50” and that the tire was brand-new. The petition is denied by the Court. good customs. Respondents on the other hand. along Picop Road. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children boarded a Yobido Liner bus at Surigaodel Sur. breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo”. After trial. They claimed that the bus was not full as there were only 32 passengers out of the 42 seating capacity. Leny filed a case of breach of contract of carriage against petitioners. the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer. such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Surety and Insurance Company. the charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the “owners shall not be responsible for loss. In a contract of private carriage. Both respondent and insurer denied liability. public order or public policy. short landing. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party exempting the ship-owner from liability for the loss of the cargo arising from the negligence of its captain valid. but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers was not liable for the lost of the cargo. Alberto and Cresencio Yobido raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito. Held :The stipulation in the instant case is valid. exempting the ship-owner from liability for the loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by the petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party. The bus fell into a ravine around the three feet from the road and struck a tree. asserted the violation of the contract of carriage was brought about by the driver’s failure to exercise the diligence required of the . Agusan del Sur. The owners of Yobido Liner Bus.Petitioner insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Company. The said vessel sank resulting on the loss of plaintiff’s insured bags. The incident resulted in the death if Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. split. the court held that the proximate cause of the los is the negligence of the captain and the stipulation in the charter party limiting respondent’s liability is void being against public policy citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code.

“in case of death or injuries to passengers. Article 1755 provides that “a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.55. a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. Be that as it may. Moreover. first by telephone and later confirmed by a formal written booking issued by Macleod and Co. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality. INSURANCE CO. having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.” In the case at bar. 018. Leny claimed that the was running fast in a winding road which was not cemented and was wet because of the rain. Held: The tire blow out is not considered as a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioners from liability.. One of the lighters sunk which Macleod suffered damage P54. There are human factors involved in the situation. The Court ruled that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. OF NORTH AMERICA Facts: Macleod and Co. Issue: Whether or not the tire blow out is considered a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioners from liability. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. that the sinking was due to a fortuitous event and that the respondent has no personality. Two lighters of the petitioner loaded said cargo from Macleod’s wharf at Davao awaiting the arrival of another vessel of the petitioner for loading.” Further. Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of carriage. it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a case fortuity that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. contracted.carrier. resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days use. Thus. . petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that. COMPANIA MARITIMA vs. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. Petitioner denied the liability on the grounds that there was no bill of lading issued thereby resulting to the non-existence of carriage contract. the services of the petitioner Campania Maritime for the shipment of bales of hemp from Davao to Manila. the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event.

but gives the right to both the shipper and carrier to mutually demand of each other the delivery of the said bill. As regards to the form of the contract of carriage. the delivery of a bill of lading to the shipper. .63.Held: There was a complete contract of carriage the consummation of which has already begun when the shipper delivered the cargo to the carrier and the latter took possession of the same by placing it on a lighter manned by its authorized employees. 350 of the Code of Commerce provides that the shipper as well as the carrier may mutually demand that a bill of lading be issued. of the goods. The Code of Commerce does not demand as a necessary requisite in the contract of transportation. On the contract of carriage. The cargo was checked both by the stevedoring company and the arrastre operator and was found in good order. however. BINAMIRA Facts: Delta Company of New York shipped six cases of films and photographic supplies to Binamira. A bill of lading is not essential to the contract. although Art. however. or receipt by. This is a situation where the carrier loses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for any loss or damage that may be caused to the goods during the interregnum. As to the issuance of a bill of lading. The barges or lighters were merely employed as the first step of the voyage. it is not indispensable. placing it in the custody of the arrastre operator appointed by the Bureau of Customs. Issue: is valid. there should be no limitations as to form. it can be said that provided there is a meeting of the minds and from such meeting arise rights and obligations. the parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have still to go through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actully turned over to the consignee. The ship arrived in Cebu and discharged her cargo. under which Macleod became entitled to the privilege secured to him by law. The cargo was later delivered to Binamira and a marine surveyor found that some were missing valued at P324. Whether or not the stipulations limiting the liability of the carrier Held: While delivery of the cargo to the customs authorities is not delivery to the consignee of the person who has the right to receive them as contemplated in Article 1736 of the Civil Code because in such case the goods are still in the hands of the government and the owner cannot be exercise dominion over them. LU DO vs. Lower Court held that the carrier liable. although it may become obligatory by reason of the regulations or as a condition imposed in the contract by the agreement of the parties themselves. the carrier or its authorized agent. it was stipulated that the carrier in no longer liable for the cargo upon its delivery to the hands of the customs authorities. These stipulations limiting liability is not contrary to morals or public policy. The responsibility of the carrier commenced on the actual delivery to. Judgment against petitioner is affirmed.

with one box in bad order condition. With regard to the contention of the carrier that COGSA should control in this case.24 The defendant CARRIER transshipped the shipment in Hongkong on board the vessel MS ‘Partas’.. LTD. Art. per invoice. although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and asserted in the bill of lading. CHI-MNL-120. the shipment was discharged and turned over to Marina Port Services. and LCM Brokerage Co. the same is of no moment. and Packing List. which arrived at the Port of Manila. 1987 by the defendant broker which delivered the same to the consignee. Inc. was found short of one piece waster cone and one piece Main Relief valued. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that “the laws of the country to which the goods are transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss.58. CA Facts: American President Lines (APL) vessel President Washington(Carrier for short) receive and loaded on board at Los Angeles. on September 6. The CARRIER. aforementioned. 1736-1738. Corp. Private respondent FGU Ins. Inc.Judgment reversed. filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against APL. 248. at P28. Inc. said section is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code. In actual damages. 248.58. “in all matter not regulated by this Code. contained in (3) boxes. Under 1766 of NCC. covered by Commercial Invoice No. at its warehouse. and the one box discharged from the CARRIER’s vessel in bad order condition. Issue: What law is applicable the Civil Code provisions or COGSA? Held: The Civil Code. hence. thru Forwarders Direct Container Lines. California. On the same date.” This means that the law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code. 602956. the subject of the shipment of one (1) unit of Submersible Jocky Pump. NCC governs said rights and obligations. vs. showing signs of having been previously tampered. issued its clean Bill of Lading No. The trial court found in favor of private respondent and ordered APL to pay private respondent the amount of P28. where the said shipment was examined and inventoried. complete and in good order condition. 1987.. Inc. Therefore. for P481. A-08851. destruction and deterioration.. Corp. It was for transport to Manila in favor or Lindale Development Corporation. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES. the consignee. The cargo remained with the ARRASTRE for ten days until it was withdrawn on April 16. The shipment was insured by FGU Ins. covered by a Turn over Survey Cargoes No. the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws. .” Art.(Arrastre0. 842. Marina Port Services.

About 2:00 p. the loss is chargeable against the appellant. Issue: Whether or not the stipulations in the bill of lading limiting the liability of carrier is valid.SERVANDO vs. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. xxx fire xxx. “Clause 14. the cargoes were discharged. public enemies. FS-176. Such provisions have been held to be part of the contract of carriage and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation. parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following stipulation. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed “owner’s risk” unless such damage is due to negligence of carrier. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. GANZON vs. complete and in good order. war. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning of November 18. of the same day. Facts: Clara UY Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the Philippine Steam Navigation vessel. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. cargoes of rice and colored paper as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the carrier. COURT OF APPEALS . and that they did not sign the same. destroying Servando’s cargoes.” There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier in delay in the performance of its obligation nor that was the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom’s warehouse in anyway attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Held: The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment on question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. Court of Appeals. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage cause by force majeure.” We sustain the validity of the above stipulation.m. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. “While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket. for carriage from Manila to Pulupundan. 1963. Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back of the bills of lading. morals or public policy. Negros Occidental. However. that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question.

Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT “Batman.” Ganzon then sent his lighter “Batman” to Mariveles where it docked. On December 1, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza; captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually began on the same date by the crew of the lighter. When about of the scrap of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5, 000.00 from Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument, Mayor Advincula drew his gun and fired at Tumambing. The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment. After some time, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basillo Rub, accompanied by the three policemen, ordered Captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brougth to the compound of NASSCO. Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. Issue: Whether or not the scrap iron were already delivered.

Held: Petitioner Ganzon insists that the scrap iron had not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control to make him liable. However, he completely agrees with the respondent Court’s finding that on December 1, 1956, the private respondent delivered the scraps to Captain Niza for loading in the lighter “Batman.” That the petitioner, thru his employees, actually received the scraps is freely admitted. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier’s extraordinay responsibility for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1738, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit unloaded.

SALUDO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: After the death of plaintiff’s mother, Crispina Saludo, Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago brought the remains to Continental Mortuary Air Services which booked the shipment of the remains from Chicago to San Francisco by TWA and from San Francisco to Manila with PAL. The remains

were taken to the Chicago Airport, but it turned out that there were two bodies in the said airport. Somehow the two bodies were switched; the casket bearing the remains of plaintiff’s mother was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened there. The shipment was immediately loaded on PAL flight and arrived on Manila a day after it expected arrival on October 29, 1976. Plaintiff filed a damage suit with CFI of Leyte, contending that Trans World Airlines and PAL were liable for misshipment, the eventual delay on the delivery of the cargo containing the remains, and of the discourtesy of its employees to them. The court absolve the two airline companies of any liability. The CA affirmed such decision. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for damages.

Held: The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria and Saturnino Saludo, agonised for nearly five hours, over the possibility of losing their mother’s mortal remains, unattended to and without any assurance from the employees of TWA that they were doing anything about the situation. They were entitled to the understanding and humane consideration called of by and commensurate with the extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, and not the cold insensitivity to their predicament. Common sense could and should have dictated that they exert a little effort in making a more extensive inquiry by themselves or through their superiors, rather than just shrug off the problem with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no knowledge about it. With all the modern communications equipment readily available to them, it could have easily facilitated said inquiry. TWA’s apathetic stance while not legally reprehensible is morally deplorable. Losing a loved one, especially one’s parent, is a painful experience. Our culture accords utmost tenderness human feelings toward and in reverence to the dead. That the remains of the deceased were subsequently delivered, albeit, belatedly and eventually laid in her final resting place is of little consolation. The imperviousness displayed by TWA’s personnel, even for just that fraction of time, was especially condemnable particularly in the hours of bereavement of the family of Crispina Saludo, intensified by anguish due to the uncertainty of the whereabouts of their mother’s remains. TWA’s personnel were remiss in the observance of that genuine human concern and professional attentiveness required and expected of them. The foregoing observations, however, do not appear to be applicable to respondent PAL. No attribution of discourtesy or indifference has been made against PAL by petitioners and, in fact, petitioner Maria Saludo testified that it was to PAL they repaired after failing to receive proper attention from TWA. It was from PAL that they received confirmation that their mother’s remains would be on the same flight with them. Petitioner’s right to be treated with due courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by every common carrier was violated by the TWA and this entitles them, atleast to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are

recoverable where some injury has been done but the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.

MACAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner Benito Macam shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang, through local agent respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. watermelons valued at US$5,950.00 and fresh mangoes valued at US$14,273.46. The shipment was bound for Hongkong with Pakistan Bank as consignee and Great Prospect Company of Kowloon, Hongkong as notify party. Petitioner’s depository bank. Consolidated Banking Corporation(SOLIDBANK) paid petitioner in advance the total value of the shipment of US$20,223.46. Upon arrival in Hongkong, the shipment was delivered by respondent WALLEM directly to GPC, not to Pakistan Bank, and without the required bill of lading having been surrendered. Subsequently, GPC failed to pay Pakistan Bank such that the latter, still in possession of the original bills of lading, refused to pay petitioner through SOLIDBANK. Since SOLIDBANK already prepaid petitioner the value of the shipment, it demanded payment from respondent WALLEM but was refused. Petitioner returned the amount involved to SOLIDBANK, and then demanded payment from respondent WALLEM in writing but to no avail. Hence petitioner sought collection of the value of the shipment if US$20,223.46 from respondents before the RTC of Manila, bases on delivery of the shipment to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and bank guarantee. Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee? Held: Under Art. 1736 of the Civil Code, the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was notifying party. However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was proper. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee. From the testimony of petitioner, we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for around 2 to 3 years already. When mangoes and watermelons are in season, his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week. The goods are released to GPC. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines to

bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. California. Virginia. Petitioner alleged that the goods were transported in accordance with the bill of lading(. An examination of the subject bill of lading shows that the subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on April 3. While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers. Private respondent alleging gross negligence and undue delay in the delivery of the goods. The goods finally arrived in the Philippines on June 10.immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his “people. 1977. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment..”) and that its liability under the law attaches only in case of loss. Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to damages resulting from delay in the delivery of the shipment in the absence in the bill of lading of a stipulation on the period of delivery.(shipper) 600. hence the present petition. Inc. petitioner nevertheless. The consignee refused to take delivery of the goods. The RTC dismissed the complaint against the shipper and ruled in favor of the consignee.” In transactions covered by a letter of credit. For reasons unknown. 1977. RTC ruled that the stipulation in the BOL is in the nature of contract of adhesion and therefore void.000 empty gelatin capsules for the manufacture of his pharmaceutical products.”the Carrier does not undertake that the goods shall arrive at the port of discharge or the place of delivery at any particular time. 1977 or after two months from the date specified. petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent(consignee) ordered from Eli Lilly. MAERSK LINE vs. said cargo of capsules were mishipped and diverted to Richmond. California. destruction or deterioration of the goods as provided for in Article 1734 NCC. CA affirmed said decision. The Memorandum of Shipment provides that the shipper advised the consignee that the goods were already shipped on board the vessel of petitioner for shipment to the Philippines via Oakland. USA and then transported back to Oakland. was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time. In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents. The specified date of arrival was April 3. unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time. there was not a single instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes.. In this regard. The shipper alleged that the mis-shipment was due solely to the gross negligence of petitioner. there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a . Held: Yes. and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery. filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against petitioner and shipper.

