MULLER VS MULLER Gr 149615 08.29.
06 FACTS Petition for review on certiorari which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent P and R (German) were married in Germany and resided there in a house owned by R’s parents but later permanently resided in the Ph. R had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of P. After they separated, R filed a motion for separation of properties RTC DECISION: - terminated the regime of absolute community of property It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. - Re Antipolo property, R cannot recover his funds coz it was a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibited aliens from procuring private lands. CA DECISION: there is nothing in the Constitution preventing R from procuring land then ordered P to reimburse him said amount.
RATIO NO. respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. W Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. R cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?
PACIFIC ACE VS YANAGISAWA GR 175303 04.11.12 FACTS R (Japanese) and Evelyn married. Evelyn then bought a townhouse unit which was registered in her name. R filed a PDN against Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, R filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin her from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. R’s petition became moot coz Evelyn committed in open court that she will not dispose of the property during the pendency of the case. Evelyn obtained a loan from P (PAFIN) and executed a REM (real estate mortgage) in favor of P over the townhouse unit. R filed for an annulment of the REM. MAKATI RTC DECISION: (at the time of the mortgage) dissolved the marriage between R and Evelyn and ordered the liquidation of their properties. PQUE RTC DECISION: - a foreign national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. - Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against Evelyn and P. CA DECISION: annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC.
.Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions
HELD Denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE WON pque rtc’s decision was improper
RATIO YES. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation
ABRENICA VS ABRENICA GR 180572 06.18.12 FACTS P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained. P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP. A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the P’s properties. HELD
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
*P has been previously married to another woman but their marriage has already been dissolved. ISSUE WON Joena had the right to the claim?
RATIO NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to one of the children, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannot be sustained. Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Thus, neither these two
LUZON SURETY CO VS DE GARCIA 30 SCRA 111 FACTS Luzon Surety granted a crop loan 1to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of Philippine National Bank where Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB filed complaint against Luzon Surety which subsequently prompted Luzon Surety to file a complaint against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first case and ordered the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. CFI DECISION: issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff levied his sugar quedans which were conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the lower court found in their favor based on Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which affirmed the lower court’s decision.. ISSUE WON a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company?
act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Such inference is more emphatic in this case, when no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Article 161 of the CC, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case.
HELD CA’s decision affirmed.
RATIO NO. Art. 163 of the New Civil Code states that as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not
GELANO VS CA 103 SCRA 90 FACTS
Insular Sawmill, Inc. leased the paraphernal property of Guillermina M. Gelano (wife) Carlos Gelano (husband) obtained cash advances but refused to pay his unpaid balances. Guillermina M. Gelano refused to pay on the ground that said amount was for the personal account of her husband asked for by, and given to him, without her knowledge and consent and did not benefit the family. Spouses Gelanos purchased lumber materials on credit for the repair and improvement of their residence, leaving unpaid amounts. Joseph Tan Yoc Su, as accomodating party, executed a joint and several promissory note with Carlos Gelano in favor of China Banking Corporation bank payable in 60 days to help renew the previous loan of the spouses but Carlos only paid a fraction of it. Guillermina refused to pay on the ground that she had no knowledge of such accommodation. Insular filed a complaint for collection against the spouses before the CFI. CFI DECISION: held Carlos liable. CA DECISION: held spouses jointly and severally liable.
ISSUE RATIO YES. Pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally can still be found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code, The obligation/debt contracted by petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal property is liable for his debt. WON the couple’s conjugal property is liable?
G TRACTORS INC VS CA 135 SCRA 192 FACTS Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He operates a logging concession, Luis Narciso entered into Contract o Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasn‘t able to pay. Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land. WIFE’S CONTENTIONS: -whatever transpired in the civil case against them could be binding only on the husband Luis R. Narciso and could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case that the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him that the conjugal property of the plaintiffsspouses could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in the civil caseconsidering that the subject matter of said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family
The obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership. The debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
ISSUE WON the judgment debt of private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership property can be held answerable? RATIO YES. Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for “all the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.” There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.
