THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS

Translated by various Sanskrit Scholars.

KDITBD BY

Major B. D. BASU, I.MS.
(Retired.)

VOL. VIII.

THE NYAYA SUTRAS OF GOTAMA

PTJBLISHRD

BY

SUDHINDRANATHA vasu
FROM THE PACINI
OFFICE, BHUVANHS'WAEI As'RAMA, BAHADURGA.VJ

Hllababao
FrINtbjI*?&§, Apurva Krishna

Bosb at the Indian Press

1913

/}-

THE

NYAYA SUTRAS OF GOTAMA

TRANSLATED BY

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA SATlSA CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA,
M.A,, PH.D.
Principal, Sanskrit Collbge, Calcutta

PUBLISHED BY

THE PACINI OFFICE, BHUVANE&'WARI ASRAMA, BAHADDRGANJ
HUababafc
Printed by Apurva Krishna Bosb at the Indian Press
1913

)

) )

)

) )

)

.TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION

...

BOOK
The Sixteen
Release
categories
...

I,

CHAPTER

I.

1

( Jrori )

2
(

Means

of

knowledge
(

vm

)

2 2

Perception
Inference
(

**m

)

defined

...

wyra
(

)

defined

...

3
3

Comparison

«wi )

defined
(

Word
Soul

or verbal testimony
(

swe ) defined

4 4
5 5 5 5
5

Objects of knowledge
(

it?

to^ )
( (

defined.

Body
Sense

*fa

)

defined

tf^) defined
(
(

Element
Qualities

^n

)
)
)

defined
of earth etc. ...

jt

Intellect (

5%
)

defined

6 6

Mind

(w
(
(

defined
)

Activity

sifn
)

defined

and explained

...

6
7

Fault

$ra

defined
(

Transmigration
Fruit
( (

fawra

)

defined

7 7 7

<w

)

defined defined defined

Pain

%:*
(

)

Release

wn^ )
)

7 7

Doubt

(

««W
(

defined and explained

Purpose

>i%wi ) defined

8
(

Example or

familiar instance
)

fgffl )

.

.

8

TenetJjJ^nw

defined

8
9 9

A dogma of alTthe Schools ( fl«5fl»«f«aiHi A dogma peculiar to some School ( nfim«^%RT A hypothetical dogma ( «fwf%*n - ...
)

9

An

implied

dogma

(

««pm%^T)
(

10

Members

of a syllogism

w«m

Proposition ( ifnw

JO 10
II

Reason (^3)

...

Homogeneous or

affirmative reason (
(

*nc%

n

Beterogeneous or negative reason

QWfy

)

(

a

)
"

Page.
11
11

Example

(

wp^w

)

...

...

...

...

...

-Homogeneous or affirmative example ( swtfquw )... Heterogeneous or negative example (<$Wqrfw ) ...
Application, affirmative and negative
(

... ...

...
... ...

12


... ... ...

)

...

12
12 13

Conclusion

( fi«ron )

... ...

... ... ... ...

Confutation

(

ni
(

)

Ascertainment

f^h

)

...

...

13

BOOK
J Discussion («Wf)
... ...
...

I,

CHAPTER
... ... ... ...

II.

... ... ...
...

... ... ...

... ...

14
15 15

Wrangling ( I a Cavil ( fair )
b

«ct

)
...

...'
...

Fallacies of reason

(

trwmi

)

15
15

The erratic ( «*R*rc ) ... ... The contradictory ( fi^w ) ... ... The controversial or equal to the question The reciprocal or unproved ( otwi ) The mistimed ( *raiiftn ) ... ... Quibble (wi) ... ... ... j
. . .

... ...
(

...

... ... ...

...
...

16

mwn )
...
...

16
16

...

... ...
... ...

...
... ...

17 17
17

... ...

Quibble in respect of a term

( wjjra )
(

...
)

Quibble in respect of a genus
Futility (wfii)...

srnpwm

... ... ... ...

... ... ...
...

...
..."
.

18
1*

Quibble in respect of a metaphor
>•

( B'rorcwi )
...

...

... ...

19

j

An

occasion for rebuke

(

finjwra

)

...

20

BOOK
Doubt
(

II,

CHAPTER

I.

iw ) examined
objects of
)

...

...

...

... ... ... ... ...

..

22

The means and
Perception
(

knowledge
( wtfift* )

( uro-JPta )
...
...

examined
...

...

24
29 31 31

*m

examined

...
... .,. ...
... ... ...

Special kinds of knowledge

...

The relation of perception and inference The whole ( wn% ) and its part ( wra )
Inference
( <«5*ni )

(

HMWu^wq

,

...

... ...

32
33 34 35 3©

examined
(

...

...

The time present, past and future
Comparison (vtm
)

^fam,
...

wfai, *wroi )
... ...

examined
... ... ...

examined
(

Word

or verbal testimony

*** )
... •••

examined
...

...

TheVeda(%*)*examined
Injunction (§6l)

... ...
...

...
...

... ...
...

...
...

Persuasion
Praise

(

1*35
...

)

... ...

*.,.

C^)

...
...

...

„.
...

39 41 41 41 41
41

Blame (finp) ... Warning ( i^ft )

...

... ...

...

...

...

...

...

,

)

(

to

)

Prescription

(

s*row
(

)
)

...
...
...

...
...
...

...
...

...
...

...
...

41 41

Reinculcation

wpmf

Tautology

( yw* )

... ...

...
...

... ...

42 42

The Medical Science

(

wj^j

)

...

BOOK
Means of knowledge
(

II,

CHAPTER
...
...
...

II.

itm

)

examined
...

...

...

...
...

43

Rumour

($firo)...
(

... ... ... ...

...
...
... ...

43

Presumption
Probability
(

wfafft
)

)

...
...

... ...

43
43 43
46
51

q*m
(

...
... ...
...

Non-existence

iwrc

) (

...

...
...

.The nature of sound
Otherness
(

*i*0

examined
...

...
...

...
...
... .

w*
...

)

...

Letters, their modifications

and substitutes
...
... ...

( «rtfi"mt

... ... ...

54
59
59

Word(iO
Individual

... ...
... ... ...

... ...
... ...

( "tftt )
...
...

Form(w»fii)

...
...

...
...

59 59

Genus

(

wtft )

...

BOOK
Sense
(
(

III,

CHAPTER

I.

ff*5* ) is
jrfK ) is

not soul
(

Body

not soul
(

wnj to^ )
(

)

...
...

...
...

...

...

83

...
... ... ... ...

63

Duality of the eye

*:

)

...

...

...
...

55
66 67

Remembrance ( t*rfn ) ... Mind ( 1*: ) is not soul ( vm\ The soul ( vmi ) established

...

...
... ...

)

...

... ... ...
... ...

...
...

...
...
...

68
7?

The body ( ito ) is earthy ... The eye- ball ( <mm. ) is material The senses ( <frat ) are material ( ^rfiw ) The eye ( **: ) and its ray ( *ftn: ) The senses ( tffs* ) are more than one ... Touch (W5) ... five ( vftfi& ) The senses are The qualities of the elements ( 5B3* )

...
...
... ... ...

...
.

70
72

.

...
...
...
.

...
...

...
...

72
75

...
...

... ...
...

..

75
77

...

...
...

...

78

HOOK
Intellect or

III,

CHAPTER

11.

knowledge

Knowledge is The nature of

58 is not not momentary knowledge*( vn )
(
...
-

eternal
...

.

,

...

...
...

83
qq

...

... ...

...

...
...
...

gg 92
94

Recollection (^fii)

...
...

...
...

...

Desire and aversion

(

imifr )-

...

The mind

( <ra: ) is

not the seat of knowledge

...

...

...

Q$

.

)

.

Page.

,

.'(*wt) and its causes Knowledge ( »pt ) is not a natural

...

...

...
...

...
...
-

gg
99

quality of the body
(

Non-siraultaueouanesB of knowledge

m flpwg
i

)

...
...

... ...
...

...
... ...

jQg
193

The mind
Desert
(

(

*m:

) is
)

atomic

(

w$

)

...
...

«f$5Jnra

producing the body

...

103

BOOK
Activity
(

IV,

CHAPTER
...

1.

wrfn

) ...
•••

... ...

...

...
...

Faults ($ro)

...

... ... ...

jOg 10g

Stupidity
.

(

^«f )
( fcrvira )

... ...

..,
...

... ...

10g
J09

Transmigration

Entity does not arise from non-en tit.y (1

smrai^ Hi%7«rin:
...
.

HO
ll2

God

(**<:

)

...
(

...

...

Production from no-cause
All are not non-eternal
All are not eternal
(
(

wfiifcruh ir^Tfrfri:
...

)

...

U2
•••113
jj^
jjj-

1

^iRmi^ )

...

1 s^' ft&i\ ) All are not distinct ( t &§' ^j )
Self -existence
(

...
...

.

wnraftfg )
(

and

relative non-existence
)
...

(

w^rowi

)

.

.

\yj

No

fixity of
(
(

number

^w-fliRjfg
... •••
...

jig
... ...
...
...

Fruit

«w
g:s
(

)
)

examined

•••
...

Ug
122 123
123

Pain

examined
(

Release

wrt ) examined

...
...

Debts and troubles

"m ita

)

...

BOOK

IV,

CHAPTER
)
...

II.

The rise of true knowledge ( aKwrr^reofn Ths whole and if.s nnrtsf wwidiauEw 1

...

127 jgw
.

Atom(«5)
The

... (

...

...
i i

...

_

130
ig«j

non-reality of things
(

iranr q m
)

r^Hnw fitt:
...

)

...
.

False apprehension
Meditation
( *»nfa: )

ft^iwfN:
...

.

igg

...
(

...

igg

Discussion, wrangling and cavil

tn<*«w<4lw«i: )

...

igg

BOOK
Futility

V,

CHAPTER
...

I.

(wft)

...

...
(

...

...

...

Balancing the homogeneity

sw^to^
(

) ...
)
..
.

... ...

._
_

140 1^1
141

Balancing the heterogeneity Balancing an addition

$f*%«n

( wwfcaro )

... ...
...

1^2

Balancing a subtraction (tm^ra)
Balancing the questionable
(

#

.

>^
^

j^g j^g
144

v&Ftt
(

)

...

...

...
...

Balancing the unquestionable

wafarar
)

)
...

...

<a

Balancing the alternative

(

fiwwww

...

...

lil

f

)

.

(

.*

)

Page.

Balancing the reciprocity
Balancing the co-presence

(

imm

)

... ...

... ...
...

...
...
...

...
...

145
147

( mfi*ror )

Balancing the mutual absence ( wwfSw ) Balancing the infinite regression ( *nfpm
Balancing the counter-example
(

...
...

148
149 149 150 152 153 153 155
156

)
)

... ... ... ...
...

...
...

alaggpww
)
...

...
.

Balancing the non-produced Balancing the doubt
(

( )

wyq ffwwi
)

... ... ... ...
.

biwit
(

... ...
...

Balancing the controversy
Balancing the non-reason
(

jwwwi
)

...

mfypm
(

...
i

... ...
...

Balancing the presumption

wWtnw

...

Balancing the non-difference (

wWwu

)

.,

... ...

Balancing the demonstration
Balancing the perception
Balancing the non-eternal
(

( ««m!rwii )
...

...

...

157 158 159

sM«r«Ki<u )
(

...
...

...
... ... ...

...
...

Balancing the non-perception
(

wjwfinwi
)
...

)

Jifiww

... ... ... ...
...

... ...
...

160
161
\Q2

Balancing the eternal
Balancing the
effect (

(

ftwOTi)
)

...
...

wfoir
(

...
....

Admission of an opinion
Six-winged disputation
(

wjit

)

...
...

... ...

134
166

*3.qftnr )

...

BOOK
Occasions for rebuke
(

V,

CHAPTER
... ... ...

II.

ftnfwi
(

)

...

...

...

167
i(J7

Hurting the proposition
Shifting the proposition

"iffim^ )

•••
... ...

...
... ...

... ...
...
...

( xfiwt«»TC )
(

168
169

Opposing the proposition
Shifting the reason

ifiwWnr
)
'

)

...
. .

Renouncing the proposition ( «tfiiw«ni )
( ^w«m

... ...

...
... ...

159 igg

...

...

Shifting the topic (wiHnc^)

... ... ...
...

...
...

...

179

The meaningless (fita*«) ... The unintelligible ( *fiwm* ) The inopportune ( vitmm )..
.

... ...
...

..
... ...
...

170
171 171

...
... ...
...

Saying too
Repetition
Silence
(

little ( *yi )
(

...

...
... ...

... ...
... ...
...

17^
J72 272 173

Saying too much
(

wftw )

...
...

jtopi )
)

...
... ... ...

vryim )

...
...
...

...
... ... ...

Ignorance

(wt

Non-ingenuity (wifiiw)

"

...

173 jy4
174
l»*

Evasion (TO*)...

...

... ...

'"

Admission of an opinion ( "Wijw ) ... Overlooking the censurable ( ffiwftfrw ) Censuring the non-censurable
Fallacies of a reason
(
....

^
...

...

tiktfbmfm
...

)

...

...
''' ...

(*ww )

274 yjg 17B

...

9

INTRODUCTION
I.-GOTAMA THE FOUNDER OF NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.
Panini, the celebrated Sanskrit grammarian,
flourished

who
5i

is

supposed

to

have

about 350

B. C.,
i

*

derives

the word

pSneI

0rd " Nyfiya °X "

"Nyaya"f from

the root "

"

which conveys the
go.

same meaning as
signifying logic
is

"gam" — to

therefore etymologically identical

with

"Nyaya" as "nigama" the

conclusion of a syllogism.
the

Logic

is

designated in Sanskrit not only by
indicate diverse " Hetu-vidyii called "X or " Hetu-

word "Ny&ya" but

also

by various other words which

aspects of the science. For instance, it is S&stra " the science of causes, " Anviksiki "§ the science of inquiry, " Pramsina-Sastra " the science of correct knowledge, "Tattva-Sastra " the " '" the science of reasoning, " Viida'rtha 'science of categories, " Tarka-vidyft

the science of discussion and " PhakkikS-iSastra " the science of sophism, Nyftya-sutra
-ii

is
-

the earliest
.., - ..

work extant on Nyaya Philosophy.

...I..I..I
i

- —

,,

— ,- —

.

-,— ,,,

-i-

n . ..

I

II

II.

-il

I

I

H

ii

.1

»

*

* Pauini is said to

dynasty about 850

B.

have been a disciple of Upavaraa, minister of a King of the Nanda C,, as is evident from the following
:

(Kathfisarit-sSgara, Chapter IV., verse 20).

Dr. Otto Bochtlingk observes :— " We need therefore only make a space of flfty years between each couple of thorn, in order to arrive at the year 850, into tno neighbourhood of which date our grammarian is to be placed, according to the Kathfisarife-sagara.*'— Qoldstucker's Panini, p. 85.

(Pacini's

Astadhyayi

3-8-122.)

Jft&'Sr fond

!$rro?

%fow& 3t wnwwfr foi^T ftnyret q*^fo ^qwl strHvift

(Lalitavistara,

Chapter XII.,

p. 179, Dr.

Rajondra Lai Mitra'a edition).
I

§ wwfrf%^ ^V'ttRRwfr&ijitfcfwrr:

(Aniarakosa, svargavarga, verse, 165).

The Nyaya or logic

is

said to have been founded

by a sage named

^SacffiKoSS
AiSfapftda or Dirghata-

Gotama.* He is also known as Gautama, Aksap&daf and Dlrghatapas4 The names Gotama and Gau-

tama point

to

the

family to which he belonged.
of long penance.

while the names Aksapada and Dtrghatapas refer
respectively to his meditative habit

and practice

;

In the Rigveda-samhita as well as the Sathapatha-Brahmana of the
_. . „ mn 4 The family of Gotama.

white Yaiurveda we find mention of one Gotama J

who was
Nodhah,
j|

.

son of

Hahugana § and

,,_,',

priest of the

Royal

family of Kuru-srmjaya for whose victory in battle he prayed to Indra.

son of Gotama, was also called Gotama

who composed
;

several

new hymns in honour of India.
Gotama
are designated

Gotamasah

The sages sprung from the family of and Agni, fl who were very intelligent
i

*g^ m

$j<A\i*m

Urn <mt&

wf^a^

w&t$k

niTgf%:
w.

11

(Naisadhacharitam

17-75.)

(Padtnannrana, Uttarakfanmla, Chapter 203.}

*nff*rflfcr«»i**vifflifti
(Skanda-purana, Kfilika Khaiida, Chapter XVII.)

tT3W?

!

jr^i

Jpfirm wire

*to* sut^t 3r»n5

i

(Udyotakara's Nyayaviirtika, opening lines). In the Sarvadarsanasanigraha Nyfiya philosophy is called the Aksapfida system.
|

Kalidasa's

Rnghuvamsam

11-88.

<rf: TO 35 Hf^r *t ^r^t'sejtk^ sg^i a^iR««f an^ra^f^Kiwidfi, Aran s I *t%jrm

tntf

5erca*TRf

i

3*r^?r

sw srrfanwfrfo aw * f* ^swiif gW|?i *mft^
i

11

(Rigveda-samhita, Manitala

1,

(Sukta 81,

mantra

8,

b'fiyana's

commentary).

(Satapatha Brfihmana of the white Yajnrveda, Kfimla
recension.)

1,

Adhyftya

4,

Madhyandinfya

(Rigveda-samhita, Manilala

1,

Sukta

68,

Mantra

18.)

(Rigveda-samhita, Mandala

1,

Sukta

01,

Mantra

10).

(Rigveda-samhita, Mandala

1,

Sukta

77,

Mantra

6).

»

IU

)

pleased with their adoration, gave them cattle and rice in abundance;'
It is related that

Gotama, once pinched with

thirst,

prayed for water of the

Marat-Gods,

who

out of mercy, placed a well*

before

him transplanted
well not only

from elsewhere. quenched his

The water gushing out copiously from the
but formed
itself into

thirst

a river,

the source of which

was the

seat of the original well. of Gotama Gotama while in

In the Rigveda-samhita the descendant's
noticed are also called
aCherS

as

already

later

Vedic

oaUed

Gauta m a°
of the

literature

they arc called
of the

Brahmana Gotama familyt among the
viz.,

The VaAsaSamaveda mentions four members teachers who transmitted that Veda to
Gautama.

Radba-Gaulama, Galr-Gautama, Sumanta-bfibhravaGautama and Samkara- Gautama and the ChAndogya TJpauisad of the same Veda mentions another teacher named Hiiridrumata-GautamaJ who
posterity,

the

;

was approached by Satya-Kaina Javala to be his teacher. The Gobhila Grhya Sutra of the Samaveda cites the opinion of a Gautama § who held
that during the winter season there should be three oblations offered to the

*ftw* 33?ssrt* a*n fi&ufa'^«|8&

j"iwflR <i"ai$

i

(Rigveda-samhita, Maiulala t, Sukta S3, Mantra 11.) Sayana in commenting on Rigveda sariilritu, Maiulala
observes

1,

SQkta

77,

Mantra

10,

:—

The well
4,

(ufcsadkl)

is

alluded to in the Rigveda,

Maiulala

1,

SQkta

88,

Mantra

thus:


«moft
«jht:
<t«i?

a wrgftnf fa?

mwfctf'

^

%tt

i

Samavediya Vainsa-Brahmana, Khaiida

2,

Satyavrata Samasvatuis edition
i

p. 7.)

&m%

«rreraT3[

*i«#t man: (Samavediya Vamsa-Brahmana, Khantla

fiizm,

gn^

2).

{Samavediya Vamsa-Brakmana, Khanda

3.)

X

* w xfa^m

farafefara sura*'
*

wra%

«rwT*gtaf
4,

*m*s»aftifo[ n

i

(Chandogya Upanisad, Adbyaya

Khanrla

4).

§«$S$T

WW Jwl^'llfcUlA'
wn famkmri
(Gobhila
ii

pP&

II

II

II

»
ii

II

«

Grhya Sutra

8-10.)

(

It.)

dead ancestors. Another Gautama was the author of the Pitrmedha Sutra* which perhaps belongs to the Samaveda. The Brhad&ranyaka t of the white Yajurveda mentions a teacher named Gautama, while in the Kafchopani^ad of the Black Yajurveda the sage NaciketasJ who conversed with

Yama on
generic

tbe mystery of

life,

is

called

name
is

as his father is also called

Gautama which evidently Gautama in the same work.
is

is

a

A

Gautar»a§
the

mentioned
to
sutra||

as a

teacher in the Kausika

sutra of tho

Atharvaveda while

another

Gautama

attributed the authorship of

Gautama Dharma

an authoritative work on the sacred law.

not take any notice of one Gautama^f who, at the bidding mother as stated in the Mahabhtirata, cast into the Ganges his old and blind father Dirghatamaa who was however miraculously saved. The Ramayana mentions a Gautama** who had his hermitage in a
of his

We need

grove at the outskirts of the city of Mithilft where
Gautama, husband
of Ahalya.

ne ^ ve(*

w ^^

his

w ^e

Ahalya.

It is

well-known how

Ahalya for her

flirtation

with Indra, was cursed by

her lord to undergo penance and mortification until
r,

* Aa inc<> m P ,et e manuscript of tlio l>it rinedha Sfltra is coutained in the Library of the i Calcutta e Sanskrit College, bub the work was printed iu America several years ago.

t *i\M\a ^ran:

im

i

s

i

^ u

(Brhadavanyaka, Adhyaya

4.)
srgr

X&* a ^'
i«n
"^

srawftr pr'
Jira?
5).

m^

wm

*m <mh
i

i

*rafi-r

m^n

it

$ n

(Kathopanisad, Valli

«^ jujb" mfoi^ jRfta
(Kathopanisad, Valli
5.)

^ wgf

swf

src

%$

i

§Vide Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 153. ||The text of the Gautama Dharaa-sfltra has been printed several Minos in India while an English translation of it by Dr. G. Buhler has appeared in the Sacred Books of the East Series.

ansr^ ^f%g; srrsr:

qalf

*? fsterar

ti

^
||

u

jpn^

srararara

niawfi^ JifmrT:
?repr:

||

(Mahabharata, Adiparva Adhyaya
**ftmrerrq?Pi

104).

gw «nsw ew
ft* far?

i

remmfrgrcr

gfa6fa(

i

WlWfjt fautorar: g!*fo

g^j n u

II

(Ramfiyana, Adikfinda, Sarga

48).

I

(*>;)
her .^mancipation at
tlie

happy advent of Rfima.

yana, while repeating the same account, places the hermitage of

The Adhy&tma R&m4U Gautama*

and our great poet K&lid&6a follows the RamSyanic legend describing Gautama* as Dirghatapas, a sage who pracof the
;

on the banks

Ganges

tised long penance.

The V&yupurana describes a sage named AksapadaJ as the disciple of a Brahmana named Soma Sarma, who was Siva Aksap&da. incarnate and well-known for his practice of austerities
at the shrine of

Prabhasa during the time of J&tukarnya
is

Vyasa.

This Aksapada mentioned along with KanAda

evidently no

other pereon than

As

to the origin of the

applied to

Gotama or Gautama who founded the Nyaya philosophy. name Aksapada (" having eyes in the feet ") as Gautama, legend has it that Gautama was so deeply absorbed
one
clay

in philosophical contemplation that

during his walks he

fell

unwittingly into a well out oE which he was rescued with great difficulty.

God

therefore mercifully

provided him with a second pair of eyes in his

feet to protect the

sage from further mishaps.

Another legend§ which

(Adliyattna

Kamayara, adik&rula, adhyaja

6).

t

& %% gafokv^ftr:

^nswu^srcraf *rahi ^|
jwr?ra fofra

11

^

g«T-

W ^g: « f%5f fofswftaftf
WfWI^ym^Mf:
II

\ii

II

(Raghuvaiiwa, Sarga

11).

snp^S v® <mm
JWi«kA4nwi«

«%«# atora:
^wfasyr!
u

mom
*o*
u

«)iirrenr

*%*w- «wn?» 3*$! mt

^

sr

11

*o|

11

(Vayupiu-ana, Adbyaya 23).

<rarat

«n#r tot^u

«nt

^ spurn

?f

cwi^ jfir ^mftrttwri

(Nyayakoja, 2nd edition, by M. M, Bbitoacftry* JhMakikar, Bombay).

(

vl

J

represents Vyass, a disciple of Gautama, lying prostrate before his master

upon him, not with his natural eyes, but with anew pair of eyes in his feet, may be dismissed with scanty ceremony as being the invention of a later generation of logicians, anxious
until the latter condescended to look
to humiliate Vyilsa for vilification of the

Nyaya system

in his

Mahabharata

and Vedanta

sfitra.

The people
Loeal tradition.

of Mithila.

(modern Darbhanga in North Behar) ascribe Nyaya philosophy to Gautama, husband of Ahalya, and point out as the place of his birth a village named Gautamasthana where a fair is held
the foundation of
of.

month of Chaitra (March-April). Darbhanga and has a mud-hill of considerable height (supposed to be the hermitage of Gautama) at the ba.se of which lies the celebrated " Gautama-kunda " or Gautama's well the water whereof is like milk to the taste and feeds a perennial rivulet
every year on the 9th day of the lunar
It is situated

28 miles north-east

called on this account Ksirodadhi orKhiroi (literally the sea of milk).

Two

miles to the east of the village there

is

another village

named

Alfalya-

sthana where between a pair of trees

lies

a slab of stone identified with

Ahalytl in her accursed state. In its vicinity there is a temple which commemorates the emancipation of Ahalya by Rama Chandra. The Gautama-kunda and the Ksirodadhi river, which ai"e still extant at Gautama- sthana verify the account of Gotama given above from the Rigveda while the stone slab and the temple of Rama at Ahalya-sthana
are evidences corroborative of the story of Ahalya as given in

the Rfuna-

There is another tradition prevalent in the town of Chapra that Gautama, husband of Ahalya and founder of the Nyaya philosophy, resided in a village now called Godna at the confluence of the rivers Ganges and •Sarayfi where a Sanskrit academy called Gautama Thomson Psithasala
yana.

has been established to commemorate the great sage. It seems to me that Goutama, son of Rahugana, as mentioned in the Rigveda, was the founder of the Gautama family from The founder of which sprang Gautama, husband of Ahalya, as narrated
Pbll0S01
'

hy

WM^fled.
*

in

the

Ramdyana.

It

is

interesting

to

note that

Satananda6 son of Gautama by Ahalytl, is a priest in the royal family of Janaka much in the same way as Goutama, son of

•wm^sw^w glrf|?OTf%f^H»
UHlfW
ifllHI*w(l

I

(R4mftyan», Sdikapda, Sarga

50).

JHWHl

^iffcflt

I

(Uttara

Rama

oharitam).

*"

)

Bahugana is a priest in the royal family of Kurusrfijaya. The fields waving with paddy plants which greet the eyes of a modern traveller near and round Gautama-sthana bear testimony to Agni'e gift of rice and cattle in abundance to the family of Gautama. The Nyaya philosophy was, on the authority of the tradition prevalent in Mithila, founded by Gautama husband of Ahalya. The same Gautama has been designated as Aksapada in the Vayu PurAoa already referred to. Aksapada has been identified
by Anantayajvan* with the author of the Pitrinedha Sutra as well as with that of the Gautama Uharma sutra, and it is possible that he is not other than the Gautama referred to in the Kautftka sfitra of the Atharva Veda. The other Gautamas mentioned in the Briihmanas, Upanisads etc., appear to be the kinsmen of their illustrious name-sake.

The Iiamayana,
His residence.

as
..

we have
.

found, places the hermitage of Gautama,

of Ahalya, at Gautama-sthana twenty-eight , , , „ _ ., , ., , , ,, miles north-east of Darbhanga while the Adhyatma
it

husband

Ramayaoa places
Sarayu
off

on the banks of the Ganges
to

at its confluence

with the

the town of Chaprft.

The VayupurAna

fixes the residence of

AksapMa, supposed
Girnar in Kathiawar

be identical with Gautama, at Prabhasaf beyond
the sea-coast.

To reconcile these conflicting statements it has been suggested that Akgap&da otherwise known" as Gotama or Gautama was the founder of the Nyaya philosophy, that he was
oji

born at Gautama-sthana in Mithila on the river Ksirodadhi, lived for

some years at the village now called Godna* at the confluence of the Ganges and Sarayu until his retirement into PrabhAsa the well-known sacred place of pilgrimage in Kathiawar on the sea-coast.
*To the Gfhya Sutras of the Samavcda probably belong also Gautama's Pitrmedhasutra (Cf. Uurnoil, p. 57 the commentator Anantayajvan identifies the author with AksapSda the author of the NySya-sfttra;, and the Gautama-dharma-sutra. Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 85. t Prabhasa washed on its western side by the river Sarasvati and ropnted as the residence of Krisiia, is mentioned in the Sriinad Bhagavata thus :—
;

(Bhagavata, fcSkandha

II,

adhyaya
wsrractf

6.)

fa«h *»rai» f&jtn

«w

swrtr

qmvfa

m sms m*&&

sraf^i:
11

i

$

it

(Bhagavata, Skandha II, adhyaya 80). Prabhasa was situated boyoud the rock of Girnar in Kathiawar where we come across all the edicts of As'oka as well as an inscription of Rudradfima supposed to be the first inscription in Sanskrit dated about 100 A. D. which mentions Chandra Gupta and As'oka by names. There are also some inscriptions in Gupta characters, and there is no doubt that Prabhasa situated on the Sarasvati acquired celebrity in very odd times. This Prabhasa is not to be confounded with another town called PrabhAsa in K»usambi near Allahabad on the Jumna where there i» an inscription, dated about the 2nd century B. C, of Asadasena, a descendant of Sonakayana of Adhiccbatra, (vide Dr. Fuhrer'a Pabhosa inscriptions in Epigraphia Indica, Vol. II, pp. 242-248.)

.

via

)

The Satapatha Brahmana mentions Gautama along with Asurayana
and the Vayupurana (already quoted) states that Aksap&da, alias Gotama or Gautama, flourished Jatukarnya Vyasa. Now, Jatukarnya, according to the
Ynjfiavalkya

during the time of

Madhukanda

and

Kinda

of

the

Satapatba Brahmana*

(Kanva recension) was a pupil of Asurayana and Yaska who are supposed to have lived about 550 B. C. This date tallies well with the time of another Gautama who, together with Aranemi, is described in the Divyavadanaf, a Buddhist Sanskrit work translated into Chinese in the 2nd century A. D., as having transmitted the Vedas to posterity before they were classified by Vyasa. It does not conflict with the view that Aksapada is identical with Gautama author of the Gautama Dharma-Sutra which is " declared to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred lawj." Aksapada-Gautama, founder of the Nyava Philosophy, was almost a contemporary of Buddha-Gautama who founded Buddhism and Indrabhuti Gautama who was a disciple of Mahavira the reputed founder of
Jainism.

means of knowledge (Pramana) into perception, inference, comparison and word found in the Jaina Prakrta scriptures such as the Nandi-Sutra, Sthanahga-Sutra§ and Bhagavatifourfold division of the
* Fide Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 140. In the Madhyandiniya reconsiou of the Katapatha Brahmana a teacher intervenes between Yaska and Jatukarnya, viz. Bhfiradvfija. Cf

The

(Satapatha Brahmana, Madhyandiniya recension, Kantla 14, ndhyaya 5.) | The 83rd chapter of the Divyfivadanr, called Mfitanga Sutra, in Chinese Mo-tan-nuein, was translated into Chinese by An-shi-kao-cie of the Eastern Han dynasty in A. D. 148-170. (Vide Bnnjin Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka). In it we read :—

wpr ^rart iwsrw: ?*%&

itfjli+w ^rafq;

sttoRi

9r

i

^:

liftt^TS^-

XXXIII). Buhler observes .-—These arguments which allow us to place Gautama before both I Bandhayana and Vflsl$ tha are, that both these authors quote Gautama as an authority Those facts will, 1 think suffice to show that tbe Gautama Dharraa Sutra on law doclarod to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred law." (Buhler'a may be safely
(Divyfivadfina, Chap.

Qantama, Introduction, pp.

XL1X and
w»id

LIV,

S. B. B. series).

q*n#

wg*tnfr 3«ri

1

(tthanlnga-Sutra, Page 809, published by Dhanapafc Sing),

:

S^tra compiled by Indrabhfiti-Gautama finds its parallel in the NyayaSutraof Aksapada-Gautama leading to the conclusion that this particular

was either borrowed by Indrabhuti from Aksapada or was the common property of both. Tn the Pali and Prakrta scriptures Gautama is called Gotania,, and a Pali Sutta mentions a sect called " Gotamaka/*
doctrine

who were
the

followers of Gautama, identified perhaps

with the founder of

Ny&ya Philosophy. The Pali Canonical scriptures such as the Brahmajala Sutta, f Udaua etc., which embody the teachings of Buddha, mention a class of Sramanas and Brahmanas who were " takki " or
"

takkika"

(logiciaus,

and " vimamsi"

(casuists)

and indulged
to

in " takka"

(logic)

and vimamsa (casuistry), alluding perhaps Aksapada-Gautama described as " Gotamaka."

the followers of

The Kathavatthuppakarana

+,

a Pali work of the Abhidhammapitaka,

composed by Moggaliputta Tissa at the third Buddhist Council during the reign of Asoka about 255 B. C, mentions " patifma " (in Sanskrit
"pratijfta," proposition),
(in

"Upauaya"

(application of reasons),
etc.,

"Niggaha"

Sanski'it

:

" Nigraha,"

humiliation or defeat)

technical terms of

Nyaya philosophy or

has not made any actual reference to
of its technical terms warrants us to in
to

which are the Logic. Though Moggaliputta Tissa Logic or Nyaya, his mention of some
that, that

suppose

philosophy existed

some shape

in India in his time about

255 B. C,

These facts lead us

conclude that Gotama, Gautama or Aksapada, the founder of Nyaya Philosophy, lived about the year 550 B, C.
* Vide Prof. T. W.
pp. 220-222.
It ia

Rhys David's Introduction
:

to

tho Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta,

observed

Gofcra,
its

"

Tho only alternative

referred to as having had a

that some Brahmana, bolouging to the Gotama community of Bhiksus named after him."
is

here

(Brahmajala Sutta

1-82,

edited by

Rhys Davids and

carpenter).

(Udana, p.
t

10.

edited by Paul Steinthal, P. T. 8. edition).
"

The terms

" PaJiiSfia " (pratijna, proposition) and " niggaha

(nigraha, defeat) occur

in

the following passages :—

*

<s

m mt wn tara
" is the

qrfesrra $«f ifearawrr fcr Rrrcrtaff
p. 3).

i

(Kathavatthuppakarana, Siamese edition,

" Niggaha-Catukkam name of a section of the first chapter of the Kathavatthuppakarana while *' Upanay a-Catukkam " is the name of another section of that work.

it. nyAyasOtra the first work on nyaya philosophy. To Gotama, Gautama or Aksapada, of whom a 6hort account has

._

'

The

.

earliest contnbu-

,

,

.,

heen given above,
,

tion to the Sutra
aphoristic style

the

ISyaya-autra

*,»„„,
is

attributed

the authorship of

the

earnest

i-

work on
in

,

Nyaya
or

Philosophy.

Sanskrit literature

the

Stitra

was presumably inaugurated at about.550 B. 0., and the Nyaya-Sutra the author of which lived, as already stated, at about that

must have been the first* contribution to that literature. The " Sutta" or Sutra section of the Pali literature reads very much like a body
time,
of

sermons bearing no

affinity
is

with the Sutra works of the Brahmanas.
five

The Nyaya-Sutra
, , The gradual development of the Nyaya,

divided into
1

books,
i

each containing two
It is

_.

chapters called ahnikas or Diurnal portions. x
believed that

Aksapada

finished his

work on Nyaya
it

in ten lectures corresponding to the Ahnikas referred
to above.

We do

not

know whether

the whole of the NyAya-Sutra, as

exists

was the work of Aksapada, nor do we know for certain whether his teachings were committed to writing by himself or transmitIt seems to me that it is only the first book ted by oral tradition only.
at present,

of the

that

Nyaya Sutra containing a brief explanation of we aro justified in ascribing to Aksapada, while

the

16 categories

the second, third

and fourth books which discuss particular doctrines of the Vais'esika, Yoga, Mlmamsa, Vedanta and Buddhist Philosophy bear marks of different hands and ages. In these books there are passages quoted almost verbatim from the Lanka vatara-Sutra t, a Sanskrit work of the Ybgucara Buddhist Philosophy, from the Madhyamika Sutra of NngArjunaJ and from the Sataka§ of Arya Deva works which were composed in the early

centuries of Christ.
rejoinders

The
for

fifth

book treating of the varieties of

futile

and occasions

rebuke was evidently not the production of

Aksapada who dismissed those topics without entering into their details. The last and most considerable additions were made by Vatsyayana otherwise known as Paksila Svami, who about 450 A »D, wrote the first regular commentary, " Bhasya", on the Nyaya Sutra, and harmonised the different and at times conflicting, additions and interpolations by the ingenious introduction of Sutras of his own making fathered upon Aksapada.
* Kapila
to Asuri
is

stated in the Samkbya-Karika, verse 70, to have taught his philosophy

Kapila therefore proceeded Aksapada by at least three generations. Kapila's Philosophy is believed to have come down by oral traditions and was not) perhaps committed to writing in his life-time. Hence the Nyaya-Sutra has been stated tc be the first work of the Sutra period. t Vide Nyaya Sutra 4-2-26, which quotes the Lankgvatara Sutra (dated about 800 A.D.) t Vide Kyaya-Sutra 2-1-80, 4-1-80, and 4-1-48, which criticise the Madhyamika Sutra. | Vide Nyaya-Sutra 1-1-48 which criticises Sataka of Aryadeva.

who is mentioned in the fcatapatha Brahmana as a teacher. Asurfiyana and Yaska who followed Asuri were the teachers of JatOkarnya, a contemporary of Ak?apada-

Gautama.

.

<*>
The Ny&ya-SOtra
Commentaries on the
Nyaya-satra.

has, since its composition,
is

enjoyed a very great
,
.t

popularity as

, nes that have / from time to time, centred round A few of the commentaries are mentioned below

_

evident from the numerous com men ta.•

.1

.

1

...

:

it.

TEXT.
1.

Nyfiya-Sutra by Gotama or Aksapada (550 B. C.)

Commentaries.
2. S.

Nyaya-Bhtisya by. Vfitsyayana (450 Nyaya- Vfirtlka by Udyctakara.

A D.)

4. 5.

Nyaya-Yfirtika tatparya-lika by Vficaspati Mis'ra.

Nyaya-Yartika-tatparyacika-parN'uddhi by Udayana.
Pari-iuddiprakasa by Vardhamfina.

6.
7.

8.

Vardhamanendu by Padmanabha Misra. Nyfiyfilaukara by fcrikantha.
Nyayalaiikara Vrtti by Jayanta.

10.-

Nyaya

liianjari

by Jayanta.

11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 10.
III.

Nyfiya-Vrtti by Abhayatilakopfidhyfiya.

Nyaya- Vrfcti by Visvan&tha, Mitabhasini Vftti by Mahadeva Vedfinti.

Nyayaprakasa by Kes'ava Misra. Nyayabodhint by Govardliana.

Nyaya Sutra Vyakhya by

Mathurfinfltha.

RECEPTION ACCORDED TO THE NYaYA PHILOSOPHY.
and Kausitiki Brahmana® that Philosophy (Adhy&t»,a-VidyA) received its first impetus frora the Ksatriyas (members of the military caste) who
"
.

It

appears from the Chandogya-upanisad, Brhadaranyaka-upanisad

JS&s&JSfflz;
military caste.

carried

it

to great perfection.

an assembly of th?Kiiru-'Pi\ncalas consoled a
* Kausitaki-BrShmana 2-1, 2; 10, 4. Brihadaranyaka 2-1-20, 2-!!-6. (Chandogya 8-14-1 5-11, 24 ; 1-8,9
;

King Ajfttas&tru m B rah m ana named ^vetaketu,

;

1-9-3, 7-1-3,

and

5-11.

(Chandogya-upanisad

5-3).

Professor P. Denssen observes :— In this narrative, preserved by two different Yedic schools, it is expressly declared that the knowledge of the Brahman as fit man, the central doctrine of the entire Vedanta, Is possessed by the King ; but, 011 the contrary, is not possessed by the Urahmaiia "famed as a Vedie scholar."— Philosophy of the Dpanishacls, pp. 17—18. Again, he remarks : Wo are forced to conclude, if not with absolute certainty, yet with a very high degree of probability, that as a matter of fact the doctrine of the Attnan standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of the Yedie ritual, though the original conception may have been due to Brahmauas, was taken up and cultivated primarily not in Bra h maim but in Ksatriya circles, and was first adopted by the former in later times'— Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 19.

KJHiW'd' WW I fajJMUMH* *** ' cFWlfa *f cRi^T 3TS£ SfT These four pregnant expressions (Mahfivakya) originated from the Brabmanas, whence it'raay be concluded Nirguna-Brahma-Vidya or knowledge of absolute Brahma was confined among them. It was the Saguaa-Brahma-Vidyi or knowledge of Brahma limited by form and attributes that is s*id to have been introducted by the Kiatriyas,
I I
-

Wi

(

xii

)

son of Aruui of the Gautama family, that he had no cause of being sorry
for his inability to

explain
to

certain

doctrines of Adhyiitma-Vidyft which
It

were known only

the

Ksatriyas.

may

be observed that Mahavira

and Buddha who founded
universal religions based
Ksatriyas.

respectively

Jainism

and

Buddhism

— two
not

on philosophy or Adhyatnw-Vidyii— were also
to

Kapila

is

reputed

be the

first

Brahmana who propounded
the

a sytem of philosophy called SAmkhya,

but his work on

subject

having come down
ascertain

to us in its original
it

form we are not in a position to

what
it

relation

bore to the Vedax or what kind of reception

was
the

given to

by the orthodox

Brihmanas
to

We know

for certain that

most powerful Bnihmana who undertook
Nyaya-Sutra.
lie

study and

teach

philosophy

openly was Gotama, Gautama or Aksapada the renoyfned author of the

which
the

at its

founded a rational system of philosophy called " NyAya" inception had no relation with the topics of the Vedic Samhita

and Brahmana.
scriptural
viz.,

At

this stage the

dogmas.

Nyaya was pure Logic unconnected with AksapAda recognised four means of valid
the
reliable assertion.
at its early stage
it

knowledge,

perception, inference, comparison and word of which

last signified

knowledge derived through any

Tins being the nature of Nyaya or Logic
0t g recefvedwU,h favon"

was

not.

received with favour by the orthodox

community

of
so-

BrAhmanas who anxious

to establish

an organised

ciety, paid their soleattention to the Samhitas

and Brah-

manas which
nothing to do

treated of rituals, ignoring altogether the portions which had with them. The sage Jaimini * in his MtmAmsa-Sfitra

dis-

tinctly says that the

actions,

Veda having for its sole purpose the prescription of those parts of it which do not serve that purpose are useless.''

We

are therefore not surprised to lind

Mann f

enjoining ex-communication
the

upon those
Valmiki

members

of the twice-born caste

who disregarded

Vedasand

Dharma-Sutras relying upon the support of
in his

Iletu-iSnstra or Logic. Similarly

Ramayana

+

discredits those persons

of perverse intellect

who indulge in
of the

the frivolities of Anviksiki the science of Logic regardless
follow

works of sacred law (Dharma-sAstra) which they should
•sraraw
BfiTT'fersnt

as

?tn^ffl[ wa^tfrrra;

I

s

i

s

m

i

(Mimiimsa-SOIi'a).

(Maim, adliyaya

2,

verso

11).

fl<«i-«ftf<&*1f strai (%*$*

sw?f% $

ii

\\

it

(Rainayaiia, Ayodhyfi Kftmla, Sarga 100).

their guide.

Vyasa

in the Mahabhfirata,*

Santiparva,
to

relates the doleful

story of a repentant
carried on debates

Brahmana who, addicted
all

Tarkavidya (Logic)

divorced from
a
jackal

faith

in

the

Vedas and was
penalty.

on-

that account, turned into

in

his next birth as a

In

another passage

Vyasa warns the followers of the Vednnta Philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a Naiy&yika or Logician. VyasaJ does not care even to review the NyAya system
of

the

$antiparva,t

in the

Brahma-sutra seeing that
related in the

it

has not

been

recognised

by any
study

worthy sage.
of

Stories of infliction of penalties on those given

to the

Nyayaare

Naisadha-carita'l we lind Kali satirising the founder of as " Gotama " the " most bovine " among sages.

Skanda Purana,§and other works; and in the Nyaya Philosoph}'

d&M

<R3rfaf f%: *snrara jto

fg&

11

»?

11

(Mahabharata. Santiparva, adhyrtya
In the tiandharva tanfcra «•« lind

180.)

:—

(Quoted

in

IVaimfosi nit antra'.

X

X

X

X

h ^k^vsfs^Kvn

?i*N Ftegpur

^
ii

II

?*

II

iMaliiiliharaia,

HfinUparva adbyaya

24«).

J'snrf^r? \*i wti«»iQ^ i

iMa

tWdarita sutra

2-2).

sw-ftsn

gf%fw?ra srrnf^f *frf»r^B[fH
I

i

gsrsjTg^Hhs^T wRiftncMafei!
w£»N>r«n»m«i

m *m
fift*?