Based upon the findings of fact of the trial court which are sustained by the evidence. SC said that it was necessarily so and that it is a settled rule that bills of lading are contracts not entirely prohibited. the plaintiff delivered to the defendants 164 cases of silk consigned and to be delivered by the defendants to Salomon Sharuff in Surigao. Barretto denied all the allegations against him stating that the said merchandise was never delivered to him. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed on April 17. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for the exemption from liability. Held: No. YSMAEL vs. Also. a domestic corporation seeks to recover from Barretto P9. 1923. With respect to the ruling that contracts of adhesion are void. BARRETTO Facts:Ysmael. and the evidence shows that their value is the alleged in the complaint. Barretto also alleged that in provision 12 of the bill of lading. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability. at Manila to be shipped to Surigao. unless such exemption is just and reasonable.00 for any package of silk unless the value and contents of such package are correctly declared in the bill of lading at the time of shipment. the goods in question were shipped from Manila on October 25. In the case before us." . which is the alleged value of four cases of merchandise which it delivered to the steamship Andres. the stipulation is not valid. The said merchandise was never delivered to the consignee Solomon Sharuff. The lower court also points out that the conditions in question "are not printed on the triplicate copies which were delivered to the plaintiff. Four of such cases were never delivered to the consignee.940. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of defendant of not more than P300 is valid. The carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped if such was caused by its own negligence. he is not liable for the excess of P300. plaintiff’s right of action is barred for the reason that it was not brought within 60 days from the time the cause of action accrued." The clause in question provides that the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason to an amount in excess of P300 "for any single package of silk or other valuable cargo. unless such exemption is just andreasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made. 1922. He also stated that under the provision of paragraph 7 of the printed condition at the back of the bill of lading." and that by reason thereof they "are not binding upon the plaintiff.mere superfluity. we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. or a little less than six months after the shipment was made. The lower court rendered its judgment in favor of Ysmael & co. to be delivered to Salomon Sharuff in Surigao.

Facts: Shewaram. The station agent of the PAL in Iligan caused the baggage to be sent to Manila for delivery to plaintiff. Such a limitation of value is unconscionable and void as against public policy. or less than one-eight of its actual value. Held: No. An action for damages was instituted against PAL. PAL however was ordered to pay damages of P100. destruction or deterioration of the goods it has undertaken to transport. his suitcase did not arrive with his flight because it was sent to Iligan. a paying passenger on defendant's aircraft flight from Zamboanga City bound for Manila. . There is no merit in the appeal. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. unless the passenger declares in advance a higher valuation and pay an additional charge therefor. Shewaram did not agree to the stipulation on the ticket. The limited liability rule shall not apply.500. It was found out that it was mistagged by defendant’s personnel.00 only. and that the value of each case was very near P2. a suitcase and two other pieces. When plaintiff Parmanand Shewaram arrived in Manila.”). Issue: Whether or not the limited liability rule applies. Defendant admitted that the two items (Transistor Radio and the Rollflex Camera) could not be found inside the suitcase. In the case before us We believe that the requirements of said article have not been met. If that rule of law should be sustained. SHEWARAM vs.The evidence shows that 164 "cases" were shipped. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES. for loss or damage to checked baggage or for delay in the delivery thereof is limited to its value and. if any. RTC ruled that the loss of the articles was due to the negligence of the employees of PAL. the limit of defendants' liability for each case of silk "for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason" would put it in the power of the defendants to have taken the whole cargo of 164 cases of silk at a valuation of P300 for each case. (“The liability. INC. as this was its limited liability as stated in the ticket. He checked in three pieces of baggages. An appeal was then brought up by plaintiff. embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. In this situation. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. the value shall be conclusively deemed not to exceed P100.00 for each ticket. The requirements provided in Article 1750 of the New Civil Code must be complied with before a common carrier can claim a limitation of its pecuniary liability in case of loss. It can not be said that the appellee had actually entered into a contract with the appellant. no silk would ever be shipped from one island to another in the Philippines. as manifested by the fact that Shewaram did not sign the ticket.

which loss. Issue: Whether or not PAL acted with gross negligence. it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended by the porter clerk which however. he found out that the folder containing documents and transcripts were missing. PAL exerted diligent efforts to locate the plaintiff’s baggage. aside from the two gift items for his parents-in-law. he gives his consent. PAL did not act in bad faith. When the luggage was delivered to the petitioner with the information that the lock was open. Petitioner filed a Complaint against PAL for damages for breach of contract of transportation. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket. The plane left Mactan Airport. fraudulent. Held: No. 946-R from Mactan Cebu bound for Butuan City. Exemplary damages can only be granted if the defendant asked in a wanton. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. are contracts not entirely prohibited. The lower Court found PAL to have acted in bad faith and with malice and declared petitioner entitled to moral damages. He was scheduled to attend the trial in the Court of First instance . reckless. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". but ordered PAL to pay plaintiff the sum of P100. It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioner’s luggage which had been miscarried. Br. in accordance with the stipulation written at the back of the ticket is limited to P100 per luggage plaintiff not having declared a greater value and not having called the attention of the defendant on its value ad paid the tariff thereon. the baggage liability assumed by it under the condition of carriage printed at the back of the ticket. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. According to petitioner. II thereat. reversed the judgment of the trial Court granting petitioner moral and exemplary damages. oppressive or malevolent manner. It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion". a bull maleta. if he adheres. the later denied. A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner was paying passenger of respondent Philippine Airlines on board flight No. . As a passenger. Upon arrival. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. Hence the present petition. Cebu City at about 1pm and arrived at Bacasi Airport. CA held that PAL was guilty only of simple negligence. Butuan City at past 2pm of the same day.ONG YIU vs. he checked in one piece of luggage. petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found.00.

SEA-LAND SERVICE. 180 Filbrate cartons of mixed British . Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by the laws of the country of destination and the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines. Held: Yes. while private respondent Manila Wine Merchants. CITADEL LINES. made applicable to all contracts for the carriage by sea to and from the Philippines Ports in Foreign Trade by Comm. INC. Inc. as the consignee is the importer of the subject shipment of Dunhill cigarettes from England. The shipper not having declared the value of the shipment. goods being transported under said bill. On or about March 17. The shipment was discharged in Manila. received from Seaborne Trading Company in California a shipment consigned to Sen Hiap Hing. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner is the general agent of the vessel “Cardigan Bay/ Straight Enterprises”. the unrealized profit and attorneys fees.1979. the vessel “Cardigan” loaded on board at England for carriage to Manila. and while awaiting transshipment to Cebu the cargo was stolen and never recovered. INC. vs. and as ordained by the said Code. The CA affirmed the decision. hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not the consignee of seaborne freight is bound by stipulations in the covering bill of lading limiting to a fixed amount the liability of the carrier for loss or damage to the cargo where its value is not declared in the bill. although that document may have been drawn up only by the consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. Even if Section 4(5) of COGSA did not list the validity and binding effect of the liability limitation clause in the bill of lading here are fully substantial on the basis alone of Article 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. by the Code of Commerce and special laws. One of these supplementary special laws is the Carriage of goods by Sea Act (COGSA). 65. in all matters not cluttered thereby. The stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of Sea-Land for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said rule to US$500 per package unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional charges is valid and binding on Cue. Act. or damage to. a foreign shipping and forwarding company licensed to do business in the Philippines. vs. no value was indicated in the BOL. IAC Facts: Sea-land. There is no question of the right of a consignee in a bill of lading to recover from the carrier or shipper for loss of. The justices of such stipulation is implicit in its giving the owner or shipper the option of avoiding accrual of liability limitation by the simple expedient of declaring the value of the shipment in the bill of lading. the liability of Sea-Land has Cue is governed primarily by the Civil Code. The lower court sentences Sea-land to pay Cue the value of the lost cargo. supplementary.

Thereafter. Based on the investigation conducted by the arrastre. The consignee filed a complaint against the carrier demanding P315. The lower court decided to absolve the arrastre form any liability. the stipulation is valid. as evidenced by a Bill of Lading. the carrier’s liability amounts only to US$4. both of them duly padlocked and sealed by the representative of the carrier. a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss. On May 1. It is provided in Clause 6 that its liability is limited to US$2. . Everett Orient Lines.000 based on the alleged market value of the goods is erroneous. EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION vs. Since 90 cartons were lost and the weight of said cartons is 2. is binding.000 which is the market value of the goods. One shipment was delivered and the other.60. Furthermore. It was found out that 90 cases of the cigarettes were missing.The shipment arrived at the port of Manila Pier 13 and the container van was received by E. Hence. The bill of lading shows that 120 cartons weight 2. the award of P315. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier contained in the bill of lading is binding on the consignee. The consignee also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of lading. In this case. imported three crates of bus spare parts from Japan from its supplier Maruman Trading based there. the container van containing two shipments was stripped. the carrier’s headchecker discovered that one of the container van had a different padlock and the sealed was tampered with. Held: Yes.00 per kilo. unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value.manufactured cigarettes called “Dunhill International Filter” & “Dunhill International Menthol”. Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading. Clause 6 of the bills of lading issued by the carrier states to limit the latter’s liability to US$2. containing the cigarettes were placed in two containers due to the lack of space. The carrier admitted the loss in its reply letter but alleged that the said matter is under the control of the arrastre therefore. the cargo was not formally turned over by the carrier. if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances. the consignee filed a complaint against the arrastre.233. destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid.80. The crates were shipped from Japan to Manila on board a vessel owned by petitioner’s principal. the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies. and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. 1979. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent Hernandez Trading Co. The judgment of CA is hereby modified.82kilos/carton. Razon an arrastre.978 kilos or 24.467.00/kilo.

In the bill of lading. the shipper. However. unless the shipper declares or a higher value is sanctioned by law. it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.000.000 yen was offered by petitioner.000." The bill of lading subject of the present controversy specifically provides. ordering petitioner to pay Y1. reasonable and just. particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. and (3) in allowing private respondent to fully recover the full alleged value of its lost cargo. Petitioner now comes to SC arguing that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in ruling that the consent of the consignee to the terms and conditions of the bill of lading is necessary to make such stipulations binding upon it. goods in an amount exceeding One Hundred thousand Yen in Japanese Currency (Y100.552. (2) in holding that the carrier's limited package liability as stipulated in the bill of lading does not apply in the instant case. A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the common carrier for the loss. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the actual value and not the maximum value recoverable under the bill of lading. Maruman Trading. if paid. and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss.00) or its equivalent in any other currency per package or customary freight unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the goods higher than this amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is paid as required. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation. Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law. An appeal was brought by petitioner only 100. The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in any connection with. damages of cargo to a certain sum. the carrier made it clear that its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100. . among others: 18.00) Yen. it is required that the stipulation limiting the common carrier's liability for loss must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances. the maximum amount stipulated in clause 18 of the BOL.500. had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums.00. The Court of Appeals deleted the award of attorney's fees but affirmed the trial court's findings with the additional observation that private respondent can not be bound by the terms and conditions of the bill of lading because it was not privy to the contract of carriage. Held: No. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. and has been freely and fairly agreed upon. it was discovered that one of the crater was missing. to our mind. Respondent made a formal claim for the recovery of the actual value of the lost spare parts contained in the missing crates. The above stipulations are.Upon arrival at the port of Manila.

