2008 International Studies Association Annual Conference
Panel FB63 Hegel and IR: After the Cultural Turn
Beyond the Debate between Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism: Toward a Hegelian Synthesis
Hsuan-Hsiang Lin Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Fo Guang University firstname.lastname@example.org
March 28, 2008
The landscape of the ethics of international relations is largely shaped by the great divide between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Theorists of international political theory or international ethics more often than not take this divide as their initial reference scheme (Brown 1992; Thompson 1992; Cochran 1999; Hutchings 1999; Shapcott 2001). Participants in this debate who take the cosmopolitan position are usually political theorists (e.g. Pogge 19; ez 99 O N i 20; usam 20)T e ot oy s ai l i i dasc 94 B i 19; ’ el 00 N s u 02. hi n l ibs ay n v ult, t l b r og c l d i ii and their way of thinking is usually in the Kantian mode of theorizing in the abstract. 1 Though this approach is very dominant in political theory, it is not very welcome among students of international relations. For most theorists of IR, the basic agent of international relations is the state, and thus any normative theory that downplays the role the state is impracticable. They dee i“t i ”o u e paio t i i daa t pi i lgn m tu p n t ptm hs n h n v ulsh r c aaet oa s e di e np and to theorize international relations in the abstract (e.g. Jackson 2005). Conversely, for cs oo t pli lhoisI t oispsi iai t t t fh cm uir in om pla o tat rt R h rt oio s k o h o t o m n a in ic e s , e s’ tn n a e t ians political theory and tends to defend the status quo. There appear to be not much dialogue between the two camps. Given the prominence of this debate, it is impossible to bypass the divide when one comes to the issues of ethics in IR. On the other hand, given the endurance of the debate, it might be equally impossible to prejudge which camp will eventually win the debate. In view of this, the issue at stake is probably not which approach is the right one. Rather, given each approach has garnered widespread supports from its own camp, my conjecture is that both positions may embody partial truth to some extent. Therefore, the right question to ask is whether we can go beyond this debate and reach deeper understanding of international ethics. In the discipline of international political theory, several theorists have embarked on the enterprise of transcending the great divide; notable examples include Molly Cochran (1999), Kimberly Hutchings (1999), Richard Shapcott (2001), etc. These works are all very
Cosmopolitanism could certainly take other forms such as utilitarianism (Hutchings 1999, 36). However, since the Kantian version appears to be the most popular one, my discussion in this paper will focus only on the Kantian version. 1
sophisticated accounts and deserve careful evaluation, which certainly cannot be done in this paper. My purpose is thus only limited to exploring and assessing one among the many approaches that attempt to go beyond the divide, ie., the Hegelian approach. But I am aware that even such a limited purpose cannot be fully accomplished in a paper, so I shall attempt instead to show that the Hegelian elements are indispensable when theorizing the ethics of IR. My way of doing it goes like this: Given the predominance of the cosmopolitan thinking among political theorists, I do not dispute the necessity of cosmopolitan elements in theorizing international ethics. In other words, I concede that the well-beings of the individuals must be taken into account in international ethics and theorizing in the abstract is also indispensable. On the other hand, however, I shall argue that the interests of the state should also be taken into account, and thinking international ethics (instead of international morality)2 in concrete historical context is also indispensable. To show why this is so, I take issue with the accounts of international ethics of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, who are regarded as the exemplary contemporary Kantians, and attempt to reveal the Hegelian elements implicit in their accounts. Then I shall explore if the Hegelian elements extracted from their accounts can be grafted to the ideas of the Hegelian approaches championed by Mervyn Frost and Andrew Linklater.3 The purpose of this exploration is to show that if both the Kantian and Hegelian moments can be subsumed in a mainly Hegelian framework, such a Hegelian synthesis might produce more insights and fruitful results than either the Kantain or the Hegelian approach can do on its own.
T e ie ne e en t c ad oatdr e f m H gl f os ii t n e en h d f ec bt e e i n m r i e vsr fr w hs ly i o eesa u d t co bt e Sittlichkeit ’ m sn i w (ethical life) and Moralität (morality) (Hegel, 1991: 62-4). See also the discussion of Chris Brown (1992, 62). 3 The choice of these two theorists ser eti s fh H gln prahsnet t Mo y oha’ a r e n t e o t eea apoc iidbe o l C cr s p s av e i d l n discussion of Hegelian method (Cochran 1999, ch. 3). It should be noted, however, that other theorists with strong Hegelian characteristics are equally important. Notable examples include Chris Brown (1994) and Km e y u h g (99. h r sn d nt i us rw ’acuts eas iil s ee pd hn i br H t i s19)T e e o I o o d cs Bo n conibcuetse dvl e t l cn a s s s o a Fot adta ee ruh sbu e b t lt. nh o ehn, u h g’acuts a l rss n icn vn ogl usm d yh ae O t t r adH t i s conim i y ’ y e tr e h cn s n concerned wi t “hnm nl i ldqay ad gna g ahns ” f o cs oo t ad t h peo eo g aaeuc” n “eel i loet o bt om pla n h e oc oc y h in cm uir n oiosImntb t d cs hr oknh ppro to esn. itH t i ’ o m n a a psi . a oal o i us ew r i t s aefrw r osFr, u h s ti tn e s i a s c ns account is theorizing at a highly philosophical level and it touches less on substantive issues; yet discussion at such a level is beyond my intellectual capacity. Second, albeit explicitly invoking Hegelian phenomenology in hr okH t i s tn pi w is“ri lhoyps oe i ad e i st oies come closest to e w r, u h g aoe o t re:c tat r ot dr s n f n th r cn n t ic e , m nm m i e te et i o i e aoanr av t oy ( u h s 9919 T isgett t e a b i m gto h bsk d fn r t nl om t eh r”H t i 19,7) h ugs h hr m io i g n tn i i e . cn s s a tn h f byn a e apor t n f ees h ooh. a eod m r prpii o H gl pi spy r e ao ’ l 2
e. But his approach offers little comfort to cosmopolitan political theorist. the similarity between Rawls and
In similar vein. for they find its Hegelian elements very troublesome. ea p . and the conception of community and the state (Schwarzenbach 1991). the conception of the person. it is because Rawls very much deems people as a moral community in itself whereas cosmopolitans regard the moral status of people as derivative of that of the individuals. but I will also reveal the prah i e oce a e n a ls l r y ’ inconsistency in his account and offer a revision that make his account more coherent. a es n 3
. e e a bi sc l cnt c dadh i ahtm r pr nly a d f wt n varied ot t lm t sl s e g oil osut .3f. based on Chandran Kukathas and PhiliPtt osrao ( ua a ad p ets be t n K kt s n i’ vi h Ptt 90. not people or the state.n4. 66) Clearly. eti svr m i pi s hrR ws ad o m n a aspsi s ovreh t i l et19)i n f s ee l a o tw e a ls n cm uir n’oio cne :io c i d ie a n n e ’ ti tn g s ra cn x as . The most notable Hegelian element in R ws acuts rbb R ws t i pol i t do t i i da a t uio a ls con i poal a ls a n ep n e fh n v ul s h n f ’ y ’ kg e sa e di e t moral concern in international ethics. K n a e m n i R ws acuts u e xlii h ue fh oi nl oio a t atn l etn a ls con iqi ep c n i s o t r i psi th i e ’ t it s e ga tn e international level.The Hegelian MomensnR ws A cu t ti a ls co n ’ L t e ei m d cs o wt R ws acut fn raoae i (a l19a T e em bg y i us n i a ls con o i e t nlt c R ws 99) h n s i h ’ tn i hs . shall attempt to show why this approach merits our serious consideration.) oi cn x ” C cr 992.n t d t “ oa e oatcn ie i i eui h f n ay r e e e a l s i fr h sc lot t (oha 19.R ws s dn SblSh a ebc i n f st e a a i w i R ws xm l a ls t et iy cw r nah d ti h e r s n h h a ls e ’ u z e ie r e c ’ position resembles that of Hegel: the task of political philosophy and its method (or justification). Given t sog poio t R ws “ep -cn i apoc a og i r pli lhoisI h t n opsi o a ls pol etc prah m n l e l o tat rt er tn ’ e r” b a ic e s . 119). e s e w e o r fundamental difference between Rawls and cosmopolitans is that Rawls regards the justice of societies as the ultimate concern of the law of peoples whereas cosmopolitans take the well-being of individuals as theirs (Rawls 1999a.4 Given that this issue area (i. My defense of this apoc wl b cuhd l gl i R ws own terms. the bearer of moral concern should be the individual. the . Why this difference? Arguably.” Rawls 1993. Rawls disagrees. For cosmopolitans.. Molly Cochran. by employing an all-inclusive global original position that treats individuals as free adeul“ ae t bs o t l o pol t nr w ( n qa m ksh ai fh a f ep so a o . T e eea e m n i R ws w rs ae en e nt b m n t oisF r h H gln l et n a ls ok hv be w l o d y ay h rt o i e s ’ l e e s. he holds that a cosmopolitan approach.
y m hs )icn e rgued that this good is s not reducible to the sum of the goods of individual citizens.they express the sum of potentialities of the membership as a whole in activities that are intrinsically good and not merely cooperation for social or economic gains…persons need one another since it is only in active cooperation with others that one’powers reach fruition. e h r e ot i z 59 Motm ot t. as Schwarzenbach rightly pi s u t tt ti t a e a “r ay t gopat i. 2. 524-5n.” (Rawls 1996. n sc ashm i h ru a “n n r l rai t n n n r t eu a t t A d uh ce e s e tn zi te s i ” “ocp aypi ” nt t pr l pi ” t aynw m m e adi aec cno b cnet l r r (o “ m oay r r o n e e br n t gny ant e ul o e l o) .i eo R ws izn “a ehipli lntu os n at ie 5) si pr n ys c fr a lci s vl t r o tai i t n ad cv i al n te u e ic st i i ts as goods in themselves” R ws 91 52 m e pai.o o tot h iar u s cr i pi c” o ru cv yfr n . but the order of discussion will be reversed.a tb e tn m it t gophs a i e a ogn ao adi e s pclroi. h e e a o a o Hegelian characteristic of this idea is manifested in a statement that draws heavily on Wilhelm von Humboldt:
…the group achieves. h h s uc cy xr e n h ’ i ic t c nl s in his exposition of the idea of well-odr sc t a a sc l n no sc l n n”T e re d oiy s “oi ui foi ui s. My discussion below will center on the three areas Scwarzenbach identifies. emphasis mine) Is Rawls here
. s aeuty o peedd n e s f “ e sm o i le at n (cw r nah 91 dqa l cm r ne i t m o a m r u ” fs a d cosSh a ebc 19.Hegel) has been well trodden. 320. s (Rawls 1971. Later in his Political Liberalism Rawls pushes the idea a step further by saying that “ a democratic society well-ordered by the two principles of justice can be for each citizen a far more comprehensive good than the determinate good of individuals when left to their own devices or limited to smaller associations. Only in a social union is the individual complete. the same totality of capacities latent in each…. I will take these observations as the starting points and explore the implications for the ethics of IR.
