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FC 48 Study Guide

FC 48 Study Guide

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  • The Confucian Pattern
  • The Political Tradition
  • Plenum in Jan 1961
  • 1949-1958 Mutual Reinforcement
  • 1959-1965 Legal-Rational and Traditional Ambivalence
  • 1966-1971 Legality Shattered, Charisma Triumphant
  • 1972-1976 Traditional Resistance to the Leader
  • Chapter 1: The First Salvos (p14-31)
  • Chapter 2: The Siege of Beijing (p32-51)
  • Liu Shaoqi
  • 7. To Protect and Preserve
  • Short Summary
  • 8. Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution
  • Potential IDs
  • Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three Provinces
  • Not a Dinner Party

13/03/2009 06:41:00

FOREIGN CULTURES 48: The Cultural Revolution Midterm Study Guide

“Overview of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76” (Lieberthal: Governing China, pp. 84-112) The Maoist Era Mao was the source of ultimate wisdom; policy making was an example of the “bandwagon effect,” where other officials would try to sense in which direction Mao was leaning and then jump on the Maoist bandwagon Mao had and especially strong impact concerning three issue areas: o Relations with the U.S. and Soviet Union o o Policies to promote the revolution in China Agricultural policy

Mao felt least comfortable with urban economics 1949-56: Economic and political recovery and basic socialist transformation o Four broad policies of the early years:     o 1) Cement terms of relationship with USSR 2) Establish governing apparatus to rule urban China and unite the country 3) Restore urban economy 4) Consolidate control over countryside while instituting land reform on a nationwide basis Mid-1950: CCP instituted series of mass political campaigns:  (1950-52) Land Reform Campaign: CCP sent land-reform teams to redistribute land from the landlords to the peasants; they also categorized peasants into different classes • •  Very violent; at least 800,000 landlords killed CCP able to establish communist power structure in the countryside

Wielding Power

(1951) Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign: targeted civil-servant holdovers from KMT regime and urban secret societies • Did not involve mass mobilization Three Anti Campaign: targeted waste, corruption, and bureaucratism among basic-level urban cadres

(1951-52) Three Anti Five Anti Campaigns: against corruption •

Five Anti Campaign: targeted corruption, tax evasion, stealing state property, cheating on state contracts, and stealing state economic secrets among urban businessmen

• 

Campaigns involved mass mobilization, study groups, thought reform

(1951-52) Thought Reform of Intellectuals Campaign: encouraged university student to criticize their teachers and advocate the Soviet system over the American/European models • Campaign involved mass mobilization, thought reform


Socialist transformation of the economy   (1953-1957) First Five-Year Plan: involved funneling resources into investment in almost 150 Soviet-assisted new enterprises (1955-56) Agricultural cooperativization • At the same time, the Socialist Transformation of Industry and Commerce campaign allowed urban capitalists to sell their enterprises to the state


1956-57: Contradictions and Rethinking of the Soviet Model o Four tensions that led to the Great Leap Forward   1) Mao’s role in the system: Mao felt that he could not exit from the bureaucratic routine (“retreat to the second line”) without risking loss of control and power 2) Soviet-style economic development favored top-down control as well as inequalities in income and power; Soviet system sought to exploit the countryside to serve the urban population   3) China’s need to mobilize domestic capital formation 4) Tension between peasant cadres and urban intellectuals: intellectuals regarded peasant cadres as uncivilized, peasants regarded intellectuals as elitist and “bourgeois” o 1956: Soviet de-Stalinization initiative made Mao rethink Khrushchev’s policies and qualifications  Mao began to modify the Soviet model to made it more applicable to his own priorities: “On the Ten Major Relationships” o (1957) Hundred Flowers Movement: Mao encouraged intellectuals to speak their minds and point out the errors of party officials, but the outpouring of criticism drove Mao to end the campaign o  Antirightist Campaign: initially targeted dissenters from Hundred Flowers campaign but ended up indiscriminately labeling many individuals “rightists”  Important results of Antirightist Campaign: • 1) No one dared to criticize the shift toward radical political and

economic policies • 2) Many intellectuals lost (professors, engineers, economists, scientists), which would make a highly centralized, government-administered approach to economic development difficult 1958-61: The Great Leap Forward o Idea that China could leap over the normal stages of economic development, based on the notion that the organized masses could transform their labor into capital o o Great Leap approach expanded role of CCP at the expense of the government, greatly decentralized policy implementation Key slogan: “Strive to go all out to achieve more, faster, better, and more economical results”  o In reality, “better” and “more economical” were sacrificed for “more” and “faster” Aug 1958: Mao called for the establishment of “people’s communes,” large, centralized organizations in the countryside meant to facilitate meshing the government administration with economic production o In terms of the PLA, Great Leap favored some of its previous guerrilla-war traditions  o Military was made more egalitarian, more involved in domestic economic construction and in developing extensive militia organizations  Great gains in production (i.e. steel output)   Partly due to many key Soviet-aided plants that came on line in 1958, good weather Many problems arose: • Disorganization: too many people removed from the fields to permit successful harvest, steel produced in backyard smelters was of very poor quality, transportation system clogged • • o Problems of administration and morale in the people’s communes Officials inflated production figures

(1959) Lushan Plenum: Peng Dehuai criticized the excesses of the Great Leap  Mao criticized and purged Peng and colleagues  Consequences: • • • Future policy debate discouraged Peng Dehuai replaced with Lin Biao Radicalism surged anew during 1959-60


Famine in the countryside  Low agricultural production, but leaders still demanded for food for the cities

 o o -

Roughly 30 million people starved to death

Chinese economy sunk into depression 1960: Soviets withdrew aid

1962-65: Recovery and Growing Elite Divisions o 1961-62: 20 million citydwellers forced back to the countryside via rationing of urban food and consumer goods o o Urban unit system led to a two-tier system of privileged urban society and exploited rural society Mao feared economic rehabilitation policies would steer China away from revolution  continued mobilization to attack internal political enemies  Mao feared China would follow the Soviets (no longer appeared socialist under Khrushchev)

Increasingly relied on PLA, headed by Lin Biao Fairbank, The United States and China, pp. 53-70, 106-7, 110-123 The Confucian Pattern 1) Most successful of all systems of conservatism a) Was the main orthodoxy of for 2000 years b) Did go through reforms, decline and revival, and innovation during this time 2) Confucian aristocracy a) “government by the best” b) Chinese philosophers adopted meritocracy during the Warring States Period c) Men are perfectible through education 3) Government by Moral Prestige a) Mandate of Heaven dates by the Zhou period (ca 1027-770) and emphasized that good conduct or virtue gave the ruler ethical sanction to rule b) “right of rebellion” stems out of the idea that Heaven can withdraw its Mandate i.e. any successful rebellion is justified c) “proper behavior according to status”- code of conduct initially only applied to scholar-officials; the common people were to be controlled by rewards and punishments d) Confucian ideals stem from relationship of Chinese man to nature i.e. fengshui i) Human conduct is reflected in acts of nature ii) Man must harmonize with unseen forces to avoid calamity iii) Ruler thought to intervene between mankind and the forces of nature; maintained universal harmony through right conduct i.e. “government by goodness”

4) Early Achievement sin Bureaucratic Administration a) Han Dynasty formalized the bureaucratic system i) Chief ministers administrate on behalf of the Emperor’s authority ii) Emperor exercised power of appointment iii) Developed system of inspection where officials checked on each other independently b) Central problem: selecting & controlling bureaucrats i) Gained strength from Legalist methods ii) Civil service exams established and later reinforced under Tang Dynasty 5) Classical Orthodoxy a) Classics mentioned during Han Dynasty: Book of Changes, Book of History, Odes, Book of Ceremonies and Proper Conduct, Spring and Autumn Annals b) Book of Mencius elevated to a classic under Tang Dynasty c) Classics depict paternal government as key to social order

d) Religious side: official rites, temples, pantheon of sages, etc state cult e) During decline of Han, almost eclipsed by Buddhism revived under Tang
f) Foreign aggression during the Song Dynasty strengthened ethnocentricity which has remained a chief characteristic. 6) Neo-Confucianism began during the Song Dynasty

a) More systematic and more complete more metaphysical content
b) Absorption of idealistic elements mainly from Buddhism to fill spiritual vacuum

c) Greatest Neo-Confucian synthesizers is12th century philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200); i) Absolute first principle is the Supreme Ultimate; li, the laws or principles of form, is a
manifestation of the Supreme Ultimate

ii) Evil: obscuring of the li and qi (physical matter). No active principle of evil.
iii) Highest Confucian virtue “complete sincerity” iv) Believed in original goodness of man 7) Chinese Militarism a) Man of violence looked down i) Every dynasty is established by the sword, but after conquest is over, civil rule is more esteemed ii) Problem of force in China essentially a police problem (1) Difficult to reconcile police institutions with type of warfare needed to defend borders b) Military always just part of the bureaucracy while orthodoxy was the primary means for preserving order c) Violence is last resort i) Sun Zi stated: “The acme of skill in warfare is to subdue the enemy, without fighting.”

” b) Law not regarded as an external and categorical element in society i.e. etc e) Imperial civil service has nine ranks. then prefectures. at the top of administration d) 18 provinces divided into circuits. war. 1 Chinese) iii) Censorate entrusted with duty to inform the Emperor of all matters in his kingdom i. each with higher/lower grade i) Emperor appoints all officers down to county magistrate ii) Circulation: few officials left at one post for more than 3 years f) Principle to set one official to check upon another i) Each province has a governor and every two provinces has a governor-general ii) Under Qing Dynasty. punishments.The Political Tradition Imperial system survived until 1912 1) Bureaucracy a) Administration divided among Six Ministries of civil office (revenue. all businesses in China were family businesses . ceremonies.e. the Grand Council. no “high law” through divine revelation. Ministries have 2 presidents (1 Manchu. law is a means to sustain moral order c) Confucius said that legal rules came from the moral character of nature itself Law is subordinate to morality & law is an inferior substitute for morality d) Chinese imperial code was chiefly penal i) Law pertained only to public affairs and occupied small share of public scene ii) One major aim of the legal system was to preserve the Confucian social hierarchy e) Private law remained underdeveloped in this legal system appealed to old custom for resolution of private conflicts i) Partially due to non-development of private business. the Emperor’s eyes g) Safety in conformity tended to kill initiative at the bottom and efficiency of one man at the top was impaired by a bottleneck h) Bureaucracy relatively small: relied on gentry class to lead the peasantry i) Low salaries corruption 2) Law a) Rewards and punishments useful to enforce order. and public works) + military + Censorate + minor offices b) Ming Dynasty created the Grand Secretariat (body of high officials to assist Emperor) c) Manchu’s added a less formal body. but object was to “punish only to be able to stop punishing.

developed techniques of governance. and then take control •   CCP benefited from identification with GMD.3) “The Victory of the Chinese Communist Party. methods for developing peasant political involvement. emphasizing antiimperialism Tensions between CCP and GMD resulted in GMD forces slaughtering communists in Shanghai and Wuhan (1927) • CCP members who emphasize urban revolution (rather than rural) were mainly the ones killed  those left were more inclined toward peasant mobilization o Adapting to the countryside (1929-34)   Mao Zedong and Zhu De established the Jiangxi Soviet in Ruijin Mao and colleagues experimented with land reform. which was recognized as a force for Chinese nationalism CCP focused on political organization in urban areas. 1917-49” (Lieberthal: Governing China. 39-56) Six basic strategies for the CCP’s path to power o Labor mobilization (1921-23)   CCP formed a labor secretariat to organize trade union activity Problem: China’s small proletariat (less than 1% of population) could not stand up to warlords •  o  i. February Massacre  Comintern advised CCP to ally with GMD Communists sought to gain access to a broader spectrum of the populace. means of recruiting and training a revolutionary army o Strategic retreat: the Long March (1934-35)  Two main legacies: • 1) Mao Zedong achieved primacy within in the CCP at the Zunyi meeting in 1935 o Mao fought to consolidate his victory over Wang Ming for the next seven years • o 2) The march became the basis for a heroic myth that bolstered CCP unity and prestige The Yan’an Era (1935-47)  CCP greatly expanded its base. pp.e. enhanced United Front with the GMD (1924-27) . help the GMD to power.

developing and maintaining close ties with local population. whom they hoped to win over Legacies of the CCP’s path to power o Discontent within Chinese society made it very “mobilizable” o o o o o o o CCP typically failed to translate popular support into sustainable political power. preference for officials who could provide general leadership. attacks on intellectuals) Peasant-based military path to power  deeply intertwined party and army CCP developed mindset that the proper combination of will and strategy could overcome any difficulties CCP grew cautious of Soviet advice . special case groups to elicit confessions from alleged enemies Fighting a civil war (1947-49)    CCP strategy: surround major cities and cut them off (guerrilla.e. torture. mass political campaigns. importance of ideology in keeping cadres loyal to leaders. the GMD essentially helped take itself down Long March and Yan’an Period helped shape subsequent CCP policies and views Mao attained unchallengeable stature in the CCP Overwhelmingly rural party membership was reflected in CCP’s subsequent policies (i. rural-based strategy) Huai-Hai campaign (1949): huge communist victory GMD fell more quickly than expected • 1948: Communists shifted their war strategy and political line to appeal more to capitalists and intellectuals. ostracism. and reintegration The “Yan’an complex”: CCP emphasized decentralized rule. decentralization.its political prestige   Consolidation of Mao’s power from 1942 to 1944  1945: Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought adopted as guiding ideology of CCP 1942-1944 “thought-reform campaign” to eliminate any remnant influence of Soviet-oriented communists •  Implemented echniques of “washing the brain” through pressure. egalitarianism and simple living among officials  o Rectification campaign led by Kang Sheng: used false accusations.