hence the instant petition. hence. Gemar to prepare his travel plan to Bombay. confident that upon reaching Hong Kong. only to the amount stated in the ticket. at most. Conditions of contacts was one of continuous air transportation from Manila to Bombay. These requirements in the bill of lading were never complied with by the shipper. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s journey to PAL.To defeat the carrier's limited liability. Issue: Whether or not BA is liable for the compensatory damages. Unfortunately. its liability is limited. the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay. The third-party complaint was therefore reinstated. The contract of transportation was exclusively between Mahtani and BA. as its subcontractor or agent. Mahtani checked in the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal effects. BA filed a third-party complaint against PAL alleging that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggage was due to the latter's late arrival in Hongkong. Since the instant petition was based on breach of contract of carriage. with extra freight paid. thus leaving hardly any time for the proper transfer of Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay. since the latter was not a party in the contract. Mahtani had to take a connecting flight to Bombay. he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. however since it had no ticket flights from Manila to Bombay. BA alleged that there should have been no separate award for the luggage and the contents thereof since Mahtani failed to declare a separate higher valuation for the luggage and therefore. Mahtani can only sue BA and not PAL. The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by private respondent. the aforecited Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the shipper should have declared in writing a higher valuation of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert the said declaration in the bill of lading. The Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. when Mahtani arrived in Bombay. Held: Yes. stating that BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual . The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was overruled although it is recognized in the Philippines. After plaintiff waited for his luggage for one week. the liability of the carrier under the limited liability clause stands. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Mahtani. Mr. Mahtani filed his complaint for damages. Prior to his departure. Gemar purchased a ticket from British Airways. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Mahtani obtained the services of a certain Mr. BA finally advised him to file a claim. India. he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives. BRITISH AIRWAYS vs. which CA affirmed.

but the third is valid and enforceable. the lower of the conditioned upon his agreeing to a stipulated valuation of his property in case of loss. A limitation of liability based upon an . however.damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage. the first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being contrary to public policy. 9. H. to wit: That a clause in a bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier to a certain amount unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. while defendant tendered only P76. the invoice value plus freight and insurance. It is mutually agreed that the value of the goods receipted for above does not exceed $500 per freight ton. if the shipper makes such a choice. And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. or. the proportionate freight ton value. Plaintiff claimed P420. Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading. Also. and any loss or damage for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted pro rata on the said basis. HEACOCK COMPANY vs. limiting the liability of the carrier. the market value of the clocks. and clause 9 should have not been applied by the lower court. The clocks were not delivered despite demands. unless the value be expressly stated herein and ad valorem freight paid thereon. null and void. he cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he thus places upon his property. if a common carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates. on the other hand. Facts: The plaintiff shipped Edmonton clocks from New York to Manila on board a vessel of the defendant. without any objection. even by the carrier's negligence. The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation.02. Both appealed. therefore.36. are contrary to public order and. E. The trial court decided for the plaintiff for P226. the carrier shall not be liable for more than the net invoice price plus freight and insurance less all charges saved. in proportion for any part of a ton. or damage to. that in the event of claims for short delivery of. limit its liability for the loss of or damage to the cargo to an agreed valuation of the latter? Held: Yes. MACONDRAY & COMPANY. cargo being made. contends that clause 1 is valid. Thus. According to an almost uniform weight of authority. Issue: May a common carrier. A reading of clauses 1 and 9 of the bill of lading here in question. and names his valuation. understandingly and freely. The BOL has the following stipulations: 1. clearly shows that the present case falls within the third stipulation.00. The defendant. by stipulations inserted in the bill of lading. is valid and enforceable. The claim of the plaintiff is based upon the argument that the clause in the bill of lading. INC. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence.

since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who.agreed value to obtain a lower rate does not conflict with any sound principle of public policy. and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and then recover a larger value in case of loss. instead of enhance. vs. valid and enforceable? Held: No. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu." "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits. SWEET LINES. will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. irrespective of where it is issued. private respondents per advice. The condition will thus defeat.” The motion was denied hence the instant petition. 14. shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. on which Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first. at Cagayan de Oro City. Issue: Is Condition No. Condition No. TEVES Facts: Private respondents Atty. the ends of . Condition No." and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. which reads: “It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket. Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity. INC." Private respondents alleged that they were. it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets. This motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents. and second. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. 14. We find and hold that Condition No. under Condition No. under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry. Tandog and Tiro. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. which limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu. In view thereof. a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes. private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. since many passengers were bound for Surigao. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature. he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard. 14 is Printed in fine letters. Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the country today. a contractors bought tickets for Voyage at the branch office of petitioner. during the trip. went to the branch office for proper relocation to another vessel.

it is not essential that the lost effects and belongings of plaintiffs were actually delivered to defendant's plane personnel or that the latter were notified thereof. petitioner. The plaintiffs declared that their suit was instituted ". QUISUMBING. 998. PAL was not negligent so as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Norberto Quisumbing Sr. as the 'use of arms' or 'irresistible force' was not taken advantage of by said armed robbers in gaining entrance to defendant's ill-fated plane in questions. 2) Whether or not PAL was negligent to overcome the hi-jacking-robbery. will not cause inconvenience to. pursuant to Civil Code articles 1754. 2) No. Hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of . although there is an occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal.justice. "the highjacking-robbery was force majeure. Contending that the "aforesaid loss is a result of breach of PAL's contractual obligation to carry them and their belongings and effects to their Manila destination without loss or damage. Quisumbing and Loeffler brought suit against PAL to recover the value of the property lost by them to the robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages. Firearms. vs. There was an exchange of gunshot between a Senior NBI agent Villarin and the four armed hijackers one of which was “Zaldy” who is a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez. as was done in the instant case." observing that: hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. with respect to said Civil Code article 1998. Upon the other hand. hand-grenades.00 and Leoffler with his watch.The CFI dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the CFI’s decision. wallet and cash amounting to P1. And. Quisumbing suffered a shock for a gun had been pointed at him by one of the hold uppers. and Gunther Leoffler were among the passengers of PAL’s plane from Mactan City Cebu to Manila. Hence the instant petition. Issue: 1) Whether or not hijacking-robbery was force majeure. the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental. and constitutes a serious dereliction of PAL's legal duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the same. dynamite. Held: 1) Yes. Hence. The four hijackers succeeded in their escape upon arrival at Manila. much less prejudice. 2000 and 2001 and on the ground that in relation to said Civil Code article 2001 the complained-of act of the armed robbers is not a force majeure. The robbers divested the passengers of their belongings including Quisumbing who was divested with his jewelries and cash amounting to P18.700... and explosives are introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth. SR. The Court ruled that under the facts. Zaldy then announced to the passengers and the pilots that it was a hijacked and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS.650.

Jorge Rapadas to request for the search of the missing luggage. The petitioner exerted efforts to locate the luggage through the Pan American World Airways-Manila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage Service. Issue: Whether or not a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger ticket declaring the limitations of carrier’s liability Held: Yes. particularly for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board the plane. Upon arriving in Manila Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case. RAPADAS Facts: Private respondent held Passenger Ticket and Baggage Claim Check for petitioner's Flight with the route from Guam to Manila. are situated either within the . as amended.00 representing the petitioner's alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a passenger's personal property under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and PAN AM. On appeal. He then gave his attache case to his brother who happened to be around and who checked it in for him. par. Rapadas was ordered by petitioner's handcarry control agent to check-in his Samsonite attache case. Refusing to accept this kind of settlement. whether or not there be a breach in the carriage or a transhipment. While standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport. For fear that he would miss the plane if he insisted and argued on personally taking the valise with him. the place of departure and the place of destination. the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which.firepower and violent fury. 2 as follows: (2) For the purposes of this Convention. but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. according to the agreement between the parties. this petition. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS. Hence. Rapadas received a letter from the petitioner's counsel offering to settle the claim for the sum of $160. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-passengers were permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. The petition is denied and appealed decision of CA is affirmed. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attache case. However. PAL could not have been faulted for want of diligence. Rapadas filed the instant action for damages. Firearms and grenades are brought to the plane surreptitiously. The lower court ruled in favor of Rapadas after finding no stipulation giving notice to the baggage liability limitation. specifically provides that it is applicable to international carriage which it defines in Article 1. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. He sent his son. The Warsaw Convention. vs. he acceded to checking it in. the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining hijackers. INC.

ALITALIA vs. it should become a common. ("High Contracting Party" refers to a state which has ratified or adhered to the Convention. The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage. Carriage between two points within the territory of a single High Contracting Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the purposes of this Convention. which it did not fail to state in the plane ticket and which it deemed to have been read and accepted by the private respondent will be considered by this Court as adequate under the circumstances of this case. or which has not effectively denounced the Convention [Article 40A(l)]). the Court finds the provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. safe and practical custom among air carriers to indicate beforehand the precise sums equivalent to those fixed by the Convention. As earlier stated. private respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages. The passenger ticket complies with Article 3. Nowhere in the Warsaw Convention. What the petitioner is concerned about is whether or not the notice. if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure. The Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. The passenger. In the case at bar. Nevertheless. was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-inluggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line. is such a detailed notice of baggage liability limitations required. as amended. upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket.territories of two High Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State. which provides: (c) a notice to the effect that. The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. IAC .

'an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal. depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance with the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. bad faith. and Dr. an associate professor in UP. Pablo booked passage on petitioner airline. or destruction. which is absurd. to be sure-with the result that she was unable to read the paper and make the scientific presentation (consisting of slides. recklessness. that some species of injury was caused to Dr. do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and employees. Dr. or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. or ignored. But the other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board. autoradiograms or films. no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline. The Convention's provisions.' Nor may it for a moment be supposed that if a member of the aircraft complement should inflict some physical injury on a passenger. The Warsaw Convention does not exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. She was however told by the petitioner’s personnel there at Milan that her luggage was delayed inasmuch as the same was in one of the succeeding flights from Rome to Milan. it is true. Felipa Pablo. loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful misconduct. or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible. ALITALIA. It is in this sense that the Convention has been applied. To fulfill this engagement. The fact is. nevertheless. the Convention might successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to determine the carrier's liability to the passenger. but without appreciable damage. Moreover. in bad faith. and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury. or maliciously destroy or damage the latter's property. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed-a breach of its contract of carriage.Facts: Dr. Thus: "The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability. tables and tabulations) that she . was invited to a meeting of the Department of Research and Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of UN in Ispra. or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Issue: Did petitioner acted in bad faith so as to entitle private respondent to damages? Held: No. In the case at bar. Otherwise. slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person. The suitcases were not actually restored to Prof. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. belatedly. Italy. Her luggage consisted of two suitcases. to comply with a contract of carriage. Pablo by petitioner until eleven months and four months after the institution of her action. in short. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her.

which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. contained in the box brought by the co-passenger. inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible. In other words. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search. who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference. when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary. was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. which gradually turned to panic and finally despair." B. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage. is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. but safely. As already mentioned. her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila.000. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers. exercise the extraordinary diligence required? Held: Yes. Laguna. may be vindicated and recognized. Appellee. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered-and this Court agrees that the respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at P40. tardily. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety. at the prestigious international conference. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita. entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. She is however entitled to nominal damageswhich. as in the case at bar. but beyond this. constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Issue: Did LTB Co. She is not. Safety of Passengers NOCUM vs. fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers. having gone to Rome. to her embarrassment and the disappointment and annoyance of the organizers. to attend which she had traveled hundreds of miles. allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. not to speak of his own.00. Facts: A passenger boarded the respondents bus carrying a box which such person attested to the conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items. Calling a policeman to his aid. the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. There can be no doubt that Dr. as the law says. Certainly. as suggested by the service . of course.had painstakingly labored over. from the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when. Municipality of Bay.

in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels. left for Negros Occidental when it collided with a carrier ship named Don Juan. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel after collision. moreover. a presumption of gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises. no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "onduty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial. As a result of this collision. the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of its passengers perished. the weather fair and visibility good. both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law. the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas. Among the ill-fated passengers were the parents of petitioners. CA Facts: M/T "Tacloban City. having unloaded its cargo. Issue: Whether or not the respondents were negligent? Held: Yes. the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instanceplaying mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted." a barge-type oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and operated by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC Shipping). The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt.manual invoked by the trial judge. after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous. such failures doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life and. there is. whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by petitioners. While the failure of Capt. did not cause the collision by themselves. When the collision occurred. Under these circumstances. CA . Santisteban not only of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry. vs. the sea was calm. MECENAS vs. could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. were indicative of the kind and level of diligence exercised by Capt. Whether or not Capt.

KOREAN AIRLINES CO. The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. four special cabin tickets for his wife. his ticket was canceled by KAL. When two of such passengers did not appear.Facts: Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co. KE 903. daughter. this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage. the M/V Don Juan sank. When he later asked for another booking. an automotive electrician. Lapuz. Inc. Initially. Also. an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. he was unable to report for his work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2week period and so lost his employment. but the four members of private respondents' families were never found. CA Facts: Juanito C. he was "wait-listed. . Lapuz and another person by the name of Perico were given the two unclaimed seats. vs. As a result.. with the M/T Tacloban City. As he was about to board the said airline a KAL officer pointed to him and shouted "Down! Down!" He was thus barred from taking the flight. Saudi Arabia. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the extraordinary diligence required? Held: No. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore. As with the Mecenas case. Lapuz was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines." which meant that he could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure. was contracted for employment in Jeddah. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. Issue: Carriage? Whether or not KAL committed a breach of the Contract of Held: Yes. Consequently. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion boarding the Don Juan. Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro. the duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel.