*>faw»Ri

11

(Skanda 1'urana, Kalikftklmnila, adhyftya

17;,

Hg^ is
rNw

ftnsrrara

mwH§
g»fa

Hpgfar
fl:
||

i

3H*W*I «WT

(

xiv

)

Nyaya reconciled with
criptuiai dogmas.

Gradually however this system of philosophy instead of relying entirely upon reasoning came to attach clue weight
.

to the authority

T

.,

ot

,

,,

the A'ectas,

t.

,

and

,

,

later

on after

f

its reconciliation with them, the principles of Nyaya were assimilated in other systems of philosophy such as the Vaide^ika,* Yoga, Him&msa.t Sariikhyalj: etc

Henceforth
Nyaya as an approved
branch of knowledge.

the
of

Nyaya
m

was regarded

as an

approved branch
.

learning.

Thus the
t
i

prescribes a .course of training in
for the

Gautama-Dharma-sfltra,§ ,>t „ t Logic (Nyaya)
• •

King and acknowledges the
is

utility of

Turku

or Logic in the administration of justice though in the case of conclusions

proving incompatible ultimate decision
to persons versed in the Vedas.

directed to be

made by

reference
is to

Manujl says that dharma or duty

be

ascertained

by

logical

reasoning not opposed

to the injunctions of the

Vedas.

He recommends Logic
to

(Nyaya) as a necessary study for a King

and a logician
Yajna-valkya^J

be an indispensable member of a legal assembly counts " Nyaya " or Logic among the fourteen principal

sciences while Vyasaj| admits that he was able to arrange and classify the
* Vais'esika-stitra 1-1-4, 2-1-15, 2-1-16-. 2-1-17, 2-2-17, 2-2-82, 8-1-15, 9-2-3, 8-2-4.
(Jayantirayaiia Tarkapancanan's edition).
t

Mimamsa-sutra

1-1-4, 1-3-1,

1-3-2,

1-3-3,

1-1-14,

1-4-35,

1-5-8,

3-1-17, 3-1 20, 4-3-18,

6-1-0, 10-3-86.

{ Samkhyi-Butra 1-60, 1-101, 1-106, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12.

Yoga-sutra

1-5, 0.

snrnftmd a$fs*g7W

for*g*i

wmtf m%n

i

fosrftrcrar

#firai?f **:

(Gautamadhurroa-sutra, adhyaya

11),

(Maun, adhyaya

12,

verse

106).

(Mann, adhyaya

7,

verse

43).

(Mann, adhyaya

12,

verso 111).

*S[T:

WtlfSlf

fount

«l*jfo

^ ^3^ ST

II

,
sariihita,

(Yajnavalkya

adhyaya

1,

verso

3),

(Mahabharata quoted by Visvanatha

in his Vrltti

on Nyaya-sutra

1 1-1).

(

xv

)

Upanisads with the help of the Anvik$ikt' or Logic. In the Padma-purana* Logic is included among the fourteen principal branches of learning promulgated by God Visnu, while in, the Matsya-purana,t Nyaya-vidya
'

together with the Vedas

is

said

to

have emanated from the mouth of

Brahma

himself.

In fact so Avide-spread
is full of

was the study of Nyaya that

the Mahabharata

references to that scienceis

In the Adiparva of the Mahabharata Nyaya} or Logic

mentioned and
the

along with the

Veda and Cikitsa
is

(the

science of medicine),
filled

hermitage of Kas'ynpa
a proposition,

described as being

with sages who were
of
to

versed in the Nyaya-tattva (logical truths) and
objection and

conclusion.

kuew the true meaning The Santi-parva§ refers
scripture

numerous

tenets of

Nyaya supported by reason and
sacrificial

while the

Asvamedha-parvajl describes the
by logicians (ITetu-vadin)

ground as being resounded who employed arguments and counter-argu-

jfatat

miteiw^ Mfyj^ q *n*ran
i

n

(Padma-purana, uidc Muir's Sanskrit text Vol. HI,
t

p, 27).

Wtf^d^ ZWPft ^P?^T
tftarcn

f^f%:^rITt
it

|

samff^n

=5j

swmim+^dr

(Matsya-puraria 3-2).

$3$*

WT

3FH f^HI;jMllfodH

II

II

(Mahabharata. Adiparva, adhyaya

1).

^H^'sgnjrfg^prawnff g^qi?»T:

11

«*

11

f^wnlf^fear 3rw*wl<rcTw:
^inT'll^lRl^l"^

n
I

«*

II

MW^df

»I&

4«j*±4^<jaj

»

^Ri+r<<u^f*i:

ii

(Mahabharata, Adiparva, adhyaya

70).

twiwttiiwfgih* a^Tiwanj

II

s* u
310).

(Mahabharata, Santiparva, adhyaya

(Mahabharata, Ativamedhaparva, adhyaya,

88),

(

xvi

)

one another. In the Sabhsi-parva* the sage Narada is described as being versed in Logic (Nyayavid) and skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality* (" aikya " and "nftnatva") conjunction and co-existence (" isariiyoga " and " samavaya "), genus and species (" parApara ") etc, capable of deciding questions by evidences (Pramana) and ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a ii ve-menibered syllogism (Pancavayava- va kya).
merits to vanquish

was in course of time deservedly high esteem. If it were allowed to Tho course of Nyaya. follow its original course unimpeded by religions dogmas it would have risen to the very height of perfection. Nevertheless the principles of Nyaya entering into the different systems of philosophy gave them each its proper compactness and cogency just as Bacon's Inductive Method shaped the sciences and philosophies of a It is however to be regretted that during later age in a different country. the last five hundred years the Nyaya has been mixed up with Law (smriti>, Rhetoric (alaftkara), Vedanfa, etc., and thereby has hampered the growth of. those branches of knowledge upon which it has grown up as
In
fact

the

Nyaya

(Logic)

held in very

a sort of parasite.

Sanskrit College, Calcutta. The 7th November, 1913,

) >

gATJg CHANl)RA VIDVABHUSANA.

fyw^HMMM WWWntalH?'
"wwfi&wnj: iwHti$dft&q:

II

^

II

ii

w n
i

ifrgpywq ?iww
CTftreRFWEI "3

u<u$i«*fan.

^Tsfq

gg*T#:

II

*

II

(Alalia IWiArata, 8al>haparra,

adhyaya

o).

.

THE NYAYA-S0TRAS.
Book
I.

Chapter

1.

W^^ftd^(t^n4H^9i^TfrfPril^'ifWH*l <M*IMI-

ftr^TOTf^m:
1.

11*1*1*11
felicity
is

by the knowledge about the true nature of sixteen categories, viz., means of right knowledge (pratnana), object of right knowledge (praattained

Supreme

meya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), familiar instance
(drstanta), established tenet (siddhanta),

members

(avayava),

confutation (tarka*),
(vada),

ascertainment

(nirnaya),

discussion

wrangling

(jalpa), cavil (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa),
(jati),

quibble (chala), futility
(nigrahasthana)
Knowledge about

and

occasion

for

rebuke

the true, nature of sixteen

calegoties
critical

'("

means true
"

knowledge

of the " enunciation," " definition "

and "

examination

" of the categories. Book I (of the NyAya-Satra) treats of " enunciation and " definition," while tlie remaining four Books are reserved for " critical

examination."

The attainment
four things,
viz.,

of

knowledge
m

of

supreme felicity (1) that which is fit

is

preceded by the

to

be abandoned

—————___

{viz.,

The English equivalent for " tarka " is variously given as " confutation," " argumentation ," " reductio ad absurdum," "hypothetical reasoning," etc.
*
t

Vatsyayana observes

:

— (Nyayadara'ana, p.

0,

Bibliotheca Indica Series).


2
pain), (2) that

BOOK
etc.), (3)

I,

CHAPTER
is

T.

which produces what
of destroying

6t lo be abandoned
is
fit

(viz.,

misappre-

hension,

complete destruction of what

and

(4)

the

means

what

is

fit

to

abandoned be abandoned (viz., true
to be

knowledge*).

2.

Pain, birth, activity, faults and misapprehension
in the reverse order,

on the successive annihilation of these
there follows release.

Misapprehension, faults, activity, birth and pain, these in their uninterrupted course constitute the " world." Release, which consists in
the soul's getting rid of the world,
is

the condition of supreme felicity

marked by perfect, tranquillity and not tainted by any defilement. A by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehensions. When this is done, his faults, rig., affection, He is then no longer subject to any aversion and stupidity, disappear. activity and is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is effected and supreme felicity secured. is the way in which his release
person,

3.

Perception, inference, comparison

and word (verviz.,
viz.,

bal testimony)— these are the
perception
(pratyakKii,

means of right knowledge.
Pauddhas admit
two,
viz.,

[The Carviikiis admit only one means of right knowledge,
the

Vaise^ikas and

perception
ception,

and inference

(aminmna), the Kunkhyas admit three,
testimony
is

per-

inference and

verbal

(iignma

or sabda) while the
viz.,

Naiyayikas whose fundamental work

the Nyiiyn-sutra admit, four,

perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison (upaniAna).

The

Prublmkrras admit a
(abhfiva)

fifth

menus

of right

knowledge called presumption
viz.,

arthupatti), the Bhattas and VcdAntins admit a sixth,

non-existence

and the Pauranikas recognise a seventh and eighth means of right knowledge, named probability (sambhava) and rumour (aitihya)].

^Ni^ #»

"ST^T**" \\\\\m\

— (Nyayadareana, p.

2).


THE
4.

fcYAYA-StTTR AS."
that

3

knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic.
Perception
is

Determinate.

—This epithet
is

distinguishes perception from indetermi-

nate knowledge; as for instance, a
ascertain whether there

man
dust.

looking from a distance cannot
a thing

smoke or
that

Unnamenble.
bears.

— Signifies
lias'

the knowledge

of

derived

through perception
Non-erratic.

no connection

with the

name which
in

the

thing

—Tn

summer

the sun's

rays

coming

contact

with

earthly heat quiver and appear to the

eyes of

men

as water.

The know-

ledge of water derived in this way
[This aphorism
is

is

not perception.

To
:

eliminate such

cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

may

also he translated as follows

Perception

knowledge and which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is non-erratic being either indeterminate (nirvikalpaka as " this is
something") or determinate vsavikalpaka as "
this is a

Brahmana

")].

5.

Inference

is

knowledge which

is

ception,
'

and
is

is

of three kinds, viz., a priori,
'

preceded by pera posteriori and
of

commonly
A
priori
e. </.,

seen.
the knowledge of ellect

derived from the perception

its

cause,

one seeing clouds infers that there will be rain.
is

A posteriori
of
its effect,
e. g.,

the knowledge of cause derived from the

perception

one seeing a river swollen infers that there was rain. [' Commonly seen is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen, e. g., one
'

seeing a beast possessing horns,

infers that

it

possesses also a

tail,

or

one seeing smoke on a
interprets as the

hill infers that

there

is lire

on

it].

VYitsy&yana takes the last to be " not commonly seen " which he

knowledge of a tiling which is not commonly seen, e. g., observing affection, aversion and other qualities one infers that there is a
substance called soul.

6.

Comparison

is

the knowledge of a thing through

its similarity to

another thing previously well known.

4

BOOK
A man

I,

CHAPTER

I.

hearing from a forester that a 60s gaoaens is like a cow Having recollected resorts to a forest whtre he sees an animal like a cow.

what he heard he

institutes a comparison,
is

by which he
bos gavaeus.

arrives at the con-

viction that the animal which he sees

derived through comparison.
separate means of knowledge,

Sonic
for

hold

that

knowledge comparison is not a
This
is

when one

notices the likeness of a

cow
reply

in a
it is

strange animal one really performs an act of perception.

In

urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how does otherwise the name bos gavaeus signify the
bos gavaeus.

general notion of the animal called

That (he name
is

bos

gavaeus signifies one and
result

all

members

of the hos gavaeus class

not a

of perception

bnt the consequence of a distinct knowledge called

comparison.

7.

Word

( verbid

testimony)

is

the instructive asser-

tion of a reliable person.

A

reliable person is

one
is

— may be a

lisi,

Arya or mleccha,

who

as an
it.

expert in a certain matter

willing to communicate his experiences of

[Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable the word of the old man is to be accepted
:

as a

means

of right

knowledge called verbal testimony].

8.

It is of

two kinds,

viz.,

that

which refers
to matter

to

matter
is

which
seen.

is

seen and that which

refers

which

nob

The first kind involves matter which can be actually verified. Though we are incapable of vcrifiying the matter involved in the second kind, we can somehow ascertain it by means of inference.
[Mattel'

strength

is

which is seen, e.g., a physician's assertion that physical gained by taking butter].
is

[Matter which

not seen,

e.g.,

a religious teacher's assertion that one

conquers heaven by performing horse-sacrifices].

Wfi<*j

"S^R"

lit I* llll

.


THE NYAYA-SUTBAS.
ft

9.

Soul,

body, senses, objects

of sense,

intellect,

mind,

activity, fault, transmigration, fruit,

pain and release

are the objects of right

knowledge.
particularity,

The
quality,

objects of right knowledge are also enumerated as substance,
generality,

action,

intimate relation

[and

non-

existence

which are the

technicalities of the Vaidesika philosophy].

<^i3[qMqHtfd ;:TOraigr "sm**t
ll*l*l*°H
10.

fat?**"

?ftr

Desire,

aversion,

volition,

pleasure,

pain and

intelligence are the
called soid].

marks

of the soul.

[These abide in the soul or rather are the qualities of the substance

11

Body
is

is

the site of gesture, senses and sentiments.
it

Body
desirable

the site of gesture inasmuch as
to avoid

strives to reach

what

is

and

what
ill,

is

hateful.

It

is

also

the site of senses for

the latter act well or

according as the former

is in

good or bad order.
also

Sentiments which comprise pleasure and pain

are

located in the

body which experiences them.

gPTOsrei^^Enfilr "<fewftr
12.

^SjJNr* ii*i*i**h

Nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses produced from elements.
Nose
is of

the

same nature as

earth,

tongue as water, eye as

light,

skin as air and ear as ether.

tfranroteit 4i3<i«hiHiAGi \*nfa" n *i*i** u
13.

Earth, water, light, air and ether

—these
H*

are the

elements.

iRTO*q w8*Ml "uflMlRjjW *&&*
s

I* 1**11

14.

Smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are objects
etc.

of the senses and qualities of the earth,
Smell
is
is

the object of nose and the prominent quality of earth, taste
is

the object of tongue and quality of water, colour
is

the object of eye and
of air,

quality of light, touch
is

the object, of skin and quality

and sound

the object of ear and quality of ether.

6

BOOK

I,

CHAPTER

I.

15.

Intellect,

apprehension and knowledge

—Tthese

are not different from one another.
[The term apprehension {upalabdhi) is generally used in the sense According to the Sankhya philosophy, perception (pvatyaltsa).
(buddhi),

of

intellect

which
is

is

the

first

thing evolved

out of primordial

matter (prahriti),
consists in

altogether different from knowledge (jiiana), which
of

the

reflection

external

objects

on the son\ (puruqa) the

abode of transparent consciousness.]

16.

The mark

of the
of

mind

is

that there do not
at a time.

arise

(in the soul)
It is

more acts

knowledge than one

impossible to perceive two things simultaneously.
the mind.

Perception
its

does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ on

object,

but
is

it

requires also a conjunction

of

Now, the mind, which

an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense-

organ at a time, hence there cannot, occur more acts of perception than one at one time.

17.

Activity

is

that

which makes the

A^oice.

mind

and body begin

their action.

There are three kinds of action, viz., vocal, mental and bodily, each of which may be sub-divided as good or bad. Bodily actions which are bad are (1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3)
:

committing adultery.
Bodily actions which are good are
:

— —

(1)

giving,

(2)

protecting,

and

(3) serving.

Vocal actions which are bad are :—-(1) telling a
language,
(3) slandering,

lie, (2)

using harsh

and

(4)

indulging in frivolous
(1)
is

talk.

Vocal actions which are good arc:

speaking the truth,
pleasant,

(2)

speaking what
sacred books.

is

useful,

(3)

speaking what
:

and

(4)

reading

^

Mental actions which are bad are

(1) malice,

(2) covetousness,

and

(3) scepticism.

Mental actions which are good are

:

(1)

compassion,

(2)

refraining

from covetousness, and

(3)

devotion.

THE NYAYA-SttTMS.

7

18.

Faults have the characteristic of causing activity.
and stupidity.

The

faults are affection, aversion,
:

^H^ItI "^TOTO:" lltmHH
19.

Transmigration means
is

re-births.
deaths.
Birtli
is

Transmigration
while death

the scries of births and

the

connection of soul with body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, and sentiments,
is

the soul's separation from them. II! It

snf%^5ff^TTS^: "qRPF
20.
faults.

Roll

Fruit

is

the

thing produced by activity and

Fruit consists in the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain.

and faults end in producing pleasure, which and pain, which is fit only to bo avoided.
All
activity

is

acceptable,

^HH^j f
21.
Pain

"j:*** "

^fcf 11*1*1**11

Pain has the
is affliction

characteristic of causing uneasiness.
to

may also be translated as follows: —
Pillll is the

which every one desires

avoid.

The aphorism

mark of hindrance

to the soul.

22.

Release

is

the absolute deliverance from pain.
is

A
pains.

soul which is

no longer subject to transmigration
is

freed from all

Transmigration, which consists in the soul's leaving one body
the

and taking another,

cause of

The

soul attains

release as soon as there

sequently, of pleasure and pain.

undergoing pleasure and pain. is an end of the body, and, conThose are mistaken who maintain that
its
all

release enables the soul not only to get rid of
eternal pleasure, for pleasure is as

pains but also to attain

impermanent as pain and the body.

Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition
23.

of properties

common

to

many

objects, or of

properties not

\


BOOK
to
I,

8

CHAPTER

I.

any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.
Doubt
(1)
tall

common

is

of five kinds according as

Recognition of

common

properties —
it is

it

arises
e.g.,

from
seeing in the twilight a

object

we cannot

decide whether

a

man

or a post, for the property

of tallness belongs to both.
(2)

Recognition of properties not
it is

common — e.g., hearing a sound, one

questions whether
neither in man,
eternal.
(3)

eternal or not, for the property of

beast, etc.,

soundness abides that are non-eternal nor in atoms which are
merely by study one cannot decide
it

Conflicting testimony,
exists, for

e.g.,

whether the soul

one system of philosophy affirms that
it

does,

while another system states that
(4)

does not.
e.g.,

Irregularity of perception,
really exists,

we

perceive water in the tank

where
it

it

but water appears also

to exist in the

mirage where
actually

really does not exist.

A

question

arises
it

whether water

is

perceived only

when

it

exists or
(o)

even when

does not exist.
e.g.,

Irregularity of non-perception,
it

we do

not perceive water in
it

the radish where

really

exists, or

on dry land where
is

does not exist.

A

question arises, whether water

not perceived only

when

it

does

not exist, or also

when

it

does

exist.

24. to act.

Purpose

is

that with an eye to

which one proceeds

Purpose refers

to the

thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid.
for the purpose of cooking his food].

[A man

collects fuel

m m mi A
25.

familial' instance is the thing
to the general proposition "
is

about which an
smoke and smoke
is

ordinary

man and

an expert entertain the same opinion.
wherever there
fire

[With regard
there is fire "

the familiar instance

a kitchen in which

abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary
investigator.]

man

as well as an acute

<\**

fW*U T*yH WH (h\

"
frl :

fct<3M :"

M

I

*

I

*l

II

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
26.

An

established tenet

is

a

dogma

resting on the

authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.

WR(

M
27.

I

t

I

*v»

II

The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma, and an implied dogma.

lit

W ««'
I

28.

A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not
is

opposed by any school and
Tho
five

claimed by at least one school.
light, air

elements
(viz.,

(viz.,

earth, water,

and

ether), the
etc.,

five

objects of sense

smell, taste, colour, touch
all

and sound),

are tenets

which are accepted by

the schools.

II

UUH
29.
is

II

A dogma

peculiar to

some school

is

a tenet

which

accepted by similar schools but rejected by oppocome
into existence

site schools. " A thing cannot
peculiar

out of nothing "
is

this

is

a

dogma

oC the

S-lnkhyas.

[The eternity of sound

a peculiar

dogma

of the Mimamsakas],

II

%i \\ \*
30.
" There

II

A
is

hypothetical

dogma

is

a

tenet

which

if

^accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet.
a soul apart from the senses, because
it

can recognise one

and the some object by seeing and touching." If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following: (1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of

them,

etc.

10

BOOK

T,

CHAPTER

I.

II

UU^
31.

II

All

implied

dogma

is

a tenet which

is

not

explicitly

declared as such,
whether sound
"

but which follows from the
it.

examination of particulars concerning
The
that
it

discussion

is

eternal or non-eternal
is

presupposes

is

a substance.

That sound

a substance"

is

here an implied

dogma.
that

sense-organ, but
it is so].

[The mind has nowhere been stated in the NyAya-sutra to be a the particulars examined concerning it it follows from

Mft^il^l^i^iM^^ HH
I

l

Pl "greqWT:" a syllogism)

II

9

I)

U*

II

32.

The members

(of

are proposition,

reason, example, application,
[1.
2. 3.

and conclusion.

—This — Because Example. — Whatever
Proposition.

hill is fiery,

Reason.

it is

smoky,

is

smoky

is fiery,

as a kitchen,

4.

Application.— So
Conclusion.
lay

is this hill (smoky),
is fiery].
:

5.

—Therefore this hill
five

Some
1 (a)

down

more members as follows
fjijiiAs
\).


Is this
hill fiery in all

Inquiry as to the proposition

its parts,

or in a particular part ?

2

{o,)

Questioning the reason

'saihssaya).

—That which you

call

smoke

may

be nothing but vapour. 3
(a)

Capacity of the example to warrant
true that

the conclusion v^akya-

smoke is always a concomitant of fire? In a kitchen prftpti). Is it. there are of course both smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron-ball there is
no smoke.

4
sists

(a)

Purpose

for

drawing the conclusion (prayojana).
such that one can approach
it,

—Purpose conin order
to

in the determination of the true conditions of the

hill,

ascertain

whether
it, it.

it is

or such that one

should avoid
ence towards

or such that one should

maintain an attitude of indiffer-

4
tant of

(6)

Dispelling

all

questions

tsamsayavyudf.sa).
is

It is

beyond

all

questions that the
fire.

hill is

smoky, and that smoke

an invariable'concomi-

the nyAya-sctras.
N43.
Sound

ii

A
is

proposition

is

the declaration of
a proposition.

what

is to

be

established.
non-eternal— this
is

34. to

The reason

is

the

means

for establishing

what

is

be established through the homogeneous or affirmative character of the example.
Proposition.

Reason.
pot.

— Because

—Sound
" pot "

is

non-eternal,

it is

produced,
is

Example (homogeneous). — Whatever

produced

is

non-eternal, as a

The example
the reason,
vis.,

possesses the

" being produced,"

same character as is implied in inasmuch as both are non-eternal.

35.
ter.

Likewise through heterogeneous or negative charac-

Proposition.

Reason.

— Because

—Sound

is

non-eternal,

it is

produced,

Example (heterogeneous).
duced, as the soul.

— Whatever
viz.,

is

not non-eternal

is

not pro-

The example
which
is is

" soul "

possesses

a diameter heterogeneous to

that

implied in the reason,

" being produced,"

inasmuch as one

eternal

and the other non-eternal.

36.

familiar

homogeneous (or affirmative) example is a instance which is known to possess the property to
this property is in-

A

be established and which implies that
variably contained in the reason given. Proposition Sound is non-eternal,

Reason Because it is produced, Homogeneous example Whatever

is

produced

is non-eternal,

as a

pot.
#

non-eternality

Here "pot" is a familiar instance which possesses the property of and implies that whatever is " produced " is attended by
(non-eternality).

the

same property

12

BOOK

I,

CHAPTER

I.

37.

flftmhw "frufrrct" mu«*»» A heterogeneous (or negative) example
instance which
is

is

a

familiar

known

to

be devoid of the pro-

perty to be established and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.
Proposition

— Sound is non-eternal,
it is

Reason
as the soul.

— Because
is

produced,

Heterogeneous example

— Whatever

is

not non-eternal

is

not produced,

Here the soul
it

a familiar instance which
if

is

known

to

be devoid of
'being

the property of non-eternality and implies that

anything were produced,
i.e.,

produced

would necessarily be deprived of the quality of eternality, and eternal are imconipatible epithets.
' ' '

38.

Application

is

a winding up. with

reference to

the example, of what

is to

be established as being so or
(I) affirmative

not

so.

Application
the example

is

of two

kinds:
is

and

(2) negative.

affirmative application,
is

which

expressed by the word "so," occurs

The when

of

an affirmative character.

which

is

expressed by the phrase " not so," occurs

The negative application, when the example is of

a negative character. Proposition

Reason

Example

— Because —Whatever

—Sound

is

non-eternal,

it is

produced,

is

produced

is

non-eternal, as a pot,

Affirmative application.

Conclusion.

—Therefore sound
— Sound
is
it is

—So

is

sound (produced),
is

non-eternal.

Or:
Proposition not eternal,

Reason-VBecause

produced,
eternal is not produced, as the soul,
is

Example

— Whatever

is

Negative application.— Sound
Conclusion.

not so

{i.e.,

sound

is

— Therefore sound
i:

not produced),

is

not eternal.

VyfoiwfiMw g**R

'^mm» num.

THE NYAyA-SCTHAS.
39.

13

Conclusion
is

is

the re-stating of the proposition
after the

after the reason has
Conclusion

been mentioned.
reason

the confirmation of the proposition

and the example have been mentioned. Sound is non-eternal, Proposition
Reason

Example

—So sound (produced), produced. Conclusion. —Therefore sound
Application
is

— Because — Whatever

it is

produced,

is

produced
is

is

non-eternal, as a pot,

I

*

It

I

«o

II

40.

Confutation, which
is

is

carried on for ascertainis

ing the real character of a thing of which the character
not known,
reasoning
1

which reveals the character by

showing the absurdity
Is

of all contrary characters.

the soul eternal or non-eternal ?

soul, viz.,

whether

it is

Here the real character of the eternal or nou-etornal, is not known. In ascertain:

ing the character we reason as follows

— If the

soul

were non-eternal
actions, to

it

would be impossible transmigration, and
absurd
:

for
to

it

to enjoy the fruits of its
final

own

undergo
is

attain

release.

But such a conclusion
to the soul
:

such possibilities are known to belong
is

therefore,

we

must admit that the soul

eternal.

41.

Ascertainment

is

the removal of doubt, and the

determination of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.
if certain statements are advanced to two parties, but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed uutil by the application of reasons he can vindicate either The process by which the vindication is effected is called of the parties.

A

person wavers and doubts
of

him by one

ascertainment.

Ascertainment
in

is not,

however, in
perception

all

cases preceded

by

doubt, for instance,
directly.

the case

of

things are ascertained

tures,

So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scripor through discussion. But in the case of investigation, doubt must

"precede ascertainment.
$fcr

iWh « HJfcwsndrt^

Rrrarcpr**

wh-'iiwiww

sr<nnnffc*n

Mite


1*
fiOOit
I,

CHAPTER
Chapter

It.

Book

I.

II.

1.

Discussion

is

the adoption of one of two opposis

ing sides.

What

is

adopted

analysed in the form of
of
is

five

members,
tion,

and defended by the aid

right knowledge, while its opposite

any of the means of assailed by confuta-

without deviation from the established tenets.

[A dialogue or disputation (katha) is tlie adoption of a side by a dis-. its opposite by his opponent. It is of three kinds, viz., discussion which aims at ascertaining the truth, wrangling which aims at gaining victory, and caoil which aims at finding mere faults. A diseutient is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the
putant and
truth].

Au

instance of discussion
is soul. is

is

given below :-

—There Opponent —There
Diseutient Diseutient

no

soul.

—Soul is existent (proposition).
Because
it is

an abode of consciousness (reason).
not existent
is

Whatever

is

not an abode of consciousness,

*

as a hare's horn (negative example).

Soul

is

not so, that

is,

soul

is

an abode of consciousness

(negative application).

Therefore soul

is

existent (conclusion).

Opponent-r-Soul
Because, etc.
Diseutient

is

non-existent (proposition).

—The

scripture which

is

a verbal testimony

declares the

existence of soul.

Opponent
If there were no soul, it would not be possible same object through sight and touch. hend one and the Opponent

Diseutient

to

appre-

Diseutient
tenets

— The

doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various
viz.,

4

which we hold,
adtti.

that there are

eternal things, that everybody.,

enjoys pleasure or suffers pain according to his
fe** there is

own

actions, etc.

There-


THE NYAYA-StJTRAS.
[The discussion
will

15
if

be considerably lengthened

the opponent
of scripture,

happens to be a Buddhist who does not admit the authority and holds that there are no eternal things, etc.].

2.

Wrangling, which aims
futilities,

at gaining victory, is the

defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid

by quibbles,
rebuke.

and other processes which deserve
*"'

A
tory,

wrangler

is

one who, engaged

in a disputation,

aims only

at

vic-

being indifferent whether the arguments which he employs support

his owji contention or that of his opponent, provided that he can

make out

a pretext for

bragging that he

lias

taken an

.active

part in the disputation.

3.

Cavil

is

a kind

of

wrangling which consists in
anything,

mere attacks on the opposite side. A caviller does not endeavour to establish

but confines

himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent.

4.

Fallacies of a reason

are the erratic, the contra-

dictory, the equal to the question, the unproved,

and the

mistimed.

Wfcdftw "«<^uhk :»
5.

ii

k

i\ hi
i

The

erratic is the reason which leads to

more

conclusions than one.

An

instance Of the erratic
is

is

given below

:

Proposition

Erratic reason

— sound eternal, — Because intangible,
it is

Example

— Whatever
is

is

intangible

is

eternal as atoms.

Application— So
Conclusion.

sound (intangible),
is eternal,

— Therefore sound

16

BOOK
Proposition

I,

CHAPTER
:

II.

Again

— Sound
is

is

non-eternal,
it is

Erratic reason.

—Because
is

intangible,
is

— Whatever intangible non-eternal, as — So sound (intangible), non-eternal (intangible). Conclusion. — Therefore sound
Example.
intellect,

Application.

is

Here from the reason there have been drawn two opposite conclusions,
viz.
:

that sound

is

eternal,

and that sound
it is

is

non-eternal.

The reason

or

middle term

is erratic
is

when

not pervaded

by the major
the

terra, that is,

when

there

no universal connection between

major term and

middle term, as pervader and pervaded. Intangible is pervaded neither by 'eternal nor by 'non eternal.' In fact there is no universal connection between intangible and " eternal or non-eternal.'
'

'

'

'

'

ftwi!*ttH*3^ flf^ft "ftf^:"
6.

lit

i

\ *
i

ii

The

contradictory

is

the reason which opposes

what

is to

be established.

Proposition.

— A pot
is

is

produced,
it is

Contradictory reason.

— Because

eternal.
is

Here the reason
never produced.

contradictory

because that which

eternal

is

U t

I

^

I

vs«

7.

Equal to

the question

is

the reason which proit

vokes the very question for the solution of which employed.
Proposition.

was

—Sound
is

is

non-eternal,

Reason which

equal to the question

— Because

it is

not possessed of

the attribute of eternal ity.

'Non-eternal'
etemality.'

is

the

same as 'not possessed
is

of

the attribute of
is

In determining the question whether sound
is

non-eternal

the reason giv«&

that

sound

non-eternal, or

in other

words the reason

begs the question.

8.

The unproved

is

the reason

which stands

in

need

of proof in the

same way

as the proposition does.

THE NYlYA-StTTRAS.
Proposition

if

—Shadow

is

a substance.

Unproved reason. Because it possesses motion. Here unless it is actually proved that shadow possesses motion, we cannot accept it as the reason for the proposition that shadow is a substance. Just as the proposition stands in need of proof so does the
reason
itself.

Tt is

possible that the motion belongs to the person
is called

who

causes that obstruction of light which

shadow.

50.

The mistimed
is
is

is

the reason
it

which

is

when

the time

past in which
it is

might hold good.

Proposition

Mistimed

—Sound durable. reason —Because

adduced
9.

manifested by union, as a colour.

The colour

of a juris manifested

when

the jar comes into union with

a lamp, but the colour existed before the union took place, and will continue to exist after the union has ceiised.
is

Similarly, the

manifested wlion the

drum comes
to

into union with a rod,

must, after the analogy of the colour, be presumed to
the union took place,

sound of a dram and the sound have 'existed before
has ceased.

.

and

continue to exist

sifter

the union
is

mistimed, because the manifestation of sound does not take place at the timo when the drum comes into union with the rod, but at a subsequent moment when the
is

Hence sound

durable.

The reason adduced here

union has ceased.

In the case of colour, however, the manifestation takes

Because the time of their manifestation is different, the analogy between colour and sound is not complete, therefore, the reason is mistimed.

place just at the time

when

the jar

comes

into union with the lamp.

Some

interpret
is

the

aphorism as follows:
in

reason which

adduced

a wrong order
is

The mistimed is the among the five members
But
this

for instance, as, if the

reason

stated

before the proposition.
is

a word bears its legitimate connection with another word (in a Sanskrit sentence) even if
for

interpretation, according to Vatsyayana,

wrong

they are placed at a distance from each other, and, on the other hand, even the closest proximity is of no use if the words are disconnected in their
sense.

Moreover, the placing of

in

the Nyaya-sutra as

members in a wrong order is noticed a nigrahasthdna (occasion for rebuke) called

apr&pta-h&la (inopportune).

^^faqidlv4fc^^M T^l "9i^" nmuoii
tion

Quibble is the opposition offered to a proposiby the assumption of an alternative meaning. 10.
51.

* (Quoted

by Vatasyayana in the Nyaya-bhajya,

p. 260).

1*857

IS

BOOK

I,

CHAPTER

It

II

t

1

*.

I

U

II

52.

It is of three

kinds,

viz.,

quibble in respect of
res-

a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in 11. pect of a metaphor.

snv

m
53.

i

* 1*
1

i

Quibble in respect of a term consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously. 12.

A
.

speaker says

:

" this

boy

is

nava-liamhala (possessed of a

new

blanket)."

A

quibbler replies

:

" this

boy

is

not.

certainly

nava-Jtambala

(possessed of nine blankets) for he has only one blanket.

Here the word nava which is ambiguous was used by the speaker in the sense of "new," but has been wilfully taken by the quibbler in
the sense of "nine."

-*1^<HHJ"
54.

«mi«M
Quibble
in respect of a

genus

consists in assert-

ing the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is

very wide.

13.
"this Brahmana
"
is

A

speaker says:

possessed of learning and

conduct."

An

objector replies
is

:

it

is

impossible, for

how can

it

be inferred

that this pBfson

Brahmana.
of learning

There are

possessed of learning and conduct because he is a little boys who are Briihmanas, yet not possessed

\

and conduct. Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knows well that possession of learning and conduct was not meant to be an attribute of the whole class of Brahnianas, but it was ascribed to " this " particular Brahmana

I

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
enough in the world to render pursue studies and acquire good morals.

19
it

who

lived long

possible for

him

to

H \\

*

I

w

Quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally while it was used metaphorically, and vice versa. 14.
55.

A

speaker says

:

" the scaffolds cry out."
it is

An

objector replies: "

impossible for scaffolds to ciy out for they

are inanimate objects."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that the word scaffold was used to signify those standing on the scaffolds.

56.

It
is

may be

said

that,

quibble in respect of a

metaphor
first

in reality quibble in respect of a term, for the

is

not different from the second.

15.

57.

But

it is

not
in

so, for

there

is

a distinction between
meanings in the case
'

them. 16. Words are taken
'

their direct
'

(literal)

of

quibble in respect of a term

while they are taken in their direct

(literal)

as well as indirect (secondary)

meanings in the case of

quibble in

respect of a metaphor.'

you do not admit that one is different from another simply because there is some similarity between them, then we should have only one kind of quibble. 17.
58.
If

'

quibble in respect of a metaphor' were not different from quibble in respect of a term,' then these two also would not be different
If
'

from

quibble in respect of a
all of

genus

'

because there

is

some

similarity

among

them.

This

is

absurd, hence the three kinds of quibble

are different

from one another.

:

20
59.

BOOK

I,

CHAPTER

II

Futility consists in offering objections founded
18.
it

on mere similarity or dissimilarity.—

A

disputant says

:

" the soul is inactive because

is

all-pervading

as ether."

His opponent replies
larity
to

:

"

if

the soul

is

inactive because
is
it

it

bears simiit

ether as being all-pervading,

why

not active because

bears similarity to a pot as being a seat of union ?"

The reply

is futile,

because

it

overlooks the universal connection

between the middle term and the major term which is existent in the arguments of the disputant, but wanting in the arguments of the opponent. Whatever is all-pervading is inactive, but whatever is a seat of union
is

not necessarily active.

Or again
Disputant
is

:

— Sound non-eternal because unlike ether a product. Opponent — sound non-eternal because as a product disit is

If

is

it

is

similar to ether,

why

it is

not eternal because as an object of auditory
overlooks the universal

perception

it is

dissimilar to a pot ?
is futile

The reply

because

it

disconnection

between the middle term and the absence of the major term. There is a universal disconnection between " a product " and " not non-eternal," but there is no such disconnection between " an object of auditory perception" and "not eternal."

occasion for rebuke arises when one misunderstands or does not understand at all. 19.
60.

An

If

a person

ignorance,

begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter or wilfully misunderstands and yet persists in showing that

he understands well, it is of no avail to employ counter arguments. He is quite unfit to bo argued with, and there is nothing left for his opponent but to turn him out or quit his company, rebuking him as a blockhead
or a knave.

An

insfSnce of occasion for rebuke
is

Whatever

not quality

is

substance.

Because there is nothing except colour, etc. (quality). A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a fool, for his reason (which admits only quality) opposes his proposition (which admits both quality and substance),

:

THE NYATA-SttTRAS.
Another instance
Disputant

21

— Fire

is

not hot.

Opponent— But
says

the evidence of touch disproves such a statement.

— "0 learned audience,
It
is

Disputant, in order to gain the confidence of the assembled people,
listen, I

do not say that

fire is

not hot,"

etc.

only meet that the opponent should quit the
in this way.

company

of

a

man who argues

61.

Owing

to the variety of kinds, there is multipli-

city of futilities

and occasions

for rebuke.

20.
for

There are 24 kinds of

futility

and 22 kinds of occasion
I

rebuke

which

will

be treated respectively in Chapter

and Chapter

II of

Book V.


22

BOOK
Book

II,

CHAPTER
Chapter

I.

II.

I.

«

* it

i

ui

62.

cognition

Some say that doubt, cannot of common and uncommon

arise

from the reproperties whether
is

conjointly or separately.
Conjointly.

1.

—It

ia

said that doubt about

an object
of
tall

never pro-

duced

if

both the

common and uncommon

properties

the object are
object
at

recognised.

For instance, if we see in the twilight a moves we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post.
it is

which

Wo

onco decide
in

that

a man, for though tallnoss

is

a property poss3Ssed

by man and
a post.

post, locomotion is a property

which distinguishes a
is

common man from

Separately.

— Likewise doubt about an object
common

said never to be pro-

duced

it

only the

instance, if

we

see a tall

or the uncommon properties are recognised. For object in the twilight, we have no reason to doubt

whether
in

Tallness is certainly a property possessed it is a man or a post. common by man and post, but the tallness of a man is not identical
:

Now the knowledge of simiit merely resembles it. between the tallness of a man and that of a post presupposes a knowledge of the man and the post, of which the two kinds of tallness are attributes. If there is already a knowledge of the man and the post,
with, that of a post
larity

there cannot be any doubt about thein, for knowledge
of doubt.

ia

the vanquisher

f^5T^T^T5^^TfW^^r?TT^
63.
It
is

ii

H

I

K

i

R

n

further said that doubt cannot arise either

from conflicting testimony or from the irregularity of perception and non-perception. 2.

tenfold
64.

^

*T*srfcnr^:

«

*

1

1

1

*
is,

In the case of conflicting testimony there
side).

according Ub them, a strong conviction (on each
:

3.

Suppose a disputant (NaiyAyika) says there is soul. His opponent • (Buddhist) replies there is no soul. The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct. Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary
:

fhers is conviction, in the

minds

of both.

THE NYAYA-StFTRAS.

23

65.
rity

of

Doubt, they say, does not arise from the irregulaperception and non-perception, because in the

4. irregularity itself there is regularity. An irregularity may be designated as such with reference

to

some-

thing

else,

but with reference

to itself it is

a settled

fact.

If the irregularity

is settled in itself, it is

regular and cannot cause doubt.
it

On

the other
its

hand, if the irregularity is not settled in itself,
character and cannot cause doubt.

is

devoid of

own

66.
less

Likewise there

is,

they say, the chance of an end-

doubt owing

to the continuity of its cause.

5.
for instance,

Recognition of properties

common

to

many

objects
to

is,

a cause of doubt.

The common properties continue

exist

and hence

there will, they say, bo no cessation of doubt.

67.

In reply,
to

it is

stated that the recognition of proobjects, etc., are certainly causes of

perties

common
there
is
:

many

doubt
doubt.

if

objects

no reference to the precise characters of the there is no chance of no-doubt or of endlessfrom
the recognition of

6.

It is

admitted that doubt does not arise
properties
conjointly.

common and uncommon
of

forth the objection that doubt is not

Aphorism 2-1-1 brings produced even by the recognition
It is

common
tall

or

uncommon

properties alone.

said that

while

we

see

object in the twilight, we at once think of a man and a post, both which are tall. Thus there is knowledge rather than doubt about the man and post suggested by the tall object. The present aphorism

a

of

dismisses the objection by stating that there
distinctive)

is

certainly a

common

(non-

knowledge about a man and a post suggested by the tall object, but there is no precise (distinctive) knowledge about them. Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge of the precise character which distinguishes a man from a post) being absent, doubt must arise. Similar arguments will apply to doubt arising from the recognition of non-common
properties alone.

U

BOOK

It

CHAPTER

I.

Aphorisms 2-1-2 and 2-1-3 raise the objection that doubt does not arise from conflicting testimony, as the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions. The present aphorism disposes of the objection by pointing out that in the case of conflicting
statements one
deration,
is

led to believe that

both statements are worth consiinto the precise characters of

but

is

unable

to penetrate

the

statements.

Hence though the disputant and his opponent remain fixed, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting
statements.

Aphorism
settled
in

2-1-4 raises the objection that

doubt cannot

arise

from
is

the irregularity of perception and
itself.

non-perception as the irregularity

that the irregularity cannot
irregulai'ity

The present aphorism meets the objection by stating be concealed by mere verbal tricks. The though settled in itself does not lose its own character un til
it

the objects which cause

are removed.
rise to the fear that there is the possibility of
is

Aphorism 2-1-5 gives

an

endless doubt inasmuch as the cause

continuous.

The present aphor-

ism removes the fear by stating that though materials of doubt, such as

common
them.

properties, etc., continue to exist,
is

we do not always recognise

Unless there

recognition of the

common n *

properties, etc

,

there

cannot be doubt.

m

«hra

w»q«aTWM*

t

i

i

i

*

n

68.

there

is

Examination should be made room for doubt. 7.

of each case

where

It

has been stated that knowledge about the true nature of the catetheir enunciation, definition,
all,

gories consists in the true knowledge of

and

examination.

In case of well-known facts admitted by

there should be

no examination.
for

We

are to examine only those cases

where there

doubt.

The author

explains, therefore, first the nature of

room doubt, and
is

then proceeds to examine the other categories, lest there should be any

room

for

doubt in them.

69.

Perception and other means of knowledge, says
at all the

an objector, are invalid as they are impossible
three times.

8.
at the present,

According
nor posterior

to the objector, perception is impossible

past and future times, or in other words, perception can neither be prior
to, to,

nor simultaneous with, the objects of sense.

TftE NYAYA-SOTkAg.

g$

u *

i

\

i

s.

II

70.

Tf

perception occurred anteriorly

it

could not, he
its object.

says,

have arisen from the contact of a sense with

-9,
With reference
If
to the

perception of colour, for instance,

it is

asked

whether the colour precedes perception or the perception precedes colour. you say that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, you
oiz.,

must give up your definition of perception, from the contact of a sense with its object.

that perception arises

TSTTfer^
71.

* STRRP^:
is

SJ&IT§1%: R
supposed
to

M

I

%

o

||

If perception

occur posteriorly

you cannot, he continues, maintain the conclusion that objects of sense are established by percei)tion. 10.
knowledge are stated by you to be perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. All objects of right knowledge are said to be established by them.
:

The objection stands thus

—Tho

means

of right

The

objects of sense, for instance, are supposed to be
is

ception: colour

said

to

conclusion will have to
posteriorly to the objects.

by perbe established by visual perception. This be abandoned if you say that perception occurs
established

ii

*

I

9

j
If

1 3

n
its

72.

perception were simultaneous with

object

there would not,

says the objector, be any order of succesis

sion in our cognitions as there

no such order in their
colour and smell exist in a flower

corresponding objects.

11.
e.g.,

Various objects of sense can exist at one time,

at tho saine*time. If we hold that perception is simultaneous with its object we mast admit that the colour and the smell can be perceived at tho same tiino, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell.

