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LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO SUSTAIN A SUCCESSFUL CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN KENYA False

imprisonment: the legal threshold In order to sustain an action based on false imprisonment, the set of facts allegedly constituting the imprisonment must meet some predetermined legal threshold. False imprisonment can be understood as the unlawful imposition of constraint on anothers freedom of movement from a particular place.1 J. Murphy states that the tort is established on proof of: (1) the fact of imprisonment; and (2) the absence of lawful authority to justify that imprisonment.2 He adds that for these purposes, imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for any time, however short, without lawful cause. The gist of the action of false imprisonment is the mere imprisonment; the plaintiff need not prove that the imprisonment was unlawful, as such, or malicious, but establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned by the defendant; the onus then lies on the defendant of proving a justification.3 To sustain an action of false imprisonment, therefore, the plaintiff ought to prove the fact of imprisonment and the absence of lawful authority to justify the imprisonment. However, the onus of proving the second limb, as noted above, is not so much the Plaintiffs duty as it is upon the defendant to prove a justification if the Plaintiff is able to prove the fact of imprisonment. Malicious prosecution: the legal threshold In an action for malicious prosecution, the claimant must show first, that he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against him by the defendant on a criminal charge; secondly, that the prosecution was terminated in his favour; thirdly, that it was without reasonable and probable cause; fourthly, that it was malicious.4 Kenyan courts have adopted the position above, with Cotran, J. setting out the creteria in resolving issues relating to malicious prosecution as follows, in the case of Murunga v Attorney General:(i) the plaintiff must show that prosecution was instituted by the defendant or by
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Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 W LR 1172 at 1178 J. Murphy, False Imprisonment, in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, Sweet & Maxwell, 20 th Edition, at 999 Halsburys Laws of England, Volume 38, 3 rd Edition, at 765. J Steele, Malicious Prosecution, in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, at 1070 to 1071.

(ii) (iii) (iv)

someone for whose acts he is responsible; that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiffs favour; that the prosecution was instituted without reasonable and probable cause; that the prosecution was actuated by malice.

With regard to what constitutes reasonable and probable cause (to justify prosecution), the test was laid down by Rudd, J. in Kagane and Others v The Attorney General & Another [1969] E.A. 643 (at 646) and informed by the decision of Hawkins, J. in Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167 (at 171) thus: Reasonable and probable cause is an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of a state of circumstances, which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead an ordinary prudent and cautious man placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. Justice Rudd thus remarked (at 647): Consequently the subjective test should only be applied where there is some evidence directly tending to show that the prosecutor did not believe the truth of his case. Such evidence could be afforded by words or letters or conduct on the part of the prosecutor which tended to show that he did not believe in his case, as for example a failure or reluctance to bring it to trial, a statement that he did not believe in it and, I think possibly, an unexplained failure to call an essential witness who provided a basic part of the information upon which the prosecution was based. The High Court was guided by the above cases in finding for the plaintiffs in a claim for damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in the case of Thomas Mboya Oluoch & Another v Lucy Muthoni Stephen & Another [2005] eKLR. In that suit, the plaintiffs, who had earlier been charged with assault, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment managed to successfully appeal against their conviction and sentence but not before serving 28 days of the imprisonment. The assault charges had been brought pursuant to a report made by the first defendant and the conviction and sentence followed. The High Court found both the first defendant and the second defendant (the Attorney General) liable for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Prosecution in the sense of the tort of malicious prosecution is defined as setting the law in motion. And the law is only set in motion by an appeal to some person clothed with judicial authority in regard to the matter in question, and to be liable for malicious prosecution a person

must at least be actively instrumental in so setting the law in motion.5 It is imperative to note that the Plaintiff needs to provide sufficient evidence to warrant grant of general and special damages, if at all. In the case of Douglas Odhiambo Apel & Another v Telkom Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2006] eKLR, the plaintiffs sued Telkom Kenya Ltd, the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. On the complaint of Telkom Kenya, the plaintiffs had been arrested by the police and charged. The plaintiffs were finally acquitted and discharged, hence the suit. Although the plaintiffs succeeded, the court held that they had not provided evidence to support general and special damages, and they were each awarded nominal damages of Kshs 100. In the case of Thomas Mboya Oluoch & Another v Lucy Muthoni Stephen & Another (Supra), failure by the police to conduct further investigations into a report made to them before proceeding to prosecute was one of the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff to prove malicious prosecution. The test for (and definition of) reasonable and probable cause in Hicks v Faulkner (supra) requires an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead an ordinary prudent and cautious man placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that the person charged was guilty of the crime imputed on the part of the prosecutor (that is, the person who sets the law in motion against the accused).

Author: James Tugee Date: 18th August, 2012.

Ibid, at 1072