The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages. respect. injurious language. before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. Diosdado Bravo. preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors. petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. as the other held the passenger at bay with a handgun then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. courtesy and due consideration. that the necessary precautions would be taken. indignities and abuses from such employees. including two Maranaos. Caorong pleaded with the Maranaos to spare the bus driver but the Maranaos shot him. Art. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager. Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers. The Constabulary officer found out that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was already a warning by the PC. FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. 1989. . They started pouring gasoline inside the bus. Under the circumstances. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. Lanao del Norte. simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers. it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees.This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. A passenger Atty. On November 22. In the present case. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of a breach of the contract of carriage? Held: Yes. CA Facts: Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers. resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney. if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan. seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon.

The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus. While the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc. constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers. Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence. morals. Issue: Whether or not the private respondent were negligent. Union. For a waiver to be valid and effective. public policy or good customs. shortly thereafter. went off the road. and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. DELIM Facts: Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's mini bus. and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. A cursory examination of the purported waiver will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. turned turtle and fell into a ditch as a result petitioner sustained injuries. instead told them that it was normal. the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road. Held: The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus. Bauang. All that said document proves . it must not be contrary to law. The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard and made known to him by the passengers.No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased. GATCHALIAN vs. Notwithstanding this document. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers. we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. petitioner Gathalian filed a complaint. respondent Delim paid for the hospitalization expenses and had the passengers sign a waiver stating that they were no longer interested to file a complaint. As she and several others were confined in a hospital. "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and.

With this knowledge the conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. Rosales. giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. a deaf-mute. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body. DEL CASTILLO vs. It appears proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. Respondents contend that the proximate cause of Mario's death was his recklessness and gross negligence in jumping out of the bus while in motion. Held: No. Pangasinan. Manalo stepped on the brake. especially one on the face of the woman. son of plaintiff Severo del Castillo boarded a bus of private respondent bus line. IAC Facts: Catalina Pascua with several others boarded the jeep owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo bound for Carmen. so it was running in an unbalanced position. he fell and died as a result. if that integrity is violated or diminished. common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. resulting from the infliction of injury upon her. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal. Issue: Whether or not respondents exercised extraordinary diligence. is a violation of bodily integrity. JAYMALIN Facts: Mario del Castillo.is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. Issue: Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar? . invading and eventually stopping on the western lane and was hit by the petitioner company’s bus causing the death of Catalina Pascua and two other passengers. actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. In this he failed. Upon alighting from the bus. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. as a result of which. Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. A scar.

Paranaque. and several others. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. Tanza. assuming such calculation to be correct. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. Secondly. if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier. Among those killed were Rogelio Bustamante and his spouse and children. During the incident. would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. In other words. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. for his driver's negligence is his." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. and in the event of contractual liability. that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently. and a Mazda passenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. CA Facts: A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck.Held: No. Metro Manila. 1981. . to Baclaran. while the passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. 1983. The principle about "the last clear" chance. even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. Firstly. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. with a line from Naic. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. Cavite. Due to the impact. the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar. several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained. BUSTAMANTE vs. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. and which the latter transferred to Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18. the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him. entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver. under a franchise. ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. which Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8. and vice versa. Cavite.

the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. pp. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. 4th Ed. Issue: Whether the respondent court has properly and legally applied the doctrine of "last clear chance" in the present case despite its own finding that appellant cargo truck driver Edilberto Montesiano was admittedly negligent in driving his cargo truck very fast on a descending road and in the presence of the bus driver coming from the opposite direction. (Sangco. stated broadly. As the doctrine is usually stated. of the sand and gravel truck have interposed an appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case. In view of this. owner and driver. the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants. VALENCIA . 1986. Hence the present petition. since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore. All premises considered. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. LARA vs. In other words. 798-799). if he. the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. respectively. the trial court reached the conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons.. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. p. aware of the plaintiffs peril. and an injury results. 165). only defendants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto Montesiano. or according to some authorities. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. Held: The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. From said decision. Jur. 2d." The doctrine. the injured person is entitled to recovery. Torts and Damages. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. which set aside the trial court’s decision.. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant.

was drowned. the driver lost control. Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death. the son. and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. Severina Garces. Lara boarded with several others a pick-up bound for Davao and were seated at the back on an improvised bench. The truck entered a wooden bridge. the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. was drowned. In this connection.Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao. and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law. The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the . NECESSITO vs. it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. Severina Garces. the son sustained injuries. A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence. and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. Thus. Issue: Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the ordinary diligence required? Held: Yes. The mother. but the front wheels swerved to the right. The mother. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable Held: While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers.the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. PARAS Facts: Severina Garces and her one-year old son boarded passenger auto truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care. the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. "The rule is established by weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation. the carrier cannot be held liable.

Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. IAC Facts: Pedro T. whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred. adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel. when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure. due to the Mt. Nueva Vizcaya. 1991. cannot be charged to JAL. Bagabag. JAPAN AIRLINES vs." the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. that defendant's truck. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event. alleging that while at Baretbet. the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. to answer for the Held: No. In this regard. private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely. LAYUGAN vs. Issue: Whether or not JAL was obligated accommodation expenses due to the force majeure. driven recklessly . However. he has no remedy against him. Corollarily. CA Facts: Private respondents boarded the JAL flights to Manila with a stop over at Narita Japan at the airlines' expense. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA inaccessible to airline traffic.carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment. JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. private respondents went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. Hence. The next day. Upon arrival at Narita private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. hence. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Pinatubo eruption. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro. JAL then booked another flight fort the passengers and again answered for the hotel accommodations but still the succeeding flights were cancelled. while the carrier usually has.

should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. like a parked truck. and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. the fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. hence the present petition. or. that the driver was licensed. as previously claimed. who claims to be a helper of the truck driver. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander. to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. Moreover. we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. the petitioner herein. which was reversed by the CA. that the accident arose from want of care. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case. are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial The private respondent or his mechanic. under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. while the immobile cargo truck had no business.by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff. as found by the respondent court. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. Likewise. his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road. who must be competent. that as a result. like that required by law. not a truck helper being a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck and hence must suffer the damages. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. Issue: W/N defendant is absolved by virtue of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner. as in the case at bar. so to speak. poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway. Held: No. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. provided an early warning device. Absent such proof of care. Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself. to be there. and the fact that he had no record of any accident. would. place. by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time. It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway. it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner. Isidro concludes. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut. to our mind. for. . He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property. it affords reasonable evidence. plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.

the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz. In this case. he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Occidental Mindoro. Upon arrival at their destination. Manila. it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked. Here the presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. boarded a La Mallorca bus. Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel. the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Secondly. The Lower Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA. DE JESUS Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife. a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Raquel. Issue: Whether or not the deceased is considered to be still a passenger of the bus to which the petitioner could be held liable. La Mallorca contended that when the child was killed.Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable. North Harbor. holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict. together with their minor children. and the passengers therein disembarked. did not put off the engine. she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage had terminated. It is a recognized rule that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s premises. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4. went back to the vessel. Firstly. who was near the bus. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. there was no utmost diligence. After said vessel had landed. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. bound for Manila. although stopping the bus. at the port at San Jose. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. Held: Yes. and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the . While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage. CA Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. was run over and killed. plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters away from the vehicle. While the crane was being operated. the driver. to be determined from the circumstances. LA MALLORCA vs.

safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. The trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly established a case of negligence against the crane operator which the court ruled is never presumed. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plantiffs. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if. Hence. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident. such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. As found by the Court of Appeals. under the foregoing circumstances. as claimed by petitioner. his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. Thus. Aboitiz is negligent. after reaching his destination. and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. Consequently. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz. Held: No. Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas. the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. When the accident occurred. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier. and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were . we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane. the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule. for example. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Once created. the vessel was completely under the control of Pioneer as the which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him. pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes. Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. which he had every right to do. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers. Issue: Whether or not the responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased when it disembarked from the vessel. Hence the instant petition. the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later died.

Sec. The Court of Appeals correctly found. and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten months from the institution of the suit against it. that the collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction. respondent BULLETIN. nor upon a curve in the highway. It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo Mallari Sr. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. common carriers like Aboitiz. vs. Netherlands Insurance Company. (a) and (b). who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway. Dinalupihan. Hence. of RA 4136 as amended. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are negligent. and Alfredo Mallari Jr. Bataan. Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries. otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. its driver Felix Angeles. Parenthetically. filed a complaint for damages against petitioners and also against BULLETIN. Hence this petition.concerned. Held: Yes. unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety. and the N. On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his employer. the appellate court ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. 41. and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. (b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction when approaching the crest of a grade. the trial court held that BULLETIN and Felix Angeles are jointly and severally liable. he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. The widow of the victim.V. considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. MALLARI SR. 41. pars. CA Facts: The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another . collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. Instead. a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant. driver of the Bulletin delivery van.

Under Art. by his own admission. In the instant case. Under Art. Clearly. Sagada. After trial. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. petitioner Mallari Jr. the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. by the contract of carriage. As found by the appellate court. the petitioner was . unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. under Art. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. being then the driver and person in-charge of Rural health Unit Jeep. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve. unless there is proof to the contrary. Clearly. Further. CA Facts: Petitioner was charged of Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence. drove along Suyo Municipal Road. it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. a passenger of the jeepney. within a business or residential district. having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction. careless and imprudent manner. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes.vehicle: Provided That on a highway. Said jeep fell over a precipice in the abovementioned place causing thereby the death of Elena Awichen. Moreover. there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. pursuant to Art. 1755 of the Civil Code.. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances. 2185 of the Civil Code. petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. 1756 of the Civil Code. in case of death or injuries to passengers. BAYASEN vs. Mountain Province in a negligent. 1759 of the same Code. was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney. a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.

as in the instant case. 1990. and considering that he would be there on April 2. the petitionerdriver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent. therefore. petitioner made arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight In San Francisco instead of boarding in Los Angeles. But the said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. entitled to acquittal. On March 23. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day. be charged to the petitioner. without fault on account of the manner of handling the car.e. 1990. four days before the expiry date of subject ticket. . the moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case. for breach of contract of carriage. i. because as he said. Upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco. In fact. he was not allowed to board.. The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established. the lower court’s decision was upheld. therefore.found guilty of the charge. The decision was affirmed in CA. hence the instant petition. On appeal. 1990 flight. Held: Yes. the petitioner used it. when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San Francisco. The PAL personnel concerned marked the following notation on his ticket: "TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY. hence the instant petition. he wanted to play safe and avoid the embankment. the skidding being an unforeseen event. which ticket expressly provided an expiry of date of one year from issuance. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the proximate cause of the death of Awichen was the petitioner's "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed" is openly contrary to the evidence of the prosecution. It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving at "an unreasonable speed". his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. parallel to the slope of the mountain. until March 27. He is. 1990. 1990. No negligence as a matter of law can. It may occur without fault. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. he immediately booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office. On April 2. CA Facts: PAL issued to the petitioner a round trip plane ticket for ManilaHonolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila. he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road. CERVANTES vs. and it was confirmed for the April 2. so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course." Petitioner Cervantes filed a Complaint for Damages. It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads.

holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. for quasidelict." a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. the acts an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal. In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage. so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. CA Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle. 3490). according to the Court of Appeals. unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. As a result. CALALAS vs. acted without authority when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. he is to blame. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket. Furthermore. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability. then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University. Calalas. Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat. took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas. Sunga was injured. he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. and the existence of bad faith is established. Should there be a finding of bad faith. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority. Just as she was doing so. Such kind of damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva. an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena. Negros Occidental. we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. on the other hand. alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority. Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code. Held: No. Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary. the owner of the Isuzu truck. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan. in which the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to . the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.Issue: Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket. The said agents. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.

1733 and 1755 of the Code. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. These are violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. In case of death or injuries to passengers. with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. whereas in breach of contract. First. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. But. should be binding on Sunga. this petition. in this case the common carrier. failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Hence. Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. In quasi-delict. 1755? We do not think so.Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide. not in actions involving breach of contract. the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor. In such a case. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. Petitioner . the jeepney was not properly parked. 3490. the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence. Now. Issue: Should be petitioner be absolved if his contentions are considered? Held: No. There is no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. not quasi-delict. the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage. and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned. the obligation is created by law itself.

