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GDI 2005 Security K, Gener Module ANC Shell Discourse Links War on Teror Links Us vs Them Links Famine Discourse Security Disco = Securitization “Politics” Reifies Sovereignty General Impacts General Alternative Agamben Module ANC Shell Links Impacts Alternative Reject Rethink Solves INC Shell Links ‘Terror Talk Module INC Shell Links Impacts ecurity Criticism 10-11 12.13 14-15 16 ” 18-19 20.28 29.38 39-44 45-48 49-51 52-53 34 55 36-59 60-61 62-64 65-66 67-70 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Orientalism Module INC Shell 14 Links Us Them 15-16 Otherization 78 Islam io Impacts Oppression 80-82 Turns Solvency 83-84 AT: Realism 85.91 AffAnswers Realism Good 92.97 Pers 98-100 General K Answers 101-104 AT: Postmodernism 105 AT: Orientalism 106-108 AT: Terror Talk 109 AT: Nuclearism 110 Borden/Maurer/Reddy os tlh, ke ANC Shelf Chapter One The Gacept of the Milena + GDI 2005 Soeur, disceurse tnvokes a mono [Pht tolenti4 on vhoce behalP viblerce 1% Londluche: [he Organi Zin fost ka politics of exclarter hasec) e a or (Cn ey) dich chien that ty Win lees abgolate evies4 contro! - Williams 2003, Michael, Professor at Univorsity of Wales, Words, mages, Enemies: Securitization and international Politics Studies Quarterly, pg. 519 the concept simply has an “identity” risks radicality of underage ne thin the specie tet of security as a speech-act (existential thea authotane ae cisely under the con seh gee euitizations that a ried, monolitie Tar ok Mesias aes when identities are securificed that th challenged, denied; or-suppressed- Under the at @ SECURING spec ‘succeed or fail) that mar] we between an identity policed and thus sill more open to processes ol heey THexibility, an ide on lin of gn oles Ment mies eel the Gb ose HO Whatit is notiocan ee a | geet Smarr see cpio sa en conditions of emergency. ms of GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy —Secuetly 1 ANC shell — es e er At aeellog jee he nl ak of lechaocrafic ruletisuec off Be en ovesh Hee, public debate aac declslon, he state dbrec self arowd what tf conrshdece a secunily th real Jenny Eakins, PhD and co-convenor ofthe Bish International Studies Association posisructuralPolics Group Poststueturaism and Intemational Relations: engine tho Pktical Back n Boulder, CO: Lyme Renner, 1998) pg. 1 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde's use of “poltcized”is quite dinar from what mine would be. Wha they call Spleereace tet “depoiizaton When an nue becomes, & they ep op oa policy reavring government decison and reson aya pateoe Bu coimes Tor mie part of “polities” and hence, as Thave argued above, “de> Politicized.” I would agree that securitization is a further step in the same Gieation, bu forme that direction sone of Senco ate are serine” they re even more firmly comand wenn ee sceepleT vera of a seee socal form And lat conse Panty dened The sae a a form of society has defined ise in ge pat ‘around what it threat” and what mechanisms it will adopt for d ling with it_Wssues of *security” are ore removed from — public debate and decision thin sates of “poly ia most calor is oes re soe, and Fen te exsens Of Mah meen ee Tons fechiical terms, following the adh eres ir jefense. Securitiza excellence, GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy — Saeale ie dale tell“ Chapter Tuo! The Alpeha. of Dnbnrife Tastee The cleeton, coll ty porbtigale In atm literiehe r adveatures iS based ea the aicbilicabln a Hie publiaetoteollachie fmascadeo 1) SE Mma 6 ee vaapiictatlea ol Auth conde pape th a Tilton, Rober J. Professor of Psychiatry and Peyehol . iy ad Peyehology at Taha Jy College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York. i “American Apocalypse” Vol 277 sue 21, Academic Search Premi December 2003 Zi ‘Warmaking can quickly become associated with "war fever.” the mobilization of public exci collective experience of transcendence. War then becomes heroic, even mythic, a task that must be carried out for the defense of one's nation, to sustain its special historical destiny and the immortality of its people. In this case, the ‘growth of war fever came in several stages its beginnings, with Bushs personal declaration of war immediately 1; a modest inerease, with the succesful invasion of Afghanistan; and a wave of ullrapatrotic ‘excesse5-riumphalism and labeling of critics as disloyal or treasonous~at the time ofthe invasion of lreq, War {fever tends always to be sporadic and subject to disillusionment, its underside is death anxiety, in this case related fess to combat than to fears of new terrorist attacks at home or agninst Americans abroad~and later to growing casualties in occupied Iraq, “The scope of George Bush's war was suggested within days of 9/11 when the director ofthe CLA made a presentation to the President and his inner circle, called “Worldwide Attack Matrix,” that described active or planned operations of various kinds in eighty countries, or ‘what Woodward calls "a secret global war on terror." ‘Barly on, the President had the view that "this war will be fought on many fronts” and that "we're going to rout out temor wherever itmay exist." Although envisaged long before 9/11 the invasion of Iraq could be seen as a direct ‘continuation of this unlimited war; all the more so because of the prevailing tone among the President and his advisers, who were described as eager "to emerge from the sea of words and pull the trigger.” ote tr EEF acttaeeie: 1g hye We Sheff fee hock 5 Fercowilsan, securiby Ve thevethe baste prlaciple of shte ach ipa Securif ond terrorism pins a stale dead, ashen ty lhich they estty ad egibldale ach Other’ actions ‘Agamben , Giorgio. "On Security and Terror.” hitpi/www, /faculty/agambenag 3-00. and- ‘emmor,html September 20, 2001 as leading pri fs ities Keto rth of state . Hobbes already ‘mentions it as the opposite of fear, which compels human beings to come together within a society, But not until the 18th century does a thought of security come into its own. In a 1978 lecture at to be published) Michel to discipline and the law ‘Turgot and Quesnay as well as Physiocratic officials were not primarily concemed withthe prevention of hunger or ‘the regulation of production, but wanted to allow for their development to then regulate and “secure” their ‘consequences. While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening ‘and to globalization; whil wants and regulate, to. them, In short, discipline wants to produce order, security wants to regulate disorder. Since measures of security cam nly fiction within a context of freedom of trafic, trade, and individual initiative, Foucault can show thatthe development of security accompanies the ideas of liberalism, ‘measures of public admini sole. of political Jegitimation. The thought of security principle of state activity, What used to be ‘becomes the sole criterium of political lestimation, ‘bears within it an essential risk. A state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile ‘We should not forget thatthe first major organization of terror after the war, the Organisation de I' 4g PE sik Our of panier relafas tn where voduced- ty reader visible sfc conbhgent ¢ Is es ee! Borden/Maurer/Reddy INC Shelf 8 eal tee sk be 4o ehelita the hejener sfonal nature ny. Professor a Polit of Wales. ® o international Politics, University Aan Pa Sper econ pest Sc as Tt and ‘Memory Famine penocie,cmergeny. taxa ntematoal femory Famine, relations theory. Poststructrualism and International Relations.Pg 142. name Sur) September 1999. I shouldbe noted that the notion of not forging involved ine = politicization is not equivatentto-a histoneal temembecinestee sor FSBO hal produces a naraive aeount or altempis lo repeduee hea, pear Lacanian ethics is ‘OF reality im past events. Ieis i mbolizable real: Our duty is all shattered and per n ethics grounded in reference to the traumatic Real ‘ead an encircling of the trauma, the memory ofall fost ims and hopes."®? Thus Zizek's hich resists symbolistion. the Real which is experienced in she cay ounter with the abyss of the Other's desire."** _fecemembering involved is the drive or “the ethical compulsion whic compel fo mark peace ame et compas us 10 mark repeatedly the memory ofa Tost Cause™™ The SE Are weord oF document or reenact a past Tura, Which Would “ gentiity"-and neutralize it What s crucial about trauma is the imposs bility of titegrating it ito the symbolic order: The Real is precisely that Rich cannot be symbolized, the surplus that remains. What is needed ic "to encircle again and ‘again the site ofthe lost Thing, to mark its very im. dane aagnats living nearby so that he can revisit the ste: the only impor fant thing is that he returns, as a mute witness, As Zizek says, “All ne hhave to do is to mark repeatedly the trauma as such, in its very ‘impossi. Suu. ints non-integrated horror, by means of some “empty” sywibolic gesture," Fouca anges." 1s not the task of te inventions ote 4s (whatever commonly "we" may bey the reverse: to challenge the hegemony of the order in whose name Fitical inv tivism, We should repeatedly mar lulled Tato Torgett somal natare. This leads ton post that “everything i dangeraus.. The ethical po- make every day is 1 determing Wh in ions theorist to secure fis tHe dager but precisely BOWE relations or symbolic to render visible its contingent ion that advocates a continual pow i and responsive ac. is produ 4 need for Fecurrin GDI 2005 The Claes calls inte guests the Borden/Maurer/Reddy See 4 (oa q 1 q Concepts tat make “p ae Ascourse David Campbell, Professor at University of Minnesota, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Poles of ony, (Minnesota Univeraty Pre) noe, Po, Consequently, in attempting to understand the ways Ty Which United States foreign policy Rat imtereatat ona Boundaries of the Mt whose pine Te SE ‘Mops nelthera purely Tegra aor es anal Berhaps best anda temas or ode Sepreiative attude suggested by Michel Foucault" A eter othe Present does not try to capture the meaning-of the past, nor does it tty to get a complete picture of the past as a bounded epoch, with underlying laws and teleology. Neither isa history ofthe present an instance of presentism—where the present is nad beck enn Bast—or an instanceof Gnas, that mode of analysis where the analyst maintains that a kernel ofthe present located in the past has inexorably progressed such that it now defines our condition, Rather, a history of the present exhibits an unequivocally contemporary orien. tation. Beginning with an incitement fom the prsort we eee ifestation of a ritual of power—this mode of analy iis seeks to trace how such rituals of power arose, took shape, f aained pore aa and effected polls? Tn Shor TS acs oP ace eo ‘img and Concepis have historically functioned WARN TRCOUSE 5 l MAS CoiASWe J PAVKS Seale “ation isa means of manipulating control. Huysmans, Jef “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security hitpu/www.findartcles.com/p/articles/mi_go2624is 20020L/ai_n6793243. January 2002 {In this final section, 1 introduce the agenda that theorizes the mobilization of the security formation from a Sociological angle. is main object of research is the inttutionalization of threat environments.(34) A modem “ gan institutional envi ronments, environment that plays a central role in the ae . oe Eee sewe L\wle TO Seca th | | < ‘obvious example. This concept open: of it ize the Action tization F ‘modern, Western societies. To explain this I will heavily rely on two of the most fruitful works in this regard: Ole ‘Waever's interpretation of securitization within a classical-realist framework and Didier Bigo's understanding of the | Sccsaieee ee ea {Let us return to Waever and his interpretation of security as a speech at. The concept ofa speech at strongly introduces an agent utering security, Someone has to perform the act. Since not every speech act is be detescon ‘successful in establishing the elocutionary effect (for example, ‘getting the promise across or turning an issue ina security question), the question arises: cit itize? Inthe sociological ‘esearch project, ths leads to an analysis of differences in the capacity ofthe actors to mobilize svurty | Crem The cpecly agents cosenblvon de ioe ee a ‘main question becomes: Who can utter security" ‘successfully or legitimately? (with the who strongly referring to ‘ipso, rer an nl age) Tas spe only reg powell in obs more nts ede eee in : a Pili To cron been ce me ab MBs Sy cl bow the pica conmunty only ered oa sae a mE positions Waever theorize this question first from a classcal-realst IR perspective. The made state represented by statesmen embodies the main capacity to securitize questions; in other words, ea ing the sta inthe name ofthe state are the privileged agens in the securtizing process, Practoes Pate Statesmen are explained in instrumentalist terms. The state elite manipulate the security utterances to realize their objectives: "By uttering ‘security. state-epresea ‘particular into a specific lal ight to use what are lock it." (35) The speech act of security thus becomes a means fo an end. This does not of course imply that successful securitization andthe specific way ms ‘which a problem may become securtized i a direct result of the intentional practice of statesmen Ino soy Spastructvist perspective, the effects are always intersubjetively constructed and therefore not cont olled bythe individual agents themselves. imply uttering the word “security” perpetuates securitization 9 ity ‘simply {anes 2003, Michael C., Professor at Un iversity of Wales, Words, 2 Securitization and Intemational Polics Images. 513 International Quarterly, PS a Loven isco Wie eh Ia To gs SO somthing done _ nae ee hp Brame eS \6 5 ena Da, evlomen ina spe teh epee re Whatever meas aT NESTE gos LLIN K S$ me SGer it? Osment hy Security K VEMEAT Wire ae Levi es > FO sk Woe SS aN : FocuS on Suvvival het ae e seeurchy Aig Covvle . ams 20 sity of Wales, Words, ~~", Will ct Professor at University of Wales, , Imogen, Eromes:Socutizaton ond hometore! Pats, International Quarterly, pg. 516 Strong To group nunrarr wemgy acc aatts, SPect of Schmitt's thinking that inforne Ge pect is formulation of “security” as a phenomeney that is concretely indeterminate and Yet Jomaly specif: constiuted by yee Kind of speech-act. Just as for Schmit itis the articular intense reabonsp toa eee a intense relationship to an ise, rather han oe mine nature, that determines : nd san is “politcal.” for the Copenhagen Schone ag ith the security of the state. As he puts it the eet is to “retain the speci quality characterizing security probes eu ‘sta power cae he ee ee Gress he Penna dhe pale Fs Boe dering ay otheh sare vit i approach tis eee a Oa stay Eta ne inight be the most imy tant focus for concerns ‘about threats, vul Inerabilities, ane Aetense™ Wier Rear ee concer Way, the “ogic’ of see Broatlened—pried loore hor od referent objects—without losing ism that makes this possible intense Seale eat_and extreme necessity «specie ey Me ors deinen Condition of existential division, of friendehigrs ‘enmity, that consticutes Schmni concept of the political GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy Va f Whe on Tee @gR = SEORIT Loci, “eyver feedS write ce oF Payehiaty an Sob the Can and Psyehslogy ai John Jay — City University of New York, ‘The amorphousness of the war on terrorism carries with it a paranoid edge, the suspicion that terrorists and their are. ‘and must be " fo ‘and attack us, Since such a war is limitless and infinite-extending from the farthest reaches of Indonesia or Afghanistan to Hamburg, Germany, or ‘New York City, and from immediate combat to battles that continue into the unending future~it inevitably becomes Despite the constant invocation by the Bush Administration of the theme of "security," the war on terrorism has xeated the very opposit~a sense of fear and insecurity among American, which s then mobilized in support of further aggressive plan in the ‘extension of the larger "war." What results is a vicious circle that engenders what we ‘in tum leads to an escalation ofthe war on terrorism, and so on. The projected "victory" becomes a form of ageressive longing, of sustained illusion, of an unending "Fourth World War" and a mythic cleansing--f terrorists, of evil, of our own fear. ican mili ic can then i Islamist apocalyptic. ‘The USFG created the Patriot Act from security logi % Howard Balll, The Critics of the 2001 Patriot Act: Civil Liberties Endangered by the Imperatives of National Security, USA Patriot Act of 2001: balancing civil liberties and national security: a reference handbook, 2005 page 66 ‘When, on October” 26; 2001, President George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act, he stat ie ‘of the legisla- jon was the pursul and the bringing to justice af the SS Fe cette enon te Untied aes. are ‘vas a reflection of the new national security policy: preventive US. Attorney General John Ashcroft, speaking one day ear- ier at the annual US. Mayors Conference, was even more sirect—and more aggressive. On September 11, he said, “A tumn- “hg point was reached... in the administration_of justice. merely or primarily iis ir ait enon tt anbher ROREY FENCE SAO, Speeaeriee ecto lanai a erney gael s contaie" 7 Fon with a diferent enemy within ourborcers \ D1 200 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security k a NJ po emcee 12. Of S002 Losi one Sampo sy at Univ Rites Forion Policy and tne Pola Sghy OF Minnesota. Wing Seana % (Minnesota University Press) am, dna otha the United States was sending nc Saudi wed “In helifeofs pee the incigpoe ne identi to danger the pepe AN and fc a aalerpretation tothe deere eh Slate's dent gee ne Fh study that eS te bvoied he hat the boundaries of fear pag ee representation gee ‘The Bush Administration uses fear to end criticism. Watson, Paul "Endless Fake Terror Alerts: Fear Based ‘Mind Control". http://www propagandamatrix.com/endless fake terror _alerts.html 2003, In May and June of 2002 watered down evidence of the Bush administration's prior knowledge of the attacks ‘emerged in the media. Despite the fact that the information was largely a whitewash it was stil a source of ‘embarrassment for a regime that had naively become used to saying and doing what it liked by dancing on the {graves of the victims of 9/11. To shut dox ide the ith a distraction to fil reported, "Th yesterday's uncorroborated FBI report that terrorists might target the Statue of Liberty, quicted some ofthe lawmakers who said President Bush failed to act on clues ofthe September 11 attacks, although Senate Majority [Eeader Tom Daschle yesterday reiterated his demand for an independent investigation, The latest alerts were issued “asa result ofall the controversy that took place last week," said Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer, referring to reports that the president received a CIA briefing in August about terror threats, including plans by Osama bin Laden's al Queda network to hijack U.S. commercial airliners.” \z GDI 2005 Security K The emergency of mindset Borden/Maurer/Reddy 7 Security initiates a friend-enemy Williams 2003, Michael, Professor at University of Wales, ‘Words, mages, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” Intemational Studies Quartery, pg. 518, = —Keccond aspect of Sch sits thinking of particular importance in relation to he > > theory of securitization involves the ways in which his understanding of the conoees arme palit ar ened by y the relationship between friend and enemys rate is decisionist theory of sovereignty Ti, af ection, by We capaci we they cele contest egal oF Tea isputes within the state, and particularly to decide when a threat io the prell Bolicaorder-has Feached & poo where Te ConStmes ai "emerges" an uires the suspension oF 10 alia | ‘exepon ata ion,” aa pt Wvereignty is defined by the act smal rules and procedures so that the political order iese are the situations that Schmitt gharacterizes as The in a characteristically pithy phrase, “Sovereign is he sion” (1985 [T923.5), ‘The exception cannot, for Schmitt, be determined by prior rules that would stipulate what constitutes and as he puts it: “The precise di TERS ore out what may take place in such a case, especially whew ine cae OT Teme emergency and of how itis to be ellminated” (108 T1922: OF) Teivasuch wae thar thease sovereignty is revealed." The a true emergency. In such cases, a decision must be made, icy cannot be anticipated, nor lecide“w ig mmr ey ccides whether there is to be an extreme emergency as well as ike er ene eo climinate it. AMHOUEH Te stands outside the normally vale Tegal system, Te nevertheless Belongs to it, for itis he who must decade whettertie- Constitution feeds to be suspended in ie AMES” “(). By contrast, the everyday Situation of hormal” politic dependvupsete “For a legal order to make Whether the maestation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitively decides whether this normal situation actually exists” (13), ie h, 2 GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy ee Security K 1 . US J thm extension aig essence of politics lies in the friend/enemy relationship Williams 2003, wichae, Professor of intomational Polis. Words, mages, Enemies: Secutizaton and Intemational Polis” Intemational tudes Custer, po. 517-518 mee Nae ee Jt fin the realm of emergency thatthe essence of sovereignty as dechion Is most avy lustalet: Here, Schmit aim Wat the-eisente ofsovercigsio hes pooh act of decision. merges powerfull idk hr anos ene ie concept oF the pollca” For Schmit the sence of ole et politics what he terms "the polica”—Tes im the relationship berieen frend and enemy, and in the poh ot mans config. Friendshipane enmity provkie eee Te “lidar, “hat underpin the apa Tor eTeS TS ee TCE of Sendship and the limits prescribed by enmity —define the parses eon ch values can Ge decided upon and the deewions or ee jostion accepted By the sodety at lage Suche come he Seo accepted By the socety at lange. Such a commonality, climates inextkalTe Tom enmnily—"Rom a eros eg ee us" —and from the possibility of call Siugle with that enemy. For Schmit, the politics ofthe enemy ake not_normative.'