R ws C net n f oi U i ad tI p ct n o It nt nl t c a ls ocp o oSc l n n n I m la o f n ra oaEh s ’ i a o s i i r e i i L t e ei wt R ws cnet no pli lo m n yw i isci t epesd e m bg i a ls ocp o f o tacm ui. emphases mine)
The significance of viewing a well-ordered society as a social union of social unions is.t a b a (a l17. by a coordination of activities among peers.
In fact. a good for individuals and associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in its common public and civic life… This is no small thing. The regulative public intention is rather that the constituti aodrhu r leh pic lo j te (a l17. while attributing certain primacy to the social union. Rawls does not grant moral status to all societies across the board. This requirement echoes Hegelian/ communitarian approach to international ethics that takes the state to be the unit of moral concerns. much less national power and prestige. a ls ii t n s o oluncs r btl m s aig ov c l R ws d t co int n nees y u a o ied (Buchanan 2000). Therefore. Ph. hts h m lao f a ls d fh oi ui o t ni bu e i i ’ e e a o i n international ethics? In his The Law of Peoples. as Allen Buchanan argues cni ig . conscientiously distances himself from the organic view of society that is characteristic of certain persuasion of communitarian thinking. o dtl a u et e m a ls pol etc prah o e vr n o “te nr ” prahF r e id r m n se y ’ e r” i a -c i ae g . such as that of religious unity or the greatest excellence of culture.6
Rawls writes: “ vroe m r pi tles o o pa a l wt n p nt s ue ria p n e g E eyn’ oe r a i is t sek p n i i a l .5 This shows that Rawls. Rawls writes:
Leaving aside the deep question of whether some forms of culture and ways of life are good in themselves (as I believe they are). and arguably this is why the basic unit of moral consideration in international ethics must be peoples not individuals. (Rawls 1999a. In other words.D.suggesting that the good of society takes priority over that of the individuals? Rawls does not say that. I take nny ’ sn i y a s l n R ws “ep -cn i apoc t b a a atfs t etc apoc. and so one is better off not to speculate by inference. dissertation (Lin 2006a). 61)
This passage shows that for Rawls the good for individuals to be associated with a way of life and to be involved in public life requires that we respect the self-determination of peoples. ceteris paribus. However. and thus not all kinds of society but only well-ordered societies are endowed with such good. We should also note that for Rawls the good of society derives from the justice of its institution. ispr d t l bi s vef a h a h o ne a n realized in the public institutions of society. it is surely. to which the aims of all individuals and associations are subordinated. 5
. It argues for preserving significant room for the idea of a people’ s self-determination and for some kind of loose or confederative form of a Society of Peoples. N w w a i t i p ct no R ws i ao t sc l n nfrh k gaot o .2) o l resol e i t r i e fu i . But this larger plan does not establish a dominant end. Rawls cautions us not to think that way. R ws 9158 n d az e n p sc ” 6 Rawls takes pains to draw a distinction between people and the state.
which suggests that the criteria are given from outside the construction process. by contrast. (Brown 1992. societies burdened by unfavorable conditions. sovereign states are equals regardless of the kind and quality of their domestic institutions. a state is a state is a state—and any attempt to distinguish between those states that have earned the right to autonomy and those that have not is totally unacceptable. for it appears to be inconsistent with the constructivist nt e f a ls h ooh a et pi . wla ohv t i u e n R ws m t do j ti t nadi n r t nl t c We i l ae o n i i o a ls e o fu ic i n t tn i hs ls qr t ’ h sf ao s i p ct n o i e aoae i . o dtl epsi o R ws pli l br h t m ct oi l r i o C ny 20)F r e id xoio f a ls o ta o r e c” o ae tn ’ ic constructivism. Third. its system of law must impose moral duties and obligations on all its members. i i tn i hs n h ’ i e s
R ws C net n fh P r n n I I p ct no It nt a ls ocp o ot es ad t m la o f n ra onal Ethics ’ i e o s i i r e i In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues that moral persons are characterized by two moral powers. To see why this is so. they are capable of having a conception of their good and capable of having a
These criteria include: First. the society must not be aggressive towards other societies. 4. 63) 9 I orwtee “a gr a f m Sm n ae (02. i. its system of law must accord with a common good idea of justice. nations as moral equals) is coupled with a refusal to distinguish between different kinds of states.7 But where do these criteria come from? In The Law of Peoples Rawls distinguishes five types of peoples or societies. and its judges and officials must possess a sincere belief that the law is guided by a common good idea of justice (Rawls 1999a. we a r o R ws pi spi ln rre u ’ l c e s9 m s fs cni rR ws cnet n o t pr n ad ep r i i p ct n f ut it os e a ls ocp o f h e o n xl e t m lao or r d ’ i e s o s i i i e aoa e i . outlaw states. Such “ categorical” taxonomy is quite troublesome. see Lecture III of Political Liberalism (Rawls 1996).8 and this distinction is drawn prior to the construction of the law of peoples. This idea of sovereign equality is eloquently expresdn hiBo n r a : s iC r rw ’ e r e s s m k …this notion (i. well-ordered hierarchical peoples (or decent hierarchical peoples). em bg wtR ws cnet n fh pr n m lao frn r t nlt c L t e ei i a ls ocp o o t e o. For the communitarian approach as well as in the practice of contemporary international relations. From the UN viewpoint.e. 8 They are liberal peoples. though. and benevolent absolutism (Rawls 1999a.e.There is a difference between these two approaches. 121)
For Rawls. Second. only societies whose institutions meet certain minimal criteria deserve respect or toleration. 64-6). 6
. which secures basic human rights for all its members.
emphasis mine) Moreover. 75) These two ideas taken together will endow people or society with moral standing.em . or one the psychologically well integrated should be respected as autonomous beings.” n u n nt n. 506. the question is whether this moral standing can also be granted to peoples or societies that are not liberal? In A Theory of Justice Rawls states that “ equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation.” (Rawls 1971.” and “ capacity for moral personality is a sufficient the condition for being entitled to equal justice. 509) And this emphasis on potentiality is especially pertinent to our discussion in that “ regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords with the hypothetical nature of the original position. We cannot go far wrong in supposing that the sufficient condition is always satisfied. and the laws and policies of their government. 0)I “ ost i a Lbr adt C net f ute es fu i R ws 91 55. it would be unwise to withhold justice on this ground. emphasis mine).n C ntu o l i t n h ocp o Jsc. emphasis mine)
The crucial point of this statement is that “ minimal requirements defining moral the personality refer to a capacity and not to the realization of it. 509.” (Beitz 1999. sc itn ey e i ” Rawls says that the term “e o”m ya o b et ddt refer to corporate entities pr n a l e x ne o s s e i l i “aoscroaoscuce. the virtuous.” while their reasonableness is expressed in their being able to offer and honor fair terms of cooperation provided other peoples do so as well (Rawls 1999a. Charles Beitz writes: “ would not want to argue that only the righteous.” (Rawls 1971.” Their rationality is “ organized and expressed in their elections and votes. 81) 7
. 25). (Rawls 1971.”(Rawls 1971.hr st s cd g i tn h a (Rawls 1999b. and so on.opr i . Now. Rawls says:
I assume that the capacity for a sense of justice is possessed by the overwhelming majority of mankind…. Hence Rawls explains in The Law of Peoples why liberal peoples have a moral character: “ Like citizens in domestic society. liberal peoples are both reasonable and rational. 505. Even if the capacity were necessary.10 But if that is the right approach to the original position at the
In the same spirit.That moral personality suffices to make one a subject of claims is the essential thing.sneo j te(a l 17.
intervention is often tarnished by parochial self-interests or self-righteous arrogance. it might be said. Rawls says:
The intuitive force of equality holds. 69)
If this argument is sound. the members of a political community are entitled to judge. why should it be any different at the international level? In his objection to the cosmopolitan view. Hence Rawls writes:
In political liberalism we must distinguish between. shouldn’Rawls regard all peoples as equally autonomous? In other t words. This does not suggest. But absent a neutral referee. but this only begs the question as to who is entitled to judge the legitimacy of a regime. rather. no states should be excluded on the ground that they are incapable of being rational and reasonable. he must assume that all peoples are moral persons in so far they are capable of being rational and reasonable. and they are free to rebel if they deem the regime illegitimate. only between individuals. second. t Instead. As Michael Walzer argues convincingly. and treating societies equally depends on their treating their members equally. individuals or collectives of various kinds when the relation of equality between them is appropriate for the case at hand. I believe this revision accords better with Rawls’discussion concerning the basis of equality in s A Theory of Justice. I don’agree. This revision would require that the representatives of all peoples or states be included in the international original position. To be sure. But the point is that their right to revolution does not transfer readily to foreigners (Walzer 1980). (Rawls 1999a. in other words. or decent. and rational. equality holds between reasonable. to be self-consistent Rawls should not distinguish different kinds of peoples in ideal theory. the moral and religious case based on citizen’comprehensive doctrines. In my estimation. however. first. that outsiders can never intervene on the insiders’ behalf. my revision does not deny that in reality some regimes may be morally superior to other.domestic level. the political case for intervention based on the public reason of the Law of Peoples and. the former s
0 tn u. emphasis mine)
Here the emphasis o pb c esn w i ioem ot tet e f a lsa r ok.ut sad oi l . 544).”(Rawls 1996. 124) F r a l “ hs cnii s r provisional fixed points that it seems any reasonable o R ws T ee ov t n a . u t r ia oa eea m m n i R ws m t d iis expressed in r i psi B th e s l H gln o etn a ls e o. . (Rawls 1999a. religious persecution is unjust.(cw r nah 91 54 T iis bcue Hegel the task of philosophy en o g Sh a ebc 19. 9
. and on and on. u tn . But those judgments are merely “ provisional fixed points.t ga tn e s i ’ h his requirement of reflective equilibrium.n sc la sa w la t e r o t w r f oc tpli ln i t n. 84.
R ws C net n futi t n n I I p ct no It nt nlute a ls ocp o oJsfa o ad t m la o f n ra oa Jsc ’ i ic i s i i r e i i Iiw lko n hth K n a m m n i R ws pi spy s m oi i h ue fh ts e nw t t atn o etn a ls h ooh ie bd d n i s o t l a e i ’ l e s e oi nl oio. co e cnet n utcon fr (a l19. for what is ir sn H gll pssht t h se o. h h s n i pr n f u o R ws le w rsi i a c a ar ’ t especially worthy of our attention. for both Hegel and R ws m r pi spyi t ae p t c ryadsn ei w a w hv ‘ l l g a l “ oa h ooh s h tm to l i n yt s e ht e ae a a n’ l l e t af h z l o be di . w m snwt no a ls h ooh am t d n h cnet n futi t e uto u tR ws pi spi l e o ad i ocp o o j ic i r ’ l c h s i sf aon. As Schwarzenbach points out.s e sh fs h d e ic st i o a w l e in the traditions of their interpretation (Schwarzenbach 1991. 19-21) These judgments consist of what Rawls calls “ basic facts”“ : These facts do not lie here and there like so many isolated bits. 4) h s o eas for n” z s it cm r edt r i at let r m oi i w ah cl “b cv sit w i so o pe n h ao ly a n o e bd d n ht e as oj t e p i” h h h e tn i t e l ei r. and thus they can serve as the starting point of our moral reflection.) rubyi p c i t sdash blfht ocp o m sacuto” R ws 968 A gal m li n h i it ee t i . To fully understand its implication for international ethics. eea o oi t a ” s t a “ air i aiat lw aiat lsaoa” H gl 912-1) Whtsao ls c a hts c air i l ( ee19. exploitation is unjust. For there is: tyranny is unjust. it i e e i a there is certain degree of reasonableness latent in those facts or judgments.must prevail if a stable peace is to be maintained among pluralistic societies. c r e t “ e ol o cnr e o tai tu oscs m .s n ul r o.11 Whereas for Rawls the t k f h ooh it “ ne chr tad o uty u cni r cnii s fute a o pi spy so r dr oe n n t j i or os e d ov t n o j i s l e e” sf de co sc or moral judgments (Rawls 1971. fr ” o when there are discrepancies between the selected principles
H gl re:T cm r ed eew is“o o pe n what is is the task of philosophy.