This explains why the damages on the bus were all on the right side . there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Pestaño. wherein. based on the testimony of the witnesses. Tabagon. 2220. Cebu. This contention has no factual basis. As a general rule. but that the latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding bus.In this case. PESTAÑO vs. Having given way to the bus. Respondent-heirs. the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon. 2219 of the Civil Code. because the deceased had given way to him upon hearing the bus horn. it was found out that as the two vehicles approached the junction. and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. Riding with him was his friend Manuel Romagos. They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road nearest to the junction but was on the inner lane. the motorcycle driver should have slowed down until he had been overtaken. filed this civil action for damages against petitioners. Said decision was affirmed by CA. SC disagreed with this contention and considered the findings of CA. When an . SUMAYANG Facts: Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. 2206(3) of the Civil Code. The lower court found petitioners liable. As an exception. 1764. The cases were consolidated. Petitioners contend that Pestaño was not under any obligation to slow down when he overtook the motorcycle.should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. Petitioners also aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this instrument been properly functioning. hence this petition. such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger. as provided in Art. Seeing that the left side of the road was clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic. Pestaño should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Pestaño and owned by Metro Cebu which had tried to overtake them. Pestaño accelerated his speed to pass the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus. owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Pestaño was negligent Held: Yes. As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the road leading to Tabagon. sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. as provided in Art.the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the radiator grill were bent and dented. in relation to Art.

Devesa was convicted of homicide. the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby. the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. and pursuant to established doctrine. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees. since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. where he was going to report for duty. was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba. A complaint for damages was filed by the victim’s widow. no liability attaches to it as employer of the Emilio Devesa because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service and that no negligence on appellant's part was shown. hence the instant petition. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable). Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as such train guard. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet. In the present case. Emilio Devesa.injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee. the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. Issue: Whether or not appellant could be held liable for the acts of its employee. Damages were awarded to the plaintiff. Appellant's contention is that. Held: No. Laguna to Manila. MARANAN vs. husband of the plaintiff. Tomas Gillaco. upon seeing him inside the train coach. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Facts: Lieut. because of this. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco. being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances. Tomas died. the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. PEREZ . GILLACO vs. a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company happened to be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. The court decided in plaintiff’s favor. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver. 884. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found guilty. did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. filed an action to recover damages. upheld by the majority and also by the later cases. 97 Phil. Under the first.operators could be held liable for damages Held: Yes. In other words. the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view.Facts: Rogelio Corachea. In the Gillaco case. inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers. Moreover. As can be gleaned from Art. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. 1960. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. Issue: Whether or not defendant. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers. 1759. the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which. unlike the present Civil Code. it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. unlike the Gillaco case. the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Now here. Antonia Maranan.. Rogelio's mother. Simeon Valenzuela. which is the minority view. from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. Manila Railroad Co. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the . the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. There. (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law. on October 18. the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. Hence the instant petition. but above all. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals. Under the second view.

1759 of the Civil Code. therefore. since it. Camarines Sur. and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger. as a defense. Under the foregoing section. as amended. the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers. it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability. Generally. Camarines Sur. the doctrine of state immunity from suit. the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its own. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary. The decision was sustained by the appellate court hence the present petition. Act 4156. no less important. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. wherein PNR raised for the first time. held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. Due to some mechanical defect. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation. but also. Accordingly. for repairs. Held: No. the train stopped at Sipocot. and not the passengers. Section 4 of the said Act provides: The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers: a.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. and b. moral fibers. boarded a train of appellant at Libmanan. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. CA Facts: Winifredo Tupang. upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena. delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law. Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case. Quezon. therefore. husband of plaintiff.performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger. Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. to their total personality. including their patterns of behavior. Unfortunately. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. as a paying passenger bound for Manila. not subject to garnishment or execution. The PNR was created under Rep. and social attitude. the PNR has all the powers. . Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment. and that its funds are governmental in character and. to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. has power to select and remove them. Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine of state immunity from suit.

Notwithstanding all these efforts. the rear left side was hit. is PNR negligent? Yes. ISAAC vs. As a result. The appellate court found. A. oppressive or malevolent manner. Said driver would not move the bus further without endangering the safety of his passengers. The driver of the bus upon the speeding pick-up truck swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road. he required in the absence of such emergency. nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages and exemplary damages. Issue: Whether or not the common carrier is liable. while not exempting the PNR from liability. Plaintiff brought an action for damages which the lower court dismissed holding the driver of the pick-up car negligent and not that of the bus. This finding of the lower court was sustained. despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. Such contributory negligence. CO. he is guilty of contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. his left arm was completely severed. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton. Thus. the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was coming from opposite direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel.Now. Neither did the train stop. Facts: Plaintiff boarded defendant’s bus as paying passenger from Albay. fraudulent. But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law. this is a circumstance which further militates against plaintiff’s position. that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train. Held: The bus was running at a moderate speed. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time. 1762). the petitioner does not deny. of the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation. By placing his left arm on the window. it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. AMMEN TRANS. as correctly ruled by the respondent court. reckless. he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train.” . The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Also. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury. he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise.L.

Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code. a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent. Butuan City. it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. . In the case at bar. the petitioner.CA Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. private respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police. with a due regard for all the circumstances. of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. 1755 and 1756 are applicable. Bachelor denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut in that their death was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. Thereafter. Bachelor was negligent. Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor and.BACHELOR EXPRESS. Bachelor is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. There is no question that Bachelor is a common carrier. the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. In effect. Art. Consequently. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. While at Tabon-Tabon. The lower court dismissed the complaint. suffered injuries which caused their death. Inc.. Hence. When the bus stopped. the bus picked up a passenger. 1732. However. In this case. in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law. vs. that about fifteen minutes later. passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road. Held: Yes. CA reversed the decision. The liability. hence the instant petition. 1733. while passengers of the bus. states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have any control. its alleged owner and the driver Rivera. if any. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries.

including two Maranaos. hence the instant petition. The operations manager of petitioner was advised to take precautionary measures. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. the bus was speeding from a full stop.Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion.. the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers. In the present case. if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Diosdado Bravo. whose heirs are private respondents herein was a passenger of the bus and was shot and killed during the incident. the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running. A constabulary agent investigated and found out that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. INC. Atty. three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers seized a bus petitioner bound for Iligan City and set it on fire. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager. Issue: Was there breach of contract of carriage? Held: Yes. Lanao del Norter. petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Talib Caorong. preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal . FORTUNE EXPRESS. Under the circumstances. and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. Art.CA Facts: A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan. resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney. vs. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers. Four days after the accident. The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage. it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees. that the necessary precautions would be taken. with petitioners contention that the acts of the Maranaos is caso fortuito. the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus. The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. Complaint was dismissed in the lower court but its decision was reversed in CA. such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.

Court of Appeals. let alone recklessness.detectors. or force. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees. not its passengers. violence. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. In Pilapil v. before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. in De Guzman v. In the present case. it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. Caorong did not act recklessly. this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. Court of Appeals. It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. On the other hand. such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. But Atty. we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY . Art. As already stated. The petitioner contends that Atty. DAMAGES A. it was ruled that a common carriers is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistable threat." Thus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals. nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers. the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. The armed men actually allowed Atty. ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. this act cannot be considered an act of negligence. Court of Appeals. III. Actual/Compensatory Damages CARIAGA vs. Mananggolo. despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken. with due regard for all the circumstances. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide. Certainly.

The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in awarding only P10. he is now in a helpless condition. and for this reason filed the corresponding cross-claim against the latter company to recover the total sum of P18. From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB appealed.00 as compensatory damages to Edgardo. and for Edgardo’s parents. The LTB disclaimed liability claiming that the accident was due to the negligence of its co-defendant. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor.00 as actual. the train whistle had been sounded several times before it reached the crossing. secondly. and dismissing the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company. when it reached that part of the Poblacion of Bay. and for actual and moral damages. that due to the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quite and retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his death. denied liability upon the complaint and cross-claim. as well as attorneys fees. a fourth-year medical student of the University of Santos Tomas was a passenger in one of the buses of LTB. Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to an increase in compensatory damages. when it bumped against the engine of a train passing by.490. virtually an invalid. for not providing a crossing bar at the point where the national highway crossed the railway track.00 as compensatory damages. the driver of the bus died. the sum of P18.75 representing the expenses paid to Edgardo.000. Firstly.000. the total sum of P312. The Manila Railroad Company. that another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo was a passenger. as a result." The impression one gathers from this evidence is that. the lower court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced his intelligence by about 50%.00 daily during his convalescence.. and many passengers including Edgardo were injured. with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the coinplaint. and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay attorney's fees. in not awarding them actual and moral damages.45 for all the hospital. Upon the whole evidence on the matter. Held: The findings of the trial court was sustained.00 in the same concepts. compensatory. where the national highway crossed a railroad track. medical and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18.Facts: Edgardo Cariaga. 1952 to April 1953. as a result of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga. the LTB having agreed to give him a subsistence allowance of P10. both physically and mentally. in turn. . The present action was filed to recover from the LTB and the MRR Co. Laguna. the Manila Railroad Company. 1953 up to April of the same year Edgardo stayed in a private house in Quezon City. paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing".490. Appellant LTB admits that under Art. The lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident and. rendered judgment sentencing the LTB to pay Edgardo the sum of P10. The front part of the body of the bus was wrecked. guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good faith.964. moral and exemplary damages.194. From January 15. alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident. The LTB paid the sum of P16.

is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.75 are within this category. Upon consideration of all the facts this Court is of the opinion. CA Facts: An Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the petitioner left Lingayen. including attorney's fees.750. for Manila. it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay.00 as damages. and so holds. Among its paying passengers was the deceased. Hence the instant petition. but this pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. that the compensatory damages awarded to petitioner should be increased to P25. 2199 of the same Code.000. . both of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver. hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17. INC. because this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. brought this action against petitioner for breach of the contract of carriage to recover the aggregate sum of P63. VILLA REY TRANSIT. We are of the opinion however. which caused several wounds. Pangasinan. LTB had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo consisting of medical. Neither could LTB be held liable to pay moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. Domingo.719. Notwithstanding the medical assistance. Pampanga. Petitioner is not entitled to recover attorney's fees. the Quintos died. about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart. have been duly proved. The private respondents. vs. hit the right side of the windshield of the bus.The claim for moral damages and attorney's fees is denied. according to Art. that the income which Edgardo could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus. penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of deceased. Jr. The protruding end of the bamboo pole. Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages may be covered and the case under consideration does not fall under any one of them. provided such damages. When the vehicle was nearing the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto.00. The present action cannot come under Paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one of quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the Laguna LTB and Edgardo. Policronio Quintos. municipality of Minalin. Said petitioner contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event.

upon the conclusion of his training period. but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount. also.90 years. but. In short. In the Alcantara case. not only relevant.184. on which petitioner relies. With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed. if not considering the growing importance of trade. whichever is shorter. and so it has been said that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation. commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income level of officers and employees therein much more. This argument is basically true. and. to earn more. hence. at the time of his death. at the time of his death. is an important factor. and had a life expectancy of 28. he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time.00 a year. life expectancy is. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary. Petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in placing the life expectancy of Quintos at 33-1/3.” Thus. petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now. Jr. and this is. unlike the Alcantara case. he being over 29 years of age at the time of his demise and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. the lower courts did not consider. . perhaps. although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein. The case cited is not. of a purely arbitrary standard. Just the same. the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos. Indeed. an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. the case had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. in the present case. controlling in the one at bar. one of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Jr. none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries. however. no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption. In other words. but only as regards the amount thereof. In addition. such as a four-year rule. It even declared “that the determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis. which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved. Inc. Surro in which the damages were computed on a four year basis.Issue: Did CA erred in its award of the damages to the heirs of Quintos? Held: No. Both parties appealed. Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. in the case at bar. the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that. whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old. the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2.

While plaintiff was standing in line preparatory to boarding the aircraft. she saw that her seat was given to a white man. IAC Facts: Private respondent Teofista P.000. And as if to add insult to injury. Domingo.00 and actual damages sustained by her in the amount of US$1. When the plane took off without her but with her luggage on board. She was forced to return to her hotel without any luggage much less an extra dress.000. attorney's fees of P100. Phil. At the immigration section. While in Sto. a Pan Am employee ordered her in a loud voice to step out of line because her ticket was not confirmed to her consternation and embarrassment in the presence of several people who heard and order. plaintiff's passport was stamped accordingly. Republica Dominica to San Juan. INC. While normally. Other instances which caused moral damage to the plaintiff are the following: 1. New York City USA. was on a business trip with a Pan-Am ticket. proprietor of Cavite Household Appliances and Rowena's Handicraft. plaintiff was made to pay the room accommodation petition in advance. but subject to modifications. Puerto Rico notwithstanding the fact that she possessed a confirmed plane ticket purchased from Pan Am’s Office at Sto. exemplary damages of P200. It was a good thing that the Hotel people remembered her because they do not usually accommodate female guests.00. after talking thru the telephone with a certain Mrs. Despite her Pleas she was not allowed to board the aircraft. Treasurer of the Molave Development Corp. Said decision was affirmed hence the instant petition. the former said that she (plaintiff) must be in San Juan that same day. Rene Nolasco. serious anxiety..546. Domingo. hotel accommodation was paid before departure. filed a complaint against petitioner for damages arising from defendant's alleged refusal to accommodate her on Pan Am Flight No. Findings of fact show that plaintiff. besmirched reputation. Tinitigan. 431 from Sto.). Issue: Whether or not the award of damages was proper. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded the amount of damages as prayed for. Domingo and thus causing her to suffer mental anguish..15.000 in said contract but since she wasn’t able to board the flight. to sign her contract or lose it. Lilibeth Warner. Phil. a businesswoman and a multimillionaire in her own right as evidenced (proprietor of Sampaguita Restaurant. vs. 2. without any luggage to stay in the hotel. said profit was lost.000. Held: Yes.00. wounded feelings and social humiliation She prayed that she be awarded moral damages of P500. It is clear from the evidence that defendant issued a Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check with assigned seat and the corresponding pass and baggage claim symbol. Defendant denied that plaintiff was a confirmed passenger since the ticket issued to her was on an open space basis which meant that she could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure. Plaintiff was made to pay the fare and terminal fee. Plaintiff expected to make a profit of $1.PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS. Plaintiff's .

