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Case no.

01-01 ALBENSON ENTERPRISES v CA and BALTAO

FACTS: On September to November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guarantee Industries, Inc located at Sta. Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates which they had ordered. Part of payment, Albenson was given a heck of PBC No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575 and drawn against E.L. Woodworks account. The checked bounced. Account closed. Albenson traced it from SEC records and discovered that it was from Eugenio S. Baltao. E.L. Woodworks was registered in the name of Eugenio Baltao and the signature appearing was from him. AEC made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, President of Guaranteed to replace/make good the dishonored check. Baltao, through counsel, denied the check and alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity. On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed a complaint for violation of BP Blg 22. Respondent Baltao has a namaesake, his son who manages a business, E.L. Woodworks on the ground floor of Baltao Bldg. Respondent filed motion for reinvestigation with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal who reversed the Asst Fiscals findings. Filed in RTC QC complaint for damages. AEC contended that it was one for malicious prosecution and its acting was without malice.

ISSUE: Whether or not AEC is liable for damages under Art. 19, 20,21 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No, AEC could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. It has been concluded that based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the CC which states that the abuse of right using a legal act with the intent to injure others shall compensate for the damage. Albenson et. al did not intend to injure that respondent for accusing Baltao of B.P. blg 22, Moreover, albenson just want to collect what was due to them for they believe that the check was issued by Baltao based on their collected info. Eugenio did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity. AEC find the best possible means to collect the sum due to it. AEC acted in good faith in filing the complaint. Therefore, in the absence of proof and bad faith, AEC cannot be held liable for damage. Damnum absque injuria. Petition is granted and decision of CA is reversed and set aside.

Case no. 01-02 Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was reorganized in 1981, causing resignation of hundreds of its employees, including Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena and Mrs. Javier. To acquire their gratituity benefits, they should apply and secure a clearance from PCA. Their clearance would be approved only if they have no pending accountability. The officer from who they should get the first approval from is Atty. Llorente or by Col. Duefias, and then by Atty. Rodriguez, the corporate auditor. Despite unsettled obligations from different sources (which were deducted from their gratituity benefits), the clearances of Mr. Perez, Mrs. Javier and Mr. Azucena were approved. Under Mrs. Javiers pending accountabilities was the amount of P92,000, which was handwritten. This was the disallowered portion of the cash advances of Mr. Curio in connection with his duties as super cargo in the distribution of seed nuts throughout the country. He received them through and in the name of Mrs. Javier, the latter being primarily liable for the disallowances. Other documents were submitted during the deductions, with an affidavit by Mr. Curio. However, Mr. Curios application for a clearance was not approved by Atty. Llorente in his capacity as Deputy Administrator, due to the grounds of the affidavit that Mr. Curio executed. He further justified his action as following the condition of the clearance (pending accountabilities). This made Mr. Curio bring the matter to the legal affairs department, which was also under Atty. Llorente as Deputy Administrator. But the same was not approved. In 1986 or 5 years later, his pending request for clearance was approved. However, in the course of 5 years he was not able acquire gainful employment because of his failure to present his clearance from PCA. Thus, he filed a case against the petitioner for failure to act in his duty. Issue: whether or not petitioner exercised an abuse of right and he is liable for damages against Mr. Curio in accordance with Article 19 of the Civil Code Ruling: Yes. Although petitioner Llorente he did not act with evident bad faith as he was following the procedures in securing a clearance as one of the public officer tasked for it, the fact that he was able to approve clearances to other 3 employees despite their pending accountabilities somehow show that he unjustly discriminated Mr. Curio. Thus, he is liable for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Case No. 01-03 Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals 219 SCRA 115 (1993) FACTS: The respondent, Marilou T. Gonzales 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; on the other hand petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time. A week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her. At the confrontation before the representative of the barangay captain of Guilig, Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement because he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Respondent thus filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

Case no. 01-04 CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ

FACTS: On August 1974, petitioner Amelita Constantino met Ivan Mendez, respondent at Tonys Restaurant located in Manila where she worked as waitress. The day after their first meeting Ivan invited Amelita to dine up with him at Hotel Enrico and professed his love and courted Amelita. At 11 PM, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse and after sexual contact in the month of September and November 1974 which resulted to her pregnancy. She pleaded for help and support but Ivan did not consented. Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. Respondent denied having sexual intercourse or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissed of the complaint for lack of cause of action. Amended the complaint. CFI decided with a dispositive portion. Filed motion for reconsideration. CFI granted CA reversed and complaint dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in setting aside the decision of trial court and dismissing the complaint. Whether or not Amelita has a claim for damages based on Art. 19 and 21 due to promise of marriage.