Since justification is addressed to others.and considered convictions. my emphasis)
The emphasis on public political culture is crucial in that it exhibits another Hegelian moment i R ws pi spy i. of the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims and judgments are founded….o 8. or to ourselves when we are of two minds.e.6. ” 581). or ourselves. the relevance of historical and social conditions to political n a ls h ooh. this agreement being stable in virtue of its gaining the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.and this in turn requires that justification must be public in nature (Rawls 1971. 580-1). 100-1. 20) ” Rawls further parts company with Kant when he draws a distinction between proof and justification:
…justification is argument addressed to those who disagree with us. It presumes a clash of views between persons or within one person.
Ifl w t tthe argument for the principles of justice should proceed from some to o sh “ l a consensus. i l ao ” z e 10
. and seeks to convince others. ’ l theory.12 And since the distinctive feature of modern conditions is the fact of reasonable
A Sh a ebc pi s u pb c o tacl ri R ws pi spy oglp y t rlo s cw r nah o tot ul pli lu uen a ls h ooh ruhy l sh o f z n . This aspect of Rawls’conception of justification is fully expressed in the following s passage:
Justice as fairness aims at uncovering a public basis of justification on questions of political justice given the fact of reasonable pluralism. “ [w]e can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments. it proceeds from what is. held in common. for Rawls assumes that the core of our political institutions are at least oj t e p i n ees h o ei r” ’ l m n ay r inl(cw r nah 9156nt1) i m l “ t a Sh a ebc 19. or can be. (Rawls 1971. and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment. i ic t ’ l a e e “b cv sitiH gl pi sophy.(Rawls 1971.A proof simply displays logical relations between propositions. (Rawls 1996.
reasonableness entails the willingness to propose fair terms of cooperation and the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason when justifying our political conception of justice to others (Rawls 1996. university. which suggests that there needs to be “ division of labor between different kinds of principles. 13 and the content of this criterion may vary from one context to another.(Rawls 1999a. we can return to the question why the unit of moral concern in international ethics is people (or the state) and not the individual. in so doing Rawls further turns his back on Kant by giving up the comprehensive liberalism of Kant and Mill in favor of the political liberalism he advocates (Kukathas and Petitt 1990. For Rawls. (Rawls 1993.e. i. In the domestic context. i p y i R ws t r o i e t nlt c e a ’ e tn i hs 11
. As Kukathas and Petitt points out. and so on. as Leif Wenar aptly puts it. and the purpose and role of its various parts and how they fit together. Let me begin with the condition of the fact of reasonable pluralism. finding an overlapping consensus. 97. 54. the reason we can appeal to the political ideal of free and equal citizens for public justification in democratic societies is because that ideal is part of the public political culture in those societies. At the core of the idea of public reason is the criterion of reciprocity. a lsy t tT eda f ul r sn s l R ws ash “ h ie o pb c e o ia o a i a s i er tT e a o Pol .pluralism.
R ws flepsi o teda f ul r sns enn i“ Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Rawls 2001. But why is the content of the criterion contingency on its context? R ws re:it is the distinct structure of the social a lw is“ t framework. 158-9) ” Now. church. Yet in the global setting. 139-42). vi) This underscores the crucial role thisda l sn a lshoy fn raoae i . This Hegelian turn has far-reaching consequences for thinking about international ethics. a lsu xoio fh i o pb c e o ise i h The ’ l tn e i a s ” which now becomes the addendum to The Law of Peoples. Below I shall elaborate on what these implications are. this condition impels Rawls to assign a more limited task to political philosophy. 47) ” This idea is further illustrated in Rawls’discussion of why the principles of justice do not s directly apply to (though do impose considerable constraints on) the internal life of associations such as family. that explain why there are different principles for different kinds of subjects. R ws t l e c e e e a r e e” 1999a. h h x nsh i a f sc lot ctte oiy f ep s (a l n ga o h L w f ep sw i et d t d o a oi cn ato h S c t o Pol . 27).
with the exception that I do not employ external criteria to prejudge the legitimacy of a people or a state. and so in the global context the criterion of reciprocity only applies among peoples or states. This may cause the concern that by granting moral status to all states regardless of the kind of their domestic institutions I am giving the state a blank check to do as they please. not citizens. the conception of personhood.It is peoples. so the criterion of reciprocity applies. S f I aeelt t H glne m n i R ws pi spy o a hv n s d h eea l et n a ls h ooh—including the r ie e i e s ’ l idea of social unions. there is no such consensus in the public political culture. I am only suggesting that they must legislate for themselves. This claim does not entail the assumption that states are self-sufficient. Rather. however. (Wenar 2001. This approach is largely couched in Rawlsian terms. and so it is these ideas of peoples that Rawls thinks he must use to develop his global political principles. just as the facts of interdependence among individuals and the lawfulness in the domestic context
. and his method of justification—in the service of defending a statist approach to international ethics. But this concern is unwarranted. In the global context. 87)
In other words. no more than assuming that they can do whatever they like. we do not suggest that they can do anything as they please.There simply is no robust global public political culture which emphasizes that the citizens of different countries ought to relate fairly to one another as free and equal…. since respect for individual autonomy is not part of the global public political culture. In the domestic case. and they must (and do) comply with international norms. In fact. In similar vein. in the domestic context. it is unreasonable from a Rawlsian point of view to appeal to such conception at the global level. Or put it in a slightly different way: In so far as liberal democracies value individual autonomy and treat each citizen as free and equal. among individuals. no states in the real world can be self-sufficient. when we regard individuals as autonomous moral beings. autonomy only means that they must legislate for themselves. when I say states are autonomous moral agents. But these facts do not run up against the claim that states are autonomous moral beings. The only widely acknowledged idea is the equality of states (or peoples). that international political institutions regard as free and equal.
Unfortunately. one principal weakness in R ws apoc t i e aoae i it t is ug n t c t io r i eeim c a ls prah o n r t nlt c sh h m gl gh re a fe m l t ay ’ tn i hs a s i e ir g gi i o h l o pol s ak o pt nlm A o e w ans o R ws t oysht i n t a f ep sm cs f a ras . 93-130). e r t n g oH br a. 9. By contrast. despite exhibiting notable Hegelian moments. is still too static. This
. a more dynamic acuthtm ly H gl d l t it b w n n. and thus in theorizing international ethics the interests of the state must be taken into consideration along with the interests of the individual. nor does it mean that the moral standing of the state is necessarily higher than that of the individual.H br a r a sh o n a a n n rc o pr g i h ooh i a ls ae s e r i w s tl i s l h ’ m gd s “t i t r a K n a sa g”n hat his approach does not try to be normatively neutral sa h ow r atn t t y i t rg f d i re ( ae a 19a 9)T i sget t t ae a’ apoc i ee m r K n a t n H br s 98. irreducible moral standing.cannot discredit the claim that individuals are autonomous moral beings. w n t e d d y n sn H br s eea o et B f eu i t ae sI ato m e ii m s i s o rn m make one more point: granting moral status to states does not suggest that the state is the single source of moral concern. This interpretation of state autonomy is to underscore the intuition that every state is to participate in the legislation process and not to comply with a law by imposition. u i s f s a lt s ep so ’ r a l c e ao r k e be the bearers of m r cne i i e aoa e i . The point is merely to suggest that the state has its independent. a ls oio i c sroK n s oa ocr n n r t nl t c R ws psi s l e t at l n tn i hs ’ tn o ’ vision of a federation of nations in Perpetual Peace (Kant 1970. e e r ei b elt g ae a’H glnm m n . ot a l t s w ans s a b con t e p s ees ie i so e at gF r nty h e ekes cn e a o ’ a cc i u e. The crux of this interpretation of autonomy is the ethos of anti-paternalism. nt r ekes f a lsh r it h t e w e e i h ’ e a s account. h ugs h H br s prah s vn oe atn h m s s a m s i a R ws i t m o gnr pi spi l r n t n B tn o a a R wsae pol t a lsn e s f ee l h ooh aoi ti . H br a se a i os t c btenK n sv i o af e t no nt n adh ae s es n n nie y e e at io f e r i f aos n i m c sn w ’ sn d ao i s notion of cosmopolitan right (I will discuss this in a moment) in that the latter calls for a federation of world citizens instead of a federation of nations (Habermas 1998a. Cosmopolitans need not worry that my approach will prioritize state autonomy at the expense o i i daat o yT iwlbcm c aa ew d cs H br a’t oy fn v ulu nm . h i eo e l rf r e i us ae s h r di o s l e t s m s e .
T e eea Mo nsnH br s T er h H gl n meti a ema’ hoy i s I a a iecm a n h pi spy wt R ws . 180-1).
and external sovereignty. could eventually run against his seemingly cosmopolitan position. Deeper understanding of this statement calls for a careful study of his analysis on this subject. But as Will Kymlicka (2002) has argued forcefully. On this issue. Habermas is apparently critical of the notions of ethnonationalism. At the core of these issues is the notion of political legitimation.