In view of it nature. petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg.000. The award of actual damages in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Forty Six American dollars and fifteen cents (US$1. it is not error to have awarded exemplary damages. There was. as the name implies. especially one on the face of the woman.546. defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. A scar.00) Pesos. By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight. resulting from the . We believe. GATCHALIAN vs. Upon medical examination. if that integrity is violated or diminished. therefore. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body. it should be imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contract in the future by defendant and other airlines. The fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in order to accommodate a white man in an airline owned by an American firm with a reputation for bumping off nonCaucasian to accommodate whites is very regrettable. The rational behind exemplary or corrective damages is. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road. to provide an example or correction for public good . Issue: Is petitioner entitled to actual and compensatory damages? Held: Yes. And these show that plaintiff was indeed a confirmed passenger of defendant's Flight 431 for San Juan. Self enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant. Bad faith was also present. but it is malice nevertheless. La Union bound for Bauang. however the amount of some damages awarded to be exorbitant: We therefore reduce the moral and exemplary damages to the combined total sum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200. a contract or carriage perfected between plaintiff and defendant for the latter to take plaintiff to her place of destination.00) Pesos and the attorney's fees to Twenty Thousand (P20. actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. arm and forehead.000.name was included in the passenger manifest. turned turtle and fell into the ditch. a “snapping sound” was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and shortly thereafter. DELIM Facts: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent’s minibus at a point in Aringay.15) computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment is hereby retained and granted. While the bus was running along the highway. Defendant having breached its contract with plaintiff in bad faith. An award of attorney's fees is also in order. having found bad faith on the part of defendant.

It may be argued that the Soberanos could not have recovered this sum in the criminal case because Juana Soberano expressly filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages. causing it to fall into a 65-foot deep precipice. Areglado. the bus hit a stone embankment. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Jose Soberano. a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Co. hospitalization. SOBERANO vs. Juana brought with her 3. tendering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5. After due trial. 529. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Facts: Juana Soberano boarded a bus of the Benguet Auto Line (BAL). The MRR has paid a total sum of P4. Because of the loss of the eggs and the destruction of the personal effects that Juana brought with her in that trip. demanded from the defendant companies the value thereof amounting to P370. the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. as well as the service fees of her caretaker. her husband. The offer was rejected. Held: The Soberanos initially contend that the lower court erred in disallowing their claim of P200. The Soberanos moved to have the decision reconsidered. is a violation of bodily integrity.000. because these expenses were properly taxable in the criminal case. driven by Santiago Caccam.000.219.76.infliction of injury upon her. to recover from them damages in the total sum of P76. resulting in death to two of its passengers and serious physical injuries to Juana and loss and destruction of all her belongings. this Court awarded actual or compensatory damages. but such reservation did not preserve whatever rights they had against Caccam on the basis of the latter's imprudence.024 chicken eggs to be sold in Baguio City. for among other things. This claim was correctly denied by the lower court. In Araneta v. About three kilometers away from Baguio City. The reservation is . allowances. and some personal belongings which she needed in that trip.00 to recover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable. dismissing at the same time the complaint against Caccam. representing the expenses of Juana Soberano in attending as a witness in the criminal case and attorney's fees incurred in connection therewith. subsistence. Issue: Whether or not the amount of damages awarded is adequate. (MRR). In that trip. hence the present recourse. Later the MRR offered to settle the case extrajudicially. and the Soberanos filed the present action against the defendant companies and Caccam. of which sum the MRR paid P300. The MRR also paid the daily expenses. medical fees and medicines of Juana Soberano. the lower court rendered the decision appealed from. giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. Juana Soberano did not intervene in the criminal case because she filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages and indemnity against the MRR and the BAL. along the Naguilian road. bound for Baguio City.757. 104 Phil. We consider that the amount of P15.66.

000.000. or to incur expenses in connection with the litigation instituted by them.76. unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. Lastly. In this case it was Juana Soberano. It was not. fraud. As a result of which Arsenio Mendoza. Polo. And the Soberanos not having intervened in the criminal case. serious anxiety and fright they suffered as a consequence of the mishap. which provide that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest. the amount should be increased to P15. the defendant companies that compelled the Soberanos to litigate. In case of physical injuries. It will be observed that the defendant companies offered to settle the case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5. Bulacan. this claim must be considered as having been impliedly adjudicated in the criminal case. however. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities. rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum of P76. and cannot therefore be ventilated in the present action. The lower court denied this claim on the strength of the oftreiterated ruling of this Court that moral damages cannot be recovered against the employer in actions based on a breach of contract of carriage in the absence of malice.ineffective as to Caccam as it did not include him among those against whom their rights had been reserved. therefore. for the physical suffering. The Soberanos next contend that the lower court erred in denying their claim for moral damages in the sum of P15. Considering all the facts this Court is of the opinion that the sum of P5. The lower court rightly denied the claim for moral damages as far as Jose Soberano is concerned. or bad faith. not her husband Jose. representing unrealized profits from the 3. An action was brought to recover damages .757. moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin. mental anguish. MARCHAN vs. or when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid.35. while travelling on its way to Manila. the nature and extent of the physical injuries suffered by Juana Soberano has the effect of making her live an abnormal life. who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple injuries. The claim for attorney's fees was also properly denied by the lower court. MENDOZA Facts: A passenger bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday.000. who sustained the bodily injuries. The Soberanos aver that they were obliged to file a separate civil action for damages against the defendant companies. just and demandable claim.024 chicken eggs which she brought with her in the trip and which were destroyed.000 in compensatory damages awarded to her for loss of earning capacity is inadequate. his wife and child. The Soberanos. She should also be awarded the sum of P45. This claim is predicated upon paragraphs (2) and (5) of article 2208 of the New Civil Code.

00 for loss of pension which the deceased had failed to receive.00 previously paid to the herein petitioner under a vehicular insurance policy obtained by the bus owner. P5. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos. he may be expected to live for 30 years more and bearing in mind the earning capacity of Arsenio Mendoza who before the happening of this accident derived an income of almost P100.00 for loss of pension and credited him for the amount of P5. the former Court of Appeals modified the CFI decision by absolving Dalmacio from the payment of the P10. de Darrocha (a USVA pensioner) who died instantly.000.00 awarded by the court as compensatory damages is quite reasonable and fair.000.00 as compensatory damages was affirmed by CA. private respondent Geronimo Dalmacio ran over Juana Sonza Vda.00 as moral damages. Dalmacio was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.000.000. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.000.000.against petitioners predicated not only on a breach of contract of carriage for failure to safely convey the plaintiffs to their destination.00 as exemplary damages and sustained the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5. survived by her only child. Held: Yes.000.000. On appeal.00 for burial expenses and P10. DE CALISTON vs.000.00 awarded for loss of pension is unjustified.00 awarded for loss of pension is justified? Held: The deletion of the P10.00. but also on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant driver. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter.00 a month which he derived as a professional boxer. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation throughout the remaining years of his life.000.00 a month from the business of his father-in-law as Assistant Supervisor of the small fairs and his income of P100. considering that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower extremities. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. especially so if we take into account that plaintiff was only 26 years old when he met an accident and taking the average span of life of a Filipino. It however added the amount of P30.00 for the death of the victim. . The award of P40. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages was proper. The amount of P40. Gloria Darrocha de Caliston. Prosecuted for homicide thru reckless imprudence. sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay the herein petitioner P15. CA Facts: While driving a passenger bus in Bacolod City.000.000. the herein petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the deletion of the P10. P5.

On August 31. at bottom. Natividad A.000 as attorney's fees. . Baco. His mother. On the other hand. INC. Vda. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines.000 as actual and compensatory damages. Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla.The plane was Identified as PI-C133. demanding payment of P600. Vda. and to pay the costs. It had flown almost 18. 1960.00 as attorney's fees. with 33 persons on board. P10. Padilla filed a complaint (which was amended twice) against PAL.000.000. and that. the trial court promulgated a decision. Padilla rather than on the life expectancy of private respondent. the damages sought were excessive and speculative.00 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one year if she did not die. the P5. including the plane's complement. a DC-3 type aircraft manufactured in 1942 and acquired by PAL in 1948.000. plus exemplary damages and P60.000 as indemnity for loss of earnings. vs. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in computing the awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor A. In its answer. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines took off from Iloilo. on its way to Manila. It had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. arises from the same culpa. CA 185 SCRA 110 Facts: On November 23. Since the civil liability (exdelicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is subsidiary and. PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's flight crew. P10. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto. de Padilla the sum of P477. Starlight Flight No.00 as award for the expected income of the deceased Nicanor. moreover.000.00 as moral damages. de Padilla. the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P 10.The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which Dalmacio was responsible. to pay the plaintiff Natividad A.00 paid to the herein petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance.000 hours at the time of its illfated flight. was his only legal heir. He was 29 years old. the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant driver.000. single. Inc. Mrs. Mindoro. and thus erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the excessive sum of P477. one hour and fifteen minutes after takeoff . 1973. As a result of her son's death.

even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. concerning Damages. Pedro Davila. B. MORAL DAMAGES CACHERO vs.delict shall be at least three thousand pesos. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. However. the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary. until it is fully paid. Even in the absence of local statute and case law. PAL. Jr. 49 SCRA 497 which involved the same tragic plane crash. 1764. as established by authorities. resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. 1973. such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court.Held: Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is. For the settlement of the issue at hand. whichever is shorter. Costs against the petitioner. Art. but also the manner of computing the damages due the plaintiff therein which it based on the life expectancy of the deceased. foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive. WHEREFORE. this Court determined not only PALs liability for negligence or breach of contract. unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant. the petition is dismissed. had no earning capacity at the time of his death. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code. not of his beneficiary.000). The decision of the trial court is affirmed with modification. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31. the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased. INC. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO. The petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417.. 2206. there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence.000 (not P477. .. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi. The articles provide: Art. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book. In the case of Davila vs.

sympathy and understanding are added thereto. It is time to fight. 1953.050. The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Fiscal and on February 26. As We agree with the trial Judge on this point. for. Inc. slight in nature. On passing Oroquieta between Doroteo José and Lope de Vega streets. then respect and sympathy give way to something else. 1953. But when a person starts demanding P2. On December 17.050. as have been shown. the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the defendant demanded an exorbitant moral damages? Held: In all cases. as an officer of the courts. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and owned by the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. to be injured.Facts: Atty. So plaintiff instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila.000) and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to such demand. We admire and respect at all times a man for standing up and fighting for his rights. was not accepted by said company.. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of Article 2208 because the Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees. and when said right consists in injuries sustained due to a breach of a contract of carriage with us.20 as the only basis for settlement. upon his plea of guilty the Municipal Court of Manila sentenced him to suffer 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor. which was followed by another of January 6. even at its generous although erroneous best. Cachero addressed a letter to the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff.. and after going over the record of this case. suffering thereby physical injuries. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff but the latter only agreed to reduce his demand to the sum of P72. there is nothing more loathsome nor truly worthy of condemnation than one who uses his injuries for other purposes than just rectification. the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable." This case was instituted by a lawyer who.20 as his only basis for settlement which. and to pay the costs. We cannot declare that he erred for not awarding to plaintiff any such fees in this case. The Taxicab Co. could only grant P5. of course. Gregorio Mira Abinion bumped said taxicab against a Meralco post.050. to avoid the expense and time of litigation.. not a misfortune. Inc. in our humble opinion. injuries for which the trial court. we do not hesitate to say that the demand of this .20 for a solitary bruise and sprain. If plaintiff's claim is granted. 1952.900. but the latter refused and insisted on his demand for P72. should be the first in helping Us in the administration of justice. "Realizing its obligation under its contract of carriage with the plaintiff. mark it as more proper for the Municipal Court only. which he asks for damages.The present action was instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant amount for moral damages (P60. thus adding a clearly petty case to the already overflowing desk of the Honorable Members of this Court. it would be a blessing. and because the facts of the case. with the result that the cab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the vehicle to the ground. Tranquilino F.