← ← success • • • Only one major purge affected the top elite—Gao Gang and Rao Shushi Ruling elite was stable—few power shifts occurred. which in turn helped solidarity Success also tended to smooth over long-term inconsistencies in policies The unity and cohesion of CCP leadership played an instrumental role in the regime’s early . the CCP established a strong centralized state. Since spoils were shared. took major steps toward industrialization. and broad consensus that China should industrialize and transform socially. Roots of unity • Victory in 1949 o Culmination of long struggle.← ← ← MacFarquhar (2nd ed. The Politics of China. pp. and success led to most CCP civilian and military members getting positions. and implemented Marxist social principles in a relatively smooth fashion. • Shared ideology and common goals o Ideological commitment to Marxism. achieved a good rate of economic growth. which made acquiescence to Party programs easier. Strong elite was necessary for real debate—policies could be discussed without fearing for the regime o Confidence from this united leadership also impressed population and local officials. o o Cohesive leadership produced good policies. regardless of any factonalism pre-1949. and members remained the same. increased living standards. no single group posed a threat to unity. 5-40 Between 1949 and 1957.).

. or underground work.o • Soviet model helped focus debate on details rather than fundamental approaches. But when Soviet model was no longer guiding principle. though in this early period these differences did not disrupt larger group cohesion. which lowered the stakes of any conflict. o o o Personal tension—Mao and Peng Dehuai already had a tense relationship Disagreements over speed of economic development and social transformation. and policies led to disasters. so less infighting b/c discouraged competition—Mao wanted solidarity. emphasis was still on Party line. and had different experiences (ie. o Tension certainly existed. Further aided by instances where he individually clashed with key colleagues o Mao overrode concerns of his associates by involving China in the Korean War. like Liu Shaoqi). Mao’s authority was linchpin of elite stability—   Final arbiter of disputes Policy advocacy was aimed at winning Mao’s approval rather than individual prestige. o o o Decision to speed up agricultural cooperativization led to achievement far before the original projection. Benefits in security and international peace helped Mao’s reputation for political wisdom. ← Mao Zedong • • Unchallenged leader—power was built off successful strategies during and after SinoJapanese War.  Observed rules of collective leadership and democratic discussion: officials were valued for their input and various expertise. which demonstrated Mao’s insight Hundred Flowers was third instance of a break from elite’s viewpoints—less successful but his immediate shift to the right mitigated the damage. But during this time. cleavages would erupt again. party. but it was willingness of leaders to overlook them and work toward consensus that ensured unity. but disagreements tended to be minor Individual leaders increasingly identified with their respective departments—Zhou Enlai with government vs. Potential sources of disunity o Participants of the revolution had taken part in different groups and organizations. Peng Dehuai with the army. Those who worked in the white areas.

o o o Economy was severely damaged Establish a strong. limiting himself to areas of expertise— agriculture and revolution. • Other concerns o Need to reunify in face of years of warfare—still groups that resented the CCP. Took Guangzhou after est. but a strong government required organizational control • Different areas had different needs o “old liberated areas” of north. PRC. o Would require social transformation to encourage more mass mobilization and political awareness. ← Broad agreement on following Soviet model helped facilitate stability • • • Basic question: how should soviet model be adapted to fit Chinese situation? How fast to industrialize? Important questions. USSR had influence over larger Chinese society as well—model used in propaganda and slogans. Organizational presence was established here down to the grassroots. Mao kept out of most policy areas. Wanted integrated. which helped him mediate conflicts within the party rather than exacerbate them. Shanghai in Apr and Wuhan in May. northeast. Military victories helped facilitate reunification—helped build patriotic support for CCP. centralized state. but would require replacing China’s traditional parochialism (life revolved around villages and small social networks) with societal structures more directly connected to the center. And he was relatively centrist at this time. ← 1949: Consolidation and Reconstruction • • • Beijing fell to CCP in Jan 1949. Strong soviet system bolstered Chinese confidence But kept Chinese priorities and realities clear—strong nationalism helped keep CCP from uncritical borrowing from Soviets. but not ones that would split the party. o First five year plan imitated USSR. but by 1956 making modifications • • • Committed to similar ideas of socialist modernization and urban-oriented development strategies—was seen as natural consequence of revolutionary success Soviet model was not just one course of action—there was a wide body of perspectives and ideas to look at. parts of northwest  revolution had essentially been won in these areas. centralized government. . and finally Chengdu in December. Sometimes aims conflicted: economic revival required reassuring groups in society and making some concessions.

Began developing specialized cadres that would be able to deal with economic management. or such a large area in general  Lacked adequate #s of personnel: led to rapid recruitment. and carry out land reform and cooperative agriculture. o Coped by making use of existing personnel/ systems to restablish order while finding add’tl resources. and south of yangtze  the Party had lacked organizational support or resources here—control had come from military conquest. (had not been policy of countryside surrounding the cities.  Growth of labor unions and extensive labor policies helped solidify central gov’t’s access to urban industry. o CCP unaccustomed to running cities.   Initially mobilized private and local organizations to provide services—like benefit societies. Factories had stopped working. and other policies to stimulate growth. ← United Front and democratic dictatorship • • Maximized support and minimized fears Unification had won CCP widespread support. but seizing the cities. Production was restored in many areas by 1952. and 1/3 of population in mutual aid teams (MATs)—first step to cooperatives.  Had to deal with the presence of resistance groups. even from non-Communists. By mid 1950.  Also attitude that urban phase of revolution was to be welcomed—made Party devote attention to recruiting workers and addressing urban problems.  o Main task was to extend party control to pockets unoccupied by CCP. but Liu pushed for production again by calling for labor discipline. urban infrastructure. CCP had some experience from before 1949. wage limits. bc of patriotic desire for unified nation o Traditional aspect: saw CCP as new dynasty o • KMT had been discredited—occupying KMT forces had been corrupt Unification was part of united front strategy o Gathering a wide collection of allies by setting limited goals and defining narrow enemies. But political organization was soon centralized. etc. and then branching out). land reform declared complete. . “new liberated areas” much of east and central china. and had to restore order and production while in a more precarious position because countryside was unsettled—didn’t have a supportive rural base.

o Central authority came up with policy. • Blueprint for future: Common Program was moderate and conciliatory. CCP in formal power and held most seats. o Military Control Commissions were set up as local authorities. Capitalism.• Developed Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—a system of people’s congresses that drew lineage from a similar KMT organization.” o Appointments to regions were all held by pol figures (except for Lin Biao). Role of military • First.   Sometimes this led to lags: in Guangdong. and often entered local regions without knowledge of conditions or often even dialect. and military roles were diversified to create a modern. o Small democratic parties put into these congresses. and bureaucratic capitalism    Patriotic policies asserting China’s rights Large enterprises run by KMT were bur. professional military—part of Common Program and motivated by Korean War. people served parochial interests by doing land reform slower. but power shifted as soon as it could—MCC responsibilities were quickly taken over by governmental groups. Used old liberated areas like North and northeast to test and optimize policies before implementing in less stable areas. • But shifted to civilian authorities as soon as possible o Regional admin remained until 1954. o Adopted gradualism o Narrowly defined enemies as imperialism. and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. military and decentralized rule because newly liberated areas fell to PLA. . o Mao articulated clear distinction between civilian and military authority as early as 1938: “Our principle is that the Party commands the gun. ← Land Reform • Familiar terrain for CCP. but regional admins decided pace and implementation. feudalism. bc bourgeoisie and peasantry joined working classes as ruling class. including small middle class and intelligentsia groups. but genuinely sought opinions of non-Communists. Landlords = feudalism • ← Constituted a people’s democratic dictatorship—not just dictatorship of proletariat. but still different because not wartime anymore. Was crucial at first because areas were so different from one another and needed decentralized rule.

Characterized land reform. Urban mass movements • • Feb 1951-1953: Campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries Fall 1951-Summer/ Fall 1952 o Three Antis Campaign against corrupt cadres o o • Five Antis Campaign against respected national bourgeoisie Thought reform campaign aimed at intellectuals Often violent. • • Constant propaganda during this time—used persuasive and coercive methods Land reform demonstrated party’s credibility—enhanced future persuasive capabilities among peasants.quanxi.  o But didn’t work very well—peasants hesitant about CCP’s promises. o Fostered climate of distrust that broke down interpersonal relationships. Reworked it by emphasizing class struggle and mass mobilization—some social transformation would be necessary to make land reform stick. organized local militias. whereas most were urban intellectuals and students.  Helped break down paternalism in urban society because traditional bonds broken • Happened after entry into Korean War—so fear of KMT sabotage was very real. and still mindful of traditional power structure.• • First to arrive: PLA that suppressed bandits. then land confiscation and redistribution. Many were very young or had questionable class backgrounds—trying to prove revolutionary status. as per Liu Shaoqi’s instructions. reduced rents and interests. After: work teams came—only small proportion of members had experience with northern agrarian struggles. o Collected taxes o o Organized peasant associations. as freeing rural productive forces for industrialization. and carried out campaigns against landlords and old elite.    Class identification. and intense psychological pressure used o Forced confessions in small groups and mass trials attended by tens of thousands.--> often led to violence and brutality Inverted power structure—new ruling elite was poor and middle peasants. and disarmed population. o But also presented convenient opportunity to push campaigns that were already planned . Work teams mobilized villages against landlords with speak bitterness campaigns and mass trials.

The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime. many affiliated groups) regularization/centralization in all spheres of life greater emulation of Soviet methods The Gao Gang Affair       only serious high-level purge of the period Gao Gang = Politburo member. General idea was to weaken influence of all intellectual currents that weren’t Marxist-Leninism.o o • Opponents of revolution and regime were targeted. pp. leading party figure in East China Gao and Rao attempt to out Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai from their positions  . Chinese approach: get mass participation to not offend public opinion. though frightening. set up Party branches in many enterprises—gave authorities much greater knowledge of internal workings of businesses.Bo Yibo denounced for lightening the tax load on capitalists.first five year plan for 53-57 approved continuity with previous period gradualism. but many found themselves rudely awakened o Three Antis: targeted urban cadres who had become corrupted from dealings with bourgeoisie o Five Antis: directed at lawbreaking capitalists. 40-86. 1946-57.” The Politics of China. General public found campaigns understandable. head of State Planning Commission Rao Shushi = director of Central Committee's organization department. 1953-6   new phase entered as a result of increasing political controlling beginning of national economic planning  1955. Socialist Construction and Transformation. but so were some people who were prominent and may have become alternate leaders.planned industrialization over 15 years still united front slightly more radical policy overall than seen previously  formulation of “general line for the transition to socialism”     Mao plays a large role in shifting emphasis to transformation. warning for others  CCP has significant base reserves with which to carry out change (80% of industry.  While investigating capitalist crimes. 6.5 million members by 1953.

expresses dissatisfaction with Liu/Zhou.no secession of minorities  Agricultural cooperativization   very significant achievements Mao pushed for more rapid cooperativization. Mao approves of/trusts Gao.adopt state constitution. try to garner Soviet support.feels insecure in his current position etc.basic unit of socialized agriculture debate over speed of socialization. good rural economic policies help this       Transforming the modern sector and the first leap forward     now that agricultural socialization was succeeding. is successful because of his undisputed leadership. overfulfillment of targets. which is extension of 1949 Common Program very similar to Stalin's constitution of 1936. BUT Chinese system has ■ ■ ■       The constitutional and institutional pattern   no universal.Mao pushes for more rapid process. Mao emphasizes need for alacrity again. first as inspiration for affair. less emphasis on all agriculture being used to support industry Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs). success for party CCP carries out a much more logical. win backing of other high officials by promising them better positions Gao travels around China to try and garner support.Gao is formally criticized. debate over speed. well thought-out program “better to err to the left than the right” peasant resistance appears in China. doesn't kill peasants. Use debates to attack policies of Liu and Zhou. could move to industry once again. disciplined party.his actions are brought to Mao's attentions. equal. eventually commits suicide Lessons-Mao is crucial. 1956-7   reassessment of conditions → new course socialism has officially triumphed over capitalism . but to a MUCH lesser degree than in USSR – gradualism.even more so than with APCs importance of science and technology Adjusting the new Socialist system. direct suffrage creation of separate/visible chairman position for Mao “ “unified multinational state”. then in squashing it 1954.Gao takes this as motivation to act Rao jumps on the bandwagon.that agriculture was largely socialized by 1956 was vindication of Mao. who expresses his anger December Politburo meeting. thought out process that Soviets.