Habermas on the Question of the Nation-State U l e R ws s t.15 nk i a ls ti ’ ac h t c s ra oo i f ep s e Habermas offers a
historical-sociological analysis on the development of modern nation-states. 15 F r c t u o R ws s t. and this may suggests a cosmopolitan reading of h t oy B t ae a ep cl s t : the nation-state should be ‘ i h r u H br s xliy te “ s e . and his position appears to come closer to that of cosmopolitans (Moon 2006.suggests that in terms of ontology H br a’ t oyo g blutege byn K n s ae s h r f l a j i os eod at m s e o sc ’ vision. Hence I will take the question of nation-states as the entry point of my analysis. and this notion is in turn closely tied to the legitimacy of nation-states. The Hegelian elements consist of. national self-determination. a dialectical approach to global justice.h ol hv a t d g n ao n pi spi lyt . firstly.e R brJcsn r et ok o a ri e f a lsti i azd o o o pol se oe ako’ e n w r Classical and iq ’ ac d i i e t s c Modern Thought on International Relations (05. 1998a: 127). m it a s transformed’ rather than abolished”(Habermas. His account
Kenneth Baynes (2002) also argues that Habermas’conception of freedom exhibits strong affinities with that s of Hegel.( ko 20. secondly. ele nt n f ep . 221) and. N nt l sIhla u t t n l e ea i t n ae a’apoc a o xi tt i oe e s sa r eh o c sr xm n i H br s prah l eh i r t he. his recognition that culture provides the context which constitutes the identity of its members (Habermas 1998a.6) s e ie e a n e l c e a 14
. and just war. the first Hegelian element can be reconciled without much difficulty with a largely liberal. individualistic scheme. which in turn requires that we be attentive to the Hegelian element in his analysis and see where it may take us. hence my analysis will focus on H br a’d l ae s iectical approach and its implication for thinking about international ethics. human rights. 14 and these Hegelian elements. m s a H br a’ t oyo g blutel gl r o e a udt i us f ot t nl ae s h r f l a j i a e e l s r n h s e o ps aoa m s e o sc r y v v o e s ni constellation. e Jcsn re:R ws ‘ep shv ni enm s 20)H r ako w is“ a lspol ’ae ehr a e. 269). e t ’ e t nr ioi nrdn tst y ny ae s ni ad rli a h ooh ass m” Jcsn 0511 o h tr s o ieti . if fully exploited. lg a o ao m s s b s as of Hegelianism. globalizaion. aioi l nt n o pol .
w e v si ir n g t e prcl i o acm ui uidb h t i l et y ( ae a 19a 15 H nce a i a s f o m n y n e y io c dsn. 1)B t a i i gi i m a m y H br a a us t t t “o p m n r r ao” bten nt nlm ad a.o “iznh w s ee cnet l tdt nt nl e b cn m s ot gn oe fr ci si a nvr ocp ay i o aoa p i s i te p ul e i identit” H br a 19. ae s r e h h cm l et y e t n e e aoas n m g a e e a li w i i r ulai i acn net n. customs. arguing that the state is a“ gl df e t m w e a ant n i acm ui cntu d b gor h a l ay e nd e ” hr s ao s o m n y ost e y ega i l e l i r e i t it pc contiguity. l n gao h h a n h rcs f in gan ” t tn c e s t tg ( ae a 19a 16 Moeseicl. for the nation-state “ peet a oetepneo h h t i lhlneo i fnt nlqi l to t r r n d cgn r os t t io c caeg t f d ucoaeu a n frh e s e s e s ra l n i ve e early modern form of socia i er i w i w si t poeso d i er i . H br s 98. and this separation is especially pressing today in that nation-states are threatened by multiculturalism from within and besieged by globalization from without (Habermas 1998a. 0) r pc i l nt nlm poi d h u ua akrud m f ay i i d e t l aa sw i ‘ b c ’ol bcm pli l at e ci n’ adi s di ihl d gi t h h s j t cu eo e o tay cv ‘ tes” n n o o g t e e n c u es d ic l i iz . common language. ot gny n h sm i i e e aoa i e os w i ism 132). n p to lay the foudt nfr nw “ oe feim t n ( ae a 19a11.begins with an etymological distinction between nation and the state. and traditions. m h e cn nec i t “y b s ”btennt nl and republicanism (Habermas 1998a.hr iaes n bi i ot vr cnet f y ( ae s 96 45 I dio t e s t i . Nonetheless. and thus the notion of a nation exhibits prepolitical quality. He submits that the function of sc l n pli ln gao m snw b pr r e b “ pate f e -legislation that oi ad o ta i er i ut o e e om d y a r i o sl a ic t t n f cc f
. aoas “rv e t cl r bcgon H br s 98. u tn h e ocp o . e ht st nao o a e m d o l t ao” H br s 98. 117). there is certain degree of rationality in nationalism. nationalism can no longer provide the foundation for social integration (Habermas 2001. 9)n t r od. With regard to the challenges to nation-states from within. 71-2). m tn e no l t e y nation-s t “e en t ui r lm o a eat i l a cm ui ad t te bt e h n e as f n gla a e l o m n y n h a.hr ia es o h iz s f dm c t o t” H br s 96 44 I o e w rst es sne f e te ac i. 1) e tu rm t t s ra i ” m Habermas submits that this tension will eventually impel republicanism to part company with nationalism. 9)nad i . Habermas argues that in a time of political fragmentation. Habermas claims that it was after the French Revolution that the “r o taqaty w sr s r e i o“ cntu v f t e fh pli ldn t o pe li l un t a t nf m d n a ost i e u o t o tai ty f p ic i” a o t ite a r e ic e i t ci n o a e or iply ( ae a 19. characterized not only by national and ethnic conflicts but also the problem of poverty and redistribution.
108. H br s 98. can persons dvl i od t c i i da . n s x esy o tot n h o et m i ’ e a o n . H br s 01 1.includes all citizens equal. 129-32). Habermas once offers a non-instrumental justification for t “ tnis n i ne o cl r frh i i da . constructed on the basis of cultural homogeneity and understood as a necessary ca l i cnio o dm c c”wlbcm “ue l u”( ae a 20.eo eni dazd n t og a n nt r l eH br s re:Pr n. 9) n t sa r ae nton. h e so i a u c i h t nt n f iz s m sr a t ao-state. Only on the path of socialization. o fud ( ae a 20.ru g “ ny s oi m m e o h i r s i ic c” fu ue o t n v ul a i :O l a sc l e br f e n i c g fa t e di s gn a s cultural communities can they develop into persons. Here I watt r e ePnk’ a u etadt ei t t opsed et n Isa a u: n o e r esy r m n n a t o h poi i co. ( ae a 20. growing into an intersubjectively shared universe of meanings and practices. ae a blvsht hna i us e rcs l” n dio H br s eee t w e d crv poes y tn m i a s i of will-fr ao cn m k ps b a r snb pli ludrad g “ pei s om t n a ae os l i i e e oal o ta ne t i . N w a t pi spi lee H br a’ drgt no nt nlm i i os t t o . I ad i . e i context culture is construed as an enabling condition for the growth of democratic institutions. which is expressed in his aforementioned recognition that culture provides the context that constitutes the identity of its members (Habermas 1998a. m i
I ao ep c.0) az i ” m 16
. m s o i i i c sn with his endeavor to accommodate the challenge of multiculuralism. Pensky argues that cultural identity is no less “rf i”hn aoai a ic lt nt nldentity. sa s m a a e i te pc e i ad“ost i a pto s ”cnr l ent nlm a t fudt no c i solidarity n cntu o l a i i itn r tm a e a aoas s h onao f i c pc i i e i v (Habermas 1998a. 716 The Hegelian character in this ee p n ii t n v ul” H br s 05 1) o t sn d i s m t s o “ d i ao t og sc lao” r cl r cntu o o t hm n i ”s h i f i i d t n h uh oii t n o “u ua ost i fh u a m n i es n v u i r az i t l itn e d r i set f a lsda foi ui sA da Ma Pnk pi s u i t dm sc e n cn o R ws i o sc l n n. ae a w is“e osi l i l apr n. a r o a e ic sn n vu background consensus. esy ris f ae s ne cr h m ot c o i v ule e v y s ic m m s s e a di f x i. and so Habermas should be equally critical of both (Pensky tia a i 20)Pnk’c ti o H br a udr oe t i pr ne fni da r l i t 00. However. 9 c H br a 19. and its purpose is to point to a form of cosmopolitanism that values global solidarity. th h ooh a l l ae s e ao f aoas s n nie e l c v. 118. 221). hl r e vs s g k e t r i l g H br a’dw p y g f aoas ibsd n h asm t n htclcv i n ts ae s o nl i o nt nlm s ae o t s p o t “o et ed ti m s an i i e u i a l i e ie a m d. in the international context the nation is deemed the principal disenabling condition for the growth of global democratic institutions. c d ge l e osbcm i v ule ol h uh h a m t s nun g s di i y r poes foii t n ( ae a 19a28 rcso sc lao. f ae s 96 44 ad h ssumption e ” m . ty n od i f e or y i eo e spru s H br s 01 azg tn a l fo m 7)T il d t h f os lm t th “ao o ci n” utel eh nt n 3.
17 If Habermas believes cultural identity deserves respect. It would be i os t to oh cn a . 64) It is dbt l hw vr w e e nt n a m r y “ ai d cm ui ” But it is not ea b . Whether or not this strategy is successful is a keenly debated issue. then he cannot say that national identity does not deserve respect. he submits that cultural rights can be derived from the principle of the inviolability of human dignity (Habermas 2005. Can we infer from this fact that they do not deserve our respect? 17
. Habermas 2001. Be that as it may. H br a a ust t u ua r h ne nt ref m asay“r u p o o eul ae s r e h cl r i t ed o a s r m g a t l gs i o hk pe m t n f qa s i vl s o cl r . 110. Indeed.aqi stseg l gl f m B nd t ne o’t s o “ ai dcm ui ” ht cu e i t nt a e r r s r h r y o eei A dr n h i f i g e o m n y t c s s es m n t a Habermas cites repeatedly in his works (Habermas 1998a. 221-2). (Habermas 1998a. ae a a usaa s t “pc spee ao”apoc t ) H br s r e gi t h sei r r t n prah o m g n e e sv i cultur r h adt “o tso sri l T er sni t s “ h acl a dpc o a i t n h pli f uv a . Habermas can revert to a more individualistic position to accommodate multiculturalism. 20-3). 17-8. Clearly. Habermas 2005. This is evident in his defense for granting cultural rights to minorities. h e o s h : T e ce r e ae f lgs e ic v” a i et change in modern societies explodes all stationary form of life. h i e e m n t ncs r t gtn t s ea hr frh f tht o e i i “osut ”de nt ees y o e i o h dbt e . o id f a c n w r es fh e e “ lb i ” fhic i s r t s em d fna eti” n wlt s o b t e t i f l it o t r lm a h de e “ dm n ltad i h nt eo r e n ai ly e a e u u as lu la d a democratic constitution (Habermas 1998a. Cultures survive only if they da t seg t t nfr t m e e f m c ti adscs o. Rather.o t a t sm t n s cnt c d os o a t i e e e c a hg r e suggest that it does not deserve our respect. multiculturalists do contest that Habermas’apoc rn aa st poeulm o H br a’pi spyi t tt s prah us gi th rcdas f ae s h ooh n h i n e i m s l a entails a substantive prejudgment wi r a t t ur snb ns o “ na eti” t e r o h ne oal es f f dm n lt h gd e a e u as
Money and property rights are socially constructed.o btcl r ad aoai n ts reul “rf i” n nie td t ot r fr o u ua n nt nld ti a qay a ic l c sn e ry h t l i e ie e l tia . they take the form of collective rights (Habermas 1998a. the crux of Habermas’ approach to accommodating multiculturalism is to s subsume the politics of recognition under the heading of socialized individual rights. s hr s al ’pli o r on i apa t sgetnr ed a e” f u ue a C a e Ty r o ts fe gio per o ugs o ne u t s l o s ic c tn s . r h t nt o r s m h sl s r ris n ees n w e r h a o e v o ic m i ” 223) This challenge of modernity demands that members of every culture take a reflexive ai d t a t icl r A dt s “ g fr s fi ”t taka a a ns o t tt e o r h r u ue n h e r i om o le h l tu w d e t . 222-4. ae . o ee ht r aos r e l i g e o m n y.