This
i

is

absurd because two acts of perception, nay, two cognitions cannot take place

26

BOOK

II,

CHAPTEH

I.

at ,the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object. The aphorism may also be explained as follows :—

In knowing a colour

we

perform,

we may

say,

two kinds of know-

ledge simultaneously,

viz.,

perception and inference.
the
colour,

As soon
results

comes

in

contact

with

perception

as our eye which does

not, however, enable us to

be aware of the colour. The colour is brought home to us by inference which, we may say, is performed simultaneously

Now, says the objector, perception and inference being two different kinds of knowledge cannot be simultaneous, as the mind which is an atomic substance cannot be instrumental in producing
with the perception.

more than one kind

of

knowledge v
'<-5

at a time.

— 11.
perception and other
of

73.

In reply,

it is

stated that

if

means
is also

of right

knowledge are impossible, the denial

them

impossible.

12.
of the matter to be denied, the denial is inoper-

Owing
ative.

to absence

74.

Moreover, the denial
all
to

itself

cannot be established,

iiyou deny
Jf

means of right knowledge.
establish

13.

{e.y., denial), you can do so only means of right knowledge, viz., perception, inferIf you deny them there will be left nothing ence, comparison, etc. which will lead you to the establishment of the thing. Hence you will not

you are

anything

by one or more

of the

be able

to establish the denial itself.

ckwiuA
75.

wr

*

^sh^srsrfrfor: n *

i

*

i

9

« n

you say that your denial is based on a certain means of right knowledge, you do thereby acknowledge the
If

validity of the means.

14.
it is

Suppose you deny a thing because

not perceived.

You do

there-

by acknowledge

that perception is a

means

of right knowledge.

Similarly

inference, etc., are also to be

acknowledged as means of right knowledge.

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.

27

76.

be denied.
is

The means of right knowledge cannot, therefore, They are established in the manner that a drum
its

proved by
There
is,

sound.

15.

says Vatsyilyana, no fixed rule that the
of right

knowledge should precede the objects
ceed thora or be simultaneous with

means of right knowledge or should sucof precedence
its

them.

The order
:

is

never uniform.

Look

at the

analogous cases

a

drum
is

precedes

sound,
fire.

and illumination succeeds the sun, while smoke

synchronous with

77.

The character of an object
is
it

of right

knowledge

re-

sembles that of a balance by which a thing
Just as a balance

an instrument
is

measured object when
senses, etc.,

itself

is weighed. 16. measuring weight bat is a weighed in another balance, so the
for

arc said to be instruments of right knowledge from one point

and objects of right knowledge from another point of view. The eye, for instance, is an instrument of perception as well as an object of So also the means of right knowledge may, if occasion arises, perception.
of view,

be also regarded as objects of right knowledge.

78.

If

an object

of

right knowledge,

continues the

objector, is to be established
this latter

needs also to

right knowledge.

The objection stands thus — You say that an object of right knowledge is to be established by a means of right knowledge. I admit this and ask how you establish Since a means of right knowledge the means of right knowledge itself. may also be regarded as an object of right knowledge, you are required to establish the so-called means of right knowledge by another means of
:

by a means of right knowledge, be established by another means of

17.

right

knowledge and so

on.

means of right knowledge does not require another means of right knowledge
79.

Or,

he

continues,

if

a

for

its

establishment,

let

an object of right knowledge

28

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER

I.

be also established without any means of ri^nt knowledge.

—18.

A means of right
object of
If

knowledge stands

in to

the same category as an
establish

right

knowledge,
of

the

means

right

you are knowledge is
if

either of them.
,

accepted as

self-established,

the object of right knowledge must also, according to the objector, be

accepted as self-established.
etc., will

In such a contingency perception, inference,

be superfluous.

80.

It is

not so

:

the

means

of right

knowledge are
19.

established like the illumination of a lamp.
It

is

A lamp illumines a jar and our eye illumines the lamp. Though sometimes the lamp, and sometimes the eye, that illumines, you are
to

bound

admit a general notion of illuminator.

Similarly you must admit

a general notion of the means of right knowledge as distinguished from
that of the objects of right knowledge.

The means

will not, of course,

be regarded as such when included under the category

of

an

object.

[The aphorism is also interpreted as follows: Just as a lamp illumines itself and the other objects, the means of right knowledge establish themselves and the objects of right knowledge. Hence perception establishes itself and the objects of sense].
Not?.— Objections raised in aphorisms 8, 9, 1.0, 11, 1U, 17 unci 18 emanated from the Buddhist philosophy. The reply given in aphorisms 12, 13, 1.4, 15 iind IS), represents the views of Brahmnnic philosophers who regard perception as a real act and objects as self-existent oiitities. According to the Buddhist philosophers, however, neither percepThey acquire an apparent or conditional tion nor objects havo any self-existeuee. existence in virtue of a certain relation which exists between them. Cause and effect, long and short, prior and posterior, etc., are all relative terms. The whole world is a network of relations. The relations themselves are illusory as the objects which are related have no self-existence. Hence the world is an illusion or has a mere conditional existence. But whore there is conditionally there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible terms. That which neutralises all relations is the void or absolute which lies beyond the conditional world. To speak the truth, the world is an absolute
nothing though it has a conditional existence. Vide my Translation of the Madhyamika aphorisms in the Journal of the Uiuldhist Text Sooioty, Calcutta, for 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898

and

1899.

%

M^^<H^^
81.

l

;iMMf?d<HHM^^HIdl

IH

M

I


of.

II

An

objector

may

say that

tlie

definition

per-

ception as given before

is

untenable because incomplete.

-20,

THE NYlYA-StTTRAS.
contact of a sense with
its object.

29

Perception has been defined as knowledge which arises from the

This definition
of perception.

is

said to be defective

because

it

dees not notice the conjunction of soul with mind, and of
sense,

mind with

which are causes

82.
is

Perception,

it is

said,

cannot arise unless there
arises

conjunction of soul with mind.— 21. From the contact of a sense witli its object no knowledge
it is said,

unless,

there is also conjunction

of soul

with mind.

A sense

coming in contact with its object produces knowledge in our soul only if Hence the conjunction of soul the sense is conjoined with the mind.
with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition
of perception.

83.

Were

it so,

we

reply, then direction, space,

time

and

ether, should also be

perception.

enumerated among the causes of

22.

Direction, space, time and ether are also indispensable conditions in

the production

of

knowledge.

But even the objector does not
the causes of perception.

feel the

necessity of enumerating these

among

point out, has not been excluded from our definition inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of
84.

The

soul,

we

the soul.

23.

Perception has been described as knowledge, and knowledge implies Consequently in speaking of knowledge the the soul which is its abode.
soul has, by implication, been mentioned as a condition in the production
of perception.

85.

The mind

too has not been omitted

from our

definition

inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simul-

taneity ^of acts of knowledge. 24. Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential characteristic of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place This characteristic is due to the mind, an atomic substance, at a time.

«

30
which
is

BOOK

IT,

CHAPTER

I.

conjoined with the sense,

when knowledge

is

produced.

Hence

in speaking of knowledge

we have by implication mentioned the mind as

a condition of perception.

86.

The

contact of a Bense with

its

object

is

mention-

ed as the special cause of perception. There are many kinds of knowledge, such
etc.

25.
as perception, recollection,

Conjunction of soul with mind
all

is

a cause which operates in the
its

production of
object
is

kinds of knowledge, while the contact of a sense with

which operates only in perception. In our definition of perception we have mentioned only the special cause, and have omitted the common causes which precede not only perception but also other
the cause

kinds of knowledge.

87.

tainly the

The contact of a sense with its object is cermain cause as perception is produced even when

one

is

asleep or inattentive.
it,

— 26.

.

Even a sleeping person hears
open to
to
it.

the thundering of a cloud
if

if

his ear

is

and a careless person experiences heat

his skin is exposed

[Aphorisms 25 and 26 are omitted by Vatsy&yana, the earliest commentator, but are noticed by Udyotakara, Vuchaspati, Vitfvanutha and
other subsequent annotators].

Isrn^ft <iMftdtii<uwi
88.

«

*

m

*•

By

the senses and their objects are also distin-

guished the special kinds of knowledge.
viz.,

— 27.
of perception,

The special kinds by sight, hearing,

of

knowledge arethe

five varieties

smell, taste

and touch.

These are distinguished

by the senate in whose spheres they lie or by the objects which they Thus the visual perception is called eye-knowledge or colourillumine.
knowledge, the auditory perception knowledge, the olfactory perception knowledge, the gustatory perception
knowledge,
is
is is

called ear-knowledge or soundcalled nose-knowledge, or

smell-

called tongue-knowledge or taste-

fcnowledge and the tactual perception

is called

skin-knowledge or touch-

THE NYAYA-SCrTRAS.

31

89.

It

may be
is

objected that the contact of a sense
it is

with

its

object

not the cause of perception, as

in-

efficient in

some

instances.

28.
its

An
may

objector

may

say that the contact of a sense with

object is

not the cause of perception, as not see colour though
it

we

find that a person listening to a eye.
If the

song

comes in contact with his [Vatsyilyana interprets the aphorism as follows
:

conjunction

of soul with

mind
is

is

not accepted as the cause of perception, a well-known
viz.,

conclusion

-will

be debarred,

the

mark

of the

mind

is

that only one act

of knowledge
priate,
is

possible at a

time.

This interpretation, here inapprothe Asiatic
that the

based on the Bh*Uya-commoutary published by
I

Society of Bengal in 1865.
real Bh&sya-eouamentary of

fully

agree with those
is

who hold

VntsyAyana

not yet available to us.]

90.

It is

not so because there

is

pre-eminence of some
to

particular object.
It is

29.
a song

admitted that a person while listening
it

may

not see

colour though

comes
to

in contact

with his eye.
its

Yet the instance does not
is

prove that the contact of a sense with
tion,

object

not the cause of percep-

for it

is

be understood that his intent listening prevents him
colour.

from

seeing

the

In

other

words,

the
is

auditory

perception

supersedes the visual perception, because the song
the colour.

more

attractive than

[Vatsyayana interprets the aphorism thus The conjunction of soul with mind is not rendored useless, even if thcro is predominance of
:

the senses and their objects.
asleep or inattentive,
it is

If

perception
is

is

produced when a person

is

because there

then the predominance of his
is

sense

and

its
-

object though even then there

a faint conjunction of soul

with mind.

This interpretation
It is

available to us.

based on the Bhasya-commentary as ingenious but out of place here].
is

91.
it

Perception,

it

may be

urged,
we

is

inference because

illumyies only a part as a

mark

of the whole.

30.

We
it.

are said to perceive a tree while
tree, as

really perceive only a part of

This knowledge of the
it is,

a whole, derived from the knowledge a case of inference.

of a part of

according

to the objectors,

32

BOOK

II,

OHAPTEfe

1.

92.

But

this is not so,

for perception is admitted of

at least that portion

which

it

actually illumines.

31.

The objectors themselves admit that a part is actually perceived. Hence perception as a means of knowledge is not altogether denied and it
is

accepted as different from inference.

93.

Moreover, the perception

is

not merely of a part,

for there is a whole behind the part.

— 32.
A
part implies the whole,

The perception
of which
it is

of a part does not exclude perception of the whole
If

a part.

person you are said to touch the person.

you touch the hand, leg or any other limb of a Similarly, if you perceive a part

of a thing you are said to perceive the thing.

and perception

of a part implies perception of the whole.

There is, some say, doubt about the whole, because the whole has yet to be established. 33.
94.

The

objectors say that parts alone are realities and that there

is

no

whole behind them.
green in other parts.
qualities

A
If

tree,

for instance,

is

yellow in some parts and
the contradictory

the tree was one whole, then

of yellowness

simultaneously.

and greenness could not have belonged to it Hence the parts alone must, according to them, be

regarded as

real.

95.

If there

were no whole there would,
all.

it is

replied,

be non-perception of
intimate relation.
denied.

— 34.
would be perceptible
if

All signifies substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and

None
it

of.

these

the whole were

Sujyjose that the parts alone are real.

Then

since a part is not

of fixed dimeusiou,
into further parts

may

itself

be divided into parts, these latter again
until

we reach the atoms which are the and so on ultimate parts. Now the atoms which possess no bulk are not perceptible. Similarly, the quality, action, etc., which inhere in the atoms are also not Consequently if we deny that there is a whole neither the rjerceptible.
'

'

substance nor quality,

etc.,

would be perceptible.

TfiE NtltA-StTRAS.

33

96.
etc.

There

is

a whole because

we can

hold,

pull,

—35.
If there
'

were no whole we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say, one jar,' one man,'
'

etc.

This use of one
'

'

would vanish

if

there were no whole.

97.

The

illustration

not hold good, for

from an army or a forest does atoms cannot be detected by the senses.

—36.
any one were to say that just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a distance bat an army consisting of numerous soldiers or a forest consisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be perceptible but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be
If

perceptible,

and these atoms being

called

'

one

jar,'

the use of

'

one

'

will

not vanish.

The analogy, we

reply,

does not hold good because the

soldiers and trees possess bulk and so are perceptible, whereas the atoms do not possess bulk and are individually not perceptible. It is absurd to argue that because soldiers and trees are perceptible in the mass, atoms are perceptible in the mass also to avoid this conclusion we must admit
:

the existence of a whole beyond the parts.

98.

Inference, some say,
it

is

not a means of right
e.g.,

knowledge as
misleads, &c.
If

errs in certain cases,
is

banked, when something

when a river is damaged and when similarity

37.

we infer that there has been rain, if we see eggs, we infer that there will be rain and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These infersee a river swollen
off their

we

the ants carrying

ences, says an objector, are not necessarily correct, for a river

may

be

swollen because embanked, the ants
nests have

may

carry off their eggs because their

been damaged, and the so-called screaming of a peacock may

be nothing but the voice of a man.

^^Wi^ii^^
99.
It is

ft

^W^N ^
i

it

*

i

\

i

id

ii

not

so,

because our inference

is

something else than the part, fear and likeness.

based on

38.

«

34

BOOK
The

II,

CHAPTER
by rain
;

I.

swelling" of a river caused

is different

from that which

from the embankment of a part of it the former is attended by a great rapidity of currents, an abundance of foam, a mass of fruits, leaves,
results

wood,
rain

etc.
is

The manner
different

in

which ants carry

off

their

eggs just before

quite

nests are damaged.

The

from the manner in which they do so when their ants run away quickly in a steady line when

rain

is

imminent but

fear

makes them

fly in

disorder

when

their nests are

damaged. The screaming of a peacock which suggests gathering clouds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural.
If in

such cases any wrong inference

is

drawn, the fault

is

in the person,

not in the process.

100.

There

is,

some

say,

no present time

—because
will yet

when
which

a thing falls
it

we can know

only the time through
it

has fallen and the time through which

fall.—39.
Inference has reference to three times.

In the a priori inference

we

pass from the past to the present, in the a posteriori from the present to

commonly seen from the present to the present. It The reason is, therefore, proper that we should examine the three times. which leads sonic people to deny the present time is that when a fruit, for instance, falls from a tree we recognise only the past time taken up by the fruit in traversing a certain, distance and the future time which will yet
the past and in the
' '

be taken up by the
time.

fruit in traversing the remaining/listance.

There

is

no

intervening distance which the fruit can traverse at the so-called present

Hence they say there

is

no present time.
ii

rflfaaroTwt
101.
is replied,

3^iwRT*n% fl^^R^rct
is

r

i

v «•
will,
it

If

there

no

present

time

there

be no past and future times because they are
it.

related to


is
i^.

40.
that

The past
which succeeds

which precedes the present and the future is that Hence if there is no present time there cannot be any

past or future time.

102.

The

past and future cannot be established

mer^ mutual reference.

by a

41.

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
If the past is defined as that
is

35

which

is

not the future and the future

defined as that which

is

not the past, the definition would involve a
to

fallacy of

mutual dependency. Hence we must admit the present time which the past and future are related.

aR&rrcrai%
103.

u^Th^hi^i^i^mm^:

mum

ii

were no present time, sense perception would be impossible, knowledge would be impossible. 42.
If there

you deny the present time there cannot be any perception which is present in time and in the absence of perception all kinds of knowledge would be impossible. Hence the present time is established by confutation or the principle of reduetio ad abaurdum.
If

illumines only what

;

104.

We

can know both the past and the future for

we can
made.

conceive of a thing as
43.
is

made and

as about to be

The present time

indicated by what continues, the past

by what

has been finished and the future by what has not yet begun.

105.

Comparison, some
it

say, is not a

means
either

of right

knowledge as
On

caunot

be established

complete or considerable or partial similarity.
the ground of complete similarity

through

£4.

we never say " a cow is like a cow," on the ground of considerable similarity we do not say that " a buffalo is like a. cow," and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say that "a mustard seed is like Mount Meru." Hence comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no
precise standard.

106.

son

is

This objection does not hold good, for compariestablished through similarity in a high degree. 45.

The

similarity in a high degree

exists

between such well known

objects as a

cow and a bos gavaeus,

etc.

?<&

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER

I.

107.
inference,

Comparison, some say,
for both seek
to

is

not different from

means

of the perceived.
to

establish the unperceived
sight

by

46.
first

We
similarity

recognise a bos gavaeus at

through

its

special

of a previously unperceived object derived

a cow which we have often perceived. This knowledge through its similarity to a peris, it

ceived object

has been said, nothing but a case of inference.

not in a bos gavaeus unperceived that we find the real matter of comparison. 47. The matter of comparison is similarity, e.g., between a cow and a boa gavaeus. The bos gavaeus in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is, on perceiving a bos gavaeus we notice its similarity to a
108.
It is

cow.

Hence comparison supplies us with knowledge
it

of a perceived thing

through its similarity to another thing also perceived.
distinguishes

This characteristic from inference which furnishes us with knowledge of an unperceived thing through that of a thing perceived.

109.

parison
It is

is

no non-difference inasmuch as comestablished through the compendious expression
There
is
is

"so."—48.
not true that comparison
established
is

identical with inference because the

former
is

is

a cow, so
' '

a bos gavaeus
it

use of so

makes

through the compendious expression "so." 'As this is an instance of comparison. This clear that comparison is a distinct means of right
'

knowledge.

Verbal testimony, say some, is inference because the object revealed by it is not perceived but inferred. —49.

HO.

Inference gives us the knowledge of an unperceived object through the knowledge of an object which is perceived. Similarly, verbal testimony enables tie Tto acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object

.

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
through the knowledge of a word which
is

37

perceived.

The

verbal

testi-

mony

is,

therefore,
is

supposed by some

to be inference, as the object

revealed by both

unperceived.

111.

In respect of perceptibility the two cases are

not, continues the objector, different.
object through an object which
of the object

50.

In inference as well as in verbal testimony
is

we pass

to

an unperceived

perceived.

In respect of perceptibility

through which we pass, the. inference does not, continues the objector, differ from the verbal testimony.

UWNW
112.

II

R lH

I

«tt N

There

is

connection.

—5

moreover, adds the objector, the same
is

1 a certain connection between a sign
it
(e. g., fire),

Just as in inference there
there

(«.?,,

smoke/ and the thing signified by
is

so in verbal testimony
it.

connection between a word and the object signified by
not different from verbal testimony.

So

inference, says the objector, is

113.

In reply

matter signified

on the by a word because the word has been used
say that there
is

we

reliance

by a

reliable person.

52.

In reference to the objections raised in aphorisms 49 and 50 we gay that we rely on unseen matter not simply because it is signified by words
are, some say, nymphs, Uttaraknrus, seven islands, ocean, human settlements, etc We accept them as realities not because they are known through words, hut because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence verbal testimony is not inference. The two agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, but the sign in one is different from the sign

but because they are spoken by a reliable person.

There

paradise,

in the other.

In the case of verbal

testimony the special point

is to

decide whether the sign (wordj comes from a reliable person.

Aphorism 51 speaks of a certain connection between a word and the object signified by it. The present aphorism points out that the We acknowledge that a word indicates connection is not a natural one. a certain object, but we deny that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with the word. Hearing, for instance, the word " cow," we

'

38

BOOK

H,
it,

CHAPTER

I.

think of the animal signified by

nevertheless the

word and the animal
In the case of

are not connected with each other by nature or necessity.
natural and necessary.

inference, however, the connection between a sign (e.g., smoke)

and the
in

thing signified

(e. g., fire) is

Therefore the connec-

tion involved in inference

is

not of the

same kind as that involved

verbal testimony.

MHlJJJdi^MH^
114.

:

in

M ^
I

II

There

is,

in

the case of verbal testimony, no

perception of the connection. 53. The connection between a sign and the thing


is

signified,

which

is

the

For instance, the inference basis of inference, is obvious to perception. " the hill is fiery because it is smoky " is based on a certain connecthat
tion

between smoke and

fire

which

actually

perceived in a kitchen or
the objects signified

elsewhere.

The connection between a word and

which is the basis of verbal testimony, is not obvious to perception. word Uttarakuru, for instance, signifies the country of that name, but connection between the word and the country is not perceived, as Hence verbal testimony is beyond our observation. latter lies
inference.

by it, The
the

the

not

no natural connection between a word and the object signified by it, as we do not find that the words food, fire and hatchet, are accompanied by the ac54 tions filling, burning and splitting.
115.

There

is

If

a word were naturally connected with the object signified by
fire

it,

then by uttering the words food,
our mouth
filled

up (with

food),

and hatchet we should have found burnt (with fire) and split (by a hatchet).

But such
is

is

never the case.

a word and the object signified by
r

Hence there is no natural connection between it, and consequently verbal testimony

not inference.

is

an objector, be denied that there a fixed connection between words and their meanings. 55.
116.
It cannot, says


'

word denotes a particular meaning, e.g., the word cow A denotes the animal of that name, but it does not denote a horse, a jar or any other thing. There is, therefore, in the case of verbal testimony, a
particular

THE NYlYA-StTRAS.
fixed connection

30

between a word and
\b

its

of inference a fixed connection between a sign

meaning as there is in the case and the thing signified. Hence

verbal testimony

considered by the objector to be a case of inference.

117.

We

reply
is

it

is

through convention that the

understood. 56. The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural. The connection though fixed by man is not inseparable and*
connot therefore be the basis of an inference.

meaning

of a

word

There is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning. 57.
118.

The
e.g.,

risis,

the

word " yava

aryas and mlecchas use the same word in different senses, " is used by the Sryas to denote a long-awned grain

but by the mlecchas to denote a panic-seed. So the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform and consequently verbal testimony cannot be considered as inference.

119.

The Veda, some

say, is unreliable as

it

involves

the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology. 58. The Veda, which is a kind of verbal testimony, is not, some say a means of right knowledge. It is supposed by them to be tainted with
the faults of untruth,
contradiction and tautology.

For

instance,

the

Veda
son
is

affirms that a son is

produced when the
is

sacrifice for the

sake of a

performed.
It often

happens that the son

not produced though the sacrifice
in the

has been performed.

There are many contradictory injunctions
clares " let one sacrifice
fice

Veda,
"'

e.g.,

it

de-

when

the

sun has risen," also

let

one

sacri-

" let the

when, the sun has not risen," etc. first hymn be recited thrice," "

There
let

such tautology as the last hymn be recited
is

thrice," etc.

120.

The

s6-called untruth in the

Veda comes from

some defect

in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice.

59.

40

BOOK

It.

CrIAfcTEft

I.

Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect
in the operator (officiating priest) consists in hid not being a learned mail,

and defect in the materials
not fresh, remuneration
is
(to

consists in the fuel being wet, butter being

the officiating priest) being small, etc.
if

A

son

sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice Therefore there is no untruth in the Veda. defects are avoided.

these

121.

Contradiction would occur

if

there were altera-

tion of the time agreed upon.
has agreed upon doing

— 60.
if

Let a person perforin sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise
it

he

at either of the times.

Two

alternative courses

being open to him he can perforin the sacrifice before sunrise or after sun-rise according to his agreement or desire. The Veda cannot be charged
with the fault of contradiction
if it

enjoins such alternative courses.

122.
of

There

is

no tautology, because re-inculcation

is

advantage.— 61.
Tautology means a useless repetition, which never occurs in the
If there is

Veda.

any repetition there

it is

either for completing a certain

number
" thrice

of syllables, or for
first

" Let the

hymn

explaining a matter briefly expressed, etc. be recited thrice," " let the last hymn be recited

such instances embody a useful repetition.

qmfiwim ^ufawm
123. tion of

ii

*

m

it*

h

And because
to

there

is

necessity for the classifica-

Vedic speech.
necessary

—62.
ii

It is

divide the Vedic speech into classes based on

special characters.

ft^^mi^iwnftWMn^
124.
of injunction, persuasion

*

1

1

1

1*

ii

The Vedic speech being divided on
and re-inculcation.
Veda
are (1)
viz.,

the principle

63.
(2) ritual.

The two main
sive

divisions of the

hymn and

The.ritual portion admits of three sub-di visions,

injunctive,

persua-

and

re-inculcaiive.

THE KYlYA-StTEAS.
(ft ft:)
125.

41
I

fa*m:

II

*

1

t

II

An

in junction is that

a certain course of action [as

which exhorts us to adopt the means of attaining good],
:

—64.
Tlie following is an

injunction

— " Let

perform the

fire-sacrifice."

This

is

a direct

him who command.

desires paradise

126.

Persuasion
speech

is

effected

through praise, blame,

warning; and prescription.
Praise
extolling
its
is

65.
"

which persuades lo a certain course of action by
e.g.,

consequences,
is

By the

Sarvajit
it

sacrifice

gods con-

quered

all,

there

nothing like Sarvajit

sacrifice,

enables us to obtain
is

everything and to vanquish every one, etc."

Here there
such
a

no direct comthat

mand but
persuaded

the Sarvajit sacrifice
to

is

extolled in

way

we are

perform

it.

Blame is speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action by acquainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglecting " One who perforins any other sacrifice neglecting the Jyotiijtoma it, e. g., Here one is persuaded to perform the falls into a pit and decays there."
Jyotistonia BAcrilica the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.

Warning is the mentioning of a course of action the obstruction of which by sora.3 particular person led to bad consequences, e.g., on pre-. senting oblation one is to take the fat iiret and the sprinkled butter
afterwards, but alas
!

the Charaka priests

first

took

the sprinkled

butter

which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Charaka priests should serve as a warning to other priests

who ought

to

avoid the course.

Prescription implies the mention, of

some thing as commendable on
the

account of iu antiquity,

e.g.,

"By

this

Brahuianas recited the

Sama hymn,

etc."

fafaftfl^TgT^
127.

(wg^rrc:)
is

ii

* it

i

U
first
is

ii

Re-inculcation

the

repetition of

that

which
or

has been enjoined by an injunction. 66. Re-inculcation may consist of (1) the repetition
(2) the repatitiou of

of an injunction,

tint

which has

bsen enjoined.

The

called

verbal re-inculcation and the second objective re-inculcation.

la the Veda

42

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER

I.

there is re-inculcation as in ordinary use there

is repetition.

" Non-eternal,

not eternal"

this is a verbal repetition. "Non-eternal, character of extinction " this is objective repetition.

possessing the

There is, some say, no difference between re-inculcation and tautology, as there is in either case a repetition
128.
of

some expression already used.
Re-inculcation
is

67.
it

supposed by some to be a fault inasmuch as does not, according to them, differ from tautology.

^sr^^q^^m^T?TTfasN:
129.

n *

I

t

I

*q

n

There

is

a

difference, becaitse
e.g.,

re-inculcation
faster.

serves

some useful purpose,

a

command to go
on,

— 68.

Tautology consists of a useless repetition but the re-petition in the
case of re-inculcation
is useful, e. g.,

"go

go on"

— signifies "go faster."
and medical

jwiflfrMw
130.

i

Jw ra

wjRTOwniijiimwi^ iiidkui
is

The Veda

reliable like the spell

science, because of the reliability of their authors.

— G9.

The

spell counteracts poison, etc.,

correct remedies.
their authors,

and the medical science prescribes The authority which belongs to them is derived from
sages,

the

who were

reliable persons.

The sages them-

had an intuitive pejception of truths, (2) they had great kindness for living beings and (3) they had the desire The authors (lit., the of communicating their knowledge of the truths. seers and speakers) of the Veda were also the authors of the spell and
selves were reliable because (1) they

medical science.

Hence
is

like the spell

be accepted as authoritative.
because eternal,
untenable.

and medical science the Veda must The view that the Veda is authoritative

THE NYAYA-SOTRAS.
Book
ii-^-Chapter
ii.

43>

131.

Some

say that the means of right knowledge

are

more than
In

four,

because rumour, presumption, probavalid.
the

bility

and non-existence are also
Book
I,

1.

chapter
to

I,

aphorism
viz.,

3,

means

of right

knowledge

have been stated
verbal testimony.

be four,

perception, inference, comparison and

Some

say that there are other means of right knowledge

such as rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence.

an assertion which has come from one to another without any indication of the source from which it first originated, e.g., in this
is

Humour

fig tree there live goblins.

Presumption
another thing
:

is

the deduction of one

thing from the declaration of
'

from the declaration that unless there is cloud there there is rain if there is cloud.' [A more is no raiu' we deduce that familiar instance of presumption is this the fat Devadatta does not eat
e.g.,
' :

during the day time.
for
it is

More the presumption
if

is

that he eats in the night
all].

impossible for a person to be fat

he does not eat at

Probability consists in cognising
of another tiling
in

the existence of a thing from that
e.g.,

which

it

is

included,

cognising the measure of

an d(}haka from that of a droi^a of which it is a fourth part, and cognising the measure of a prastha from that of an arjhaka of which it is a
quarter.

Of two opposite things the non-existence
existence
of

of one of

establishes

the
the

the other, ey.,

the

non-existence

rain

establishes

combination of wind and cloud.

When

there

is

a combination of wind

and cloud, drops

of water cannot fall in spite of their weight.

TR^FfTWT^S^fr^T:
132.
is

II

H

1*

I

*

II

This,

included in

no contradiction since rumour verbal testimony, and presumption, probabiis

we reply,

lity

and non-existence are included in inference.

2.

Those who maintain that rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence are valid, do not really oppose our division of the means
of right

knowledge

into four, viz., perception,

inference,

comparison and

verbal testimony.

U
Rumour
and
is

BOOK
a special kind of
is
it.

II,

CHAPTER

II.

partakes of the general characteristics of verbal testimony

Presumption
tance, the fat

explained as the knowledge of a thing derived
it

through the consideration of

from the opposite standpoint.
:

For
here

ins-

Devadatta does not eat during the day time
is

the

presumption
night has
deration

that he

eats in

the night.
is

The

fact of his eating in the

not been expressly stated but
that

ascertained from this consithe

a person

who docs not

eat during

day

cannot be
like

stroug unless he eats in the night.
inference passes from

It is

evident that presumption
olie

a perceived

thing to an unperceived

because

they are in some way connected.
Probability
is

inference

because
it is

it is

the cognizance of apart from

knowledge of a whole with which
Non-existence
is

inseparably connected.
as
it

inference inasmuch
the

really

infers

the obs-

truction of a cause from

non-existence of

its effect

through a certain

connection,

viz., if

the obstruction occurs the effect cjiunot occur.
etc.,

Hence rumour,

are not independent

but, are included in the four

means of right knowledge enumerated in Book I, Chapter], aphorism 3.

133.

Presumption, some

say, is not valid

because
this

it

leads to uncertainty.
" If there
said to
is

3.
will

no cloud
if

there
is

be no rain"

—from

we are
it

presume that

there

a cloud there will be rain.
rain.

But

often

happens that a cloud is not followed by always lead to certainty.

So presumption does not

134.
to

We
4.
is

reply

:

if

there

your supposing that

to

any uncertainty it is due be a presumption which, is not
is

really so.
'

" If there
entitled to
if

no cloud there will be no rain."

From

this

we

are

presume that if there is rain there must have been cloud. you pretend to presume that " if there is a cloud there will be But raiu" your so-called presumption will be an invalid one.

135.
it

The

objection

itself,

we

say, is invalid

because

leads to uncertainty.

5.

THE
" Presumption
is

NYAYA-StfTRAS.
it

45
to

not valid because

leads

uncertainty"

— this

In it there are two points for consideration, viz., is your objection. (1) the validity of presumption and (2, the existence of presumption.

Your objection refers to one of the points, t>iz., the validity of presumption. So you do not deny the existence of presumption. In some instances,
however, your objection

may
is

refer

to

more points than one.
in
itself,
is

In fact

the nature of your objection
it

not definite

or

in

other words,

leads to uncertainty.

Hence, your objection

invalid.

136.

Or,

if

that be

valid, then our

presumption

is

not invalid.

6.
will

Perhaps you
objection.

say that your objection

is

valid

because you can

ascertain in each case

Similarly,

we

whether one or more points are referred to by the shall say that our presumption is not invalid
is

because wo can ascertain in each case whether the presumption
of leading to more conclusions than one.

capable

Hence

if

you say that your

objection

is

valid,

wc

shall say that our presumption is also valid.
11

JTroTsrsrmnpf gtarfci:
137.
of right

*

i

t
is

i

u

n

Some say
it.

that non-existence
is

not a

means
is

knowledge because there

known by

no object which

7.

138.

an object
objects.

we reply, serves to mark out unmarked by the mark which characterises other
Non-existence,

— 8.

Suppose a person wants to bring a pot which is not blue. The absence of bluenesH is a mark which will enable him to mark out the particular pot he wants to bring and to exclude the other pots which Thus an object may be known through the non-existence are blue.
(absence) of its mark.

139.

a mark

is'

you say that the non-existence (absence) of impossible where there was no mark at all, it is,
If
so,

we

because the non-existence (absence) possible in reference to a mark elsewhere. 9..

reply, not

is

46

BOOK
We can,
was previously
"Not-blue"
is

II,

CHAPTER
A

It.

says an objector, talk of a
existent (present).

mark being
In reply

non-existent (absent)

if it

pot is said to be not blue only

in reference to its
so.

being blue previously.

we say

that

it

is

not

no doubt

possible only in reference to " blue " but

that blueness

may

exist elsewhere.

For instance, we can talk of
is

this

pot being not-blue, in -contrast to that pot which

blue.

140.

Though a mark may
say,

distinguish the

object

which

is

marked, the non-existence (absence) of the mark
distinguish

cannot,

some

the

object

which

is

not

marked.

10.
is

A
how can

blue pot

distinguished by the blueness which

we, says the objector, distinguish an

But is its mark. unmarked object by the

non-existence (absence) of the

mark which

it

does not possess ?

141.

This

is

not

so,

because the non-existence (ab-

sence) of a

mark

serves as a

mark

in relation to the pre-

sence of the mark.

11.
is

We

can

speak of a pot being not blue in relation to one which
positive

Hence though not-blueness is not a blue. (negative) mark in relation to blueness.

mark

it

serves as a

ST^%Hrefcra%«r
142.

ir
viz.,

m^

12.

h

Moreover we perceive non-existence as a mark
antecedent non-existence

antecedent to the production of a thing.
There are two kinds of non-existence,

and subsequent non-existence. When we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jnr in the halves which are destined to compose it. This is antecedent non-existence. Similarly, when we say that a jar has broken, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the This is subsequent non-existence. jar in the parfi* which composed it.

fcrifc^^pfft
143.

^
is

PiiiftM%:

wmx

ii

^

(

%

i

^ a

doubt about the nature of sound because there are conflicting opinions supported by conflicting
reasons.

There

13.

— —
THE NYAYA-StTRAS.
Some say
eternal,

47
it is

that sound

is

a quality of pther and that

all-pervading,

and capable of being manifested.
manifested.

Others say that

sound
is

like

smell, etc., is a quality of the substance in

which

it

abides,

and

capable

of being

Sound

is

said

by others

to

be a quality of ether

and destruction like knowledge. Others again say that sound arises from the concussion of elements, requires no abode, and is subject to production and destruction. Hence there arises
and
to be subject to production

doubt about the true nature of sound.

^lfe*WI?P^*^
144.

f*|3ra§tRTCT^r

II

R

I

\

I

9*

II

and
14.

is

Sound is not eternal because it has a beginning cognised by our sense and is spoken of as artificial.
is

Sound

non-eternal because
e. g.

it

begins or arises from the concustree, etc.

sion of two hard substances
for the non-eternality of

an axe and a
that
it is

Another ground
Moree.g.,

sound

is

cognised by our sense.
artificial

over

we

attribute to

sound the properties

of an

object,

we
if

speak of a sound being grave, acute,
it

etc.

This would be impossible

had been

eternal.

Some say
manifestation of

that
it,

the so-called that
is,

beginning of a sound ,is merely a sound does not really begin but is merely
In reply we say

manifested by the concussion of two hard Substances.
that the concussion does not manifest but produces

sound.

You cannot

suppose the concussion

to be the

manifester and sound the manifested

unless you can prove that the concussion

and sound are simultaneous.
heard at a great distance even

But

tile

proof

is

impossible as a sound

is

after the concussion of the substances

has ceased.

So sound

is

not mani-

fested by the concussion.
is

It is,

however, legitimate to suppose that sound
heard at a great distance.

produced by the concussion, and that one sound produces another sound
last

and so on until the

sound

is

i*i

1

1

in

i.

argument because the non-existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of as if they were artificial. 15. /
145.
will not accept this

Some

Some say
eternal.

that
!

it is

not true that whatever has a beginning

is

non-

Look

the non-existence 'destruction) of a jar which began

wheu

48
the jar was broken
is
is

BOOK
non-eternal
:

H,

-CHAPTER

II.

Whatever is cognised by on unsound argument. When, for instance, we perceive a jar we perceive also its genus (i.e., jaruess) which is eternal. It is further said that we often attribute to eternal
eternal (indestructible).
tliis is

our sense

also said to

be

things the properties of an
of ether as

artificial object,

e.g.,

we speak

of the extension

we speak

of the extension of a blanket.
it
i

r \ \% n rTTSPfTTTpffcrfaR^T feWTT^sqfjRR: 146. There is, we reply, no opposition because there
i

is distinction

between what

is really

eternal

and what

is

partially eternal.

16.

That which

is

really eternal belongs to the three times.
of a jar

But the nonit

existence (destruction)

does not belong to three times as

was

impossible before the jar was broken.
tion) of a jar

Hence the non-existence
not really eternal.

(destruc-

which

lias

a beginning

is

147.

It is

only the things cognised by our sense as

belonging to a certain genus that must, we say, be inferred
to be non-eternal.

17.

The

objectors have said that things cognised
e.g.,

by our sense are not

necessarily non-eternal,

as

we

perceive a jar

we

also

perceive

its

genus jar-uess which is eternal. In reply we say that not all things cognised by our sense are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a
certain genus.

A

jar, for instance, is non-eternal

because Ave perceive
is

it

as belonging to the genus jar-ness.

But jar-ness which

cognised by

our sense

is

not non-eternal because

it

does not belong to a further genus
is

named jar-ness-ness. Similarly, sound is non-eternal because it nised by our sense as belonging to the genus called sound-ness. The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows: Sound

cog-

is

non-

eternal because

We
a series

it is inferred to advance in a series. do not say that whatever is cognised by our sense

is

non-eternal

:

our intention

is to

say that things cognised by our sense as advancing in

am non-eternal.

Sound

is

cognised in that manner
is

(i.e.,

sound

advances like a wave) and hence sound

non-eternal.

148.

We

further say,

that only artificial things are

designated by. the term extension.

18,

THE NYAYA-StJTRAS.
When we

49

speak of the extension of ether we really mean that the extension belongs to an artificial thing which has for its substratum the Hence we do not in reality attribute to eternal things the properties ether.
of artificial objects.

149.

Sound
it.

is

non-eternal because neither do

we

perceive
If

it

before pronunciation nor do

we

notice any veil

which covers

19.

sound were eternal it would be perceived before pronunciation. You cannot say that sound really existed before pronunciation but was covered by some veil, for we do not notice any such veil.

150.

The

veil,

some
If

say,

really

exists

because

do not perceive the non-perception thereof.
The
objectors say
:

— 20.
it is

we

you deny
the
veil

the veil

because
it

not perceived,
perceived.

we deny the non-perception of The denial of non-percoption
perception, or in

because

is

also not

is the same as the acknowledgment of other words, the veil is acknowledged to be existent.

Mil

1

1

*t

«

151.

If

you assert non-perception
is

of the veil

though
not per-

the non-perception
tors, assert

not perceived we, continue the objecit

the existence of the veil though
of the veil

is

ceived.

21.

You admit non-perception
(non-perception).
veil

though you do not perceive it Similarly, we, the objectors admit the existence of the
it.

though we do not perceive

152.

This,

we

reply, is

no reason, because non-per-

22. ception consists of absence of perception. Our non-perception thing fit to be perceived. A veil is a

of

it

On the other hand, the non-perception of a veil is indicates its absence. Hence non-perception of the non-percepperceived. not a thing fit to be
tion leads us to nothing real.

7

50

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER

II.

153.

Some

say that sound
is eternal.
it is

is

eternal because

it is

23. intangible. Ether which is intangible
ing to some, be eternal because

Sound must

similarly, accord-

intangible.

154.
Action

This we deny, because action
is

is

non-eternal.

—24.

non-eternal though,

it is

intangible.

Hence

intangibility

does not establish eternality.

•T^g
155.

Pl^J^I^ *
II

I

I

I

Vt
is

II

An atom,

on the other hand,

eternal though

not intangible.
Tangibility


is

25.
not incompatible with eternality,
e.g.,

atoms

are

tangible yet eternal.

SFSRHT^ H
156.

*

i

*

i

^

H

Sound, some

say,

is

eternal

because of the

traditionary teaching.

— 26.
knowledge to his pupils by
In fact the traif

A
means

preceptor could not ha"e imparted

of sounds if these were

perishable (non-eternal).

ditionary

teaching would, according to the objectors, be impossible

the sounds were non-eternal.

157.

This

is,

we reply, no reason because sound

is

not

perceived in the interval.

— 27.

'

Suppose a preceptor delivers certain sounds (in the form of lecwhich are received by his pupil. The sounds are not audible '.in ture) the interval between the preceptor giving them and the pupil receiving them. They would never he inaudible if they were eternal.

3WlMHl<*i|frt^:
158.

II

*

I

*

I

*q

II

This, say the objectors, is no argument because
:

28. there is the teaching. If the sounds as soon as they came out of the The objectors say were destoyed and did not reach the pupil, there could not. be preceptor

THE NYAYA-StTRAS.
any- teaching
carried
on.

-

'

8%
sound

But there
it is

is

the

teaching,

hence

does not perish or in other words

eternal.

159.

In whichever of the two senses

it is

accepted
pupil's
imitat-

29. the teaching does not offer any opposition. " teaching" maybe interpreted either as (I) the The word receiving the sounds given by his preceptor, or as (2) the pupil's
ing the sounds of his preceptor as one imitates dancing.
interpretations

Neither of these
In consonance

would support the eternality of sound.
interpretation

with the

first

the preceptor

produces another sound

reaches the pupil.

coming out of and so on until (he last sound This would make sound non-eternal. It is obvious
shall

we

say

that

the sound

that the second interpretation similarly proves the non-eternality of sound.

160.
it is

Sound, continue the objectors,

is

eternal because

capable of repetition.
That which
is

— 30.
ia

capable of repetition

persistent or

not perishable,

e.g.,

one and the same colour can be repeatedly looked at because it is persistent. One and the same sound can similarly be repeatedly uttered,
it is

hence

persistent or not perishable.

161. It is, we reply, not so because even if sounds were " other" (different), repetition could take place. 31.

Repetition does
possible even
sacrifices
if

not prevent perishableuess because repetition is the things repeated are " other" or different, e.g., he
thrice, etc.

twice,

he dances

Here the two

sacrifices are different

and yet we use the repetitive word
are different

twice, similarly

the three dancings

and yet we use the

repetitive

word

'

thrice.'

162.

Some say
is

that there is

ness because what

no such thing as othercalled " other" in reference to some
itself.

other is^not other in reference to

32.
if

We
"other"
is

maintain that repetition

is

possible even

the things repeated
•'

are " other" or different.

Our

position is said to be untenable
is

the term

described as unmeaning, as nothing

other than

itself.

«

§8

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER

II.

In the absence of otherness there would, we reply, be no sameness because the two exist in reference to
163.

each other.
If there

—33.
viz.,

lead us to absurdity as
ableness.
will

was no otherness there would, be no sameness. This would it would disprove both persistency and perishHence we must admit otherness, and if there is " other" there
repetition
is

be no flaw in our expression,

possible even

if

things

were " other" or different.

l«MUIehl'MJ||«!M<HS§:

ihi^iwi
we
perceive

Sound, some say, no cause why it should perish.
164.
to

is

eternal because
34.

Whatever is non-eternal is destroyed by some cause. Sound is said have no cause of destruction, hence sound is held by some to be not non-eternal, {i.e., is regarded as eternal).

But by the same argument we are afraid that non-perception of the cause of inaudition would mean
165.

constant audition.
If


is

35.
is

non-perception

cease to hear because

we do

But such a conclusion

establish non-existence we should not not perceive any cause of our not hearing. absurd.
to

sq«T«mi%
166.

-ni^m<h*Q<*it«ii<m^!(i:
position,

i

* i^i
is

n
is

Your
is

we

further

say,

untenable

because there

no non-perception, on the contrary there

perception, of the cause of inaudition.