doesn't go over so well eventually. intellectuals do criticize party. but overall remarkably successful since 49 soviet model. application of successful revolutionary era strategies. experiment is a failure. persuasive appeals in securing compliance. new propositions:    attenuated class conflict. leadership unity. changes in economic administration (greater consultation with local authorities)  The Eighth Party Congress    September. struggle meetings viewed as overly harsh post-Mao Conclusions   major problems by 1957. bureaucratism. increased bureaucracy reform targeting subjectivism. economic progress as opposed to revolution not as much of a personal triumph for Mao (in light of Kruschev. sectarianism cautious approach to party reform initial plan to accept input from intellectuals etc.faulty assumption that intellectuals are on the side of the party    Party Ramification and the Hundred Flowers       The Anti-Rightist Campaign      direct counterattack to intellectual criticism of Hundred Flowers Mao is at forefront of this effort defensive tone to campaign harsh attcks.these attacks are unsettling to the party.end of turbulent revolution shift of priorities to economic development social forces should be mobilized in new adaptation of united front   attitude towards intellectuals softens Adapting the Soviet Model   beginning of censure of Soviet ideas Mao's speech in april 1956. de-emphasis of personality cult) Mao begins to plan for orderly succession expansion of Politburo and CC. absence of any perceived incompatability in policies key in successful. 1956 emphasis on steady (not crazy rapid) advance.“Ten Great Relationships” ■ changes to Soviet structure-. particularly student vehemence morale suffers.less emphasis on heavy industry. .

though still the dominant authority. which was the result of strong leadership and effective policies Great Leap Forward (GLF) was alternate plan meant to replace the Five Year Plans imported from Soviets—made use of mass mobilization.Overview • 1958. Even when Mao began to try to bring situation under control again. and though it had been clear that mass mobilization had failed to bring econ progress. had suffered for the misjudgments of the GLF. though. o Mao’s search for allies and alienation of colleagues who disagreed with him would define the political landscape for years to come. The Politics of China. But GLF fared poorly—was used to justify a lot of extremism and produced poor economic results. 87-117 Great Leap Forward. a technique that had worked in the past. ← Origins of GLF • Problems with Five Year Plans o Chinese didn’t have the same consistent rural surplus that Soviets could use to implement their other policies and provide a buffer for rough times. pp. o o • Replaced technical expertise with efforts to rouse workers’ enthusiasm Strained Sino-Soviet relations because USSR advisors lost prestige in country.  FYPs in Soviet Union were exploitative and led to millions of peasant deaths —the CCP (mostly rural) was unlikely to favor this. • • Party would lose the prestige it had enjoyed from 1949-1957. still advocated it to prevent the bureaucratic deterioration of the revolution that he observed in USSR. • Once things got better. 1961: economic malaise spread from rural areas to cities. on top of damage that had already been done by the Leap. and Mao would launch an attack on his colleagues that would lead to a decade of tumult and chaos. • 1960: Soviet aid withdrawn—hurt a number of key industrial development projects. CCP leaders still confident about China’s progress. o His colleagues thought CCP should shift emphasis on technical expertise and specialists to guide growth. . political tensions flared. Mao. whereas Soviets were urban. o CCP was also predominantly rural. couldn’t. but within 8 years leadership would be wracked with division.← ← ← MacFarquhar (ed). o Coupled with political attacks from within against the GLF: Peng Dehuai cultivated strong relationship with Soviets and criticized Great Leap.

o People’s Communes were developed to provide bigger organizational unit in order to facilitate mass mobilization. and had led to a strong belief in the power of mass mobilization because of the success of cooperativization in the countryside. and then based on the brigade or team that they were in. o Needed to provide incentive for peasants to increase output even thought state investments were used on heavy industry.  Larger reason for defeat was ideological shift in party. bourgeois experts. thought peasants would only respond to material incentives. 5th ranking member of the party and economic specialist. at first. but Chen Yun. Over time. o Mao thought organizational and political tools could be used. embracing several standard marketing areas 1959-1962—communes became smaller so they could be better managed.  But defeated by impatience—plan would take years to implement. work that required literacy and statistical skills—more prevalent in urban intelligentsia than peasant masses.• Debated a new strategy that would allow rapid growth of heavy industry while expanding agricultural output—without the human cost. not urban economics. Plan relied on continued centralized control of economy. this would also produce enough profit to develop heavy industry quickly. Mobilization over expertise also meant that CCP would play greater role than government bureaucracy.  Chen wanted emphasis on light industry so peasants could benefit from the economic growth. (1958)    o o Initially huge. Everything collectivized.  But Hundred Flowers and Antirightist Campaign had largely discredited the urban. Discussed at 3rd plenum of Eighth CC 1957. and incomes paid out to people equally. Other motivations  Soviet approach to status had led to stratification of cities and party— industry. commerce and civil service had grade system that led to more status consciousness and careerism—good for growth but Mao didn’t like it. o Ultimately relied on creative set of military and political policies centered on mobilization of wide range of forces to save the day— .  Mao’s area of expertise was rural policy. GLF’s particular methods helped refocus policies on areas with which he felt familiar.

Disregard expertise in favor of more. Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun only dissenters in Politburo (as Premier and head of the state council. economical results • Initial success was largely false o Destroyed statistical system and applied great pressure to cadres—led to falsifications. ← Politics • Most people encouraged GLF. . o • Liu was has succession in mind. so they liked the plan. Zhou would have lost power given the strategy of mass mobilization and decentraliztion) o Liu shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were involved more with the party. professional. Many projects from first FYP had stared to come on stream. Deng was part of Antirightist campaign and played key role in managing GLF. o o o But 1958 weather was good. and elimination of money in communes led to belief that food problems had been solved and commune dwellers got free supplies of food. Four key elements o Make up for lack of capital in agricultural and industry by mobilizing underemployed labor power—produced essentially self-financed development o o Set ambitious goals for leading economic sectors and encouraged any innovation necessary to prevent bottlenecks and promote growth. CCP and leadership found this encouraging  People generally supportive. Motivated by the hard work put into mass mobilization. Military also did not like obligations to support miltias and participate in civilian work—most prominent dissenter was Peng Dehuai. who were necessary to help China build a strong. Use modern and traditional methods to increase output    o Invest in major steel complexes Also build backyard furnaces Traditional sectors usually used to feed inputs into modern sector with nothing in return. so this led to impressive growth in output. which did make agricultural performance better. faster. GLF was way to cast Soviet model.  ← GLF: Strategy • Strategy flushed out over several conferences/ meetings GLF formally adopted at Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in May 1958. modern army. who had always had a stormy relationship with Mao o He also wanted good relationship with Soviets. and agreeing with Mao would be important.

a close supporter and great military tactician. July 1959 • . Zhang wentian. Considered it a breach of permissible behavior. Mao had wanted Lin Biao to take his place anyway. Lasted an entire month—Mao launched attack against Peng Dehuai—defense minister and one of the PLA’s ten marshals.• Mao moved Lin Biao. to place in politburo above Peng o Once GLF ran into trouble. July 14: Peng wrote letter to Mao to complain about GLF. but these mostly kept along with what others were saying. was just taking opportunity. could have been General Sec of Party during Long March. But other circumstances: ← Lushan Conference. and letter may have seemed like 2nd attempt to position for higher office. Letter was printed and circulated to all participants at Lushan by Mao—July 23. and put Peng up to write letter. but was edged out by Mao and steadily demoted since then.  o    Baffling bc Peng had not really said anything that extraordinary Peng had been involved in Gao Gang affair. • Spring 1959: Tibetan revolt o Due to some actions and missteps by han soldiers and civilians in 1959. he responded by calling Peng Dehuai a right opportunist who had deliberately attacked Mao in the letter. ← Planned adjustments to GLF after bad reports started coming in • • • Peasant food shortages despite optimistic official reports—sometimes food not harvested because people had left to join local industry or gone to cities to work at factories. Was very popular with peasant cadres bc of emphasis on abandoning urban expertise. Set in motion effort to replace him with Lin Biao. o Kruschev cancelled aid right after Peng had been in Moscow—Mao claimed this meant he was scheming with Krushschev o o Peng also criticized small group discussions during the conference. Advocated adjustments at First Zhengzhou Conference Nov 1958—asked for figures for production to be a bit more realistic Feb 1959: mao urged to use right opportunism—wanted decrease in communization. these underlying tensions would bubble to the surface. a vice minister of foreign affairs who had close ties to Moscow and Peng. o Many mid-level cadres unwilling to abandon the radical approach—wanted to keep strategy of going all out.

who undercut Peng to service Mao. o • Found himself pushed out of day to day affairs more. Peng was ousted and told to study for a few years. Consequences o Mao broke unwritten rules of debate among top leadership.  Mistaken policies led to food shortfalls—like insisting that peasants leave land fallow or poor management due to push for more efforts in industry. • Anti-Right Opportunist Campaign also attempted a second leap forward in 1960 o Failed: agric output in 1960 was 75% that of 1958. Light industrial output declined 21% in 1961 severe goods famine to complement food shortages. and Mao began to fear that his life’s work would be wasted in a similar way in China o Mao would devote much of his time to dealing with the Soviet issue—bringing on kang Sheng to help due to his experience with soviet affairs. and hua guofeng. Luo ruiqing became chief of staff. o Mao feared soviet revisionism more and more and used that as impetus for movements. 6 different factors . but this only caused Mao to reevaluate the Russian Revolution.o • Afterwards. • Mao’s prestige in highest levels of CCP suffered— o Made a form of self criticism at CCP Central Work Conference in Beijing in June 1961.before. ← Failure of second leap and outrage over Peng Dehuai’s dismissal broke down solidarity cultivated • Kruschev had wanted to discourage China from GLF by withholding aid. leaders could freely voice opinions    Mao labeled it “unprincipled factional activity”—sowed some personal bitterness Lin Biao bumped up to defense minister—gave Mao more influence over the PLA than he had had before. was elevated to a higher post in Hunan. Mao believed that the Soviet system had degenerated from socialism to fascism. (Deng Xiaoping is cited as an example. during Lushan Plenum and MAC meeting that followed. and Kang Sheng’s experience with Stalinist politics would give party politics a more Stalinist air rather traditional maoist one. Zhang also removed.) Different leaders drew diff conclusions from failure of GLF o Mao realized political mobilization couldn’t produce rapid economic growth since Yan’an. and didn’t think he was getting as much deference as he had been. By the end. o Most devastating famine of 20th C in China 1959-60.

o Peng petitioned for rehabilitation based on rural investigations. which permitted great decentralization in communes—led to GLF’s collapse o • Helped create material incentive again for production Two types of responses predominated in spring 1961 o Lin Biao and military: stressed renewed study of politics to boost morale and increase discipline    Sept 1960.000 character document to central committee about how he had been right. Wanted to regain control and repair national apparatus by setting 6 regional bodies. better” to “agriculture as base.o o • But he retained faith in mobilization as a method to produce changes in values. industry as leading factor. • • Disagreed over how quickly China was recovering—Mao was super optimistic o Mao began to sense that pessimists were limiting his flexibility within the system. CCP lost prestige and organizational competence bc it had run GLF o Cadres who had supported second leap were branded as leftists and purged. Extraordinary damage had been done—vindicated what Peng had said. most people did not think Lin’s method served a purpose outside of the army. And question of how to deal with lower levels also caused dissension. o Mao blocked it. distrib of power. But many of his colleagues and supporters wanted to get rid of political campaigns altogether—the time of high tide politics of Yan’an was over. . After the leap: Liu and Deng • Beidahe Meeting in Jul/ Aug 1960 began to tackle issue of dealing with GLF disaster o Policies came out of this meeting and following months as harvest looked bad o o Second leap terminated Guiding policy changed from “more. consolidation. and thus distanced himself from even more of his colleagues. faster. o Zhou Enlai helped put out Twelve Articles of People’s Communes. Lin called for program of concentrated study of Mao’s works. Targeted toward barely educated peasants. with readjustment. o Lost a lot of morale. o • Agriculture as base became official policy at 9th Plenum in Jan 1961. and outlook. Mao’s own self criticism was never circulated to lower levels. and raising standards” as formula. so needed simplification: produced Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong—little red book. and submitted 80. But 1960-3. filling out.