Maeve Cooke. m s itn r tm a ae e a tn appeal for Western democracies. e i sovereignty. Habermas 1996. Once inside the world of nation-state civic identity. d a io ” h i emphases in the original) 18
. or to h tn g o l e e . I am not suggesting that non-Western societies will never become like Western societies. But we sol nts m t th Wet n r et ysh ol pt t “ oe i t n E e it hu o as eh t d u a e s r t j o it ny a o m dr z i . B u e t 03 4. Habermas is so hostile to the right to self-dt m nt nt t eee r a sia “he nnes” H e r i i h h vn e r t s ser osne. but it is doubtful if the Western experience can be generalized and extended to the rest of the world. but an end to Western colonial or Soviet or other external dominance of their particular histories. they are pitched into that outside w r o s tcm et n (l tn 9520 ol fte o pti . for example. Baumeister also contends that such denial of equal recognition “ does not sit well wt H br a’ o n cm i ett r pc ec pr n cpcy t fr hro n i ae s w o m t n o e et ah e o’ aai o om e w h m s m s s s t conception of the good life”and iti a o i o pt l wt H br a’ c i t t s l n m ab s c i e i ae s lm h h m s a a “ democratic will-formation does not draw its legitimating force from the prior convergence of ste e i lcnii s (am ie 20. Unfortunately.e. nationalism may prove to be the most effective mode of social integration. 2 D e t s enit Bis pc i l i t o u ua qat” H br s 01 7) os h m a fh ri f ay g s t l i.79 cf. indeed they can (i.”(Cooke 1997. e e ao a gd cn nsht dm ns o ‘aoa needne a l im t ol a a epne ot ot d t “e ad frnt nl dpnec’ r e t a n s r os t h e a i -i e gi e y s e repression of minorities whom the central government has deprived of equal rights. it may still be the case that the idea of national self-determination has not exhausted its appeal among non-Western societies.ways of life. The evidence is not hard to find—just consider the reason why so many Taiwanese and Tibetans want to pursue independence. Es a 19. m i e th
A Ja B t e la a us lqet. Japan).. Andrea T. or national autonomy. A al spi spi lee H br a’ cntu oa pto s m yhv cr i t e h ooh a l l ae s ost i l a i i s l c v. argues that “ denial of equal political recognition the to some persons on the basis of the content of the substantive ethical commitments and convictions poses a problem with a moral dimension.18 For those nations that aspire for their own states. seicl r h t cl r euly ( ae a 20. 278) Such el t c ov t n. vn fh e ac r e h n ao ” e Western experience is the model for the rest of the world. 281) In similar vein.7. cultures and wounded sense of collective identities. td h a co ” sr contentions suggest that the task of accommodating multicultural aspirations within a fundamentally individualistic framework is much more difficult than Habermas anticipated.A gi e pol w n ntn n tt nt n s en e k Es i r e e un y“ gr vd ep s at o a ed o h ao-state. languages.
171-8). ch. 2). American pol dvl a es o “ m r a ecp oas ” rm t io nh t i l xe ec. the US has been hostile. m s d e u n ba ae i s seg . e cnwe e h eey e l yt s e i l m ud n h i e c d a g e h ay a expresses a form of life and not merely reflect the universal content of basic rights (Habermas 1998a. This suggests that at the international level the difference between constitutional patriotism and nationalism cannot be overemphasized. and this raises serious concerns in the ethics of IR. Habermas 1998a. The case of American patriotism is a good example. 144. But as I have argued elsewhere (Lin 2006.r he r h e ’ o 1998a. However. and even belligerent in its confrontation with the so-cld“ tir n s t . MoevrH br a’cni ne fh pae ledny fi r dm c c s e vst r e ae s of ec o t ecf t ec o l e l e or i dr e i o . h sget t t t international ae t at i ” te T i ugs h a the l o la a a s s s a level constitutional patriotism may prove to be just as troublesome as nationalism does. Because of this execptionalist mentality. one wonders if the patriotism initially based on constitutional principles will not turn into another form of nationalism.sn h cs o R ws acut osf m t democratic peace thesis (Habermas t nt a i t ae f a ls con de. it does not preclude the possibility that they may still be involved in conflict with the rest of the world without a just cause. But could it be the case that constitutional patriotism as a foundation for social and political integration is too thin and too weak? Habermas is not unaware of this pol .Empire had granted Indians equal cultural rights then the Indian would have no right to self-determination? Let us tackle the issue from different angle: Habermas wants to replace nationalism with constitutional patriotism. ep ee p sne f A e cn xet nlm f e o i i i o h r w io c epr ne e s ra i they deem patriotism as a civic virtue while find fault with the nationalism of others. as is evident in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. For. 217). even if constitutional principles can serve as the foundation of solidarity among Europeans as Habermas wishes. As is well known. democratic peace thesis cannot guarantee that democracies will never attack non-democracies.nf th ako l gst t vr l a ss m i “t cl i be”i t tt rb m I a . is it likely that their ethical content may someday develop into their distinct political cultures? And once their political cultures are consolidated.
. if constitutional democracies are so permeated by ethics.
Habermas on the Challenge of Globalization to Nation-States For Habermas. w i i rdcsanw hr o t trl ott ot n o et nli t i s h h n oue s ” c t e oi n h u s u h p o f x raz g h z a e e i e in e consequences of our actions (Habermas 2001. and (3) an increasing inability to perform the kinds of steering and organizational functions that help secure legitimacy (Habermas 2002. but it changes nothing in the e l l so df s e la e aa st e a e v ln n m d o l aoa cm et na sc.
Habermas argues that competition between states in the age of globalization weakens the cpcyo sc ln gao o w l r s t . the only way out of this impasse is to introduce elements of a global will-formation. g it e gi i of decision-making processes.hn“ edc i qet ni om pla o m n y f te ” f h s h o t n t in t as i e u o e t eiv uso s h se i whether the civil society and the increasingly large regimes can foster the consciousness of an ol a r cs oo t sl a t”( ae a 20. One alternative to the nation-state is to transfer its welfare functions to supranational agencies such as the European Union. h rwn n r pnec a r s m d h l e n r g td a o e o t community of rk. I t si t sl i . 51. 3 I ad i . the nation-state faces not only the challenge of multiculturalism from within but also the challenge of globalization from without. These add to the reason why the nation-state must be transformed. But the creation of larger pli l n ts w u a bsgnr e n ra avn gs o g bl o pti .h l e l k oe fo t nl o pti s uh H br s 01 5)n dio t s e la s ci io ” m tn i v c ao e m d o pli l ori t n t s i tu osa “ ow a t t eb d g nt r oe f o ta cod ao: h e n i t n r t h ic ni e st i e o ek o a i i k nn decisions and to assume any efficient regulatory function over the economy. However. ( ae a 20. H br s 98) t” m For Habermas. He argues that under the pressures of globalization the prerogatives of the nation-state have eroded in three aspects:
(1) the decl enh s ts aaie frot l() rwn df i it l im t n i it te cpci o cn o 2 go i e csn h e t ao n e a’ ts r.w i i opr e i i da s t i o “ e b d g procedures of a h h n roa s n v ul te n t i i c c t di as t h n n cs oo t cm ui o s t . m
. w i o ta eti “ ol t et ee t i e l dat e fr l a cm et n h h ic ie d a tn a o io ” c m r yed t “e ni ai cs gi the rest of the world. h hr dr osle“ es n m i oe aai f oi i er i f e a te w i e e bo t K yi i n n t a t tn fe a s c n s e as cut ” T ego i i e eednehst nfr e t g b i oa“ on y. 79). 55. 220). as Habermas is quite b gt y om pla o dry H br s 01 55) i o in i i. ecology or social scry ( ae a 19b eui.
s s a m s an e e as v e NGOs and social movements is unpersuasive.T e u cr onomy.0-10) In this dynamic e i t aoa i e t nl n g ble l” H br s 0119 st i . Habermas remains skeptical of svr g s t : T eH bei pol —how to create a stable social order—overtaxes oe i te “ h obs n rb m en as a e t coe t e aaie o r i aeo t ee o t g blee” H br a 20. who may also be rational egoists.
. Oye ed. and uniqueness of formerly sovereign states will have t b t e i o con”H br a 20. students of rational choice and game theory have argued convincingly that states as rational egoists are not incapable of reaching cooperation under the condition of anarchy (Axelrod 1984. are capable of sl n i T i sget t t ae a’ dw p y go t rl o s t i f o o t o i t h ugs h H br s o nl i fh o f te n a r fh vg . it is not clear why social movements and NGOs. Even if we concede that states cannot solve the problem. 6).6 o ea nn acut ( ae s 015) k t .a a .( ae a 20.t pli l u ue f w r sc t l k t cm o e i l w r “ e o ta cl r o a ol oiy a sh o m n t c -political dimension e h ic t d e c e ha that would be necessary for a corresponding global community—and its identity fr ao….( ae a 20. 6 h opr i cpci fao lgis vn n h l al l ( ae s 01 5) e av ts tn s.h m dl ae a hsnm n i g bl o et ply H br s 01 19 H net oeH br s a i i s o i i ” m e m d not that of cosmopolitan democracy championed by David Held and Daniele Archibugi. s sn d i i h d n ” az through an international negotiation system t t pr e bten“o ta poesst t h oe t e e pli l rcs h a as w ic e a prsant nl n raoa ad l al e . Nonetheless. 1986). 0) ec. and even to the Kantian culture (Wendt 1999. particularity. e o v. r hrh v i o “ w r dm sc o c wt u a ol gvrm n it b r le a e i io f a ol o et ply i ot w r oe et so e e i d t . Hence the Hobbesian problem is not unsolvable by egoist states. But is it true that sovereign states are not capable of solving the Hobbesian problem? In the literature of IR. cs oo t cm ui o w r ci can thus offer no adequate basis for om t n A om pla o m n y f ol izens i in t d t a l adm sc o c. m By far it seems that Habermas cannot but acknowledge that states still play an important role in the process of global will-formation. ch. o vs m p t e “ h at iu . tn i . AeadrWed s cnt cv m ee sget t tsvr g s t a cpb o l ne x nt osut i ’ r i s vn ugs h oe i te r aal f s a en as e e transforming the international system from the Hobbesian culture to the Lockean culture. m H ne t “dr se” frt project he has in mind are social movements and ec h ade es o h e s e non-governmental organizations and not the states.
