P. 1
Proofs that p

Proofs that p

|Views: 3|Likes:

More info:

Published by: Raúl Ibarra Herrera on Sep 25, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less





Proofs that p

Davidson's proof that p: Let us make the following bold conjecture: p Wallace's proof that p: Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p Grunbaum: As I have asserted again and again in previous publications, p. Putnam: Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the fallacies in this "argument". (It's really awful, isn't it?) Therefore p. Rawls: It would be nice to have a deductive argument that p from selfevident premises. Unfortunately I am unable to provide one. So I will have to rest content with the following intuitive considerations in its support: p. Unger: Suppose it were the case that not-p. It would follow from this that someone knows that q. But on my view, no one knows anything whatsoever. Therefore p. (Unger believes that the louder you say this argument, the more persuasive it becomes). Katz: I have seventeen arguments for the claim that p, and I know of only four for the claim that not-p. Therefore p. Lewis: Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious and when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the fact that they find not- p obvious is no argument that it is true; and I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare. Therefore, p. Fodor: My argument for p is based on three premises: 1. q 2. r and 3. p From these, the claim that p deductively follows. Some people may find the third premise controversial, but it is clear that if we replaced that premise by any other reasonable premise, the argument would go through just as well. Sellars' proof that p:

Unfortunately limitations of space prevent it from being included here. I hope to expand on these matters further in a separate monograph. I cannot be held responsible for any lacunae in the (published version of the) argument. all such criticisms misconstrue my argument.called "counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that pin a way that it was obviously not intended -. . It will be noted that the present version of the argument seems to presuppose the (intuitionistically unacceptable) law of double negation. _________________ (1) This outline was prepared hastily -. Earman: There are solutions to the field equations of general relativity in which space-time has the structure of a four. Goodman: Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false. then there is a model for p. Plantinga: It is a model theorem that p -> p. on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But none of them seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case.at the editor's insistence -from a taped manuscript of a lecture. Outline Of A Proof That P (1): Saul Kripke Some philosophers have argued that not-p. . the argument now seems to me to have problems which I did not know when I wrote it. Therefore p. But the argument can easily be reformulated in a way that avoids employing such an inference rule. and which are completely unrelated to any criticisms that have appeared in the literature (or that I have seen in manuscript). Therefore p. Also. Therefore p. p. Therefore. Therefore p. In each such space-time.dimensional Klein bottle and in which there is no matter. Surely its possible that p must be true. But these so. but which I can't discuss here. Thus p. But it is a model theorem that p -> p.for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. but important parts of the proof can be found in each of the articles in the attached bibliography. the claim that not-p is false. or for any fallacious or garbled inferences resulting from faulty preparation of the typescript. Routley and Meyer: If (q & not-q) is true. Since I was not even given the opportunity to revise the first draft before publication.

  Plato:   SOCRATES:  Is  it  not  true  that  p?   GLAUCON: I agree.   Churchland:   Certain  of  my  opponents  claim  to  think  that  not-­‐p.   may  nevertheless  be  adhered  to  by  a  scientist  for  any  length  of  time. ERYXIMACHUS: The argument certainly points that way. PHAEDO: By all means.  If  this  state  of  affairs  does  not  obtain  then  it  is  less  than   perfect. PHAEDRUS: What you say is true. ALCIBIADES: Certainly.  but  it  is  precisely  my   thesis  that  they  do  not. Socrates.   heliocentrism.  Therefore  p.  For  did  not  the  most  "absurd"  of  theories.  for  an  obtaining  state  of  affairs  is  better  than  a  non-­‐obtaining   one. ARISTOPHANES: Assuredly. if we are to be consistent.   and  "rationally"  adhered  to.  stage  a  come-­‐back  after  two  thousand  years?  And  is  not   Voodoo  now  emerging  from  a  long  period  of  unmerited  neglect?   Goldman:   Several  critics  have  put  forward  purported  "counterexamples"  to  my   thesis  that  p. THRASYMACHUS: Yes.Chisholm: P-ness is self-presenting. Socrates.  since  I  intended  my  thesis  to  have  no   counterexamples.  Therefore  p. Therefore.  so  the  state  of  affairs  inconsistent  with  not-­‐p  obtains. CEPHALUS: It would seem so.  etc. what? q maybe? More  Proofs  that  P     Anselm:   I  can  entertain  an  idea  of  the  most  perfect  state  of  affairs  inconsistent   with  not-­‐p.   Feyerabend:   The  theory  p.  though  "refuted"  by  the  anomaly  q  and  a  thousand  others. . Socrates. PAUSANIAS: Quite so. p.  therefore  it  is   proved.  but  all  of  these  critics  have  understood  my  thesis  in  a  way   that  was  clearly  not  intended. Morganbesser: If not p. POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily.