.o Liu and Deng: series of investigations that provided material used for programmatic policy documents in various areas. Multiple drafts resulted from frequent consultations with other party members and experts.     Large plants also required imports. and generally more material incentive. He wrote the 60 Articles on People’s Communes himself. and articles on education undercut many of the local schools that had opened.     Economic policy: chen yun and li fuchun Cultural and edu affairs: peng zhen Political and legal work: Deng Xiaoping In making reports. which GLF had been against (opting instead for self reliance) Bo yibo’s report on industry placed emphasis on material incentives and experts Articles on literature valued traditional art forms. (#s of articles) Party leaders took charge of drafting process Three broad policy groups were developed under Secretariat to oversee and coordinate policy issues.  Liu and deng’s policies also undercut basic GLF tenets  Large scale factories in sharp contrast with the small scale production encouraged in GLF (backyard furnaces…) Uses fertilizer plant as example. then solicited opinions from experts. typically ascertained actual situation with on the spot investigations. People’s communes article shifted toward more private plots. But he gradually grew more disconcerted as investigations and consultations yielded more and more to policy. which claimed that Mao’s thought held answers to any question. Emphasis on expertise clashed with lin biao’s approach.  No evidence Mao disagreed with these trends in 1961.    1961-2: various major policy papers produced. team as basic accounting unit.

does not bring up this report o This shows the extent of Mao’s authority  Mao is truly in a unique position: as Chairman. they hurt the Purty  Mao actually agrees. with Mao out of town. bad weather 30%  Mao thinks this should be flipped. thinks economy is doing fine o Zhou agrees with Mao. Pg 117-147 • 7000 Cadres Conference. scaling down of production o 1962-1965 will be a “period of recovery” o Xilou Conference: called by Liu. however.The Politics of China (Continued). overall positive about the GLF  This reflects Zhou’s “operational practice of siding with Mao whenever there was an open clash” o Peng Zhen’s position  Ordered his Beijing subordinates to investigate the real causes of the GLF and prepare a report  Deng Tuo is in charge of the investigation  The report blames the disaster directly on the mobilizational politics of the GLF strategy  “GLF disaster must be laid largely at the doorstep of the Politburo”  Peng. we had two different assessments of the 1962 situation: o Mao/Lin argue that the country is well on the way to recovery. he stands above the hierarchy  No institutional curbs on his power o Other divisive issues:  Rehabilitation of rightists: some want to bring back Peng Duhuai  Evaluation of current situation: Mao was optimistic  Party rectification: issue of how best to reconstruct a disciplined party Ministry of Finance projection by Chen Yun o Huge deficit o Gloomy forecast. for the most part o They disagree. Chen Yun say situation is desperately bad. Jan-Feb 1962 Convened to “review methods of leadership and to sum up the situation” o Liu: let’s avoid the brutal purges and counterpurges. situation demands decollectivization Beidaihe Conference. to address the issue  Endorsed Chen’s assessment  Support systems of “individual responsibility” in agriculture. upon sensing the tenor of the conference. opposes further decollectivization o Deng. 10th Plenum o Clash of the two approaches o • • • . a de facto partial decollectivization Thus. Liu. in their evaluation of the GLF  Liu thinks bad policy is 70% responsible for the disaster.

southern outskirts of the capital. on the other hand. Most of them were confused from the beginning. on one hand. grew rapidly. are not to have it held against them that they participated in mass beatings with a fatal outcome” Violence is not limited in cities. Changping country.” They helped to organize the hearings about the progress of Cultural Revolution for the top leaders. Daxing county) September 2. one-on-one connection was built between top leaders and the leaders of selected organizations. compromise is reached: Mao’s ideas are embraced in theory Rise of Lin Biao o Faced with two tasks: consolidate his position in PLA. Mao got disappointed by the progress of the conference.g. Top leaders sent their children to the local communities and universities to get a true sense of what was going on there. Thus. leaving egalitarian paths)  Here. Bourgeois reactionary line---. the central authorities issued Zhongfa [1966] 445 in a first attempt to bring the “red terror” under control. Mao sent Li Na to Beijing Geological Institute. local and central leaders tried to understand the aims of Cultural Revolution. the group endorsed by top leaders. Mao attacks Ministry of Finance. all suffered greatly. stresses need for class struggle. solidify his relationship with Mao o Reforming the PLA  Bringing Military Affairs Commission (MAC) bck into prominence  A party body use dto control the military  Personnel changes to ensure his control fo the ministry of defense  Stress role of Mao Zedong thought in the military  Enhance role of PLA in CCP affairs Criminal responsibility is not pursued by the authorities during and after cultural revolution “Students and Red Guards who when the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ began were under eighteen years of age. and north of the city. he resolutely opposes decollectivization and insists that communes remain intact o At tenth plenum. Chen Boda’s report on “bourgeois reactionary line”: o . warns against retreat from socialism o 10th Plenum: Mao warns against revisionism (catering to intellectuals. Lin Biao. Capital 3rd HQ and Zhu Chengzhao. The central work conference followed up on “bourgeois reactionary line”. No one really knew what Mao wanted.the term Mao Zedong coined in Red Flag magazine to instruct the mass about the situation. tacitly supported more mature university students in a head-on conflict with the local state.• • • • • • • • • • • • Mao feels like he’s losing his grip in the Politburo. Mao. who later realized and admitted their errors. creates a coalition of his own  Jiang Qing. Kang Sheng o At conference. (e. had hundreds of thousands of teenagers destroy the “four olds” in an orgy of violence and destruction. I meant to clarify the relationship between Red Guards and the police. The elders and kids got killed as well in some extreme cases. and whose current behavior is good. they supported Lin Biao’s note on “not defining everything based on family background. Daxing county.

• • • Describe the current situation as “excellent” Criticize the role of the sons and daughters of high level officials. Concern about evolution of Revolution  Soviets have gone astray from fundamentals  Mao questions the permanence of any socialist revolution  Writes polemics against USSR. report on conditions  Liu Shaoqi. They sometimes assumed that they were the successors to the revolution. Concern about evolution of Chinese Revolution  2. Involved imposition of massive work teams instead of mobilizing the masses o Mao wants the SEM to be about fighting revisionism. for 3 reasons:  1. calls for large work teams to go to select communes. Sept 1964: Reflects these worries. and shake the minto shape. Worries about succession  Compains that Deng. Related sense of impending death o 1. Mao sees problems at both the apex and the base of the political system o o • • Apex: Colleagues want policies that strength anti-Communist forces o Base: GLF has done huge damage to basic-level Party units Mao believes rectification campaigns can solve both problems o Former Ten Points: Lays out structure of Socialist Education Movement (SEM) o Sets up poor and middle peasant associations to serve as a vehicle for exercising supervision over the erring basic level cadres o Called for formation of urban-based work teams. not jus tabout battling corruption  Mao tries to change the direction with his 23 Articles. o Criticize the work team o Self criticism. the Secretariat leader. Concern about succession  3. Jan 1965  Work teams pull back. goes to Henan. Liu Shaoqi’s self criticism. for example. finds widespread corruption o Revised Ten Points. did not consult with him on policy o . o Mao didn’t like these revised ten points quite as much. Khruschev  Mao shares his political views through these polemics  Mao genuinely worries about the youth growing up with a “revisionist perspective”  He did not want to be seen as China’s Stalin. take them over. the person who was later seen as having led the country astray o 2. Narrowed target of attack from revisionism to corruption  2. Deng Xiaoping’s criticism. punished cadres are rehabilitated Why did Mao decide to launch an assault against his colleagues in the Politburo? o 3 elements affected Mao’s psychology in 1959-1966:  1. carry out urban Five Antis Campaign o Eventually shifts to rural areas: high level cadres go to rural areas. Imposed penalties that were too harsh on cadres  3.

• Mao pulls back from regular meetings because he dominated the political system to such a great degree  Implemented strategy of stepping back to give more influence to successors  BUT after collapse of GLF.  Achieve immortality through proper revolution The split in the Yan’an leadership o Leaders did not appear to see the impending showdown with Mao. he has a hard time assuming full control of policy  Liu and Deng restrict his access to policy flow  He tested his successors on their loyalty. although they did try to keep PLA/Jiang Qing in check o Areas of doubt:  What did the leadership who did not join the CR coalition think about the policies? It seems that they “tried to meet Mao more than halfway”  Mao appears to have distorted reality in his own mind. Experts need to take control of the economy. Mass mobilization is anti-bureaucratic. at best.  Mao tries to get his way: in culture. “Mao increasingly saw his colleagues as running a bureaucratic leviathan that gobbled up his pressing demands and turned them into relatively innocuous reforms…” (144) o 3. in the countryside  Objecting to economic centralization. Concerned about own moratality  Saw his fundamental identity tied to the fate of the revolution he had fathered. ideological renewal. Mao calls for greater regional selfsufficiency  Liu implemented Mao’s wishes only halfway. boost production once again. Mao’s personal security forces  Role of Zhou Enlai is obscure: did he begin to see himself as Liu’s replacement? o Three factors led to the split in the leadership:  Different lessons drawn from the GLF  Tensions regarding the issue of succession to Mao  Growing fears of an aging and possibly senile leader  . his suspicions fed by Jiang Qing and others  Role of public security apparatus. emphasizes learning from average people. found that they were “inadequate”  Mao retains his faith in mass mobilization as an instrument of social change. antiintellectual  Liu and co. believe that mass mobilization is no longer a useful tool for policy (read: GLF failure).

ordinary Party members and bureaucrats 1949-1958 Mutual Reinforcement • With victory of the revolution. urban youth. o Goals accomplished ahead of time. o It is an anti-personal cult movement led by Khrushcheve’s denunciation of Stalin. tradition as well as legal-rational considerations reinforced the essentially charismatic basis of Mao’s legitimacy 1959-1965 Legal-Rational and Traditional Ambivalence Lushan conference affects Mao’s standing The developments at Lushan can be seen as the relationship between an emperor and his • • • • • • • . 62-76 4 period of Mao's leadership: (1)1949-1958: all modes of legitimation reinforced Mao's authority (2)1959-1965: Mao's behavior led to reservations on traditional and legal-rational grounds by ranking officials but no serious challenge (3)1966-1971: the resort to unbridled charismatic claims destroyed legality and caused graver doubts within the elite (4)1972-1976: limited challenges to Mao's authority appeared Major setback to Mao's authority: • Economic crisis following GLF: shook the faith of peasantry • Consequences of Cultural Revolution: disillusioned intellectuals. Legitimacy. and Conflict in China.Teiwes. pp. Leadership. No purge for policy reason until late 1957 In earliest period of the PRC. high economic growth rate • Mao's specific policy initiatives: o Operated as a consensus leader o Made wise decision in case when he needed to play forceful role • Korean War made China a force to be reckoned in international politics Made the mistake in the Hundred Flowers since the initial plan fell and he used the Anti-Rightist Campaign to restore the prestige in the party Mao pushed GLF since the output of the agriculture by the end of 1958 was nice Mao’s personal cult: o The excising of the “thought of Mao Zedong” from the new Party constitution. socialization of commerce and industry. Mao's role established as the "exceptional" strategist leading communist and national victory and liberation • Achievement of socialist transformation and economic growth o 1st FYP(1953-1957): collectivization of agriculture.

1966-1971 Legality Shattered. He was suddenly given power during August 1966 Plenum.veteran officials failed to restrain Mao. threat from military which Lin controls. mixture of imperial dynasty founder. mainly based on favor of charismatic leader just like Liu Shaoqi. As Mao’s cult intensifies. His power limited. instead of coalescing to oppose Mao. influence diluted. Mao’s authority significantly faded. more pragmatic officials). This added to prestige. But his personal cult sent to the masses an image. the disruption of this period led to net loss of authority of Mao among public. Some high officials also plotted secretly with Deng. Cultural Revolution attacked all institutions except PLA. Deng later returned to power. Zhou protected high-ranking comrades during the Cultural Revolution. hope that Mao will ultimately act within bounds. In reality. by 1976 even could not communicate. revolutionary leader. and remote father. but not enough to command full obedience or prevent his comrades from planning a reversal of the course he had set in his last decade. even though they didn’t prepare to act against Mao himself. Even though he tried to purge Deng again and put Hua Guofeng as premier after Zhou’s death. less on recent achievements. and Mao could hardly have enhanced his reputation within the top elite.• • ministers. Lin Biao was pictured as “Mao’s best student” and has his authority derived from Mao. Liu Shaoqi was chosen as successor. Why they refused to fight: fear of damaging the system that relies on its founder. Mao is more inclined for the radical side. and any opposition or deviation from Mao is viewed culpable now. Yet the elites only defended reputation and avoided disgrace. the rebellious and egalitarian. Liu’s position was dependent on the favor of the charismatic leader. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . after getting sanctions from Mao through Zhou’s urging. distortions of revolutionary history virtually eliminate the contributions of most other leaders. and purged most of the top elites. All those failures in economic reform or other campaigns paled in comparison with Mao’s dual victory of Communist revolution and national liberation. No more official endorsement for the “Four Modernization” that Zhou promoted and the legal organs sanctioned. Faith still existed based on pre-1949 successes of Mao 1972-1976 Traditional Resistance to the Leader Mao was physically unable to make decisions among factionalized power (“Gang of Four” vs. The campaign attacked on long standing CCP norms. Mao’s authority was still enough to keep him on the throne. Politburo was replace by CRG where Jiang Qing was key role. In February Adverse Current in 1967. Charisma Triumphant Frustration with current policy led to Mao’s fundamental rejection of legal rational norms during the Cultural Revolution. it never worked in reality.

first purge of the Revolution May 16 Notification – published 1966. stand up against Mao Last chance for them to restrain Mao before they were divided and denounced Peng’s February Outline and Jiang Qing’s Forum Summary <1966> Chapter 2: The Siege of Beijing (p32-51) <April 1966> Peng Zhen criticized by Kang Sheng and Chen Boda • February Outline annulled. many punished/imprisoned/removed from office • Marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution . Group of Five dissolved • Replaced by “cultural revolution document drafting group”  Central Cultural Revolution Group <May 1966> Dismissal of Lu Dingyi (Peng’s senior colleague in the Group of Five) • Lu’s wife Yan Weibing wrote letters accusing Ye Qun of being a slut Lu accused of collaborating with wife to frame Lin Biao and his family Yang Shangkun (controls paper flow) accused of tape recording Mao’s conversations • Part of normal process. 14-51 Chapter 1: The First Salvos (p14-31) The Campaign Against Wu Han The Purge of the PLA Chief of Staff: Luo Ruiqing <1965> • Lin Biao first targeted Xiao Xiangrong (Luo’s deputy) – accused of being anti-Mao Defended by Luo  gives Lin Biao an opening • Ye Qun’s private conversation with Mao 1) Unwillingness to report to Lin on a regular basis 2) Attempts to supplant Lin by getting him to resign • Mao denounced Luo as a way to sever the link between the PLA and the CCP Accused Luo of being revisionist • Members of Politburo were uneasy about the Luo case Ideal opportunity for Liu. not extremely out of the ordinary • But.Mao’s Last Revolution (MLR). Zhou. released to public 1967 • Four families condemned. pp. Zhu De and Deng to defend Luo. Mao wanted someone he could totally trust to control the CC’s paper flow Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang purge is a hinge event: last pre-Revolution purge.