HELD: As regards on her claim based on Art. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivans promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, the Court agree that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tonys Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 y/o and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact. The repetition of their sexual intercourse indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan. Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Case no. 01-05 Serrano v. CA Facts: In early March 1968, petitioner Loreta Serrano bought pieces of jewelry worth P48,500 from Niceta Ribaya. Later that month, she instructed her private secretary Josefina Rocco to pawn the jewelry. The latter was able to pledge the jewelry in the amount of P22,000 and was issued a pawn ticket with an issue redeemable on presentation by the bearer from Long Life Pawnshop, Inc., with Yu and Kiong as its general manager. However, Josefina Rocco was never heard of again. Three months after not knowing the whereabouts of her pawned jewelry and/or its proceeds, petioner, through Niceta Ribaya, learned that it was in the hands of Long Life. Upon verification, she asked Yu An Kiong to hold the jewelry for her as the rightful owner. She subsequently informed the police and pledged charges (robbery and estafa) agains Josefina Rocco. Manila policeman Mateo also went to the pawnshop, showed the request and asked the manager, through a note, to hold the jewelry. However, despite this, someone in the name of Tomasa de Leon was able to redeem the jewelry from Yu An Kiong the next day. Issue: whether or not respondent Yu An Kiong is liable for damages to be compensated for petitioner Loreta Serrano Held: Yes, he is liable in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code. Yu An Kiong exercised bad faith, because despite the requests of petitioner and police to hold the jewelry, he failed to do so. Upon knowing of the report of the missing jewelry, it was his duty to hold the possession, especially since it was stipulated in the pawn ticket that it was redeemable by the owner. The abuse of right lies present in his part. Thus, he is liable for damages to petitioner.

Case no. 01-06 CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. vs. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation G.R. No. 138088 January 23, FACTS: On 19 December 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporation ("USHIO Realty") filed an ejectment case against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. ("CAR COOL") to recover possession of a parcel of land ("property") located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue, corner Victory Avenue, QC.USHIO Realty alleges that CAR COOL leased the property from the former owners, spouses Lopez, since 1972. On June 15, 1995, Hector Lopez wrote to CAR COOL informing the latter of his intention to sell the property. Hector Lopez gave CAR COOL the option to buy the property before offering it to prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer. Thus, on June 28, 1995, Hector Lopez terminated the lease agreement and gave CAR COOL until August 31, 1995 to vacate the property. In a letter dated August 31, 1995, USHIO Realty informed CAR COOL that it had purchased the property from the spouses Lopez. CAR COOL continued to occupy the property despite USHIO Realtys demand. This prompted USHIO Realty to file a complaint for ejectment. CAR COOL, on the other hand, alleges that USHIO Realty was aware of the lease agreement between CAR COOL and the former owner, Hector Lopez that they agreed to renew the lease agreement for another two (2) years covering the period from January 1, 1995 to December 1996. CAR COOL further claims that it had paid in advance to Hector Lopez the monthly rentals covering the 2-year period. In this regard, CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. On 1 October 1995, USHIO Realty allegedly broke into the leased premises, demolished the improvements on the premises, and threatened and inflicted bodily injuries upon two employees and found some personal items missing ISSUE: Whether or not to award damages by way of rentals in favor of USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. HELD: USHIO Realty, as the new owner of the property, has a right to physical possession of the property.11 Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rentals as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Contrary to CAR COOLS allegations, the Supreme Court held that the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the property does not constitute unjust enrichment. The court found out that the allegations of USHIO Realty were true. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that "every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. USHIO Realty has the legal right to receive some amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOLs occupation of the property.

Case no. 01-07 VALENZUELA v COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The heirs of Carlos Telosa, a fisherman and farmer with a very limited education, initiated a complaint before the CFI seeking the nullification of the real estate mortgage executed by Carlos Telosa in favor of Rural Bank of Lucena. Carlos Telosa obtained a loan on Nov. 29, 1960 from the Rural Bank of Lucena. He secured it with a mortgage of a parcel of land with an area of 50,000 sq. m. which was registered in the name of sps Carlos and Rufina Telosa. On Marh 27, 1962, Lucena Bank was declared insolvent and the liquidation of it was decided by the Monetary Board. They designated Superintendent of Bank Carlota Valenzuela to take charge. The Board decided to convert the assets into money. Among those accounts was of Carlos Telosa in the principal amount of P5,000. Demand letter sent to Telosa. Telosa executed an affidavit protesting the demand because his debt was only 300. But paid 411.25 on Jan. 4, 1986 as evidenced by his OR. He died on Jan. 13, 1968. Because of insufficient payment Central Bank ordered the foreclosure of subjetcs property scheduled on 04/20/1972. To restrain its sale, heirs of Telosa then filed on April 18, 1972 involving Art. 24 of the CC. CFI rendered in favor of Telosa. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 24 of the CC can be invoked and entitled to the relief prayed for which is the annulment of extrajudicial sale.