however. in response to the catastrophes of the twentieth century. It should be noted. an international agreement ont nr av s t o hm nr h i sll k g ad“ e h om t e tu f u a i t s tla i . o h ep cl of sat s o “ g i ao t og hm nr h ” n u a i t fr e xliy f r h i f l im t n h uh u a i t gs it e es et i r gs (Habermas 2001. 8) uh cnet le s n f at v i s eesa d n h e m u vi ’ sn it r grounds: First. ant eed n ec oe et o n n ’ b gt n H br s 98. ch. r i h n n e n eie e br i n h s ii fr ad qa w r iz s ad sp e o ao e d te ” ( ae a 19a 11 S c a ocp a r io o K n s io incs te o t e H br s 98. This federation is voluntary in so far as the associated states retain their sovereignty.h l azt n f t s sms e tn en as r e o i i dne fr e cl fr r ocp ot lao o t vr cnet f pae ( ae a agrut r as o a e net n azt n fh e ocp o “ec” H br s h l c i ui i e y m 1998a. They only imply that states are no longer sovereign today. the introduction of the notion of “r e aa s c m s gi t i n hm n y a ost l i o t i e a svr gt o s t . h d t g blao o u ai ” l e i t n h n r l oe i y f te T i . the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the incrimination of war itself as a crime have altered the external relations among states. d r in w a e e l i es of international law and directly establishes the legal status of the individual subjects by gat gt m um d t m m e h i t asc t no f e n eul ol ci n. Habermas finds this vision of perpetual peace inadequate. cod g o ae s nl i K n s n m s ys ’ social contract theory draws an analogy between the individual and the state. independent states. at .Habermas on Human Rights and Its Implication for International Ethics A full exposition of Habermas account of international ethics must also include his position o hm nr h . the three grounds given above are sociological or post hoc justifications. arguing that the state must exit th s to nt e n et a te fl ay eue f eo . 6) i i m R t rim sb scr t og a om pla l t t bps sh clcv sb c a e t ut e eue h uh cs oo t a h “yas t o et e uj t h. Second. H sb i t t e e a pae l pr” e um t h pr t l ec l t s a pu cno dpn o “ahgvrm n s w moral self-ol ao”( ae a 19a 19.F r at h e te f a r ad n r s to “ gl scr r dm” o K n t s a u e a e l d e . for with the poi t tte m y i o ehicm att f e t n r a s ot eo n nt l rv o h s t a d sl t r o pc h e r i “ m i hs g t a us b s a as s v e . however. e d ao e n a ae constellation of interests and will inevitably fa aa . As Habermas is quite aware. the two world wars in particular. but by a federation of free. 178-86). 5). they tell us nothing about the moral and political status of human rights. n t e i as gs i cn h
.i state of freedom is to be achieved not by a federation of citizens. Habermas d cs o bg s i t l ayo K n s o o o ’ i us n ei wt h e c f at nt n f s s i n h e g ’ i cosmopolitan law (das Recht der Weltbürger) A cri t H br a’ aa s .
Habermas appeals to the Western standards of legitimacy expressed in a i asec sut ni w i “ e adeulizn t e onet e e o hwt y n d lpeh i ao n h h f e n qaci sa cuslo t r n o h e t i c r te k gh e can regulate their cm o le ( ae a 20.( ae a 19a14 h pli li lni o eoo iad u ua os ln tim aue ” H br s 98.8) ic m t t t l m t e d m 23
.2) o m ni . His account can be found in his response to three lines of objection: the self-criticism of the West. the fact of pluralism of worldviews.h 5. 128). Hence the burden of justification falls on the rest two arguments. and argues that the secularization of politics requires that traditional w r v w udroa“ f x er om li ”( ae a 2001. w oe“ d i ascs l adscl bs ”acrscn at t at o y( ae a hs i i d lt t e n eu r ai cod et ly o u nm H br s n v u ii y a s ri o m 2001. In response to the ol i s ne de g r l i e r u t n H br s ee v f ao m d cus o “ s t vl s H br a a ust th t d i a fr so pli l n i or f A ii a e. the rest of the world may not follow the path of the West. it is not clear how human rights are to be enforced universally around the (real) world. H br s 0111 f” m It should be noted that the second line of justification is a functional one. Habermas de w is“ h Fr Wolt s e ns o o pa t m r i o a r et y h h os re:T e it r h df e s t sekh e d n f pe n b w i t s d u i e ia s c te o tas u aey fcnm c n cl r nni u aiys esr .e.( a h hs o prvl n h hl” H bermas 2001.19 But as I have argued earlier. m 2001. ae s r e h t r io l om f o ta ad s e ac u ” m g a e a tn ic sc ln gao m saato“ e a -to-resist imperative of an economic modernization oi i er i ut dp t t hr a t tn h d t t a w napoa o t w o . 122) This appeal to individual autonomy amounts to seeing the West as the measure of the rest of the world. nn gs e ee . and Habermas is aware that functional arguments cannot easily be converted into normative arguments (Habermas 2001. ot tadr k go hm nr h a a cn s da ee” H br a ee l ad ycn n n a i f u a i t r s ot t s vr ( ae s a it e. To meet the A ii a e. in response to criticism a e e from inside the West. i. 125). 124) Finally. Habermas must offer a philosophical justification as to why human rights provide the sole basis for legitimation at the international level. ) ac u ” e l as m challenge of fundamentalism. the discourse of “ s t vl s adt caeg o fna eti ( ae a 20. 119) Hence. n h hlne fudm n lm H br s 01 c. Habermas appeals to the modern condition. And even if they do.gnr vl i. The question of enforcement is especially important in that it t e u t t H glnm m n i H br a’t oyt t os o s w lwt h a s so h eea o etn ae s h r h de nti e i i k e i m s e a t l h s K n a m m n T iH glnm m n iepesdi H br a’i at t u a r h atn o et h eea o ets xr e n ae s d h hm n i t i . Habermas writes:
Indeed. s i s m s e a gs are not merely moral but legal in nature.
…human rights belong structurally to a positive and coercive legal order which founds actionable individual claims. it is part of the meaning of human rights that they claim the status of basic rights which are implemented within the context of some existing legal order. 226-7. To this extent. or not yet. from our ideas about personality and moral agency. 192. (Walzer 1980. be it national. It is not the case that one can simply proclaim a list of rights and then look around for armed men to enforce it. such an arena. Or rather. or global.” (Frost 1996. and the rights recognized within it have been minimal and largely negative. without reference to political processes and social circumstances. and the process by which they come to be recognized is a political process which requires a political arena. And where these problems are not at issue. 5). Rights are only enforceable within political communities where they have been collectively recognized. a community of nations. international. not of humanity. the only global community is pluralist in character. (Habermas 1998a. ch. The globe is not. As I have argued elsewhere. so allow me to quote in length:
Individual rights may well derive. 8) u h m n e i .
. emphasis in the original)
This idea is similar to Mervyn Frost’idea that r h a “i a d: [r]ights are not things s i t r sut ” “ gs e t e which a person can be conceived of as having outside of or prior to any and all social and political institutions. But the enforcement of rights is another matter. designed to protect the integrity of nations and to regulate their commercial and military transaction. m tn e h n e o ei human rights r a s h asneo a eeu v pw r ( ae a 19a 12 B t e e i t bec f n xct e o e” H br s 98. as I am inclined to think. the fact that those values are often pursued paternalistically is of great concern (Lin 2006. 138) But what is the implication of this notion of rights as situated for international ethics? Michael Walzer has answered this question eloquently. m f lt ep r t i p ct n o t s efr m n df i c” o t oin i e aoa aso xl e h m laos fh “noc et e c ny frh r i n r t nl i o e i i i e ie e z g tn i ethics. the absence of an impartial authoritative administration often gives rise to the problems of selective enforcement and double standard that are bound to breed cynicism. emphasis mine)
T b sr H br a icr i ynt nw r o “ e ekl ki t g bl rt t no o e ue ae ss e a l o ua a f t w a i n h l a po co f .
1) aue y h otn f e v s h . 207. Rawls does not consider that a consistently worked-out procedualism could defuse the whole issue o w e epi spy ne i sh pli lu nm o t ci n. Hae a’ t oycu of a at o . If thousands of Shi’ in Nasiriya ites demonstrate in equal measure against both Saddam and the American occupation. (Habermas 2003. they express the truth that non-Western cultures must appropriate the universalistic content of human rights from their own resources and in their own interpretation. Interestingly. Habermas 1998a. h c t u o R ws pi spi l rj t ae a w is“ o ee olahoyht n a i a i i ri e f a ls h ooh apo cH br s re:H w vr ny ter t tu r n s iq ’ l c e m t . 369)
This criticism points to a more dialogical and less monological approach to international ethics in which the West and the rest can learn from each other through dialogue:
I prcl .The problem of paternalism is of particular interest here. it is cr i y ea b w e e t c ti o pt nlm if ro a ls o tal e lm e a l dbt l ht rh ris f a ras sa t R ws pli li r i .( ae a 19a9) f ht r h ooh udr n t o taat o y fh iz s H br s 98.20 Now. a lays down the complete design of a well-ordered society for the citizens create the danger of political paternalism.o h dc i o sl br s h r ol f r n n dt fr i otn f e -legislation. for the ethos of anti-pt nlm i a t ha o H br a’ pi spy T i e o i epesdi h a ras s th er f ae s h ooh.39. m s e d e i e s re f w e ap e t t i e aoa l e w u r u ea“eet lao o oe o n hn pld o h n r t nl e l ol e i i e tn i v. o ol Ty r pli o r on i bt l R ws pli li r i e s t n nt ny al ’ o ts fe gio u a o a ls o ta l e lm g li o s ic c tn s ’ ic b as will appear to be paternalistic (Habermas 1998a. m d i re self-l iao. ’ e tn i ethics does exhibit the trait of paternalism i t t t “a gr a t oo y o pol n h i ct oi l a nm ” f ep s a s e c x e relegates non-liberal peoples to an inferior status and it prejudges certain regimes illegitimate by smuggling in criteria of regime legitimacy prior to the construction of the law of peoples. d qr dcn azt n f n’ w ri i s pr et e ( ae a 20. 95). h t s s xr e n i e i e t m s l s h s s repeated emphasis that a legal order is legitimate only when the addressees of the law can see t m e e a i at r” ( ae a 19a 25 Mesr b t s dc i o h sl s s t u os H br s 98.5 h l m e e ic o e te ” m 25
. one that will construct a convincing connection to local experiences and interests. They win their binding force only within normative orders and practices of particular forms of cultural life. tn ae h e ic m e i i ’ ic b as a R ws i cn st vl i o t ca e N nt l sR ws t oyo i e aoa s a ld ot th ad y fh hr . oe e s a lsh r fn r t nl d e e it e g he.T e at a rasc ca c rt o H br a’ e pcv” H br s 03 6) h n -pt nlt hr t ii f ae s s i m i e ii a e sc m s international ethics in most evident in his criticism of American invasion of Iraq in 2003:
“ Values” —including those that have a chance of winning global recognition—don’ t come from thin air.