Mao agreed with Lin that ideology was more important than weapons. pp. and addicted to sleeping pills for insomnia. where Yang used tape recorders to keep records of what Mao said. only Mao could decide who the revisionists were Never revealed his thoughts  people “work toward” the Chairman.• • Party cadres found it difficult to believe the accusations against Peng. 1965—Li visited by Wang Dongxing. over professionalization of the military). so Luo was in trouble with Mao. Li dilutes his sleeping pill supply with placebos because he doesn’t want Mao to overdose on his watch Mao read histories of earlier dynasties. Mao placed the real blame on higher ups. partly due to Jiang Qing’s urging. there was talk that Luo wanted Lin Biao to resign Wang Dongxing summoned back to Beijing. 433–463 Nov. Luo. rather than Marx. Lin Biao’s wife Ye Qun campaigned against Luo. but Peng Zhen and others tried to protect Wu Han Li did not understand at the time that Mao was planning to attack the top leaders in the party. accused the guesthouse of being poisonous and decided to move to Wuhan . including Liu Shaoqi Mao was paranoid about the guesthouse. led to some of the most radical and worst excesses of the Revolution <1966> Mao is paranoid  established the Capital Work Team to secure the capital and Zhongnanhai Li Zhisui. when preparing for political battle Mao thought that Wu Han’s play about Hai Rui was meant to be an attack on his dismissing Peng Dehuai. Mao supported Yan Wenyuan’s published article attacking Wu Han. but struck at mid-levels first Kang Sheng told Mao that Peng Zhen had anti-Mao tendencies Lu Dingyi was in charge of propaganda. head of Central Bureau of Guards Discussion of the Luo–Lu–Peng–Yang purges: Mao purged Yang Shangkun because he never trusted him over the “bugging” incident. Li summoned on 1 Jan. so Li says it was almost inevitable that he would be purged Luo Ruiqing had differences of opinion with Lin Biao (esp. 1966 to see Mao at Nanchang because he was ill Mao was surrounded by female attendants. was ill with a cold and fever. Lu. Yang  worried about who might be next In reality.

Mao went outside the PSC and met with Jaing Qing. 1966—Mao arrives in Shanghai. Outline 4 days later. circular submitted to enlarged Poliburo in May and passed (May 16 Circular) Mao suggested that Li make peace with Jiang Qing. under PSC’s direct supervision. turns out to be wildcats. returns to home village of Shaoshan on June 18.In Wuhan. new Central Cultural Revolution Small Group formed. telling them he wanted the Five-Man Small Group of the Cultural Revolution and the Beijing Municipal Party Committee abolished. Mao interpreted it as a rebuke to his own views. Peng. Kang. history. Wu Lengxi (head of People’s Daily) meet with Mao to discuss Wu Han’s play. 1966—Li learns from Lin Biao’s doctor that he was a hypochondriac. 1966—Lu. proposes launching a “Cultural Revolution” in literature. Kang Shen. April 1966—Mao officially expands his criticisms to include Peng Zhen 24 April 1966—enlarged PSC meeting discusses Chen Boda’s draft revoking Feb. asked Li to stay Feb. too hot. Mao explained to Li that the “four cleanups” were no longer a priority. Mao adjourned meeting without making his views clear and refused to review Peng’s document (the February Outline) After publication of Feb. letting others work things out. so moves to Wuhan on June 28 . had fear of water and never used a toilet 15 Mar. thought someone broke into his guesthouse attic. economics At the same time. forges an alliance with Lin Biao and writes a document attacking Lu Dingyi Mar. but Peng and Lu tried to promote the view that the disagreement was academic only. but Mao insisted on leaving and moving to Hangzhou Dinner with Mao revealed that he thought the characters that Deng Xiaoping employed in the central secretariat were shady Jiang Qing meets with Mao. Kang declared Wu Han to be anti-party. convenes Politburo meeting where he singles out Wu Han and three others for particular rebuke. Li did not wished to and tried to find other protection May 1966—Mao retreats from politics. law. Peng Zhen was to be toppled for it Mao became irritable. and Zhang Chunqiao. Zhou Yang (deputy chief of propaganda). learns from his wife that he had been addicted to opium and later to morphine (treated in the Soviet Union in 1949). Outline.

were sent in to stabilize the situation.Mao writes letter to Jiang Qing.” gets ready to return to political stage (arrives in Beijing on 18 July) MLR. Work Team Whenever problems arose. Mao gets ready to return. which is what happened with criticisms at the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution. . Cao Yiou Cao. work teams. and writing about his discomfort with his cult of personality. One of the only restrictions on their leadership is that they have to receive permission from the central authorities before taking action against cadres at or above the rank of country governor. and distribute punishments and rewards. The first such poster. floats “like a balloon. She had access to valuable information as head of her husband’s private office. but Mao withdraws the copies July 1966—Beijing in chaos. Jiang Qing excited about letter and tries to have it published. Nie Yuanzi Not known as a very good person since her years in Yan’an during the Sino-Japanese War. 52-70 Potential IDs “News blackout” Refers to the consignment of criticism to inner pages or academic supplements of newspapers. the wife of Kang Sheng. Nie helped bring down party leaders at Beida in 1966 after an unsuccessful first attempt to knock the university president Lu Ping off his perch in 1965. was sent by her husband on a secret mission to Beida to stir up grassroots opposition to the school’s party leadership. writing that rightist movements cycle and reappear every few years. deliver a judgment. composed of trusted cadres from uninvolved units. establish reasons for the problems.” etc. created by Nie Yuanzi and six colleagues at Beida. Marxist-Leninist Big-Character Poster These posters would have big characters written on them to accuse certain Party leaders of being “revisionist. helped mobilized the masses and led to utter chaos. She had joined the CCP in 1938 at age 17. pp. Mao instructs Li to see Tao Zhu and to investigate the Cultural Revolution in Beijing 16 July 1966—Mao swims in Yangtze.

” After reading the text on June 1. At midnight on May 25. top Communists did not necessarily trust the “worker-peasant-soldier masses” to emerge victorious.” since it would have followed the line of Peng Zhen’s February Outline. Mao ordered it be broadcast in its entirety by Xinhua News Agency and published in all the nation’s newspapers.” In early 1966. Nie teamed up with leftist colleagues. Alongside the text in the People’s Daily was a laudatory essay written under the direction of Chen Boda.” Yet.” sending Zhang Yan. As evidenced in diary entries. visited 800 CCP and CYL members to stress the importance of “struggling in an orderly fashion.” a reference to Song’s support of stronger leadership when the Beijing Party Committee was no longer functioning in order to persuade the masses to the “correct road. The public announcement on June 3 of the dismissal of the Beijing Party Committee was the more significant “explosion. with hundreds and thousands of big-character posters put up soon after. Mao manipulated a mass movement at China’s educational institutions to unseat the head of state. The first battles of the Cultural Revolution largely did not affect ordinary citizens. It was clear. Lu Ping. to remind everyone that the presence of foreign students imposed certain restrictions on the right to put up big-character posters in public places. three days later a powerful editorial in the Liberation Army Daily “leaked” the main points of Jiang Qing’s Forum Summary. Emboldened by Cao. titled “What are Song Shuo.” particularly for foreigners. The noisy fairground atmosphere that gave foreigners . General Summary In Phase II. which had not yet been publicly repudiated by Mao with the May 16 Notification. Not until April 15 did this practice change.” Chaos ensued. Kang Sheng sent his wife Cao Yiou on May 14 to Beida supposedly to examine the “academic criticism” at the university. Cao gave the green light to Nie to put it up despite not seeing the text. The answer was “cunning scheme. that the criticism would be “bogus” rather than “genuine. Constant noise was a hallmark of the revolution. The poster. From reading the People’s Daily. who ultimately decided to attack with a big-character poster. Li Xuefeng. Zhou Enlai tried to ensure a “controlled burn. urging people to rise up in the “Great Socialist Cultural Revolution. newly appointed Beijing first secretary. Nie and her leftist friends realized that the widening of the anti-Wu Han campaign to include Deng Tuo meant that Bejing party propaganda establishment was in trouble and Lu Ping had lost his high-level protection. deputy director of the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office. though. China seemed to be far more concerned with escaping poverty than with “class struggle. Nie Yuanzi had been severely criticized in 1965 because of her vendetta against university president Lu Ping.” But Nie and her colleagues called these attempts to direct the Cultural Revolution “revisionist. The real purpose of the trip was to stir up grassroots opposition to the school’s party leadership. and Peng Peiyun up to in the Cultural Revolution?” was put up on May 25. who headed the People’s Daily work team. The movement of foreign journalists was curtailed. and was about to lose her job.Chen Boda New leader of the Chinese Communist Revolutionary Group (CCRG). the Xinhua News Agency had imposed a news blackout on the criticism of people such as Wu Han. June 2 became a turning point for Cultural Revolution activity in colleges.

Students and junior staff turned against anyone who might be a potential member of the “counterrevolutionary black gang. In order to control this chaos.” but discarded this label in August after two months for supposedly not indicating the nature of the person labeled as such. Mao finally returned to the scene in mid July (Yangzte swim to show his health and power). though he said that sending in work teams too early would not be good. Mao refused to be pinned down on what should be done. Provincial party committees also began to send work teams after Beijing. or was unaware of the situation in Beijing. The Central Committee Secretariat then sent a work team to take over at the Propaganda Department on June 6. not the workteam’s. In addition. no one really understood who the real target of the revolution is. and officials were at risk from not only students. students were in an uproar. Liu. But due to the incompetence of the untrained workteams and the explosive craziness of the students. Since there didn’t seem to be a set target. Chen took over on May 31. when in reality. it was the top leaders from the center. The practice of acquiring/releasing information through the children of the politburo members began. Students didn’t want to humiliate teachers too drastically. Important things to remember: Mao never lost control of the revolution. the new head of the CCRG. but also wanted to avoid criticism from their classmates. He finally within drew the workteams. pp 70-85 Summary: This section of the book concentrates on the Fifty Days (see IDs) at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution without the guidance of Mao. When Liu and other leaders went to report to Mao in Hangzhou on June 9. everyone was being attacked. Chen Boda opposed the decision. though. Mao approved sending in a Beida work team. but colleagues with confidential insider information or even chauffeurs. Liu and Deng decided to send work teams to universities in order to control the students. and on June 3.239 cadres entered educational and cultural institutions in Beijing. IDs: • Socialist Education Movement: Investigation led by Liu Shaoqi reported that there was a . During the early weeks of June 1966. MLR. However. On May 29. to take over at the People’s Daily (Zhou immediately phoned Mao to get his permission). an expanded PSC meeting under Liu’s chairmanship agreed that the new Beijing Party Committee should send in work teams to various colleges and schools. Most people still believed it to be the intellectual bourgeois. Class-based discrimination charges found a more receptive audience than gender-based discrimination charges did. there was great resistance and rebellion against authority. and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in a temporary work team under Chen Boda. It was the student’s revolution. called this period the fifty days and used it to condemn Liu and Deng. work teams totaling 7. One can only learn to make revolutions by making revolutions. The problem was that he kept his colleagues in the dark about what he was trying to achieve.the illusion of good humor and organization was achieved only by considerable behind-the-scenes activity by the Beijing Garrison. a revolution began at the university levels with Big Character Posters and student movements. After the May 16 Circular. He showed great dissatisfaction with the progress of CR and the decision of sending in workteams. Zhou.

and Kang Sheng defended Kuai’s right to criticize revisionism in the Party.significant anti-Party sentiment in rural China ca. • Nie Yuanzi: a teaching assistant in the philosophy department at Peking University. Basically 8 rules limiting and regulating the activities of the Red Guards. There was widespread corruptionand to deal with this he recommended severe measures be introduced. Kuai Dafu: one of the leading radical students at Qinghua University.” Eight-Point Guideline: Drafted by Li Xuefeng. At the meeting. claiming that it was the outspoken teachers and students. and the Cultural Revolution Group.Workteams would stay in a commune for up to 6 months and punish severely those who opposed them. Liu Shaoqi attacked Kuai as a troublemaker. He told his workteam leaders “You trick the snakes into leaving their pit. Result = “Revised Later10 Point Plan” (Sept. • • • Fifty Days: A critical period from June to July 1966 (during the eve of the Cultural Revolution) that resulted in the downfall of Liu Shaoqi and Mao’s approval of the Red Guards. but Mao ordered that the poster be broadcast and published nationally. Even before its elimination after the fifty days. with favorable commentary. This was the Socialist Education Movt. and then you wipe them all out at the same time. and counterrevolution was a serious threat. The university administration and Zhou Enlai opposed this dissent. Workteams were therefore withdrawn and those who had been punished by them were rehabilitated. Like many others. they were almost impossible to enforce due to the uncontrollable Red Guards and incompetent and unprFMJepared workteams. but was soon to be breached. 1964. in the May . on June 1. This served to increase the division among cadre ranks in rural China just as the Cultural Revolution was about to take off. Mao reorganized this movement issuing his “23 Articles” in Jan ’65 such that it became a campaign to educate all levels of the Party on the evils of revisionism. criticized there by the work teams sent. and Zhou Enlai even sent a second central work group to criticize Nie’s wall poster. she led a group of radical professors and teaching assistants to write a largecharacter wall poster (dazibao) criticizing the university’s leadership for having supported the liberal policies of the February Outline and for having prevented mass discussion of the political issues raised by the Hai Rui affair. Mao felt that Liu’s approach here was flawed in that it focused on fighting corruption more than the greater threat of revisionism. Nie probably received encouragement from Kang Sheng’s wife. Bo Yibo: vice premier at the time of the Fifty days who chaired the Sate Council’s Industry and Communications Office Party Committee. Cao Yiou. Mao also felt that it was too harsh on basic-level party cadres. Basically Mao. his case was the subject of a high-leve Party meeting in Beijin. he inaccurately predicted the true targets of the Cultural Revolution. It marked the beginning of the conflict between the radicals (connected to the central CRG advised by Kang Sheng) and Liu Shaoqi and his work teams. On May 25. ’64) sent large workteams to selected communes to thoroughly shake themup and wipe out all revisionism and anti-Party ideology. This announcement served to legitimate spontaneous mass protest as part of the campaign against revisionism. July 1966.