— 36.

Suppose that a sound is produced by an axe striking against a tree. This sound will perish after producing another sound which will again perish giving rise to another and so on until the last sound is destroyed

by some
perish.*

obstacle.

In

fact,

Hence there
there
is

is

every sound that is produced is destined to no non-perception of the cause of inaudition, on
of

the contrary
is

perception

such a cause.

Consequently sound

not eternal.

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.

53

There is, we again say, no non-perception because the sound [of a gong] ceases on the contact of our
167.

hand [with the gong].
You cannot
of sound,

— 37.
is

say that there

non-perception of the cause of cessation

because we actually perceive that by the contact of our hand

we can

stop the sound of a gong.

168.

We

call a
if

thing eternal (persistent)

if

it

conit

tinues to exist, and

we cannot

perceive any cause

why

should cease.
perceived.

38.
its

Sound does not continue to exist and Hence sound is not eternal.

cause of cessation

is also

169.

That the substratum of sound

is

intangible

is

no

counter-argument.
Sound has not
viz.,

— 39.
for
its

substratum any of the tangible substances,
for
it is

earth, water,

fire

and

air,

found to be produced even where
is

these do no exist.
is

For instance, sound
taste,

produced

devoid of smell,

colour and touch

in a vacuum which which are the qualities of
in

tangible substances.

The reason why the sound produced
is

a vacuum

does not reach our ears

that

there

is

no air

to

carry

it.

Hence the

substratum of sound
Jt is

is

an intangible substance,
it

viz., ether.

a peculiarity of sound that
substance
(e.g.,

cannot co-abide with colour,
is

etc.

A

tangible

earth)

which

the abode of smell

may

also

be the abode of colour, taste or touch.

But the substance, in which
qualities.

sound abides, cannot be the abode of any other
This peculiar substratum
called ether.

This distin-

guishes the substratum of sound from the subtrata of other qualities.
is

having an intangible substratum is no bar to the noneternality of sound. Sound, though its substratum is the intangible ether,
fact of
is

The

prodiiced by the contact of two'hard substances.

One sound produces
owing

another sound (or a certain vibration) which again causes another sound
(or vibration)

to

some

obstacle.

and so on Sound

until the

last

sound

(or vibration) ceases

is therefore non-eternal.

54

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER

II.

170.

Sound cannot be supposed
tangible substance
If

to

co-abide with
taste,

other qualities, for there are varieties of
In each
there
is

it.

— 40.

only one kind of smell,

touch or colour.
these qualities

we suppose
tangible

that sound
Ave

in a

substance,

abides with one or more of must admit that sound is of

one kind only.

and even

tfie

But sound is of various kinds such as grave, acute, etc. ; same sound may vary in degrees according to the nature of the
meets.

obstruction

it

This proves that sound
substance.
It

does not abide with other
that sound is not

qualities in a tangible

further proves

unalterable or eternal.

Also signifies that this aphorism

is

to

be considered along with
of

aphorism 2
given.

— 2— 8C in

which a reason for the non-etcrnality

sound

is

171.

From
' '

the

injunction

substitute there arises doubt. 41. The word dadhi conjoined with the word
yatra
'
'

about modification and
'

atra

'

becomes
in

'

dadh-

by the rule of Sanskrit grammar.
'

Looking

at 'dadhi-atra'

and

y Here some say that i undergoes modification as y while others say that y comes as substitute for i. Consequently we are thrown into doubt whether letters really undergo modifications or take up substitutes.
i

dadhyatra

we

notice

that there is

in

the former and

the latter.

Sl^fcrf^l^t
172.
If

ftchK&ld*

II

*

I

R'l

«R

II

underwent modification an increase of bulk in the original material would be attended by an in42. crease of bulk in the modification.
letters

accept the theory of modification the letter y which originated from the short i must be supposed to be less in bulk than the y which
Jf

we

originated from
the

the long

I.

But in
concluded

reality the

y

in both the cases is of

same bulk.

Hence

it is

that letters

do not undergo modi-

fication

but take up other

letters as substitutes.

^Wtifo«flM^»3ff«hKiq *Aa :
i

H *

I

*
to,

I

*\

n
be-

173.

The foregoing argument, some

say,

is futile

cause we find modifications less than, equal
than, the original material.—43.

and greater

THE NYAYA-SttTRAS.
The bulk
which
which
is its
it is

55
to

of the modification does not, in all cases, correspond
e.g.,

the bulk of the original material,

thread

is

of less bulk than cotton

original material, a bracelet is equal

in bulk

to

the gold of

made, and a banyan tree

is

greater in bulk than the seed from
of modification

which
is,

it

springs.

Hence the argument against the theory

according to the objectors, baseless.

HI^W^Hl
174.
It is,

fa+KfW<JT3[

11

R

I

*

1

««

II

I reply,

not so because I spoke of those
different materials.
its

modifications

which originated from
may
materials are different

44.

A
But
if

modification
the
original

not 'correspond in bulk to
their

original material.

modifications are exi

pected to be different.
are expected
to

Here
or

i

being different from

their modifications
t.

be

different.
i
*.

But y issues from

i

as well as

Hence

y

is

not a modification of

3o-*lft+ft
175.
letter

iN^^fWRfa^q:
is,

II

3

I

3

I

?K

II

There
its

says an objector, difference between a
is

and

modification as there

and
(or %)

its

modification.

between a substance
between the
letter
*

45.
is is

According

to the objector there

difference
difference

and its modification y as there cotton and its modification thread.
5T

between the substance

f^TW«J<TC%:

II

*
is

I

*

I

94

II

176.

In reply I say that

it

not so because the

character of a modification does not exist here. 46. A modification must be of the same nature with its
material,

original
latter.

though the former may not correspond

in

bulk to the

A

bracelet is no doubt a modification of gold or silver but a horse is not a modification of a bull. Similarly y which is a semi-vowel is not a modii)

fication of i (or

which

is

a

full vowel.

facfrKmidHmaHiltTl :
177.

II

*

I

s*

I

SV9

||

thing which has undergone modification does not agajn return to its original form. 47.

A

Milk modified into curd does not again attain the state of milk. having reached the condition of y may again revert to its original from. Hence y is not a modification of *.

But

i.

56

BOOK
tj4*U?<flHt
178.

II,

CHAPTER
:

IX.

3«KHrikfe
say that this

II

*

I

*

I

«C

II

Some

is

untenable because golden

ornaments may again be converted into their original forms.

—48. A
again

golden bracelet
be modified

is

converted

into

a

mass of gross gold which
objector relying on

may

into

a bracelet.

The

the

analogy of golden ornaments says that in the case of letters the theory of
modification does not suffer by
i

reaching the condition of y and again

returning to

its

original form.
I

ufahKKUl g^MI«qftft*l<Jlll *
179.
fications

R

I

II

The analogy, we

say, is inapt because the

modi-

of

gold (called ornaments) do not relinquish the

nature of gold.


i

49.
into

A
own

mass of gold when made

ornaments does not relinquish
into y loses its

its

nature.

But

when converted

own

nature.

Hence

the analogy is unsuitable.

180.
in the

There

is,

according to the objector, no inaptness

analogy as the modification of a letter does not relinquish the general notion of letters. 50.

Just as gold

is

modified into a bracelet without relinquishing the
i

general notion of gold, so the letter

undergoes modification as y without

relinquishing the general notion of letters.

> UWM«ld> wWl'fi * «MM*t|
181.

II

*

I

*

I

*t

II

A

quality belongs,

we reply,

to a thing possessing
itself. -^-51.

a general notion but not to the general notion

a modification of a ring inasmuch as both of them are gold which possesses the general notion of goldnesH. The letter y cannot
bracelet

A

be a modification
basis another

of the letter

i

because they have not as their

common

lettfcr

which possesses the general notion of
-«l
l

letterness.

fa^
,182.

ft<tiKHflk*k!>
If the letter

«wmm< IU U

m

II

and

if it

were eternal it could not be modified, were impermanent it could not abidelong enough to

fKurmsy the material for modification.—^52

THE NYAYA-SttTRAS.
On
into y,

pi
i

the supposition of the letters being eternal

cannot be modified
i

and on tbe supposition of their being impermanent
it

must perish

before

can be modified into

y.

siftfor: n *
183.

I

*

i

*** n the letters be eternal their modification,
as

Though

says an objector, cannot be denied,

some

of the eternal

things are beyond the grasp

of the

senses while others

possess a different character. 53. Just as some eternal things (as ether J are supersensuous while others (such as cowhood) are cognisable by the sense, so some eternal things as
ether

may be unmodifiable

while others as letters

may

be susceptible to

modification.

»M<Wi|lBl<a
184.

* *#Hftq«MUWftMMRl
Even
if

:

II

*

I

*

I

W

II

the letters are impermanent their modi-

fication, like their perception, is,

possible.


if

according to the objector,

54.

you say that letters are impermanent you admit that they abide long enough to be capable of being perceived. Why then cannot they abide long enough to be capable of being modified ?

Even

srftfor: n *
185.

I

*

i

**

n
that our position
is

In reply
is

we say

unassailable

no eternalness where there is the character of modification and because your so-called modification presents itself at a time subsequent to the destruction of
because there
the original material.

— 55.
if

you say that they are eternal When a thing is modified it assumes another nature, abandoning its own. Again, the letters cannot be modified if you say that they are impermanent because there is no time

The

letters

cannot be modified
is

because modification

the reverse of eternalness.

for *

(of*

dadhi) to be modified into y

when
at

q.

(of atra) follows.

The sound
(continuesly)

'dadhi*

is

produced (pronounced) at the

first

during the second moment and perishes

moment, exists the third moment.

The sound

8

58
(atra)
is

BOOK

II,

CHAPTER
at the second

II.

produced (pronounced)

moment,

exists (continues)

during the third moment and perishes at the fourth moment. Now, i (of dadhi) cannot be modified into y until a (of atra) has come into existence.

But a comes into existence at the third moment when i has already perished. So on the supposition of impermanency of letters, modification
is

impossible.

186.

Letters are not modified because there is

no

fixity as to the original

material of their modification.
is
is

— 56.
the

In the case of real modifications there
original materials,
versa.
e.g.,

a fixity as regards their

milk

the original material of curd but not vice
e.g., i is

In

the case of letters, however, there is no fixed rule,
of

original

material

y

in

dadhyatra (dadhi +atra) but y

is

the original
of modi-

material of tin vidhyati (vyadh+ya+ti).
fication is not really applicable to letters.

Hence the operation

187.

Some

say that there
is fixed.

is

the absence of fixity itself
I
is

no lack of
57.

fixity

because

pect of letters there
fication.

sometimes modified into y and y sometimes into i. So in resis no fixity as to the original materials of their modiThis much, however, is fixed that there is no fixity, or in other
fixity is fixed.

words, the absence of

Hence the

contends that there
tion.

is

fixity at least

objector, who is a quibbler, as to the negative aspect of modifica-

ftwiftqHfaflMKfHqil PmUNISlR fo II * By saying that the absence of fixity 188.
l

:

U Uq
is

II

fixed
its

you cannot

set aside

our reason, because the

fixity

absence are contradictory terms. 58. Our reason is that in respect of letters there is no fixity as to their You contend that though there is no fixity, the absence oi , modification. fixity is fixed. Our reply is that though the absence of fixity is fixed it
does not establish fcxity as a positive
fact,

and

because

fixity

is

incompatible

with the absence of

fixity.

Wirc:

mm m

ii

"

THE NYAyifcStTBASi
i89.

5ft

There

is

an apparent modification of

letters in

the case of their attaining a different quality, taking up substitutes, becoming short or long and undergoing diminution or augmentation.

59.

A
of

letter

is

said to attain a different quality when, for instance, the
is

grave accentuation

given to what was acutely accented.

a

letter accepting a substitute

we may mention gam

as

As an instance becoming gaech.

A long vowel is sometimes shortened, e.g., nadi (in becomes nadi. A short vowel is lengthened, e.g., 'muni (in the vocative Diminution occurs in such cases as 'as+tas* case) becomes 'mune. ' In devanfmi (deva+am) na is an augment. stas. becoming
the vocative case)
'

'

'

'

'

190.
affix, e. g.

The letters ended with an affix form a word.
:

60.

Words are of two kinds nouns and verbs. Ramas (Rf-ina+su) while a verb ends in a
ti).

A

noun ends
e.g.,

in a sup

tin affix,

bhavati

(bhfi

+

doubt what a word (noun) really means as it invariably presents to us an individual, form and genus. 61.
191.

There

is

The word cow reminds us
'
'

of an individual (a four-footed animal),
is

its

form (limbs) and

real

genus (cowhood). Now, it is asked what signification of a word (noun) an individual, form or genus?
its

the

^VTRf s^clTl^TWfo:
192.

II

Some
it is

say that the

* * ** II word (noun) denotes
I
I

indivi-

dual because use "that,"

only in respect of individuals that "collection," "giving," "taking,"
* ;

ber," "waxing," "waning," " propagation." 62.

colour,"

we can "num"compound" and

That cow is going "—here the term " that " can be used only in reference \p an individual cow. Similarly it is only in respect of individuals that

"

we can use the expressions "collection of cows ""he gives the cow, " "he takes the cow, " " ten cows, " " cow waxes, " " cow wanes," " red cow, " " cow-legs " and " cow gives birth to cow,

SO

BOOK

Hi

CHAPTER

II.

word (noun) does not denote an individual because there is no fixation of the latter. 63.
193.

A

Unless we take genus into consideration, the word cow will denote any individual of any kind. Individuals are infinite. They cannot be
distinguished

from one another unless we refer some of them to a certain
to another

genus and others

genus and so on.
called horse.

In order to distinguish a
called

cow-individual from a horse-individual,

we must admit a genus

cow distinguished from a genus

194.

Though a word does not
it

literally

bear a certain

meaning
wood,

is

used figuratively to convey the same as in

the case of

Brahmana, scaffold, mat, king, flour, sandalGanges, cart, food and man in consideration of
place,

association,

design,

function,

measure, containing,

vicinity, conjunction, sustenance
If

and supremacy.

— 64.
'

word does not denote an individual how is it that we refer to an individual cow by the expression " that cow is feeding"? The answer is that though the word cow may not literally mean an individual we may refer to the same figuratively. There are such instances as :— Feed the staff' means 'feed the Brahmana holding a staff,'' the scaffolds shout' means " men on the scaffolds shout ,' he makes a mat means he aims at making a mat,' 'Yatna' (chastiser) means 'a king,' a bushel of 'flour' means flour measured by a bushel, 'a vessel of sandal-wood' means 'sandalwood placed in a vessel,' 'cows are grazing on the Ganges means 'cows
the
'

'

'

'

'

'a black cart' means a cart marked with blackness, food means life and this person (Bharadvaja) is a clan means this person is the head of a clan.'
are
' ' '

grazing in the vicinity of the Ganges,
'
'

'

'

'

^l^^d^^^T^e ^^^^M^
195.

:

II

*

I

i*

II

Some
is

say that the word (noun) denotes form by
recognised.
'

which an entity

65.
is

We
alleged by

use such expressions as

this

a

cow

'

and

'

this is

a horse *
it

only with reference to the forms of the cow and the horse.

Hence

is

some that

the word denotes form,

THE NYArA-StTRAS.

61

;U

* 1.*
196.

I

U

II

Others say that the word (noun) must denote genus, otherwise why in an earthenware cow possessed of
individuality and form do

we not find immolation,

etc.

66.

We
real

can immolate a real cow but not an eartbfinware cow though

the latter possesses individuality and form.

The distinction between a cow and an earthenware one is that the former comes under the genus cow but the latter does not. Hence it is urged by some that a word (noun) denotes genus.

197.
is

In reply

we

say that

it is

not genus alone that
of

meant by a word (noun) because the manifestation genus depends on the form and individuality. 67.

The genus abides
recognised except by
its

in the

individual and the individual cannot be

form.

form and individual, or
tion of a word.

in

Hence genus has reference both to the other words, the genus alone is not the significa-

oWHfr RMIdq g
j
198.

q<sHJ:
of a

II

*
69.

I

*

I

43

II

The meaning
(noun) signifies

word (noun)

is,

us, the genus,

form and individual.
all

according to
is

The word
to one of them.

the three though prominence

given

For the purpose of distinction the individual is prominent. Tn order to convey a general notion, pre-eminence is given to the genus. In practical concerns much importance is attached to the form.

As

a fact the word (noun) ordinarily presents to us the form, denotes the

individual and connotes the genus.

* * oqt^&ufa^Nlgpft *|f%: 199. An individual is that-which has
II
I

I

(&

II

a definite form
as

and

is

the abode of particular qualities. 69. An individual is any substance which is cognised by the senses
taste, smell, touch,

a limited abode of colour,
velocity or elasticity.

weight, solidity, tremulousness,

WTfrfrFSlffafafreqT

I)

V

I

*

I

\»o

II

'

;

fig

BOOK
200.

II,

CHAJTE^IL
is

...'.'
called

i

..

.,,,...

The form

is

that which

tlws|ol^b^

the genus.

79.
for instance, is recognised

The genus, cowhood
formless substance.

tion of the dewlap which is a form.

We

by s certain coUoca. cannot recognise the gen u< of ft

201.

Genus

is

that

whose nature

is to

produce the

Seeing a cow someCowhood is a genus which underlies all cows. of cows {i.e., derive knowledge of where we acquire a general notion
cowhood).

same conception.

71.

This general notion enables us on

all

subsequent occasions to

recognise individual cows.

Book IIL— Ohapteb
j

I.

^H^fol^lifal fatqi^ \ 1. A sense is not soul because we
II
\

\

\

\

II

can apprehend

an object through both sight and touch.
" Previously I saw the jar aud now I touch it " such expressions will be meaningless if "I " is not different from eye which cannot touch
:

and from skin which cannot distinct from the senses.
5T
2.

see.

In other words, the

"I"

or soul

is

faN<Jo<M^Ml^
is,

II

VI

S

I

^H
is

This

some

say, not so

because there

a fixed

relation

between the senses and their objects.
is

Colour, for instance,

an exclusive object
It. is
is

of

the eye, sound of
that,

the ear, smell of the nose, and so on.

the eye

according to

the objectors, appreheuds colour, and there

no necessity for assuming

a soul distinct from the eye for the purpose of explaining the apprehension of colour.

3.

This

is,

tence of soul
There
is

U

no opposition because the inferred from that very fixed relation.
reply,
batwoan
tlia

we

exis-

a

fixe. I rolatfo'n

sensas an

1

their objects, eg.,

between the eye and colour, the ear and sound, and so on. It is the eye and not the ear that can apprehend colour, and it is the ear and not the eye that can apprehend sound. If a sense were the soul it could apprehend only
one object, but " I " can apprehend many objects, that is, " I " can see colour, hear soun I, an I s) on. Hanoa the "I" or soul which confers unity on the various kinds of apprehension is different from the senses each of which cau apprehend ouly one object.

4.

If the

sins as soon as

body were soul there should be the body was burnt.

release

from
froui

no soul beyond his body he should be freed body is destroyed. But in reality sins pursue him subsequent lives. Hence the body is not soul.
sins

If a person has

when

the

in his

H$$£

BOOE
The aphorism admits
If the

III,

OflA^fSfi

I.

of another interpretation

:—
no
sin

body were

soul there could arise

from

killing living beings.

Our body varies in dimension and character with every moment. The body which exists at the present moment is riot responsible for the sin which was committed at a previous moment inasmuch as the body which committed the sin is now non-existent. In other words, no sin
would attach
to

the person

who

killed

living beings

if

the soul were

identical with our transient body.

rTWR:
5.

<Hl<H*Sw|sftr rtfvM^I^

\\

\

\

%

I

V.

II

There would, says an objector, be no sin even

if

the body
eternal.

endowed with a soul were burnt

for the soul is

sins

In the previous aphorism it was shown that the commission of would be impossible if we supposed the body to be the soul. In the

it is argued by an objector that we should be incapable committing sins even on the supposition of the soul being distinct from onr body, for sucli a soul is eternal and cannot bo killed.

present aphorism
of

*
6.

fnFsqfepra$^TTgr u ^

\

\

\

i

11

In reply

we

say that

it is

not so because

we

are

capable of killing the body which
of the soul.

is

the site of operations

we can kill the body which is Hence we are uot incapable of committing sins by killing or murder. Moreover, if we do not admit a permanent soul beyond our frail body we shall be confronted by many absurdities
the soul
is

Though

indestructible

the seat of

its

sensations.

such as " loss of merited action " (krita h&ni) and " gain of unmerited
action " (akritabhy/igama).

A man who
life

not suffer

its

consequeuces in this

to his next life he will not suffer

has committed a certain sin may and unless there is a soul continuing them at all. This is a "loss of merited
suffering the consequences of action
of unmerited
life.

action,"

Again,

we

often find a
this life.

man

which he neverMid in
action " unless

This would be a "gain

we

believed that his soul did the action in his previous

is

a soul beyond the sense] because what seen by tha.left eye is recognised by the right.
7.
,

[There

is


THE NYSyArSUTRAS:
A
thing perceived previously by the
left

m
is

eye
if

recognised

now by

$he right eye.
with the
nition
left

This would, have been impossible

the soul were identical

eye or the right eye on the principle that the seat of recog-

must be the same as the seat of perception. Consequently we must admit that there is a soul which is distinct from the left and right eyes and which is the common seat of perception and recognition.

8.

Some say

that the eyes are not

two

:

the conceit of

duality arises from the single organ of vision being divided

by the bone
The
If

of the nose.
:

objectors argue as follows

the eyes were really two,
to

vis.,

right and

left,

we would have been

bound

perception and recognition.

admit a soul distinct from, the senses as the common seat of But there is only one eye which is divided
of

by the bridge

the nose

perception and recognition.

and which porforma the two functions of Hence there is, according to the objectors,

no soul beyond the

eye.

^it?rr^ fMHnftareniNra^
9.

im

i

t

i

fc

11

The
of

eyes,

we

reply,

are

really

two because the

destruction
other.
If

one does not cause the destruction of the
was only one, then on the destruction
total blindness.

the organ of vision

of that

one

{i.e.,

one eye) there would bo

WtW4Hliftu|cKJegM«|«Q<{3:
10.

This

is,

some

say,

H 1 \ no argument for the destruc\\
'

tion of a part does not cause the destruction of the whole.

The
of
it

-Just as a tree does not perish though a branch has been destroyed, so there may not be total blindness though
objectors say
:

one eye (apart of the organ of vision) has been destroyed.

ilftl-dftflMUMftflq : \\\
11.

\

\

I

\%

II

This

is,

we

reply,

no opposition
branch

to

our argument

inasmuch as your
The
illustration

illustration is inapt.
of a tree

and

its

is

not quite apt for a tree-

does not exist in

its

entirety but assumes a mutilated condition

when

m
a-bwmch
the
left

BOOK
of
it

HI,

CHAPTER
full

I.

is

cut

off.

The

right eye, on the other hand, remains in

a perfect condition and performs the
eye
is

function of an eye even

when

destroyed.

12.

The

soul is distinct from the senses because

there

is

an excitement of one sense through the operation
see an acid substance,
virtue
of

of another sense.

When we
other words,

water overflows our tongue.

In

in

the operation of our

visual sense there is an

excitement in the sense of

taste.

This would be impossible unless there

was a soul

distinct
its

from the senses.
;

The

soul seeing the acid substance
of the acid properties

remembers

properties

and the remembrance

excites the sense of taste.

y

some say, not so because remembrance lodged in the object remembered.
13.
It
is,

is

Remembrance, according

to

the objectors,

is

lodged in the tiling

remembered and does not necessarily presuppose a

soul.

d« tHMq*MMI«S|flflq :
l

II

\

\

%

I

\%

II

14.

This

is,

we

reply,

no opposition because rememone can remember

brance

is

really a quality of the soul.
is

Remembrance

based

on perception, that
It

is,

only that thing which one has perceived.
the colour of a thing

often happens that seeing

we remember its smell. This would be impossible remembrance was a quality of a sense, eg., the eye which has never if smelt tlte thing. Hence remembrance must be admitted to be a quality
of a distinct substance called soul which
of colour
is

the

common

seat of perceptions

and smell.
\\

^ft^MN qjfofaqma
15.

\

i

\

i

u

n

Also because the things remembered are innuwe could remember innumerable But none can remember more things than one at a time.
in things,
to be

merable. If memory were lodged
things at a time.

Hence memory must be supposed called soul (endowed with a mind).

a quality of a separate substance


THE
NYAtA.SttTEAS,

some say, no soul other than the mind because the arguments which are adduced to establish the
16.

There

is,

" soul" are applicable to the mind.

The substance

of the objection is this

:

apprehend an object by both the eye and the skin. It is true that the acts of seeing and touching the object by one agent cannot
be explained unless we suppose the agent to be distinct from both the eye

We can

and the skin
with the mind.

(i.e.,

from the senses),

let

however the agent be

identified

17.

Since there
it is,

is

a knower endowed with an instruui!$nt
reply, a

of

knowledge

we

the

name
To

"

mind"

to that

mere verbal trick to apply which is really the " soul."
etc.,

explain the acts of seeing, touching,
its

you admit an agent

distinct

from the senses which are called

instruments.

The sense

or

instrument by which the act of thinking is performed is called the " mind." The agent sees by the eye, hears by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue, touches by the skin and thinks by the " mind."

Hence we must admit the agent call the agent as " mind," you
designate the instrument.
position.

(soul) over

and above the mind.
to invent
will

If

you
to

will

have

another

name
affect

This verbal trick

not, after all,
it

our

Moreover, the mind cannot

be the agent as

is

atomic in

nature.

An atomic

agent cannot perform

the acts of seeing, hearing,

knowing, feeling,

etc.

18.

Your conclusion

is

moreover opposed
soul.
If

tQ inference.

We

admit a mind apart from the

you deny anyone of them

or identify one with the other, an absurd conclusion will follow. Unless you admit the mind you will not be able to explain the internal perception. By the eye you can see, by the ear you can hear, by the nose- you can By smell, by the tongue you can taste and by the skin you can touch.

what sense do yon carry on internal perception, viz., thinking, imagining, Unless you admit the mind for that purpose your conclusion will etc. ?
be opposed to inference.


,

-

...

•.

19.

(The soul

is to

be admitted) on account of joy, fear
child from
the

and grief arising

in

a

memory
and

of things

previously experienced.

A

new-born child manifests marks of

joy, fear

grief.

This

is

we suppose that the child perceiving certain things The in this life remembers the corresponding things of the past life. things which used to excite joy, fear and grief in the past life continue to do so in this life. -Tho memory of the past proves theprevious birth as
inexplicable unless well as the existence of the soul.

WFfta«4M*fl*Hfa*IWTlft*irc
20.
It is
fl^Std are like those of

II

\ \\

\

*o

||

objected that the changes of countenance in a

expanding and closing up in a
:

lotus. -

The
by

objection stands thus
is

Just as a lotus which
itself,

devoid of

memory expands and

closes

up

so a child expresses joy, fear and grief even without the recollec-

tion of the things with

which these were associated

in the previous life.

21.

This

is,

we

reply, not so

because
heat,

the
cold,

changes in
rain and

inanimate
season.

things are

caused

by

The changes
heat and cold.

of

expansion and contraction in a lotus are

caused by

Similarly the changes of countenance

in a child

must be
of

caused by something.

What

is

that

thing ?

It

is

the

recollection

pleasure and pain associated with the things which are perceived.

i^i^Krvqr^i^n^ SF*nfi*«rNT^ ^
22.

i

\

\

\\\\

A child's desire for milk in
it

this life is

caused by the
life.

practice of his having drunk

in the previous

A child jttet born drinks the breast of his mother through the remembrance that he did so in the previous life as a means of satisfying hunger. The child's desire for milk iu this life is caused by the remembrance of his experience in the previous life. This proves" that the yhild's soul, though it has abandoned a previous body and has accepted a new one, remembers the experiences of the previous body.

——

23.

Some deny

the, above

by saying

that a new-born iron

child approaches the breast of his mother just as an

approaches a loadstone (without any cause).
The
objection runs thus
:

Jufit as an iron

approaches a loadstone by

itself,

so does a child

approach the breast of his mother without any cause.

R* II 5TTO5T Srf^mRTr^ II ^ \\ we reply, not so because there This is, 24. approach towards any other thing.
I

is

no

no cause which makes an iron approach a How do you then explain loadstone, or a child the breast of his mother. only a loadstone but not a clod of earth and a that an iron approaches child approaches only the breast of his mother and not any other tliiifgir
say that there
is

You

Evidently there

is

some cause

to regulate these fixed relations.

«ftd<Hi«Mndni^
25.

We

find that
is

none

is

H \ ** ii \ born without desire.
i

i

Every creature
the

born with some desires which are associated with
life.

things enjoyed

by him in the past
is

In other words, the' desire
in

proves the existence of the creature or rather of his soul
lives.

the

previous

Hence the soul

eternal.

20.

Some say

that the soul is not eternal because

it

may

be produced along with desire as other things are produced along with their qualities.
The
so

objection stands thus
jar,

:

Just as a
the
soul,

when
it is

it is

produced,
is

is

distinguished by

its

colour, etc.,

when
is

produced

marked by
in

its desire, etc.

Hence the
or,

desires

do not pi*e-suppose the soul
not eternal.
l

the previous lives

in

other

words, the soul

?
27.

&h^MWi 4HU<(lHlH M M
This
is,

I

W

II

we

reply, not so because the

desire

in

a

new-born child is caused by the ideas left the things he enjoyed in his previous lives.
The
other words, the soul is eternal.

in his soul

by

desire implies that the soul existed in the previous lives or, in

:

fp

BOQ&'lft

CHApOTtl

28.

Our body

is

earthy

because

it

possesses the

special qualities of earth.
la other worlds there are
airy or ethereal.

beings whose bodies are
is

watery,
five

fiery,

Though our body
to the

composed

of all

the
it.

elements

we

call it

earthy owing

preponderance of earth in

29.

In virtue of the authority of scripture too*
is

That our body

earthy
the

is

proved by our scripture.

In.

the section
texts as

on " Dissolution

into

primordial matter,"

there are such

May

the eye be absorbed into the sun,

may

the

body be absorbed into the"

earth, etc.

The sun

is

evidently the source of the eye and the earth of

the body.

\

I

%

I

II

30.

It is

doubtful as to

whether a sense

is

material
there
is

or all-pervading because there is perception
(contact with) the eye-bull

when

and there
to

is

perception even

when

the eye-ball is far off. The eye-ball is said by some
inasmuch as
its

be a material (elemental) substance

function

is

limited

by

its

contact.

A thing

is

seen

when
is

it

has contact with the eye-ball but
In other
its

it is

uot seen

when

the eye-ball

not connected.

words, che eye-ball, like any other material
its

substance, exercises

function only in virtue of
is

contact with

things.

Others hold that the eye-ball

a non-material all-pervading substance

much as contact The
in as

it

can perceive

things with which

it

has not come in
it

eye-ball

does not touch the things which
arises

sees from
is

a distance.

Hence the question

as

to

whether the eye-ball

a, material or an all-pervading substance.

ttWIpWUItil
31.
It is

II

\\ l* \\ ">
is

contended that the eye-ball
it

not a material
could have appre-

substance because
If the eye-ball

can apprehend the great and the small
it

had been a material substance

hended only those things which coincided with itself in bulk. But we find it can apprehend things of greater and smaller bulk. So it is
Contended that the eye-hall
is

not a material substance.

^M^fti^^tM N ^il^ ^ » \
32.

:

I

*. I

1H U

(The Naiyayika's reply to the above is that) it is by the contact of the ray that the things, great and small, are
apprehended. The Naiyayikas say being A material substance
small will
riot

that even on the

supposition of the eye-ball

the apprehension

by
is

it

of the great

and the

be impossible.

Their explanation

that

though the eye-

ball itself does

not coincide with things which are greater or smaller in
the eye-ball reach the things in their

bulk, yet the rays issuing from
entire extent.

Hence in

spite of the eye-ball
it to

being a material substance

there is no impossibility for

apprehend the great and the small.
II

d<4<M«£k)g:
33.

^

I

%

\

\\

II

Contact

is

not the cause because
with a thing

we do not

per-

ceive the ray.

The contact

of a ray

is

not the cause of apprehension

of the thing because we perceive no ray issuing from the eye-ball.

^rf^mR^T 5RW dl «4M <H RWTT^:
34.

||

^ \%

\

^J

II

That we do not apprehend a thing through percep-

no proof of non-existence of the thing because we may yet apprehend it through inference.
tion is

The ray
But
it is

issuing from the eye

is

not perceived as

it is

supersensuous.

established by inference like the lower half of the earth or the

other side of the moon.

scs^OTvt^T^rafivri^m:
35.

ii

*

i

<

i

vmi
it

And

perception depends upon the special cha-

racter of the substance

and

its qualities.

A substance

unless
is

it

possesses magnitude,

or a quality unless

possesses obviousness

not perceived.

From

the absence of magnitude

and obvious colour the ray

of the eye-ball is not perceived.

36.

A

colour

is

perceived only

when

it

abides in

many

things intimately and possesses obviousness. The sun's ray is perceived as it possesses an obviousness
But the ray of the
eye-ball is

in respect of
it

colour and touch.
in

not perceived as

is

obvious neither in respect of colour nor in respect of touch.

m
37.

%om in, oha^wj
And

i.

the senses subservient to the purposes of
,

man

have been
The

set in order
is

by

his deserts.
:

order referred to

as follows

The eye emits ray which does not

possess the quality of obviousness

and cannot consequently burn the thing it touches. Moreover, had there been obviousness in the ray it would have obstructed our vision by standing as a screen between the eye and the thing. This sort of arrangement of the senses was made to enable man to attain his purposes according to
his merits and demerits.

38.

The

senses are material substances inasmuch as

they invariably receive obstruction.*
Nothing can
stance.
offer obstruction to

a non-material all-pervading subetc.,

The

senses receive obstruction from wall,

and are therefore

material substances.

^P<S^^13+UII^Mh(^tI[^MqiI^: \\\\\ IHII
39.

Some say

that the ray of the eye (possesses obviit) is

ousness of colour but

not perceived just as the light of

a meteor at midday
The
sun.

is

not perceived.

light of a meteor though possessing obviousness of colour is not
it

perceived at midday because
Similarly,
it is

is

then overpowered by the light of the

some

say, the

ray of the eye possesses obviousness of
its

colour but

not perceived during the day time on account of

being

overpowered by the light of the sun.

**raT^§q<JT^:
40.
It is,

||

\\%Wo

II

we

reply, not so because

even in the night
would have

the ray of thfreye

is

not perceived.
it

Had

the ray of the eye possessed obviousness of colour
it

been perceived during the night when
light of the sun.

cannot be overpowered by the

As the ray

of the eye is not perceived
it

even during the

night we must conclude that

does not possess obviousness of colour.

•No.

88 appears to be a part of the commentary ot.Vatsyayana.

THE

mmmOTRABJ

78

41.

The ray
its
it

of the eye

is

not perceived in conseits

quence of
nal light.

unobviousness but not on account of

total
*

absence because
In the eye there
colour.
object.

reaches objects through the aid of exterray which does not however possess an obvious

is

Had

the eyo possessed

no ray

it

could not have perceived any
it,

Since the eye perceives objects,

it

possesses ray in

and since

it

requires the aid of external light (such as the light of the sun) to perceive

them

it

follows that the ray does not possess the quality of obviousness.

This aphorism answers the objection raised in 3-1-33.

wffeqr^ ^rTfrwrr^
42.

ii

\\%m

II

And
its

the invisibility of the ray of the eye cannot

being overpowered (by an external light such as the light of the sun) because the overpowering is possible
only of a thing which possessed obviousness.
It is

be due to

only a thing which possesses obviousness or manifestation that

can be overpowered or obscured.

But how can we throw a thing into

obscurity which never possessed manifestation ?
that the ray of the eye is not perceived on

We

cannot therefore say
its

account of

having been

overpowered by an external

light.

43.
it

There must be ray in the eye

of

man
cats*

as

we

see

in the eye of animals that

move about

in the night.
possess ray

We
man.

see that animals

wandering by night, such as

in their eyes.

By

this

we can

conjecture that there is ray in the eye of

44.

Some

say that the eye can perceive a thing even
it

without Tcomirig in contact with
as things screened from us
crystal are seen.

by means

of its rays just

by

glass, mica,

membrane

or

m
The
material substances.

BOOK

in,

CHAPTER
to

I.

objection raised in this aphorism controverts the

Nyaya theory

of contact (in pratyak§a)

and seeks

prove that the senses are not

45.

The foregoing objection
is

is

not valid because

we

cannot perceive what

screened from us by walls.

The eye cannot really perceive a thing without coming in contact with it by means of its rays. For instance, a thing which is screened from us by a wall is not perceived by our eyes.

46.

There

is

a real contact because there

is

no actual

obstruction (caused by glass, mica,

membrane

or crystal).
There being no

The ray
glass,

issuing from the eye can reach an
etc.,

external object through

mica,

which are transparent substances.

obstruction caused by these substances, the eye comes really in contact

with the external object.

47.

A ray

of the

sun

is

not prevented from reaching
is

a combustible substance though the latter
crystal.

screened by a
a ray

This

is an.

example which supports the theory of contact,

vis.,

issuing from the eye passes actually through a crystal to an object lying

beyond

it,

^

%^^W5R7fT^
48.
It is,

II

^ISS

||

some

say, not so

because the character of

one presents
The
If

itself in

the other.
:

objection stands thus

crystal,

a ray issuing from the eye can reach an object screened by a why can it not reach auother object which is screened by a wall?
itself in

According to the objector the property of the crystal presents
wall.

the

lunmn
49.

In reply

we

say that the perception of a thing

screened by arcrystal takes place in the same manner as that

THE JTTAtA-SOTRAa
of a form in a mirror or water

75

owing

to the possession of

the character of transparency.

The form

of a

face

is

reflected

on a mirror because the
on a crystal

latter
inas-.

possesses transparency.

Similarly, a thing is reflected

much

as the latter

is

transparent.

A

wall which does not possess trans-

parency can

reflect nothing.

It is therefore entirely clue to

the nature of

the screens that

we can

or cannot perceive things through them.

50.

It is

not possible to impose injunctions and pro-

hibitions

on

facts

which are perceived or inferred
to

to

be of

some

fixed character.
crystal

A

and a wall are found respectively

be transparent and

non*transparent. It is not possible to alter their character by saying " let the crystal be non-transparent " and " let the wall be transparent."

Likewise, a ray of the eye in passing to a thing

is

obstructed by a wall

but not by a crystal. This is a perceived fact which cannot be altered by our words. Hence the theory of contact remains intact.

titroiiWittii
51.

Since

many

things occupy

many

places and since

one thing possessing different parts occupies many places, there arises doubt as to whether the senses are more
also

than one.
whether there are as many senses as there are sensuous functions or whether all the functions belong to one sense

There

is

doubt as

to

possessing, different parts.

^JM&UldL H^m^U
52.
is

Some say

that the senses are not
(skin).
to

many

as none

of

them
The

independent of touch

eye, ear, nose

and tongue are said

touch (skin; which pervades them, tlfat is, touch f skin), all others being merely its parts.

be mere modifications of there is only one sense, viz.,

m
:

tOOS

III,

OHAFlpt t

^>fai|i>tl<I^M<|J> :M^lt1^tt53. It is, we reply, not so because the objects

of other

senses are not perceived by touch (skin).*
had been only one sense, viz., touch (skin) then it could have seen colour, heard sound and so on. But a blind man possessing Hence it is concluded that senses the sense of touch cannot see colour.
If there

are many.

54.

Perception of various objects of sense

is

comparin

able to that of smoke by a special part of touch.® Just as smoke is perceived by a special part of touch located
eye, so sound, smell etc., are perceived

the

by special parts of touch specially

located.

55.

This

is,

according to us, absurd as
is

it

involves

contradiction.
It

has been said that touch

the only sense by the special parts of

which special functions are performed.
then the senses are many.
the nature of senses, then
it is

Now

it

is

asked whether the
If

special parts of touch do not partake of the nature of senses.
If

they do,

to

on the other hand they do not partake of be admitted that colour, sound, etc., are

not cognisable by the senses.

56.

Touch

is

not the only sense because objects are
viz.,

not perceived simultaneously. Had there been only one sense,
ing, tasting
etc.,

touch,

it

would have in condifferent func-

junction with the mind produced the functions of seeing, hearing, smell-

simultaneously

But we cannot perform

tions at once.

This proves that the senses are

many

:

the

mind which

is

an atomic substance being unable to come in contact with the different senses at a tkme*«annot produce different functions simultaneously.

57.

Touch cannot be the only sense prohibiting the
.

v

functions of other senses, f
* This
f This
is not really an aphorism but a part of the commentary of V&tsy&yana, seems to be a part of the Commentary of VAtsyAyana,

Touch can perceive only those objects* which
But
it

are near (contaguous)
fact

cannot perceive objects .which are far

off.

Asa
This
is

we can

per-

ceive colour

and sou ad from a great

distance.

certainly

not the

function of touch but of some other sense which can reach distant objects.

58.

Senses are
five

five

because there are
viz.,

five objects.

There are
(savour)

objects,

colour,

sound, smell (odour), taste

tongue and skin.
five objects.

and touch which are cognised respectively by the eye, ear, nose, There are therefore five senses corresponding to the

59.

Some say

that the senses are not five because there

are

more than
The

five objects.

objects of sense are said to be

many such

as good

smell, bad
taste,

smell, white colour, yellow colour, bitter taste, sweet taste,

pungent
there

warm

touch, cold

touch

etc.

According

to the objector

must be

senses corresponding to

all

ihese objects.

»Fvi^iiioq(rAch(^Mi<fiwinM^r; imit»uThere is, we reply, no objection because odour 60.
(smell) etc. are never devoid of the nature of

odour (smell)

etc.

Good odour, bad odour, etc. are not different objects of sense but they all come under the genus, odour. It is the nose alone that cognises all sorts of odour— good or bad. Similarly all colours— white, yellow, blue or green— are cognised by the eye. In fact there are only five objects which are cognised by the five senses.

61.

Some say

that

there is only one sense as the so-

called different objects of sense are not devoid of the character of

an object.
objection raised in this aphorism
so-called
is

The The

as follows

:

different objects, viz., colour,

sound, smell (odour),

taste (savour)

in each of them being an As they all possess the common characteristic of being an objectofsense.it is much simpler to say that the object of sense

and touch agree with one another

object of sense.

is

only one.

If there is only

one object of sense, the sense must also

be one only.

78

BOOK

Ul,

CHAPTER X

62.

It is,

we

reply, not so because the senses

possess

a

five-fold character

corresponding to the characters of know-

ledge, sites, processes, forms

and materials

The
(a)

must be admitted to be five on the following grounds :— The characters of knowledge There are five senses correspondsenses

ing to the

five characters of

knowledge,

viz.,

visual,

auditory,

olfactory,

gustatory and tactual.
(6)

The

sites

—The

senses are five on account of the various sites

they occupy.

The

visual sense rests

on the eyeball, the auditory sense

on the

on the nose, the gustatory sense on the tongue, while the tactual sense occupies the whole body. (c) The processes— There are five senses involving five different
ear-hole, olfactory sense
e. g., the visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching through the (ocular) ray while the tactual sense apprehends an object

processes,
it

which

is in association

with the body, and so on.
are
of
different

(d)

The forms— The senses

forms,
is

e.g., the

eye

partakes of the nature of a blue ball, and the ear
ether, etc.
(e)

not different from

The materials— The
the ear
is

senses are

made up

of different materials

:

the eye

is fiery,

ethereal, the nose is earthy, the totigue is watery,

and the skin (touch)

is airy.

with the elements in consequence of the possession of their special
identical
qualities.

63.

The

senses are essentially

The
water and
savour

five senses, viz., the eye,

ear,

nose,

tongue and skin (touch)
viz.,
fire,

are essentially identical with the five elements,
air

ether,

earth,

(taste)

whose special qualities, viz., colour, sound, smell and tangibility are exhibited by them.

(odour),

lity

Of odour (smell), savour (taste), colour/ tangibi(touch) and sound those ending with tangibility belong
64.
:

to eaxtt». rejecting

each preceding one in succession they

belong respectively to water, belongs to ether.
The earth
colour and tangibility.

fire

and
viz.,

air

;

the last (sound)
savour

possesses four qualities,

odour

(smell),

(taste),

In water there are three
colour and tangibility are

qualities, viz.,

savour,

colour and tangibility

;

known

to

of fire while tangibility and sound belong respectively to

be the qualities air and ether. •

65.

An

objector says that

it is

not so because an

element
quality.

is

not apparently found to possess more than one
of the objeotion is that
viz.,

The substance
by the
one
nose.

the earth does not possess
(smell)

four qualities but only one quality,

quality,

odour which is apprehended Water does not possess three qualities but possesses only viz., savour (taste) which is apprehended by the tongue.

Similarly the other elements do, each of them, possess only one quality.

66.

The

objector further says that the qualities be-

long to the elements, one to one, in their respective order
so that there is non-perception of other qualities in them.

The substance of Odour (smell) is
other three qualities,

the objection

is this

:

the only quality of the earth.