Not-P entails that there are sense-data. Only philosophers would think that not-P.. Therefore P.  I  won't  even  waste  my  time  arguing  for  it  any  further.  some  philosophers  feel   curiously  compelled  to  assert  that  not-­‐p. [Galen Strawson.   and  several  by  people  who  aren't. [various] 5. See my ". I know that P is true because I teach it to my undergraduates. Therefore P. [Bill Lycan] MORE PROOFS THAT P .  I  shall  label  this  phenomenon  "the  blithering  idiot  effect". Representationalism entails P & not-P. [Charles Siewert. [Brian Loar] 3. Not-P is true from the transparent perspective. Aaron Zimmerman] 6.  are  due  to  the  blithering  idiot  effect. Therefore P. with attributions to arguer added). [various] 7.   there  remains  no  reason  to  deny  p. Therefore P.   While  everyone  knows  deep  down  that  p. But I take the oblique perspective. Therefore P & not-P. others] 2. [Bill Lycan] 9. P is a bold and controversial claim that shatters common-sense intuition. [various] 4.     TOP TEN ARGUMENTS FOR P HEARD AT THE NEH INSTITUTE (T-shirt list. Therefore P. Therefore P. You don't think that phenomenology supports that P? Look haaaarder! Therefore P. [Brian Loar] 8.Smart:   Stove:   Dammit  all!  p. 1." where I argued for P. Therefore P.  which  everyone  knows  deep  down   anyway..  as  a  result  of  being  closet   Marxists. Therefore P.  As  I   have  shown  that  all  assertions  of  not-­‐p  by  anyone  worth  speaking  of. [John Searle] 10. It's completely implausible and a violation of common-sense intuition to think that not-P. To think that not-P is to over-intellectualize.

Therefore P. I'm beginning to lose my grip on what it means to say that not-P. Therefore P. Therefore P. Therefore P. [Charles Siewert]   . [Susan Hurley] P gives me an "aha!" reaction. [David Chalmers] Now that I've taken you on this little journey. Therefore P. [by Amy Schmitter. I went surfing. [Brad Thompson] I have a lot of arguments for P. Therefore P. But I just called them "the folk". Sellars argues that not-P. [Galen Strawson] The argument for not-P has seven steps. [Susan Hurley] Someday someone might discover that P. [Susanna Siegel] Not-P? That just doesn't work for me. attributed to unnamed presenter] The folk think that not-P. Therefore P. [attributed to Frank Jackson] P* and representationalism holds. (Actually. [by Becko Copenhaver. and I'm way too old for that. Therefore P.) Therefore P. Therefore P. [Amy Schmitter] I'm tired. attributed to unnamed presenter. therefore P&~P. though none of them are very good. [John Searle] I've considered and rejected one possible defense of a key premise in one possible argument for not-P. [Frank Jackson] Sellars has established to McDowell's and my satisfaction that P. but that was wearing his black hat. [Bob Brandom] Sellars argues that P. Therefore P.No amount of tub-thumping by dualists (including my past self) carries any weight in establishing that not-P. and I want to get the credit. [Bob Brandom] Most philosophers think it is a priori that not-P. Therefore P.] These considerations tend to suggest something in the vicinity of the ballpark of P. [Colin McGinn] Anyone who says that not-P is using the terms differently from me. Therefore P. Therefore P. Therefore P.

You're Reading a Free Preview

/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->