® They represent the essence of polite hr-t3o Tr prio individuals can cone togethers oma pene el together to form a group aroundTany particular interest, but they-will_only become properly “political” if they enter'inte a friend-enemy ‘lash wa ere ore eta. cnen Se servval oF the group and its uldmate willingness to Cngaye In moral SUgGEE i a saRE—The pote emery” he ape a ee mpetitor and Ti may cven be advanlageour io engage ar Mest tanec: Bute never te oer ea ent or Bishature athe thing dierent Nene Wa ely something eileen inva spectically intense way, exstentially so aul alien, so that in extreme cases conflicts with him are possible. These Gan) neither be deeded by a previ fned_general norm wor” by the Judgement of a diamicreited and therefore newtral tind pay TOUS TTOISETY Judgement ofa Tsinerested and therefore newtral thind pari The affinity between this understanding of “the concept of the political” and Schmit’sdecsonis theory of sovereignty clears The eas Pena an underpinned —indeed almost defined —by its sity we sipprt and aera sorted and obeyed Sy given political grouping.” ‘The lundamental division ot tad and casing ‘and. he eaparty-tor-attnetve decision are_mutually supportive. A sovereign onder que META ere Se By the exisicnce of suchea | / gener of decison andthe sctplance of is decom by tht ean eh Schmit, a “people” only becoraes “propeshy elise ee ee Bet capaci far Secbior Say ee i ae lan by the evaton bert endl and enemy, along with the fear end Seater asin he that is-cnemtnter entails. Bo the pola oe ga ea sovereignty are defined by the enitense A anemia SRT SAS Fe ‘side existing norm nthe name of presen Te a tng Schmls view al hncioning soveRtgndes Se Ieee a GDI 2005 Security K emd pobbical chars to pyep uP dawimarct gues ~ Tenay Eakin, PHO and co sonvenar a he B Si a Ses eon Poststructural Politics. Sconp Postsneturtem and itermatona! ‘Bringing {he Potties! Bock in ulder, CO: Lynne Rlenner, 889) pa. 10ce35¢5 of tecnologization of depoliticization ean be sean in ings 7 ational politics itself; as well asin the discipline that studies it, One — Sse 8 ound in responses to famines, humanitarian ersesrar Somptexpoliucal emergencies * Agenves and gover eee tsi ae dono ke seni: of is pace Soe ace he May. OT WHER Te css ia symptom Instead, Rep ie et eee from an abstract, technical analysis ofthe tae for “eauses.” no poiieal reasons ROMAN peat SEAT aT,” ey analy the sation in tems of erp oon food avallbity-ane-te Manat satiSaT ie wees tems are putin place that give ealy warnings oF tapending Trains Based on Such Tacors, occasionally including vsosiat wee net Imowement of peoples in earch of ROU OT SMBIOVMENT-Te that elu for reasons, Fist. it means that asian epee sae ations can ake place only whens ctena for Soe oe ee have been salisted: generally. when sarvaloicimarerer oT tal mt station ~aheay to ne ortceenes ese Second. it means thot the asaitance Tat ONTTeT eee that fen plays Tito the hands ofthe pole opposes Fe tims, Food aid can be used to feed armies as wel Providé-an onomy of "permannY Emergency" Toa which con (eee (ors oF the will benefit atthe expense of others” suffering. Pond Sear a er political ends of the donors, whether governments or agencies. David Keen has analyzed these processes at work in the Sudan famines of the 1980s.** Methods of administration of food aid programe forawork programs in Eritrea in the 1990s provide examples of disciplinary processes and technologization in practice: {have discussed these in detad celsewhcre.*? = \G ——>—— p1200s a ERMAL Pik. BordenarerRey Security K Ay Secs ep Moke SUT owt > Secor ZATIO., yw tt OP Socurey AiScoun6e result in stcunitizathon. Williams 2003, Michael C., Professor at university of Wales, Words, mages, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics, Intemational Quarterly, pg. 512-513 Cites ons is gas aE ee ts Watts te renewed controversy in security studies." The field has been challenged to consider questions surrounding the “broadening” of its agenda to include threats beyond the narrow rubric of state and altary security, anl to conkont the clans tea da agenda must also be “deepened” to include the security concerns of actors ranging from individuals and sub-state groups (often now formulated under the rubre ef “human security") to global concerns such as the environment that have often been marginalized within a traditional state-centric and military conception. While securitization theory must be seen inthe context of the shifting agendas of security, and as part of the broader theoretical movement to study the social construction of security," the Copenhagen School has developed a distinctive position within these debates. In securitization theory, “security” is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a s Spenco iad ‘Social process: the 5a roca ese CE aS Sues (who or whats Being secured, and fom hat} aloe ere {euriizing’ speech-acis” through which threats become represented “am Sues become “securitized,” treated diy issues, through i Speecl-acis which donot simply decrbS an existing emmy ST a ova riation by succeasfilly TepeseHtne ites Sena rey nary sc oon i ho As Waever d's cove Secumiieetien ABET oe ociatan Securitization leQic. — * Huysmans, Jef, “Defining Social Constructivism in Security ‘Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security” ‘utps//www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go2624/is_200201/ai_n6793243. January 2002, ‘The normative dilemma receives its full weight from the combination of the performative logic and a generic understanding of language. Securit definition, Here it differs ‘from the normative dimensions of security policies that classical realists sometimes discussed, For example, Amold Wolfers's classi analysis of national security argues that security is a value among other social values such as wealth. (20) This implies that a security policy implicitly or explicitly defines how ‘mportant security is compared with other values. (To put the question crudely: How much do we spend on ‘nuclear weapons that we cannot then spend on health care?) The policy also has to decide the level of ‘security that is aspired to; for example: will it be minimum security or maximum security? But this tive "a 5" does ivity of securit is ial ‘constructivist face. Social-constructivist authors face not only the two questions formulated by Wolfers, they also have to answer a question that in a sense precedes Wolfers's remarks. They have to decide ‘whether they want to "write" security in a particular area. In other words, security emunciations not only implicitly or explicitly assume the level of priority they give to security and the level of security they aspire ‘to; they first determine if one should approach an issue from a security perspective at all. Normative ‘Questions are thus inescapably present in the very heart of security analysis. \> GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy ! Pentvenre AD 2 co-conenor of he Bish ita Saas ong Poststuctural Poltics Group Poststructuratsm ar Relations: Bringing ‘te Pola! Back in (Boulder, CO: Lynne Renner, 1609) peg ‘The legal rational authority upon which modern bureaueraey depends rea, aitimacy beyond the legal system upon which he sates evee ns relies: the establishment ofthe legal system itself can the ste easel conses the bss for sen ors ESE Biss thereafter, within heute ‘ot "the political,” ara Cok “nology of governance. Ironically ne, technology Ts What we Call "polis = IgA lowing he a and gl aoa prone GHinacy and elicaey are assured only as ong ante eo faim fo Sovereign power remains hidden and unc {tis now generally recognized that aid and famine relief carty the risk of worsening the situation, but this does not prevent Tarihoratemist at Eshnalogizing” what have’ come to be called "complex emergencies "ST Once itis seen that famines often involve conflict, analysis emt the features of conflict rather than the nutritional status of famine vies, and this in turn produces various techniques of conilic analysis and resol, tion Whats still not widely understood is that processes af emergency ust that: processes of cal structures I is precisely in such Td "he poled” The common "methods oF ae do not grasp this and instead seck to impose a technology of either nut Gonal unalysis, coaMict control, or “doing no hatm."™ Ta an important Sense, thoUh a with al attemps at technologization, what is being done 4s, afterall intensely "political." It involves the suppression of the now forms of political order whose emergence the emergency anno nc eon ean, PRD a vet oe BH Talal Ses Reston Postural Poles Group Poststcturafem and tomato sectors aaah {he Potia Backin oulder, CO: Lynne Renner 199) pa 6 Jn otber Words, 1 poli” vewed ws onc of he sys ofa the s/s ta BoE he oi ey Seaeea foie! Tick of "the poiical” and the absence of MEFONTS Noe amy politica acto Wes ined by thi process omc erm Bowndanes sets cca ee order and rT i retieted othe techncal saree se up the "patsy ~Subjecis" ofthe siate. The political subject and |. the imemational subject tor ‘are safely caged and their teeth pulled tO. age safely Caged and their teeth pulled. \% GDr2005 PATRIOT-Act Case Neg Borden/Maurer/Reddy doit / Ralitics denies its own origin for control cenit chD 20d co-convenoe ofthe Britah rtematonal Skis Associaton recs Su Fossum and iteration ears sig ‘Pte Back n Bolder, CO: (me Remote There was a moment of openness, a political moment, in which the ab: sence of one social order had not yet been succeeded Byte peeeree aother, and at that time “acts” were precisely tat; “acis™in the Lacasian sense—unsupported by any foundation of le in the social order. I is a this point that subjectivity arises. In Zizek's words: “This "impossic ond be" moment of opemess consuls the moment of subject ‘wvpcar is a nome for that unfathomable X called upon sudlenly mare scence able thrown Into poiion of responsibility. ita the urgency ins 1oment of undecidability."37 a nei pith Moments OF transition, where there is a sense of openness, of decision, are both moments of the political a vty is called into play. They are also mome st symbolic onder. Or rater, moments at which through the pesapmany tion ofthe existence ofa new soral system, sucha system is trove ioo being. Not only is the new society founded, but itis produce nen vitae, authoritative, and legitimate as been prophesied, The contingency of is origins come ‘At that moment, Once the foundational myth ofthe new social or syme bolic order is (reinstated, the subject as such disappears, and with sro “poitical”—to be replaced by “politics.” What is more, the inleregnoms Where there was a brief openness forgotten: de-seribed or unsaricee by the “writing” of the history of the new state. The set ofthe subiee ene ceeds by becoming invsible—by ‘positivising’Hsell in 4 new opens network wherein it locates and explain itself as a result of hewrical Droces, thus reducing itself toa mere moment of the totality ngendared ty its own act." This happens when events are “read” bactonta ee retroactively at that point itis easy to explain “objectively” aio covape forces were effective and how particular tendencies “won,” Indesd the Lr canian definition of “act” is just this: “a move tha, soto speak, def aa ‘wm conditions; retosctively produces the grounds which justly This is where the notion of ideology associa fantasy, wih I discuss ip detail in Chapter 6, comes in. Qace the new symbelie order i in pace a ontingences that gave rise to are obliterated they eiappesr et see ‘\eision af social realty established. The role of ideology hee isto eal the ile founded nature of what we eal socal reality sha Zizek calls “social fantasy.” Ideology supports the principle of legitimacy ce ich the new sate is “founded” and conceals its “impossibiig "h does this in part by defini ” a a subsystem of the social ordsr Sn obliterating “he polical"—is unfounded Tounding mame Pate 8 “SubDE.aSaseparne sphere of sie, rpr (ur forgotten foundation, is genesis ina violent abecat se SEitin he social space, whit must Tar This ware a SelE"WOr as Zizek ‘expresses it more provocatively, “Politics as subsystem: ‘a'metephor of the police subject, of the Political as subyonses society its \q GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K \ owe eo a \DeY ext Securitization is an apocalyptic game. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York. American Apocalypse” Vol 277. Issue 21. Academic Search Premier, December 2003, i ic, then, exactly hecause itis militarized and yet amorphous, without mits of time Seer ee imple ns approach tha every ast in that way the world will be ri of evil, Bush keeps what Woodward calls "his own personal scorecard forthe war" pad eda sets in the form of photographs with brief biographies and personality sketches of Se a is terrorists, each reads The sco oe swer in the Oval Office, Societal security objectifies identity, making conflict more probable 2003, Michael, Professor at University of Wales, “Words, Iago Eres’ Sosszaten an hat! Pls cra Studies Quan. pg, 844 veel cikePt of societal security has been one of the most influential and yt severely criticized elements of the Copenhagen School.” In a pointed andl lt inet ~ fuiaue, for example, Bill McSweeny has argued that while “societal secure” Pighlights an important issue in contemporary security relations, the eye ohh its ‘openhagen School ends up reifying and objectiying bod in_ways that are-analVicaly-UMnaDIe eT oe rab of ent, MeSweeny aiguer tae eee ‘society” and “iden ciety” and “identity” in_ways dangerous. By defining society ita or Sweeny argues, Ue concery “Uracil secuny effet actin ay MS le identity. This involees a sociological distortion in which the fuidity and mukiplieecat soca, luiplicity oF social identities are obscured! along with the proces of negotiation and acammodaien ie Which they operate (1999:79). In addition to this reification of eecal reality, Mefneeny charges that by defining society as having an identity, and by defony societal security as the defense of this Went he Cee Copenhagen School fostering ant lagtinising ieclooce Eitimizing intolerance, and encouraging and exacerbating (al unconsciously) r uritizing “dynamics between identity 8. Se theory, in short, produces x Tasely objeced seas eee ial identity that e Br a eee cbiectined understanding oF sci Taare eating or at Teast not opposing—the rise of Tatolerant, exelustomes ‘entities, that make confiets more hkely (74-78) sonar Shits. that make conflicts more likely a GDI 200s Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy Securitization results in massive in massive war. Aradau, Claudia. oe ere er i pty pr ar lr uudia2. December 01. fear. [13 es aint o toe bel syncs verte magyar a harmonious growth ofthe garden. [14] counter-measues refer to unearthing the ae ‘The metaphor of war is constitutive ne onstituti -of what both Ashley and Campbell have call the ‘paradigm of sovereignty. ‘order’. The injunction to preserve the nd ext i der 0 undaries and preserver of law and ternal enemies, the weeds that the modem harmonious garden has targeted both internal and ‘As the war on drugs’ will clerly illustrate, this approach is highly ambiguous fora poiticsl community predicated ‘pon the friend/enemy differentiation In this political dupont oe : iq ts on | Sisquieting effects on the political community, Moreover, the mutual consttutiveness of threats and threatened ‘objects leads o-a spiral of enemy constructions. The enemy needs tobe eliminated z limit and at the same time the very toa identity of society, for e for example, depends on paradoxical story, in which security is only liksy fo breed more inseausy sedsccaenolewe ee Securitization Logic Leads to War ions at Keele University of International Relati ‘Theory pl10-111, 1993 RBI Walker, Professor rial Relations as Politica! Inside/Outsie: Internation ‘The usual focus is inevitably on the _prspoaton that rats Hobbes’ state of nature. Hedley Bull, for example, has reiterated the what Hobbes says about feeling that we are entitled to infer that all of the Jfe of individual men in-the state of nature may be read as 4 description of thecondition of states inte ati .e another’ .""0}~ this account, states are led to war because of competition for material ‘Bfime motive in that it supposedly leads to_a_concern 1 Secs ‘what, ‘onal state of nature’ there is, there- arr already haven thisinternational st fore, only the natura igh GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy < Sano 9, DEON =\rn¢ a ‘The grand ideal of securitization manifests a violent visionary projection. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York “American Apocalypse” Vol 277. Issue 21. Academic Search Premier. December 2003 “The apocalyptic imagination has spawmed a new kind of violence atthe beginning of the twenty-first century. We ‘can, in fa ak of widwi ridemic a 2e ai at mas ive des a se of ‘iblons of purification and renewal. In particular, we ate experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off oe re ane sir willing ‘to kill and die for their religion am restrained and reasonable but no ir projection ofa cleansing war-making and ary power. e i ; both see themselves as embarked oma ‘Both sides are energized by versions of intense idealism: both se 3 nilligy poet ating ev in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of ssion of coi lence to achieve that purpose, 5 tai sof mass des but with no evident The saan county wlan sons lt a stockpiles of them and.no apparent connection io the assaults of September L1--was a manifestation Of ‘American visionary projection, The American apocalyptic harms soft power ~ security for the sole purpose of power and domination. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York “American Apocalypse” Vol 277 Isue 21. Academic Search Premier. __Devemiber 2003, = ‘The American apocalyptic entity i less familiar tous, Even fits urges to power and domination sem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I've come to think of ax “superpower syndrome.” By that term I mean a national mindset~put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership iroup~that takes ona sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants tthe right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely ‘Powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower from the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. ‘More than mere domination, the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement~of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems parly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower-the world’s only superpower-~is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it isa superpower. ‘The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did.not require 9/11, but the attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, & ‘giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower ean perm OC. coi Sonate Borden/MaurerReddy Le 4009 Fear is used to distract masses from important issues, justify Invasions, and pursue corporate interests ‘Chomsky 2003, Noam, Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT, ‘Hegemony or Survival, Henry Holt & Company LLC, pg. 120 ~CAfer a mage of reveled political power, the Bush forces were virtually compelled to adopt what Anatol Tieven calls “the classic mos 7 gered 4 ‘ing oligarchy, which js 1o-divert mass discontent into.’ nationalism," a strategy which is segond nature to them in any event, Raving worked so well during their frst ewolve gears The strategy was outlined by Karl Rove, the chief political adv ser. RepUBIGANS MT 0 the issue of national | seeurity"Jin November 2002, because voters “trust the Republican _ Party” for “protesing Ameria.” Similarly, he explained, Bush will have t0 be portrayed as a wartime leader for the 2004 presidential carmpaign. “As Jong as domessicissues were dominatin, Jong as domesticwssues were dominating news cov ‘erage and political battles over the summer, Bush and his ibli- ee eee oe ley cima ems ee a inn ane ar ce Realy cae a For the midterm clectoral campaign, the tactic wocked-just, ics aah zane, “balnee ne lee ae cal about large corporations than about ordinary Americans,” they srust ‘he Republicans on national secur. > Ae GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Redd; ity ly . 