Consequently the
the only quality

viz.,

savour

(taste),
it.

colour and tangibility alleged to

belong to the earth, are not found in
of water,

Savour

(taste) ia

hence the other two qualities, viz., colour and tangibility alleged Colour is the only quality of fire, to belong to water are not found in it. and hence the other quality, viz., tangibility alleged to belong to fire is
not found in
of ether.
it.

Tangibility

is

of course the quality of air

and sound

through their commixture, continues the objector, that there is the apprehension of more than
67.
it is

And

one- quality.

The objector further says as follows :-rThe earth possesses only odour (smell), and
ia also

if

sometimes savour
'

'taste)

found there

if

is

because the earth

it

"'.-.

is

then mixed with water.
"
.';::-:

1

W
Similarly
if

BOOK
it.

III,

CHAPTERit is

there is odour (smell) in water

because the earth
:

is

mixe<|

with

fire
68.

stor^t u^ui^^u
is,

Of the elements one often interpenetrated by others.

according to the objector,
:

The objection is explained as follows The earth is often interpenetrated by
consequently found to possess savour
(taste),

water,

fire

and

air

and

is

colour and tangibility besides
etc.

odour

(smell).

Similar

is

the case with water

69.

It is,

we

reply, not so because there is visual per-

ception of the earthy and the watery.

The Naiyayikas meet the foregoing
qualities,

objections

by saying that the
fire

earth really possesses four

water three,

two,

air

one,

and ether

one.

Had

the earth possessed only odour (smell) and the

would have been impossible for us We are competent to see only to see the earthy and watery things. those things which possess colour, and if the earth and water had not possessed colour how could we have seen them ? Since we can
water only savour
(taste)

then

it

and the watery it follows that they possess colour. If you say that the earth and water are visible because they are mixed with the fiery things which possess colour, why then the air and v ether are also not visible? There is no rule that it is only the earth and water that can be mixed with fiery things but that the air and ether cannot be
see the earthy

so mixed.

Proceeding in this way we find that the earth

etc.

do not

each possess only one quality.

70.

Owing
is

to the

element, a sense

predominance of one quality in an characterised by the quality which prein

dominates in Us corresponding element. The nose is characterised by odour (smell) which predominates
its

corresponding element the earth; the tongue
its

is

characterised

by

savour (ta^jhwhich predominates in
the eyejs characterised

corresponding element the water;
its

by colour which predominates in
the skin (touch)
is

correspondtangibility

ing el^lnt the

fire

;

characterised
a,ix

by

^hicli libides in.;0§

corresponding element the

while ;$he ear

^

THE NY&Y&SUTBAS;
characterised by sound which is the special quality of
its

S|
corresponding

element the ether.

71.

A

sense as distinguished from
its fineness.

its

corresponding
the

element

is

determined by
(e. g.,

A sense
earth) is able

the nose) which is the fine part of an element
(e.g.,

(e. g- t

to

perceive a special object

odour)

owing

to the

act-force (sansk&ra,

fecmna) of the person possessing the sense.

A

sense

cannot perceive more than one object because it possesses the predominant quality of an element, e. g., the nose possesses only odour which is
the predominant quality of the earth, the tongue the savour of water, the

eye the colour of

fire,

and so

on.

72.

A

sense

is

really called as

such when

it

is

at-

tended by its quality. Some may say why a senso (the nose for instance) cannot perceive The reply is that a sense consists of an element its own quality (odour). with its quality. It is only when a sense is attended by the quality endowed
that
it

can see an object.

Now

in perceiving

an object the sense
quality
it is

is

attended by
tended.

the quality but in perceiving its

own
its

not so at-

Consequently a sense cannot perceive

own

quality.

73.

Moreover an object

is

never perceived by

itself.

An eye can see an external object but it cannot see same principle a sense cannot perceive its own quality.

itself.

On

the

74.

It

is,

some

say,

not so because the quality of

sound

is

perceived by the ear.
objection stands thus

The

:—
cannot perceive
is its

It is not true that a sense

its

own

quality.

The

ear,

for instance, can perceive sound which

own

quality.

75.

The perception

of

sound furnishes a contrast to

thats of other qualities and their corresponding substrata.

:

The

nose,

tongue, eye and skin can respectively smell earth, taste

wj^er, see colour and

touch air only

Own

qualities, viz,
it

odour (smell), savour
hears

But an ear when
the ear
inference

when they are attended by their (taste), colour and tangibility. sound is not attended by any quality. In fact
itself.

is identical

with the ether and hears sound by

By indirect

we can prove

that sound is the special quality of the ether

Odour

is

the predominant quality of the earth, savour of water, colour of
:

the eye, and tangibility of the skin (totich) quality of the remaining element,
viz.,

Sound must

therefore be the

the ether.

Book

III,

Chapter

II.

WUuwiwiiidL
76.

mm

n \

i

*

i

%

ii

Since the intellect resembles both action and
is

ether there
nent.

doubt as

to

whether

it is

transitory or perma-

1.
intellect bears

Inasmuch as the
tory like an action or

likeness

to

both action and ether
it is

in respect of intangibility, there arises the question whether

transi-

permanent

like the ether.

We

find in

the intellect

the function of origination and decay which marks transitory things as "I well as the function of recognition which marks permanent things.

knew

the tree," "

I

know

it

"

and "
" I

I shall

know

it

"

— these

are expresindicate our

sions which involving the ideas of origination

and decay

knowledge
it

to

be transitory.

who knew

the tree yesterday

am knowing

again

to-day "

this

is

continuity indicates our knowledge

an expression which involving the idea of to be permanent. Hence there is

doubt as

to

whether the

intellect

which exhibits both kinds

of

knowledge

is really transitory or

permanent.

77.

Some say

that the intellect

is

there

is

recognition of objects.

permanent because

2.

The Samkhyas maintain
before
is

the permanency of the intellect on the ground

of its capacity for the recognition of objects.

A

thing which was
is

known

known again now
only
if
is, if

this sort

of

knowledge

called recognition.

knowledge which existed in the past continues also knowledge is persistent or permanent. Recognition would have been impossible if knowledge had been transitory. Hence
It is possible

at the present, that

the

Samkhyas conclude

that the intellect

which recognises objects

is

permanent-

smutw^i^:
78.

II

\

H

I

\

II

The foregoing reason
it

is not,

we

say,

valid inas-

much
...-

as

requires proof like the very subject in dispute.—3.

Whether the intellect is permanent or not this is the subject The Samkhyas affirm that it is permanent and the reason adduced by them is that it can recognise objects. The Naiyayikas dispute
in dispute.

not only the conclusion of the Samkhyas but

also,

their reason.

They

#
so.

book
Knowledge cannot be
but
If
it

tit

oamiR; &
it is

say that the intellect does not recognise objects but
attributed to an
to

the soul that does

unconscious instrument, the

intellect,

must be admitted
is

be a quality of a conscious agent,
its

the soul.

knowledge
is

not a quality of the soul, what else can be

quality?

How

the soul to

be defined?
viz.,

There

is

therefore no proof as

to the validity of the reason,

that the intellect recognises objects.

Jf

3WW<t
is
it

II

^

I

* 19-11
of

79.
intellect

Knowledge

neither a

mode

the permanent

nor identical with

because various sorts of know-

ledge do not occur simultaneously.
The Samkhyas
intellect
is

4.

affirm that
it

knowledge

is

a mode of the permanent
to

from which

is

not different.

Knowledge, according

them,

nothing but the permanent intellect modified in the shape of an object
is reflected

which

on
if

it

through the senses.
as a

The Naiyayikas oppose
permanent

this

view by saying that
not different from
it,

knowledge

mode
oi"

of the

intellect is

then we must admit various sorts of knowledge to be
fact various sorts

permanent.
that
is,

But as a
is

knowledge are not permanent,

we

cannot receive various sorts of knowledge simultaneously.
not identical with the permanent intellect.

Hence knowledge

80.

And in

the cessation of recognition there arises

5. the contingency of cessation of the intellect. If knowledge as a mode of the intellect is not different from

it,

then

the cessation of

recognition

which

is

a kind of knowledge should

be

followed by the cessation of the intellect.
of the

Samkhyas

that the intellect

is

This will upset the conclusion permanent. Hence knowledge is not

identical with the intellect.

*fllfo4l*g<|il4ihltyll. U
81.

\ *
I

"I

<

II

The reception

of different

sorts

of

non-simultaneoSis owing,

according to us, to

knowledge is our mind com-

ing in contact with different senses in succession.
The NaiySyikas say
intellect

6.

that

if

knowledge as a mode
it,

of the

permanent

variety of
iforta

had been knowledge nor origination and cessation of it. The different of knowledge da not occur simultaneously because they are produced,

identical with

then there would have been neither a

the NY^t^tmi&a
according to the Naiy&yikas, by the mind which
is

&r
atomic in dimension

coming in contact with the senses in due succession.

STSRsrfJrfJH^
82.

faw^3TTO$fT^
(or
is

II

\

I

R
of

I

VS.

II

The
7.

recognition

knowledge)

cannot take place when the mind
object.
the eye
different

an object drawn away by another
the


is

We

cannot hear a sound by our ear

when

mind conjoined with
that
is

drawn away by a colour. This shows from the intellect, and that the mind which

knowledge

is

atomic in dimen-

sion serves as an instrument for the production of knowledge.

* *k<mMI<l
83.

II

\

I

*

I

c;

II

cannot be conjoined with the senses 8. in succession because there is no motion in it.

The

intellect

The mind which, according to the Naiy&yikas, is atomic in dimension can move from one sense-organ to another in succession to produce
different

kinds of knowledge.

This

is

impossible
is

intellect which,

according to the Samkhyas,

in the case of the not only permanent but

also all-pervading

possess the tendency
succession.

and as such cannot change its place, that is, does not to be conjoined with the different sense-organs in
is

In fact there

other two so-called

internal senses

only one internal sense called the mind, the intellect (Buddhi) and self-conceit

(AhaipkSra)
is

— being superfluous.

It is not

all-pervading,
visual,

and knowledge

not

its

different kinds

mode. Knowledge classified as which belong to the soul.

olfactory etc. is of

Wift+M^n^H^TW-^^lRmR:
84.

II

9
to

I

R

I

i

II

A conceit

of difference

is

said

arise in

the

intellect in the

same way

a

crystal.

9.

as the appearance of difference in *

As a

single crystal appears to assume the different colours of different
it,

objects which are reflected on

so the intellect though one appears, according to the SSmkhya, to be modified into different sorts of knowledge
different objects reflected
i

under the influence of

on

it

through the senses.
||

"sr
It
is,

V^N
we

dl

II

^

I

*

I

*o

85.

reply,

not

so because

there

is

nq

£.-10,

8a

boWsij,
The Sarnkhya

mmm^m
The
various

says that the -variety of knowledge arises from tfif

same

intellect

appearing to be modified by the various objects whiebafij

reflected

on

it

through the senses.
is,

modes which the

intelieot

undergoes, that
apparent.

the various kinds of knowledge are not real but only
is

The NaiyAyikas dispose of this view by saying that there
is,

no proof as to the unreality of the modes, that
knowledge inasmuch as
they are found
•order in consequence of the contact of senses
versa.

the various kinds of

to originate

and cease

in

due
pica?

and

their objects

and

86.
tal

It is said to

be absurd even in the case of a crys-

being replaced by newer and newer ones which grow
to all individuals

up owing

being momentary
seems
to

11.

The Sarnkhya says

that as a crystal
it,

be modified by the

colours which are reflected on

so the intellect seems to be modified
it

by

the objects which are reflected on
is,

through the senses.

In reality there

according to the Sarnkhya, neither any modification of the crystal
intellect.

nor that of the

This theory has in the preceding aphorism
arid
is

,been. controverted

by the Naiyayikas

in the present

aphorism
including

opposed by the Buddhists.

According tothe

latter all things,

even our body, are momentary.

A

thing which exists at the present
at.

moment grows up
is

into another thing
of

the next

no wonder that in the course

moments

there should

moment so that there grow up crystals
Hence the conclusion
is,

ol different colours or intellects of different modes. of the

Samkhyas

that a crystal

remains unaltered

according to the

Buddhists, untenable.

87.

Owing to

the absence of any absolute rule

we

shall give our assent according to the nature of each occur-

rence

— 12^

It is not true

that in every case

there are at each
increase

growths.

Our body no doubt undergoes

moment hewer and decrease buill
xulr

piece of stone or a crystal does not, so that the doctrine of growth applies to the first case but not to the second. Hence there is no general
;ljhAt

a thing at the lapse 6f a
its place.

moment should be

replaced

by

which fflpwa-ui^B

THE NYAYA-StTTRAS:

88.

cause of
is

no absence of link as we perceive the growth and decay— 13.
There
is of a thing is the increase of
its

The growth
before
it

parts

while the decay

An ant-hill gradually increases in dimension growth while a pot decreases in dimension before We never find an instance in which a thing* it reaches its final decay. any connecting link for another thing which decays without leaving grows in its placo. There is in fact no linkless growth or linkless decay.
the decrease of them.
attains its full

tJUPmRT *IW^Mdf5v|cKi^jfiJqM
fl^MMfrT:
89.
II

*

I

R

I

\*

II

The growth
is

of

newer

crystals in the place of

an

comparable, according to some, to the growth of curd in the place of milk the cause of whose decay is not 14. perceived
old one

The Buddhist

says that there are

things which

grow and decay

without the gradual increase and decrease of their parts. Of such things we do not find the cause of the first growth (origination) and the last

decay (cessation), that is, there is no link between the thing which ceases and another thing which grows in its place. The milk, for instance, ceases without leaving any connecting link for the curd which grows in
its place.

Similarly

new

crystals

grow

to take

the place of an old one

which decays without leaving any mark. The ciystal which exists at the present moment is not the same one that existed at the previous moment. There is no connection whatsoever between thera.

fa^ J) ii^^iiprr gq^>^ :
90.

n

\

i

*

i

*

n u
final

There
it is

decay as

no non-perception of the cause of cognisable by its mark 15.
is

say that it is not true that we do not perceive the milk which is the cause of the first growth of the curd. final decay of the The .mark etteuding the final decay of milk (that is, the disappearance of sweet flavour) is the cause of the destruction of the milk, and that attend^ag^the first growth of curd (that is, the appearance of acid flavour) So through the mark we really perceive is the cause of its production.

The Naiyayikas

88

BO0K

III,

CHAPl'lft

m
Bat there
is

the cause of decay of milk and

growth, of card.

no

s^ioh

mark

perceptible in the case of a crystal which at the lapse of a

moment

is said to

be replaced by another crystal of a different character.

91.
"but

There

is, it is

alleged,

no destruction of the milk
16.
not destroy-

only a change of

its

quality

The Samkhya says

that the milk as a substance is

ed to produce another substance called curd. In reality a qualityof the milk, viz., sweet flavour, is changed into another quality, via., acid
flavour.

92.

Seeing that a thing grows from another thing
infer that the latter thing is

whose parts are disjoined, we
destroyed

17.

Seeing that a thing grows after the component parts of another
thing have been disjoined,
destroyed.

we

infer that the latter thing has really

been

The

curd, for instance, is not produced until the
destroyed.

component

parts of the milk have been

This shows that the growth of

curd follows the decay of milk.

93.

There will be an uncertainty of conclusion on the
is

assumption that the cause of destruction

perceived in

some cases and not perceived
you perceive ^he cause
jar,

in others

18,

In the case of a jar being produced out of a piece of clay you say

and production of the but in the case of the curd growing out of milk you say that you do
of destruction of the clay
'.

not perceive the cause of destruction of the milk and production of the curd.

This sort of perception in certain cases and non-perception in. others will
lead to an uncertainty of conclusion.

As a

fact in every

case there is/

perception of the ..cause of destruction.

Milk, for instance, is

whew

there

i^^-QO%tacV of $n ac *d substance,

94.

Knowledge belongs neither
it

to the sense nor to

the object because
thereof.
If

continues even on the destruction

19.

knowledge had been a quality of the sense, it could not continue after the sense has been destroyed. But knowledge in the form of memory Hence the is found actually to abide even after the sense has perished.
sense is not the abode of knowledge.
Similarly
it

may be proved
,

that

knowledge does not abide in the

object.

95.

It
is

does not also belong to the

mind the

existence

of

which

inferred from the knowables not being perceived

simultaneously. —20.
As two or more things cannot be known (perceived) simultaneously, to be concluded that the mind which is an instrument of our knowis

it

is

If we supposed this mind to be the abode we could not call it an instrument in the acquisition of the of knowledge same ; and knowledge as a quality of an atom would in that case become imperceptible. An atomic mind as the abode of our knowledge would stand moreover in the way of a yogi perceiving many things simul-

ledge

atomic in dimension.

taneously through

many sensuous

bodies formed by his magical power.

Even if knowledge were a quality of the soul it would, says some one, give rise to similar absurdities. 21.
96.

which is all-pervading .were the abode of knowledge, there would be the simultaneous perceptions of many things in virtue of different sense-organs coming in contact with
If

The

objection stands thus:

the soul

the Boxd simultaneously.

But two or more things are never perceived
bouI.

simultaneously
that
is,

:

the soul cannot therefore be the abode of knowledge)

knowledge cannot be a quality of the

There is, we reply, non-production of simultane* ;otts cognitions on account of the absence of contact of the mind with many sense-organs at a time.—-2^
97.

M

sooit iii,
The Naiyayikas say

chams&

m
an object unless
is

that the soul cannot perceive

the latter comes in contact with a sense which

conjoined with the

mind. Though many objects can come in proximity with their corresponding senses simultaneously, the mind which is atomic in dimension can come in conjunction with only one sense at a time. Hence two or

more things are not perceived simultaneously although the perceives them is all-pervading.

soul which

98.
is

This

is

held by some to be untenable as there
of

no ground for the production
The
objection stands thus
is
:

knowledge.

— 23.

It

has been argued by the NaiySyikas

that there

absence of production of simultaneous cognitions on account

An opponent takes of the lack of contact of the senses with the mind. " production " and says that knowledge cannot be exception to the word
said to be
eternal.

produced

if

it

is

regarded as a quality of the soul which

is

fiRT^rcwrgq^^^R
99.
If

aftrerersrsrf : ii^irsii

knowledge

is

supposed to abide in the soul

there

is

the contingency of its being eternal as there is

perceived no cause of its destruction. 24. Knowledge can never be destroyed if it is supposed A quality may be destroyed in two ways (1) of the soul.

to

be a quality

either

by the
as the

destruction of its abode, (2) or by the production of an opposite quality in
its

place.

In the case of knowledge neither of these

is possible

soul, which is its
its-

abode
it

is

eternal

and as we
if

place.

Hence

follows that
is

no opposite quality taking kuowledge is a quality of the soul it is
find
it is

eternal.

But as knowledge

not eternal

not a quality of the soul.

100.
is,

Cognitions being found

to

be non-eternal there

we

reply,
1

destruction of one cognition

by another

like

that*of a sound.

25.

We

realize

that cognition

(knowledge)

is

not eternal

when we

time there arises in us a certain kind of cognition observe (knowledge) and at the next time that cognition (knowledge) vanishes

that at one

giving rise to another kind of cognition (knowledge).

It

has been asked

how

cognitions undergo destruction.
it is

Our reply

is

that one cognition
is

vanishes as soon as

replaced by another cognition which

opposed

THE NYlYA-SratAS.
to
it

W

just as a sound-wave is destroyed

by another sound-wave which takes

its place.

101.

Since recollection (memory)

is

produced, accord-

ing to some, by the conjunction of the mind with a certain
part of the soul in which knowledge (impression) inheres, there is no simultaneous production of many recollections.

—26.
knowledge be a quality of the soul there is the possibility of many recollections being produced simultaneously inasmuch as the many
If

impressions deposited in our soul by our past perceptions are liable at once to be revived and developed into recollections by the mind whose contact

with the soul always remains constant.
possibility

Some

say that there

is

no such

of simultaneousness because recollections are produced accord-*

ing to them, by the mind coming in contact
soul in which particular impressions inhere.

with particular parts of the

As

the

mind cannot come

in

contact with all parts of the soul simultaneously, the

many

impressions

deposited in different parts of the soul are not revived and developed into
recollections at once.

JTT^T:
102.

*fa#ren?*TTO: II^UIV®
is,

II

This

the body that
It

we reply, not so because the mind has its function. 27.

it is

within

has been said in the preceding aphorism that recollections are produced by the mind coming in due order in conjunction with particular
parts of the soul in which impressions inhere. This is, according to the Naiyayikas, untenable because the mind cannot come in conjunction with

the soul except in the body, and

if

the conjunction takes place in the body

then there remains the possibility of simultaneous recollections.

*n^l«^J: \\\W\*
103.
to

II

This

is,

some

say,

no reason because

it

requires

be proved.

—28.
admit that the conjunc-

soul only within the limit of the body.

The, Naiyayikas say that the mind comes in conjunction with the Some oppose this by saying that

until they receive sufficient proof they cannot

tion takes place only in the body.

104.

It

is,

we

reply, not unreasonable because a per-

son

is

found to sustain his body even while he performs an

act of recollection.
If

29.

we suppose

that a recollection is produced

by the mind coming in

conjunction with a particular part of the soul outside the body,

we cannot

account for the body being sustained during the time
tion
is

when

the recollec-

performed.

an

effort

which

is

The body in order that it may be sustained requires supplied by the mind coming in conjunction with the
is

eoul.

Now

the effort which arises from the conjunction
for sustaining,
will

of two kinds,

viz., (1)

the effort

and

(2)

that for impelling (setting in
first

motion).

The body
to

be devoid of the
it

kind of

effort if

we suppose

the

mind

wander away from

for

conjunction with the soul.

105.

This

is,

some

say,

not so because the mind

moves

swiftly.

30.

Some meet the objection raised in the preceding aphorism by saying that the mind while producing a recollection by its conjunction with the. soul outside the body can, on account of its swift motion, come back at
once to the body to produce the
effort

required for the sustenance of the

same.
?r

wTOHifawidi
is,

ii

\w\\

i)

106.

It

we

reply, not so because there is

no fixed

rule as to the duration of recollection.
on the ground that the mind,
the
if it is to

— 31.
sufficient

The NaiyAyikas oppose the view expressed in the foregoing aphorism
body,
it

bo that

may may

be conjoined with the soul outside take a pretty long time to produce a recollection there,
not

come buck

to the

body with
it.

quickness to

produce the

effort

required for the sustenance of

no peculiar conjunction of the soul with the mind either in virtue of the former sending the latter in search of what it wishes to recollect or through the latter being cognizant of what is to be recollected of
107.
is

There

through larb^r&aness. —32.

suppose the soul to send the mind to recollect a particular thing we encounter the absurdity of admitting that the soul already
II
yrfc

possesses the

memory
shall

of what
to

it is

going

to

recollect.

If

on

the other

hand we suppose the mind
recollection,
;

wo

reality

it

is

not so.

own accord for a particular have to assume that the miud is the knower but in Wo cannot even hold that the mind comes in
of its

move out

conjunction with the soul arbitrarily for in that case there will remain

no order then as

to the occurrence of the objects of recollection.

108.

This

is,

some

say, parallel

to

the particular

conjunction which occurs in a
hurts his foot.
If a

man who

while rapt in

mind

— 33.
mind comes
instantly in conjunction

man

while looking eagerly at dancing hurts his foot with a

thorn, he feels pain because his

with his soul at the foot which has been hurt. Similarly the peculiar conjunction referred to in the foregoing aphorism takes place, according to some, through the mind being cognizant of what is to be recollected.

109.

Recollections are not

simultaneous owing to
opera-

the non-simultaneousness of the efforts of attention,
tions of stimuli etc.— -34.

A recollection
the soul in which

is

produced by the mind coming

in

conjunction with
of recollection

impressions inhere.

The production

"also presupposes efforts of attention, operations of stimuli etc.

As

these

do not occur simultaneously there

is

no simultancousness of

recollections.

110.

[It

is

not true

that] there

is

possibility

of

simultaneousness in the case of recollections

which are

independent of the
case of

efforts

of

attention etc., just as in the

cognitions

derived

from impressions of equal

vividness not dependent on stimuli. 35. z* way Some say that recollections which are not dependent on the
of attentiop etc.,


is

efforts

may be simultaneous
But
this

like

several

cognitions or acts of

knowledge that are produced from impressions
the aid of external stimuli. view

of equal vividness without untenable because neither

$be recollections nor the several acts of knowledge are simultaneous.

The

U
acts of
'

BOOK

ni,

CHAPTER

IT.

knowledge though derived from impressions of equal vividness, will appear in succession according to the amount of attention paid to them, and the recollections though not dependent on the efforts of
attention will appear one after another in proportion to the strength of

stimuli that revive them.

111.

Desire and aversion
r

belong to the soul inasits

much

as they are

the causes of

doing an act or forquality of the soul (Purusa)

bearing from doing the same. 36. The Ssiihkhyas say that knowledge is a
while
desire,

aversion,

volition,

pleasure aud pain are the qualities of

the internal sense (the mind).

This

is,

according to the Naiy&yikas,
it

unreasonable because a person does an act or forbears from doing

on

account of a certain desire for or aversion againBt the same. The desire

and aversion again are caused by the knowledge of pleasure and pain Hence it is established that knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain have all of them a single abode, that is,
respectively.

they are the qualities of a single substance called the soul.

112.

It cannot,

^aversion belong to

some say, be denied that desire and the body inasmuch as they are indicated
activity.

by

activity

and forbearance from
activity

37.

and forbearance from activity are The C&rvakas say that the marks respectively of desire and aversion which again are the effects Now the body which is made of earth etc., is the abode of knowledge.
(field;

of activity

and forbearance from
desire, aversion etc.

activity.

Hence

it is

also

the

abode of knowledge,

113.

This
38.

is,

we

reply, unreasonable because activity

and forbearance from
the like.

activity

are found

in the

axes and

Just as an axe, which
other times not to split
aversion, so the
it,

is

found sometimes to split a tree and at
of knowledge, desire of earth etc., is

is

not a receptacle
is

body which

made

and not an abode of

knowledge
in
it.

etc.,

though we may

find activity

and forbearance from activity

unreasonable also on account of the non"perception of knowledge in pots and the like. 39.
114r.

It is

In a pot there
different earthy parts

is

activity

indicated

by the conglomeration
is

of

while in sands there

forbearance from activity

indicated by the disruption of the parts from one another.

Yet there
.

is
is

no knowledge, desire or aversion

in a pot or

sand.

Hence the body

not the seat of knowledge, desire or aversion*

115.

The

regularity

and irregularity of possession

demarcate the soul and matter.

40.

A
activity

material thing

when

it

by nature inactive but becomes endowed with is moved by a conscious agent. There is no such irreguis

larity or uncertainty as to the possession

of

activity

etc.,

by

the soul.

Knowledge,

desire,

aversion, etc., abide in the soul through

ah intimate

connection, while these belong to matter through a mediate connection.
etc., if we assume atoms a conglomeration of which forms the body. Those who suppose the body to be the seat of knowledge cannot admit the efficacy of deserts and can offer no consolation to sufferers.

We

cannot account ior the function of recognition
to abide in the material

knowledge

not the seat of knowledge on account of reasons already given, on account of its being
116.
is

The mind

subject to an agent and owing to

its

incapacity to reap

the fruits of another's deeds. 41. The mind cannot be the seat of knowledge because it has already been shown in aphorism 1.1.10 that desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the marks of the soul. Had the mind been the abode of knowledge it could have come in contact with the objects of sense independent of
any agent. Since it cannot do so it is to be admitted to be a material thing Serving the purpose of an instrument in the acquisition of knowledge. If you say that the mind itself is the agent you will have to admit that it is not an atom but possessed of magnitude like the soul so that it can apprehend knowledge etc-,, which are its qualities. In order to avoid the
fftmultaneousness of

be necessary to assume an internal sense of an atomic dimension like the mind as we understand it. These assumptions will lead you to accept in some shape
perceptions
it

many

will further

9t

book in>

cHAftmm

the tenets of the Naiyayikas. On the supposl^bn of the mind (or body) being the seat of knowledge and consequently of merits and demerits! it will be possibe for work done by a person not to produce its effects on him after death and it may even necessitate a person to suffer for work* ttot done by him. Hence the mind is not the seat of. knowledge, desire,
aversion, volition, pleasure

and pain.

117.
qualities of

Knowledge etc., must be admitted to be the soul by the principle of exclusion and on

account of arguments already adduced.Knowledge
stance
is
is

—42.
That subit

a quality which inheres in a substance.
It

neither the body nor the sense nor the mind.

must therefore
is

be the

soul.

The body cannot be
is

the abode of knowledge because

a

material substance like a pot, cloth etc.

Knowledge cannot belong

to the

sense as the latter

an instrument like an axe.

Had

the sense been the

abode of knowledge there could not be any recollection of things which were experienced by the sense before it was destroyed. If knowledge quality of the mind many perceptions could be simultaneous. were a

But
but

this
it is

is

impossible.

the soul which

is

Hence the abode of knowledge is not the mind, permanent so that it can perceive a thing now
in the past.

as well as

remember one perceived

118.

Memory belongs

to the

the character of a knower.

soul which possesses

43.
it

.The soul is competent to recollect a thing because knowledge of the past, present and future.

possesses the

119.
tion,"

Memory

is

awakened by such causes as attensigns,

context, exercise,
of

marks, likeness, possession,'

relation

refuge and

refugee,

immediate subsequency,

employment, opposition, excess, receipt intervention^ pleasure and pain, desire and aversion,, fear, >entrea^ja^€^ ^flection and merit and .demerit.-—44.
jkeparation, similar

;

THI^H¥^M©1BA&

I&
it

A.Uention—en&b\ea,«f/4o' fix the mind on one object by checking from wandering away to any other object.

Context—-iB the connection of subjects such as proof, that which is to be proved etc.
Exereise-^is the constant repetition which con-firms an impression.

Sign—may be
ted, or (4)

(1)

connected, (2) inseparable (intimate), (3) correlaopposite e. g. smoke is a sign of fire with which it is
t

connected

;

horn

is

a sign of a

cow from which

it is

inseparable
;

an arm
tion.

is

non-existent

a sign of a leg with which it is correlated and the is a sign of the existent by the relation of opposi-

Mark

—a mark on the body of a horse awakens
which
it

the

memory

of

the

stable in

was kept.

Likeneaa -r-as the image of Devadatta drawn on a board reminds us
of the real person. Possession

— such

as a property awakens the

memory

of the

owner

and

vice versa.

Refuge and refugee
in a

—such as a king and
—as
wife.

his attendants.
rice

Immediate subsequency
Separation

sprinkling the

and pounding

it

wooden mortar.

—as of husband and

Similar employment--as of fellow-disciples.
Opposition

—as between a snake and ichneumon.
been or

—awakening the memory of that which exceeded. Receipt — reminding us of one from whom something has
Excess
will

be received.

Intervention

—such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.
pain— reminding
us of that which caused them.

Pleasure dnd

Desire and aversion
Wear-

—reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.
it, e. g.,

—reminding us of that which caused Entreaty-—reminding us of that which
for.

death.

was

wanted

or

prayed

Action

—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer.
—as recollecting a son or wife.
is
life,
.

Affection

Merit and demerit— through which there

recollection pi the

pauses of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous

120.

Knowledge perishes

instantly because all actional

are found to be transitory,

—45.
like

Does knowledge perish instantly
liko a pot ?

a sound or does

it

continue
its

Knowledge perishes

as soon as

it is

produced in virtue of

being an action.

In analysing an action; such as the falling of an arrow,
arrow undergoes a series of movements in the course of
Similarly in examining an act of knowledge

we
its

find that the

falling

on the ground.

we

find that a series of steps are

production.

undergone by the act in the course of its These steps perish one after another in due succession.
that
say,

Hence'

it

is

clear

knowledge
"
I

is

transitory.

If

knowledge were

permanent we could

am preceiving
Since
is

a pot" even after the pot has

been removed from our sight.

we cannot use such an expression

we must admit

that

knowledge

not permanent but transitory.

knowledge were permanent it would always be perceptible so that there would be no recollection. 46.
121.
If

If there is

knowledge

it is

perceptible and as long as there is percep-

tion there is

no

recollection.

Hence on
total

the supposition of knowledge

being permanent there would be a

absence of recollection.

122.

An

opponent

fears that

if

knowledge

were

transitory
is

no object could be known

distinctly just as there
flash, of

no distinct

lightning.

apprehension of colour during a

47.
:

The
it

fear of the opponent arises thus

If

knowledge were transitory

could not at a

not apprehend the infinite
object'

moment apprehend an object in its entirety, that is, could number of its properties at once. Hence the could oWy be known indistinctly. Asa fact, however, we can
Hence knowledge
is

know

things distinctly..

not transitory.

'

123.

From

the

ieply, to admit J,hat

argument advanced you have, wewhich you went to disprove.— 48,

In the previous aphorism the opponent feared that if knowledge were transitory no object could be apprehended distinctly. The Naiyayika removes the fear by saying that objects are apprehended indistinctly not

knowledge but on account of our apprehend* ing only their, general qualities. The knowledge which takes cognizance of objects as possessed of both the general and special qualities is distinct

owing to the

transitoriness of

but that which concerns

itself

only with the general qualities
:

is

indistinct,

The very illustraThe aphorism may be explained in another way tion cited by you, viz., that there is indistinct apprehension during a
flash of lightning leads

you

to

admit the transitoriness of knowledge which

you went

to disprove.

124.

Although

knowledge
it

is

transitory
is
.

there

is

distinct apprehension through

as there

one through the

series of

momentary rays

of a lamp.

— 49.

Though
is

the series of rays emitted
is distinct.

by a lamp are transitory the

apprehension through them

Similarly though our knowledge

transitory there is no obstncle to our apprehension being distinct.

125.
ties

From our
to

perceiving in a substance the quali-

of itself as well as of others there arises, says

an oppo-

:_

nent, a doubt as

our body
aa well as

is

whether the knowledge perceived in a quality of its own. 50.

In water

we perceive warmth which

liquidity which is one of its
is

natural qualities
therefore

an adventitious one.

One may

ask as to whether the knowledge perceived in our body is a natural quality of the latter or is a mere adventitious one.

!l|N^i4|inf4lj(Ml4hn<II^RI^tll
126.

[Knowledge

is

not a natural quality of the body,
etc.

because

it

furnishes a contrast to] colour

which as

natural qualities of the body do exist as long as the latter
'continues.

51.
is

Knowledge, according to the Naiyayika,
tie body because
it

not a natural quality of

may

not continue quite as long as the body does,
etc.

BtttTsuch ia not the case with colour

which ae natural qualities of

.

W
127.
qualities
It

book m, cm&M^u.
it.

the body do always exist with
tious quality of the body.

Hence knowledge

is

merely an adventi-

It

is,

says an opponent, not so

because other

produced by maturation do arise.-— 52;
its

has been stated that a substance and

natural qualities co*exisfc

with each other and that knowledge not being always co-existent w'rth the

body

is

not a natural quality of the

latter.

An opponent
qualities

in order to main-

tain that a substance

and

its

natural

are

not

necessarily
is

coexistent cites the instance of a jar whose natural colour

blue but

which assumes a red colour through maturation in

fire.

128.

This
if

is,

we
is

reply,

no opposition because matura-

tion occurs

A
is

jar

production of opposite qualities. —53. which was blue may through maturation become red but it
there
is its

never totally deprived of colour which
totally devoid of
it.

natural quality.*
is

But a
is

body (dead) may be
natural quality of

knowledge which

therefore not a

In the case of maturation moreover a quality

replaced by an opposite one with

which

it

cannot co-abide

e. g.,

the

blueness of a jar

may

through maturation assume redness but cannot*coIn the case of the

abide with the same.

replaced by an opposite quality.
of the body-

body however knowledge is not Hence knowledge is not a natural quality

4l4U«qiP)MI4 IWtlWII
129.

[Knowledge, says an opponent,
it
tries
it

is

a natural

quality] because

pervades the whole body.—54.
to

The opponent
body because the numerous parts
of the

prove that knowledge

is

a natural quality'
.

pervades, according to him, the whole body and
it.

of

But

this,

according to the Naiylyika,

is

un-

reasonable as
that
is,

it

leads to the assumption of numerous seats of knowledge,

souls in thj

body destructive of

all

order and system as to the

feeling of pleasure, pain etc.

130.

as

it is

[Knowledge does not pervade the whole body] not found in the nair> nails etc— 55,

— —

-

in

Knowledge does not pervade the whole body, e. &, it is not found the hair, nails etc. It cannot therefore be a natural quality of the
This aphorism
It is

body.

be explained as follows:— not true that a substance should be entirely pervaded by
also

may

its

natural

qualities.

Colour, for instance,
etc.

is

a natural quality of the body

but

it

does not pervade the hair, nails

131.

The body being bounded by touch
says an

(cuticle)

there

is,

opponent, no possibility of knowledge

abiding in the hair, nails etc. 56. The hair, nails etc. are not, according
body as they are not bounded by touch
quently abide in them.

to the

opponent, parts of the

(cuticle).

Knowledge Cannot conse:

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows The body being bounded by touch (cuticle) there
colour abiding in the hair, nails etc.

is

no possibility of

132.

Knowledge, we

reply, is not a quality of the

body because
of the same.

of its difference

from the well known

qualities

— 57.
:

The Naiyayika says The qualities of the body
cognised by them,
of the
e.g.,

are of two kinds, viz

:

(1)

those which are

cognised by the external senses,
gravity.
it

categories as

is

e.g., colour, and (2) those which are not Knowledge does not come under either uncognizable by the external senses and is at

the same time cognizable on account of our being aware of the same.

The aphorism may also be explained as follows: — The qualities of the body are cognized by the external
is

knowledge

not so cognized.

senses but Consequently knowledge cannot be a
.

quality of the body.

133.

This

is,

says the opponent, not so because of

the mutual difference in character of the colour, etc.-— 58'. The opponent argues':
'

If

differ*

you say that knowledge is not a quality of the body because it in character from other well known qualities. of the same, I should
'

:'say that the well

k$own

qualites themselves differ

from each other,
is not.

e.g.,

the colour

is

cognized by the eye bat the touch
is

You cannot on
is not.

•this ground say that colour

a quality of the

body but touch

134.

There

is,

we

reply no objection to colour, etc.,

being qualities of the body because these are cognized by
the senses.— 59.

The
are all

colour,

etc.,

may

differ

from touch

etc. in

respect of certain
viz.,

aspects of their character but they

all

agree in one respect,

that they

cognizable by one or another of the external senses.

But know-

ledge

is

not so cognized and cannot therefore be a quality of the body.

?THT#N*JT^ IR:
135.

II

^

I

R

I

<o

||

The mind

is

one on account of the non-simul-

taneousness of Cognitions.
If there

60.
cognitions could be produced simulat once the

were more minds than one, they could come in contact with

many

senses at a time so that

many

taneously.

As many cognitions are never produced
to

mind

must be admitted

be one.
:

* -gwft*BMhM«i«fr
136.
It is,

m
certain

i

*

i

U

n

says an opponent, not so because

we do

cognize The

many

acts simultaneously.

— 61.
teacher while

objection stands thus:-

-A

walking on

a road holds a waterpot in his hand.
fear, looks at the read, recites

Hearing wild sounds he, out of
this instance
etc.,

a sacred text and thinks of the nearest place
to

of safety.

The

teacher

is

supposed in

perform visual
This

perception,

auditory perception, recollection,
if

simultaneously.

would be impossible

there were only one mind.

/WIMiM^TliM^Mil^WFa^
137.
reply,

II

1

I

*

I

**
is,

II tfoe
~

The

appearance of simultaneousness

due to* the mind coming in contact with different senses in rapid succession like the appearance of a circle of
firebrand.— 62.
nuous
circle,
*

Just as a firebrand while whirling quickly appears to form a conti-

mind moving from one sense to another in rapid: succession appearato come in contact with them simultaneously. Hence 7
so the

THE tt^A^tfTtiAS.
in reality

*<&

the cognitions produced by the contact appear to be simultaneous though

they are successive.

138.
is

And on account of the

aforesaid reasons the
could

mind

an atom.
If the

— 63.
of

mind were possessed

magnitude

it

come

in contact

with

many

senses at a time so that

many

cognitions could take place

simultaneously.
is

Since this has been found to be impossible the

mind

an atom.

St$*d4i<dl«4«l«*TTl£<MlTl: H
139.

^

I

^

I

The body

is

produced as the

fruit of

our previous

deeds

(deserts).

— 64.
of elements

Our present body has been made up
fruits of merit

endowed with the

and demerit

of our previous lives.

^jteft
140.

q^mjTORt diMUMn
The formation
:

ii

*

i

vi **n
says
etc.

of our

body

of elements,

an opponent, resembles that of a statue of stone,
The objection stands thus
clay, etc.,

—Just

— 65/

as a statue is formed of stone,

which are deviod of

which are not endowed
demerits.

deserts, our body has been made up of elements with the fruits of our previous merits and

* sT^rcnrar^
141.
It is,

n

^

i

*

i

ii

n

66. requires proof. To prove that our body
deserts, the

we

reply,

not so because the statement
formed of elements which are devoid of

is

opponent
is

cites the
to

instance of a statue

made up

of clay or

stone,

which

supposed
replies

bear no connection whatsoever with deserts.

example cited requires to be verified for clay etc. are made of atoms which have actually a reference to desert as they comport themselves in such a way as to work out the designs of

The Naiyayika

that the very

Retributive Justice.

Hl^ftlfafa-^HrH irTTft^T:
142.
14

IM

I

*

I

t*S

II

Not

so because

of its production.

father and mother are the cause

67.

1&
The
father

BOOK
the

lit

CHAl^rpt

ft.

formation of our body cannot be compared to that ofa clay-

statue because

body owes

its
is

origin to fhe sperm

and blood

of our

and mother while the statue

produced without any seed at

all.

143.

So too eating

is

a cause.

68.

The food and drink taken by the mother turns into blood which develops the embryo (made up of the sperm of the father) through the
various stages of formation of the arbuda (a long round mass) mdihsa-pe&t
(a piece of flesh),
pefcut

kalala (a round lump), hawlard (sinews), Hrctfy (head),

(hands),

pfcto (legs), etc.

Eating

is

therefore a cause of production

of

our body but not

of a clay-statue.

srraft

^iPnwi<t
there
is

ii

\

i

*

i

<*

n
•*

144.

And

desert because of uncertainty even

in the case of union.
All unions between
tion of a child (body).
to

69.

husband and wife are not followed by the producof the child
its birth.

Hence we must acknowledge the desert

be a co-operative cause of

^il<MfaWto^RI ^^qfrrfafaTT
145.
of the

^4

il

*iw©-

it

Desert

is

the cause not only of the production

body but

also of its conjunction with a soul.
etc.,

—70.

Just as the earth,
to produce his body,

independent of a person's desert are unable

so the

body

itself

as a seat of particular pleasures

and pains

is

unable

to be connected with a soul without the intervention

of the desert of the latter.

146.

By

this

the

charge

against

inequality

is

answered. 71. Some persons

are found to possess a healthy
is

body while others an
This

unhealthy one; a certain body

beautiful
is

while another ugly.
to

inequality in the formation of the

body

due

the desert acquired

by

the persons in their previous lives.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :— By this the charge against uncertainty is answered. 146.
It is

— 71.

due entirely

to the
is

interference of the

desert that the union

between husband and wife
a child (body).,

not always followed by the

production of

'imwW^i^im^^
147.

m?
soul and the

And

the separation between the

body

is effected

by the termination of the deserts.
of the

— 72.
separation

It is

in virtue of its deserts that a soul is joined
it

with a particular
the

body and

is

by the exhaustion

deserts

that

between the two takes place.

The

soul cannot be separated from the

body
and

until

it

attains perfect

knowledge through the cessation of ignorance

lust.

148.

If the

body was attached
the

to a soul

only to re-

move

the

inexperience of the latter,

then the same inex-

perience would recur after

soul had

been emanci-

pated (released). 73. An opponent: says that
and that the body which
is

there

is

no necessity

for
is

admitting the desert

made up of elements

connected with a soul
its distinction

only to enable the latter to experience objects and realize

from matter (prakriti). As soon as the soul satisfies itself by the experience and attains emancipation (release) it is separated from the body
forever.

*The Naiyayika asks:

"Why

is

not the soul, even after emits

ancipation (release), again connected with a body to regain

experiential
is

power?"

Since the opponent does
the connection.

not admit desert there

nothing

else to stop

149.
to

It is

not reasonable, because the body

is

found

be produced in case of both fulfilment and non-fulfilment

of its ends.

— 74.
it

was stated that the body was produced only to enable the soul to experience objects and to realize its distinction from matter (prakriti). In the present aphorism the Naiyayika points
out the worthlessness of the statement by showing that the body is produced irrespective of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its ends, that is, it is produced in case of the soul experiencing objects and realizing
its

In the previous aphorism

distinction from

matter as well as in the case when the soul remains
its failure to realize its

enchained on account of

distinction
is

from matter.

In a certain school of philosophy the desert
quality of the atoms and not of (he soul.

supposed to be a

In virtue of (he desert atoms

:"

im

BOOK

lit,

CHAPfEft

If.

are said to combine together into a body (endowed with a mind) to enable

the soul to experience objects, and realize

its

distinction

from matter,
it

This school of philosophy

fails

to
is

explain

why

the soul after

has

attained emancipation (release)

not

again

connected

with a body

inasmuch as the atoms composing the body are never devoid

?R: <W$faftH^N #ft*ng5§ft : II ^ 150. And there will be no cessation
tion
if it is

I

*

I

W

of deserts,
II

of the conjunc-

caused by the desert of the mind. 75. Those whp maintain that the desert is a quality of the mind cannot explain why there should at all. be a separation of the body from the
mind which
is eternal.

