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France EDF Areva

France EDF Areva

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IAEA General Conference 2012 Nuclear Operating Organizations cooperation Forum Strengthening the effectiveness of operating organizations Tuesday

, 18 September 2012

Enhanced NPPs Safety and Protection after Fukushima French Industry experience: a responsible approach EDF / Areva
Michel Debes - EDF Generation and Engineering Division (michel.debes@edf.fr) Bertrand Delepinois - Areva (bertrand.delepinois@areva.com)
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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CONTENT - The industry prime responsibility of safety - Importance of periodic safety reassessments - Avoid environment contamination, even in extreme situations - Results of EDF Stress Tests and improvements for existing NPPs - The EPR safety at the light of Fukushima - Main lessons drawn for nuclear development and new projects - Enhancing collective international safety responsibility
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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EDF Nuclear plants in France and Operational Experience
Nuclear generation (2011):
Gr avelin es Pen ly Palu el Cho oz Cat tenom N ogent Seine St Lauren t Chino n Civaux D am p ierre Belleville Fessenh eim

421,1 TWh (+3,2%)
58 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) on 19 sites: 63 GW Three standardized series: => a major safety and economic benefit 900 MW: 34 units, 31 GW 1300 MW: 20 units, 26 GW 1500 MW (N4): 4 units, 6 GW Operational experience safety and transparency as a major priority average operation time: 26 years (10 to 34 years) Experience feedback: ~ 1500 reactor years Periodic 10 years Safety Reassessment process ==> Long term operation: goal up to 60 years EPR under construction: Flamanville 3

kd : average 80,7% (top10: 89 to 98%) ; ku : 94,3% (frequency control, load follow..)

Flam anville

Bug ey St A lban Cruas Tricastin

Blayais Golfech

900 M W

1 300 M W

1 50 0 M W

Rythme de construction du parc nucléaire actuel d’EDF MW
70000 60000 50000 40000

1400 M W

1300 MW

30000 20000 900 MW 10000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Decommissioning program: 9 reactors (6 GGR, HWGCR Brennilis, SFR Creys Malville, PWR Chooz A)

IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Safety is a prime responsibility of industry

EU Safety Directive – Art 6:
... the prime responsibility for nuclear safety of a nuclear installation rests with the licence holder. This responsibility cannot be delegated. (cf also IAEA Safety Fundamental 1) ⇒ Competences, training, procedures, design, safety culture, organisation, controls,… … requires licence holders, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority, to regularly assess and verify, and continuously improve, as far as reasonably achievable, the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations in a systematic and verifiable manner. ...

After Fukushima, the nuclear industry collectively shares the sense of a burning priority to be put on nuclear safety, in all circumstances

IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Periodic safety reassessments are key
Every 10 years : safety reassessment for each plant
- reassessment of the licensing basis, - experience feedback, - new knowledge or evolutions, - internal/external event: earthquake, flooding, electrical supplies, cooling water, industrial environment... - severe accidents prevention and limitation of consequences - probabilistic studies, backfitting (cost / benefit analysis), - compliance assessment and checking , ageing assessment, R&D => as a result, a new safety basis and an improvement programme is proposed to

ASN, including safety controls and a consistent set of modifications • Plants built for decades must get regular design improvements •Necessity for the operator to remain continuously involved in engineering issues • Need for an organization encompassing adequate engineering and operational skills
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Beyond design situations must be addressed
► Ensure robustness and margins against extreme natural hazards
Earthquakes, flooding, weather…

Beyond referential (the referential remaining the referential…)

► Strengthen plant autonomy (water, power, fuel…) to cope with :
Long term loss of offsite power Loss of heat sink Devastation of roads and infrastructures around the site

► Harden the vital safety systems ► Put in place mobile means ► Ensure containment integrity in case of extreme hazards and severe accident
Fukushima stresses the need for a reinforced and shared objective worldwide : nuclear plants must be able to face extreme, beyond design, situations. Objective : prevent a severe accident or, should it occur, avoid long term contamination. (design objective for new reactors, to be addressed for existing plant through PSR)
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Results of "Stress tests" for French NPPs : - Complementary Safety Assessments - Improvements for existing NPPs and emergency planning

Main objective - The future NPPs have to be designed and operated with the objective that no accidental scenario may lead to long term contamination in neighbouring territories. - This objective should be used for existing plants, underlining the importance of Periodic Safety Review process (PSR)

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The CSA : a two steps methodology
5 technical areas to be assessed: earthquake, flooding, loss of heat sink, loss of electrical power, Severe accident management + conditions for subcontracting activities (safety, radiological protection)