While the vehicle was descending the Sta. or one day before the accident happened. The plaintiff himself must have felt embarrassed by his own attitude when after receiving defendant's brief as appellant. for plaintiff has already deprived the Court of Appeals of the occasion to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over this case which he recklessly dumped to this Court. the decision appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the amount awarded as unearned professioral fees from P3. when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place. causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. we do not hesitate to say that the demand of P72. among other things. This acknowledgment comes too late. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed. 1953. he makes in his brief as appellee the categorical statement that he "DOES NOT NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE LEAST to collect from the defendant all the damages he had claimed in his complaint. but instead he is submitting his case to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and equitable damages allowable by law. without pronouncement as to costs.case. Wherefore.000 to P2. registered in the name of Paz Fores. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22. 1953. It is so ordered. the driver lost control thereof. The CA awarded moral damages to respondent hence this petition. and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. At the time of the trial. series of 1952. and a third one to remove such splint.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone and an insignificant contusion in 'he chest. has not even the semblance of reasonableness. We certainly cannot look with favor at this attitude of plaintiff. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment. and later was subjected to a series of operations. A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21. Said decision is in all other respects affirmed. MIRANDA Facts: Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. Quezon City. it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.050. (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even had the name of "Doña Paz" painted below its windshield. the moral damages of P2.000 and by eliminating. TPU-1163. Five of the passengers were injured. . 1953. the first on May 23. FORES vs. who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of the incident.000 awarded by the Lower Court to the plaintiff. to compensate the plaintiff of the suffering and losses he had undergone and incurred because of the accident oftentimes mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff was injured". a second. that it carried plate No. she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman. No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the petitioner. effected to insert a metal splint. including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as that belonging to the petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found.

2206. since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement of his expenses and the said loss of income. not only because Art. is essential to Justify an award of moral damages. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased". 2219. But the exceptional rule of Art. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable. which provide as follows: "ART." By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. To award moral damages for breach of contract. that entitles the spouse. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Such fault or negligence. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. 2220." "ART." The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. ART.Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages given by the CA was valid? Held: No. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. 2219. there being fault or negligence. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the . moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.e. under the circumstances. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. such damages are justly due. 2176. Petitioner’s contention of loss of income and payment of attorneys fees cannot be the basis for the award of the damages on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. i. therefore. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation.

In case of fraud. "ART. Alfredo Montelibano. 1762. 1756. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored.defendant. and Art. and it would be never accountable for simple negligence. but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced. that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. as required by Art. In view of the foregoing considerations. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. his wife Maria J. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.000." "ART. The suggestion that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breach of the passenger's confidence. his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano. Jr. natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation.00 by way of moral damages the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously). 2220. justifying recovery of moral damages under Art." It is to be presumed. but that fact must be shown in evidence. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. and his daughter. In case of death of or injuries to passengers.. LOPEZ vs. Mrs. 1756) "ART. if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith. in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. bad faith. 2201." The distinction between fraud.PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS Facts: Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight No. the damages forwhich the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that arc the. by "Your Travel Guide" agency. the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5. Jr. malice or wanton attitude. 2 of Pan American World Airways from Tokyo to San Francisco were made. for then Senator Fernando Lopez. and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith. In contracts and quasi-contracts. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier. and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. 2220 is untenable. Lopez. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. PAN-AM's San Francisco head office confirmed the . while under the law (Art.

in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. From the foregoing evidence of defendant. however. First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were subsequently issued. Plaintiff prayed for an increase in the award. plaintiffs asked for P500. wounded feelings. P100. then. Court of First Instance rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs. PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego that PAN-AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first class passengers. the latter suffered social humiliation. Both however appealed the decision.000 exemplary damages. out of racial prejudice against Orientals. defendant's evidence would seek to establish its theory of honest mistake. All the time. asserting that its failure to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same.000 attorney's fees plus costs. Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against PAN-AM.reservations. They were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers. P25. Against the foregoing. Herranz forgot the matter and told no one about it except his co-employee. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will. however. but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation for them in the first class. Now on the issue of amount of damages. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant. Since the flight involved was still more than a month away and confident that reinstatement would be made.000 actual and moral damages. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages. According to plaintiffs. PAN-AM filed its answer. reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation. defendant acted in bad faith because it deliberately refused to comply with its contract to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs. The reservations employee mistakenly cancelled all the seats that had been reserved. First. Held: Yes. letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to show the same to PAN-AM's Tokyo office. it is in effect admitted that defendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs. stating that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class therein. For the given reason that the first class seats therein were all booked up. As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations for that evening's flight. that is. including those of Senator Lopez and party. when in fact they had none. serious anxiety and mental anguish. defendant willfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its contracts with plaintiffs. For plaintiffs were travelling with . As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs. It said that the first class reservations of Senator Lopez and party were made together with those of four members of the Rufino family. as to moral damages.

for his appointments there the next day. Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. but only economy seats available. the Far East. various cities in the United States. to be in Hongkong. ORTIGAS. For the moral damages sustained by him. At stop-overs. Asia. told Ortigas that the Lufthansa had no first class. political. 000 is reasonable. but his aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind.. only to be found among the tourist passengers. F. contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. for several appointments he had there. In concluding. Lufthansa German Airlines issued to the plaintiff First Class Pan American Ticket which would take him from Manila. The man at the counter of the Alitalia office told him it had no flight on Monday but the Lufthansa had. Ortigas .00 is appropriate. Senator Lopez was going to the United States to attend a private business conference of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company. the travel department of C. General Agents of the defendant. an award of P100.first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. considering the attorney’s prominence in the legal profession.00 as exemplary or corrective damages. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers. JR. the place of destination. He left Manila as scheduled. Ortigas went to the office of the Alitalia to book passage.000. social. In New York. and the business and financial position of the offender on the other. it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such. let it be stressed that the amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the official. the place of departure. Sharp. he decided to leave out some cities. to Hongkong. Ortigas' ticket for all these different legs of his journey was first class. To be sure he could fly first class to Hongkong. In this light. Europe. and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand. Considering also the physical discomfort of the wife of Senator Lopez as well as the members of his family. Inc. Ortigas arrived in due course in Rome. A written contract for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. the majority interest-in-which is held by Rocha y Cia. therefore. And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Inc.000. The amount of P25. included in his original itinerary. and that the defense counsel’s fees is more than half the said amount. The man thereupon called up the office of the Lufthansa and. we find it just to award P75. after talking to an employee thereof. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES Facts: The Sharp Travel Service. and then back to Manila. they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. and in fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore... vs.

He unloaded his baggage and proceeded to the counter in charge of the Lufthansa passengers. and this agreement the defendant violated by compelling the plaintiff to travel . 4 which corresponded to the Rome-Hongkong leg of his TWA Ticket. He was furthermore asked to pay 800 liras for bus fare and 700 liras as embarkation tax. said he could not board the plane that day because his seat would be given to a Belgian. she apologized and said the plaintiff's ticket was in order and would be confirmed and validated. Inc. There was. Held: Yes. Ortigas had his luggage weighed and was given the free luggage allowance of a first class passenger. a valid and binding contract between Lufthansa and the plaintiff to transport him as a first class passenger from Rome to Hongkong. The man thereafter asked for Ortigas' passport and other travel papers and attached a validating sticker on flight coupon No. he said he would not as a sign of protest. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages. An employee in the airport asked for his passport and other papers and. Ortigas checked out of his hotel and took a taxi to the terminal. At Dharham. The following Monday. After an argument with the employee. Manuel Otayza. Ortigas made another request. Ortigas requested her to check with her main office. Ortigas immediately asked him to get the seat and to see to it that his ticket be confirmed and validated for the flight and a first class seat. general manager of Filital. where his Filipino nationality appears. which she did by calling it up. After calling. the plaintiff requested the Lufthansa agent to transfer him to first class but the agent said he could not and that he did not receive any communication from Rome to that effect. which is the general agent of the Alitalia in the Philippines. It was only in Bangkok when the chief steward asked him if he wanted to move over to first class but having been already embarrassed and humiliated and the trip to Hongkong being only three hours. The lady at the counter told him that Lufthansa had no space for him that day. with the promise that he will be transferred to first class in Cairo and onward to Hongkong. therefore.was not willing to take an economy seat and requested the employee to call up other airlines. On her request. Upon arrival in Cairo. the plaintiff once more requested a transfer to first class but was also told by the Lufthansa agent that he had not received any communication about the change and the request could not be granted. after examining his passport. The employee afterwards informed Ortigas that the Lufthansa had a first class seat available. in which an award of moral and exemplary damages was ordered and now subject of an appeal. He was constrained to agree with the arrangement. The foregoing facts resulted in the filing of the case by the plaintiff against defendant. testified that space reservation through telephone calls between airlines is permitted by IATA's. "Manual of Traffic Conference Resolutions" and that telephone calls for reservation by one airline to another is in fact accepted procedure in accordance with the official airline guide of the Air Traffic Conference and International Air Transport Association.. Ortigas once again requested a transfer or that he be assisted in booking passage on other planes but was also refused. In Calcutta. that the employee call other airlines to inquire if they had flights to Hongkong that day but he once more turned down the plea and insisted that Ortigas travel economy.

inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A passenger contracts for first class accommodations for many reasons peculiar to himself and pays a higher price therefor. and it is certainly not for the airplane to say later. the economy class accommodations are not much different from first class and Ortigas was not delayed in his trip. however. As found by the lower court what worsened the situation of Ortigas was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping him as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given first class accommodation at Cairo. This Ortigas rejected. But in the instant case. It is argued that any such policy would be self-defeating. similar false representations were made to him at Dharham and Calcutta. the breach appears to be of graver nature. since it would certainly be damaging to its own business. Ortigas was at last informed that he could have a first class seat in that leg of the flight. but a specific act of Lufthansa employee at the airport of giving preference to a Belgian after examining Ortigas passport wherein his Filipino nationality is noted. after it deprives him of his space in order to favor another passenger. said plaintiff can easily be taken for a European or white more than his own witness Amado Castro and besides. It is Our considered view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage. there were other Orientals in the same flight on that occasion. the next station. who may not be discriminated against with impunity. since his luggage was already in the plane. the Lufthansa employee who had indifferently told him about his downgrading paid very little attention if ever to said request. It was only at Bangkok where for the first time. Thus. that economy class is anyway just as good as first class. Ortigas hardly had any choice. Although molested and embarrassed to the point that he had to take nitroglycerine pills to ward off a possible heart attack. when in truth such was not the case. if only to make patent his displeasure and indignation at being so inconsiderately treated in the earlier part of his journey. he was told by the Lufthansa office there that no word at all had been received from Rome and they had no space for him in first class. instead of complying with the request of Ortigas that other airlines be contacted to find out it they had first class space for him. since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino. it is argued. . Moreover. for what appears from the evidence is not really a case of a general policy of discriminating against Orientals or non-whites. that there could not have been any possible discrimination by reason of race against Ortigas because from his appearance. It cannot be said the breach was the result of an honest mistake or excusable negligence. We cannot see the point. Again. Worse.as an economy passenger. from Bangkok to Hongkong. this ratiocination is untenable. Lufthansa contends. when the plane reached Cairo. To his disappointment. the proper arrangements therefor having been made already. There is evidence that the defendant acted with bad faith and in willful disregard of the plaintiffs rights.

together with their respective drivers. 223 of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. As the bus approached barrio San Marcos. jointly and severally damages.00. vs. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE. a freight truck owned and operated by the Transport Contractors.. Inc. litigation expenses and costs. He boarded the said bus at the Manila terminal about four o'clock in the afternoon of November 6. The Court of Appeals affirmed CFI’s decision. Inc. The Court .In the light of all the foregoing. was coming from the opposite direction. The left arm was amputated. respectively. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. Bulacan.ESGUERRA Facts: Patrocinio Esguerra was a paying passenger of Bus No. 1961. and the Transport Contractors. even if death does not result. In all other respects. Bulacan for treatment. He sat at the left-end of the fourth row behind the driver. praying that judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants requiring them to pay. The contention of petitioners with respect to the award of moral damages is meritorious. This Court has repeatedly held that moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code. We have uniformly upheld the right of a passenger to damages in all cases wherein. including as to the payment of interests on the said amounts. The left forearm of Patrocinio Esguerra was hit by a hard blunt object. moral and exemplary. he is transferred over his objection to economy. The window glass near the driver's seat of the Rabbit Bus was detached and the left side of its body was damaged.000. which he has to take in order to be able to arrive at his destination on his scheduled time. and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas to damages. INC. the judgment appealed from is modified by raising the award of moral and exemplary damages to plaintiff Ortigas to P150. breaking the bones into small fragments while the soft tissues of the muscles and the skin were mascerated. the same is affirmed.000. both moral and exemplary. as in the instant case. Inc. Inc. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger. class. Calumpit. The vehicles sideswiped each other. actual and compensatory. He was immediately brought to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital in Malolos. Pampanga. after having contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly confirmed and validated. Plaintiff filed a case against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper Held: No. bound for San Fernando.00 and P100. close to the window.