5a NO Coven) = WAPOCKS ext, 4 ‘The discourse of security is self-perpetuating. Huysmans, Jef. “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security.” http:/swww.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go2624/is_ 200201/ai_n6793243. January 2002, ‘Authors in this field seem to have a degree of discomfort about wrtings~their own and other people's~on societal issues from a security perspective. The question does not arise inthe same way forall authors, however. Some will argue that thee is no objective evidence for regulating migration froma security perspective, And this settles ther problem. Their contribution consists of arguing that a misperception is at ‘work and that this should be remedied. But another group of authors, whom I will all social Constructivists, cannot so easily escape the nuisance. They share with the former group that transforming, ‘migration into a security problem is (party) the result ofa practice of definition; security is what agents ‘make of it, But, instead of making this act of definition dependent on cognitive processes of an agent sulting reat, t stand the creation of a security pro al phenomenon, tions such a itfroma mobilization. ices work and thus fect that we: ‘problem. This effect is a structural effect that is beyond the intentions and control of the individual's practices of definition, Immigration as a security problem is thus not a natural given; it does not just pop up ‘asa new threat manifesting itself and triggering a security policy trying to curtail the danger. “Turing immigration issues into a security question involves a mobilization of certain institutions (eg, the police), a particular kind of knowledge (security knowledge), and specific expectations concerning the Social exchanges between various social groups. Its an intersubjective understanding of security rather than a subjective one ral level isnot the individual's his tera 2 actions aricula vwledge: security © finan area insttutionalized context, (5) fo) GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security k SUE ty K= Tempa al Extensions = I Seeumbaahon yest Ries able typ | “Teny Edkng, PHD and co-convenor or ms Wns Tlematena’Stuies Associaton” — Poseruchral Police Group Pestarutratem an itemationg Felton: Garang. fe Pottcal Back in Gelr,CO- Lyne Remer, 188) Fa 1 second example in the field of intemational polities is the proces hal politics is the process of *curTzaton.¥ Securization, or claiming tha I this changes the terms. z no Tonger be asked. Ta the secon Sy tte eran ee asked. Ta The security explain how they see “securitization”: shove plies, Securit cay mae mat aye ed (meaning the sate does ea eo SU ay ther Way mde sand Say rm seenaas aa form of eomman “sk alg ore Arey. some other | ‘eile a an euistental tn oe tTUEE (meaning th sae eee | Sea ee yew aaae ay | a of politeal procedure). S Poles debeys nougitt “Jenny Edkins, PhD and co-convenor of the Britsh Intemational Studies Association entirvetural Polics Group Poststructuralism and Intemational Relations: Bringing the Pottical Back in (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rlenner, 1998) pe. 4 ‘Once it is decided (by wars, revolutions, and the like) that legitimate au- thority resides, for example, with a particular state form, what follows is the bureaucratic technique of governance elaborated through recognized expertise and endorsed in the continuance of the state form through the regular tal replacement of the placcholders of authority, whether by elections Tn a democracy or through the rules of succession in a monarchy fr dictatorship. As Max Weber has argued, bureaucracy succeeds because of its technical efficiency, and once in place itis dificult to remove." It | ined on FeBlsces the nest Tor politcal dedisons: Actons can be determined purely technical grounds AS, GDI 2005 Security K nen Clans, Va ¥ ‘Securitization causes an “us/them” “friend/enemy” mindset. Huysmans, Jef “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security.” hitpdiwwfindartcles.convp/articles/mi_go2624/is 200201/ai 6793243. January 2002 ch studies shifts in litical discourses and knowledge nex discourses al relations. Bi the level ofthe 5 = con how a formation of rules structure ingfully and it ‘concentrate on shifts in security fields and how these shifts ilization of social dispositions. In other words, the: ‘esearch brackets the level of the mediating structure; it stresses Lee ae aS the agents "fl snd fiend positions effet ches how lean yn the lictzation oc ent of issue areas and the political units contesting it, Within this research project, one can, for example, look at how the politicization of migration has changed in Western Europe inthe last decade; how an intensification of the Europeanization of migration policies goes hand in hand with a strong linkage of the migration question with the crisis ofthe welfare state and with afast-spreading interpretation of migration asa security problem. (25) Another example is Lene Hansen's research on how a securitization of national identities entered the Slovenian political scene in the 1980s and early 1990s. (26) ‘The critical position this literature articulates consists of "denaturalizing" the taken-for-granted discourses ‘structuring international or domestic conditions. For example, they show how Slovenian nationalist discourses developed and mobilized social dispositions in the lead-up tothe Yugoslavian criss The cri pont i that he analysis shows how others not natural enemies ‘way the nationalist discourses construct history, social deprivation, and so forth. Crucial forthe stars snoring om fs ‘dominant discourse is that the work articulates how a discursive construction that retrospectively looks as if it was ‘the natural or necessary way for things to develop is actually contingent. Securitization has no alliances. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York “American Apocalypse” Vol 277. Issue 21. Academic Search Premier. December 2003 indeed ins essence, it precindes genuine sharing. While Bush has taking on terrorism and terrorist states worldwide, he has als it clear Jaws any policymaking por on this sme. In one revealing statement, he declared: " 1K with me, America." In such declarations, ie ha allot clanod that ree the globe's anointed ones and that the sacred mission of purifying the earth is ous alone. LG Borden/Maurer/Reddy 1 ti i the process of reasoning Se eee ee cae eee nance Secreta rae tre bw a, €8 ate Raa 08) — As feminists in particular have reminded wis.2" the political is not him= "ted othe grand moments of openess er andecdaBifc Tar aie (ween eed sora siete, where Te Whale pope ESTE es wreviously in place has been effectively challenged aMMITEW One Hot yet ISUIGE I nie anon ee UREA a Re echiod: since GEN RoMeMOTaS DET ngues TET Lr tthnology, oF HUGH They cecur wher an act ESS STE rSinvtates and follows the lav. The at of decison sam historical momar canna be sed yan ape To Gene Bach such Sth apie and iter hy Gas Hea tot be conned The tecappear retoapenticly meay te fave taee fllowed. The poli! comprc in his tne an temirable poser decisoning of wavering te focal ius ht Deve The Political appeals to itself, not social order ey Eine PHD an of the Bish niemasonal Susles Associaton cual Poics Group 2nd intematona Relations: ging the Poti Back n aude CO: Lynne Risen teaayt © nig aaelaw's terminology, this moment is the noment of antag wich “pole oRER s0cial forms, hose rigin inconceaieg ae) | sen oa, NOU be one) withthe politcal" "The sacl ease Fee te Primarily, ab dsedimented ensemble af aa eS | Fane seu wou gee te ma | Te Ba rest la, Rowever, te socal world's mar Tesey ee Dist But structured around 2 lack Social ander ie hae Fan cies CriNe 10 light both the contingency of the Ieee, | and ie exsenee of ener posits see anism,” what happens Tat se Sees And tsi resolution through wove iis moment that consis “he politcal” The pola ea tale of cal ris tough e polizl ear sted. Fathemer: epoca bee In the “moment of antag. | nature of the alternatives lations becomes fully visible." tig } } eal departure from sedimented ‘cannot appeal to anything in t corder that would oper- at GDI 2005, Security K. Borden/Maurer/Reddy Wd 2bcusiires Ke ippgce Cétens/ is = Politics removes dissent Jenny Edkins, PhD and co-convenor ofthe Brilish International Studles Association Postsructal Potties Group Poststucturatsm and inert the Pola! ack n Goucer CO: Lynne Renner, 988)69. 12 ns ae “ine secant aspect of tehnologization, on the power ats, comes from the notion of dividing practices. In his disciplinary model, Foucault argues that in adaiton to punishment, prison has a technodisciplinary aspect that ‘operates through surveillance, isolation, work programs, and the offer of remission in exchange for compliance. This is a depalitcizing and con- trong process, onc that produces a dist the et “subject” (the delinguent) and techniques of producing “knowledge” about that subject (te discipline of criminology). It isa search for order, discipline, and regulation, The failure of prisons in their (apparent) aim of rehabilitation is in actuality a success. This success rests inthe way that, by eriminalizing, they depoit- cize: The political force of certain acts—forms of protest or dissent, for ‘example—is removed. A way to repoliticiz, a “political act,” would be to fmtemupeaicourseto challenge what hive through discus teen constituted as normal, natural, and se aa cay GDI 2008 Security K By understanding the root causes of secu Patricia Thornton and Thomas Thornton ‘America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 37 Language that creates the possil reality. John Collins and Ross Glover “fo this end, itis important o enueally jimerrogate the phenom Though the disastrous consequences enon of blowback. For even. def ded, within a historical and “of blowback are by definition unintens ey are more explicable and_pte- poltical-ecological context ty : BFAIE than the Rapls ici perpeste SWS TT portantly, by understandin; the root causes of past and present i ‘unilateralism, and “impe- ‘blowback, including U.S. hegemony, nilateral a id instances of this phe- rial overstretch,” itmay be possible to av0% nomenon in the future. _nomenon in the future: war.” 2002 Pg. 11 This book demon- strates how language helps manufacture consent and demon- strates that language, sometimes the same language, creates the cits, nor religious Teaders own the words they use to sway our De- jegree that lief. Ih this sense, speech is always free, at east to the ‘remake meh, Wemate ngage meat See io and if “Jneas, rather than what a talking head tries to make them meat ‘Pvery essay in this collection attempts, in one way or another, to ‘address this reality. We are not interested jin creating a new lan- sage, but in permitting the language given usin times ‘of war to gu ‘mean something eRe We do, however, believe that some terms hhave more possibility than others. Some terms of war seem to us Tn need of replacement. Specificaly, words used to minimize the impact of war such as targets, collateral damage, civilization, bar. Zould be replaced by “excessive destruction.” Any time a term Tania the Teal destructive impact of our actions or mini izes the humanity of large groups of people, we believe it needs serious interrogation and possible reformation. ity of dissent should be changed to better suite Borden/Maurer/Reddy ritization, we can prevent future attacks. “Collateral language: A user’s guide to “Collateral language: A user’s guide to America’s new GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Redd} OUCH: Servis) una © Ridding ourselves from a security mindset means changing the U.S.’ concept that ‘economic success is freedom. : o 3 cedrew Van Alstyne “Collateral language: A user's guide to America’s new War 2002 Pg. 89 ie amorp!_« definitions of freedom have fueled the tra- jectories outlined in this essay, redefining freedom could poten- “tially empower dissenting voices, Instead of freedom to consume products and lifestyles, a definition of freedom focusing pon human rights is needed, . Bush’s political freedom, in part, hhas stemmed from wrapping himself in the vagueness of freedom and its centrality to the mainstream American ideology, Argu_ _ments that global citizens deserve freedom from racism, sexism, mophobia, disease, starvation, environmental degradation, other for ion challenge current trajectories of the U.S. and global political economy, The real work of freedom lies not in the waging of war, the unchecked depletion of re- ‘sources, or tie Teeding of the treadmills voracious appetite, but in combating these practices wherever and whenever they _ ‘occur. 0 GDI 2005 omnis Borden/Maurer/Reddy Fhe Norn iS More Wroorrany thay (OLIGO. of current Seevrtty lege ‘Agamben , Giorgio. "On Security and Terror’ lwo non terror html September 20, 2001 JJopment of a clandestine co cof opponents, but that the search for security, ‘The sks not merely the devs tof Jandesine complicity of opponent bt thst i SAS TT ap dead tical form of war between sovereign stats it becomes clear tat security finds its end in globalization: i implies the ides of a new planetary onder which is in truth the worst of all disorders. 0 general. use of sod America 3 ec - ic Slhemselves: but maybe the time has come t0 . It is not that democracies ‘should cease to defend themselves: Q sopra emo tonne wort ur polis serely-orks towards he production of pease ‘America must rethink the idea of contending apocalyptic forces. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center ofthe City University of New York “American Apocalypse” Vol 277. Issue 21. Academic Search Premier. Decemiber 2003, ‘We can do better. America is capable of wiser, more measured approaches. more humane applications of our iderable nce These may not be as far away as they now seem, and can be brought Soser by bringing ou imaginations to bear on them. Change must be political, of course, but se it ‘As a start, we do not have to patition the world into two contending apocalyptic forees. We are capable instead of ‘reclaiming our moral compass, of finding further balance ‘in our national behavior. So intensely have we embraced Superpower syndrome that emerging from i s not an easy tsk. Yet in doing so we would relieve ourselves of ‘of our own creation of ins jon, For ‘weight than that which ‘on when pursuing total power. a GDI 2005 Security K Bertani gy tO ‘We must reevaluate political rhetoric. 2 i John Collins and Ross Glover "Collateral language: A user’s guide 0 America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 2 ise and pes ements ng a ‘The US, politicarmilitary lexicon “Tillizes terms in particular sways to produce desired responses from its citizens. Most of these Jerms are familiar to us, and we often seem to respond to them as if they carry meaningful and specific messages. However, inter- rogating the history and development of such terms: often leads Jill The use of specific Kinds of Tanguage for political purposes ‘exists within a Jong historical lineage ‘of human development, and in order to understand any political system, we must under: stand the meaning created by that system, Rather than blindly ac Trews stories, we have an obligation, 35 citizens of a ‘democratic state, “cretion ciigue andunessand Ne an sae, Ga po, laim to represent our interests WD," a et We ey Saeco forms such asthe state, that are assumed to possess power or “be” powerful In this collection, the emphasis is very much the reverse. The focus is Ta ‘on live lived, hence the title Sovereign Lives. In our approach, day-to-day social interactions—lives—are examined as productive of both power and _ subjectivities. What is interesting to us is not the examination of power as something that already exists but the detailed study of power relations in both their productive and controlling aspects. Because of the wa ch they conceptualize power as an object to be possessed by someone or something, the traditional images of world poli- tics that we started with focus on institutions that are assumed to be the holders of power: the sovereign state, international organizations, social ‘movements perhaps, and multinational corporations. They are concemned to ask about the relative significance of these institutions in the contempo- ‘world. In contrast, the contributors to this volume are not interested so ‘much in institutions themselves as in what they see asthe prior question of the forms of power relation that give rise to and sustain particular institu- tions in the first place. They seek to show in a very grounded, localized, and historically situated way how these forms of power relation work, and, most importantly, what forms of subjectivity and resistance they entail. What forms of life do particular power relations make possible? What does this ‘mean for people caught up in these power relations? How does this change? Can subjects contest their subjectification, and if so, how? What counts as resistance? Is there any escape from power relations? Does that question even make sense? , Leys GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy zs EE Dns tel cit cee 7 a a Sovereign power has pervaded the 21" eentury power networks (Dillon, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Polities: “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower", October 30, 2004, pg 58, Accessed 7/8/05) Clearly driven by capitalistic demands, its allied promotion of carefully cal- ‘brated self-regulating freedoms was by no means, however, confined solely to satisfying the interests of global capital. It was addressed to the organization and promotion of a whole variety of other political, cultural, developmental, social and human rights projects nationally and internationally, and these ‘often conflicted with the interests of capital. Compared with classical meta physical definitions of it, sovereign power also appeared to have become crit ically weakened o the point where it became popular to alk ofthe demise of Sovereignty. And yet, sovereign power simultaneously also became much tore extensive and much more intrusive a well Newly allied with proife ing of biopower, networks of veillance as well as with mor systems, sovereign power seemed rather to have become re-engineered as one ‘powerful modality of power in an emergent and complex network of powers that has increasingly come to characterize power at the beginning of the “Twenty-ist century, at one and the same time both global in its reach yet also penetrating deep into the very structure of cellular fe. , G1 2005 Security Borden/Maurer/Reddy FA youn buco dl ink Power and Knowledge are always intertwined seeking freedom through knowledge will not necessarily produce liberation (Dillon, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower”, October 30, 2004, pe 54-55, Accessed 7/8/05) Precisely because it is a force that circulates in human relations, for Fouicaulf there is no escape from power relations. In-parti «scape from power relations through knowledge. While he is insistent on ‘not conflating the two, or Foucault there isa mutually disclosive belonging together of power and knowledge.” Where there is knowledge, there is also Power. Where there is power, there is necessarily also knowledge: ‘power and knowledge directly imply one another; there isno power Sarat the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, tor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. are to beanalysed, therefore, not ‘on the basis of a subject of or isnot free in rela- tion to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who ar he objec 10 be koown and he mod ‘must be regarded as many effect of these funda of powerlknowledge ‘The idealization of knowledges something separate from power relations and emancipatory with respect to power isles an illusion for Foucault, then, than itisa kind of category mistake. Ontologically undecideable and undetermined, | resists any final delineation or lasification by anifesting itself as this form of life, > life in virtue ofthe strategic organization of the rela- tions of power that its very relational existence cals into being. Freedom in the sense that Foucault understands freedom is not something that seeks emanci Pation through an escape from power relations or, alternatively, tunalloyed good of the advance of knowledge: As a free existence defined in a eal areas terms of ity/potentiality rather than_ determination, human beings Grae cancion on ofvcsure of eimtng ar Sts arco powered and empowering, but different, practices of selfhood, individual and collective. Power relations do not necessarily and automatically defeat such ef- forts. Knowledge does not necessarily or automatically guarantee their realiza- tion. Freedom is not a powerless condition, an guarantees, ower relations are thus a positive and not merely a negative thing for Foucault: We must cease once and forall to describe theeffecs of power ‘in negative terms: it ‘excludes, it ‘represses, it ‘censors, it ‘abstracts, it “masks, it’conceals. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it pro- duces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the ‘knowledge that may be gained from him belong to this prodi she U4 Borden/Maurer/Reddy —Agamben Modure = Lives Vi Cpr Ww But they do remain strategic. Indeed, power/knowledge in biopower is con- cerned with cultivating life, making it more developed, productive, secure and so on rather than with threatening death. To do this, the very nature of ‘processes itself has to become known in its details and dynamics as an. object of systematic investigation. ‘This is the explanation for the term biopower. Power's manifestation as the strategic organization of networks of relations according to different generative principles of formation, regularities and norms of behavior, closed by the sciences of powerlknowledge, is a_creative force, Thus power knowledge is also inventive. It brings new things to presence. Henee, Tr ee adie essere antec hc known, and with biopower and biopolitics known in its changing life forms and processes both individually and in the form of populations. In the [pFOCES, OF course, power/knowledge also and necessarily subjagates, sup- presses, outshines and outmatches and therefore also works by erasing from presence, effacing and reducing some things, while elevating and empower- ing others. These are differentiating and dividing practices that not only constitute inclusions and exclusions but they also modulate intelligibilities, cligibilties liabilities and legibilities for populations and individuals alike. ‘However, since Foucault has taken so heavily to demote the operation of sovereign power in favor of biopower, diverting attention from the ways in which they also complement each other, Giorgio Agamben's recent workon sovereign power somewhat remedies the imbalance.” oh GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy A spelocy fe dole hel Sovereign power operates through a sovercign ban that separates zoe and (Bidkins, Jenny and Pin-fat, Veronique, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Polis: introduetion: Life, Power, Resisténce", October 30, 2004, pp 67, Accessed 7/8/05) Agamben's work enables us to establish what it ‘that makes ita distinct form of power 1 tes through the sovereign ban, that is, through the making of distinctions, in particular distinctions between forms of life. In ancient Greek thought, there were two words fr “life” z0e, which meant the simple fact of living shared by all beings, and bios, which signified the particular way of life ofan individual or group. Agamben argues that from the start, sovere relies on the separation of these two forms of life, which can be called Politically qualified life (in the ancient world, the life appropriate to the Public or political sphere) and bare or naked life (the if ofthe home or do- mestic sphere). In modern biopolitics, Agamben argues, bare life is poiti- ized and politcal Mf iappear, Soveregn politics constitutes itself frst by the exclusion of bare life or, more accurately by the inclusion of bare life realm by virtue of its very exclusion from it. Bare life, in- cluded by exclusion, becomes sacred life—life that can be Killed but not rificed, or homo sacer. The sovereign i ‘exception: in this sense, the sovereign is b ‘What this logic of sovereignty produces isa of life that inhabits that zone is homo sacer: “Neither political ios nor nat- ural 20e, sacred life is the zone of indistinction in which zoe and bios con- stitute each other in including and excluding each othe s the way it operates Sovereignty splits subject ‘command them (Dillon, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower”, October 30, 2004, pg 45, Accessed 7/8/05) Sovereignty then is about right, and right ultimately becomes a matter of the ‘organization of subjects in their reciprocal relations. Hence, the relational con. {estnow alo, atthe turn ofthe twentieth cof the twenty ist century, ‘sbetween the sovereignty of indivciual rights global wereignty of sates, The same mechanism of power i in play but the gr of intelligibility governing the play of sovereign power has nonetheless mutated once more. ‘The advent of disciplinary power/knowledge also illustrates this point. “That is why we now find ourselves ina situation where the only existing and apparently solid recourse we have against the usurpations of disciplinary ‘mechanisms and against the rise of a power that is bound up with scientific knowledge is precisely a recourse ora return toa right thats organized around sovereignty, or is articulated on that old principle....We obviously invoke a right” But, Foucault adds, Shaving recourse to sovereignty against discipline willnot enable us to limit th effect of disciplinary power.” And so ithas come to pass that, new relational complexes of sovereign juridical, disciplinary ppower/knowledge and biopower have formed and continue t. develop. In the Symbiotic relations and relational transfers and exchanges of power relations, sovereignty takes on a different ten« wn becomes exposed to other a counts ofthe life whose deployment and death it ultimately seeks to com- mand. Sovereignty has always been inextricably entwined in the power "ations of other modalities of power relations and tei respective idioms, Ale 44 GD12005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K a, —Aromnten Module Vowgncty Sovereign power makes physis and nomos impossible to distinguish Dillon, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Comela Sovereign and Biopower”, October 30, 2004, pg 56, Accessed 7/8/05) What sovereign power does is institute emergency as the strategic order ing principal of power, The state of emergency/nature is “not areal epoch chronologically prior tothe foundation ofthe city but a principle internal to. the city, which appears at the moment the. -city.is considered tanquam disso- uta” The foundation of sovereign power in this maneuver “is not an event achieved once and forall but is continually operative in the civil state ind ae orm of the sovereign decision?”"This ensures the “survival ofthe state of na. ‘ure at the very heart ofthe state In this sense, the state of nature is some. thing like a state of exception and sovereign powers the power by which it perm without committing homicide and without celebrating “At its very centre,” Agamben notes, “the localization-ordering link of sovereign power, thus always already contains its own virtual pe the form ofa suspension of every law By virtue of its very formal structure, then, the topologizing of sovereign power tends towards the indis- Linguishability of the spheres of inside/outside, physis/nomos, esta ablished by The sate of nature and the state of the exception ar simply two sides ofa single topological process in which what _was “presupposed as external (the state of nature) now reappeats, asin a Mobius strip or a Leyden jar, in the in ide (as state of exception)” In its topologizing, sovereign power becomes ety impossibility of distinguishing between inside and outside, nature ‘When physis and nomos are impossible to distinguish so too does violence and law ae Dillon, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower”, October 30, 2004, pg. 56-57, Accessed 7/05). "TThe topology of sovereign power is not in facta space at all. It is a divid- ing practice. As such it does work. That “ily However, to comi rit isto effect a passage izing i so the in which not only the exception and the rule but also the eT GE Si eee a rin tegic operation of power, ‘of phase with one another according to a stra of Which is know as sovereign. This is why Agamben characterizes it as “the int of indistinction between violence and la the threshold on which vi- lence passes over into law and law passes over into violence: He cele "the sve nom he rine henge nd vi lence, threatens them with indistinetion.”® Similarly that is also why an how all constitutions in establishing a constituted power siitaneouy presuppose themsches as consinting power” Sovereign power, whether of the state, the nation, the people o the individual, is simuliancously posed S 0 thenBoth“on the violence that posts lw and the violence shat preserves” GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Bhy pselo wt Sovereign power makes a life of power impossible (Falkins, lenny and Pin-fat, Veronique, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Rolines: Mntroduction: Life, Power, Resistance", October 30, 2004, pe? Accessed 7/8/05) “Tn Agamben's analysis of sovereign power, the camp isthe ultimate ex= ssion of the sovereign exception and the arena where life becomes noth. g but bare life, life included by its exclusion: Inasmuch asits inhabitants have been stripped of every politcal sta- tus and reduced completely to naked life, the camp is also the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realised—a space in which por This leads him to the question with which we began this section: “Is today a life of power available?” For Agamben, such a life is not possible within present forms of sovereign power and their reliance on the division cof forms of life from pure living itself A life of power would mean an exo- dus from sovereign power, a nonstatist politics, and “the eman« im S| GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy mr Alt = ‘We must reject sovereign power and discover a new polities not based on the exclusion of bare life (Edkins, Jenny and Pin-fat, Veronique, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “introduction: Life, Power, Resistance”, October 30,2004, pe 12, __Accessed 7/8/05) TAgamben’s injunction is that we must find “a completely new politics — ‘that is, a politics no longer founded on the exception of bare life” Ifthe zane Tndistinction has exten nnd the camp to embrace much of the rest ‘of the world, then what we have isan extension of bare life, and it ionalifes of power:in other words, an impossibility of politic. The sence of a power relation is not desirable because there is then no possl iy of resistance. We have nothing but a form of servitude or slavery. $6, fephrasing in Foucauldian terms, Agamben is arguing that we have moved 10. power-less relation, that i, toa relationship of violence. Let us remind ‘ourselves how Foucault describes sucha relationship and its contrast with a power relation: A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things:it forces, itbends, it breaks, it destroys, or it clases off all possibilities, Its op- posite pole can only be pasty and comer up against any re- sistance it has no other option but to tr breal relationship, on the other hand, can only be artic of two elements that are indispensable if itis really to be a power re- [ationship: thatthe “other” (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognised and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; ‘and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of re- ‘sponses, reactions, results and posible inventions may open up", ted on the basis Va Se GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy ——AroumSun Module © AW = Resp ‘We must reject sovereign power at any chance (Eakins, Jenny and Pin-fat, Veronique, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Introduction: Life, Power, Resistance”, October 30, 2004, pg 3-4, ‘Accessed 7/8/05) “The second claim motivating this collection is that soverei rer is far from dead, The notion of sovereign power as opposed to sovereignty is cru ‘Galhere. The volume does not focus on the debate concerning the survival of otherwise of sovereign statehood, but rather traces the continuance of certain grammars of power and resistance, irrespective of the site or sites in ‘which they are located. The interesting question is not whether a system or even a society of states has been replaced by an empire or by some other in- stitutional configuration, but what relations or grammars of power persist and how they operate. Following Giorgio Agamben, we seck to extend a Foucauldian analysis to encompass an expansive and more thoroughly an~ alytic view of what William Connolly calls the logic of sovereignty. We want to break away from a notion of “sovereignty” as synonymous with “sover= eign statchgod?” that often app. center of analysis. Instead we want, to insist upon an engagement with the term “sovereign power”. Barry “Hindess reminds us that itis high time that we in political theory “ the King’s head” and follow Foucault’s injunction to develop “a political philosophy that isnt erected around the problem of sovereignty” Foucault sees the notion of sovereignty as little more than a smoke screen concealing, the operation of disciplinary practices. He argues that “the procedures of normalization” or discipline “come to be ever more constantly engaged in. the colonization of those of law” such that “sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mecha- nism of power in our society.” This “general mechanism of power” has been analyzed by Agamben as “sovereign power” and the essays in this volume trace ways in which this form of power is productive of particular forms of life (or lives lived) and crucially, their attendant forms of resistance. are S$ GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy tle Let - Te only way slop sovereign powers rethink anew economy of (Edkins, Jenny and Pin-fat, Veronique, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Introduction: Life, Power, Resistance”, October 30, 2004, pe 3, Accessed 7/8/05) ‘Foucault argues that the best way to move toward a new economy of power felations “consists in taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power asastarting pint [and] we to bringto i their position, find out th ‘of applica- tion and the methods used.” This intrc ry ‘Foucault's sug- ‘gestion on board and uses an analysis of forms of resistance to locate and differentiate forms of power relation. It argues, following Agamben, that the predominant form of power in the contemporary world remains sovereign power and it ecamines how that form of power operates through the pro- duction of a form of life that Agamben calls “bare life.” We argue that sov- ‘eteign power in its current form needs to be seen not so much as a power relation but rather as a relationship of violence. The chapter locates exam- ples of practical resistance ¢ rm of power in two practices oF modes first, in refusal to “draw the line” or make distinctions between of life ofthe type upon which sovereign power relies, and, second, in Sihat we el the asumpiion of bare Me that i, voluntary aking onthe ‘very form of lfe that sovereign power Sécks to impose. This assumption of bare life, in its very voluntarism, subverts the operatfon of sovereign power i ial power relations. wy GDI 2005 Security Borden/Maurer/Reddy Beau 4G Freedom and resistance are all fundamentally rooted in power relations illon, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics: “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower”, October 30, 2004, pz 53, Accessed 7/8/05) Second, power is ess a commodity that is possessed, for Foucault, than a force that circulates. As a force that ci context 0 «cdom of human being acting in effect as a conductive ma- terial Tor power’ very circulation and strategic organizing. If we were not fiee, by which Foucault means radically undetermined creatur by no general telos, natural law or historical determin: tural law or historical determination said to govern our « -Asae, For Foucault there ate no power relations in human affairs without freedom. There is dominance, ut that is another thing, Similarly, there is no freedom in h 5 without the existence of power relations, ~ Herein aso lies the explanation for Foucault’s account of resistance. All, conductive material exhibits resistance to the force that circulates through suffused by this force, conductive material ought not to be conflated with ugg is thus an involuntary manifestation ofthe temporal freedom of hhuman being for Foucault: “there are no relations of power without resist es; the later are all the more real and effective because they are formed right atthe point where relations of power are exercised resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real... it exists all the more by er resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies? - a laine Jenny and Poles: “etucton Accessed 7805) VPessimism is not justified, for just as relations of power can form a ‘web that seems to solidify into institutions like the state and sediment into ‘forms of don forms of domination, so points of resistance can. come together to lead to evolution. However, “more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance” that produce shifting cleavages and regroupings. These are the very fabric of political li ‘Another way of putting it sto say that relations of power are “exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free” Like power and Fssance, “he power rstonshp and eedons reff bmi can. Sethe separated" What ins in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and mé Spherion ac goede power: slavery, for example, is not a power relationship unless there is chance of escape. Freedom and the power relation provoke each other: like igh the resistance basis of power relations -fat, Veronique, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global ‘fe, Power, Resistance”, October 30, 2004, pg 5-6, “tations of power in Foueauldin terms, then the nation of fis freedom “would not arise, vy G1 2005 Borden Maurevefdy Security K y \ N é vee Cin (1) Tae AR EVM ATIVE TOPS Aro yp, NV ECL 4 nr VAR LaPr UW A MANNER Thar TR ACIza¢ NUEésarn vAR RY Ne ceive VW eS Vas IT> @ ads URE Acasa iy. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York. “Illusions of The Second Nuclear Age”. World Policy Journal. Vol 18. Issue 1. ‘Academic Search Premier. Spring 2001 Inthe absence ofthe sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, wwe canall too readily numb ourselves ing nuclear, and thereby live as though the e ‘tas though they dont exist. Tobe sure, we have never quite been able to muster an appropriate level of fear with respect to these wespons-one that would spur us to take constructive steps to remove the threat. We have always been able to numb ourselves in this regard, which must be seen as aba toa threat that i ‘basic human response to-a threat that is ‘apocalyptic in scope and so technologically distanced as to be unreal But there were atleast brief moments when ‘we would awaken from our nuclear torpor. Now there is little but torpor. The weapons accepted as be ‘on our planet if they were part of nature~like great trees or mountains that are old, established, immovable-rather than ‘technological instruments of genocide that we ourselves have created, GD12005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy ta t oe VNC — pce (om ‘Acceptance of nuclearism leads to catastrophe. ——— Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center ofthe City University of New York. “Illusions of The Second Nuclear Age". World Policy Journal. Vol 18. Issue I ‘Academic Search Premier, Spring 2001 But during o ar ag 2 ‘To be sure, we have not lost that awe and anxiety, but as with any group of longstanding residents, there isa tendency toward acceptance. The second nuclear age-for the United States at least~-has so far been a period of ‘elative (and misleading) nuclear quietism, sustained even aftr the testing of weapons in India and Pakistan, The factor at work here is our relief at no longer livin din which the two cleat sights, while repeatedly threatening to destroy the world in the name of something called "national security.” That reliefs real, a response to a good thin, or at east to an end of the worst thing imaginable. “The trouble is that jn other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever the continuing ‘weapons-centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in conolling nuclear weapons that ‘exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet | ‘Union);(n2) and the ‘eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the nuclear quitism is perilous, Or, to put the matter another way, we no Jonger manifest an appropriate deore of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding e inthe face of da dead Borden/Maurer/Reddy GDI 2005 Security K a YWoclewisn Qu, &. HANI A ae UAC fey. Tir, AT VE; RedectT THE areiemate AND MAKE COR SELVES Aun, OF THE (PEI Ro PLICAT low S CAUSES, Wee PSYCHOLOGICAL ML FFECTS OF VECZARISM ANID NVCLCAR VAR mined and ceased. rciatry and Psychology at John Jay Jf New York, “Illusions City University o Nuclearism must be reexau Journal, Vol 18. Issue Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psy College and Graduate Center of the wnd Nuclear Age”. World Policy ‘of The Secor ‘Academic Search Premier. Spring 2001 Looking peeholgially and Pimple Seto conclusions philosopher and drama ‘words of Seneca, the Roman fe , © Certical TO CRBs comminG Page. eGo yee Ae A Ri cogyiTiov oF THL 2 PELSONAL \Wolevle, oF boTH Gee Enitile fuuctiows AS A Pi brea — elaine oS a. g ~<> GD12005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K 12) Nuc\eas ian = senpeats— (A/C Nuclear victims are immersed in eternal death. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York. “Illusions of The Second Nuclear Age”. World Policy Journal. Vol 18. Issue 1. ‘Academic Search Premier. Spring 2001 No n of psychic numbing with nuclear ‘could have much: ‘without what we Bae ‘That nolo tet Shnats saclen: cul Snntaaee:Ysapeen co. a beings, So let me sum up in a few sentences what I leamed about that nuclear truth while living in Hiroshima and interviewing survivors some decades ago—keeping in mind that the Hiroshima bomb was, by present standards, the ‘tiniest of nuclear weapons.(n!) [Erom the split second during which one was exposed to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima, one came to experience a lifelong immersion in death and a lifelong death taint--which I described in four stages. There was first the sea of ‘death one encountered at the moment of the bomb blast, the sense of being inundated by u witnessing something close to the end of the world, Survivors retained lifelong images of ultimate horror. The second stage occured shorly afterward, wih dav or weeks ine form of roesque symptoms of acute ration ‘many deaths. The thd age cane mots or yea even decades ater: delayed radiation effets, including an {peresed incidence of ance, left survivors feeling that they were constantly being stalked by death, ‘The fourth stage was the experience of the permanent identity of the hibakusha, or “explosion-affected person,” ‘meaning survivor of the atomic bomb, which for many included feelings of being as if dead. This had to do with both the survivors’ profound identification with those who were killed by the bomb (whose number can never be known, with estimates ranging from 70,000 to 200,000), and with their own vulnerability to death. That identity and that death taint, it was feared, could be passed on to subsequent generations because of the possibility of hereditary transmission of radiation effects. So the immersion in death extended not only over one's entre lifetime but, at least fe e's as well b L GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy 7 oar BENS Aen seen er) Vos Nuclearism has massive spillover impacts. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York. “Illusions ‘of The Second Nuclear Age”. World Policy Journal. Vol 18, Issue 1 ‘Academic Search Premier. Spring 2001 = [Even worse, nuclearism can “trial "(ie Reaganite term is more accurate here than in its usual economic application) to smaller and smaller groups, Nuclearism arose initially in the country that produced the first atomic ‘bombs, the United States, and could be observed in the intensity of our early commitment to the new weapon~2und to its investiture, however inaccurately, as the "winning weapon" of World War Il. The Soviet Union did not take long {o evolve its own sustained version of nuclearism, so that, over the long vears of the Cold War, that spiritual deformation was centered mainly in the two great superpowers—whatever its additional manifestations in France, England, and China, Other countries could and did have nucleaistic aspirations of their own, but it was very clear to everyone that vast resources of money, science, and technology were needed to create and maintain a nuclear arsenal. National security is used to justify nuclearism and gain hegemony. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center ofthe Cty University of New York. “Masions of The Second Nuclear Age”. World Policy Journal. Vol 18. Issue 1. ‘Academie Search Premier. Spring 2001 Now, however, there is all too much evidence that smaller, less wealthy nations—such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran--can entertain the possibility of stockpiling their own ultimate weaponry, or are already doing so. The Indian-Pakistani confrontation is instructive in both its terible danger and its psychological nakedness. In both India and Pakistan, the leaders who ordered the detonation of nuclear weapons saw themselves as not only protecting their c "but as also enabli ‘onto the world stage as Tespect while evoking in others terror and awe. The reactions of many ordinary Indian and Pakistani people~the celebrations, the dancing in the streets, and the exuberant assertions of pride and triumph-were just as troubling. ‘They were experiencing in themselves as individual people, as well as in their country, a new dimensi ls ‘bound up specifically with muclear weaponry. The explosion of their country’s nuclear weapons had unleashed a ‘riumphalist nationalism, a nuclearized nationalism, Securitization trivializes nuclear proliferation. Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York, “Illusions of The Second Nuclear Age”. World Policy Journal. Vol 18. Issue 1. ‘Academic Search Premier. Spring 2001 By a perverse paradox, even though the danger of a nuclear calamity—-whether by design, accident, or through an act ‘of terror has grown greater, most of us seem less inclined to talk or even think about it. The Cold Wat has ended, its ological fe abated, and thus falsel cour fears of locaust. Yet the weapons main, arms contol is at a in s A ‘esting fo upgrade an aging nuclear arsenal, and. seldom before, We can usefully speak of a second nuclear age, with its fresh illusions about protecting ourselves ‘rom these weapons, even as the number of would-be nuclear acolytes continues its alarming increase GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy “Te No CLEAR AM Sa Securitization justifies causing its dest Ltt, Rober 3 Potesony College and Grad of The Second Nut Academic Search nuclearism tate Center ofthe City Univer clear Age”. World Policy emit. Spring 2001 ry of New York, si 'y Journal. Vol 18. Issue fa = ti ae a 4 i the fanatical Japanese cult {uclearism is its own stimull. Lifton, Robert J. “Illusions of The Second Nuclear Age”. World Policy Journal. Vol 18, Issue 1. Academic Search Premier. Srping 2001 ‘Nuclear weapons beget nuclear weapons, This has been the case since the moment of their appearance. During the Cold War, for instance, each new weapon served as a stimulus for an opponent's improved version. But now the existence of the weay 3th material and psychological proli so that even without their use, they sustain the dynamic of nuclear globalization: all can be drawn to the source of ultimate power. Nuclear ‘weapons anywhere cal forth nuclearism everywhere, which creates more weapons and weapons projects, which in ‘turn deepens and extends the nuclearistic mindset. In the process, the weapons become a source of motivation for their own use, ‘Even weapons advocates~those deepest into nuclearism~sense that these weapons are instruments for evil. But the ue of ultimate power becomes irresistible, to the point that this awareness of evil must be suppressed-all the more ‘so.when one justifies the acquisition of such power with the claim that it will be used for noble purposes. Then one's ‘enemies, rater than the weapons themselves, become the repositories of evil. However quietly they may sit in silos ‘or even in virtual space, nuclear weapons are never innocuous, G| Leah Renold “Collateral language: A user’s guide to America’s new war. Borden/Maurer/Reddy 4 Fundamentalism is a Christian theological movement related to specific events, places, and people. Christian fundamentalism should not be applied indiscriminately to Christian charismatic movements, Christian conservatism, or evangelicalism, though it has connections with these, But fundamentalism has come to be employed very loosely. The term “fundamentalist” is seldom de- fined specifically, but it is almost always used derogatively. Im- plied in the term fundamentalism is all that is oppressive, big- oted, and antimodern in religion, regardless of the faith. Mem- bers of other religions such as Hindus and Muslims, erroneously described as fundamentalists in popular journalism, are thus de- Picted in a negative light. Vague assumptions regarding funda- mentalism widely accepted in th Wests descipohe of Islam, in- Glude“the idea that fundamentalists are against freedom of thought and modernity. The rhetoric that attributes a dangerous and oppressive ch \etoric, portraying millions of innocent people as the enemy. Muslims have long been subject to this kind of portrayal. Most U.S. citizens have never lived in a Muslim coun- tty. They have never been intimate friends with Muslim store- keepers, farmers, grandparents, and children. They have most likely never seen a Muslim portrayed as a good and noble figure in movies, on television, or in Western literature, Ifa Muslim ap- pears on the TV screen, he or she will appear as a menacing character, wearing a gun belt and bearing a raised fist. The Amer- ican public has long been ea to such negative portrayals, “Whietrseverely distort and m 7 » 2002 Pg. 105 GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy 2 Udage, F teller tlle encoopages ee » Enyiotnmenta Aestocttion. ‘Aud destochoe ot homauily, John Collins and Ross Glover “Collateral Tanguage: A user’s guide to America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 6 As any university student knows, theories about the “social con: struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruee ton) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im. mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders Jeads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (im. cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu. nities. al the devastation of the natural environment, Indeed, i the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the desiraction, ofthe earth iself isjustiable, From our perspective, then, gery act of politcal violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in THeS5- Viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center and Row the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the cont, G3 GDI 2005 Security K a Borden/Maurer/Reddy MIC Erpoe. TALK Soll Ss" Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the Processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people's per ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup- port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef- fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup- » Posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes Public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges ‘entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines, As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio- lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu- phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” Itis important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itselfis abhorrent, Were it not for the abstract language ical strikes" Ghd he Pee of “vital interests” and 4 i strikes” and the flattering Tan- strikes” and | juage of “civilization” and “just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence. @D12005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Vp Legg [ 1 THEIR “TERROR JUSTIFIES ATROCITIES” LINK IS INEVITABLE - WE JUST PICKED TERROR AS THE EXCUSE TO INVADE IRAQ, BUT WE. WOULD HAVE RATIONALIZED IT FOR OIL OR ANY OTHER NUMBER OF THINGS — AND, TERROR IS REAL - NO IMPACT TAKE-OUT ‘ZINN 02 (Howard, Historian, 10-28, 4 Ti FIZ Tne a ea tn Paola comeing ace witn egret scaled Wao Taot? ‘eda excuses io spread U.S. power real pe er fare ‘ Sees eters HZ: T think she eal obicives fat do-wih he control of Mideast ci and wih the expansion of military bases to even more countries in the world (already we have bases in 130 or so. countries), ‘ith iti ivantas ¢ ¥ a i “war on terrorism" which is used to rally the Public behind the president. wads te ant eave +We John Collins and Ross Glover “Collateral Tanguage: A user’s guide to America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 7 The Tink between language and violence works Tw w Tea wo ‘ways which combine to create an endless cycle of justification, First, language helps to create a climate in which the need for after September 11, supposedly “objective” journalists were echo- ing politicians and pundits by saying, “The United States has no choice but to respond,” thereby giving the subsequent war an aura of inevitability. Administration officials and sympathetic ‘commentators fueled the same process with similar remarks: "We must respond forcefully to terrorism,” or “If we do nothing, we Jill encourage more terrorism.” By the time the U.S, military began raining bombs down on Afghanistan in early October, the use of language had already prepared the groundwork, and little Public opposition was heard. In terms of media coverage, the new war has made the highly managed Gulf War of 1991 look like an unrestricted festival of investigative reporting, Yet even in such a controlled information environment, the existence of vi- olence has the potential to generate revulsion on the part of the reading and viewing public, and this is where language plays a second, related role, Q i GDI 200s Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K the US ts, them dithetowy, Lifton, Robert J. Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at Johi Jay College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York American Apocalypse” Vol 277. Issue 21. Academic Search Premier December 2003, Im this case, by m, instead been raised t lute level of war itself And although American leaders auilitarizing the problem of terrorism, stimensions. Terrorism has instead been raised tothe absolut level of war itself. sreacot ii s being a "different kindof wa," here ia drumbeat of ordinary wat rhetoric thd caron call taal ga ato the crushing defeat of our tenorst enemies. When President Bush declared that "this config was bbequnon the timing and terms of others [but] will end in way, and at hes of our choosing,” he was misleading Po insuegesting cleat besiming in Al Qaeda's acts anda decisive end in the bate” again enorens eee ered titan ata memorial service just thee days after 9/11 atthe National Catedral in Washington, he also asserted, ibility to history i lear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil." Mastington Post reporter Bob Woodward, not man given to irony, commented thatthe paciiom coe easting his ‘mission and that ofthe country in the grand vision of God's master plan.” Bush air recall, "I had to show the A K. So-batever it took to win" With wold leaders, he felt he had to "look them inthe eye and-say, Vavivenhe sig or you're against us." Long before the flrag-indeed, even before the invasion of Afghanistan~Bush, ify himself, and be identifi "wartime president,” GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Vn Tg! Empact Extensin Tener talk © ed 4° dt, gr ae A security mindset causes racial profiling, =i surmninat on , John Collins and Ross Glover “Collateral language: A user’s guide to America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 5 ‘This understanding of lan, becomes especially important when thinking through the lopments since September 11. 2001, Since that time, a perceptual system emerged linking up any person \who appeared “as if they were Middle Eastern. The immediate increase in raciall motivated crimes after. ings demonstrates the significance of these perceptions, We begin as a country to perceive danger in people based on skin soloy. or of the association of certain types of bodily features with >. government had arrested over a thousand eople, virtually all of whom, ‘ither Arab or Muslim, in most cases without shange: This was the most significant detention of a racial group since the internment of Japanese Americans during World War IL. While these detentions may seem justified to some, it is ime Portant to remember that after the Oklahoma City bombings, the gorernment dd not arrest anyone whore nate mene Irish except Timothy MeVeigh. Nor did we come to see all white People, Christians, or former Marines as suspected terrorists alter these bombings. With this in mind, the impact of language on perception becomes clear, Because the Middle Easterner has been linked through language wi texan eee people who resemble someone from that region of the world as possible terrorists. This aspect of I helps governments miinufacture_consent_for discrimination against_ particular Broups of people. ES GDI 2005 Security K The media uses the term fundamentalism to create feelings of hostility toward Borden/Maurer/Reddy zy i ne ” 95 Leah Renold “Collateral language: A user’s guide to America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 9: ~__When the term “fundamentalist” is used in the med ass0- ciation with Islam, itis rarely defined, Such usage suggests a com. ‘mon understanding of the term. While most Ame ins are not familiar with the different schools of thought within Islam, they are acquainted with fundamentalism in the Christian context, where the temiLisised in common parlance to rel tively, to a certain brand of Christianity. When the term fanda. mentalism appears as an appendage of Islam, the reading public can only assume that the same connotations associated with Christian fundamentalism must also apply. Fundamentalism be- comes blanket term, shrouding Islam in Western perceptions of fundamentalism. In using the term, the media manages to ass0- Cate large numbers of Muslim people with certain attitudes and behavior of a backward and inherently dangerous nature, In in- stances where the ter ereotypical images are only reenforced, without specific mention of histori: Cal political, social, or theological developments within Islam, Fundamentalism is applied as an exendial term, implying that there is a certain characteristic, a core essence of the phenome: nnon, which transcends distinctions of specificity. CE GDI 2008 Security K John Collins and Ross Glover “Collateral Borden/Maurer/Reddy Ettor Tale £ f L nSLUS US. ORtcials dbe. of the fete deittism CleateSs Feat baded politics Wap i language: A user’s guide to America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 1 Language is a terrorist organization, and we stand united against terrorism. This book is a collection of essays written to ex: Pose the tyranny of political rhetoric used to justify “Ameri New War.” From Buchenwald to Rwanda, from Wounded Knee to ‘Watts, from the gulags of Stalinist Russia to the massacres of Sabra and Shatila, from San Salvador to Srebernica, the killing fields of the modern world respect no national boundaries, All these places are, in a sense, the same place, where the practices of war destroy the dream of human rights, In October 2001, the United States marshaled all its resources and began bombing ‘one of those places, Afghanistan, shamefully sending one of the Poorest countries in the world back onto the list of global war zones. U.S. officials, like their counterparts in decades past, als tempted to generate public support for their actions by appeal- ‘ng to ideas.as powerful as they are abstract: freedom, civilization, terrorism, evil, This language needs interrogation wherever itis found. The essays in this book explore the use of such language by American political leaders and mainstream media outlets in the wake of the September 11th attacks. ‘We entitle this book Collateral Language to illustrate that while language always shapes our lives, the effects of language during War are unique. Just as “collateral damage” describes military damage in addition to the intended targets, “collateral language” refers to the language war as a practice adds to our ongoing lex- icon as well as to the additional meaning certain terms acquire during wartime. We call language a terrorist organization to ik lustrate the real effects of language on citizens, especially in times of war. Language, like terrorism, targets civilians and gen- erates fear in order to effect political change. When our political Teaders and our media outleis use terms like Anthrax, terrorist threat, madmen, and biological weapons, a specific type of fear fulness emerges, both Intentionally and unintentionally, We are all targets for this type of language, and we are all affected by it as well, Regardless of the truth of the words, collateral language produces effects beyond its meaning. The title Collateral Lan- guage and the reference to language as a terrorist organization highlight these effects. wy 64 GDI 200s Sane Borden/Maurer/Reddy th Te Tal, Lmpact Extensins r U.S. officials use ambiguous terminology to manipulate major political outcomes. John Collins and Ross Glover “Collateral language: A user’s guide to America’s new war.” 2002 Pg. 3 The use of vague terms for creating the consent of the US. population is one strategy employed by political leaders, Many of the essays in Collateral Language highlight this reality. Terms such “as freedom, justice, terrorism, and evil offer excellent examples of how language can be utilized to produce consent. We all want freedom and justice and we all oppose evil and terrorism, but we rarely question the meaning of these terms; we believe We OW: what they mean until we attempt to define them, Thus a politi- cian