If it is said that the

very desert which connected
it

the body with the mind does also separate

therefrom,

we

shall

be

constrained to admit an absurd conclusion that one and the same thing
is

the cause of

life

and death.

PMrWUftST
151.

ilUHUI-JMMxl: U ^
be eternal.

I

R

I

II

Owing
find the
is

to there

being no reason for destruction

we should
If the

body
find

to
to

76.

body

supposed

of deserts,
its

we should not

be produced from elements independent any thing the absence of which will cause

Tn the event of the destruction being arbitrary, there will be no fixed cause to effect emancipation or rebirth thereafter as the elements will always remain the same.
destruction.

^igWHd Tfoq^^ *ST<1
152.
(release)
is,

II

\

I

*

I

V9V9

||

The disappearance
according to an

of the

body in emancipation
the

opponent, eternal like

blackness of an atom. 77. Just as the blackness of an atom suppressed The opponent says through contact with fire does not reappear, so the body which by redness
:

has once attained emancipation (release) will not reappear.

5n^fn=qnwsr^WR[ n
153.
TMiis is,

*

i

*

i

w

n
it

we

reply,

not so because

would lead
according to

us

to

admit what was undemonstrable.
in the

78.
is,

The argument employed

previous aphorism

the Naiyayika, futile for it atom is suppressed by redness through contact with
that the blackness is altogether destroyed,

cannot be proved that the blackness of an
fire

for

it is

possible


THE NtlYArSOTfim
The aphorism may. also be interpreted
153.

XW
:

as follows
it

This

is,

we

reply, not so, because

would lead us

to

acknow-

ledge the consequence of actions not done by us.

— 78.
The absence
of such

Unless we acknowledge deserts there will be no principle governing
the enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain.
principle will be
scripture.

a

repugnant

to

all

evidences

perception, inference

and

m
Book IV.— Chapter
I.

snftnWhurH
1.

«m

\

\\

Activity, as

it is, lias

been explained.
aphorism

1.

The

definition of activity is to be found in

1-1-17.

2.

So the faults.— 2.
definition of faults
lias

The
faults

been given in aphorism 1-1-18.

The

which co-abide with intellect in the soul are caused by activity, pi-oduce rebirths and do not end until the attainment of final release
(apavarga).

rTgpkPW *Fli[WfTOFcRWWTrT
3.

II

8 \\

I

^

II

The

faults are divisible

in three

groups, as all

of

them are included
The
Affection

in affection, aversion
viz.,

and stupidity.

3.

faults are divided in three groups,

alfection, aversion

and

stupidity.

and covetousness. and implacability. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessincludes lust,
avarice,

avidity

Aversion includes anger,

envy,

malignity, hatred

ness.

4.

It

is,

some

say,

not

so,

because they are the
is

opposites of one single thing.

4.

The
affection,

objection

stands thus:

— There
The

no

distinction

between

aversion and
viz.,

stupidity, as all of

them are destructible by one
three,

single thing,
destructible

perfect knowledge.

in so far as they are

by one single

thing, are of a uniform character.

5.

,erratic.

This reason, —5.
that there is

Ave reply, is

not good,

because

it is

To prove
stupidity,

no distinction between
This reason
to
is

affection, aversion

and

the opponent has advanced the reason

that all the three are

destructible

by one single

thing.
it

declared by
cases,
e.

the Naiyav

yika to be erratic, because
black, green, yellow,

does not apply

all

g„ the blue,

brown and other colours, although they are different from one another, are destructible by one single thing, »&., contact vn$h
fa?.

%qf
6.

*ftf : qTfl^flHi<8^dQ<M%?

II

g

I

Mill
because in

Of the

three,

stupidity is the worst,
is

the case of a person

who

not stupid, the other two do not
aversion

come

into existence.

6.
viz.,

There are three

faults,

affection,
it is

and

Stupidity, of

which the

last is the worst,

because

only a stupid person

who may

be influenced by affection and aversion.

7.

There

is

then,

says an opponent,

a difference
inter-

between stupidity and other faults owing to their
relation of cause
the other two faults,

and

effect.

7.

The opponent argues as follows: Since stupidity is the cause of it must be different from them. In fact there cannot be the relation of cause and effect between two things which are not
different

from each other.
5T

.

^M^^HUN^T^T^TTl^T
It
is,

II

$

\

\

I

5

II

8.

we

reply, not so,

because faults as already
homogeneous with or

defined include stupidity.
Stupidity
is

8.
it

indeed a fault because

is

possesses the character of the

same

as defined in aphorism 1-1-18.

Pi[^TAmfr!^MM%Sr4^^lrft^RR5Tfrl^^: S \ III 9. And there is, we reply, no prohibition for homoII
I

geneous things
effect.— 9.
It is

to

stand

in

the

relation

of

cause and

not proper to exclude stupidity from the faults on the mere
to

ground that they stand

each other in the relation of cause and

effect.

In fact the homogeneous things such as two substances or two qualities

may stand
of cause

to

each other in the relation of cause and
its

effect,

e. g.,

in the

case of a jar being produced from

two halves we notice the relation

and

effect

between the jar and the halves which are homogeneous

with each other.

EwPuq^
10.

l

frsrarafefe:
is

II

9

I

*

I

go

11

Transmigration

possible

if

the soul

is

eter-

nal— 10,

110

BOOK

IV, Off APTJfc

I>

Transmigration defined in 1-1-19 belongs to the gout and not to the body. The series of birtbs and deaths included in it is possible
only
with
if

the soul is eternal.

If the soul
viz.,

were destructible.it would meet
destruction
of actions
it

two unexpected chances,

done by

it

(krita-hani)

and suffering from actions not done by

(akritabhyagama).

o^rhl^irbMf
11.

MWNS IU mW g
f

II

tt

I

*

I

\\

II

There

is

evidence of perception as to the produc-

tion of the distinct from the distinct.
It is

11.

found that

jars,

etc.,

which are

distinct are
is

produced from
produced from

earth, etc.,

which are also

distinct.

Similarly our body

the elements.

12.

It is,

some

say, not so,

duced from another jar.

because a jar

is

not prothe
is

12.
is

The objection stands thus:— You cannot say that there
production of a distinct thing from another distinct thing,, not produced from another jar.
e. g.,

a jar

There is, we reply, no prohibition for a jar being produced from a distinct thing. —13. A jar may not be produced from another jar but it is certainly
13.

produced from another distinct thing, viz., from its bowl-shaped halves. There is therefore no bar against the production of the distinct from the
distinct.

14.

—Some say that

there
tion.

is


A

from non-entity, as no manifestation unless there has been destrucit

entity arises

14.

sprout cannot come into existence, unless the peed from which

comes has bee!* destroyed.

This shows that there

is

no manifestation

of effect without the destruction of its cause.

«4ii4Nii4si4ta*
15.
It is,

imYi

tn-n

we>reply, not so, because such an expression,

inconsistent as

it is,

cannot be employed.

15.

the m&¥&m?Bm
To
say that a thing comes into existence
is
its

m
by destroying another
for
if

thing which

cause, is a contradiction in

teruris,

that which,

according to you, destroys the cause and takes the place thereof, was not existent prior to the destruction, then it cannot be said to be a destroyer,

and

if it

existed prior to the cause, then

it

cannot be said to come into

existence on the destruction thereof.

16.

There

is,

says

the objector, no inconsistency,

because terms expressive of action are figuratively applied
to the past

and

future.

16.

The
which

objector says as follows:

—There

is

no impropriety

in the

statement that a thing comes into existence by destroying another thing
is its

cause, for terms expressive of action are figuratively

employed

to denote that

which

is

not existent

now but which

existed

in the past or

will exist in the future,
to
its

be born.
cause "

e. g., he congratulates himself on the son that is In the sentence " a sprout comes into existence by destroying

— the term expressive
*

of destruction

is

figuratively

applied to

the sprout that will come into existence in the future.

for&«ftsfa*T%:
is,

ii

a it

i

w

ii

17.

It

we

reply, not so, because nothing is produc-

ed from things destroyed.

17.
already destroyed.

A
we can
entity.

sprout does not spring from a seed
lay

Hence,

down

the

general rule that entity does not arise from non-

su ftlfwMRfty
18.

n

$
if

i/t

i.

\*

ii

There

is

no objection

destruction

is

pointed

out only as a step in the processes of manifestation.— 18;
In connection with earth, water, heat
tion of its old structure
etc.,

a seed undergoes destrucstructure.
is

and

is

endowed with a new
It is in this

A

sprout

cannot grow from a seed, unless the old structure of the seed

destroyed

and

a.

new

structure is formed.
is

sense allowable to say that

preceded by destruction. This does not preclude a seed frotn being the cause of a sprout. But we do not admit an unqualified assertion that production springs from destruction or entity arises from
manifestation
non-entity.

'

'

tlf

BOOK

IV,

CHAPTER

Ii

19.

God, says some one,

is

the sole cause of fruits,

because man's acts are found occasionally to be unattended

by them.
exertions,

19.

Seeing that

man

does not often attain success proportionate to his

some one

infers that these are entirely subservient to

God who

alone can provide them with fruits.
5T

flWWtffl lfr 4WrP|W4%:
This
is,

II

*

I

t

I

*o

II

20.

some are

afraid,

not

so,

because in the

absence of man's acts there is no production of fruits. 20. If God were tho only source of The fear referred to arises thus
:

fruits,

man could

attain

them even without any
: II

exertions.

*MilR<MH^d
21.

Since fruits are

* It I \\ II awarded by God, man's

acts,

we

21. conclude, are not the sole cause thereof. Man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God. The acts become fruitless without His grace. Hence it is not (rue that man's acts produce fruits by themselves. God is a soul specially endowed with qualities. He is freed from misapprehension, carelessness, etc., and is enriched with merit, knowledge

and concentration, lie possesses eight supernatural powers (such as the power of becoming as small as an atom) which are the consequences of his merit and concentration. His merit, which conforms to his will, produces merit and demerit in each person and sets the earth and other elements in action. God is, as it were, the father of all beings. Who can demonstrate
the existence of

Him who

transcends the evidences of perception, inference

and scripture

?

wftffr^at ^renrerfrT: *qd«*3hW*llfadHI<t U
22.
etc.,
'-7-22-

sum

II

From an
ftay

observation of the sharpness of thorn,

some
The

that entities are produced

from no cause.

objectors argue as follows

:

—Thorns

are by nature sharp, hills
so.

beautiful,

and stones smooth.

None has made them

Similarly our

bodies, etc., are fortuitous effects which did not spring
is,

from a cause, that

were not made by God.

tab mxtm&mm

m

23.

Entities cannot be said to be produced from nois,

cause, because the no-cause
of the production.

according to some, the cause

23.

An
Some

opponent has said that entities are prod need from no-cause.
point out
that the use of the fifth case- affix in connection
it is

critics

with no-cause indicates that

the cause.
II

P<fi{T>iftfi«xl^<^<^N^Mrd^r:
24.

ft

I

\

I

*ft

II

The

aforesaid reason presents

no opposition, be-

cause cause and no-cause are two entirely different things.

—24.
less

Cause and no-cause cannot be identical, e. g., a jar which is watercannot at the samo time be full of water. The doctrine involved in
aphorism does not
differ

this

from the one explained

in 3-2-70

according to

which our body cannot be made up independent

of our desert (Karma).
II

MoJHfiw^fti Rh Rl wl«h*H<
25.
All, says

ft

I

!

I

**

II

some

one, are non-eternal, because they

possess the character of being produced and

destroyed.

—25.
AH
which
is

things including our body which

is

material and our intellect

immaterial are non-eternal inasmuch as they aro subject to the

law of production

and destruction.

All things which are produced and

destroyed are non-eternal.

HlffteMlfikq^Htl
26.

II

ft

I

t

I

H
is

II

These are, we reply, not 26. eternalness being eternal.

so,

because of the nonit

If non-eternalness

pervades

all

things you must admit
at least

to

be

eternal.
viz.,

Hence,

all are

not non-eternal, for there
is eternal.

one thing,

non-eternalness which

a*l^s«*tfto1ift
27!

Rnnwi^ftHnmct iift.it
which dies out

i

^

.11

Some hold
fire

non-eternalness to be not eternal on
after the combustibles

the analogy of a

have perished.—27,

The objection

is

explained as follows :-~Justa& a
it

fire

dtes out as

soon as 'the things which caught
disappears as soon as
non-eternalness
is all

have perished, so the non-eternalness non-eternal things have passed away. Hence,

not eternal.

ft«ti*Hiwu<gqi«l
28.

q^q^fN^^R^RT^
is

II

$

I

%

uc H

There

no denial

of the eternal, as there is a

regulation as to the character of our perception.— 28. Whatever is perceived to be produced or destroyed is non-eternal and that which is not so is eternal, e. g., there is no perceptual evidence
as to the production or destruction of ether, time, space, soul, mind, Consequently these are generality, particularity and intimate relation.
eternal.

ssf
29.

P^^qs^rf^r^T^
Some say

II

tt

I

t

I.

u

ir

-

that all are eternal, because the five

elements are so. 29. The elements which

are the material causes of all

things are eter-

nal, consequently the things.themselves are eternal.

«i^ftlfaHUIsH<*!fJM<Hofr :
30.

II

*

\

\

I

\*
we

II

These

are,

we

reply, not so, because

perceive

30. the causes of production and destruction. because wo find them to bo produced All things are non-eternal and destroyed. Whatever is produced or destroyed is non-eternal.


\

fl&Td^MilMKilftfor: It S \ \\ II This is, some say, no refutation, because the 31. character of the elements is possessed by the things which
I

are produced-or destroyed.

— 31.
—A
II

The

objector says as follows:

thing which

element, possesses the character of the element.
eternal, the thing also

made up of an Since the elements
is

must be

so.

H^(rld<*K*!j)M<j«^:
32.

*

l|l \*

II

Tnis

is,

we

reply,

no opposition, because we

perceive production and the cause thereof.

32.

An
identical,

effect inherits
e. g. t

ether

is

cause but the two are not the cause of sound, although the former is eternal
its

the character of

and the

latter non-eternal.

pioduce&which convince us of their non-eternal ness. If production is regarded as a mere vision of a dream, then the whole world is ho better than an illusion which can serve no practical purpose. If all things were eternal, there could be no effort or activity on our part to attain any object Hence all are not eternal.
Moreover,
actually perceive that things are
,

we

*5?F*OT3<R%:
.33.

II

SI \\ \\

II

If all

things

were eternal there would be no
:

regulatiori of time.

33.

Some say
But

that things are eternal, because they existed even before

they were produced and will continue even after they are destroyed.
this view, contends the NaiyAyika, is absurd.
It

destroys

all

regu-

lations with regard to time, for if all things were perpetually existent, there could not be any use of such expression as " was produced" and " will

be destroyed," which presuppose a thing which was non-existent into existence or one which is existent to lose its existence

to coino

34.

Some

say that

all

are

aggregates because each
parts, such

34. consists of several marks. A jar, for instance, is an aggregate consisting of several
as bottom, sides, back,
taste, colour, touch, etc.
etc.,


is

and several

qualities,

such

as,

sound.-smell,
its

There

not a single entity devoid of

several

parts or qualities.

[This refers to the Buddhist doctrine which denies a substance apart

from

its qualities

writings of

and a wholo apart from Nftgarjuna*, Arya Deva f and

its

parts as

is

ovident from

the

others.]

a<hwnh:s«w£ fore
(Mftdhyamika
Sfltra.

'Eftrcf

tsm n
edition.)

Chap.

I,

page 84; Prof. Pousstn's,

qrenfW*&frq tot *fr * fold
(Madhyamika
Sfltra,

11

tfi u

Chap.

I,

page 71

;

Poossin's edition.)

t

*w

«$r silrsrer

^ v£

ft srra$

i

i$w fawn
(&taka quoted
in the

§t(&i *rgr

^

i

Madhyamika VritM,

p. 71.)

m
35.

BOOK W, CHAPTER

I.

These

are,

we

reply, not so

because by several

marks one
qualities

single entity is constituted.

—35.
we must admit an
entity

The Naiyayika

says that there is certainly a substance apart from its
its parts,
e.g.,

and a whole apart from
its several

called jar as the substratum of its several qualities, such as colour, smell,
etc.,

and

parts such as bottom, sides, back, etc.
this

[The Buddhists* oppose
independent of
its qualities

view by saying that the substance

and the whole indopendont of its parts admitted by the Naiyayikas are opposed to i-eason and cannot be accepted as realities though there is no harm in acknowledging them as " appearances "f for
the fulfilment of our practical purposes.]

36.

There

is,

moreover, no opposition on account of

the very distribution of the marks.

— 36.
conclusion
is

The NaiyAyika
owing
to

says as follows:
in

— Our

unassailable
for instance,
it

the

marks abiding
viz.,

one single

entity.

A

jar,

possesses two marks,

tangibility

and colour, by each of which

can

be identified.
If there

were no jar beyond

its tangibility
1

and colour we could not
touched yesterday."

use such expression as " I see the jar which

To

enable us to ascertain the identity there must bo a substance called jar beyond its tangibility and colour which are two distinct qualities belonging
to the

same substance.

The opponent has

said that " all are aggregates."

Whence, we ask,

does the aggregate arise if there are no units? The very reason given that " each consists of seve/al marks " presupposes an " each " or unity
or entity beyond the marks or aggregate.

jfirf^r: q*raf :

wwUm^ h T *rmr>
I.

i

*wmn*twij<m*aM<i*wmrKii

i

(Madhyamikil Vfltti, Chap.

p.

W

;

Poussln's edition.)

{Mtdhyamikft Vfitti, p.

70,

Chap.

I

;

Pougsin's edition,)


THE ra£&SOT&&S:i

37.

All

are non-entities

because the entities are

non-existent in relation to one another.

— 37.

la the expression " a horse is not a cow " there is the non-existence " of " cow " in the " horse " and in the expression " a cow is not a horse there is the non-existence of " horse " in the " cow." As a fact every
thing
is

non-existent in so far as

it is

not identical with another thing.

38.

It

is,

we

reply, not

so because the entities are

existent in reference to themselves.

—38.
:

A
thing.

cow

is

a cow though
it is

it

is

not a horse

a thing
it is

is

existent in

reference to itself though

non-existent in so far as

not another

39.

Some

say, that entities are not self-existent inas-

much

as they exist in relation to one another. The objection is oxplained as follows
:

39:

A
and

thing

is called
;

short only in relation to another thing which is long,

vice versa

the long

and short are

inter-related.

[This refers to the

according to which
self-existent.]

all

" Madhyamika Buddhist doctrine*of " relation things are inter-dependeut and nothing is

40.
it

The

doctrine,

we reply,

is

unreasonable because

hurts

itself.

—40.
;

If the

long and short are inter-dependent then neither of them

can be established in the absence of the other if neither of them is selfexistent, then it will be impossible to establish the inter-relation ; and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of the opponent will fall to the
ground.

[The Madhyamikas say that there

is

no realityt underlying any

(Madhyamika Satra, Chap. XV,

p. 08

;

B. T. Society's edition.)

swnra: wfa^srsT anj Trig «ft«ifir u Chap. I. 24 (Arya Ratnakara Satra quoted in MidhyamikA VfM*i.

fiwfii

;

B. T. Society's

edition.)


rfi
errtity,

noowvr,

camm*

and that the entities exist only by virtue of their mutual relations which are mere illusions. Viewed from the standpoint of absolute truth the world is void, iSdnya,* but measured by the standard of "relation "or "condition "it possesses an apparent existence which serves all our
practical purposes.]

41.

Neither

through

the

reason being given nor
is

through the reason being omitted there
of the fixity of

the establishment

number.— 41.
that there
is

Some

say,

only one thing

<

Brahma) pervading

all
,

the so-called

varieties.

Others say, that things are of two kinds, viz
Certain philosophers find

the eternal and the non-eternal.
via.,

three things

the knower, knowledge and the knowable, while others treat of four

things, viz., the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge. In this way the philosophers indulge themselves in a fixed number of tilings. The Naiyayikas oppose them by saying that there is no reason to establish the fixity of number. The fixed number is the Sadhya or that which is to be proved and the reason is

which is to prove it. Now is the reason included in the Sadhya or excluded from it ? In either case the fixity of number will be unfixed.
that
If,

on the other hand, the reason no means
to establish the

is

not different from the S&dhya, there

is

Sadhya.

42.

part of

some say, not the number. 42.
This
is,

so,

because the reason

is

a

The
fixity

objection is this

:

The number
identical with, the

of things

is fixed,

and there

is

on the score of the reason being included

no disturbance of the in, excluded from, or
the

number

for the reason is a part of

number and

as

such

is

hot different from

it.

43.
is

^The reason, we

reply, is not valid because there

no part available for the purpose.—-43.

MAdhyamik* JiMira, Chap. XV,

p.

98

j

B. T. Society's edition.)

.

The opponent has argued that the number is fixed and that the reason is only a part of it. The Naiy&yika counterargues that the number
cannot be fixed until the reason
is

fixed

and it

will

be absurd to fix the
asserted by the
until the

number with an unfixed reason. The reason which is opponent to be a part of the number will remain unfixed
itself is fixed.

number

The
es of

doctrine of the fixity of number, opposed as
inference

it is to

the evidenc-

perception,

and

scripture,

is

a false doctrine which

cannot refute the variety of things established through the speciality
of their characters.
If there is

an agreement as to the number of things

on the ground of
be abandoned.

their general characters,

and

difference
is

on the ground
admittedly to

of their special characters, then the

doctrine of fixity

W*i
44.

*Mk<A ^
There

4t<HpM^:*a*T

: II

91

uw

44.

II

arises

doubt as to the fruit which
interval.
its effect

is

produced either instantly or after a long

Seeing that some action such as cooking produces
effect until

imme-

diately while another action such as ploughing does not bring about

any sometime has passed away, a certain person asks whether
fire will

the fruit of maintaining the sacred
after

be produced immediately or

a considerable lapse
5T

of time.

it is

CRT* qKMMflM+frq <4 l<t 11*1* 19 *U fruit, we reply, is not immediate because enjoyable after a lapse of time. 45.
45.

The

The fruit of maintaining the sacred
which
is

fire is

the attainment of heaven

not possible until the time of death when the soul departs from

our body.

«hMI<rft<llftuift?3AHIW<l
46.
It

* III cannot, says some one, be produced
I

\m\

lapse of time because the cause has disappeared.

after a

46.

The The
to

objection is this

:

fruit (viz., the attainment of heaven) cannot be
(viz.,

produced after
fire)

our death because the action

maintaining the sacred

calculated

produce the

fruit

was destroyed before our death.
ii«i i

srr^q^^ipsR^ ^ng[
This
fruit,

iron

47.

before

it is

produced, bears analogy

to the fruit of

a tree.-t47.

m
tf ulst "as

BftOK TV, CtfAVf^L
a
tree,

I.

whose roots are now nourished with water, will be
fire

able to produce fruits in the future, so the sacred

which

is

maintained

now wiU enable

the maintainer

to

attain

heaven after

death.

The

doctrine involved here has been explained in aphorism 3-2-64.

48.
tion,
is

Some say

that the fruit,

anterior to its produc-

neither existent nor non-existent nor both, because

existence

and non-existence are incongruous.
any
the
effect) anterior

48.

The
one thing

fruit (or

to its

production was not nonso

existent because
is

material

causes

are

regulated

that

each

not

produced from

each

other

thing

promiscuously.
its

We cannot suppose
an
its

the fruit to have been existent prior to

production

because a thing cannot be said to come into existence
existence.

if it

had already
to

The

fruit

was not both existent and non-existent prior

production because existence and non-existence are incompatible with

each other.
[This aphorism refers to the

Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy
it is

which maintains that the

effect,
is

before

produced,

is

neither existent

nor non-existent nor both, as

evident from the writings of Nagarjuna*

and Arya Devaf.]

49.

It is,

we

reply, a fact that the fruit before

it

was

produced was non-existent because
tion

we

witness the produc-

and destruction.

49.
it

When

a jar

is

produced we find that

was non-existent prior

to

the production.

h 4MWKMN
fora^T 3*
*r

fa

^iMmMifym

'

II

*ra:

wraiths gwft

i

Mffli tfpsni ww fafa $ Wfl
;

ii

(NagArjuna's Mftdhyaniika Sutra, Chap. VII, p. 61

B. T. Society's edition.)
I

|«VMJIVWfit
ymwgftfatft

TO 1^ H fa*Kl
ii

«9 vis* "w^

(itya Deva'a Sataka quoted in the Mldbyamlka VfittJ, Chap.
edition.)

I,

p. 4

;

B.

T. Society's


THE Nf It A&OTRAS:

mi

50.

That

it

was non-existent, |is establhthec^lby our

understanding.
It
is

— 50.

when a thing is non-existent that we can apply ourselves it by means of suitable materials. A weaver, for instance, sets himself to work for a web which is non-existent but which, he knows, he can make by means of threads.
only
to

the production of

51.
is

Some say

that the analogy to the fruit of a tree
is

ill-founded because a receptacle
It

awanting.

51.

has been stated that the fruit obtainable from maintaining the
bears analogy to the fruit of a
tree.

sacred

fire

An opponent

finds fault
is

with the analogy by showing that the tree which produces fruits now

the same tree which was previously nourished with water, but the body

which

is

alleged to attain heaven after death
fire.

is

not the same' body which
different their analogy

maintained the sacred

The two bodies being

to the tree is ill-founded.

52.

The foregoing objection, we
is

reply, is unreasonable

because the soul
It
is

the receptacle of happiness.
fire

52.

not our body that maintains the sacred
is

or attains heaven.

In reality the soul
ness in heaven.

the receptacle for both these acts.
fire is identical

The

soul

which
the

maintained the sacred

with the soul which enjoys happiis

Consequently a receptacle
is

not awanting and

analogy to the tree

not ill-founded.

53.

—The

soul,

some

say, cannot

be the receptacle for
a son, a wife, cattle,

the fruits which are

mentioned,

viz.,

attendants, gold, food, etc.

The objection
soul.

is this

:

If the fruit consists

merely of happiness

it

wife,

But the soul cannot be the receptacle for such cattle, etc. which are mentioned in the scripture.

can be lodged in the fruits as a son, a

im
The

BOOKv IV,

Ctt

APTE& £

54.
it is

fruit,

we

reply,

is. attributed

to

them because
name
fruit

produced through their conjunction.
In reality the fruit
is

54.
to

happiness.
is

We

attribute the

a son, a wife,

etc.,

because happiness

produced through them.

55.

Birth

is

a pain

because

it

is

connected with

various distresses.
Birth
is

— 55.
be a pain because
it

stated to

signifies

our connection with
various distresses.

the body, the senses and the intellect which bring us

The body

is

the abode in which pain resides, the senses are the instruis

ments by which pain

experienced, and the intellect

is

the agent which

produces in us the feeling of pain.
body, the senses and the intellect
is

Our

birth as connected with the

necessarily a source of pain.

56.
intervals.

Pleasure

is

not denied because

it is

produced at

—56.

We

cannot altogether deny the existence of pleasure which often

arises amidst pains.

57.

This

is,

we

reply,

no opposition because

disojie

tresses

do not disappear from a person who enjoys

pleasure and seeks another.
The substance

57.
:

of the Naiyftyika's reply is this

—Pleasure

itself is

to be regarded as pain because oven a person who enjoys pleasure is tormented by various distresses. His objects may be completely frustrated only partially, and while he attains one object he cannot resist , or fulfilled

the temptation of pursuing another which causes

him uneasiness,

58.

only

And because there another name for pain.

is

conceit of pleasure in

— 58.

what

is

Some persons thinking

that pleasure is the

summum bonum

are

addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth,

infirmity,

disease, death,
etc.

connection with the undesirable, separation
It
is

from the desirable,

therefore clear that one

who pursues
is

pleasure does in reality pursue pain, or in other words, pleasure

a

synonym

for pain.

^fllifrg lTqa^W^rt' n** II 2 It I Vi II 59.. There is, some say, no opportunity for us to attain release because of the continual association of our debts,

troubles and activities.

59.
:

The we

objection stands thus

are born

The scripture declares that as soon as we incur three debts which we must go on clearing oil until
;

the time of our decay and death

nions, while activities pursue us throughout

and troubles are our constant compaour life. There is then no

opportunity for us to attain release.

The

three debts are

:

Debt

to sages (ttishi-rina)— which can
life.

be cleared

off

only by under:-"

going a course of student

Debt to gods (Deva-rina)
performing
sacrifices.

—from

which we can be freed only by

Debt

to our progenitors (Pitri-rina)—which cannot

be cleared

off

except by begetting children.
Activity has beeti defined in 1-1-17

and

1-1-18.

*
60.
If

I

*

u*
literal

an expression
it

is

inadmissible in

its

sense

we

are to accept
praise.

in its secondary

meaning

blame or

—60.
is

to suit

born he incurs three debts" this expression, is to be taken in its secondary meaning, was., "as soon as a person enters the life of a householder, he incurs three debts the clearing off of which brings him credit."' The expression " until the time of our decay and death " signifies that " as long

"As soon as a person
it is

inadmissible as

in its literal sense,

as

we

do.not arrive at the fourth stage

mendicant."

are to adopt the life of a If the scriptural texts are interpreted in this way, it belife

when we

comes clear that our whole
off of

does not pass away in the mere clearing

our debts.

Ml

BOOK

IV,

CBAPTEl

!.

61.

An
it.

injunction must be appropriate to

its

occasion

just as a topic

must be appropriate
is to

to the treatise

which

deals with

—61.
deal with
its

A

treatise

on Logic which

own

special problems

cannot be expected to treat of etymology and syntax which form the
subject of a separate treatise.

A

sacred book which professes to deal

with the

life of

a householder can appropriately bestow every encomium
text extols

on him.

A certain Vedic
to

karma by saying

that immortality is

attained by the force of one's

own

acts,

while another text lays

down

as a

compliment
knowledge
other

asceticism

that immortality

cannot be attained except

through renunciation.
of
to
it.

Some

text declares emphatically that

Brahma alone

that one can attain

by the immortality, there is no
it is

way

There are again certain texts which attach an equal
is to

importance to study, sacrifice and charity each of which

be performat

ed by us at the different stages of our
extolling the life of a householder can,

life.

Hence a

text

which aims

without creating any misapprethe time of our decay and death.
II

hension in us, lay down that as Boon as we are born we incur three debts

which we must go on clearing

off until

q*H<lMWIdHJS|[tl*N ;
62.

?

I

*

KH

II

There

is

no lack
(to

of opportunity for our release
off

because the sacrifices

be performed for clearing

our

62. debts) are trusted to the soul. A Brahman, while old, should refrain from all searches after sons, wealth and retinue. Sruti (Veda) instructs him to retire from the world

when he has
to clear off
sacrificial
fire

trusted to his soul the sacrifices which he used to perform

his debts.
in

By

so doing he will imagine that his soul is the

Freed from

all

which his physical actions are offered as oblations. debts, he will live on alms and find an ample opportunity

.for effecting

his

own

release.

of Itihasa,

As regards the division of life into four Furaga and Dharma Sfistra.

stages, there is the authority

gjs*r *uii*£)
63.

foumMwwI
is

i

im
who

\

i

<vhsound

As

there

is

no

distress in a person

ts

asleep and sees no dream, so there
troubles in one

no association of

who

attains release.

—63.


the ttt&M^^RAa
A person who
release, is freed

m
very

has,
all

through the knowledge of Brahma, attained
last, pleasure, pain, etc.

from

bonds of

{The word

Mem

{here rendered as trouble) is a technical term

extensively used in the Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali literature to signify
depravity, defilement, corruption or passion.
is

Klesa, called in Pali kileso,
re-births.

the cause of

all sinful actions

and consequently of

Arhatship
ten

consists in the annihilation of Mesa.
l&ilems, of

which

five are

prominent.

The P&li Pifcakas enumerate The ten kUesas are
:

§&T (greed), $1% (hatred),
(heretical
Vfifcftffil

ftifcr

(stupidity),

flptr (pride), ftsfe

view),

A&ft^SI

(doubt), 4ftm{ (sloth),

33FWRL (arrogance),

(shamelessness) and

H^Wq[ (recklessness).
six

The Buddhist Sanskrit books enumerate
upaMestM.

Mesas and twenty-four

(l)harmasamgraha LXVII,)
sigftr *5ri%5*i$

sin

i

cram" u

BlcT$t ftrBJTOBT

fcl

II

(Dharmasamgraha LXIX.)

The word Mesa used
(

in the

4-1-65 evidently conveys the

Nyaya Sutra 4-1-59, 4-1-63, 4-1-64 and meaning of moral depravity. Hina-klesa

fNlff

)

used in 4-1-64 rings in

my

ears as a phrase borrowed

from

the Buddhist philosophy.]

*
64.

Sift: SlfaWMfil ilH&tlW The activity of one who has got

II

111 *

I

**

||

does not tend to obstruction.
Activity does not present

—64.
to

rid of the troubles

any obstacle

release (apavarga)

in

respect of a person
stupidity.

who

is

freed from the troubles of lust, hatred

and

In his case activity produces neither merit nor demerit, and consequently no re-birth.

«T$Wtoti: m+tiPNw*ltt
There is, some these are natural.—65.
65.
say,

II

9

I

*

I

H

II

no end of troubles because

The
it is

objection raised here is this

:

—None can attain

release because

impossible to get rid of troubles which are natural (beginningless).

66.

Even

the natural, says
that

like
tion.

the non-existence

some one, are non-eternal was antecedent to producis

66.
objection raised in the previous aphorism
:

The

answered by some

one as follows

A
but
it

non-existence antecedent to production

is

natural (beginningless)

disappears as soon as the production takes place.

Similarly the

troubles are natural (beginningless) but they terminate as soon as release
is attained.

A

jar before

it is

produced

is

non-existent.
It

called antecedent non-existence.

This non-existence is has no beginning but it has an end

for it disappears as soon as the jar is produced.

The

troubles like the

antecedent non-existence are beginningless but not endless.
is, an existent thing that can be called cannot apply the epithets " eternal " and " non-eternal " to non-existence except in a figurative sense.}

[It

is

only an existence, that

eternal or non-eternal.

We

^qWdl^PM?M&l
67.

II

9

I

^

.1

||

Or

non-eternal like the blackness of an atom.
is

67.

An
it is

earthy atom, which
kiln.

naturally black, changes

its

colour

when

baked red in the

Likewise the troubles which are natural

disappear as soon as release is attained.

H HfrflftfilTMW
68.
It is,

<HH<flH H, M *
I

I

t

I

<*

M

we

reply, not so because affection etc. are

caused by misapprehension.
The
Naijfgyika says :-r-There
that a thing

— 68.
is

no necessity for us here

to

admit

which

is

natural (beginningless)

may

not be endless.

The

troubles are not in fact natural (beginningless) because they are caused by activity which springs from our affection, aversion and stupidity. These
feet are generated

by our misapprehension.

The

troubles not being
release.

natural, there is

no lack of opportunity for us to attain


Book
Chaptfr

IV.

II.

^n^WthhI ^^^Ri^ffn^iftr:
69.

n «

1

\

i

\

it

Through knowledge about the true nature of the
is
is

causes of faults, there
Egotism
" I am," entertained

a stupidity of the form "

cessation of egotism 1. I am." It consists of the notion
is

by a person who

devoid of

self.

It disappears as

soon as we attain knowledge about the true nature of the faults which are

caused by

all

objects such as body etc. enumerated in aphorism

faTOT: Sf«M*<m II *l II The colour and other objects, when regarded as 70. good, become the causes of faults 2.

jfafaftw

W^ft

W

1— I —9.

It is

only

when we look upon colour
it

or any other object as a source
affection, aversion or stupidity.
I
I

of enjoyment that

becomes a cause of our
II

dftlfiH^sM^fiWR:
71.

The

faults

R 8 ^ II are caused through a conception

3. the whole apart from its parts. The faults are produced if a man or woman looks upon each other

of

as a whole,

viz.,

as a male or female

with

all his or

her paraphernalia of

teeth, lips, eyes, nose, etc., together with their secondary

marks

;

are

shunned
all

if

he or she looks upon each other by pzrts only,
frail.

viz.,

and they upon

his or her hair, flesh, blood, bone, nerve, head, phlegm, bile, excrement
etc.,

of

which are

The

notion of the whole engenders lust while

that of the parts produces equanimity.

We

the standpoint of evil

e. g.

the rice boiled with

must regard every thing from poison is looked upon by

a wordly

man

ft^i
72.

JW&fW^ mm
Owing
to the

as rice and

by an

ascetic as poison.
11

1

1

*

i

* n
exist-

apprehension and non-apprehension

being each of two kinds, there arises a doubt as to the ence of a whole apart from its parts. —4.
There are two kinds
apprehension of
water
is

of apprehension,

viz.,

real

and

unreal.

The
and
an

water in a tank is real while that of

mirage as a mass of
viz.,

unreal.

The non-apprehension
while
that of

is

also of two kinds,

real

unreal.

The non-apprehension

of a hare's

horn (which

is

non-existent) is a
is

real, non- apprehension

the ether (which

existent) is

unreal non-apprehension. both real and unreal there arises a doubt as to whether there
17

The apprehension and non-apprehension being
is

really a whole

m
part from
its

sooE i%
parts.

mmmm
\i

apart from its part^ oar apprehension may be unreal. IE we do not apprehend a whole, our non-apprehension too may be unreal.
If

we apprehend a whole

* ii a*sforo: l$)g&iRi4«4i<i ii a i There is no room for doubt with regard to the 73. existence of a whole already established through arguments.
—5.
No
2
I

one has yet

set aside

the arguments employed in aphorism
its parts.

— —34 to establish a whole apart from ^«yw^uPi rrff *
74.

mm

-II

There

is,

says some one,

* t ii no room for doubt even
tt
I

I

with regard to the non-existence of a whole on account of 6. the impossibility of the whole residing any where.

In the preceding aphorism the NaiyAyika has said that there is no doubt a3 to the existence of a whole apart from its parts as demonstrated 1—34. In the present aphorism his opponent says that in aphorism 2

there

is

no doubt as

to the non-existence of a

whole apart from

its

parts

because neither the whole can reside in
former.

its

parts nor the latter in the

One

affirms that

there is a whole while the other affirms that
is

there is no whole.

In either case there

no room

for doubt.
:

^^^^TTl^^WT^RWTWmsTOTW
75.
its

There

is,

* I vs II says the objector, no whole because
II
I

«

parts reside in

it

A

part does not occupy the whole in
;

neither totally nor partially. its totality owing
neither does
it

7.

to the differ-

ence of their dimensions

occupy the whole partially

because the part can reside neither in

itself

nor in another part.
i

^3 ^n%^Pi5?mnr:
76.

s 11 h $ * Also because the whole does not, continues the
i

objector, reside in its parts.

8.

The whole does not
of the
its

reside in each of its parts separately

on account

difference of their dimensions.

Neither does
it

it

reside in

some

of

parts collectively because in that case

loses its connection

with the

other parts.

^£ 5(T3q^¥tftsf%:
77.

II

3

I

^

I

A

II

Owing
is

to

the lack of

residence,
its

affirms

the

objector, there

no whole apart from

parts.

9.

The whole does not
is

exist 88 the relation between

it

and

its

parti

not that of the container and the contained.
5T

^NiMWHl H
And
No one

*l *'!"!• U

78.

the parts are not the whole.-r-10.
says that the thread
is

The
is
is
-

objector says that the relation between the whole and its parts

not that of identity.
the house.

the

web

or the pillar

«wft*H 3«i*iMi^*M>w)*i
79.

i

4MM3w ft miuii

There

is,

we

reply,

owing

to the impropriety in

in reference to

what
its

is one.

no room for the question " the use of the term " variety
11.
raised the question as to whether

In aphorism 4
the whole occupied
of the

—2—7 an opponent

parts totally or partially.

The Naiy&yika

disposes

question by saying that there is no room for it because the terms " totally " and " partially " cannot be applied to " one."' The term " totally " is employed only in the case of several things of which no one
left

has been

out while the

word "
left out.

partially " refers to an aggregate of

which some parts have been

Now, neither the term " totally " nor the term " partially " is applicable to what is " one ", that is, to a " whole." In the case of a whole the employment of language implying

variety is unjustifiable.

W*HM<¥n¥*lf%*|g:
80.

II

*

I

*

I

\\
is

II

The

question,
if

we

further reply,

unreasonable

one part could be the residence of another part, it would not be the residence of the whole. 12. When we speak of a whole residing in its parts we must not under-

because even

stand that the term residence refers to any space, in fact
relation of refuge
is
.

it refers to

the

and refugee.
of the

A

refuge

is

that with
it

which the refugee
exist.

inseparably connected and without which

can never

Hence

there is

no impossibility

whole residing in

its parts.

sfarcifl

aftR+l^f^^MoiP**:
.

II

«

U

I

tVH

The perception of a " whole " bears analogy to 81* that of a collection of hairs by a person affected with a dim*
ness of

sight— 13.

Hfr
tfast as

BOOK TV", CHAPTER

H,

a person of dim sight cannot perceive hairs separately but can perceive them in a mass, so we cannot perceive the atoms separately but can perceive them in a mass in the form of a jar or the like.

82.
its

A

sense

is
its

inoperative in reference to

what

is

not

object because
restricted
to

acuteness or dullness of apprehension

is

its

own
it

object which

it

cannot trans-

cend.


is

14.
eye,

The

whether

is

acute or dim, cannot apprehend a sound.
All senses have

Similarly the ear, sharp or dull, caunot see a colour.
their special

objects to

which their operation

is restricted.

An atom

which

supersensuous, cannot be apprehended by any of our senses

—no

matter whether these are acute or dim.
collection also
is

Each hair being

perceptible, its

capable of being perceived whereas the atoms being

imperceptible their collection canuot be perceived.
the collection of atoms in the shape of a jar or the

As we can perceive like, we must admit
its

that the collection or the whole
(the atoms).

is

a reality independent of"

parts

The whole and its parts should in that case be supposed to continue up to the time of annihilation. 15.
83.

Even
tion at the

if

we admit

the existence of a whole and

its parts,

we cannot
to

suppose them to continue for ever because they are subject
time of annihilation.
parts again have their parts

destruc-

A whole has got which do not cease until

its

parts

tliey

and the become non-

existent at the time of annihilation.

'*
84.

wflM pwMi g
i

ii

m*
there

i

it

ii

TJjere

is,

we

reply,

no annihilation because there
will

are

atoms.— 16.
There
will never

come a time when

be an utter annihia thing which

lation, for things will

even then continue to exist in the state of atoms.
is,

An atom is

a thing of the smallest dimension, that

is

not capable of being of smaller dimension,

THE NYStA^PMt^S^

til

qt^rsg&n «
85.

i

.* "x
is

w

«

An atom
17.
is

is

that

which

not capable of being

divided.

An atom

not divisible into further parts.

[Two atoms make a dvyaytaka (tlyad) and three deyamhas make a tryasarequ (triad). All things which we perceive are composed of tryasrerjtus. An atom (auu) is finer than a doyanuka and the latter finer
than a tiyasarevu.]

^raro^f^T^^qqfa:
86.

u «

-i

*

i

m

u

There

is,

snch a thing, as
that
is,

it is

an impossibility of 18. divided throughout by ether.
atom as a whole which has no
into
parts,
is

says some one,

The Naiyayika

defines the

a thing which

not divisible

further parts.
is

Someone

controverts the definition by saying that an atom

not devoid of parts

because

it is

intersected by ether within

and

icithout.

87.

Else there would not be the omnipresence of

the ether. 19. The ether would not be
within the atoms.

called omnipresent

if it

could not reside

rfWTW:
88.

II

9

I

*
is

I

Ro'll

There

no

" within" or

" without" of an eter-

nal thing.

The terms

are

applicable only to factitious

things inasmuch as they imply constituents other
those which are seen.

than

— 20.
is

The word " within" refers to that constituent of a thing which is enclosed by another constituent thereof while the word " without" refers
to that constituent

which encloses another constituent, but

not enclosed

by it. These terms cannot be applied to eternal things such as atoms which do not possess constituents some of which may enclose the rest.

ad^n^ftwro flslmsgji
89.

«

i

r

nt

ir

The

ether is omnipresent because of the univer-

sality of its conjunction

which

is

a cause of sound.

-21.

— —

Owing

to

Boutfd

being produced
If

everywhere

it

is

inferred tHife
^

the ether is omnipresent.

ether there would be no sound

a certain place were devoid of contact with there. There is in fact a conjunction of

ether everywhere.

90.
it is

The ether possesses three properties
it

;

viz.

that

not repelled, that

pervading. 22. The ether is not
it

does not obstruct and that
because
it it

it is all-

repelled

does not possess any form,

does not obstruct because
it is

is

intangible,

and

it

is

all-pervading

because

omnipresent.

4iR*Hdl3f
91.

mqHlMMTk<W*fa re:
are,

II

*

I

*

I

R^

II

There

says some
is

one,

parts in an

atom
also

because a thing that

endowed with a form must

possess a collocation of parts. 23. The objection stands thus An atom is divisible into parts because
:

it

possesses a form, that

is,

it is

of a limited dimension.