1/ In-depth assessment of the current safety layers according to the current design basis of: – Physical protections such as dikes, embankments, anchorage, water resources,… – Design Basis accident management – All relevant systems used for the safety demonstration => confirmation of adequate margins for all NPPs 2/ New analysis going beyond the current design basis referential: – Efficiency of protections – Consideration of extreme situations – « Hard core » of systems and equipment enabling to avoid releases with significant long term consequences => If necessary, implementation of supplementary means – Equipment – Human resources – Local/national organization
Copyright EDF April 2012

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The next key steps
Definition of the industrial modification programme submitted to ASN (June 2012): - Over 500 actions identified (ECS, GP review, etc.) - Short-term modifications: FARN, temporary mobile equipment (small diesel generators, thermal motordriven pumps, etc.), “plug and play” connections - Medium-term modifications: ultimate back-up diesel (DUS), ultimate heat sink, local emergency centre, anticipation of changes in operating reference safety standards: earthquake, flooding, loss of power supply, etc. - Long-term modifications: close interaction with Long Term Operation safety objectives and related modifications
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Improvements for existing NPPs
• Enhancing robustness of systems designed to protect key safety functions against external hazards (earthquakes, flooding...)
- flooding: protection of equipment and materials (dams or dykes, building leaktightness...) - Supplementary protection of electrical switchyards against flooding - robustness against seism: reinforcement of supports and anchorages, electrical equipment..

• Increasing water make-up and electrical power supply capacity, to cool the reactor and avoid fuel uncovery (reactor core, spent fuel pool)
- additional water reserve (basin, underground table…) - reinforcement of the back up cooling water supply (tank...) - implementation of additional back up diesel generator s on each unit: supply of AFW pumps, water make-up to RCS and spent fuel pool, thermal pump to supply water in RCS - spent fuel pool operation: instrumentation (level, temperature), supply systems, fuel handling..

• Protective measures in case of core meltdown, minimizing radioactive releases to avoid significant long-term contamination of surrounding areas
- robustness and efficiency of U5 containment filter to limit external releases (cesium...), seismic resistance, improvement of fitration capabilities (iodine), - soda in reactor building sumps (to trap iodine) - studies of countermeasures to avoid contamination of the water table (in case of basement melt through)

• Reinforcing site and national emergency preparedness organizations:
- personnel and equipment; event involving multi-units on site
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Key additional measures
• Implementation of a “Hardened safety core” of systems, structures and components designed to prevent large radioactive releases to the environment in extreme conditions - protected against extreme external hazards exceeding the scope of the current design basis., - to increase mitigation and robustness beyond design
ex: DUS, U5, relevant instrumentation, water make up means with dedicated pumps, water reserve ...

• Nuclear Rapid Response Force (FARN) - The setting up a supplementary "resilient" line of defense through a national "Rapid Action Force" (FARN) ready to support a site in trouble within 24h (event involving multi-units ), to maintain or restore core cooling and to avoid any significant release: support team, mobile means (pumps, power, plug and play connections,...), accident management, logistics , - reinforcement of crisis management premises on site

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Nuclear Rapid-Response Force
Objectives: Missions: to re-establish and/or maintain reactor cooling with the aim of avoiding any core fusion or any significant release

IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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The EPR reactor safety in the light of Fukushima

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EPR Genesis
Three Miles Island (1979): Core meltdown accident • Modifications on operating plants (human factor, severe accidents) • Considerable R&D on severe accidents

Chernobyl (1986): Dispersal of radioactive material

Eliminate the risk of experiencing consequences on populations similar to the Chernobyl disaster (incl long term consequences)

• 30 years of experience of French and German fleets Operating experience • Probabilistic Safety Assessment of current plants

9/11 (2001): Terrorist attack using a commercial aircraft

Ensure that a terrorist attack will not cause a severe accident in the context of nuclear technology diffusion worldwide

The EPR design includes, from its origin, all safety progresses. Voluntary choice of an evolutionnary design, for safety reasons
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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EPR safety objectives
Reduce core damage frequency by a factor 10 Reduce radiological releases in case of an accident
design basis accidents : no protection measures for the population practical elimination of all situation leading to large and early releases (hydrogen explosion, core melt under pressure, steam explosions) in case of a low pressure core-melt, only limited protection measures can be tolerated (eg no permanent relocation)

Increase robustness against terrorist attacks ( resist lo a large commercial aircraft crash) Simplify operation Deterministic approach, complemented by probabilistic assessment

• Severe accident mitigation is included in the design • These objectives define the Gen 3 (or 3+) reactors
Convention SFEN – 8 et 9 mars 2012 – Analyse sûreté de l’EPR

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15

EPR resistance to external hazards
►Strong resistance to earthquakes
single basemat shared by reactor, spent fuel and safeguard buildings all safety and support systems are seismic classified
1,8 m