employing this type of language can justify a variety of dif we must overthrow the evil government of [insert country].” Crit icizing this type of statement is difficult at best because most peo- ple want freedom and only a few actively support evil. This sim- ple example demonstrates the way in which a complex, geopolit- ical _decision gets the support of many without the need for understanding the specific meaning of anything, understanding the specific meaning of anything. GDI 2008 PATRIOT Act Aff Secuesce ( K) < OR sentA Cr 54 Tee Borden/Maurer/Reddy qt! $ AE0TA Soukces THe AERNATIVE LSE GReyNO OON KeacroVSHre To OTHERS AS AN TUSS- “Tren DECOreEnr Edward W. Said, Covering Isiam Page 43-44, 1981 or most Americans (the'same is generally true for Eu- ropeans) the branch of fhe cultural apparatus that has be includes the televi- delivering Islam to them for th on bod sadn net the daily newspapers, and the mass: ‘circulation news magazines; fms play a role, of course, if only because to the of history and distant lands informs our own, it often comes by way of the cinema, Together, this powerful concentr a can be Said to constitute a communal core of interpretations providing a certain picture of Islam and, of course, reflecting bowed nists We ety saad be he ne with this picture, which is not merely a picture but also a ‘may call its over-all context. By context 1 the picture's setting, its place in reality, The values implicit in it, and not least, the kind of attitude it promotes in the beholder. ‘Tins, if the Iranian crisis is regularly rendered by television pictures of chanting “Islamic” mobs accompanied by commentary aboul “anti-Americanism,” the distance, unfamiliarity, and threaten: ing quality of the spectacle limit “Islam” to those characteris- tics; this in tum gives rise to a feeling that something basically Saas unattractive and negative confronts us. Since Islam is “ag a and "out there” the neni of ete tional response of our own tow loubted ‘And fe sean heaca Walls Conk fat hoe broadcast with the phrase “that’s the way itis,” we too wil ‘on Yo conaiude-tok thatthe so oe ‘sion company has caused to a] it before us in this way, that itis eet the iy things are: natural unchanging, for- ‘us.” No wonder that Jean Daniel of Le Nouvel Observateur was able to say on November 26, 1979, “les Etats-Unis [sont] assiégés par Islam.” CHAT LS SNEeVITABLET UIDL EXT. + GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Case Neg a etvene Oxseracsn Tess OCHERTT ATION PEMYUNAVIZE 5 Peorle, GmEee— Ano MYS< BE ReTectev Orientalism Edward W. Sai Books ed fy 108 | New York: Vintage Books, 1979, c1978. Ist Vintage [has as revolutionary turmoil grips the Islamic Oven, socio ogists remind us that Arabs are aducted to “oral functions" while economists—recycled Orientlisis—observe that for modera Islam neither capitalism nor socialism is an adequate rubric” At anticolonialis sweeps and inded unifies the entre Oriental worl, the Orientalistdamas the whole Business not only as a nuisanes but as an insult to the Western democracies. As momentous, generally important ives face the world isues involving nud ~issues involving nuclear destruc- on, catstrophicalyseace resoifees-Unpesedented. human de. Id or Se eS ae a {ater the Oregt are eaaTONeT Beale Wee sees ar fodbgl Spry a ae RE Seient warn ATAU flame NES GS tv ld The pore Chinese, balénakod Indians, and pasive Muslin are described aa vultures for “our” largesse and are damned when “we lose them” to communism, or 10 ther unregeneate Oriental instinct the dierencs is scarcely significant, ‘These contemporary Orientals atitudes food the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of ss camel- riding, terorsic, hook-nosed, vena leches. whose uadesered SsumpliogUaY aliough the Western consumer belongr 10 @ ‘numerical minority, he iseniled either to own or to expend (oF both) the majority ofthe world resourees, Why? Bocause hz unlike the Oriental. tou human being. ‘No better instance exists today ‘hat Anwar Abdel Malek calls “the hegemonism of posesing minorites” and anthropocentrism allied with Europoccntism: a white midate-clase Westemer believes it his human plerogative nat only pune weed Car alas ovat, or beau by definition iis not que a Rama ar There i m0 Pee. xample an hi of dumanzer og, | GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Onlals bo el ve le ee (On the other hand, scholars and critics who are trained in the traditional Orientalist disciplines are perfectly capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket. Jacques Berque’s and Maxime Rodinson’s training ranks with the most rigorous avail- able, but what invigorates their investigations even of traditional problems is their methodological self-consciousness. For if Oriental- ism has historically been too smug, too insulated, too positvistically ‘confident in its ways and its premises, then one way of opening, ‘oneself to what one studies in or about the Orient is reflexively to submit one's method to critical serutiny. This is what characterizes ‘Berges aad Rodinsoa, cr Bs ona wey What one odie "Their work is always, Hirst ofall, a direct sensitivity to he material before them, and then a_contis examination _of their im ice, @ constant attempt to keep their work Feposste fo the mate Salo wT ia “Certainly Berque and Rosinson, as well as Abdel Malek and Roget Owen, ate aware too tat the study of man and society wheter Oriental or not—is best conducted in. the broad Beld of ll the human sciences; therfore these scholars are erical reader, and students of what goes on in other fields Berqu's tenon recent discoveries in stucural anthropology, Rovinso’s to solo. ogy and political theory, Owen's to econom isory all these are itstrative comrctiver brought from the contemporary, human sciences to the study of so-called Onell problems F'4 SH GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Case Neg. Orientalism polarizes the world into an “us* “them” dichotomy Orientalism Edward W. Said. New York: Books ed Fy.45~40 Asde=Ply forged as is this monstrous chain of command, as siongly munaged as is Cromer's “harmonious working.” Qriatalism can also 2x strength of the West and the Orient's as ‘Such strength and su intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any view that divides the world into lange general divisions entities Wal coe aoe Pay eee oe For that the main itelectal nue sled oy Ovantalsm, Can one divide human reali as OGST Rumah Fae come ic en genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, tradi. By cacoristes, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say: of men into “us” (Westerners) and “they” (Orientals). For Fae peas OnS are generalies whose use historically and actually hhas been to press the importance of the distinction between some mem and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable fends. When one uses categories like Oriental and Westem ax both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (Gs the categories were used by Balfour and Cromer, the result usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human em, counter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In short from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism 5.2 form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such fand-and fast distinctions as “East” and “West: to channel thought iit & West or an East compartment, Because this tendency i right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice, and’ at the center of Orientalist theory, and values found in the, West, the sense of W, Cover the Orient is taken for {granted as having the st Dink = atgpealneee eden to ——— ee tory V2 Vintage Books, 1979, c1978. Ist Vintage +s GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Aff Link -"Us” “THEM” dichotom 2h Use of geographical orders props up the “us” them” dichotomy Orientalism Edward W. Said. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, c1978. Ist Vintage Books ed °3/5 FIC pty posible oa hat some inte abst a= made by the mind, and that these objects, while appearing io exist. objectively, have only a fstional reality, A group of people living. ona few acres of land will set up boundaries hetweentheirland and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which ‘theycall."the land of the barbarians,” In other words, this universal. factice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is ‘QUES” aidan unfamiliar space “ours” which is “theirs” a_way of making geographical distinctions that arbitrary. I use the word “arbitrary” here” because imaginative ‘geography of the “our land-barbarian land” variety dogs not that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for “us” to set up these Boundaries in our own minds; “they” become “they” accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from “ours.” To a certain extent modern and. primitive societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively. A fifth-century Athenian was very likely to feel himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian, The geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, ‘and cultural ones in expected ways. Yet often the sense in which someone feels himself to be not-foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is “out there,” beyond one’s own territory. lL ki “bere ree ee 46 GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Case Neg and freaks. Link = Otheri zation ‘America’s media has warped America’s view of the Islamic World i Edward W. Said, Covering Islam Page xxii-xxiii, 1981 id assertions of American TEE eS umphant return. "The victims were directly transmuted into heroes (understandably upsetting” various veterans’ and former POW groups) and symbols of freedom, theit captors into salttaata beasts. To this end the New York Times said editorially on January 22, “let there be ‘Tage and rev those selease,” and then, ving reflected for a while, came up with the following ques. tions on January 28: “What should have been done? Mining harbors, or landing marines, or dropping a few bombs might frighten rational foes. But was Iran—is Iran—rational?” Cer- tainly, as Fred Halliday wrote in the Los Angeles Times on January 25, there was much to be critical of in Iran, religion and unceasing revolutionary turmoil having proved incapable of providing a’modern state with the kind of day-to-day de- cisions likely to benefit the population at large. Internationally Tran was isolated and vulnerable, And certainly it was just as clear that the students at the embassy had not been gentle with their prisoners. Yet not even the fifty-two themselves went so far as to say that they had been tortured or systematically brutalized: this emerges in the transcript of their news con- ference at West Point (sce the New York Times, January 28), where Elizabeth Swift says quite explicitly that Newsweek lied about what she said, inventing a story about torture (much amplified by the media) that had nothing to do with the facts. It.was the leap from a specific experience—unpleasant, anguished, miserably Jong” in _duration—to huge generaliza- fons about Iran and Islam that the hostage return licensed in the media and in the culture at Jazge. Once again, in other words, the political dynamics of a complex historical ex- Perience were simply effaced in the service of an extraordinary amnesia. We were back to the old basics. Iranians were re- Suced_to “fundamentalist screwballs” by Bob Ingle in the Atlanéa Constitution on January 25; Claire Sterling in the ‘Washington Post on January 23 argued that the Iran story was an aspect of “Fright Decade I,” the war against civilization by VY VN ae into a vision of barbarians, Confinu ed On Nex 7A GDI 2005 PATRIOT Act Case Neg We > Otherja. terrorists. To Bill Green on the same page of the Post, “the Iranian obscenity” raised the possibility that “freedom of the ress,” which presented news about Iran, might be “perverted into a weapon aimed directly at the heart of American na- Teresa and seltesteem.” This remarkable combination of janfidence and insecurity is somewhat deflated by Green when he asks a little later whether the press helped “us” te andec Nand the lanians’ revolution,” a question easily answered by Martin Kondracke in the Wall Street Jounal, Januaty-2¢ who wrote that “Ameri ion [with scant exceptions} Aran _ctisis cither as a freak show, featuring self Aagellans and fst-navers or 5a soap opera. 2 Bordexaurer ay lee A dina G ont n wel GDI 2005 PATRIOT Act Case Neg Borden/Maurer/Reddy Discourse on Islam is biased by those who produce it Baward W. Said, Covering Islam Page xvii-xviii, 1981 Let us say that discourse on Islam is, if not absolutely iated, then certainly color the political, economic, and intellectual situation in which it arises: this is astrue of East as it is of West. For many evident reasons, it is not too ‘much of an exaggeration to say that all disco as_an in: ‘erest in some authority or power. On the other hand, I do not mean ee that ee or writing about Islam is thessfore uscles. Quite the contrary; I think it is more useful ian not, and very revealing as an index of what interest is being served. I cannot say for sure whether in matters having to do with human society there is such a thing as absolute truth ot perfectly true knowledge; pethaps such things exist in the abstract—a proposition I do not find hard to accept—but in present reality truth about such matters as “Isl five to who produces it. It will be noted that such a position les it pacer Teoelipe (pee a ferent), nor the possibility of saying things accurately. Tt sim- ply asks (hot anyone speaking about “Islam” remember what any beginning student of iterators knows that the waiting ot ot clas of texts about human say brings into play many fac oe th (or protected) “abjective.” > be 1 i GDI2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Case Neg Tmpaet — Opression The language of the Orient subjugates the east Orientalism Edward W. Said. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, c1978. Ist Vintage Books ed f.34-40 T Cromer makes no effort to conceal that Orientals for Kim were always and only the homan material he governed in Britsh colonies “As I am only a diplomat and an administrator, whose proper study is also man, but from the point of vew of governing him Cromer says,» T content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental generally acts, spesks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite tothe European.” Cromer’ dese tions are of course based partly on direct observation, yet bere and there he refers to orthodox Orientals authorities (in particular Enest Renan and Constantin de Volney) to suppor his views, To these authorities he alo defers when it comes to explaining why Orientals are the way they are He has no doubt that any knows of the Oriental will confim his views, whic, to judge from his description ofthe Egyptian breaking under erosr-examination, find the Oriental to be uilyThe crime was thatthe Orental was an Oriental and itis an accurate ign of ow commonly aSSepibIe hrs tatty was tat could be wien Wilout even appeal ie Burapean Toe or SPARETE OF Thos Soe desi eo fre ea oe fo be MRnIGTAT "Cromer Tas? anGaT Tepor tom Eaypt coos ‘quently proclaimed Egyptian nationalism to be an “eniely novel idea" anda plat of exotic rather than of indigenous growth." ‘We would be wrong, 1 thin, 10 underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge, the codes of Orientals orthodoxy, to which Cromer and Balfour refer everywhere in their writing and in theit public policy. To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization Of colonial rule is 1 ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justifed in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact. Men have always divided the world up into regions having sitter rater ised cession mea. The sb Snap oi shatig. Te soi demain ween East and. Wes, which Balfout tid Cromer accept with such complacency, had been years, even century, in the making There were of cout TARINERME Voyages of discovery thes were contact through trade and war. But more than this, ance the middle ofthe eighteenth century there had been two principal cl ‘ments in the relation between East and West. One was a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge rene forced by the colonal encounter as well as by the wiSeepead ine terest inthe alien and unusual, exploited by the developing sciences af ethnology, comparative anatomy, philology, and history further: tote to this systematic knowledge Was added a sizable body of Iitersture produced by novelists, post, translators, and. piled travelers, The other feature of Oriental European telatons was that Europe was always ina postion of strength, not to say domination. There is no ay of puting this euphemistcally. Troe, the relation: Sbip otter raipedetesald Ge dagulesd or lid, or Wie Balfour acknowledged the “greatness” of Oriental civilizations But the estentil relationship, on polit, cltral, and even religious {grounds, was seein te Was, which ls what covccrns us hive to be one between a strong and a weak partner. J 7 | 3 SO GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Aff Rhetoric of Orientalism portrays the west as superior : Orientalism Edward W. Said. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, c1978. 1st Vintage Books ed fy 33-34 ~TNow at lasts approsch the lg developing coe of eanial knowede, iow ole Bak Seadeni a pecak shes ee and Ballou inherited from a Senary asi WS ism: ,knowedge about and knows of Greve me ‘knowledge was effective: Cromer believed he had put it to use in fovemning Egypt Moreover war nat aa Gigs, since sCrentals oral prctal purpose rent tone cxsene, which any Orca (or ler of aoe cc “worvolume work Holém Epypr he mopeeel ae cee experience and achievement, Cromer puts down a sort of personal ccanon of Orientalist wisdom: Sir Alfred Lyall once sid to me: “Accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. Every Anglo-indisn should always remember that ‘maxim.” Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates ino untruth: fulness, is infact the main characteristic ofthe Oriental mind, The European is a close reasoner; his slatements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he isa natural logician, albeit he may fot have studied logi; hei by nature sceptical and requires proot before he can accept the trath of any proposition; his tained ine tellgence works like a piece of mechanism, ‘The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, ike his picturesque streets, is emis ently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning sof the most sipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat higher degree the science of dialectics, ther descendants are singularly deficient in the logical faculty. They ae often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusion fom any simple premises of which they may admit the truth, Endeavor to eit alin Satoment of facts from any ordinary Egyptian. His explanation yl generally be lengthy, and wanting in Init. He wil probably omtradit himself half-dozen times before he has fished hig story, He will often break down under the mildest process of ross-examination, lentals or Arabs are thereafter shown to be gullible, ‘devoid of Energy and initiative,” much given to “fulsome flatter)” intrigue, cunning, and unkindness to animals; Orientals cannot walk on cither a road or & pavement (their disordered minds fail to under. stand what the clever European grasps immediatly, that roads and aements are made for walking); Orientals are javeterate lat, they are “Jstharsic and suspicious and.in everything oppose the, Alo-Saxon race" / clarity, directness, and nobility of the —honpac tis Opressiipmeass 7 2. > GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Aff Representations of the Orient recreate repression Orientalism Edward W. Said. New York: Vin Books ed ?;,40 “Many terms were used to express the relation? Balfour and~ Cromer, typically, used several. The Oriental is rational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”; “thus the Euroy is_rational, virtuous, mature, “normal” But the way of enlivening the relation: ship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental fived ina” Gifierent but thoroughly organized world of his own, a world with its_own_national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence.-Yet what gave the Orie id its inteligibility and identity was not the result of his own efforts ‘but rather the winole complex series of knowledgeable manipula- tions by which the Orient was identified by the West. Thus the two features of cultural relationship T have been discussing come to- gether. Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in_a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and_his_world. Tn Cromer's and Balfour's Tanguage the Oriental is depicted as some- thing one judges (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum), something one disciplines (as in a school or prison), something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual). The point is that in each of these cases the Oriental is contained and represented by dominating these come from? T = 1 itage Books, 1979, 1978. Ist Vintage 3 /, CL GDI 2008 Borden/Maurer/Reddy PATRIOT Act Case Neg There is a definite connection between t} Im pact = turn Salveney the West’s words and actions. Edward W. Said, Covering Islam Page xvi-xvii, 1981 Nevertheless T believe that even if we do not blame vetting that is unhealthy about the lslanic world on the ‘West. we must be able to see the connection between what the ‘West has been saying al slam nul what seactively, vat etic ie. The dialectic between ‘two—given that for many parts of the Islamic world the West, partner, is a very important interlocutor—has produced species of what Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband have called “word politics,”* which it is the Purpose of this book to analyze and explain. The d-forth between The backand-forth between the West and Islam, the challen; nd_the answering, the opening of certain_thetorical_spaces_and_the closing i ‘others: allthis makes up the-"word politics” by which each side sets up situa tives _on the other. Thus when_It seized eta Tate the former shah’s entry into the United States, but to what the ceived as a long history of humiliation inflicted on “spol ce” istant intervention in their lives, and re a3 Muslims who, they Felt, had been held prisoner in their_own country, they took American prisoners_and held them as hostages on United States territory, the Teheran e bassy. ough the actions themselves made the point, it words, and the movements of power mae ae that repared the way and, toa very great extent, made the actions: This pattern is, I think, of very great importance because it underscores the close affiliation between Janguage and polit. ical reality, at least so far as discussions of Islam are con- cemed. ‘The hardest thing tn_get most academic experts on Islam to admit is that what they say and do as scholars is set in a profoundly and in some litical con- fext, Everything about the study of Islam in the contempori West is saturated with pol alti tapers ince, but hardly any what they say. Objectivity is assumed to inhere in. learned discourse about other societies, despite the long history of po- litical, moral, and teligious concern felt in all societies, West- em or Islamic, about the alien, the strange and different. In WA VY (2 the West and the problems of the Islamic World due to Contanuro OW NEKT z xa CE GDI 2008 PATRIOT Act Aff Borden/Maurer/Reddy __srreser- ew Sou vence \ Y Burope, for example, the Orientalist has tracitionally Deen ‘affiliated directly with colonial offices: what we have just begun to lean about the extent of close cooperation between scholarship and direct military colonial conquest (as in the fase of the revered Dutch Orientalist C. Snouck Hurgronje, who used the confidence he had won from Muslims to plan land execute the brutal Dutch war against the Atjehnese peo. ple of Sumatra’) is both edifying and depressing. Yet books and articles continue to rth extol nal ‘ship, the fruits of Orientalist learn- ing, an “objective” expertise. ‘Very same. time there is scarcely an expert on “Islam’_wh consultant or even an employee of the government, the vari-? ous corporations, the media. My points that t eration must be admitted and taken into account, not just for mora yeasons, but for intellectual reasons as well.7 GDI 2005 Security K Roabsm Bad: AZ: REALISM : ce a Realism creates a self-fulfilling prophesy because it encourag Borden/Maurer/Reddy behaviors leading to the wars it tries to prevent. SELF FULFILE ines peopnecy (iz in Politic ie tralian National University) jim (Lecturer in Political Science at Australiar eh Sroctones ot Global Politics. A Critical (Re)introduction to 4 Internatior 14 Relations. "Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado.1994 p 12 ave been severely limite, tothe exten that complex epistemological’ closicl debates over knowledge, meaning, language, end sete ae, issues of how we think and act inthe world—-have toe etely conrnas the primitive Realist framework deseibed eaten, 1 both the inlectual and policy communis, accordingly, one has era the power politics Realism ofthe Fie. which became the Westet “catechism” ding the end Intemational Relations scholars sought factual certannt sour ao Yorld, verifiable via the Traditional wisdom of certain “prem eee Realism at this time ome signiy a stat of mind tht perscated we Siy and government seciféand sondiiond (he tothe ‘exten that some actions seemed "f tand to ‘thes seemled) ‘aive=b5 dentin." Ta this situation the real world meee ane hich Cout there") cs were involve in an unending stage mth cach thr hecaise that the nature of Stes in an anachie Worl): power was maconey ak {BES in or cominue wo ph al sates Wee poten cnomies eae ts mors might be avoded by clever diplomacy an by vue tic et tha al alice shared similar conepion of [oltatis] sane ace the probleme of understanding and explaining global ie in Realist post theoretical terms, More significant, it did s0 in the falsitistionst eons that. since 1945, have been dominant tthe (North) American dscpiney enter. Setting aside the quantitative idiom at the end of his study, ‘Rasauez concluded that, as particular image of the world employed by Realist policymakers, power politics promot kinds of behavior if often Teads to self-fuliling-peophecies. Drawing out some of the ications of this situation on the central question of war and pease ‘Vasquez had a chilling statement t9 make on the orthodox answers the Alliance system and balance of power. Here. he mainuned, the most key (Gaistica outcome of Realist anarchical “theory” in“pracice” i warane [eace. His findings were that a ower politic ian image ofthe word that eacourages behaviour that IelprBring abou wari owe si SS GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy soo or Raankew@a\2 PEALISH: gh REAL sth senSGUSe: REND Realism ¢reates a world that is fundamerilally Separate from the actual real world of human life while looking at peace and liberty as only extra-benefits to order. George, Jim (Lecturer in Political Science at Australian National University) “Discourses of Global Politics. A Critical (Re)introduction to 4 International Relations. “Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado.1994 12 e ly, the Knowledge form integral to a Realism ofthis kind -ieaiyas consequence is marked by iimy. A nox ower og ie Cll Wa, ut Ae med a tin bs teat in permanent ned of rex ihr cieumaance, El hotng. pe [asT- special bonus, accruing to people as a result of living in a well onlered soe ‘As Berk suggests, this Realist Iogical a i ca nade nt nha el fo tee a Me tal oe ST a He text of everyday human existence—from tual Ijehunr of ray Eres ab st Sop en ee ‘Carwran)-a potvist Reals appr ce st Serose eal eee ae eon ee nT oe Tod ty of ence beyond Sete Unsere pu ae ee Imma itgoes manasa eae Cor hag arcs Semen ‘eran ofr of idee vegas tat is sete ae Pete novingeyond is pve chron U7 OE noc1 _ Realist responses to the Balkans crisis set it up for genocide Geroge, Jim (Lecturer in Political Science at Australian National University) “Discourses of Global Poilitics. A Critical (Re)introduction to 4 International Relations. "Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado.1994 at whoa one onder more cflly the evens and sss sound ing heparan ister hesoncs pret ta fs ten » decisiomakers tht might hive ave Sliorated er nt ‘vas nothing ine Balan ition a a oat Rat Situation that demanded ano Wester response tothe disinerai {sized by the parsyss noted eal Consul a7 In the coal, in June 191, ‘Baker Wa Sotronied by Croatia and Bos ‘Saga fre Setrinaton,Wereoon ws med of aoerigny ania of see3tion," At that vital w ordinal, the Wi the Yugoslav stmy thie tney country togetcr—witioat at it, from the bagi TE Wael back on outmoded diplomacy, insisting that Yupostayia Unie Sites and oat of pes Et Whe i, the mee se European Community acid like aati, Tsien ‘of the Balkan inate Ya negra othe ase ‘Spee ts eens. ade and ence simplistic grand of International Relations, honed suri a Fos scot Wa antsy conse a Bosnian example i, pl is in his Content, another Misiatice LF GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy PrabsirnBadfl2 = REAUSM— y HADES IDEwr ity Realism Shapes Perception of Identity, Destroys Diversity RRBJ Walker, Professor of Intemational Relations at Keele University Inside/Outside: Intemational Relations as Political Theory p161-162, 1993 ae common identity cgpvey a great aeal about ous capacity 10 imagine particular identities, for a-common identity j etsy what werdo not have lesst na lly meaningful sefige- Modern politic ities. dispersed among a ‘multiplicity of sites, a condition sometimes attributed to a specifically Gaia copetnceiUat nC ae his teas tek eee selectively forgotten, characteristic of modern political life for several centuries. This specifically modern proliferation of spatially delimited identities has had shasplimits, The presumed anarchy among states. hhas been an anarchy of the select few. But it is this proliferation, a yo the select few, But it afi ution, container of all cultura meaning, and site ‘of sovereign jurisdiction aver territory, property and abstract space, ly over history, possibility and abstract time, thats and collective identities. It does so despite all the dislocations, acceler- ations and contingencies of a world less and less able to recognise itself in the cracked mirror of Cartesian coordinates. Whatever avenues ins ned up in the exploration of = aven es : yr movements, they logical and discursive options expressed most elegentlyrand to the modem imagination most per. Suasively, by claims about the formal sovereignty of territorial states. As both principle and practice, as an expression of a specifically modern articulation of political identity in space and time, state sover- eignty is somethin; neit nor renounce, nor fe toon gee a mae exclusion sancti the dense textures of sovereign virtie) may Hse ons esac DoT a RY the anachronistic ambition lo perfect te spatial ecto ne eet dition of perpetual peace among nations, what then? It remains excep- tionally difficult to renou ity of Cartesian coordinates, not as ur most powerful sense of wh means to look over the horizon.y * 1/7 SE D1 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy Renlam Oa? PEAUSM- Kitty He genowy We do not endorse the of the Cold War prevented a total chan emergence of non-state actors realist framework impossible George, Jim (Lecturer in Politic ‘Discourses of Global Politics. A Critical Relations. "Lynne Rienner Publishers, p89 and new challenges makes he: in the long run. ‘al Science at Australian Natio: Boulder Colorado.1994 FOF Fina commentary on the ise OF paRE-CoKE War theory a pra: tice might provide the most explicit indiation yet of why this situton Continues inthe 1990s and might help dec the Gcuson more precisely to central themes in this book. Th precisely, Vaclav st they evoke with approaches are of most significance From Havel’s Fete, te dni of te Sve! mpd an baci Si (65a be Foy tas) ar, ean “jor implications for the way in which the dominant aricalaors of mod= evi th he ral Wet nd communist ois conn wT iy thnseles as the “hia = = Hana? palin, more etpcny, ear ital of cnpagiag ix arlie ‘umpkalon, the Western “victors” oft Cold Wat © ‘onfront the aspects of their own societies that saw them bound together ‘ike Soviet Union for same as mage at tie eget ets GuaanueGe creer ‘The specific raposition here is one rarely encountered nai for global life It epresens, [Relations text, notwithstanding its significance for sl a in short, an appeal for serious critical ef 2 Weston modems. Moe re sti ta sae reas the United Sia ate tem ac gee ump ot po i ments of modern political ie but ee Te Tada, Sugacsis Hav a Ey pe inte wake ofthe Cols War Spend Ffdowra stra ingle te tet spt of tet theory and practice ta derstanding of a complex, changing 8 ramen ot se He ar peal ‘rh oi Senin a te pac vei at x Sore prod s patie taney det nal University) (Re)introduction to 4 International G7 gendered language in this evidence. The tensions ge in the world system. The gemony in the 64 GDI 200s Security K PunbsmnBadaz: REALISM - Gbvepmized ANARCH) mess IEE REIN = Bue Pali ZED ANDRCHIC Realism reduces the international that cannot adequately account fo! the Cold War. George, Jim (Lecturer in Political Science at Australian “Discourses of Global Politics. A Relations. "Lynne Rienner Publis Borden/Maurer/Reddy lers, Boulder Colorado. 1994 re ee okie cron the pola! pina who have acenyhglged te Sangean Inndeuscia af oer spposchen te Top Far tape he al War sor Jobs Lo perl th cre oat ne titel te a ep of no aa take afer all. More presale dominant peer in ner Ip oct alte: noua seas eee sw le a al grin nto Sete et pve pi mo sia ee an ans ee nelle tern om fe te i ise cece pee og cog ses nd toa eae ca havior eal a in Traditional power polities terms. Hence invoking the “victory” of the Western superpower in is power struggle cessful” power politics principles inthe Gull, playing field to a state of anarchy 1 phenomena like the peaceful end of G17 National University) Critical (Re)introduction to 4 Intemational =) GDI 2005 77 posers Borden/Maurer/Reddy AZ HREALIG« = IR mepute Gamba Bak The stage has been set as i realist framework that we George, Jim (Lecturer in Political Science ‘Discourses of Global Politics. A Critic Relations. "Lynne Rienner Publisher 0.2-3 must transcend. rs, Boulder Colorado.1994 ‘The implications of this proean ware starkly Hutatd ithe Gulf ‘War of 1990-1991, which, as the first major conflict of the past-Cold War ‘period, provided a profound challenge to the policy and intellectual sectors OF the Toternational Relations communiy, faced withthe kind of low- ontingeney threat to established order that isthe most likely policosrate= ic scenario in tat space beyond the “Balance Tn these terms, T the orthodox response tothe Gulf War was a disaster, a devasat- ing and (gic ndfetment of 3 moribund but lethal theory as practice, Sesgned Towle spose ad ipower coxrcon a ot al fr, ‘Kind of sensiive, preventative globat states that willbe required in the poat-Cona War ea, “In this first “new world” scenario, therefore, the U. . ‘invoked traditional old-world images (eof Hiteism and appeasement) acted in accordance with old-world siratesic rituals in accomplish iy pis the designated “Oier” witout fat of reatiadon,Consequty, ata moment when imovatve and. imaginative apnea i ana ne ager” wots Te onc of spacial cay 8 si rvlcaring apectacle wa eidet-via te crest axiaparn of Macvelin “toca oi and the woe "pace" of cootempo- ‘ay Technoraionalist savagery. TRe whole event was then legitimated ia ‘efits of a rather desperate concéction of medieval and modernist rhetoric ‘hh or expla Kawai “dcnoray” and aelf-determinaon anicuatedin terms of neo- August sof Tast Wat Th of couse ma ony way interpret he evens in the Gul Nor ingot isthe way in which the policy store of he major Wester omers andthe maieseam intelectual sector within the Internals Felons community fave pensrallyecrde th experiences 0 Operation ‘Deas Stam. On th contey th daminan ply dita sexo have represented the Gulf War n-exemplary radionalterme=ae sponse fing aioe tole aerate ie “ike satel ction. Ts, general vido rom wii : [ving rnc sanctuns ofthe Pentagon and the disciplinary eltadls of Tntcrationa Rlaionsscolarstip hve mainaned thatthe nl reali Ae" espns tothe quid adventrism of Sadam Hossein in 990 was the eat the “marie retain Scie of he aly Cold War years tr in broader terms, tthe fist (achivellin) principe of power poles Static love that vit in International Relation its that epson mabe mei wih gc eggeson meaning ode oe ainained2 Ths rings me clothe real foc of this hook anda election ts nat esta om len etn Se una seep eater “ata fought ant con, Voniaat nthe of imperial power ote a5 fur Soc ft “lance of te" The argument more CERUSyrir har raw emerging ag of peat dangers, complex, and in gel WH eel Wt we go beyond ional sr and praia begin a eusy ‘erain_ireducible images of teat for the policy and infllectoal commonities in Internationa Taos. international relations policy focuses on a at Australian National University) ical (Re)introduction to 4 international GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Vo Fils Re Bod CRITICAL THEORY ISN'T AN ALTERNATIVE TO REALISM John Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1994/95, p.46-7. (MHSOLT0982) Critical theorists have ambitious aims. However, critical theory also has important flaws, and therefore it will likely remain in realism’s shadow. Specifically, critical theory is concerned with affecting fundamental change in state behavior, but it says little about how it comes about. Critical theorists do occasionally point to particular causes of ‘change, but when they do, they make arguments that are inconsistent with the theory itself. Finally, there is little empirical evidence to support the claims of critical theorists, and much to contradict them. -Critical theory alone cannot succeed- need realism to further emancipation from oppressive structures ‘Wendt, ass International professor of political science, University of Chicago ,2001 (Alexander, “What is, lations For? Notes Toward a Posteritcal View,” Critical Theory and World Poliies, ed. By Richard Wyn Jones, p. 221) pite its praxeo cont d for lack stems ‘fom tbe fp side of ove of ts aan Seats to social slenee, namely, ts ener impulse. tial GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K 20 AT ~ Realism Bad "REALISM IS INEVITABLE es eee John D. Steinbruner, Fellow at Brookings Institution, Principles of Global Security, 2000, p. 3 (MHHAR2819) On broad questions of this sort, assigning the burden of proof is nearly always decisive as far as prevailing opinion is concemed. Those who are made to carry it generally lose the argument. In this instance it clearly would be extremely difficult to overturn the entrenched presumptions ofthe realist school whose origin can be traced, ifnot literally to all of human history, then certainly to prominent faved Coie task as far as there is documented testimony. From the earliest records of human societies, warfare has been Gollan organizing focus mda rites sous cheoiter ee ‘The binding power of common threat and the closely associated impulse to control territory have fi F to do with the rise of states, the justification of their govemments, the genesis of armies, the development of technology, the evolution of manufacturing capability, and formation of the human attitudes that have accompanied all of these. Countless battles have been fought in theensiyol cologizieg da paas’ Eaccneie of millions of individual lives have been expended. The experience has created a legacy of military confrontation that many people consider immutable, as the senator's question implied. ‘Since preparations for war and the occasional conduct of it have been central preoccupations for virtually all the major states throughout their existence, it is widely assumed that the pattern is rooted in human nature and that it will endure indefinitely. ‘THE DISCURSIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR REALISM WONT NECESSARILY BE BETTER John Mearshimer, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1995, p.92. (MHSOLT0987) Wendt's failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if itis possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, "then itis irresponsible to pursue policies that Perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generations." The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations, However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt's argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the Tuture, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism, He has no ‘Way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to ‘come to power in Russia, but he cannot be sure we will not get a Zhirinovsky instead. So Se GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Blio Descuritization snot an option both are awed. Aradau, Claudia. "Beyond Good and Evik Ethics and Securitization Desecurtzation Techniques” bnp:/venvs.ci.uw-edu pV ~rubikow/forumvelauia2.htm December 01, dnt chica concems have always accompanied securitization, they have een largely absent fom the analysis of Secourtication, Desecuitizaton as unmaking of security’ has been considered a panacea for the exclusionary violence-prone society of security, Placed in a binary relation with securitiza sec igues can have disquieting consequences and will argue that sthico-political concems should have preval curitization and desecurtization or, Michael Dillon, that the story of security should always be an ethical one - _{5] This paper will therefore subject both seeuegition and desecuritization to ethical interrogations, and to this end it will proceed in three stages. Fst will Gontider securitization and the war logic of security, and scratiize the social and political consequences of he wer on crue. Second wll focus ona technique of desecurtization, that of managing the drug risk [6 and eruelly point Out the uneasy consequences it entails. Thirdly, 1 will point out the similarities