Prof Vladimir G.

Asmolov

2nd Nuclear Industry Cooperation Forum

Side event of 56th regular session of the IAEA General conference 18 September 2012, IAEA, Vienna /Austria

What has happened at FukushimaDaiichi NPP? Why multi-units accident has happened? What are the lessons we have learned?

I.

Reports:
Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS INPO 11-005 (November 2011)
Lessons Learned from Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS INPO 11-005 Addendum (June 2012) Kurokawa Commission Report (June 2012) A number of technical reports presented by TEPCO, JANTI, JAIF and NISA at various international meetings

II. Reports of International missions before and after the accident

III. Outcomes of own national analysis of the accident

3

1.

It is now clear that many of the factors contributing to the Fukushima accident were identified prior to the accident:

poor severe accident management planning structure; lack of safety improvements;

inadequate evaluation of external hazards;

weak regulatory system; lack of training of personnel on Emergency Preparedness.

2.

The necessary measures to address these shortcomings were not put in place.
4

1.

The Safety Fundamentals remain appropriate as a sound basis for nuclear safety when properly implemented.

2.
3.

Implementation should provide for prevention and mitigation with an equal priority.
Primary responsibility for safety remains with operators, and their prompt actions to recover power supply and water feed for decay heat removal

4.

Design safety features of NPPs have to provide sufficient time to the operators for implementation of accident management actions
5

Reliability

The equipment additional failures Deterministic experience related to BDBA consequences evaluation

First step in the robustness analysis

Fire

NPP
1) Total loss of:
- electric power supply; - core cooling; - coolant sources

2) Loss of primary circuit integrity 3) No actions of operators for accident management

7

Evaluation of time to degradation of safety barriers on the path of radioactive fission products release due to sequential failure of safety functions of regular systems and unsuccessful accident management actions
Decay heat removal to the final absorber Reactor core components integrity Main coolant circulation circuit integrity Leak-tight compartments integrity
8

Guaranteed times for operation in cooldown modes in case of accidents with loss of power supply

24 hours

In case of LOCA in Tianwan, Kudankulam, Novovoronezh-II and Leningrad-II plant designs

72 hours

In case of LOCA in VVER-TOI design

As long as necessary

In case of absence of LOCA

The accumulated knowledge of severe accident processes and phenomena allow us to solve the problem of severe accident management by means of:
NPP design quality and using operating experience accumulated as much as possible (accident prevention)
A consistent fight for retention of integrity of physical safety barriers while every barrier being considered as the last one on the way of the melt propagation (accident management)

1 2

10

Implementation of the severe accident management allows us to proceed to the second step of the robustness analysis
Cost-benefit analysis

Estimation of reasonableness of investments into the hazard reduction

11

Definition of detailed measures at each NPP

Corporate measures to mitigate the consequences of beyond-designbasis accidents at NPPs

Design documentation development

Emergency equipment delivery to NPPs

Implementation of the measures at NPPs

12

Near-term actions
Purchasing and equipping the plants with portable engineering means to be used for the elimination of severe BDBAs:

Diesel generators, Diesel-driven pumps, Motor-driven pumps, etc.

Medium- and long-term actions

Analysis and development of specific supplementary design solutions to be implemented at each NPP
13

RST SMO KLN LEN

- brought into operation - brought into pilot operation - not available

Introduction of seismic protection systems at NPPs

BEL
BAL

BIL
KUR

NVO KOL

Completion of works on seismic microzoning for each NPP site in 2013

1.

Performing calculations using conservative approaches

2.

Implementation, when necessary, of measures for the equipment and piping fixation
3.
14

Novovoronezh
in case of breaking Matyra and Voronezh water reservoirs dams and taking into account the maximum possible flooding at the Don River, the water level can reach the value 2.0 m higher than the emergency dike of Power Units 1 to 4, which will cause the flooding of Unit 3,4 Pumping Station for 0.5 m
implement the project of water pumping-out from lower levels of NPP buildings with the aid of enginedriven pump

increase the height of the protective hydraulic structure for the protection of Unit 3,4 Pumping Station

Balakovo
in case of breaking the dam of Kuybyshev water reservoir at the Volga River and taking into account the maximum possible flooding, the level margin is 0.65 m
implement the project of water pumping-out from lower levels of NPP buildings with the aid of engine-driven pump during the upgrading, supplementary systems of heat removal to the ultimate heat sink were installed, with the use of special equipment functioning under flooding conditions

Leningrad
in case of a storm surge, the water level in the Gulf of Finland may reach up to + 4.3 m higher than the rated level

the NPP equipping with mobile emergency means for reactor residual heat removal 15

AT OTHER RUSSIAN NPPs FLOODINGS ARE IMPOSSIBLE

Balakovo

Rostov
introduce the spray cooling pond emergency make-up systems introduce the reactor and spent fuel storage pond cooling, with the water delivery from mobile high-pressure pumping stations, engine-driven pumps, and fire engines

the loss of ultimate heat sink is possible water carry-over from spray cooling ponds of the service water system and pond pipeline damage
Kursk Smolensk

tornado is probable

strengthening structural units at Kursk NPP Power Units 3,4 and Smolensk NPP Power Units 2,3 is required
16

In 2012, the following equipment was delivered to the 10 Russian NPPs:

31 units
Mobile diesel-generators 2.0 MW (6kV; 0.4 kV; 220 V DC)

36 units
Mobile diesel-generators 0.2 MW (0.4 kV)

35 units
Mobile high-pressure pumping units of various capacity and head pressure

80 units
Engine-driven pumps of various capacity and head pressure

182 units
TOTAL:
17

18

The VVER-TOI design and Novovoronezh-II NPP

TORNADO, HURRICANE

Protection from external impacts

AIRPLANE CRASH
Basic impact: 20.0 tons with 200 m/s velocity Option: 400.0 tons

Maximum design wind velocity of 56 m/s (tearing off roofs, uprooting big trees, overthrowing railway carriages, blowing out cars off-road )

SHOCK WAVE With frontal pressure of 30 kPa

SEISMIC IMPACTS
Basic impact: MDE 7 point as per MSK-64 scale DE 6 points Option: MDE 9 point as per MSK-64 scale DE 8 points

FLOODS, STORMS
As applicable to specific site conditions

PROLONGED LOSS OF POWER AND WATER SUPPLY

19

 Supplementary design solutions planned

to be introduced will enhance safety, survivability and autonomy of the Russian NPPs up to 510 days in case of a severe accident

Technical solutions introduced in modern

Russian designs and aimed at the safety enhancement meet the Post-Fukushima requirements and are based on relevant references
20

Conclusions
1. Improvement in safety can be reached through better sharing of operation experience and improvements in technology. The IAEA is to increase interactions with utilities and nuclear industry. 2. The IAEA is to declare clearly the recognition of the role of operating organizations and nuclear industry in safe and sustainable nuclear power development and to strengthen cooperation with them.
21