Issue: Whether or not moral damages may be rightfully demanded. 1972. This being the case. That the finding of bad faith is binding on us. defendants. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8. In other words both vehicles were in their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other.appellants did not offer to refund plaintiffs-appellees’ tickets nor provide them with transportation form Tacloban to Catbalogan.of Appeals found that the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. Western Samar. M/V Sweet Grace. which was the first port of call. Under Art. moral damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 2220 of the Civil Code. 1972 at around 8:00am. They were to board petitioner’s vessel. Hence. affirmed by the CA. the vessel lifted anchor again on July 10. Held: Yes. aside from the fact that we find it faithful to the meaning of bad faith enunciated thus: . CA Facts: Private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner at the latter’s office in Cebu City. arrving at about 4:00pm n the same day. (3) Defendants. Instead of docking to Catbalogan. and when plaintiff-appellees wanted to leave the port and gave up the trip. the vessel set sail at 3:00am of July 9. since it is not the function of the court to analyze and review evidence on this point all over again. no moral damages are recoverable. decided in favor of plaintiffs.appellants instead made announce ment of assurance that the vessel would leave within a short period of time. SWEET LINES vs. defendantsappellants employees would come and say. 1972. “we are leaving already”. Private respondents had no recourse but to disembark and board a ferryboat to Catbalogan. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. 1972. Repairs having been accomplished.Appellants did not give notice to plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the vessel. bound for Catbalogan. (2) Knowing fully well that it would take no less than fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine. only to be towed back to cebu due to engine trouble. the vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban at around 9:00pm of July 10. this suit for damages for breach of contract of carriage which the Trial court. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of petitioner in that: (1) Defendants.

He asked for an explanation but TWA employees on duty declined to give any reason. New York.00 to P3. Judgment MODIFIED .000.M. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES vs. Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in the Court of First Instance of Rizal alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Self enrichment or fraternal interest.” Under the circumstances. Vinluan reconfirmed his reservation for first class accommodation on board TWA Flight No. Honolulu and back to Manila thru the same airline and other airlines it represents for which he was issued the corresponding first class tickets for the entire trip. As . A validated stub was attached to the New York-Los Angeles portion of his ticket evidencing his confirmed reservation for said flight with the mark "OK " On April 20. It was twice confirmed and yet respondent unceremoniously told him that there was no first class seat available for him and that he had to be downgraded to the economy class. 1979. Paris. rudely threatened him with the words "Don't argue with me. he went to the office of Trans World Airlines (TWA) and secured therefrom confirmed reservation for first class accommodation on board its Flight No. and not personal ill will. He was informed that there was no first class seat available for him on the flight. While waiting for the departure of Flight No. 41 of petitioner from New York to San Francisco on April 20. at about 8:00 o'clock A. Moscow. 1979. 1979. Vinluan was compelled to take the economy seat offered to him and he was issued a refund application" as he was downgraded from first class to economy class. may have been the motive. Hamburg.. 41. 41 with its New York office. On February 15. the scheduled time of the departure being 11:00 o'clock A. we find the award of moral damages excessive and accordingly reduce them from P75.. Zurich. When he began to protest.00 respectively for each of the private respondents." To be able to keep his schedule. while in Paris. 1980. The CFI ruled in favor of Vinluan which was affirmed by the Court of appeals with some modifications. Vinluan presented his ticket for check-in at the counter of TWA at JFK International Airport at about 9:45 o'clock A. Vinluan noticed that other passengers who were white Caucasians and who had checked-in later than him were given preference in some first class seats which became available due to "no show" passengers. CA Facts: Rogelio A. however.M. Issue: Whether or not Trans World should be liable for damages. Held: Respondent had a first class ticket for Flight No. I have a very bad temper. Braam. Vinluan is a practicing lawyer who entered into a contract for air carriage for valuable consideration with Japan Airlines first class from Manila to Tokyo. one of the TWA employees. Los Angeles. a certain Mr. but it is malice nevertheless.M. He was advised that his reservation was confirmed.000.“Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 41 from New York to San Francisco. On April 18.

00. Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy. Status. Braam. amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. Consequently. NW flight 002. The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was subjected is undeniable. plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the children. At the time of this unfortunate incident. ARMOVIT vs. he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. Worst still. though not involved in the suit. which is a good one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A. However.S. private respondent had shown that the alleged switch of planes from a Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 was because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller plane and not because of maintenance problems. Inc. the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and friends in the Philippines.he protested. scheduled on January 17. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. the moral damages should be reduced to P300. while he was waiting for the flight.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the U.000. Indeed. he saw that several Caucasians who arrived much later were accommodated in first class seats when the other passengers did not show up. date 17 January. OK.M. the award of moral and exemplary damages by the respondent court is in order. to Manila and back. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight: from Manila to Tokyo. was already .COURT OF APPEALS Facts: In October 1981. time 10:30 A. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a. 1982.00. and the exemplary damages should be reduced to P200. the private respondent was a practicing lawyer. (Northwest Airlines.M. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration. petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning.000. a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. 5 More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances. particularly as to their convenience. This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify private respondent for the humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts. scheduled flight time recited in their tickets.m. On their return trip from Manila to the U. he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the community. he was arrogantly threatened by one Mr. so they purchased from private respondent.S.

took the witness stand for he was there from the time they checked in until the time they were rudely informed that their flight had already taken off. wounded feelings. moral damages.S.S. and 308.. media so petitioners were advised to refrain from returning to the Philippines at the time when they were scheduled to testify. The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was not changed when re-confirmed. The CA overlooked the fact that a year after the incident there was a turmoil in the country because of the assassination of Benigno Aquino and that violent demonstrations in the country were sensationalized in the U. 307.taking off and the 10:30 A. Petitioners suffered anguish. Angered and frustrated Dr. Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated demands of the petitioners for compensatory damages arising from the aforesaid breach of their air-transport contracts. brother of Dr.S. Nevertheless. Atty. exemplary damages and nominal damages to the plaintiffs but the CA eliminated the award for moral and nominal damages. Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the private respondent's Roxas Boulevard office. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U. The contention of the CA that the appellees did not take the witness stand to testify on their "social humiliation. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous. petitioners were compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Armovit told the said check-in-officer that he had to be accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all his appointments in the U. Issue: Whether or not the elimination of the CA of the award for moral damages. Held: Yes. that petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also complained about not being able to report for work at the expiration of her leave of absence. Flight 002. Armovit. The names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306. Armovit.M. Herein petitioner Dr. wounded feelings and anxiety" and the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent was without merit. and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will be available for them on the flight that day. The RTC awarded actual damages. that while petitioner had to accept private respondent's offer for hotel accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up .

PAL denied liability on the ground of fortuitous event. wounded feelings and social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon having been bumped off.00 while waiting to be flown out of Manila.00 each. The airplane crash-landed beyond the runway due to the slow reaction and poor judgment of said captain. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the serious anxiety. Nominal damages cannot coexist with actual or compensatory damages. but were assured of this flight only on the very morning of that day. and breakfast in the sum of P1. so that they experienced anxiety until they were assured seats for that flight.300. which caused him to file a complaint for damages. dinner. when it did not maintain the required pressure on the brakes and notwithstanding the diligent efforts of Samson. The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is welltaken since there is an award of actual damages. No doubt Atty. The jolt caused injuries to Samson.and wait for their flight out of Manila the following day. the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages. And instead of PAL giving Samson expert and proper medical treatment it referred him to a general medical practitioner. considering the circumstances of this case whereby the private respondent attended to the plight of the petitioners. COURT OF APPEALS 106 SCRA 391 Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with Captain Delfin Bustamante in a plane belonging to petitioner PAL. taking care of their accommodations while waiting and boarding them in the flight back to the U. the following day. However. Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the medical appointments he missed due to his inability to take the January 17 flight. and that the physical headaches and dizziness experience by Samson were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required upgrading course given by . 1982. Wherefore the decision of the CA is modified providing the award for moral damages. on grounds of physical disability Samson was discharged from PAL’s employ. the gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight. that Dr. Now. Also.000. petitioners did not use their meal coupons supplied because of the limitations thereon so they had to spend for lunch. that the petitioners were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18.S. the Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs.

justifying the recovery of moral damages. even if he was sick. C. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-employer relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment. applying the provisions of Article 2220. Doctors presented by PAL even admit the vital facts about Samson’s brain injury. Judgement was rendered in favor of Samson in the lower court which was affirmed by CA with some modification. Having affirmed the gross negligence and casual connection of the aftereffects of the accident.PAL. The plane hit outside the airstrip. 2219(2) is applicable. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease. private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice.000] by computing the basic salary per annum at P750. to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold classes. having tumor on his nose. These more than prove what private respondent had complained of. The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph. Disregard thereof by PAL is condemnable. The grant of compensatory damages[P204.00 a month for extra pay for extra flying time including bonus every year is justified. One month prior to the crash-landing. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM. Hence the instant petition.00 a month and P300. private respondent warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. which further warrants the award of damages? Held: Yes.000] was also justified. There was also gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. Exemplary Damages PRUDENCIADO vs. by imposing legal rate of interest on the unearned income of Samson. In another instance. that before crossing Taft Ave. headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the accident. she stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on . Facts: Petitioner was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left. Issue: Is there a causal connection between the injuries suffered by private respondent during the accident and the subsequent periodic dizziness. INC. the award of damages was likewise affirmed. when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet. the pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not the plaintiff warned him. The grant of moral damages[P50. headache and general debility allegedly caused by the accident and private respondent’s discharge from employment. The dizziness. having considered the bad faith of PAL.

The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190. failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the required diligence of a good father of the family in the selection. While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the petitioner. P25.27.451. In fact.. in addition to the other consequential damages prayed for. therefore.451. As to exemplary damages. P5. A careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries sustained by petitioner are not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be.00 as moral damages. The award was P2. On the other hand. Hence the instant petition.00 as attorney's fees.27 for actual damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff.” The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is justified in modifying or changing the grant of damages by the trial court. to provide an example or correction for the public good.00.000 and eliminating the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. it will be observed that the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic. a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be established. thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body.000. Otherwise stated. The lower court found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence. serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness. . Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents. Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: “In quasi-delicts. to warrant the damages awarded by the trial court. it was nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the respondents that Dra. to pass the test of reasonableness. actually took place. supervision and control of its employees. Inc. Unquestionably.000. she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering. with costs against the defendants.first gear to cross the same. and the further sum of P3. her fears can be more real and intense than an ordinary person. the damages imposed by the lower court should be reduced to more reasonable levels. Held: No. suddenly bumped and struck petitioner’s car. CA modified the award.00 as exemplary damages. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence. but when she was almost at the center. Both defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff as well as for the damage to her car. which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.000 to P2. as the name implies. Inc. Being a doctor by profession. reducing the amount of moral damages from P25. suffering more particularly brain concussion while her car was damaged to the extent of P2. not to mention the fact that such were not supported by the medical findings presented. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and can lead to some.000. Alliance Transport System. Jose Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance Transport System. near the island thereof.

The findings of the trial court is apparent. MARCHAN vs. Much more. that in the complaint.00 as exemplary damages. who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple injuries. and (4) the sum of P3.000. An action was brought to recover damages against petitioners predicated not only on a breach of contract of carriage for failure to safely convey the plaintiffs to their destination. he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision. plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable.00 as attorney's fees. As a result of which Arsenio Mendoza. Failing to notice petitioner's car.00 as exemplary damages and sustained the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5. Held: Yes. in which this Court finds that it has erred. Bulacan. DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED. which became the basis of the award of exemplary damages that respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the right along Taft Ave. and respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner. It however added the amount of P30. coming from Ayala Boulevard.451. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures. nor proof. (2) the sum of P15. This however was overruled by CA and did not subscribed to the fact that the driver was grossly negligent.000. Polo. (1) the sum of P2. but also on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant driver.00 as moral damages.000. considering that the traffic was clear. MENDOZA Facts: A passenger bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday. his wife and child. while travelling on its way to Manila. It is to be observed however. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs.000.00 as compensatory damages was affirmed by CA. it was raining that time and the roads are slippery. since the body of the complaint sought to recover damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's employee and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages. No pronouncement as to costs. nor counterclaim of error for the same by the respondents. Issue: Whether or not there should be an award of exemplary damages.00. (3) the sum of P5." Now. The award of P40. It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer. plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the kind of damages they .000. the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the award of damages is concerned.27 for actual damages representing the cost of the repair of her car.000. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities.

A modification of the decision however is proper. but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right. therefore. among others. If the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved. Respondents are entitled to interest for the amount of compensatory damages from the date of the decision of the lower court and legal interest on the exemplary damages from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals. their determination depending upon the discretion of the court. in effect. and the reason is obvious because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages. the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. to compensatory damages. There is no reason to consider that the lower court erred in awarding the P5. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises. .are trying to recover against the defendant's carrier. it need not also be alleged. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition.000 attorneys fees.

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