HELD: Yes. The heirs are entitled to the relief they prayed for. The transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officers of the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc. They took advantage of the very limited education of Carlos Telosa. The decision also made findings that the bank acted fraudulently. It was the bank, represented by petitioner, thru its fraudulent acts which compelled private respondents to litigate and incur litigation expenses. The court must be vigilant for Telosas protection.

Case no. 02-08 St. Louis Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Conrado J. Aramil 133 SCRA 179 Facts: Dr. Conrado Aramil is a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center. On December 15, 1968, St. Louis Realty Corporation published an advertisement in the Sunday Times with the heading where the heart is which featured Dr. Aramils house, instead of Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. The same was published on January 5, 1969. After Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation. Despite after such receipt of Ernesto Magtoto, the Officer in Charge of the advertisement, no rectification or apology was published after a week. Thus, Dr. Aramil sought and demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1968, St. Louis published an ad with Mr. Arcadios real house without an apology or explanation of the error in the previous publication. On March 29, 1968, Dr. Aramil filed a complaint for damages. The notice of rectification was published on the April 15 advertisement. The trial court awarded P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorneys fees. Had it not been a late action for publication of rectification and apology which only took place on April 15, 1969 of the Manila Times, Dr. Aramil could have not suffered mental anguish and reduced income by P1,000 to P1,500 a month. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial courts decision. Petitioner St. Louis contends that the decision is contrary to law and argues that the case is not covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. Issue: whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. Held: Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. St. Louis Realty Corporations employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication such as the Sunday Times. Through that negligence, people who know the residence of Dr. Aramil were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed and suffered reduced income and mental anguish.

Case no. 01-09 Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449 (1988) FACTS: Violeta Delmo was elected treasurer of a state college organization named Student Leadership Club. In that capacity, she extended loans from the club funds to some students. Thus the petitioner and college president, Jose B. Ledesma claiming that extending loans was against school rules, wrote Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award from the school. Delmo appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. The Bureau directed the college president not to deprive Delmo of any award if she is entitled to it. On April 27,1966, the President received the Directors decision. On the same day he received a telegram airmail records Delmo missent that office. The Bureau Director asked for the return only of the records but the President allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. So he returned by mail all the records plus the decision to the Director. The next day the President received from the Bureau Director a telegram telling him to give a copy of the decision to Delmo. The President in turn sent a telegram to the Bureau Director telling him that he had returned the decision and that he had not retained a copy. On May 3, the day of graduation, the President again received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmos name in the program as one of the honor students, the President let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the latin honor magna cum laude. RULING: The President of the state college was held liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with honors, on account of said officials neglect of duty and callousness. Undoubtedly, Delmo went through a painful ordeal brought about by the presidents neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code are but proper.

Case no. 01-10 PADILLA v CA

FACTS: On or about February 8, 1964, at around 9 AM, in the municipality of Panganiban, Camarines Norte, the petitioners, by confederating and mutually helping one another, acting without authority of law. Prevent Antonia Vergara and his family in close their stall located at the Public Market Bldg. No. 3; by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall brutally demolished and destroyed by axes and other instruments, the goods, wares and merchandise to the damage and prejudice of Antonio Vergara and his family. It was the payer who ordered such thru his memorandum No. 32. Since then up to the trial, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known. Plaintiff filed in RTC, respondents guilty. Petitioned to CA. Petitioners acquitted criminally but civilly liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed an error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.

HELD: No. What Art. 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquitted for the same criminal act or omission. It does not extinguished civil liability unless there is a clear showing that the act from which liability might arise did not exist.

Case no. 01-11 People vs. Bayotas Facts: On June 19, 1991, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was convicted with charges of rape against him. Pending appeal of his conviction, he died on February 4, 1992. The Supreme Court, in its Resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. The Solicitor General n his comment expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability. Counsel for the accused-appellant believes that both criminal and civil liabilities are extinguished upon death of the convicted. Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability Held: Yes. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability. The judgment against defendant has not become final and executory pending his appeal; thus, it cannot be said that he is definitely guilty of the felony against him. One of the provisions under Article 33 of the Civil Code is that a civil action may be done independently of the criminal prosecution (even in the case of death). This was not done in this case; thus, an action for recovery may not be pursued. Nevertheless, a separate civil action may only be instituted if it does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. In this case, the only offense committed is rape, which totally extinguished the civil liability of the accused.