e a i o b o t o cn c bt e a ls n n h n ae n a w ’ r n rss v ’ account of international ethics.n t ss o esre f eetoii t n f a lw is“ lsc ts ne ga acagsad h in l t o dcn sc tsh o t ee g d i s u ee a others. Just like Rawls takes people to be the basic unit of moral concern in international ethics. This could support the rejection of Eurocentrism.21 My difficulty with Rawls is that he should not assume that only liberal peoples and decent societies are capable of moral learning. Liberal peoples should not suppose that decent societies are unable to reform themselves in their own w y (a l19a6) a.m r io o R ws f m w r wl b ee m r n r t nl r i tn i g a oio t n y e s n f a ls r e ok i e vn oe vi ’ a l cniet i a ioi lprahhn a ls w . o t ru al a ug i ic e e n e n a e h t e n aaal”Fot969) vib .(rs19.7e paiite r i l“s py ot dhat any discussion about what ought to be done in world 964. T bg wt w cnf dnt l pi s f ot t e enR ws adMe y Fot o ei i . the European powers also got the chance to assume a reflexive distance from themselves.With the growing distance of imperial domination and the loss of colonialism. by allowing the representatives of all peoples to participate in the i e aoa oi nlpsi . now I shall explore if they can be dovetailed with other more Hegelian accounts in IR. (Habermas and Derrida 2003. They could learn from the perspective of the defeated to perceive themselves in the dubious role of victors who are called to account for the violence of a forceful and uprooting process of modernization. Rather.1 ” 22 Fot re:Whts e g rud shtni da ad te m shv some m r psi ….(rs rsw is“ aibi a e it i v ul n s t ut ae t n g a di s as oa oio ”Fot l tn 19. we must assume that all peoples have the same moral capacity unless evidence proves otherwise. os t wt d l c apoc t R ws o n sn h a g a a ’
The Hegelian Approaches of Mervyn Frost and Andrew Linklater A t r el gt H glnm m n i R ws adH br a’ acut fn raoa f r e an h eea o et n a ls n ae s con o i e t nl e v i e i s ’ m s tn i ethics. In thir a . R ws 99. Frost takes the state to be the basic unit. and inspire the Kantian hope for a global domestic policy. 297. for Rawls explicitly affirms that decent societies are just as capable of moral learning as liberal peoples are.0 l e 26
. a ls hoym ypoet b eul s e r R ws t r a rv o e qay gd ’ e l suited to such a dialogical approach. emphasis in the original)
Arguably. 22 There is a slight
R ws re:Aloii udro r ulhne.m hs n h oi n )Ii lcn n t s ga m e pli …m sb cnut i t l gae fh m dr s tss m N o esib l gaes o ts ut e odc dnh a ug o t oe te yt . for this dialogical approach to be possible Habermas must abandon his claim that the West is the measure of the rest. Hence.
international law. rst sh m dr te o a f h as o ” k e n a n d cus”t b t s rn pi o h t oy T j tyh s rn pi . 111-2). A normative theory of a social world constructed out of the thin air is no good for us. and by showing how the shortcomings of the subordinate institutions are overcome by subsequent and higher institutions. Fot 9611 T u.adFot apoc eh i t s eea ca c rt i t t e ugs : We xr s ” n rss prah xi t h H gln hr t ii n h h sget “ ce ’ bs i i a e sc a s must begin with what we have. 0) i R ws t law of peoples. sf s a i n v R nl D ok ’m t d f sti cn s d s e b a u et T im t d ee b s oa w ri s e o o “el g ot t i us y r m n . A Mo yC cr pi s u “ ees h ooh i a a i av m t dl i l s l oha o t ot H gl pi spy s n fr t e e oo g a l n n .5) hsFotae t “ oe s tdm i o t rte s u nm u. 142)
For Frost.huh Wh e a ls ep -centric approach can be justified by appealing to a ie net g: i R ws pol fr o l ’ e Hegelian notio o sc l n n Fot s t n f oi ui . Normative goals must be instructed by reality. modernization. there is r n ia ol f te ” C cr 99 11 Lk a lsh s d as n e ’ e
The settled norms include eighteen norms that represent international consensus on four issues areas—sovereignty. (Frost 1996. like family and civil society.(oha 19. 93-104). Both [Hegel and Charvet] support this contention by examining how our individuality is partially constituted by subordinate wholes. at the international level the state is an individual vis-à-vis other states. and democracy and human rights (Frost 1996. h e o r m l d n h tn ee s g ” s h s e that of Rawls in many ways: First. frh proe e ut ei wt “ htvroe nw ” n e p yR ws m t do o t s ups w m sbg i w aee n ko s ad m l a ls e o f i n h y o ’ h reflective equilibrium to render an initially not fully coherent body of norms more coherent (Frost 1996. This dialectical process then culminates in the state. Frost infers e a’ d i i f e s o s f m t shtfrhici nh t b fl at le t is tneso e eon e b r h t “ t r iz si o e u y c azd h rte ed t b r gi d y o i a o e te p l ui e a c z o e s t a at o os (rs19. rss te a o ’ a -centric approach is justified by appealing to a “ost i t oy o i i dat w i ia odr e l gl f m H glT e rxo cntu v h r” fn v uly h h s l e vd a e r ite e d i i. c s i r y o ee h c . and reality for IR at peets w r o s t . ’ l fm i h oc ee i .d f ec.23 Second. it regards the main task of normative theory as constructing the best possible background justification for settled body of norms. 27
. and for Hegelh s tsni dat im n et i i at o y i t te i v ulys ai s d n t u nm v -à-vis other states. rs i oe i or o e h t t g o t f i h r o u i i t t g o tFotn ks s e e ai n s e . u f this constitutive theory is expressed in the following statement:
It is only in the state that individuality can be fully realized.
90) In fact.(rs19 157) h uh h o n r at n fl oe i te ”Fot96. d cs o o Ln a r con da hai o C cr s nl i C cr 99c. however. 109) It should be noted. eak fibten omad akrud hoyi 0)t “ o ro t s ie i . h c t w e . 171-82. that Frost may avoid this os its C i li ” charge by claiming that he is not committed to holding that life in states is the only proper life for human beings. n s takes us to Linklater appropii o H gl d l ts i r a ti e aoae i . Linklater traces the development of human freedom in a succession of ever more rational social institutions. s oha pti i a d l ta poes f hne (oha 19. ol te i o e bu ibyn Fot cne I ad i although Frost regards his d a l ’ n tn s rn pi t b. r t n f ees ie i wt e r on r t nlt c 24 ao ’ a cc h g d tn i hs Like Frost.n dio. who traces the constitution of individuality in a hierarchy of institutions within the state. starting with tribal societies (Linklater 1990.ts os e dt b t cne av i t t h s rn pi wt n Ii cni r o e o osr t e n h “i t t g o t i i de o vi a s ai n h contemporary international practice leaves no space for imagining new institutional ps b ie.) s i kt s w l n ys n 28
. r e ua i l e n as It is ironic to witness that a statist approach to international ethics could be more open to the possibility of a world state than most cosmopolitan approaches. or that the way that states are organized at present is the best way of organizing them (Frost 1996. e m t ” fh d l tsi. In this evolutionary process. 81-3). (ochran 1999. a cc n 16. 0) h r s m tn r a o i o n y f n r c t om o nt r C cr 99 13 T i p ts e l h. etl a sc l y o pli l eoo y t t “xln t e p i l poess o ni a oi o o g r o ta cnm h ep i h m ic rcs ic a as e ra e f t nfr ao f m oet eo i e oia fr t ao e”(oha 19. Nonetheless. Cochran 1999. et l o f e e nr n bcgon t r s h o i a cc . nevertheless inadequately dialectical. Frost even argues that we must not rule out the j ti it o aw r s t F r rs aw r s t cu b j ti “ icm aot u ia ly f ol te o Fot sf b i d a. . u t t et tht rssm t do j ti t n t i o t f n r t nl t c B to h x n t Fot e o f u ic i an n tn i hs e e a ’ h sf ao exhibits the Hegelian affirmative character. ol te ol e u ie i t a e bu d a d sf d f t og t vl t y co o a svr g s t . t t g o to e a C cr u t n “ie i l rcs o cag” C cr 99 ai n n s. how a w r s twlcm aots eod rss ocr. his theory is also often faulted for being oriented to the status quo. each prior form has certain degree of rationality. the state replaces kinship relations and custom with legal and political society.h3. and each stage contributes to the improvement of human freedom. which treats
My i us n f i le’acut r s ev y n oha’aa s (oha 19. An adequately dialectical account must. Specifically. in my opinion.certainly a good sense of realism in taking this state of the world (as a world of states) as the s r gpi o i e aoa e i .
Linklater finds the modern state an inadequate institution in that it exhibits paradoxical character: “ on the one hand. Nonetheless. At one point Linklater even acknowledges that one should not assume that the post-Westphalian arrangements are the destination that all communities should strive to reach (Linklater 1998. it is thus considered to be a higher stage of freedom (Linklater 1990a. 182. as students of the English School observe. 167).
A pluralist society of states is a framework in which “ constitutive principles aim to preserve respect for the the freedom and equality of independent political communities. Linklater offers three alternative frameworks: a pluralist society of states. Yet. 176.” post-Westphalian order is a framework A in which sovereignty.citizens equally under the law. 6) suggests that he deems the post-Westphalian framework as the most progressive order. Linklater’ account appears to suggest that the sequence of “ s kin. quoted in Cochran 1999. territoriality and citizenship no longer immediately associated with the concept of the state (Linklater 1998. it is the site on which radical intensifications of social control have been established but. a solidarist society of states. state”would eventually be completed by “ world”26 The universalism and . 146-7) To overcome this paradox the modern state and the international society must undergo substantial transformations.” solidarist society of states is a framework in A which states “ have reached an agreement about a range of moral principles such as individual human rights. 83). it has been the setting for unprecedented efforts to eradicate the tyranny of unjust exclusion. 167-8). and a post-Westphalian framework (Linklater 1998. his discussion of the problem of exclusionary sovereignty state and citizenship in the post-Westphalian state (Linklater 1998.” (Linklater 1998. 101). tribe. 167). progressivism implicit in this sequence are bound to be vulnerable to Chris Brown’criticism s of cultural imperialism (Brown 1995). 26 This sequence is borrowed from Brown (1995. 166-7). ch. He tries to avoid this quagmire by asserting that each of the three aforementioned frameworks “ strikes the balance between the universal and the particular in a distinctive way” thus all three frameworks make positive contribution to the creation of a and “ universal communication community”(Linklater 1998. But unlike Frost who seems to suggest that the modern state already provides the individual with the basis for human freedom. city.25 On the face of it. minority rights. 29
. on the other hand. But Linklater is quite aware of the totalizing tendency of a universalistic project. responsibilities for nature and duties to other species.
who submits that the universalism of republicanism will eventually part company with the particularism of nationalism. they do not exhibit a common desire to establish more solidarist arrangements.” (Linklater 1998.“ while states in the modern world can agree on the principles of a pluralist international society. we still need a more dialectical account of how this ideal can be realized. ay t t f d m n r i lens. s gd rn i h ut r bt cv t ” o e h r i e orak( ae a 20. H br a’ falls short of being adequately dialectical due to its inadequate attention to the ae s . In s addition.i-xiv) cn l oc cn i reverse her argument to contrary effect. it is subject to the criticism s leveled against Habermas’ideal of constitutional patriotism that I have discussed earlier. Yet Lnle’acutcompared with i a r con kt s . Like Habermas. n h iea i h rcs h uh h e f t ut ya i f h pn g ad a e e r e n h l e n r e e c sr o sc l i er e le ol ( ae a 20. ei t og t s e w d l ue f oil n ga d i w r ” H br s 01 8)Se g h uh h n o . we may need to go back to Habermas’analysis. 30
. Habermas finds a universalistic momentum toward a more abstract form of social integration in the process of evolution from village and clan to dynasty to nation-s t h a or a s cr i o t s rcs wt afr e asat es p t b te e l e r “a y g n h poes i a. globalization is regarded as an impulse toward opening that provides individuals with
I orwt sdarm w aH t i s as peo eo g aaeuc” H t i s 99x i but br h i f o i e o ht u h g cl “hnm nl i ldqay ( u h g 19. s Like Linklater. 1. 173) This observation suggests that Linklater’ aspiration for a s post-Westphalian framework needs a justification. however. 8 B t ae a’acuts oe ieta t nLnle’i u t H br s 01 1) u H br s con im r d l i lh i a r n s m m s a cc a kt s t tt xm nst poest og t l so “ esb ednm co t oei . Linklater justifies his vision by arguing that the movement toward the “ post-exclusionary states”is an answer to the “ universal rationales”that is inherent in the modern idea of citizenship. even if we concede that the idea of citizenship provides the “ moral r or s that e uc ” s e make the movement toward a post-Westphalian order possible. m s material conditions of possibility. Linklater also argues that the universal principle underpinning the modern idea of citizenship contradicts the exclusive nature of the nation-state and thus the tension inherent in this idea creates the possibility of advances beyond the sovereign state (Linklater 1998.27 To remedy this weakness. 191-3) To the extent Linklater’argument resembles that of Habermas.