It was broadcast . The phrase is symbolic of the purging of the top level of the CCP. Mao signed them and gave symbolic support to the red guard’s actions. but low in quality.. and try to bring students back under party control while “leading the CR”. MLR.16 Circular. The terms below detail the important points. and no one acknowledged the responsibility of higher officials for revisionism. During Liu Shaoqi’s opening remarks. pg 86-101 Summary: This short part of the book depicts Mao’s starting actions against the establishment. The Sixteen Points – Mao’s blue print for the cultural revolution. Eleventh Plenum – Gathered after Mao had evicted Liu Shaoqi from control over the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shaoqi suspended enrollment for 6 months in the schools and sent 400 work teams to enact reforms. Mao interrupted frequently and asserted that the work teams for which Liu had taken responsibility were major errors. (E.g. had called for a thorough purge of revisionism and capitalists in Chinese culture and the CCP bureaucracy. The work teams were not well trained. All of this helped set up the CR. While students initially expected the arrival of these work teams to resolve the conflicts with the School Party Committees. involving only the cultural and education spheres and denunciations of the usual suspects of bourgeois background. The Plenum was a gathering of party leaders. This had led to student uprisings sparked by Nie Yuanzi’s dazibao attack on Beijing University authorities. Mao used these 50 Days to discredit Liu Shaoqi and set him up for a fall in his position in the Politburo Standing Committee. Tsinghua Red Guards – A group of red guards that sent Mao two big character posters. Work teams were the usual method Communists used to organize large events. and the Socialist Education Work Teams. From the 11th plenum to purges of officials and reorganization of party organs. Mao raged against the party members after it became clear that some of them were luke-warm rather than enthusiastic to the removal of work teams. They were large in size. . “Bombard the Headquarters” – Mao wrote this phrase on a character poster during the 11th Plenum. This platform was more moderate than one would have expected from Mao’s speeches at the plenum. the Chinese Youth League. Mao criticized Liu’s approach as too similar to the Socialist Education Campaign: low officials were attacked. restrain campus violence. It attacked the “four olds” and suggested that the CR would continue much as before. they were dissatisfied with the work teams and began to crit icize them too. Teams were ordered to replace the authorities of the schools. as Liu was put in the difficult situation of having to simultaneously support the revolutionary movement and maintain some semblance of party order and control on the campuses. they had been used in the late 1950s to aid the collectivization of farming throughout China. sold and presented to the public.) This work team campaign lasted for 50 days until Mao stepped back in and the work teams were recalled. mass involvement was restricted. It gave almost totally free reign to the red guards to continue their work. These work teams were composed of personnel from the Party. With Mao gone from Beijing and “mumbling” whenever consulted.

replacing the CC secretariat and becoming as powerful as the MAC and State council on paper. It began as a group of 10 party intellectuals and the wife of the CCP chairman charged with drafting policy documents for the PSC. .Central Cultural Revolution Group – Campaign headquarters of the Cultural Revolution. By 1967 it grew to a bureaucracy employing thousands. Zhou Enlai and Lin Bao praised it as having firmly carried out Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line at its dissolution. The book notes that it was a very chaotic institution due to internal disagreements.

Mao had manifested himself to 12 million Red Guards from all over China. he believed that China’s youth should see leaders in person in order to keep them loyal to the cause. the appeal spoke of “hooligans” masquerading as Red Guards causing chaos and called on genuine Red Guards to end the disorder. The violence that spread through the campuses of colleges and middle schools was a product of the Red Guard movement and Mao’s endorsement of student rebellion. At the first six-hour rally on Aug18. By the last rally on Nov26. In early August. not counterrevolutionary. at Mao’s insistence. and a significant number of people murdered. the incident was revolutionary. Aug 13 – Rally at Beijing Workers’ Stadium Event staged by the Beijing Party Committee during which 70. did not support the appeal.000 youth gathered to watch the denunciation of about a dozen “hooligans” who were eventually beaten up when the rally got out of control. and to struggle against revisionism. invites students to visit the capital. In Mao’s opinion. this communication had endorsed the Peking University work team’s breakup of the June 18 incident. Zhongfa 312 Revoked by Mao on August 5. Red Guard “Urgent Appeal” Issued Aug 6 by Red Guards from three elite middle schools. The Red Terror began its spread through the capital that Saturday night. 102-128 “Red Terror” A well-known period of violence from Aug-Sept 1966 during which private and public property was destroyed. urban undesirables expelled. Mao. wanting chaos. eight massive rallies were held in Beijing between mid-Aug and late Nov. a million students and teachers were led into Tiananmen Square to visit Mao and other officials. pp. Red Guard rallies After Chen Boda. Mao gave the Tsinghua middle school Red Guards his “ardent support” and the movement took off. an act which removed the constraints on violence imposed by earlier work team.MLR. Song Binbin She was one of the students chosen to meet the leaders during the rally. Red Guard movement Movement born as early as May 29 when students from elite middle school attached to Tsinghua University organized themselves to support Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. . Her placement of a Red Guard armband on Mao’s arm signaled his support of the movement and legitimized it nationwide.

Tan Houlan A young cadre that led fellow students and teachers from Beijing Normal University to Qufu county where they destroyed the Confucius Temple in November 1966. Destroying the four olds and fostering the four news became one of the Red Guard’s first tasks. Wu Xun was a beggar that used all the money he gained to found schools. the West City Pickets received material support (office space. and official that had earned Mao’s gratitude for arranging financial assistance for a nascent CCP.) and political backing from the authorities (likely because its members included the children and grandchildren of influential cadres). Xie Fuzhi (Minister of Public Security) He approved 100+ municipal level mass rallies struggling deposed authorities from April 23 to October 27. revolutionary cadres. etc. . broken. 1966. joined by locals and students from the Qufu Teachers’ Institute. educator. or rightist. poor peasant.“Four Olds” Prime task for the Cultural Revolution was the elimination of “old ideas. rich peasant element. vehicles. In the course of four weeks. Chen Boda had decreed it alright to level the grave of Confucius. Repatriation The eviction of urban residents from their homes and forced removal to the villages of their ancestors Five black categories The “bad” classes targeted for repatriation: the landlord element. including 2000 graves. culture.” These were reaffirmed in Lin Biao’s speech during the Aug18 rally. reactionary. His complaint to Mao after Red Guards trashed his house enabled Zhou to issue an order protecting the homes of several senior non-Communists. Five red categories The “good” classes: workers. hooligan. His ministry also sent a report to Mao that became Zhongfa 410. He was attacked as “a propagator of feudal culture” and his corpse was exhumed. 1967. and burned by Red Guards. they. and habits of the exploiting classes. and martyrs’ relatives. customs. this Central Document prohibited police suppression of student movements. Zhang Shizhao Zhang was a retired journalist. Wu Xun A 19th century cultural hero. West City Pickets An elite Red Guard organization that enforced the repatriation program. destroyed 6618 artifacts. soldiers. Issued August 22. including Song Qingling.

or struggled. Chen Boa invites students to the capital. there was mass searching. newspaper offices. and to create.” including the Confucius Temple in Qufu county (Confucianism was thought to foster landlords. and study big character posters. prevented by Zhou. Red Guards first targeted capitalists. Many students were the children and grandchildren of party leaders that outranked their teachers. often beaten to death. At Mao’s insistence. By November.” This exciting time for students was an administrative nightmare and also led to outbreaks of epidemic meningitis. Students were encouraged to devote themselves full-time to the Cultural Revolution – to start Cultural Revolution committees and small groups. some eclectic aspects of the movement included demands for undesirable elements to labor under mass supervision (and in one case to collect their own feces themselves). denunciation of vulgar language. declaring the Forbidden City. the Great Hall of the People. and destruction of property belonging to families of “bad” class background.) and Hai Rui’s grave. They also destroyed public property. As the Red Guard movement took off and pledged to combat the four olds. There was even an attempt. the most fervent supporters turned out to be the middle and even elementary school students. the CCP decided to temporarily suspend all classes. General Summary As the Cultural Revolution started. rich peasants.” Many changes were made. since Red Guards could not consult party members every time.) to reflect the revolutionary ideal. Some destruction was organized and sanctioned officially and the CCRG used the media to encourage and promote the Red Guards. in front of mass rallies designed to rouse the Red Guards to greater fury against Mao’s enemies. and the changing of names (street. were humiliated. landlords. During this period. Mao also believed that Red Guards should enjoy free travel and accommodations s they traveled the country “igniting the fires of revolution. On June 13. many others committed suicide. Zhou sought to limit the destruction. During the Red Terror starting in the summer of 1966. this process relocated 397. it was safer to go along with most changes. calls for a 25 year drinking/smoking age requirement. The police were told to support the Red Guards . etc. personal. the broadcasting station. to criticize teachers for their bourgeois/revisionist teachings. shops. and airfields off-limits. some urban residents were evicted and forcibly repatriated to their ancestral villages. Jinggangshan was led by Kuai Dafu. to rename Beijijng “East Is Red City. etc.000 were arriving by train every day. mainly “places of cultural or historical significance. the group organized a large on-campus rally that “struggled” Wang Guangmei (Liu Shaoqi’s wife) and 300 others. MacFarquhar argues that the Cultural Revolution provided them with the opportunity to emulate their parents and take advantage of knowledge gained from reading secret documents at home. more than 200. and other bourgeois regardless of status. With the cooperation and logistical support of authorities.Jinggangshan organization An organization of Red Guards at Tsinghua University.000 people throughout China. Others. as the last of the rallies were held. especially top-level “revisionists” like Peng Zhen and Peng Dehuai. Carried out by the Red Guard and supported by party members (often under pressure to conform). but also entered homes of adres and people connected to the movement. post. Many were tortured and killed. However. his attempts to issue nationwide orders of protection and set rules restricting Red Guard behavior were vetoed by Mao and the CCRG. looting.

and. the author basically argues that it was not a “one-sided. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History. and no motion without rest. Be warned though. “China’s patron saint of cultural relics”: Protected Beijing Ancient Observatory. this is not everything—if you feel this is very important. Esherick et al. even after the Cultural Revolution. 64-95. It was inspired by the essay “on New Democracy” which said that “there is no construction without destruction. Specifically. physical violence against red guards) as in the defense of the Confucius . Han tombs at Mancheng Lingshan etc… Even if he did not do all the protecting. 96-123 (Readings 7. a temple bell from the Sigou village temple) • Active resistance (i. and even Kang Sheng (who actually protected them to seize them for his own collection) • Passive resistance from villagers and local committee members.e. together issued two circulars directly advising against the destruction of relics)—names include Chen Yi. and mention some particularly good supporting evidence if necessary. State Council. no criminal responsibility for the murders was pursued by the authorities. closed up. I’m not sure how useful any of the material in these two readings will be to you: it seems to be more like a context-builder and discusses some pretty ancillary topics in way too much detail (lots and lots of anecdotes…). we have efforts from these elements of society • Zhou Enlai. I’m only going to lay out the argument. who buried. he became the symbol of cultural preservation—many citizens would write personally letters pleading for his assistance in protecting one artifact or another • Key members in Central Committee. 8) *Note* to be honest. Qi Benyu. then you should probably read the article — Nick 7.” apparently authorizing the destruction of Chinese cultural relics. Li Xiannan. and Central Military Commission (bodies which. Contrary to popular view. pp. To Protect and Preserve Short Summary The article covers the “Destroy the Four Olds” campaign over the period from 1966-1967.” He gives examples of how in all segments of society (from the highest party officials to the local peasantry) there were those who actively opposed the work of the Red Guard in destroying Chinese cultural artifacts. all-consuming mass movement in which Chinese culture was wholly repudiated.. or covered many important artifacts (for example. I’ve decided not to put in lots of examples because you’ll never remember them anyway. no flowing without damming. the Imperial Palace.