The

ether, soul, space

and time being of unlimited dimensions are

not divisible into parts.]

#fortaq%3r u 9
92.

i

*

i

*? u

An

atom, continues the objector, must possess
it is

parts because

capable of being conjoined with another
:

atom. 24. The objection is this The fact that atoms possess
Only in some of
its parts.

the quality of conjunction proves that

they have parts, because an atom can come in conjunction with another

W^tmiR^ WWl^^
I

l

^v

T:

It

9

I

VI *K

11

93.

Tile doctrine of the indivisibility of atoms cannot,

we

reply,

rise to
If

be refuted because such a refutation would give a regreasm ad infinitum which is not proper.;—-25.

is divisible into parts, you will have to admit that those parts again are divisible into further parts. This would give rise .*$ regreasut dd infinitum which ehould, if possible, be

you say that an atom


$y0ideci:.

were indefinitely divisible we should find alarg© thing and a small one to be of equal dimensions as both possess an infinite'
:

If all things

number of parts. A thing although itself, There must remain a particle,
even at the time of annihilation.

indefinitely
viz,

divided should not lose

an atom which should not perish

Md^-KNl^oift^^g ^"JMsrf*^:
94.

II

VM

R

I

H

II

Things, some say, do not possess a reality
just as there is
22.

if

they

are separated from our thoughts,
in a

no reality

web

separated from
is

its

threads.

The objection
as a
it is

this :—

Tilings do not possess a reality independent of our thoughts just

web does not
aphorism

possess a reality

independent of

its

threads.

Hence

our thoughts alone that are
refers
to

real,

the external things are all unreal.
of

[This

the

doctrine

the

Yogacara

Buddhist

philosophy explained in the Lankavatftra Sutra].*

oqi
95.

^teH^ g;
we
if

II

*

I

*

I

*V9

II

The

reason,

reply, is not

good as

it

hurts

itself.—27.

The Naiyayika says
do not possess a
is

that his opponent's reason, viz, that things

reality

they

are separated

from

our thoughts,

if things are capable of being separated from our thoughts they cannot be said to be unreal, and on the other hand

self-destructive because

if

things are unreal

they are

incapable of being separated from our
contradiction

thoughts.

The opponent commits a

by saying that things

are unreal and at the same time by going to separate

them from our

thoughts.

rKTT
96.

Mq^l^qm^ll^
is,

||

9

I

*

I

*q

II

There
its

we

reply,

no separate perception of a

refuge and

refugee.

— 28.
l

tctt^toiis mfo»»mnj frswrerar

$ftrcrp

i

m
A web
them.

BOOK

IV,
its

chapter

n.

being the refuge of

threads, the perception of

the^pr^er

includes that of the latter so that there are no separate pereBpjjrpna/pj
If our thoughts were the refuge of external things', then there Would be no separate perceptions of them. But the opp^ent?s%argttVment viz., that "if things are separated from our thoughts," makes

it

manifest that our thoughts are not the refuge of external things.

97. And things are established by evidences,—^2ty The reality of things is proved by evidences such as perception. Every thing requires an evidence for its establishment. The very assertion that "things are not real if they cannot be separated from our thoughts" must be based on an evidence if it is to commend itself to our acceptance. Hence we cannot deny things if they are established by evidences.

98.

The

non-reality of things
that " there is
is

is

demonstrated neither

by evidences nor without them.
The proposition
way.
If

—30.
If

you say that there
viz, that,

nothing" cannot be proved in any an evidence to prove it, you hurt your
again you say that there
?

own
.is

proposition,

there is nothing.

no evidence, how do you then establish your proposition

99.

ledge,

The concept of the means and the objects of knowsays some one, bears analogy to that of things in a

dream.

—31.
the objects of

The means and

knowledge are as delusive as things

appearing in a dream.

[The aphorisms 4-2-31 and 4-2-32 evidently refer to the Buddhist doctrine of "non-reality " expounded in the Arya-Upali-priccha, Samadhiraja-sutra,

Arya-gagana-gaiija-sutra, Madhyamika-sutra,

Arya-ratnavali,

Lalitavistara-sutra and other
«*

Mahayana

works.'

15

]

*FST TlfVJ

11T

?5«Rit

T« 1bI«N»PC*
,

Ijtll I
ll

qfrWHRffft

*«n*

ffOT *?$

^qifW^

(Madhyamika-Satra, Chap. VII.)

*&q weipfyt

n€tfa*T

ifo

mm

tsjfifcf

iwj

i

mm

Vftlfct Slftl

%

fa*?**

I

(Arya-TJpftlipriccha, quoted in
i

(Quoted in MadhyamikA VvittI, p. 57). M. V. 88)
(Arya-samidhiraja-Biia$Vpitti,

mtnrnnf

nn^H^^f^v^afvrairnf^i^nn!
tlmka quoted
in

Madhyamika

Chap. XXI.)

the mmmtjums.

m
I"*
I

MMH H*^^y ftwil«hN*i
ICKX
It
hibited in jugglery, etc.

:

II

*

A*

«

may, continues the objector, be likened to

jugglery, Ihe city of the celestial quiristers or a mirage. 32. The means and the objects of knowledge are as unreal as things ex-

34MHI4fofit: H *
101.

I

*

I

**

II

This cannot, we reply, be proved, as there

is

no

reason

for, it.

— 33.
in

There is no reason that the concept of the means and the objects of knowledge should bear an analogy to the concept of things in a dream
but not to that of things
in our wakeful state,

our wakeful

state.

If you, to

prove the un-

reality of things in a dream,

adduce the reason that these are not perceived
to prove the reality of the means and adduce the reason that these are perceived in

we would,

the objects

of knowledge,
state.

our wakeful

*qfikifgm«l
102.

*w&WSrr:

II

e

i

r

I

II

The concept of things in a dream arises same way as remembrance and imagination. 34.

in the

of

The things that appear in a dream are not unreal. We can conceive them in a dream just as we can do in our wakeful state. Our concept of things in the dream is due to our memory and imagination. It is by a reference to- the knowledge in our wakeful condition, that we ascertain our knowledge in the dream to be unreal. But in the
viz.,

event of there being only one condition,

that of wakefulness, the ana*

logy to the dream would not be appropriate.

ti{9fMft:ii a
103.

i

*

i

n

u
is

Our

false

apprehension

destroyed by a know-

ledge of the truth, just as our concept of objects in a dream comes to an end on our awaking. 35.

In the case of jugglery, the city of the celestial quiristers and

"that" when we mistake a post for a man. The objects of the apprehension are, however, not unreal, inasmuch as they arise from our memory and imagination,
it is false,

the mirage, ©ur apprehension, if to what is " not that " just as

consists of our imputing

18

.

m-

book iv, chaiptwii;
JyQglery- (inaya) consists of a false aMprehensloix J.^)daced in others
of materials similar to those originally

by an artificer through the use announced by him.

Just as our concept of objects in a dream passes away as soon as we are awake, so also our false apprehension of objects disappears as soon as we attain a true knowledge of those objects.

104.

There

is

therefore no denial of false knowledge,
is

inasmuch as we perceive that there knowledge .—36
It

a cause for that
is

has already been shown that our concept of objects in a dream

unreal, inasmuch as

we do

not actually perceive them at that time, but
unreal,

that the objects of the

dream are not
In

inasmuch as they
itself
I

arise

from

our memory and

imagination.

fact,

the objects that give rise to false

knowledge are never unreal, although the knowledge
II

may be
I

false.

dTclM^IM^l^ fa ^l^?ft*?IMMfrl : 9 * And false knowledge involves a 105.
and appearance of its object. :'.:. When we mistake a post for

V*

II

two-fold

character on account of the distinction between the essence

37.

a man, our knowledge assumes the " that is man." Our knowledge of the post,, in so far as it is called form " that " is a true knowledge^ but in so far as it is described as " man "
is

a false knowledge.

This

falsity of

of certain properties

common

to the post

knowledge is due and the man.
II

to our recognition

KHlftWftNI*IWI<t
106.

9
38.

I

R

I

The knowledge
is

of truth

a special practice of meditation.
Meditation
the
soul's

is

rendered habitual by

union with the mind abstracted from the

senses whose contact with objects does not produce' any perception.

The

knowledge of the truth
this' meditation.

is

rendered habitual by the repeated practice of

HWfii&MSIN^IdL
107.

HI'^IU

.11

Meditation, some say, is not

practicable

by

reason of the predominance of certain external

olyects.''--39.

There are innumerable obstacles to meditation, e, g., hearing the thundering noise of a cloud, one is prevented from practising meditation;

108.

And by
etc.
thirst,

reason of our being impelled to action
heat and cold, disease,
etc.,

by hunger,

—40.
sometimes prevent

Ranger and

as from practising meditation.

109.
fruits of

It arises,

we

reply,

through possession of the

our former works.
life.

— 41.

We acquire

a habit of practising meditation in consequence of our

good deeds of a previous

110.

We

are instructed
forest, a
practised

to

practise meditation

in

such places as a
by any
obstacle.

cave or a sand-bank.

—42.

The meditation

in these places is not seriously disturbed

sro^ifs
111.

<afcr srcifp t

Such

possibilities

? may
u

i

*

i

** h

occur even in release.

—43.
Even a person who has attained violence of an external object.
release

may be

disturbed by the

112.

It is,

we

reply, not so, because

knowledge must

spring up only in a body already in the state of formation.
violent external object produces knowledge only in a body which has been formed, in consequence of our previous deeds and which is endowed with senses, etc.

—44. A

snwwnraif
113.

\\

mil

**

ii

And

there

is

absence of a body in our release.
»

—45.
Onr.merits and demerits having already been exhausted,
get a

we cannot

body

after

we have
:

attained release.

Release

is

the perfect freedom

from

all sufferings

it

consists in a complete destruction of all the seeds,

and seats of

suffering.

&S

BOOK

IV,

CflA£TMH.

For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain
114.

by following the gleaned from the Yoga institute—46.
duties as

well as

spiritual

injunctions

In order to attain release we must practise meditation after our soul

has been purified by our abstinence,
the

etc.

The

injunctions gleaned from

Yoga

institute refer

to penances,

the controlling of our breaths, the

fixing of our mind, etc.

115.

To

secure release,

it is

necessary to study and

follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions with those learned in that treatise.— 47.
by the Yoga institute caunot be we have already acquired a true knowledge of the categories explained in the Nyaya fkstra. It is therefore very useful to study the Nyaya $astra and to hold discussions with persons
properly assimilated
unless

The

spiritual injunctions furnished

learned in the iSastra.

116.

One should

enter upon discussions with unenvi-

ous persons, such as disciples, preceptors,

and seekers of the aummum bonum.
The
desire victory.

fellow-students

48.

epithet " unenvious " excludes those

who do not seek truth but Discussion has been defined in aphorism 2r~l.

1—

ultaflflHIlft *T *wl«Mui *lffl&
i

II

«

-|

*

|

S*.

||

117.

Incase

of a

necessity for the search of truth,

discussion

may be

held even without an opposing side.—49

A
nation

person desirous of knowledge

by simply expressing

may submit his views for examihis curiosity for truth without an attempt

to establish the views.

Wranglings and cavils may be employed to keep up our zeal for truth just as fences of thorny boughs 50. are used to safe-guard the growth of seeds.
118.

Certain talkative people propound philosophies which are mutually

opposed, while others violate

all

sense of rectitude out of a bias for their

own
tfnd

side.

Seeing

that

these people

are not freed from faults,
cavils

have not attained true knowledge we may, in our disputation against them,

employ wranglings and
profit or

which do not iu themselves deserve any

encomium.

Book V, Chapter

I.

s?^on%^^T

1

Futilities
(2) (4)

are

as

follows :-<D' Balancing
(3)

the

homogeneity,

balancing the heterogeneity

balancing

an addition,

questionable, (6)

halancmg the balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing balancing the unquestionable, (7)
(8)

the alternative,

the co-presence, (10)

t*toing balancing the reciprocity, (9) babalancing the mutual absenee, (11)

balancing the counterlancing the infinite regression, (12) (14) balancing example, (13) balancing the non-produced, controversy, (16) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the the presumption, (18) balancthe non-reason, (17) balancing balancing the demonstration, ing the non-difference, (19) perception, (21) balancing the non(20) balancing the non-eternality, (23) balancperception, (22) balancing the the effect.— 1. ing the eternality and (24) balancing
in general terms which is a fallacious argument, has been The twenty four kinds of futility enundefined in aphorism 1-248. characters defined in due course. The fallacious ciated here will each be exposed in separate aphorisms. twenty four kinds will also be
Futility,

of the

an argument based on a homogeneous one offers an opposition based.on or heterogeneous example the opposition will .be called the same kind of example, " balancin^tbe hejerp^ ^balancing the homogeneity" or
2.

If against

neity.''Tr2?

Balancing the Mmo<^neiiy.-^-A certain person, to prove the noneternality of sound, argues as follows :*—

Sound

is non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition :-rSound
is eternal,
it is

because

incorporeal,

like the sky."

The argument,
ducts.

viz.,

sound

is

non-eternal,

is

based on the homosaid to be based on
of

geneity of sound with the non-eternal pot on the ground of both being pro-

The

opposition,

vis.,

sound

is

eternal,

is

the homogeneity of sound with the

eternal sky 'on the alleged ground
futile

both being incorporeal.

This sort of opposition,

as

it is,

is

called

" balancing the homogeneity" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them.
Balancing the heterogeneity.

—A certain person,
:

to

prove ihe non-eter-

nality of sound, argues as follows

Sound
>"-'

is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,
is

whatever

is

npt non-eternal

not a product,

as the sky.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

Sound

is eternal,
it is is

because

incorporeal,
is

whatever

not eternal

not incorporeal,
as a pot.

The argument, viz., sound

is

non-eternal,

is

based on the heterogeneity

of sound from the not-non-eternal sky

The

opposition,

viz.,

sound

is eternal, is said to

which are mutually incompatible. be based on the heterogeto

neity of sound from the not-incorporeal pot which are alleged

be incalled

compatible with each other. This sort of opposition, futile as

it is, is

"balancing the heterogeneity" which aims at showing an equality of
the arguments of two sides in respect of the heterogeneity of examples

employed by them.

That is, we say, to be established through cowhood (or cow-type). 3,
3.

like a

cow


142

BOOK
The Naiyayika
says:
is

V,

CHAPTER

I.

—If the opposition

referred to in

the previous

aphorism

to

be valid

it

or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between
the predicate such as

must be based on the example, homogeneous tlie reason and
oi;

we discern between a cow and cowhood

a universal

disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as

we

discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. In the argument— " sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot" the homogeneous

example "pot" exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternality, all products being non-eternal but iu the opposition "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky" the homogeneous example sky does not exhibit a universal connection between

;

incorporeality

and eternaJity because there are things, such as
but not eternal.

intellect

or knowledge, which are incorporeal

A similar

obser-

vation is to be made with regard to the opposition called " balancing the In the opposition " sound is eternal, because it is incorheterogeneity."
poreal,

whatever

is

not

eternal

is

not

incorporeal,

as

a pot "

the

heterogeneous example pot does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which arc incorporeal but not
eternal.

4.

The

subject and example alternating their charac-

ters

or both

standing

in

need

of

proof,

there

occur

(futilities

called) " balancing an addition" " balancing a " balancing the questionable," " balancing subtraction." the unquestionable" " balancing the alternative " and

" balancing the reciprocity."

4.

Balancing an addition.— It agaiust an argument based on a certain
character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof the opposition will be called " balancing an addition."

A

certain person,
:

to

prove the
non-eternal,

non-eternality

of sound,

argues

as follows

Sound

is

because

it is

a product,

like a pot.

— —
the Iw&^tms;
A
certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

m
:—
it

Sound

is

non-eternal (and corporeal),
it is

because

a product,
is

like a pot (which

non-eternal as well as corporeal).
is

The opponent
must
also

alleges that
it
:

if

sound

non-eternal like a pot,

be corporeal like

non-eternal.

not corporeal let it be also not of futile opposition is called " balancing an This sort
if it is

addition " which aims at showing an

equality of tbe arguments of two

sides in respect of an additional character (possessed

by the example and

attributed to the subject).

Balancing a subtraction.
certain character of

If

against an
offers

the

example one
it,

argument based on a an opposition based on
be called " balancing

another character wanting in

the opposition will

a subtraction."

A

certain
:

person, to prove

the non-eternality

of sound,

argues

as follows

Sound

is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,

like a pot.

A certain

other person offers the following futile opposition

:—

Sound

is

non-eternal (but not audible),

because

it is

a product,

like a pot (which is non-eternal

but not audible.)
it

The' opponent alleges that

if

sound
;

is

non-eternal like a pot,
if

cannot be audible, for a pot

is

not audible

and

sound

is still

held to
is

be

audible, let it

be also not non-eternal.

This sort of futile opposition
at

called " balancing a subtraction "

which aims

the arguments of two sides in respect of

showing an equality of a certain character wanting in

the example (and consequently also in the subject),

Balancing the questionable.

If

one opposes an argument by main-

taining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called " balancing the questionable."

A

certain person,
:

to

prove the non-eternality of sound, argues

as follows

Sound

is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,

like a pot.


144

BOOK

V,

CHAPTER

I.

A certain other person offers a futile A pot. is non-eternal,
because
it is

opposition thus

:

a product,

like sound.

The opponent
question,

alleges that

if

the non-eternality of sound is called in

why

is

not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot

and sound are both products ? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect
of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.

Balancing the unquestionable.

If

one opposes an
is

argument

by

alleging that the character of the subject
of the example, the opposition
tionable."
will

as unquestionable as that

be called

"balancing the unquesargues as

A certain person,
follows:

to prove the

non-eternality of sound,

Sound

is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

A

pot

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like sound.

The opponent
be unquestionable,

alleges that
is

if

the non-eternality of a pot

is

held to

why

not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot

and sound are both products ? unnecessary on the ground of
character.

His object
its

is

to

render the argument
" balancing the

subject being of an unquestionable
is

This

sort of

futile

opposition

called

unquestionable "

which aims

at

showing the equality of the argu-

ments

of

two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the
of the subject.

example as well as

Balancing the alternative.

If

buting alternative characters to tion will be called " balancing Jhe alternative."

one opposes an argument by attrithe subject and the example, the opposinon-eternality of sound, argues as

A
follows

certain person, to prove the

:—
Sound
is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,

like a pot.


THE NXAYA-SUTRAS.
A
certain other {ferson offers a futile opposition thus
'""Sound is eternal
:


M5

and formless,
is

because

it is

a product,

like a pot

(which

non-eternal and has forms;.

The opponent
is

alleges that
is

the pot

yet one has form and the other

formless

and sound are both products, why on the same principle
:

not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal ?
is

This sort

of futile opposition
at

called
of the

" balancing

the alternative " which aims
of two sides in respect of

showing an equality

arguments

the

alternative characters attributed to the subject and example.

Balancing the reciprocity.
" balancing the reciprocity."

— If one opposes an argument

by alleging

a reciprocity of the subjoct and the example, the opposition will be called

A
follows
:

certain person, to prove the

non-eternality of sound, argues as

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

A

pot

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like sound.

The opponent
Sound
is to

alleges that the pot
its

and sound being both products,

one requires proof for

non-eternality as

much

as the other does.

be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot This leads is to be proved non-eternal by the examples of sound. to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in
conclusion as to the eternality or non-eternality of sound. This sort' of futile opposition is called " balancing the reciprocity " which

no

definite

brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the
subject and the example.

f^^^
5.

(

M 4^?^q^^Ki^^W^fc^^: III * 1*11 This is, we say, no opposition because there is a
I

between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality of their cha*
difference
racters.

5.
futilities called "

The Naiyayika says :— The

balancing an addition,"

"balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing

6

3A&
on the

BOOK
false

V,

CHAPTER

I.

the unquestionable" and "balancing

the alternative" are all based

supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the.
there is

example.

Though

no denial

of

an equality of the subject and
is

the example in certain characters, there

indeed a great difference

between them in other characters.

Sound

is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,
is

like a pot.

In this argument although there

an equality of "sound" and

"pot " in respect of their being both products, there is a great difference between them in other respects. A cow possesses some characters in common with a bosgameus but there is no complete identity between them. No body can commit the futilities mentioned above if he bears in mind the equality of the subject and the example only in those characters which
are warranted

by the reason (middle term). In the case of the futility called " balancing an addition " it is clear that the equality supposed to exist

between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product), because there are things, such as Similarly intellect or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal. futility called "balancing a subtraction," the reason with regard to the
(viz.

being a product) does not justify an equality of sound and pot in As regards the futilities called respect of their being not audible. " balancing the questionable " and " balancing the unquestionable," we
cannot ignore the difference between the subject and the example without putting an end to all kinds of inference. The futility called " balancing the alternative " introduces an equality between the pot and sound
in respect of a character (viz. being eternal)

which

is

not warranted by

the reason

viz.

being a product.

6.

And

because the example happens to surpass the
*
is

subject.


futility called " balancing the reciprocity "

The

based on the

false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as r^ut that one surpasses the other is evident from aphorism the subject,

1-1-25 which states that the example does not stand in as to its characters.

need of proof

Sound

is

non-eternal,

because

it is

a product,

like a pot,


THE NYSl^SPTEAS.

W

In this argument sound (the subject) may not be known by some to be non-eternal but a pot (the example) is known by all to be a product " Balancing the reciprocity " is therefore a fallaas well as non-eternal.
cious argument.

an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from or being
7.

If against

non-conducive to the predicate, be called " balancing the
Co-presence " or " balancing the mutual absence."
Balancing the eo-presenee.

7.

If

against an argument based on

the

co-presence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based

on the same kind of co-presence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from the predicate, be called " balancing
the co-presence."

A
follows
:

certain person, to prove that there is fire

in

the

hill,

argues as

The

hill

has
it

(ire,

because

has smoke,

like a kitchen.

A certain

other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

The

hill

has smoke,
it

because

has

fire,

like a kitchen.

the predicate.
is

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke
is

present at the same site which
If

occupied by the
lire

fire

or

is

absent from
site,

that site.

the

smoke

is

present with

at

the same

there

remains, according to the opponent, no reason from the predicate.

criterion to

distinguish
as

the a

The smoke

is,

in

his opinion,

much

reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the co-presence " which aims at stopping an

argument On the alleged ground of the co-presenccof the reason and the
predicate,


BOOK
V,

m
tion based on the

CHAPTER

I.

Balancing the mutual absence.

If

against an argument based on

th© mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposi-

same kind

of

mutual absence, the opposition

will,

on

account of the reason being non-condncive to the predicate, be called
" balancing the mutual absence."

A
follows:

certain person, to prove that there is fire in

the

hill,

argues as

The

hill

has
it

fire,

because

has smoke,

like a kitchen.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

The

hill lias
it

smoke,
fire,

because

has

like a kitchen.

The opponent asks
because
it

:

" Is the

smoke

to

be regarded as the reason
?"

is

absent from the site of the

fire

" Such a supposition
the predicate

is

indeed absurd."
not within
establish

The
it,

reason cannot
just as a

establish

without
is

being connected with
its

lamp cannot exhibit a thing which'
could be as

reach.
latter,

If a

reason unconnected with the predicate could
fire

the

then the

much

the reason for the

smoke as the smoke
to a close

This sort of futile opposition is called for the fire. " balancing the mutual absence " which aims at bringing an argument on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and

the predicate.

Mdl ft f^Mfa ^TT^tefr ^Tfa^TRSrfry^: II * 1*1 * II This is, we say, no opposition because we find the 8. production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons

by

spells.

8.

A

potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his

reach but an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from

a distance. Hence it is clear that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site and" sometimes by being absent from " Balancing $he co-presence " and " balancing the mutual absence" it.

which attach an undue importance
sites,

to

the proximity or remoteness of

are therefore totally fallacious arguments.

MU$^fa^M<^V

II

*

I

%

I

£

U


THE NYlYA^tiTRASv
9:


110

one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter-example,
If

the opposition will be called

" balancing the infinite regres*
9.

sion" or " balancing the counter-example."—
Balancing the infinite regression.

—A
:

certain

person, to prove the

non-eternality of sound, argues as follows

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A
If
is

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:


how
This

sound

is

proved

to be non-eternal

by the example

of a pot,

the pot again to be proved as non-eternal ?
is to

The reason which proves

the non-eternality of the pot

be proved by further reasons.

gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition "sound is non-eternal " not less than the proposition " sound is eternal." This " balancing the infinite regression " sort of futile opposition is called

which aims
which
is

at stopping

an argument by introducing an

infinite regression

said to beset the example.
the.

Balancing

counter-example.

— A certain person,
:

to

prove the non-

eternality of sound, argues as follows

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,
-

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

Sound

is eternal,

like the sky.

The opponent
example of a
of the sky ?
pot,
If

alleges that
it

if

sound

is

held to be non-eternal by the
is set aside, let

why

should not be held to be eternal by the example

the example of the sky

the pot too be set aside.

This sort of

futile opposition is called

the example of " balanc-

ing the counter-example " which aims

at

setting aside

an argument

by the introduction

of a counter-example.
II

sr^^R^Wf^TRrrf^f^T:
.

11

t

I

! •

II

10.»

The example does
its

not,

we

say, require a 'series of

reasons for

establishment just as a lamp does not require
its illumination.-?— 10.

a series of lamps to be brought in for


ISO

"

SQO& X
The Naiyayika says
:

CHA^IM
It

An
ordinary
reasons

example

is

a thing the characters of which are well-known to an

man as well as to an expert. to reveal its own character or to
which
it

does not require a series of
sub-

reveal the character of the

ject with

stands in the relation of

In this respect

it

homogeneity or heterogeneity. resembles a lamp which illumines itself as well as the
its

things lying within

reach.

Sound

is non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

In this argument the pot
it

is-

the example which

is

so well-known that

requires no proof as to

its

being a product or being non-eternal.
" balancing the infinite regression

Hence the opposition
is

called

not founded on a sound basis.

11.

The example, we

say, cannot,

reasonable only because a counter-example
the reason.

be set aside as unis advanced as

11.
:

The Naiyayika says The opponent must give a
should be taken as specially should not be taken as such.

special reason

why

the counter-example

fitted to

lead to a conclusion, and the example

Until such a special reason is given, the counter-example cannot be accepted as leading to a definite conclusion.-

In fact a mere counter-example without a reason (middle term) attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion. Hence we must rely on an

example attended by reason but not on a counter-example unattended by
reason.

Sound

is eternal,

like the sky.

This opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example therefore to be rejected as unreasonable.

is'

one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing 4©B.oted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the op12.
If

position will be called "balancing the non-produced."


THE NYiraWSUTBia

W
non-eternal,

A certain person,
follows:—

to

prove that sound

is

argues as

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

an

effect of effort,

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

Sound

is eternal,
it is

because

a non-effect of

effort,

like the sky.

vis.,

.The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, viz.,
it

sound ^while
eternal,
it

is

not yet produced).
eternal.

Consequently sound
is,

is

not non-

must then be

There

according to the opponent,

an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being noneternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort.

This sort of

futile

opposition
to

is

called

" balancing the non-produced "

which

pretends

show an equality

of the
to

arguments of two sides assuming the thing
be as yet non-produced.

denoted by the subject

no opposition against our reason so well predicable of the subject which becomes as such
13.

This

is,

we

say,

only

when

it is

produced.

13.

The Naiyayika disposes of- the futile opposition called " balancing the non-produced "by stating that the subject can become as such only when it is produced, and that there is then no obstacle to the property
of the reason

being

predicated
is eternal,
it,

of

it.

The
it is

opposition,

vis.,

" sound

(while non-produced)
carries

because

not then an effect of effort,"
the sound to be the subject
is

no weight with
it is

since

we do not take
it is

before

produced.
is

Sound, while
non-eternal.

produced,

certainly an effect

of effort

and as such

*pf:
14.
,

II

tl

t

I

19

II

one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the
If

non-eternal consequent on the example
so

and

its

genus

(or


152

*

BOOK

V,

CHAPTER I

type) being equally

objects of perception, the opposition

will be called " balancing the doubt."

14.

A
follows

certain person,
:

to

prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as

Sound

is non-eternal,
it is

because
like a

a product,

pot.
:

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

Sound

is

non-eternal or eternal (?)
it is

because

an object of perception,

like a pot or pot-ness.

The opponent
as pot-ness

alleges that

sound

is

homogeneous with a pot as well
;

but the pot inasmuch as both are objects of perception being non-eternal and pot-ness (tbe genus of pots or pot-type) being eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. Thi» sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the doubt " which aims at rejecting an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from
the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.

unit
15.

inn

no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends. 15.
This
is,

we

say,

:

The Naiyayika

saj's

:

Sound cannot be

said to be eternal on the

mere ground of
but
it

its

geneity with pot-ness (the ge»«s of pots

or pot- type)

homomust be

pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from Though on the score of the same in respect of being a product. homogeneityVe may entertain doubt as to whether sound is eternal
but on the score of heterogeneity we can pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in
or

non-eternal,

* The term sdmauya in the sense of "general evidently taken from the Vaiaesika philosophy.

notion, genus

or type "

was


THE NYAYA-80TRAS.
respect of
things.
If
its

153

homogeneity

with as well as heterogeneity from other
to its true nature, that

even then there remainB any donht as
never end.

doubt

will

16.

which

is

"Balancing the controversy" is an opposition conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or

heterogeneity from) both sides.

16.

A
follows
:

certain

person,

to

prove the non-eternal ity of sound, argues as

Sound

is

non- eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:—

Sound

is eternal,
it is

because

audible,

like soundness.

sound is non-eternal, oaunot be proved because the reason, viz., audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is
alleges that the proposition,
viz.

The opponent

provokes the very controversy for the settlement of which it was employed. This sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the controversy " which hurts an argument by giving rise to the very controversy
eternal),

which was

to

be

settled.

II

*

I

\

I

V9-.A
pro-

we say, no opposition because it vokes a controversy which has an opposing side. 17..
17.

This

is,

The Naiy&yika says:

—The

opposition called " balancing the con-

main argument because it leads to a which suppprfea one side quite as strongly as it is opposed controversy

troversy " cannot set aside the

by

the other side.

3*Mifa3W<isWH
18.*

*

II

*

I

t

I

%*

II

which

is

"Balancing the non-reason" is an opposition based on the reason being shown to be impossible

at all the three times.

18.


154

BOOK
A
certain
:

V,

CHAPTER

1.

person, to prove

the non-eternal ity of sound, argues as

follows


Sound
is

non-ejernal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

Here "being a product"
eternal "

is

the

reason or sign for " being non-

which

is the predicate or significate.
:

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus
is

The reason or sign
significate.
(a)

impossible at

all

the three times because

it

cannot precede, succeed, or be

simultaneous

with

the predicate

or

The

reason (or sign) does not precede the predicate (or signiits

ficate)

because the former gets

name only when

it

establishes the latter.

It

is

impossible for the reason to be called as such before the establishof the predicate.
{b)

ment

The

reason (or sign) does not succeed the predicate (or significate)
if it latter

because what would be the use of the former
(c)

existed already.

The reason

(or sigu)

and the predicate

(or significate)

cannot

exist simultaneously

for

they will

then be reciprocally connected like
"
is

the right and left horns of a cow.

This sort of

futile opposition is called "

balancing the non-reason

which aims
impossible at

at
all

setting aside an

argument by showing that the reason

the three times.

19.

There

is,

we

say,

no impossibility
is

at the three

times because the predicate or significate
19. the reason or sign. The knowledge The Naiyayika says
:

established

by

of the

knowable and the

establishment of that

which

is
is

which must precede that which
established.

be established take place from reason to be known and that which is to be
to

Mftflm«y4M %:
20.

Mfd^oq Mfofrft
i

(I

*

I

\

I

II

which
It

is

There is, we further say, no opposition of that to be opposed, because 'the opposition itself is
all

impossible at

the three times.
which
is to

20.

being impossible for the opposition to precede, succeed or be
that

aiinultiineous with

be opposed, the opposition

itself is

invalid

and consequently the

original

argument holds good.

.

THE NYiYA^OTEAS.

155

Wqh^RT: S|^M^(^^fqfi|^l(
21.
If

:

II

\

{

%

[

%%

II

one advances an opposition on the basis of a

presumption, the opposition will be called " balancing the presumption. "
follows

—21

A certain person,
:

to

prove the non-eternality of sound,
non-eternal,
it is

argues as

Sound

is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

Sound

is

presumed
it is

to

be eternal,

because

incorporeal,

like the sky.

The opponent
duct), it

alleges that

if

sound

is

non-eternal

on account of

its

homogeneity with non-eternal things
account of
its

(e.g.

in respect of its

being a prois

may be concluded by presumption
homogeneity with eternal things
This sort of futile opposition

that sound
{e.g.

eternal

in respect of its called

on being

incorporeal).

is

"balancing the

presumption "

which aims

at

stopping an argument by setting presump-

tion as a balance against

it.

22
would,

If

things unsaid could
say, arise a

come by presumption,
the

there

we

possibility of

opposition itself

being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid conclusion. 22.

Sound

is eternal,
it is

because

incorporeal,

like the sky.
If

reason,

by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the we could from the opposition cited above draw the following

conclusion:

Sound

is

presumed
it is

to

be non-eternal,

because

a product,

like a pot.


156


BOOK
by
the

V,

CHAPTER
itself.

I.

This would hurt the opposition

In fact the presumption as
If

adduced

opponent
its

is

erratic.

one says that "sound
",

is

non-eternal because of

homogeneity with non-eternal things
is

the pre-

"sound is eternal because of its " and viae versa. homogeneity with eternal things There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called " balancing the
sumption that naturally follows
that
;

presumption "

is

untenable.

23.

If the

subject and, example

are treated as non-

different in respect of the possession of a certain property

on

account of their possessing in

common

the property con-

noted by the reason,
are mutually

it

follows as a conclusion that all things

non-different in respect of the

possession of
:

every property on account of their being existent
of opposition is

this sort

called " balancing the non- difference."
to

23.

A
follows
:

certain person,

prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A
If

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

tho pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of nontheir

eternality in consequence of

both being products,

it

follows as a

conclusion that

all

things are mutually non-different in respect of the

being existent. no difference existing between the eternal and the nonTherefore, This sort of opposition is called eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. " balancing the n^n-diiference " which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

possession of every property in consequence of their

24.

This
in

possessed

we say, no opposition because the property common by the subject and the example
is,


THE NYAYA-SOTBAS,


157

happens in certain instances to abide in the reason while in
other instances not to abide in Sound is non-eternal,
because
it is

it.

-24.

a product,

like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being
a product are treated as non^different in respect of the possession of noneternality. On the same principle if all things are treated as non-different
in consequence of their being existent,

we would

like to

know
:

in what

respect they are non-different.

If

they are treated as non-different in

respect of liOn-eternality, then the

argument would stand thus

All things are non-eternal,

because they are existent,
like(?)
all things" being the subject, there is nothing which may serve as an example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are non-eternal since some at least are eternal. not In other words, nonleft

In this argument "

eternality abides in

existent things.

some existent things and does not abide in other Hence all things are not mutually non-different and the
is

opposition called " balancing the non-difference"

unreasonable.

^Vf^chKlihMMTi^MMRlHHi
25.
If

II

V.

I

\

i

^V.

II

an opposition

is

offered

by showing that both

the demonstrations are justified by reasons, the opposition
will be called " balancing the demonstration."

25.
of

A
-follows
:

certain

person

demonstrates

the non-eternality

sound as

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers

an opposition by the alleged demons:

tration of the eternality of

sound as follows Sound is eternal,
because
it is

incorporeal,

like the sky.

demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternality
in

The reason

the

first


158


BOOK
.


Yj

OflAPTEB 1

»f sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance
against the first to create a dead lock. " balancing the demonstration."

This sort of opposition

is

called

26.

This

is,

we
:

say,

no opposition because there

is

an admission of the first demonstration. The Naiyayika says The opponent having asserted that both
justified

— 26.
the demonstrations are
first

tration

by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the which supports the non-eternality of sound. If

demonsdenies

to avoid the

incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he
the reason which supports non-eternality

now

we would ask why does he jam''

deny the other reason which supports the eternality of sound, for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons. Hence the opposition called " balancing the demonstration " is not well-founded.

^fts^^^TWRS^q^FHTfM^^^H:
27.
If

II

*

I

*

I

*V»

II

on the ground tha*t we perceive the character of the subject even without the interan opposition
is offered

vention of the reason, the opposition
the perception."— 27.

Avill

be called "balancing
argues as

A
follows

certain person, to prove the
:

non-eternality of sound,

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it.

because

is

a product,

like a pot.

A
that
of
^the
it is

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason a product, for we perceive that sound is produced by the branches
broken

trees

perception "

by wind. This sort of opposition. is called " balancing which aims at demolishing an argument by setting up
it.

an act of perception as a balance against

** u «M<4ure rcwft aOTfo^terRfar: u * \ This is, we say, no opposition because that 28. character can be ascertained by other means as well. 28.
i

\

The Naiyayika
because
it is

says that the argument, viz., "
like

sound

is

non-eternal,

a product,

a pot," implies that sound

is

proved to be

"

THE NYAYA-8TJTRAS.
*iion-eternal

159
It

through the reason that
etc.,

it is

a product.

does not deny
to

Qthejt

means, such as perception

which also may prove sound

be

non-eternal.

Hence the opposition called " balancing the perception

does not set aside the main argument.

srfercw u *
29.
If

\

%

i

**

ii

against an argument, proving the non-existence

of a thing

by the non-perception

thereof,

one
will

offers

an

opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-percep-r
the non-perception, the " balancing the non-perception."
tion of

opposition
that

be called

— 29.
there
In
veil
is no veil aphorism 2-2-20

In aphorism 2-2-19 the Naiyayika has stated

which covers sound

for

we do not perceive such a
If

his opponent has stated that there is a veil because

we do not perceive
its

the

non-peroeption thereof.

the non-perception of a thing proves

non-

existence, the non-perception of the non-perception must, in

the opinion

of the opponent, prove the existeuce of the thing. " balancing the non-perception" which is called

This sort of opposition

aims at counteracting
it.

an argument by setting up

non-perception as a balance against
II

^gq«n^H+^l«3M<H*v|<^i:
30.

V.

I

%

\

\*

II

The reasoning through non-perception
sound, because non-perception
is

is not,

we

say,

merely the negawhich
is

tion of perception.

—30.
says
:

The Naiyayika
of non-perception

— Perception
is

refers to that

existent

while non-perception to that which

non-existent.

The non-perception

which

signifies a

mere negation

of non-perception cannot

be interpreted as referring

to an existent thing. Hence the opposition called " balancing the non-perception" is not well-founded.

31.

There

is,

moreover, an internal perception of the

existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds
of knowledge.

31.

There are internal perceptions of such forms as" I am sure," "I am not sure," " I have doubt," " I have no doubt" etc., which prove that we can perceive the non-existence of knowledge as well as the existence
81


160
thereof.


BOOK
V,

CHAPTER
itself is

I.

Hence the non-perception
falls to the

perceptible,

and as there

is

no non-perception
non-perception"

of non-perception, the opposition called " balancing the

ground.

'HI*
32.
If

UH

II

one finding that things which are homogeneous

possess equal characters, opposes an argument
non-eternality to all things, the opposition " balancing the non-eternality.' 32.'

by attributing
will

be called

A
follows
:

certain person, to prove

the nou-eternality of sound, argues as

Sound

is non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,

like a pot.

A
If

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus

:

sound
is

is

non-eternal on account of its
it

a pot which

non-eternal,

will follow as a

being homogeneous with consequence that all things

are non-eternal because they are in

some one or other respect homogeneous
all

with the pot —a consequence which will render
for

inferences

impossible

want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called " balancing the non-eternal" which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.

*?TWI?«tfa& srf^rftrfe: MfaVq<Him+qf^
* It
33.
I

II

\\

II

unfounded because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity and because there is homogeneity even with that which is oppossay,
is

The

opposition,

we

ed.

—33.

The Naiyayika

says

:


the character of a thing from
:

We cannot

ascertain

its

mere homological

geneity with another thing

in doing so

we must consider the

connection between the reasou and the predicate.
is

non-eternal

not merely because
is

it is

Sound, for instance, homogeneous with a non-eternal

a universal connection between "being proa duct" and "being non-eternal." Hence it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homopot but because there

THE NYiYA-SCTBAS.

geneous with a non-eternal pot in some one or other respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal sky in some one or The opposition other respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. " balancing the non-eternal " is therefore not fonnded on a sound called
basis.

^r

^sx^ ^r snssrerrewT^ s^rnro ^^fer tgm'^wrmrfrarff^: * \ \*
||
i [

||

no non-distinction, because the reason is known to be the character which abides in the example as conducive to the establishment of the predicate and because it is applied in both ways. 34.
34.

There

is,

we

say,

The Naiy&yika says
all

that

we

are

not justified in concluding that

things are non-eternal because there is no character in respect of which " all things " may be homogeneous with a pot. In order to arrive

at a correct conclusion

character of the

we must consider the reason as being that example (and consequently of the subject) which bears
with
the

a universal connection

character of the predicate.

possesses no such character in

common

with "all things."

The pot The reason

moreover
ways.

is

applied in the homogeneous as well as in the heterogeneous

We

cannot draw a conclusion from a mere homogeneity of the

The opposition called subject with tho example in a certain respect. " balancing the non-eternal " is therefore tmreasonablo.

fa^44fe^MKft^pM^MMTlW<*l*W:
35.
If

II

V.

1

%

I

^K

II

nality to all

one opposes an argument by attributing eternon-eternal things on the ground of these being
will be called "balanc-

eternally non-eternal, the opposition

ing the eternal."

— 35.
to

A certain
follows
:

person,

prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

a product,
like a pot.

A certain

other person offers a futile opposition thus

:—You

say

sound always or only sometimes ? If the non-eternality exists always, the sound must If the nonalso be always existent, or in other words, sound is eternal. eternality exists only sometimes, then too the sound must in the absence
that sound is non-eternal.

Does

this non-eternality

exist in


BOOK
V,

m
is

CHAPTER

I.

of non-eternality be pronounced to be eternal.

This sort of opposition which counteracts an argument by called "balancing the eternal"

setting

up

eternality as a balance against

it.

gfcfasjmre:
36.

II

V.
is,

I

\\
say,

U

II

This
is

opposed

no opposition because the thing always non-eternal on account of the eternality of

we

36. the non-eternal. The Naiyayika says :— By speaking of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be always non-eternal and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other by admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it Hence " balancing the eternal " is not a sound opposiis also eternal.
:

tion.

M^H+l^fo+^l**l^*W:
37.
If

II

V.

I

\

I

^vs

||

one opposes an

argument by showing the

diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition will be called " balancing the effect." 37.

A
follows
:

certain

person

to

prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

an

effect of effort.
:

A

certain other person offers a futile opposition thus
effect of effort is

found to be of two kinds, vis. (1) the producwhich was previously non-existent, e.g. a pot, and tion of something (2) the revelation of something already existent, e.g. water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind ? If sound is an
effect of

The

the

first

kind

it

will

be

non-eternal

but

if it

is

of the

second

kind

it will

be

eternal.

Owing

to this

diversity
is

of the

effects of effort,

it is not possible to conclude that sound opposition is called " balancing the effect."

non-eternal.

This sort of

*lWfor^ 5WHI^^4^M^fcM<W<aflM<j3:
i
38.
Effort,
I

II

*

I

^

II

did not give rise to the second kind

of

efect, because there

was no cause of non-perception.

—38.

——

The Naiy&yika answers
as follows:

the opposition called " balancing >he effect"

by our effort because we are it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence sound is an effect which is not revealed but
that sound is revealed

We cannot say

unable to prove that

produced.

39.

The same
A

defect,

we

say, attaches

to the opposi-

tion too.

— 39.
certain person argued
:

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

an
it

effect of effort.

would not be meant a thing revealed. The Naiy&yika observes that if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word " effect ", why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground ? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special
non-eternal
if

A

certain other person opposed
"effect "

saying that sound

ground

to

suppose that the "

effect " in the

produced and
that the

not revealed," so also there is

argument signified " a thing no special ground to suppose

word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence the opposition called "balancing the effect " is selfdestructive.

«oJ5Nn
40.
If a special

ii

v

i

%

{


to

ii

Thus everywhere.
meaning
is

40.
the opposition, the

to

be attached

same

meaning

will

have to be attached to the original argument.

In this

respect there will be an equality of the two sides in the case of opposition such as " balancing the homogeneity " etc.

of all kinds

Slfrf^rftsrfrl^
41.

MWh<fl*milN

:

||

*

\

^

\

*?

||

Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposiit

tion just as

attaches to the opposition.
person to

— 41.

A
follows
:

certain

prove the non-eternal ity of sound, argues as

Sound

is

non-external,
it is

because

an

effect of effort.

IM
A certain
offers

BOOK
an opposition thus
:

V,

CHAPTER
that

I.

other person, seeing

the effect

is

diverse kinds


it is

Sound
(Here "effect "

is eternal,

because

an

effect of effort.

may mean "a thing

revealed by effort.")

The arguer replies that sound cannot bo concluded to be eterjial because the reason " effect " is erratic (which may mean " a thing produced by
effort.")

again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason " effect " is erratic (which may
rises

The opponent

mean a thing

revealed

by

effort).