Case no. 01-12 Prudential Bank v. IAC FACTS On August 8, 1962, Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To effect payment for said machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. Two of these drafts were accepted by Phil. Rayon through its president, Anacleto R. Chi (ARC), while the others were not. Upon the arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to Phil. Rayon which accepted delivery of the same and it also executed, a trust receipt covering all machineries, which was signed by ARC, in favor of Prudential. At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who, by the very terms and conditions thereof, were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should Phil. Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank. ARC signed this form. The obligation of Phil. Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated even by repeated formal demands for the payment. Per RTCs decision the amounts involved in the drafts not presented to Phil. Rayon, the same not having been accepted by defendant Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc., plaintiff's cause of action thereon has not accrued, hence, the instant case is premature. Issue: Whether or not the presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. HELD: NO, A letter of credit is defined as an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. Through a letter of credit, the bank merely substitutes its own promise to pay for one of its customers who in return promises to pay the bank the amount of funds mentioned in the letter of credit plus credit or commitment fees mutually agreed upon. In the instant case then, the drawee was necessarily Prudential. It was to Phil. Rayon that the drafts were presented for payment. In fact, there was no need for acceptance as the issued drafts are sight drafts. Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law lists when presentment for acceptance must be made. Under this provision, sight drafts do not require presentment for acceptance. Declaring private respondent Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. liable on the twelve drafts and on the trust receipt and also declared private respondent Anacleto R. Chi secondarily liable on the trust receipt and ordering him to pay the face value thereof, with interest at the legal rate, commencing from the date of the filing of the complaint.

Case no. 01-13

PADUA v ROBLES

FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of a young boy who was struck by the taxi driven by Romeo N. Punzalan during the New Years Day of 1969. Gregorio N. Robles, defendant, is the owner of the Bay Taxi Cab. Sps Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua filed up the Court of First Instance of Zambales and sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo filed up the same court, charged Punzalan of homicide through reckless imprudence. There were two separate liabilities: the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligent act of Romeo N. Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent liabilities.

HELD: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as the dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent hinds up liabilities, 1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and 2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so called culpa aquiliana. Should there be varying amounts avoided in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. Thus, in the case at bar, in as much as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay therein petitioners the amounts stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.

Case no. 01-14 Yakult Philippines v. CA GR 91856 Oct. 5, 1990 Facts: On December 24, 1982, five-year old Roy Camaso was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by Larry Salvado. Salvado was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries. On October 19, 1984, a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father David Camaso. Then, defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff in the amount of P13,006.30 for actual expenses, P3,000 for attorneys fees and costs of the suit. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from the criminal negligence of Salvado cannot be filed independently under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Issue: whether or not Civil case against Salvado can be filed independently of a criminal case

Held: Yes, civil case can be instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action. Provisions under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal state that When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action and the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In this case, the offended party did not waive the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded. Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was duly informed, the civil case against Salvado can be filed independently of the criminal case against him.

Case no. 01-15 Meynardo Beltran vs People and Judge Tuazon FACTS: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting and filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. In September 16, 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest and Petitioner and also contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The SC ruled that the import of Art. 40 of the Civil Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case at the bar, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Case no. 01-16 FORTICH CELDRAN v CELDRAN

FACTS: Plaintiffs were the children of the deceased, Pedro Celdran, Sr. from the first marriage. Defendants were Josefa Celdran, spouse of the decreased by the second marriage and their seven children. When the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, Ignacio Celdran withdrew as one of the plaintiffs, alleging that the documents was falsified. On March 6, 1959, the parties an amicable settlement, except Ignacio Celdran, recognizing as valid for being satisfied by Ignacio, upon receipt of P10,000 plus two residential lots. Ignacio appealed to the CA. On March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio, an information for falsification of public documents was filed by the first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question be suspended, for the reason that the alleged falsification of document of withdrawal is at issue in the case pending in the CA.

HELD: The court held the action poses a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for alleged falsification. The authenticity of the document was assailed in the same civil action. The resolution in the civil case be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending. As such, it is a prejudicial question which should be first decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case. Prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal; it is determinative of the case before the court and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in another. The decision of the CA under review is affirmed. The administrative case was held in abeyance of the high court.