Revolutionary rhetoric – is so vague that it could clearly be used to argue on both sides. one of the four types. A general theme that flows through is the idea of using revolutionary rhetoric to persuade the Red Guards not to attack the property. but because it surfaced that Peng Zhen had initially planned to make changes to the palace. major centrist and was key to the preservation of many key sites. which illustrates the general point that not all (or even most) of China was very convinced by Mao’s orders to “bombard the headquarters” 8. and finds that there are substantially more mass killings in the former two than in the latter.e. because they were “state property” or because they were “fruits of the genius and creative power of the Chinese masses. military captive.• Temple complex in August 1966. etc…) were intentionally killed over a short time period He examines their prevalence on a county level in three provinces: Guangxi. Even as people might pretend to support Mao and his revolution.” or because they would be useful as educational materials for the future. More generally what this paper illustrates is that there was not a mass hysteric frenzy in support of Mao. a large number might actually have had ulterior motives and even objectives directly conflicting with Mao’s own agenda. not sure how much material will show up. After his public disgrace. Destruction of the Qufu Confucius Temple Complex – although this incident is regularly used as an example of the wholesale renunciation of traditional culture. These are defined as incidents in which 10 or more non-combatants belonging to a single “category” (i. Guangdong. Successfully (and violently) resisted first Red Guard attempt. it was far from it: the temple’s destruction was contested (and indeed to some extent advocated against by Party leadership). though it was eventually lost after they were reinforced by other red guards The red guards (or certain ones among them) viewed certain relics with an element of national pride.” so the Palace was saved. and might have stayed their own hands when it came to certain things. . and Hubei. but some helpful points) Zhou Enlai – protector of cultural artifacts. Potential IDs (again. Relics were declared safe on the pretext that it would be good for the revolution. A great example is that the Forbidden Palace was spared not just due to Enlai’s efforts. Otherwise. Enlai and others might never have gotten away with protecting as many relics as they had— the Red Guard were simply too powerful to control absolutely. Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution Short Summary This reading discusses the phenomenon of mass killings that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. no one “wanted to be identified with ‘counterrevolutionary revisionist’ Peng Zhen.

and to even do that required some crafty rhetoric and extreme violence. they would always find out too late to do anything about it Potential IDs Only one big one I can think of here: Factionalization: even though the order to form revolutionary committees came from the very top of the party bureaucracy. as the Cultural Revolution was in full swing and interrupted usual means of party control. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History. pp.Most of the paper is actually a summary of these findings. such that the mass killings might be attributed to conservatives lashing out against opposition without restraint. and more violent ones like Guangdong. with the worst county (Wuming) having 2463. But as in the previous reading.. though it often had beatings • Killings happened after the formation of revolutionary committees. Another theory is that mass-killing is part of the class-elimination policy of the part (but taken to an extreme). Similar in Guangdong • Hubei rarely had killings. of which I have selected some salient facts: • In Guangxi. while Guangdong had more conservatives). this might have just been the rhetoric concealing the true motive: • There was a great deal of factionalization. and the revolutionary committees that were called for by party policy had to use “class struggle” terms to attack their enemies to gain control (possibly intentionally encouraging their outright execution). 93 -123 . Esherick et al. they took a long time to form. The remainder of the paper discusses the reasons for variation between low-occurrence provinces like Hubei.” and there seems to be a connection between violence. and furthermore how tenuous a hold the party had on everything. It goes to show just how fragmented the political climate was. The situation was worse because the Cultural Revolution caused disintegration of the infrastructure of the state: even if the upper levels of the government did not view the violence as acceptable. and future political reward. in rural areas far from the provincial capital. • They were perpetrated by governmental authorities. who viewed “killing as a political duty. and a more diverse government provides deterrents. Perhaps due to differences in government structure (Hubei incorporated those who were against the preCultural Revolution government. 15 counties out of sixty-five reported more than 1000 deaths (each).

Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three Provinces Most mass killings took place when party-state began to form new local governments and demobilize mass organizations • Local representatives of the state turned “class struggle” into a reign of terror  mass killings Documenting Mass Killings with County Gazetteers: Guangdong. fewer in Hubei • Peaks of mass killings closely followed the founding of the revolutionary committee Killings concentrated in a few months  evidence for correlation with establishment of revolutionary committees and demobilization of mass organizations • In Hubei.e. reports many injuries Differences most likely indicate real differences in political events across provinces Divergent paths of prior conflict leading to the founding of revolutionary committees • Most provinces had two factions: more militant rebel faction wanting to overthrow pre-Cultural revolution government. and more moderate faction defending the government • Type I provinces (i. rather than county level • Lack of mass killings in urban settings.Hypotheses • Differences not historical fact. abundance in rural villages Reflects disconnect between lower-level jurisdictions and upper-level authorities Indicates weakness of state control at lower level • Perpetrators organized by governmental authorities (militia. rich peasants. new volunteers) Killings carried out as political duty. if anything • Definition: intentional killing of a significant number of the members of any group of noncombatants Membership based on alleged political crimes or unfavorable family background Event must not have occurred during armed combat between mass factions • “Four-types”: landlords. unlike in Guangxi and Guangdong. not in detail” Hubei gazette may have been more conservative – however. counterrevolutionaries. united with revolutionary committee to crush the rebel faction . mass organizations. often with political rewards Provincial Variations . bad elements • Types of mass killings 1) Pogrom against the “four-types” 2) Killings in a political witch-hunt: based on association with alleged conspiratorial groups 3) Summary execution of captives Mass Killings in Three Provinces • Most mass killings in Guangxi and Guangdong. Hubei): rebel faction dominated the new government • Type II provinces (Guangdong. but result of editorial policies in compiling county gazettes “Recording in broad strokes. Guangxi): moderate faction dominate. rebel faction had been included in the new government • Killings tend to occur in commune or brigade level. Guangxi. and Hubei provinces • County gazetteers will underreport.

purges senior staff in State Council. Mao wants revolutionary committees established by Feb 1968 • Two tasks involved in establishing a new order: 1) Installing an effective local government 2) Cracking down on dissenting mass opposition • Leaders of the mass factions that were shut out of the revolutionary committee could become strong opponents of the new order • Revolutionary committees encouraged to defend their power and treat opposition in “class struggle” terms  terror campaigns • Mass killings involve dehumanization of a population segment – the “class enemy” Whoever the local government deemed to be standing in the way of the new social order Enables manufacture of tangible threats to justify terror • However.• Hypothesis: Hubei government was more representative of oppositional elements  deterred mass killings The Political Context • <1967> Mass factions demobilize. Mao sent his documents to Lin Biao. not professional act. CCRG. military/industrial complex least affected. 1967—Mao declares ministries superfluous for revolution. 155–198 26 Dec. looks forward to year of all-round class struggle From early 1967. culture. public health most affected Zhou promoted the idea that power seizure in the ministries was a political. central and provincial governments constantly warned against excess violence Clogged channels of information flow from top down and bottom up State do not find out about mass killings until too late. creation of Central Caucus at 11th Plenum strengthened power of radicals. laid down guidelines and tried to make sure that routine performance was not affected May 1967—Zhou gets Mao’s permission to send in PLA into the ministries as government crumbled. . 1966—Mao toasts cultural revolution at his 73rd birthday. pp. Chen Yun). education. localities do not report mass killings Conclusion/Main Points: 1) Mass killings result from province-specific conditions rather than national politics as a whole 2) Result of repression by local state rather than of conflicts between independent mass groups 3) Primarily rural phenomenon 4) Perpetrators were local leaders and their mass followers MLR. Deng. as did disappearance of the CC Secretariat and disappearance of CCP’s regional bureaus 8 Jan. Zhou Enlai. but not other PSC members (Tao Zhu. Liu.

put up by Wan Hongwen. try to foment rebellion 12 June 1966—first workers’ big character poster. Zhou drafts telegram congratulating rebels in name of party centre. etc. Zhou Enlai phones Shanghai party secretary Chen Pixian and orders him back to work and to disperse the 20. Liberation Daily. beginning 1968. encounter resistance and appeal to WGHQ for help. 1967—establishment of Shanghai Commune. Mao reads and endorses.taking various levels of control. establishment of a united organization. 5 Jan. who later emerges as head of Workers’ General Headquarters (WGHQ) 30 Nov.000-strong Scarlet Guards 28 Dec. commander of Shanghai Garrison. Zhang and Yao are informed that Mao has changed his mind about the commune idea (thought “commune” would be too lax). Scarlet Guards capitulate (“Kangping Road incident”).000 Scarlet Guards attempting to petition authorities in Shanghai and disrupt traffic. 1966—Red Guards occupy Liberation Daily offices.000 gather to witness denunciation of Chen Pixian. 1967—open letter to people of Shanghai published in Wenhui Daily 4 Jan. signifying beginning of nation-wide violence 1 Jan. large percentage of ministry employees sent down to “May 7 Cadre Schools” to do manual labour Late August 1966—Beijing Red Guards arrive in Shanghai in three waves. 1967—100. etc.” . 1967—Wenhui Daily and Liberation Daily publish joint “urgent notice” on measures to fight economic chaos. in return. with WGHQ being dominant To combat. 1966—four hours of fighting.” etc. 1967—Liao Zhengguo. under Zhang and Yao’s leadership 12 Feb. mayor and deputies purged 9 Jan. 23 to “Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai Municipality. begin precipitating rebellions at Wenhui Daily. Chen Pixian orders urgent meeting drafting order to petitioners to withdraw and open letter calling on people to “grasp revolution. radio and TV stations. Shanghai Party Committee organizes 800. 6 Jan. organ of power changed on Feb. 1966—Zhang Chunqiao informed that Scarlet Guards planning to cut off utilities in Shanghai. 1967—Mao formally approves Shanghai seizure of power 5 Feb. ordered WGHQ for action 30 Dec. 1967—upon return to Beijing. orders all workers’ militia members to hand in weapons for “inspection and repair”. municipal committee effectively collapsed. promote production. 16 Jan. 1967—Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan arrive in Shanghai from Beijing.

and to carry out military training and control Military tries to impose control. problem with military discipline. Heilongjiang: revolutionary committee set up 31 Jan. workers were told to make revolution in their spare time. schools recalled. Lin Biao draws up 10-point order endorsed by Mao. along Third Front. shoots “rebels”. request was granted and Mao acknowledged the 8 measures as “very good” (known as the Eight Points) 19 Mar. in favour of rebels.In wake of Shanghai’s January Storm. peasants. urban youths originally sent to countryside who had returned during revolution were sent back. as Lin Biao had conceded that military academy students could challenge leaders just like Red Guards as early as Oct. chaotic attempt to take over lead by various rebel coalitions. Jiang Qing explains that the 8 Points and 10 Points are not contradictory: one was to “support the army” and the other to “cherish the people” . saying that they are taking too serious a view of student assaults 2 April 1967—People’s Daily editorializes on behalf of leftists (“Adopt a Correct Attitude toward the Little Generals”) 6 April 1967—on basis of editorial. maintaining security and playing key role in power seizures (major force behind successes of early power seizures). 1967. anecdotes about confrontations at Qinghai Daily in Xining 1 April 1967—Mao critiques PLA. military ordered to support the left. limits to travel. were causing Five-Year Plan targets to slip PLA played double role. 18–19. only 8 were recognized in 1967. Mao ordered military to support rebels in Hefei when they requested However. who with backing of military district put himself at head of command. Spring 1967—Zhou gets Mao’s approval for limiting confusion of revolution. workers. but on Jan. national security buildings were off-limits. party first secretary skilful enough to manoeuvre into becoming chair of revolutionary committee (Pan Fusheng) In Shanxi. 1967—“Three Supports and Two Militaries” published. 1967—extended session of MAC ask Lin and Biao for measures to restore order in PLA. 1966 23 Jan. 1967. most attempts at power seizures failed. taking control 12 Jan. 20 more not till 1968. party first secretary was outsmarted by party secretary Liu Geping (Muslim). work stoppages. Zhou had to mediate and the revolutionary committee was finally inaugurated April 20. party first secretary imprisoned and committed suicide Beijing had already experienced a power struggle. esp.

loses his temper at their Jan. this frustrated Zhou Zhou had relied on Tao Zhu. 1967—Chen Boda and Jiang Qing denounce Tao. 1966—first serious attack on Tao Zhu. Zhou denies Tao is guilty of suppressing the masses.” denies personal knowledge of Tao before his transfer to the centre. attacks Chen and Jiang. Li Fuchun. and discusses with Tao need for 2–3 month provincial tour to inspect Cultural Revolution’s progress 30 Dec. 1966—meeting to discuss Wang Renzhong turns into attack against Tao. angry words. Wang Li to meeting. extensively in second half of 1966. 1967—Mao summons Lin Biao. but says this issue not to be debated elsewhere Mao probably did not really want to save Tao. to a question from Mao. tells CCRG to hold meeting to criticize Jiang Qing and Chen Boda. guards rush in to protect Tao and he is accused of suppresses the masses 4 Jan. Zhou. Jiang Qing. Mao’s reaction unclear 6 Dec. 4 attack on Tao Zhu. Wang Li and others accuse him at expanded Politburo conference. none of his Politburo colleagues defend him 29 Dec. Chen Boda. and here he did not. because he has in other cases intervened personally much more decisively on behalf of colleagues he wanted to save. 1966—Mao criticizes Jiang Qing for not getting prior permission for attack on Tao. wishes Red Guards good luck in dragging out Tao. appoints Wang Li to succeed Tao Zhu as head of CC Propaganda Dept 3 Feb. transferred to centre from the Central-South Region. Tao tried to protect his former Central-South Region deputy Wang Renzhong 27–28 Dec. Kang Sheng. probably moved Tao to centre earlier as calculated move to separate Tao from his power base Li Fuchun shares Mao’s criticisms of Jiang and Chen with other members of Poliburo . attacked Tao instead 27 Nov. knowing they could not attack Zhou.” that he was “very dishonest. Mao’s reaction ambiguous 8 Jan. 1966—Tao Zhu has confrontation with Red Guards who claimed to be aiming to seize Wang Renzhong. 1966—Jiang Qing requests document detailing 7 of Tao’s crimes from Guan Feng. 1967—Mao comments that Tao Zhu’s issue was “very serious. praises Tao’s work.Anti-PLA riots break out in response to order Mao seems never to have ordered execution of his colleagues. 1967—Mao criticizes CCRG for submitting reports only irregularly 10 Feb. but Zhou’s ability to protect them was limited. CCRG leaders. accuses them of being opportunist. Ye Jianying.