between the two types Of ehical Souremuenees and propose a Foucauldan ethical’ approach to problematize security storie, be they in a securtzing eratetic essentialism is necessary for the emancipatory potential of postmodern and postcolonial criticism, reach Lecturer in intemational relations at La Tobe University, Australia, 1999 (Albert, Navgaing Neoderniy:Postcolonilism Ident, and International Relations, ed. By Anthony Elliot and Antony Moran, p. 101-2) trate id necessas the basis. Fo modern er ate f.this mov eoples int notion of political sublestivity, It is in this context that Ahmad has noted how "politics 2s seok wee paearGone remarkable degrees of diminution.” Further, “ny attempt to know the world asa whole otto hold that it is open to rational comprehension, let alone the desire to change it, [is] dismissed ne Gauemplble atempt to construct ‘grand narratives’ and ‘totalizing’ (totalitarian?) Knowledge,'4l Th this ahs se erusial question for Krishna is not, therefore, the postmodem impossibility of eubjertivity, bun iti Y otentialY of various subject posi qe GDI 2005 Security K Pris Realism Bad Borden/Maurer/Reddv 4+ LIBERALISM AND REALISM ARE COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES Toscph Nye, Professor of Intemational Security, Harvard University, BOUND TO LEAD, 1990, p.178. (MHSOLT0467) The appropriate response to the changes occurring in world politics today is not to (estg epronene her Tee ee “power, but to realize its limitations and to supplement it with insights from the liberal” == REALISM AND LIBERALISM CAN BE RECONCILED David Baldwin, Professor of World Order Studies, Columbia University, NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM, 1993, p.24. (MHSOLT0466) Looking back on the post-World War II debate between realism and idealism, Inis L. (Claude (1981:198, 200) challenged the "notion of the essential opposition of realism an idealism" and suggested that they "are more propefly regarded as complementary rath ‘than competitive approaches to intemational affairs." John Herz (1981:202) agreed wit Claude and described his own position as "realist liberalism.” Joseph Nye (1988:238, 25q) has echoed ine view thatthe wn approaches are complementary and expressed the hope that "the 1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic 1970s and _ 1980s." The essays in this volume are a step toward such a synthesis. aS GDI 2005 Security K Borden/Maurer/Reddy (t. Realisn Bad S -Security is essential to humyn autonomy Devetak, Lecturer in International Relat ‘ Thsories of insernatiomal Relat, p.1GES) nH I Richa, “Cac Theory,” ‘Security, which Booth defines. : -Realism needed for 3 reasons Harrod, Sr, Research Fellow atthe Research Centre for Intemational Political Economy, University of ‘Amsterdam, 2001(Jeffrey, “Global Realism: Unmasking the Power in the Intemational Political Economy,” Criffeal Theory and World Politics, ed. By Richard Wy Jones, p. 122) Realism can recognize different actors in IR and help explain behavior Harrod, Sr. Research Fellow at the Research Centre for International Political Economy, University of ‘Amsterdam, 2001(leffrey, “Global Realism: Unmasking the Power in the International Political Economy,” Critical Theory and World Politics, ed. By Richard Wyn Jones, p. 125) ‘The global outcomes of the use.of power ére measurable and ‘concrete as, for example, the universal tendency ‘of redistribution of income toward the higher-income groups, the universal degradation ofthe envionment, and increased incidences of new maladies The Complexity of power sources and mechanisms atthe global level is such that an application of 2 real or Societal realism would now have to be based on false analogies, asin the case of IR realism. What is G o evel and that approache ion ally, Such 2 global realism may well confinn Morgenthau's aphorism of half « century ago that “the revolt against power. - is 45 universal asthe aspiration for power itseie* GDI 2005 Seeurity K Borden/Maurer/Reddy AT. Realism Bad ue TO OVERTHROW REALISM, A BETTER ALTERNATIVE IS NEEDED Robert Myers, President, Camegie Commission on Ethics and International A fairs, ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Volume 11, 1997, p.258. (MHSOLT1039) Debate over the validity of looking at the world through the realist telescope continues _Unabated. In my view, however, the realist core holds up remarkably well. As Ethan “Kapstein says, "In order to overtum a theory, one needs a new theory that does a better. job of explaining both the old observations and the new observations. Part and parcel of the falsification process is alternative theory development.” Be, || couse BordenMarerRey A ie : 3 Sew ty I Perins -Modernity opens up space for action and reflection Paolini, Lecturer in international relations at La Trobe University, Australie, 1999 (Albert, Navigating ‘Modernity: Postcolomialism, Identity, and International Relations, ed. By Anthony Ell Moran, p. 15) fons, ed. By Anthony Elliot and Anthony For this notion of intersubjectivity to have direct relevance for Aftica, it must inc e direct relev rica, it must incorporate the folowing evo elements: an nseptance that demi, ina constant tussle withthe premoder, pundit and exond key insights of postcolonial and globalization dacouss he (onmerinallawing fox suet actively navigate ambivalence (and here I seek to move beyond the dead ends of Lacanian thought); the latter in anchoring notions of space and globality m everyday practices and localities and thus exploriig spece and place as a meeting ground. These elements frame the intersubjective process in A\fica (end the ‘hisd World and provide the conditions for its expression, -Modernity offers a theatre for resistance to globalization and imperialism and engagement with the “other” Paolini, Lecturer in international relations at La Trobe University, Australia, 1999 (Albert... Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations, ed. By Anthony Elliot and Anthony Moran, p. 9-10) inthis respect, modernity js an intersubjective proeess. On the one hand, ‘subjects (in groups, societies, com ‘rounities, inert ih eachother mote and ose under [ts mademit in the new Ts ont i evident in the sruggle over the body of 5. M. earlicr inthis chapter, and indeed inthe werious episodes of Afticas navigation of modemity that I explore in Chapter 8, -Resistance is disarmed and absorbed into the system- this refashioning of resistance takes away its ability to be mutually exclusive and means you vote for forms of resistance like the plan that operates on the same cultural space as the system of domination Paolini, Lecturer in international relations at La Trobe University, Australia, 1999 (Albert, Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations, ed. By Anthony Flliot and Anthony Moran, p. 72-73) thedow’ of the pusimder, «preseoce that has romped a sigan sift in the potolonlal approach. ‘Theres a certain neatness in the dichotomy between resistance and domination in the writing explored thus * feted cease ner conten oem moderty, a tara of bata ihe poste cllgste FO binarism and the greater reflexivity and contingency of late ee me oan vies Retina, 2S Security K 22, Seumrzaron ® Perme ~Our advocacy is emanicipataory in the short term and allows Jong term transformation- some problems demand solutions using existing structures of the international order Wendt, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago ,2001(Alexander, “What is {International Relations For? Notes Toward a Postcritical View," Critical Theory and World Politics, ed, By Richard Wyn Jones, p, 206) ‘There is much to recommend this framing of the positivist-critical debate, but the distinction between, is 20 te ‘are ultimately about the world a better place. Few positivists in {R are committed to reproducing the existing intemational order for its own sake. A vocal minorty-cealsts have a principled belief that itis impossible to transform the character of anarchic systems and that trying to do so can therefore be dangerous. But a majority-inaffding both liberal cosmopolitans and rational choice institationalists-are committed to reform of the international system. To be sure, reform implies oreservation of at least some features of the status quo and to that extent + GDI 2005 Seeurty K Borden/Maurer/Reddy 313 Secures2ation © Parmne -Perm- either/or propositions cannot form the praxis necessary to solve problems Ashley and Walker, Professors of political science at Arizona State and University of Victoria, 1990 (Richard K, R.B.1, “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies," From international Studies Quarterly 34 (1990): pp. 367-416, Reprinted in International Relations: Critical Concepts, 2000, ed. Andrew Lniklater,vol.1,p. 164) It is not-difficult to understand why scholars who know themselves to be at one with a discipline so challenged do not rush to embrace a promise of freedom issued in this fashion, Given what would sem to bbe @ proffered choice between getting on with their work as they know it and embracing a promise of freedom that rings hollow, the choice is easy: get on with the work, To be sure, there is always the risk chat the disciplinary resources recurred to - the assumptions and commitments invoked - can no longer go without saying. Time and effort will now have to be expended defending these resources. What is worse, the defenses now will scem embacrassingly arbitrary and thin, often reducible to mawkish confessions of personal belief or commitment. And in the face of this persistent embarrassment, scholars will remember ‘the dissident performers of this relay function in a negative way, as thieves of the night who have stolen that most precious of things: the possibility of innocent faith. Yet the struggle to test limitations and open ‘up possibilities for new ways of seeing and doing must go on, a discipline’ scholars might say. There ate real and pressing dangers that need to be addressed, and in answer to these it does precious little good simply to tum loose of time-honored commitments, embrace the abstract promise, and say, "We are fee.” By and large, dissident scholars would agree with such complaints. Whatever one's intentions might be, it is strategically, practically, and ethically wrong to engage in practices that leave the work of thought andl the struggle for freedom in such a bind. Boundaries and dichotomous choices are imposed and refed, and unnecessarily so. Resources that might be put to work in the testing of limitations are unnecessarily diminished rather than expanded and again unnecessarily so, As Jim George and David Campbell note in their article, strategems of discourse asserting that one must proceed "by recourse to either one option o another” might have a "seductive appeal," but they cannot equip us “to deal with the enormous issues of ‘praxis that we confront in global life.” \oo Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K V 2 neva le \ x “Critical and postmodern theory will fail for 3 reasons: 1. It’s failure to engage the state, 2. Lack of understanding of our current situation, 3. Rejection of instrumental rationality ‘Wendt, associate professor of political science, University of Chicago ,2001(Alexender, “What is International Relations Far? Notes Toxagre.a Postrtical View,” Critical Theory and World Politics, ed. By Richard Wyn Jones, p, 221) _ First, exit sweak makes is Democratizing the world system by strengthening civil society is important, but global civil society will never be a primary agency of intemational steering and thus does not solve the problem of who's dri the ring. Oppositional politics make for fewer messy compromises, but tem reform is in effect saying that we're em that would red knowledge problem in In part this attitude reflects a healthy skepticism toward the narrow criteria positivists use to define rigorous and systematic (Walker 1989). However, it may also reflect « deeper, epistemological suxiety about making any claims about how the worid realy works, since truth can be a form of domination, Either way, the result is that critical IR na ‘ -Lack of an alternative. ensures no action will be taken Keyman, assistant professor of intsmationfif Yéations, Bilkent University, 1997 (B. Fuat, Globalization = State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Crittal Social Theory of International Relations, p. 142) = = d = ns. The f what co This question has been raised in different forms, from dismissing dissident thought to problematizing the ability of dissident thought to “contribute 10 Seneral perspective that might support reconstitution of aspects of international life." The latter form is Porsuasively stated by William Connolly in his eritique of Richard Ashley's self-estricton.137 According to Connolly, such zt mn wert e n_obligation to defer infinitely the construct e ‘elites.’ He concludes that itis perplexing that Ashley promotes this theoretical ‘when the greatest dangers and contingencies are global in character." LO} GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Zr —Goneral © brews -Promoting theories for the sake of emancipation will fail- it only focuses on the ends and not the development of a theory to get us there ‘Holst distinguished Professor of fnternational Relations, University of British Columbia, 2001 (Kevin ening the Road of International Theory," nernational Relations Sill an American Social Science, 89.90) 4." Emancipation": This tem oth is i with an ‘telnt connection berween the realm of ideas and action. This theme reflects the continuation ofa long intellectual tradition, going back to Marx and beyond, at it lice, a la Marx, ace inseparable, although frequently in ins typeof analysis the demands for change take precedence over scholarly rigor. Nevertheless, many ‘ezent statements by international theorist are making the case for emancipation asthe predominant function of the field (cf, Hazel Smith, 1996). But, as is is s i regarded by -Critical IR theory Collapses back into traditional theory and cannot serve as an emanicipatory project Rutger Professor of intemational elatons at St. Andrew, 2001 (NJ. “Negative Dialectic? The Two Jone ion tl Theory in Word Politis," Criteal Theory and World Poits, ed. By Richard Woe Jones, p. 102-3) is his danger, then thet critical IR theory might be said to be curently courting and, at leat to some ceancipa el is to perform the tak it has st itself. fa the frst place, itis eral theory ce oa ‘emancipatory project that requires, as Linklater suggests, ios" and thus runs mee nee © previously. Wis therefore the notion of emancinaon inthis context thatsteientn Dobler rther than the project oferta theory per se, Its noteworthy, however, that manent not one of Adomo's major.concerns. Iéis precisely this, of course, that has irvtated so many emancipatory ‘entical theorists (Bronner 1994: 199-200), However, 2 Sercloved by Habermas. As such, these would be vulneable, I think, tothe charges levclad a na project by Bemstein and others. The point here is to suggest that i i result, could not off iment of Only if Habermas's reconstruction-and that mote recent followers--an escape the Adomoesque critique will emancipation in this sense be a plausible trajectory for critical theory. GDI 2008 eae ee Seouty 14 enera\ were -Focusing on textuality fails to challenge domination ‘Keyman, assistant professor of intemnational relations, Bilkent University, 1997 (E. Fuat, Globalization, ‘Sate, Identiy/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations, p. 140) 1t can be concluded that by attempting to problematize modem society, dissident thought constructs a Postmodern altemative which involves, (i) the rejection of such modernist concepts as totality, universality, the autonomous character of epistemology, the ralionally acting subject; ii) the promotion of such concepts as the discursive and textual construction of reality, meaning, identity, historicity, and the Power/knowledge relationship; and (ii) the privileging of ertical social movements as the new agents of social change, However, in cach of tha three respects, dissident thought presents several dificutiThe first concems the unquestioned acceptance of poststructuralism. Following Foucault ond Derrida, dissident thought suggests that if reality is not given, or objective (but refering instead to a discursively and historically constructed system), then international relations does not kave an ontological existence apart. fiom its discursive construction. To the extent that it points out the importance of historicity of reality, such 8 suggestion helps problematize the concept of society. However, what diss in fact, is to i itv. Drawing on Derrda’s proposition that everything is textual and there is nothing outside the text -Practice is key to fostering social change- theory alone cannot solve ‘Wyn Jones, lecturer in the Department of Intemational Politics a the University of Wales, 1999 (Richard, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 168) 7 fi Criticat theorists cannot hope to emulate those Australian aboriginal people so memorably portrayed by Bruce ‘Songli during their "dream-time," sang their world into existence. erdeMaarerte coiams ny oe -Critical theory Strategies collapse back into the same instrumental rationality that they serve to kritik <4 “Nogative Dialectic? The Two Politics, ed. By Richard Wyn, Emancipatory theory in international relations stands outside this mainstream of contemporary IR scholarship, however, E1 ‘seek their anchorage in that proud and ‘much broader tradition that encompasses Kant and ‘Hegel, Marx and Max ‘Weber, Emile Durkheim and Freud, ‘They know there is light outside the cave-the light of real historical Processes-and they seek to fet it in so that the cave can be shake ene flight Doing that, they believe, would transform the cave, for it weatt me observablaby att who ate ose it for what itty: the completion ofthe Enlightenment prjen. indeed, their challenge is precisely that itis the comuption of the Ea lightenment proiect by the growing eminence of instrumental rationality that has made JR thenr-indindoot eos aspects of contemporary social science, especially the “queen of the social sciences,” ‘sconomics the tool of the powerful rather than i i n However, Adomo’s problem casts a dark shadow on this For Adomo, the danger is that Marxism in its traditional mode snd) oe Bernstein suggests, theory in its Habermasian mode run es ique on theic distrust of it. This claim i, T thinle, true, but it misses T want to draw on a distinction taken from the De Cemteau distinguishes between strategy and tactics in 8 very particular way. For de Certe is the caleulus of force relationships which becomes 8 whi Possible when a subject of will and plage te 8 i 8 scientific investigation) eantbe ievane {fom an environment. A f Sxterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, ... targets or objects of au, strategy ower (a proprietor, In other words, he understands th (r (although there ae differences, t which? Security K iy Ais Post Modevnism -Postmodern deconstruction of international relations cannot solve and sets back many struggles against domination assistant professor of international relations, Bilkent University, 1997 (E. Fuat, Globalization, lentiny/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations, . 170-1) ‘However, posmodemism faces a crucial dilemma because it constitues a knowledge embedded in Western ‘modernity to whieh it aims to radically oppose, In other words, ‘providing a radical eritique of what Derrida calls " i ‘in which "the white man takes his own mythology, IndoEuropean mythology, his own logas, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universel form ofthat he must still wish to call Reason," this ritique is, extentaly diected at displaying the Eusecentric character of Western modemity and its culturally essentialist operation.38 In this sense, i i ‘ofthe Other, Two points are worth emphasizing. First, as Kumkum Sangari has pointed out Emphasis on text prevents solving power-domination relations Keyman, assistant professor of intemational relations, Bilkent University, 1997 (E. Fuat, Globalization, Sate, dentity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations, p. 173) ly constructed, then attention is to be that were at work in the process of its construction, ‘economic, polit GDI 2005 Borden/Maurer/Reddy Security K Vic AT: Sard -Postcolonial resistance will fail ‘Paolini, Lectures in international relations at La Trobe University, Australia, 1999 (Albert, Navigating Modernity: Pastcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations, ed. By Anthony Elliot and Anthony Moran, p. 84-5) -Said’s criticism Is totalizing and ignores alternative forms of resistance to colonialist discourse ‘Keyman, assistant professor of intemational relations, Bilkent University, 1997 (E. Fust, Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations, p. 185) s: Said offers a totalizing vision of but possibility of - ‘esisiance 1 onentalist discourse, Thus, orientlist discourse appears to be monolithic, undifferentiated, and uncontested. Contrary to Said, Bhabha argues that {uc 1 Other i