P. 1
Evolution of Citizenship

Evolution of Citizenship

|Views: 12|Likes:
Published by Bianca Antal

More info:

Published by: Bianca Antal on Oct 27, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

07/07/2015

pdf

text

original

thus the right to vote, to migrants, is driven by the benefits and costs associated with
this
decision.
A few warnings are in order, before we present the model's details. First, while in
practice
citizenship acquisition implies a larger set of rights, beside the right to vote, and also
implies
some duties, our focus on the right to vote as the main benefit of citizenship is easily
justified,
since political rights can be viewed as an instrument through which migrants could
achieve
broader political, economic and social goals. Second, even if the model concentrates
on voting
on a specific policy, namely, a redistributive tax scheme which finances a public
good, the
same approach could be extended to consider alternative agenda. Finally, in our one-
period
framework the distinction between different ways to acquire citizenship becomes
irrelevant,
therefore the model's predictions can be applied to the laws concerning both
citizenship at
birth and naturalization.
We consider an economy where a population of mass P consists of natives with mass
N and migrants with mass M, where M + N = P and M < N. Migrants are poorer
than natives since they are relatively unskilled, namely, y
N
> y > y
M
, where y
N
and y
M
denote average income for natives and migrants, respectively, and y =
N
P
y

N
+
M
P
y
M
is the
economy-wide average income. We also assume that income distribution is skewed to
the
right for each group, namely, median income is lower than average income both for
natives
and migrants, and thus for the economy as a whole.
Both natives and migrants derive utility from consumption of a private good, c
i
, and a
public good, g, according to
u
i
= c
i

+ λg

(1)
where λ is a positive preference parameter. Both groups pay taxes, according to a
propor-
tional income tax rate τ, such that 0 < τ < 1. Tax revenues are used by the government
to
finance the public good according to the following balanced budget constraint:

g = τy −
τ

2
2
y
(2)
where the second term captures tax collection costs.
The tax rate is set through a political choice under majority voting, as in Meltzer and
Richard (1981). Each enfranchised individual casts a vote on the tax rate. Assume
initially
12

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->