a kt s og individualistic while the dialogical approach I have in mind is a statist one. 154-5). This approach to recognition is paternalistic in that the relationship between the initiator and the novice is plainly unequal and the novice is merely a passive receiver of the rl o t gm . e R ws t oyFot t oy l eh i t t io pt nlm T is evident in his use a lsh r rssh r a o xi t h r t f a ras . they must close themselves again with expanded horizon (Habermas 2001. it suffices to note that his analysis finally leads to the conclusion. 127). his ’ e . But to the extent that lifeworlds disintegrate under the pressure of opening. is not an unreasonable one. This d l taaa s i n ay ugs t t rss t t g ie i lnl i r i l sget h Fot s rn point of international ethics. h pt nlm i Fot acuts i irot t f a l adI ae u fh a e T e a ras n rss con is l t h o R ws n hv e e e i ’ ma a . t hu e o d o ee h i a r con s n l d e . kt s ao m s s e hs kt Linklater 2005) I sol b nt . By this metaphor. Hence. admission of a new state to the international society is likened to the process of an initiate teaching a novice to the game (Frost 1996.new possibilities and freedom on the one hand while increases their risk of making mistakes on the other. the challenge is to strike a balance between opening and closure (Habermas 2001. 83).e. o ee i e ’ e a ee . how
. Such a dialogical approach has been adumbrated b Lnle i h apor t no H br a’ d cus e i (i le 19. a udt th w ans o pt nlm cnb oe o eb apy gH br a’ m r r e h t ekes f a ras a e vr m y pl n ae s oe g a e e i c i m s dialogical approach to international ethics. Rather. i t fr e l ee t “ ia s adt lt “oi s i t te wt h om ri nd o i tt ” n h ae nv e” n h as h e k n ie e tr c e chess game (Sutch 2001. i. the new closure should not be a return to the so-cld“ r m dri ”i w i nt n c s ae fs oe t n h h ao. the a cc ys o cl s a ’ ai modern state domain of discourse. h 3 y i a r n i prpii f ae s i or t c Ln a r 98 c. .hw vr t tLnle’ acuti ot oically . T e i oew ans i Fot t oyt t ed t b cr c d hw vrLk hr s n ekes n rss h r h nes o e or t . ’ e s bs e a e i of the chess-playing metaphor: Frost divides the world into two kinds of states— developed states and quasi-s t . l s l it ny c i a and state were the most important components. as I have pointed out earlier. that a cosmopolitan community is premature in that it is dependent on a civic solidarity that has yet to be achieved at the global level. For Habermas. Here we need not go through his analysis in detail. 86-8) Habermas tests the conditions of possibility of this new closure by the case of the European Union.
Mitzen (2005). emphasis in the original) It should be noted. he does not dispute the “ s two-stage” characterization of his approach (Rawls 1996. Habermas 1998. 69). In this forum The it is no longer the fictional citizens of a just society about whom statements are made within the theory but real citizens of flesh and blood. we move to a constitutional convention where—seeing ourselves as delegates—we are to draw up the principles and rules of a constitution in the light of the principles of justice already on hand. Notable examples include Risse (2000).: T epi i e j ti a the first stage must be exposed to public om t n i. Rawls summarizes this sequences in his exchange with Habermas as follows: “ begin in the We original position where the parties select the principles of justice. I shall leave this task for future exploration.“ h r c l u ie t i e n p s sf d d cs o a t scn s g. Habermas may want to deny that he also adopts a two-stage approach to theory-formation. next. But I am skeptical of the claim that the divide between the two philosophers cannot be bridged. “ is you and I—and so all citizens over time.28
Conclusion: Toward a Hegelian Synthesis I aeso nbt R ws adH br a’ acut o i e aoa e i a cm ab hv hw o a ls n ae s con fn r t nl t c r o pt l h ’ m s s tn i hs e ie with the Hegelian approaches of Mervyn Frost and Andrew Linklater. Payne (2000). we must consider a potential objection to sc a edao:t tR ws pi spi let pi i s r i l d f etf m uh n nevr h a ls h ooh a n rre s o a c l ie n r a ’ l c e s d ay f r o H br a’t thy ant e usm d n n gad hoyI utcnweg t t fl ae s h t cno b sbu e i oe r t r m sako l eh a u m s a e n e . Before proceeding. 129 s i e a ” m
Many students of IR have embarked on such an exploration. albeit explicitly disagree with each other in their exchange (Rawls 1996.” (Rawls 1996. chs. 61. d a l rejoinder to this objection is beyond my intellectual capacity. we assume the role of judges interpreting the constitution and laws as members of the judiciary..” (Habermas 1998a. that the purpose of Habermas’interpretation is to show that Rawls’framework prioritizes “ liberal rights of the s s the moderns over the democratic of process (or the liberties of the ancients) (Habermas 1998a. as it were. rather. 195-201). But due to the space limits. 398) The crux of this four-stage sequence is that citizens’ conception of justice is not decided by abstract reasoning in the original position once and for all. After this we become. Lynch (2002). legislators enacting laws as the constitution allows and as the principles of justice requires and permit. which Rawls describes in his A Theory of Justice. ( ae a 19a 6) This suggests that the divide i us n t h eod t e H br s 98. My optimism is based on the fact that Rawls and Habermas. 396-9).” (Rawls 1996. Steffek (((2003). 2 & 3). But as Rawls rightly points out. Lecture IX. 29 What Habermas calls “ two-stage approach” refers to Rawls’four-stage sequence concerning the formation s and application of the principles of justice. Though Rawls denies Habermas’charge. 383. 14) Habermas’interpretation of Rawls’four-stage sequence is quite illuminating: s s “ theory as a whole must be subjected to criticism by the citizens in the public forum of reason. one by one and in associations it here and there—who judge the merits of the original position as a device of representation and the principles it yields. On the other hand.H br a’d cus e i it b ap e t r aos m n s t r a s sb ct b ae s i or t c so e pld o e t n a og te e i a uj to e m s s e hs i li as m n e explored. both adopt a two-stage approach to theory-fr ao. fn. and finally. Habermas’appeal to the ideal speech situation in fact s 32
. §31 (Rawls 1971. Müller (2001). however. Risse (2004). Now I shall further explore if it is os lt sbu e a ls n H br a’t oi o i e aoae i i ps b o usm R ws ad ae s h r s fn r t nlt c n ie ’ m s e e tn i hs a broadly Hegelian approach.
179-87).e. of formulating a vision of the good. they will select well-established norms such as sovereign equality and non-intervention and not controversial norms such as rights to democracy or a difference principle applied at the global level. 30 In fact. s/he is capable of a sense of justice. impartiality. 2). each individual is a moral person endowed with the same moral rights as ourselves. the line between ideal theory and non-ideal theory is drawn in parallel with Seyla B nai s ii t nbtent s npi o t gnr i do e adthe standpoint of ehb ’d t co e e h t do t fh ee le t r n b sn i w e a n e az h the concrete other (Benhabib 1992. Benhabib 1994. For cosmopolitans. and unanimity. instead representatives of all peoples are included in the deliberation and selection of the principles of international justice. enjoins us to view every moral person as a unique individual. 158-9. Thus Christopher McMahon does not go far wrong to conclude: “ when the moral theories of Habermas and Rawls are examined more fully. such a law of peoples would be too
presupposes five values. Habermas explicitly invokes Rawls’ s “ thought experiment of the original position” illustrate what he calls “ moral point of view” to the (Habermas 1996. some matters are presumably “ settled by philosophical analysis of the moral point of view. But as I proposed elsewhere (Lin 2006.between the two philosophers may be narrower than it appears to be. 31 In this revised Rawlsian framework. openness. lack of coercion. pooead io o l o btenR ws ad u d g n h be t n I rps ln i vi i s n f a r e e a ls n vi b w ’ H br a’acut fn raoa e i : bg l gl wt R ws pol ae s con o i e t nl t c We ei a e i a ls ep -centric or m s tn i hs n r y h ’ e statist approach that he lay out in The Law of Peoples. and of engaging in activity to pursue the latter. and so there is no need to distinguish different kinds of peoples or societies. however. The standpoint of the concrete other. 111)30 B i i o t sosrao. equality. I believe that both Rawls and Habermas adopt a two-stage approach to theory-formation. 425-6) For these reasons.” (Benhabib 1994.” s (McMahon 2002. thus Habermas does not leave all substantive questions open to discussion. in his discussion of the immigration policy of Germany. ch. 179) 33
. 31 The crux of the distinction is summarized in this statement: “ According to the standpoint of the generalized other. as well as needs and limitations. In other words.” (Rawls 1996. Rawls can make use of Habermas’ procedure. and s Habermas could employ a theoretical device that plays the role of Rawls’original position. Since the principles are now selected by all and not only by liberal peoples. this revision should be able to correct the paternalistic bias of The Law of Peoples. disposition. with a certain life history. But since the parties do not know the identity of their regime behind a thick veil of ignorance. 511-2). parties to the international original position should adopt the standpoint of the generalized other. and endowment. i. it can be seen that these two procedures of moral thinking are not in competition with each other.
It should be noted. instead. however. The Hegelian moment is expressed in the movement from the abstract (the first stage) to the concrete (the second stage) and a concrete analysis of the conditions of possibility. human rights and just distribution at the global level can be expressed in the international public political forum when we move from ideal theory (the first stage) to nonideal theory (the second stage). This emphasis on the reciprocity among states will forbid the use of force to promote democracy and human rights. and the Hegelian moment can sit well with the Kantian moment in a broadly Hegelian approach. this synthesis may appear to be advantageous to the communitarian position and thus it has not gone beyond the divide between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. For cosmopolitans. The Kantian moment is expressed in the use of the original position at the international level. This new approach is a Hegelian synthesis in that it both entails a Kantian moment and a Hegelian moment. for their aspiration for democracy. which subsumes the two moments in the division of labor of the two-stage theory formation. for the public political culture at the global level treats states and not individuals as equals. Cosmopolitans need not be disappointed by this Hegelian approach. it calls for international dialogues in which liberal and nonliberal states can learn from each other. And at the global level the criterion of reciprocity applies mainly among states. at the core of which is the criterion of reciprocity.thin or too conservative. this is the price we need to pay in order to avoid paternalism. that parties to this forum must appeal to public reason. where Habermasian discourse ethics can be applied. though.
. Yet. from a Hegelian (and a communitarian) point of view. But I hope I have made it clear in this paper that a full account of international ethics cannot do without Hegelian moments.
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