were to self-criticize 22 Apr. Old Guard attack CCRG (February Countercurrent). threatens to fight guerrilla war again if opposed. China's Cultural Revolution. Xu Xiangqian (marshal). 1967—Mao signs off on Zhou Enlai’s submitted editorial “Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly. 1967—unity meeting with Zhou Enlai and Feb. says that Tan Zhenlin (vice premier). and for Liu Shaoqi’s downfall. • This includes the big-character poster “Unmasking the Inside Story of the Big Renegade Clique” which made public the list of names. etc…) that show how the Cultural Revolution was just as destructive internally (i. pp. 93-135 (Reading 9) Not a Dinner Party Short Summary Basically a collection of primary sources (party documents. Peng Zhen and others that would serve as fuel for the denunciations.” Jiang Qing. Zhou Enlai did not support his colleagues from the State Council and PLA Zhang Chunqiao. . and had been imprisoned three months earlier.. significantly. Mao becomes angry upon hearing of Chen Yi’s remarks that the guys in power are the ones who are revisionists 18 Feb. transcripts.e. to CCP members) as it was externally. Chen Yi (marshal). 1967—Mao launches counterattack at meeting of senior officials. agree that the three men would report to Mao. Countercurrent protagonists. permits them to watch May Day fireworks from Tiananmen Schoenhals. Yao Wenyuan meet with Jiang Qing. etc. these were sons and daughters of high-level officials who organized to oppose “left-opportunism.” but was privately furious 19 Feb. 1967—Mao orders United Action Committee members freed. In order of documents: 19 “Annihilate Every Renegade” (Nankai University Red Guards) • Details the Nankai University Red Guards’ role in “uncovering” the renunciation of communism by Bo Yibo.11 & 16 Feb. Wang Li. 1967—two meetings of Central Caucus. speculation that reason for freeing them was that Mao did not want to antagonize Old Guard further 30 Apr. who were the principal Old Guard attackers.

Also interesting because it illustrates just how substantially party position changed after the Revolution.” The reserved.• In general the ostentatious and propagandistic tone of the report conveys the political atmosphere at the time: Red Guardists were keen to interpret any and all evidence as categorical proof that the enemies of China were precisely the ones Mao said were his enemies. as they refuse to hear anything they do not like “We are the revolutionary masses. Again refers to the “Open Notice of Renunciation of Communism” . and humiliated constantly in order to force from him a confession that he was reactionary and a member of the renegade group of traitors. Directly criticizes the factional fighting that characterizes the period (and comes up in previous documents) 22 Bo Yibo Has an Attitude Problem • Account from much after the Cultural Revolution. struggled against. the upright. and principled idealist who refused to bow to the injustices of his guards. she is accused of her own “crimes” • 21 On Case Examination Work (Kang Sheng) • Document from Kang Sheng giving guidance to those conducting Case Examinations • • • • Preaches a degree of moderateness and the need to be exceptionally careful in considering the circumstances of the past. and is humiliated by them with little protest • She cannot even reason with them. Secondarily. cautious tone is slightly ironic (especially given the subsequent document in which Kang is adamant that they extract a confession from Bo Yibo) Not just ironic. given that the result could affect “a person’s political life. she clearly fears them greatly. 20 Interrogation Record. Don’t try to confuse the class demarcation line” Interesting points: Main purpose of interrogation is to get material to implicate Liu Shaoqi further as a reactionary revisionist. and you are a notorious counter-revolutionary old hag. which paints Bo Yibo in a completely different light: here he is the martyr. Wang Guangmei (Qinghua University Red Guards) • A frightening look at the power of the Red Guards: interrogating a former lady. • • • Describes how Bo was tortured. but perhaps a way for Kang to justify the suppression of evidence against those who were not meant to be purged.

Jiang Qing interfered and caused a series of confusion. Mu Xin. with the specific intention of targeting foreign diplomats (incl. he addressed the PLA senior officers with the line “The bigger the trouble gets.became motivated to press for wider attacks on conservative groups.supported by the CRG . As a result. the better. On his departure. radicals . reacted with his usual ambiguous manner.” However. Lin Jie. The role of the PLA was to support “the revolutionary masses of the left. After aligning with the conservatives. Guan Feng) were dismissed and . He declared them as a disruptive “counterrevolutionary adverse current. This potentially explosive atmosphere directly threatened the legitimacy and power of Zhou Enlai. the longer it lasts. Each side claimed that CCRG was on their side. as both groups claimed to be the true left. Therefore. he was willing to sacrifice anything for the sake of revolution. the PLA’s ability to keep order was weakened. Although Chen Zaidao and Zhong Hanhau almost succeeded in gaining the support of the CCRG after returning to Beijing for a meeting. pp 221-238 After the Wuhan incident. not weapons. in August 1967.” However. MLR. it also created many tension and division within the organization.” horrific acts of violence occurred everywhere.”In the end. of course. Four of the most radical members (Wang Li. ultimately Zhou Enlai) and the PLA. this constant contradiction of restoring order and supporting chaos not only confused the role of PLA. Mao. a Wuhan civil war broke out between the radical SteelTempered groups and the conservative Million Heroes. Lin Biao. even incidents of children being paid to kill other children were recorded. and Mao. he appeared to advocate for nonviolence. the judgment from the center at Beijing was quite the opposite. pp 199-238 Summary: This part of the book is divided into two parts: The Wuhan Incident and The May 16 Conspiracy pp 199-220 The Wuhan incident occurred during a period of chaos and struggle between the conservative and radical mass organizations of the Cultural Revolution. the CRG was ordered to reorganize. Although ostensibly.Potential IDs Nankai University Red Guards/Open Notice of Renunciation of Communism/Bo Yibo – important fuel for the fire that would ultimately purge Liu Shaoqi and supporters from the Politburo. it was difficult to determine who to support and who to suppress. Chen Zaida. The members of the mass organizations were not the only ones affected. Despite Mao’s order of “struggle with words. in reality. the regional commander in Wuhan. Kang Sheng/Case Examinations – Investigations to find evidence against key members to justify their purge. And due to the ten-point MAC order of April 6 and the February Countercurrent. disbanded the Workers' General Headquarters of the radical side.

The Million Heroes even paid for the murders of Red Guards. Xie formed a close association with the CRG. upon their dissolution. the Million Heroes stormed Wang and Xie’s hotel. was forced to suspend publication. pushing them out of all of their strongholds in just over a month. and named a member of the Party Secretariat responsible for all political and legal matters (a position formerly held by Peng Zhen). when Mao labeled them as “conservative. When Beijing told them to stop. and the rebels had control of the city. In end. He received a formal welcome. Because Mao sort of gave contradictory messages. the Million Heroes destroyed the radicals. a member of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee. The military commander in Wu Han. They didn’t like the insecurity and instability of the CR in Wuhan and decided to take violent action against the rebels. Wang Li was one of the two representatives of the CRG to attend the meeting. as Mao said. which had sided with the MH) because they thought he had given up on them. everyone thought the Chairman was behind them and believed they were supporting Mao’s Thought. Basically Chen Zaidao made self-criticism and promised to reinstate the workers organization. Lots of bloodshed & death. at this time in Wuhan.the Party's theoretical journal Hongqi. The end of the Million Heroes was sort of the last stand of armed resistance against the radicals. “Attack with words. However. they were angered and beat up Chen Zaidao (leader of the Wuhan Military Re gion.” their days were soon over. The important thing to note is that. they didn’t realize that they were not in his favor until after several weeks of violence. Later they even kidnapped Wang Li (important member of CRG).2 million people. Because the radicals were fragmented and the Million Heroes were well organized. Opposite them were the Rebels who were made up of 50 Red Guard organizations and workers. Wang Li: a member of the Cultural Revolution Group. They disbanded soon afterwards. etc. purportedly made up of 1. In 1966. which was under the editorship of Chen Boda and had been a mouthpiece of the CRG. medical care. the radicals weregiven weapons and the military was strictly ordered to support the radicals (unlike previous vague orders to “support the left”). the conflict between the radical group and the conservative (the “Million Heroes”) in Wu Han was very intense. IDs: • Million Heroes: This organization. Xie Fuzhi : He replaced Luo Ruiqing as Minister of Public Security and had a subsequent meteoric rise in the CCP in 1966-7. Wang Li was rescued by Zhou Enlai and brought back to Be ijing. They did not realize that Mao was in Wuhan and that most of the orders came from him. was the more conservative organization in Wuhan at the time of the Wuhan Incident.). Then Wang Li and Xie were to inform the party. The majority of them were workers in the factories of Wuhan who felt indebted to settled authorities for their work related benefits (housing. kidnapped Wang and beat him up. In 1967.” After this incident. The fallen individuals in this group of targeted radicals were known as the “May16th Group” (the "516 Group"). military and the CRG. and at the eleventh plenum in 1966 was appointed an alternate member of the Politburo. • • . Angered by this development. defend with weapons. probably because the Ministry of Public Security played such a large role in the conflicts leading to the CR. he was dismissed as a result of May 16th Conspiracy. Chen Zaidao requested a meeting with Zhou Enlai.

Chen decided that the radical organizations were gaining too much control in Wuhan. and told the rebels to overthrow the Shanghai Party Committee and assume power. saying that the actions of Chen Zaidao and other players in the adverse current were suppressive. However. Wang was seized but Xie was spared because of his formal position of vice-premier and minister of public security. had begun to take over Wuhan) to criticize the Million heroes. and many radical groups seized weapons and munitions from army storehouses. After the February Adverse Current. a conservative umbrella organization. Chen Zaidao requested a meeting with Zhou Enlai and the Cultural Revolution Group. as a part of the CRG. the armed forces could o longer declare an organization to be counterrevolutionary or to make mass arrests. was left to convey the results of Mao's dictates after the Wuhan incident (in which the Million Heroes. Wang and Xie stuck around to enact his orders. necessitating a second series of meetings with Zhou Enlai and two members of the CRG (Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi). He felt that. The Million Heroes stormed the hotel where Wang and Xie were staying to retaliate. The radicals could not be easily be controlled by the army. In response. he would be able to disband the Workers’ General Headquarters faction in Wuhan. The Million Heroes representatives were angered by this announcement and stormed the hotel where Xie and Wang were staying. Zhang Chunqiao: In 1966. Because of the changes. Unfortunately for Chen. About two weeks later in late January. he and Yao returned to Shanghai. Xie and Wang returned to Beijing as heroes. Mao even attended a couple of meetings. met with the WGH. The Million Heroes and the radicals continued to fight. giving her ammunition to undo the agreement. The radicals in Wuhan (and all across China) protested. He became First Party Secretary/Mayor.” Mao approved. Under the directives. and endorsed the radicals. dealing a major blow to the Red Guard movement. since some of the central authorities were restricting the Cultural Revolution. Chen was let off . A conservative group called “The Million Heroes” was established in defense of the military. Instead. possibly beating Wang in the process. the struggle between large organizations in Wuhan intensified. In 1967. repudiate the military region command. Chen Zaidao: the commander of the Wuhan Military at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. the party published directives that greatly limited the PLA’s ability to suppress radical organizations. This centralized the authority in China—only Beijing could classify groups. and endorse the city's radical mass organizations. Mao and Zhou both criticized the decision to disband the Workers’ GH. Surprisingly. The group actually agreed with Chen. and ordered that it be reinstated.• • with Wang Li. they presented Mao’s instructions as a censure of the military. and that the radicals (under the umbrella of the Workers’ General Headquarters) should stop attacking the city. After Mao left. Wang Hongwen and the CRSG supported him and the students were suppressed. The Wuhan Incident was only resolved when Zhou Enlai came to restore order. Zhang was sent to deal with the Anting incident and pacify the workers. he recognized the Workers’ General Headquarters (WGH) under Wang Hongwen and met their “five-point demands. Despite the ruling. while Chen Zaidao was taken in for questioning. and ruled that the Wuhan Military Region had acted correctly. Radicals like Jiang Qing threw their weight behind the radical protests. word of the agreement reached Wuhan before Beijing made an official declaration—Jiang Qing said that this meant that Chen was taking advantage of his success and going behind the party’s back. the Red Revolutionaries (a Red Guard group) attack Zhang. At the end of it all.

the whole point is that Chen was at the center of one of the more important events at the beginning of the CR. but with the tacit support of Mao. He tried to limit the Workers’ General Headquarters. . So. the radicals were allowed to flourish.the hook without facing any major consequences. and efforts to curtails their activities were generally destined for failure.

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