So the defect which

is

pointed out in

the case of the opposition,

may

also be

pointed out in the case of the

opposition of the opposition.

sifter srfhwpgjfar srt^rfirarfa^ sftht *ta-

sra#

*Rn«prr
If

II

M

t

I

9*

II

one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called " admis42.

sion of an opinion."

—52.
down a
viz.

A

certain person lays

proposition which

is

opposed by a certhat the

tain other person.

The

first

person, viz. the disputant charges the opposition
the opponent, with a defect
e.g.

made by
reason

the second person,

is erratic.

The opponent
it

instead of rescuing his opposition from the

defect with

which

has been charged by the disputant, goes on chargthe
is

ing the disputant's opposition of the opposition with

same

defect.

The counter-charge which

the opponent

brings in this way

interpreted

by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant's reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called " admission of an opinion."

"

mjwkwimT *N
43.

fftrn

hi

t

i

*\n
when
the

" Admission of an opinion " also occurs

disputant instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from

has been charged, proceeds, to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.
it

the defect with which


105

THE NYlYA-SUTRAS.
Six-uringed disputatioti (Satpaksi katha).

Disputant

to

prove the non-eternality of sound says
is

:—

Sound

non-eternal,
it is

because

an

effect of effort.

This

is

the

first

wing.

Opponent
opposition thus

— seeing
:

that the effect is of diverse

kinds, offers

an

Sound
(Here "
revealed by
effect "

is eternal,
it is

because

an

effect of effort.

means a thing which already

existed

and

is

now

effort).

This is the second wing.

Disputant

seeing that the reason " effect "
:

is erratic,

charges the

opposition with a defect thus

Sound

is

not eternal,

because it is an effect of effort. (Here the reason " effect " is erratic meaning

(I) either

a thing that

did not previously exist and
existed and
is

is

now produced

(2)

or a thing that already
This
is

now

revealed by

effort).

the third wing.
is

Opponent

— finding
is

that the

reason

"effect,"

which

erratic,

proves neither the eternality nor the non-eternality of sound,
counter-charge against the disputant thus
:

brings a

Sound

also not non-eternal,
it is

because

an

effect of effort.

He

alleges

that

the

defect (oiz. the erraticity of the
is

reason) with

which his opposition (ou. sound
the opposition of the opposition

eternal)

is

charged, also attaches to
{viz.

made by the

disputant
This

sound

is

not

eternal or non-eternal).
is

the fourth wing.

Disputant

finding that the counter-charge brought against him
:

amounts

to his

opponent's admission of self-defect says
that " sound
is

The opponent by saying
has admitted that
it is

also

not non-eternal

"

also not eternal.
is, it

has proved the charge, that
the disputant's opinion.

In other words the counter-charge has indicated that the opponent admits
This
is

the

fifth

wing.

Opponent iindiug that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument /rom the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent's
admission of the charge says
also not
:

The disputant by saying
admitted that
it is

that

"sound

is also

not eternal"
if

has

non-eternal.

In other words,

the Counter-

10

BOOK

V,

CHAPTER

1.

charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.
This
is

the sixth wing.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition The sixth of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of " admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential. The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wing if the disputant had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special
meaning';
viz.,

a thing which did not previously exist but was produced.
the opponent instead of stopping at

The disputant and
limit has carried
is

the proper

further wing

on their disputation through six wings beyond which no possible. After the six-winged disputation has been carried on, it becomes patent that neither the disputant nor the opponent is a fit person to be argued with.


THE NYAYA-SOTRAS;
Book
srftrfrrfrft :

m
I

V.

Chapter

II.

m[Wi-<-k srf^rrfWhr: srfi^n^«n#

VMiH^W
*tfW%
•flTST

fa< *k H fta

Ml4^l^«M M*N

s^T-

aHfrbH^^iq*U^HHMfo*T
II

WW"

*WI«J*U

fa^fTORTH

*
for

I

R

I

\

II

1.
1.

The occasions

rebuke

are

the following

:

tion, 3.

Hurting the proposition, 2. Shifting the proposiOpposing the proposition, 4. Renouncing the pro5.

position,
7.

Shifting the reason,

6.

Shifting the

topic,

The meaningless, 8. The unintelligible, 9. The incoherent, 10. The inopportune, 11. Saying too* little, 12. Saying
too
16.

much,

13.

Repetition, 14.
17.

Silence,
18.

15.

Ignorance,

Admission of an opinion, 19. Overlooking the censurable, 20. Censuring the non-censurable, 21. Deviating from a tenet, and 22. The semblance of a reason. 44.
Evasion,

Non-ingenuity,

The definition of " an occaaion for rebuke" has been given in aphorism 1-2-19. " An occasion for rebuke" which is the same as " a ground of defeat", " a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace" arises generally
in connection with the proposition or any other part of an

argument and

may

implicate

any disputant whether he

is

a discutient, wrangler or

caviller.

M^^kd ^Rfvi^TT^rggT'^ ^rd^l^lft
2.

in one's

11*1 t '* II " Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits own example the character of a counter-example.
:
I

—45. A

disputant argues as follows

Sound

is

non-eternal,

Because

it is

cognisable by sense, cognisable by sense
is

Whatever

is

non-eternal

as a pot,,

Sound
22

is

cognisable by sense,
is

Therefore sound

non-eternal.

— — —

168

BOOK

V,

CHAPTER "It
by

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :— A genus (e.g., potnesa or pot-type), which is cognisable
is

sense,
is

found to

be

eternal,

why

cannot

then the sound which

also

cognisable by sense, be eternal ?

The disputant being thus opposed says : Whatever is cognisable by sense
Sound
is

is eternal

as a pot,

cognisable by sense,
is eternal.

Therefore sound

By

thus admitting in his example (pot) the character of a countertype,),

example (genus or
non-eternal).

he has hurt his own proposition
hurts his proposition in this

(viz.

sound

is

A

person

who

way

deserves

nothing but rebuke.

*rTTO

II

*

I

*

M
is

II

3.

" Shifting the proposition " arises
it

when a

proposi-

tion

being opposed one defends

by

importing a

new

character to one's example and counter-example.—46.

A

certain person argues as follows

:

Sound

non-eternal,
it is

because

cognisable by sense

like a pot.

A

certain other person offers an opposition thus

:

Sound

is eternal,
it is

because

cognisable by sense like a genus (or type).

The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and hence the sound which is likened to a pot is nonthe other is not so
:

all-pervasively non-eternal.

The defence thus made involves a change of proposition originally laid down was Sound is n5n-eternal, proposition now defended is 'while the Sound is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.
:
:

proposition.

The

A
in as

person

who shifts

his proposition in this

way

is

muph

as he has not relied

upon

his original reason

to be rebuked and example.

*

4.

" Opposing
its

the

proposition "

occurs

when

the

proposition and

reason are opposed, to each other.
is distinct f rora,quality,


is

47.

Substance

because^lt is perceived to be non-distinct from colour etc.

la this argument

it is to

be observed that from colour

if
etc.

substance

distinct

which constitute the from quality, it must is non-distinct from colour etc., is opposed quality. The reason viz. substance A person .who substance is distinct from quality. to the proposition, viz.
also be distinct

thus employs a reason whtch opposes his proposition

is to

be rebuked as

a

fool.

5.

A proposition being
it

opposed

if

one disclaims

import,

will

be called " renouncing the proposition."
:

A

certain person argues as follows

its

48.

Sound

is

non-eternal,
it is

because

cognisable by sense,
:

A certain other

person offers an opposition thus


meaning
of

Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is Jiot yet noncognisable by sense and is^ot yet non-eternal. The eternal so a sound is
first

person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the
:

his proposition thus " Who says that

sound

is

non-eternal ?

This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called " renouncing the proposition " which rightly furnishes an occasion for
rebuke.

*.

I

R

I*

II

6.

" Shifting the

reason" occurs

when

the reason of

a general character being opposed one attaches a special character to it. 49.

A certain
follows

person, to prove the

non-eternality of sound,

argues as

:—
is

Sound

non-eternal,
it is

becanse

cognisable by sense.


tin


BOOK
V,

CHAPTER
its

II.

A

certain other person

says that sound cannot be proved to be

non-eternal through the mere reason of

being cognisable by sense, just

as* genus
and
is

(or

type)

such as pot-ness

(or pot- type^ is cognisable

by sense
viz.

not yet non-eternal.
first

The

person defends himself by saying that the reason,
is to

being cognisable by sense,

be understood as signifying that which

comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognisabJe by seuse. Sound comes under the genus (or type) "soundness" and is at the same but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pottime cognisable by sense type does uot come under another genus or type vsuch as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type } though it is cognisable by sense. Such a defence, which
;

consists in shifting

one's reason,

rightly

furnishes an

occasion for

rebuke.

U^dKW^Mfri^H^l^^-d^
7.

II

V.

I

*

I

vs

||

an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant. 50.

" Shifting the topic" is

A
follows
:

certain

person,

to

prove

the

eternality

of sound,

argues as

Sound
"'

is

eternal (proposition),
it is

because

intangible (reason).

of

Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence any other resource, to defend his position as follows
:

Iletu,

which

is

the sauakrit equivalent for "reason,"

is

a word derived

from the root "hi" with the suffix "tu". A word, as a part of a speech, may be n noun, a verb, a prefix or an indeclinable. A noun is defined as etc. etc.

The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of tlnwigh non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

defeat

^chHftfoNfa<^ 5TCt
8.

II

*

I

*

I

d

II

"The meaningless"
person,
to

is

an argument which
eternality
of sound,

is

based
51.

on a non-sensical combination of letters into a

series.

A
follows
:

certain

prove the

argues as

^
is eternal,

Sound

because

k, c,

like jh,

and p are j, v, g, d and bh, gh, <Jh and dh.
$, t

d,
«

As the letters k, c, t etc. convey no meaning, the person who employs » them in his argument deserves rebuke.


TrlE NY&YA-SOTRAS.


iUj.

KMUII
9.

"

The

unintelligible" is an argument,

which

al-

though repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent. 52.

A

certain person being

opposed by another person and finding no

means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double entendre or words not in ordinary use or words
very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent This sort of nor by the audience although they are repeated three titues.
defence
is

called " the unintelligible"

which rightly furnishes an

occasion,

for rebuke.

The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung
10.

"

together without any syntactical order.

— 53.

A

certain

person being opposed by another person and finding no
:

other means of self-defence, argues as follows Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl,
sweets.

goat's skin

and a lump

of

This sort of argument, which consist of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent" which rightly presents on occasion
for rebuke.

^q*ftq^f^^TORr*>n5rat
11.

n

m
of
fire,

*

I

it n

"

The inopportune"

is

an argument the parts of
precedence.

which are mentioned without any order

— 54.
:

A

certain person, to prove that the hill has

argues as follows

The hill has fire (proposition \ Whatever has smoko has fire, as a kitchen (example). Because it has smoke (reason). The hill has fire (conclusion). The hill has smoke (application ).\ This sort of argument is called " the inopportune" which rightly Since the meaning of an argument is presents an occasion for rebuke. affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who
overlooks the order cannot establish* his conclusion and
is

therefore

rebuked.

——
4|.r

BOGS

%

.

CHAPTER It

^HH^dftHM^H
12.
If

gpL.ll HI

VI J*
its

II-

called "

an argument lacks even one of saying too little." 55.

parts,

it

is

The following is an argument which contains all its five parts: The hill has fire (proposition), 1. Because it has smoke (reason), 2. All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example), 3. 4. The hill has smoke (application),
5.

Therefore the
the five parts or

hill

has

fire

(conclusion).

members are essential, a person scolded as " saying too little." even one of them should be
As
all

who omits

Saying too much " is an argument which consists 56. of more than one reason or example.
13.

"

A certain
And

person, to prove that the hill has
fire

fire,

argues as follows

:

The hill has
Because
it

(proposition),

has smoke (reason;,
it

because

has light (reason),

like a kitchen (example),

and like a furnace (example), In this argument the second reason and the second example are
redundant.

A
is to

person,

who having promised

to

argue in the proper way (accordreason or example

ing to the established usage), employs more than one be rebuked as " saying too much."

14.

" Repetition " is

an argument in which (except in

the case of reinculcation) the

over again.
:'

word or the meaning
is

is

said

57.

Repetition of the

word

—Sound

non-eternal,

sound

is

non- eternal.

Repetition

of the meaning —Sound is non-eternal, echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent,

etc.

A
:

person

who

unnecessarily commits repetition

is to

be rebuked

as a fool. Reinculcation has been explained in aphorism 2-1-66.

,

THE NY£¥A-St)TRAS.

1$

15.

In remeuleation there

as a special
repeated.

meaning
58.
hill

is

no repetition in as much deduced from the word which is
is

The

has
it

fire

(proposition),

Because

has smoke (reason \

All that has

smoke has

fire

as a kitchen (example),

The

hill

has smoke (application''
fire (conclusion).

Therefore the hill has

In this argument the " conclusion " is a mere repetition of the " proposition " and yet it serves a special purpose.

16.

" Repetition " consists also in mentioning a thing

by name although the thing has been indicated through
presumption.

59.
character of a product
:

"A

thing possessing the

is

non-eternal

"

— this
"

is

a mere repetition of the following
thing

A

not possessing the character of a

product

is

not non-

eternal."

Win

*

i

*

i

\v

-

ii

"Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant
17.

within the knowledge of the audience.

— 60.
if

How
tains

can a disputant carry on his argument
stolid

his
is

opponent maintherefore
to

an attitude of

silence?

The opponent

be

rebuked.

srf^frrasTTfrm u
18.

\
the

i

* i* * n
non-understanding
of a

" Ignorance "

is

proposition.

61.
betrayed by the opponent
it

Ignorance

is

who does not understand a

proposition although

has been repeated three times within the know-

174
ledge of the audience.

BOOK

V,

CHAPTER

II.

Plow can an opponent refute a proposition die meaning of which he caunot understand ? He is to be rebuked for his

ignorance.

^K^iM^MfrliM frnTT
19.

II

M
is to

*

I

ft

II

" Non-ingenuity "
reply.

consists in

one's

inability

to

hit

upon a

—62.
down
a proposition.
If his

A
stands
it

certain person lays

opponent under-

and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he

be scolded as wanting

in ingenuity.

3RF*r sqre^Tg; <NMlft«dt<0 ft%<*:
20.

II

*

I

*

I

II

" Evasion " arises

if

one stops an argument in

the pretext of going

away

to attend another business.

63.

A
finds
it

certain person having

commenced a disputation
its

in

which he
stops

impossible to establish his side, stops

further progress by

saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business.
the disputation
evasion.
in
this

He who

way courts

defeat

and humiliation

through

^q^^i^Miifn<M<M^^ N&i^ Hdi^
i

i

mm m
—"You

II

21.

"

The admission of an opinion
exists in one's

" consists in charg-

ing the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the

same defect

own side.

—64.

A

certain person addressing another person says:
thief."

are a

The other person

replies

:

— " You too

are a thief."

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the
charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of " admission of an opinion " which brings disgrace on the
person

who makes

it.

for^snrora^Tforf q^fteiftRRjr^ii *
:

i

*

m

u

22.

" Overlooking the censurable "

consists in not

rebuking a person who deserves rebuke. 65. It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues
furnishes an occasion for censure.

not confess his short-coming,

it

is

in a way which Seeing that the person himself does the duty of the audience to pass a

IftE ttTAYA-StJTitA&
Vote
,,ql

Hi

Aensui© on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the
censurable."

23.

" Censuring

the

non-censurable"
if

consists

in

rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.

66.

A person

brings discredit on himself

he rebukes a person

who does

not deserve rebuke.

f^^kd*{^^lPr<|l ir^h'MIITH^l^fe«dlkd:
:

I!

VU ^

I

W

II

24.

A person who
the

after accepting

a tenet departs
is

from

it

in

course

of

his

disputation,

guilty

of

" deviating

from a tenet."

— 67.
(

A certain person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sankhya philosophy which lays down that 1 what is existent
)

never becomes non-existent, and
existence etc.
activity

(2)

what
the

A

certain other person opposes
if

would be impossible

comes into him by saying that all human thing now non-existent could not
is

non-existent never

come

and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and nonexistence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.
into existence in the course of time

25.

"

The

fallacies of a reason" already explained

also furnish occasions for rebuke. 68. 1-2-4 it is evident that the fallacies are mere From aphorism semblances of a reason. A person who employs them in a disputation do
certaiidy deserve rebuke.

do

There are infinite occasions for rebuke of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.

.

Alphabetical Index to the SutraS.
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v
v
ii

1
1

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iii

1

08

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5

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163

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s?n:

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i

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1

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5

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7

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58

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96 93 10
168

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:

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in

2 34

iii

2 49

99
149

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...

...

i

1

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iv

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fetra:

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i

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n
ii

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1

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v

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2

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2

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i

1

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ii

2 30
1 1

134
27

16

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*

...

•••

v

1

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150 100

v
i

37
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162
7
7-

1 1

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iii

2 53
2 49

i

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1

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...

1
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108
6

iv

138

i

17

.

4t»

(

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PAGE
1

PAGE
p*no'gm

6

3
1

...
•••

...
•••

ii

1 1

69
31

42

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1 45

35
126

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70
135

2 32
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1

6G

2 35
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ii
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135

2 10 2 12
1 31

49 46
150
119 93 109
11

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ii

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2 23

132

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'

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1

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.

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3,

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110 110
61
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...
..

iv
IV
ii
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1 13 1 11

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V

170

IJNHJMIHI"*^

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2 69 2 68 2 66
1

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...

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61

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iv

5

108 110

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a^RiSIiih

1

42
62

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«n^ara^n

iv

1 15

i

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93
117
31

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40
28
55

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11

2 55 2 47
2 41

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h
iii

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ii
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76 133

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,

54
173
127

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66
63

41
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ii

1

40

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n^Tjfar:

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ii

2

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43
172

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....
...

v
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2 14
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ii

2 38

53 90
52

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55
49

38
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101

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ttob^i:
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111
ii

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I

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PAGE

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Wbiw;
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wifii:
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IUNMWI4
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9
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34
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83
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113
117 131
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2 24

175

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11

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30
56

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(

xi

)

PAGE
i

PAGE
2 3 15 134
WJWMilHiiiim"

ifi

1 51

75 85 86 96 92
135

mwAwn^PR

iv

2 31

m
Hi

2

9

2 10

iv

2 14

130

WW'

Mlfftl

TOffWWJ

iii

2 43
2 29 2 34 2 21

iii

fln'wifln menifrH
i

*y^

v

ujlwiwwi wjfwiiRirt:

tynwifar^
iv
^nMi^iwnf««lgwiiw|ijw

...
...

v
iii

2 12 2 13 2 48
1

172

172 98
12

v
«m««wrtqfo4rgii«jrt

174

i

39

iv

2 33
2 25

135 175

v

v

1

43

164

tft

1

1

Index of

Words
Page.

in

English.
Page.

Akrit&bhyagaraa
All-pervading
Alteration

...

...

110 40 40
142
17
»

Abhava Abode Abode of

...
...

...2,

117
6

20, 70, 132
... ...
... ...

particular qualities
...

Alteration of time

Absence Absence of link
Abstinence

112, 137
... ...

Alternating character
Alternative

87

Absence of perception
...
... ...
... ...

49 138
80 13
9

Analogy
Annihilation

17, 113, 119, 121
...2,
...

...

Absurd
Absurdities

...76,86
... ...

Ant

hill

130 87
'2,3

Antecedent

46,126
...

Absurdity
Acceptance

Anumana
Apavarga

...
... ...

...7,125
...3,34,
...
.

Act
Act force
Action
Activities

...
...

8,39
81

A

posteriori

Apparently

79

5, 6, 32,
...

11, 50, 83,
...

96

Apparent modification
Appearance

59 136
116

123
1.18

.

Activity

2, 5, 6, 7, 94,

108, 123, 125
...

Appearances
Appearance
Application
of difference

.

Act of knowledge
Acts
...
...

... ...

112 130

Acuteness
Acuteness or

...

Apprehension

6, 71, 79, 98,
...

85 10,12 127, 130
•••
•••

dullness of

ap-

prehension ... 130 ... Admission of an opinion 164, 167, 174 ... 13 Adoption ...

A A

priori

3

priori inference
... ...
...

34
124

Appropriate

•• ••
•••
...

Adultery

... ...

...

6

Approach Apraptakala
Arbitrariness

Advantage
Affection

...

40
11, 12

...

"9 17 92
104
J

2, 3, 7,
...

96, 108, 126

Affirmative

Arbuda Argument
Argumentation

•••

...

47, 50, 52, 147, 150
...

Affirmative application
Affirmative example
Affix
...
...

...
...

12
11

•••

Arguments
Arrogance
Artha-patti
Artificial

...
... ... ••• •••

20,67,96,128
•••

**°

...
...
...

59
2 118 115
9,

Agama

2, 43,

44
2

...

Agent of knowledge Aggregates ...
Air
...

...47,48
•••

...
...

Arya

...

...

79

Aryade&
Aryas...

... ...
....

Airy

...

...
...

... ...

70 2

Aitihya
8

Ascertainment

115,120 39 ... 1, 13

.

.

(

H

; )

Page*

Page.

Adhaka
Asleep
Asolute rule

...
...

...

43

Balancing the homogeneity

140, 141

...
... ...
... ...

124
86
17

Balancing
gression

the

infinite
...

re-

...

...140,149

Assumption
Assent
Assertion
Association

...
...

Balancing
absence

the
...

mutual
...140,148

86
3,

... ...

4

Balancing the non-difference 140, 156

60,123
...
...

Balancing the non-eternality 140, 160
Balancing the non-perception 140, 159

Association of troubles

124

Assumption

...

88
95

Balancing the non-produced 150, 170 Balancing the nou- reason ...140, 153 Balancing the perception ...140, 158 Balancing the presumption

Atom
Atomic mind

50, 103, 106, 126, 131
...
...

Atomic dimension Atomic substance

89
6,

140,455
140, 143

...

29

Balancing the questionable

Atoms
Attach

8, 15,
...

130
15
1

Balancing the reciprocity ...140, 145
Balancing the subtraction ...140, 143
Balancing the unquestionable 140, 144

Attainment of supreme
Attendants
Attention

felicity
...

121
93, 96

Beginning
Beginningless

...

...
...

47 126
31 2
27, 122

...

Audience
Auditory
Auditory perception

...

24

Bhasya-eommentary
Blmttas
Birth
...

... ...
...

20,78
20, 30, 31
...

Augmentation
Authority

59

Blackness

...

...

126

9, 15,
...

70
42

Blame
Blanket

... ... ...
...

...
... ...

41,123
18

Authors

Avayava
Aversion

1, 10, 2, 3, 5, 7, 94,
... ...

129
108

Block-hoad
Bodily actions

20
6 65

...

Awaking Awanting

135
121

Body
Bone

5, 63, 64. 70,
...

100, 10 1, 137

B
Balancing the addition
Balancing the alternative
Balancing in co-presence
pie
. .

Bosgavaeus

...
... ...

...
...

4,

36

Bragging
140, 142

Br&hmana
Breast

15 ••3,18,60

140, 144
140, 147

69
2 6

...

Balancing the counter-exam
.140,

Buddhas Buddhi
Buddhist
Literature

149

15,22,86
125

Balancing the controversy
Balancing the doubt

140, 153

Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali

Balancing the demonstration 140, 157
.140,152
140, 162

Bulk

54
38

Balancing the

effect

Burning

Balancing the eternal

161
•••

Balancing the eternality

140
Capacity

Balancing the heterogeneity 140, 141

10,83

. .

"

(

iii

>
Page.
Collocation of parts
•••

Page.
Carelessness

112
15 2

132
102, 127

Carping
Cftrvakas
Categories
Cattle

Colour

5, 9,

1

7,

30, 59, 71, 78, 98, 101

1,24
121
8, 23, 104, 112,
1

Combustibles

•••
•••


•••
•••

113

Command
Commixture

42
79

Cause
Cause and

14,

127

•••
...

effect

...
.

109

Common
"

•••
*••

22
3,34

Cause of destruction

Cause of growth and decay. Cause of in -audition ...
.

90 87
52
127
157

Commonly

seen

Comparison

2, 3, 4, 25, 35,
...
...

36
22

Common

properties

Cause of production
Causes of faults

...103,113
...

Compendious expression Complete destruction

36
2

... ...

Cave
Cavil
Caviller

...
...
...

...

Compound
Compassion
Conceit

...

59
...

1,

14, 15,
...

139
15

...
...

6

65,85,122
...
...

Censuring
able
Cessation

the non-censur- ...
,.

Conceit of difference
Conceit of duality Conceit of pleasure

85 65 122
135

...167,175
...106,127
... ...

...

...

Cessation of egotism

127

Concept Concept of means
Conception
Conciousness
Concentration

...

...
. . .

Cessation of recognition
Cessation of the intellect

...
...

84 84
1,17
9

134
6

...
...

62,127
... ...

Chala

...
...

Channels
Character

...

...

112
"

7, 11, 12, 13, 23, 54, 71, 75,

Conclusion 10, 12, 13,

15, 20, 67, 88,

78,96, 101,113,136
Characterised
... ... ...

145

80
'

Concomitant
Conditions

...

...

10 10
18

Character of an object
Character of a modification

77
55

...
...

...

Conduct
Confirmation
Conflicting
Conflicting

... ...
... ...
...

Character of perception Character of transparency

...

114

...
...

13

...

75
41

22
7

Charaka

... ...

...
..

judgment

Change

88
102 135

Conflicting testimony Conflicting opinions

22

Circle of fire brand

...

...

46
46

City of the celestial quiristers...
••

Conflicting reasons

...

Confutation
Conjointly

...

1,13,35
...

Classification of

Vedic speech
... ... ...

40
148 104

...

22

Clay
Clay statue
Co-abide
Cognisable

...

Conjunction

6, 29,. 31, 60, 90, 92, 93,

...

104, 106,122, 131

54
76,87 47

Connection

...

3, 20, 37, 38,
...

39

•••
'•••

••• •••

Connoted
Consciousness
...
.,...

Cognised
Cognitions

...

150 14
78,73

25, 26, 90, 93, 102

Consequence

.

(

iv

)

Page.

Page.
Defilement
Definite

Constant audition
Constituents
..

82
131

2,125
...

form

61

Contact

3, 25, 30, 71,

73

81,89
..

Definition

...1,24

Contentious

23 96 23

Deliverance

7
...

Context
Continuity

..

Demarcate
Demerits
Demonstration
Denial

95

.

72,
...

125 157 125

Contingency
Contradiction
...

84,90
3£1, 40, 76 If
,

114, 136
...

Contradictory

...

16,

58
16

Depravity
Desert

Contradictory reason

104,105,106
...

Contrary
Controversy
..

13,22
153

Design
Desire

60
96

5,68,69,94
...

Convention
Conviction

.. ..

39

Desire and aversion

22
147

Destruction

2, 9, 19, 48, 57, 65, 88,

Oopresence

• •

89, 90, 106,

Corresponding element
Corresponding substrata
Corruption

••

80
81
125

Determinate
Determination
Deva-rina

110,111,114,120 3
10,
...

..

13

..

123
6

Countenance
Counter argument
..

68
53
49, 150

Devotion

Dharma
Dialogue

Sastra

...
...

124
14

Counter exam pie
Course
Covetousness

. .

2
6

Diminution

... ... ... ...

59
129
19

Dimness
Direct
Direction

Cow

...
..

4
141
1

Cowhood
Critical examination

29
106

Disappearance
Disconnection
Disciples

...

Crystal

...

73,

7-1[,

85,

86 87

...
...

20
138

Curd
Cuticle
..

101

Discussion
Disjoined

I, 10, 14,

138

D
Dadhi
Deaths
..

Disputant

... 88 20,22,24 ...

54
7

Disputation
Dissimilarity

14

...
...

20

Debt Debt
Debt

to

Gods

..

123 123 123

Dissolution
Distinct

70

to progenitors
to sages
:?.

...

...-no
122, 124
... ...

..

Distress

Debts

...

123

Distribution
Divisible

116
108

Decay
Declaration

83,87
4
95, 103
i

Doctrine

Deeds
Defect
...

Dogma
Doubt
1, 7,

'

14,132 ... 9, 10

39,40
..

22, 23, 32, 54, 59, 119,

Defence

15

125, 127, 151, 152

.

.(

'*

)

Page.

Page.

Dream
Drst&nta

124, 134, 185
1

Evidence Examination

110, 134

1,10,24
10, 12, 13, 142,
... ...
... ...
...

Drum
Duality

...17,27
...
...

Example
Excess

145

Dullness

65 130
17

96

Durable
Duration

...
...

Excitement Exclusion
Exercise

66
96 96

92 3

Dust

Existence
Existent

...
...

Duties

138
131

49 63, 109, 127 120 ...
...
...

Dvyanuka

...

Extension

Expanding

48 68
4

E
Ear ... Earth x Earthenware Earthy
Effect
3,
...

Experience
5,81

...
...

5,9
61

Expert Expression
Expressive of action
External light

...
...
...

4,8
110
Ill

...70,80
109, 102
...

...
... ...

73
136

External objects

Efforts of attention

93
127

Eye
Eyeball

...
... ...
...

5,8
70 30

Egotism Element Emancipation Endless doubt
Enjoyable
Entreaty

5, 9, 78, 79, 80,
...

103

Eye knowledge

105, 106
...

...
...

23
i17
Factitious
Fallacies
...

•••

131
15

Entity 28,60, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117
...
... •••

...

96 1,24
3,

Fallacies of a reason

15,
...

175
147
1

Enunciation
Epithet

...
... ...

Fallacious

argument

...

12

Fallacy
False apprehension False knowledge
...
...

Equal

to the question
...

Erratic

15,
...

16 108

...

135 136
1

Essence and appearance
Established tenet

136

Familiar instance
Fault
Faults Faults of untruth
. .

...

1,9
118

5
2, 7,

Establishment
Eternal

...

...

108, 127
...

8, 10, 13, 15, 47, 50,

51, 53,

39

57, 64, 69, 90, 106, 109, 113, 114,

Fear
Felicity

...68,96
...

131, 157, 161

1,2
139
70 60

Eternal ness
Eternality

... ...
...

57 12, 16, 152
...
...

Fences
Fiery
Figuratively
Filling

...

...10,
...
...

Eternity

9

Ether
Ethereal

83, 5, 9, 20, 29, 53, 79, 129,
*

132
...
...

Five
Fire brand

8,

70

38 38, 79, 113 102 ...

Evasion

...

167,174

Fineness

...

~

81

.. .

(

vi

)

'

-

Page.
j

Page.

Fire

sacrifice

...
...

41

Growth

...

87 78 30

Five elements

114 77
77

Gustatory
Gustatory perception

...
...

Five objects
Five senses
Fixation
... ...
.

j

i

60
75

H
Habitual
Hatchet
Haii...
...
...

Fixed character
Fixed connection Fixed relation
Fixity

.

...
...

136

. .

38 63

38
100
121

...

58
118

Happiness
Horse
Hatred
sacrifices
...

...

Fixity of

number

.

.

...

4
...
...

Food
Forbearance

38, 121
...

125

94
94

Heat
Heretical view

68
125
11,

Forbearance from activity
Forest
Forester

...

...

...4,137

Heterogeneous
Heterogeneous exam pits
Heterogeneity

12

Form
Formation
Fortuitous

...

4 59 61,62,78
...

12,140
152, 153
...

137

Hetvabhasa

1,

15

effects...
5, 7, 13, 95,
,

...

112
137

Hina klesa

... ...

125 137

Fruit

...

103 112, 119, 103 105
7fi,

Hunger
Homogeneity Homogeneous

...15J, 15<J, 153,
... ... ...
...

160
11

Fruit of previous deeds
Fulfilment

...
...

Function
Futile
Futilities
... 1

60,
...

91

i

Homogeneous example Homogeneous things
Hurting the proposition
Hypothesis
Hypothetical

140
109
167

20
140
146

5, 21,
1,

9
9

Futility

20,

Future

34, 111

Hypothetical

dogma

9
1

Hypothetical reasoning

G
Ganges
General nation
Generality
...
... ...

60
152
Ideas
Identical

I
...
.

69
78,

...5,32
•••

.

84

Genus
Gesture
Glass

18,

l
.

17,

59, 61,

Ignorance
Illumination
Illusion

. . .

20, 167,

173

62,

170
5

28, 149
... ... ...

28

... ...

73

God
Gold

*

Imagination

135
119

...

112
127

Immediate Immediate subsequency
Immolation Impelling

56, 121
...

...
...

96
61
Otd

Good
Greed
Grief
...

...
...

125

••

Ground...

68 90

Impermanent
Implication

....

56

a

.

(


*

>

^

Page.
...

Page.
Interval Intervention
...
...

Implied dogma
Impossibility

...

9,

10 93

50, 122
...

18, 128,
...
... ...
...

131

96
5,32
71

Impressions

Intimate relation
Intimately
Invalid

...
...

... ...
...

Impropriety
Inactive

129

20
123
68

45 10 8
13

Inadmissible

Invariable
Investigator
...
...

Inanimate
Inandition
Incapacity

19,
...
. .

... ...

52
95
Ill

Investigation
Invisibility

-

Inconsistency

...

Iron
Iron ball
Irregularities
...

73 69
sk'Jtii

Incoherent

167, 17
...
...

10

Incompatible

50 120
110
10
19
3

22
95
7

Incongruous
Inconsistent
Indifference

Irregularity

23, 24,
...
...

...
... ...

Irregularity of perception
Itihasa
...

124

Indirect

Indeterminate
Individual
Individuality
Indivisibility
Indivisibility of

J
Jalpa
1

59, 60, 61,
...

86
61
132

Jar
Jati
Jijfiasa
... ... ...

17, 47,
1,

...

62,
...

110 140
10
6 7

atoms

...

132 104 105

Inequality

...
...

Jflana

Inexperience
Inference

Judgment
Jugglery
Jyotistoma

2,3,25,28,31,
33, 67, 71

...

135
41

...

...

Infinite regression

140, 141)

Injunction

Innumerable
Inopportune
Inquiry
Instance
Instructive assertion
...
.

40,41,75, 124 ... 67
17,

K
Kalala
...
>

104
104
14
125
6

130, 157 171
...

Kandara

.

...

10
12

Karma
Katha
Kileso

...

81, 124
... ...

1, 8,

...

4
...
...

Instrument

67 67

Killing

Instrument of knowledge
Intangible
Intellect

Kitchen
Kleda

. .

8,10

15, 16, 50,

53

.

.

... ...

125

5, 6, 7, 16, 83,

84,85
Intelligence

5
...
...
....

Knave Knower Knowledge

20
67,

96

1,

2,

3, 6, 9,

24, 29, 35,

Internal-perception

159

67, 78, 84, 89,

90, 91 , 96, 97, 101,

Interpenetrated
Interrelation

...

80
109
109

127, 136, 137

Knowledge
Kritabani

of truth

.

.

135

Interrelation of cause

and

effect

...

110

.

.

\

(

viii

)

L
Page.
Lalitavistara Sutra
...

Page.

Mica
Milk

'...
...

73
87 9

134
149 133

Lamp
Larikavatttra Sutra

17, 28, 99,
...

Mim&m
Mind
Mirage
Mirror

Sakas
5,

...

6,

10,

29,

67,

90, 92

Light
Likeness

5, 9, 72,
... ...

73 96
87

8,135
...
...

78

Link
Letter

Misapprehension

2,

112, 126

55,
...
... ...

56
69

Mistimed

15,17
...
...
...

Loadstone

Mistimed reason
Mleccha
Modification

17
4,

Locomotion
Lotus
..

22

39

68

54, 55, 57,
...

58

M
Madhyamika
sophy
Buddhist,
philo... ...
...
...

Modification and substitute

54
86,99
163

Momentary
Mother
120 134
71
...

Motion

17,85
...

Mfidyamika Sutra

Magical power
Multiplicity

89
21

Magnitude

...
. .

Mahayana works

...
...

134 104
6

Mutual absence
Mutual

140, 147
...

Mamsa
Malice

pe*i

difference...

101

Manifestation

17,

61,73,110,111
116

N
N&garjuna
Nails
115,
...

Mark Mat
Material

6, 45, 87, 96, 115,
...

120

60
78

39, 54, 70,

Naiy&yika
Natural Natural connection
Natural quality
...

2,

22, 80, 83,
...
...
...

100 94
125

Material substance

...70,72
4, 6,
...

Matter

95

38
99
77

Maturation

100
136

Maya
Meaningless

...

Nature
Nature of sound
...

1, 6,
...

167, 170
...
1

46

Means Means

knowledge of right knowledge
of

118
,

Navakambala
Necessity

...
...

18

2,

26

138
4,

Measure
Medical Science
Meditation
. .

... ...

60
42

Negative Negative application

...
...

12

12

136, 137
...

Newborn
Night Nigraha sthana
Nirnaya
Nirvikalpaka
...

...
...

69
73

Members Membrane Memory
Merit

1,

10
73

.'*
.
.

...

...1,17

68,96
74, 112, 125
...

r
3
...
...

Merit and demerit

96 19 19 72

No-cause
Non-difference

113
161 147

Metaphor
Metaphorically
...

17,
... ...

36,157
...

Non-distinction

...

Meteor

Non-distinguished

...

"

,

,

,

(ix
Page.

)

Page*

Non Non Non Non

erratic

...

Nonentity
eternal

...

3 110,111,117
...

Occurrence

Odour
Olfactory
Olfactory perception

...77,
...
... ... ...

78

8, 10, 1 1, 12, 13, 16, 48,

78

50, 90, 113, 126, 151, 162

SO
181

eternalness
eternality

... ...

...

113 158

Omnipresence

11,

One
Operation
Operations of stimuli Operations of the Soul

129

Non-existence

2, 43, 45, 47, 48, 7 1

64,66,93
...

126, 128, 159

93 64

Nonexistent
Nonfulfilment

...

117,120
...

...

.105

Operator

... ...

39 22 48

Non
Non

ingenuity

...
...

167, 174
...

Opponent
Opportunity

14, 20,

Non-material
perception

72

Oppression of persons by spells
... ...

22, 28, 29, 32, 49,

124

52,87,159,162
Nonperception of knowledge in
pots
...
...
...

Opposing the proposition

167, 169

Opposition 17, 20, 48, 51, 63, 96, 114,

95

145

Non-produced

...
...

150 89
134

Organ of vision
Origination

...

...

65

Non production ... Non reality ... Non simultaneous Non simultaneousness Non simultaneousness
nitions
...

... ...
-

...
,...

...

"Other"
Otherness

83 51
51

...

84

...

...

93, 102

Overlooking the censurable 167, 174

of cog...
...

102 29
75

Non Non
Nose

simultaneity...

Pada
Pain
Part

... ...

-

..,

...

104
122
41

transparent

...

2, 5, 7,
...

...

...

5,65

Paradise
...

" Not commonly seen

...

3

32, 127,
...
... ...

128

NyAya Sutra

...

2,10,17,138

Partially Partially eternal

128 48 35
5,32
132

O
Object
3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 30, 66, 76,

Partial similarity

...
...

Particularity

81, 83, 85, 89, 136

Parts

127,128,129
...
.,

Objection

...

...23,35
118, 134
...

Parts in an atom
x ftSt
«•

...

Object of knowledge
Object of right knowledge
Objects of sense
...

34, 111
...

1

Pauranikas
Perception

2

Obscurity

...
...
...

5,76,77, ... 73
...
...

2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 22, 24, 25,

28,30,32,38,57,70,71,74,76,

Observance
Observation.

138

81,110,114,133,158,159
Perception of sound
Perfect tranquillity
...
...

112

8!
2 50 83

Obstruction

...
...

72,125
71,72,73 20, 167

Obviousness

Perishable

...

...
...

Occasion for rebuke

1,

Permanency

...

{

*

y
Pag*.
Prohibition
...
...

Page.
Persistent
....

53,83,08
...
...

Permanent
Person
Persuasion

intellect

84
122

Promiscuously
Pronunciation
Proof...

...

75,110 120 49

"...

40, 41
...

...

Pervades
Philosophy
Physician
Pitri riaa

100 8 4

Propagation

... ...
...

16,83,85 59 ...
...

Proper
Properties

132

7, 8, 22,

...

Pleasure
Pleasure and
pain...

5, 7,
...

123 122

Property
Proposition

...

23 8,11,150
167

8,10,11,12,13,15,16,
124 138 94

96
119

Ploughing
Possession

...

PurSna
Purifying

...

75, 78, 95, 96, 137 16, 95, 198

... ...
...

Pot

...

Purpose

1,8,10,72
...

Prabhakaras
Practice
...
...

2

Purusa

6,

68
136
Qualities

Practicable
Praise.

41,123
6
1
1

5, 9, 54, 69, 70, 71, 79, 99,

Prakriti

Pramana Prameya
Pratyaksa
2, 6,
...
... ...

102, 112
Qualities of earth...
...

70
145

Quality

74

5, 32, 59, 66, 79, 99,
...
...

Quality of soul

Prayojana
Preceptors Predicable
Predicate

1,10 138
151

89
81

Quality of sound

... ...
...

...
...

Question

8
'10

Questioning
147, 154

...

Quibble
80, 136
...

Predominance

...

1, 15, 17,

18

Predominant quality
Pre-eminence
Prescription
... ...
... ...
...
-

81
31

... ... ...

41 34

Radish

...

8

Present timo

Rain

...

... ...

68 93
72
133

Presumption
Previous
Pride...
life

2,43,44,155
68,69 ... 125
... ... ...
...
...

Rapt

in

mind

Ray

...

70, 71,
...

...

Reality

Primordial matter
Principle
...

Principle of injection
Probability
...
...

6,70 96 40
2,

Really eternal

...

48

Reason
Reason

10, 1

1,

12, 13, 16, 83, 91, 118,

135, 147, 154
.,,

43
78

46, 118
... ...

Processes

Reasoning
Rebirth

...
...

1

Produced
Product

...

113, 119
...

125
f

...

20

Rebuke
Receipt
Receptacle

...
... ...

Production 46, 90, 103, 104, 110, 111,

112,113,114,120,126,148

1,15,17,20,21 ... 96 121 .;.

(

il-)
Page.

Page.
Receptacle of happiness
...

121

Sankhya Philosophy
Sftnkhyas
2, 9, 83,
...
... ...

6

Reception
.

...

...

Recognition

7, 8, 22, 23, 83, 84,
...

84 85

94
10
81
41

Recognition of objects
Recollection
...30, 91,
...

83 92, 93, 98
...
.». ...

Samsaya Samiaya vyudasa Samskara
Sarvajit sacrifice
Satisfaction

i,io

Recklessness

125

Reductio ad absurdum
Reflection
...
...

1,35
6
97

8
...

Satpak§f katha*

... ...

164

Refuge

129,133
...

Savikalpaka

3
78

Refuge ad refugee
Refutation
...

Savour
Saying too
little
...
...

...

...

114
132

167, 172
167, 172

Regressus ad infinitum
Regularity
...
...

...

Saying too much
Scaffolds

23,95
114, 115
40, 41, 42, 172
...

Regulation
Reinculcation
Relation

Scepticism

...
...

School

109

Screened
Scriptures
13,
...

Relation of refuge ad refugee

...

96

18,60 6 9 ... 73 14, 15, 70
...
...

Release
Reliable

2, 5, 7,
...

63, 123, 124, 137
...
...

Search of truth Season

138

Reliable person
Reliability

... ... ...

42 4

68
95
123
121

Seat of knowledge

... ...
..:

...
...

42 37 135
132

Secondary meaning
Sacred
fire

Reliance

Remembrance
Repelled
Repetition

...

66,

Seeds
Self existent

...
...

139
117

Renouncing the proposition 167, 169
...
...

Sense
70,

3, 5, 9, 30, 47, 51, 63, 65, 66,

41, 51, 167, 172, 17.3
...

72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 85, 89,

Residence

128, 129
13, 26, 27,
4,
... ... ... 2,

130
Sense organ
...
...

Right knowledge
Rifi
...

1, 2,
...

43 39 33

6, 7, 10,
...

89
35

Sense perception

Risi rina

...

123

Sensuous bodies
Sentiments
Separately

... ...
...

...
...

89
5,7
22

River

...

...
...

Rumour

43

...

Separation

...
... ... ... ... ...
...

7, 97,
...
... ...

105

Sivah

104
7

Sabda

...

••

...

2 6

Series Series of reasons

Sacred books
Sacrifice

...

149


39,
...

124 118

Several marks

...
...

US
17

Sadhya
Sakya prapti
i


••

Shadow
Shamelessness

...
,..

Saraadhiraja 3utra

10 134
«5

...

125

Shifting the proposition
Shifting the reason
Shifting the topic

167, 168

Sambhava
Sameness

•"

*••
...

167, 169

?•*

52

167,170

•.

(

m

)

Page.

Page.
Statue of stone
Stealing
*•#
...

SiddhAnta
Significate

...

1

...

103

... ...

154
63
154

... ...

6
Ill

Sight

...

Step

...

Sign

...

96,

Study
Stupidity

••

...

8

Silence

167,173
...

2,7, 108,109,125
...

Similarity

3,19,20,33,35
24,93
... ...

Subject

Simultaneous

Suhject in dispu te

Simultaneous cognitions
Simultaneously
...

89

Subservient

••

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