►Protection against malvolant action
aircraft protection shell buildings and doors are explosion resistant geographical separation

►Watertight buildings and doors Margin assessment demonstrate with a high level of confidence that a Fukushima quake would not have impacted EPR capabilities to avoid a severe accident Buildings, would have resisted dynamic impact of the wave and a 3-4 m of flooding without risk of excessive leaks
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Robustness of cooling capability
Emergency power
Physical protection Physical separation Redundancy & diversification

SBO

Diesels

Diesels & fuel tanks housed in reinforced buildings earthquake resistant doors designed to resist explosions & floods

2 buildings located on each side of the reactor building impossible for both of them to be damaged by an external hazard (explosion, airplane crash…)

4 main 100% redundant diesels: 72 hours autonomy each, at full load 2 additional SBO diesels : fully diversified, 24 hours autonomy each batteries: 12h autonomy

6 emergency diesels plus batteries: redundant, diversified and protected
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Robustness of cooling capability
Redundancy & diversity
Four 100% safety trains 1. Emergency feedwater system

3 2

4 Tanks (4x 400m3)

Cooling through secondary loop with EFWS1

1

4 safety trains located in 4 dedicated safeguard buildings 2 safeguard buildings are further protected by the APC shell One train is enough to cool the core (“100% train”)

For each train: 2 redundant and diverse sub-systems

2. Safety injection system

Pressurizer

Highly redundant cooling systems, with two ways to cool down the core in accident conditions

Cooling through primary loop with safety injection system

IRWST2 (1800 m3)

IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Robustness of cooling capability
Water supply
Emergency feedwater system (water reserve in safeguard building) Emergency injection system (water reserve in reactor building) 4 3
4 Tanks 400m3 x4 Pump IRWST (1800m3) Fire fighting Tank (2600m3) Pump

Heat sink 1 (e.g. ocean)

Alternate 2 heat sink

5

In case of loss of main heat sink access 1 ,the EPR™ reactor can rely: ► On an alternate heat sink source1 2 (against floods or earthquakes…) ► On significant protected water reserves: ► four EFWS2 tanks 3 in the safeguards buildings ► a large fire fighting tank 4 ► the IRWST3 5 in the reactor building

The EPR™ design has multiple and diverse access to water
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Severe accident mitigation
Prevention of high pressure core melt Elimination of H2 risk

Core melting at high system pressure can potentially lead to loss of containment integrity and major melt dispersal The EPR™ design includes additional dedicated primary depressurization valves

Minimize H2 concentration : Large reactor building with interlinked compartments Reduce H2 quantity: Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners

Short and long term function of containment ensured

Prevention of direct leakage

Reinforced containment Core catcher Long term cooling (severe accident dedicated system) ► Basemat integrity ensured

Potential containment leakage is collected in the annulus (subatmospheric pressure)

IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Post-Fukushima Safety authorities assessments on EPR™ Design
Stress tests performed in Europe highlighted the intrinsic robustness of the EPR design:

France : ASN reported that “the enhanced design of [the EPR ensures already an improved robustness with respect to the severe accident”

Finland : STUK highlighted that “earthquakes and flooding are included in the design to ensure safety functions to a high level of confidence

UK : ONR issued the EPR interim Design Acceptance in December ’11, stating that there is no ‘show stopper’ regarding EPR™ safety

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EPR synthesis
►EPR safety principles are conforted after Fukushima :
robustness towards external hazards enhanced defence in depth severe accident mitigation included in the design

► modifications will be made to further strengthen safety :
reinforced water tightness longer autonomy (diesel fuel, batteries) connections for mobile means

► the lesson learnt process will continue

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Lessons drawn for New projects

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Key Success Factors for Nuclear Development
• Developing a nuclear program involves a wide range of initiatives:
- Setting the proper regulatory framework

-

Establishing optimal industrial organisation for new nuclear plant construction Selecting a technology

- Building a solid, secure plan for the entire nuclear fuel cycle (front end, back end, waste management...) - Setting up an efficient operation system - Training, boosting national expertise - Involving local suppliers in the programme (qualification, oversight...)

IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Fukushima impact on New Nuclear Build
► The strengthening of safety requirements :
Generation III and III+ reactors to be the reference in Europe Gen 3+ are defined by the WENRA safety objectives for new reactors WENRA and IAEA SSR 2-1 standards seem valid after Fukushima some adjustments may be made, according to the full return of experience actual implementation is the major stake

► The independence of the regulator : a key factor ► International institutions’ greater role (IAEA, OECD/NEA etc.) in the development of new nuclear power programs (forwarding high safety standards) ► Role of WANO to enhance operator's responsibilities at international level.

Nuclear safety involves a collective responsibility and action
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum

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Thank you for your attention and your questions …

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