FRANCISCO VS GONZALES GR 177667 09.17.08 FACTS Coz of a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed to set forth their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support, custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains in a compromise agreement. Ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old. Respondent ordered Michele and her partner Matrai to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and attorney's fees. Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment. CA DECISION: Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held answerable for it. ISSUE WON the conjugal property of the former spouses may be held accountable? RATIO NO. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. *Cleodualdo and Michele married prior to the affectivity of the FC thus their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she -purchases things necessary for the support of the family
- when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum -when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband -or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. In this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. Michele, who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own benefit. In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife. Both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis.
BUADO VS CA GR 145222 02.24.09 FACTS Civil case for damages that arose from slander filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to pay for damages, which was affirmed by CA and SC court issued writ of execution, directing the sheriff to collect the indemnification from Erlinda Finding Erlinda’s personal properties insufficient, sheriff deigned to issue a notice of levy on real property on execution, and thereafter, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued Two days prior to the bidding, a Third Party Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from one Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. Sale proceeded with the spouses Buado emerging as the highest bidder A year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff, and alleged that the property was directly levied upon without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda. ISSUE WON wife’s criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership?
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RATIO NO. There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
YU BUN GUAN VS ONG 36 SCRA 559 FACTS * Paraphernal property refers to property over which the wife has complete control. This property is not part Yu Bun Guan and Ong are married since 1961 and lived together until she and her children were abandoned by him in 1992, because of his incurable promiscuity, volcanic temper, and other vicious vices. In 1968, out of her personal funds, Ong purchased a parcel of land (Rizal Property) from Aurora Seneris. Also, during their marriage, they purchased a house and lot out of their conjugal funds. Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly agreed to execute a Deed of Sale of the Rizal Property on the promise that Yu Bun Guan would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the children. He suggested that the property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved in any obligation. The consideration for the sale was the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor their children and the payment of the loan he obtained from Allied Bank. However, when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun Guan, he did not pay the consideration of P200K, supposedly the "ostensible" valuable consideration. Because of this, the new title was issued in his name was not delivered to him by Ong. Yu Bun Guan then filed for a Petition for Replacement of the TCT, with an Affidavit of Loss attached. Ong, on the other hand, executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and asked that the sale be declared null and void . RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property since she purchased it with her personal funds. CA affirmed. ISSUE WON the lot in question was paraphernal property? RATIO YES. The property was the paraphernal property of respondent, because (1) the title
had been issued in her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the “absolute and registered owner”; and (4) she had paid the real property taxes. It was also sufficiently proven that she had means to do so. The testimony of petitioner as to the source of the money he had supposedly used to purchase the property was at best vague and unclear. At first he maintained that the money came from his own personal funds. Then he said that it came from his mother; and next, from his father.
* A deed of sale, in which the stated consideration had not in fact been paid, is null and void:
DAR VS LEGASTO GR 143016 08.30.00 FACTS Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners where they were sued as “Mr. and Mrs.” in the said case. Petitioners were found guilty of failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their respective spouses did not sign the same. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: since what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the system of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can sign the petition. * Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping. ISSUE WON The signing of one of the spouses in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping? RATIO YES. The petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR GR 164584 06.22.09 FACTS Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought a lot Boracay property. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. RTC DECISION: considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. CA affirmed. RATIO NO. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
ISSUE WON Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same?
HEIRS OF GO VS SERVACIO GR 157537 09.07.11 FACTS Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners). Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). The petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. RTC DECISION: affirmed the validity of the sale - declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina) - that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta - that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife ISSUE WON the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? RATIO NO. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. NONETHELESS, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Also, it should not impair vested rights.
UGALDE VS YSASI GR 130623 02.29.08 FACTS P and R married and got separated after 6 years. They had a son. Respondent allegedly married another. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with the RTC against respondent but respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI. R also said that P already obtained a divorce from him in Mexico. RTC DECISION: dismissed and CA affirmed. - the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them. ISSUE WON P and R’s conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved? RATIO YES. P and R were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under ART 175 (4), conjugal partnership terminates in the case of Judicial Separation of Property. The finality of the Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
* A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. HELD
CA decision affirmed.