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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

No.46 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v.R. that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section.” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act.5 People of the Philippines v. 121” does not embrace.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Buenviaje Case No. Page 12. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine. to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses. and consequences of the law. 1925) Chapter I. L-22945 (March 3. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). 203 G. in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee. d FACTS: Republic Act No. scope.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. In Section 3 of the same act. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. 37. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. 25c. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. National Power Corporation Case No. which may be enacted into law. and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic. d . 121”. expressed in its title. Footnote No. Respondent is empowered. 1968) Chapter I. and lastly. cannot embrace more than one subject. No. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble.R.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. Page 12. 8 G.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. 37. L-24396 (July 29. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. “A bill shall embrace only one subject. When there is doubt as to its validity. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act. Footnote No. which shall be expressed in its title. 7a.

37. 1199. Footnote No. Abalos Case No.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. LATIN MAXIM: 20a. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R. 7675. which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.A. L-14542 (October 31. 1994) Chapter I. otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Cabatuando Case No. Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. LATIN MAXIM: 24a.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. Footnote No. 1962) Chapter I. d FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. 7675. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. 291 G. No.R. Act No. language of such precision as to mirror. Page 12. the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover.6 Cordero v. d . a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.R. Page 12. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. L-114783 (December 8. Hon. and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be. No. will be regarded as valid. so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. 81 G. No.

The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. payable every three months. 14019 (July 26. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. after payment of a fee of P50 annually.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. section 3 of the Jones Law. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. “An Act amending the Administrative Code. 13. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Footnote No. 148 G. LATIN MAXIM: d . prompted by the upcoming elections. Page 13. now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. Rizal adopted its Ordinance No.7 Ayson and Ignacio v. section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject.R. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government. which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790. L-28089 (October 25. with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents. now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title. violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. which is Cotabato.” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law. 1967) Chapter I.” It does not violate Paragraph 17. It does not violate Paragraph 17. and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law. Commission on Elections Case No. No. No.51 FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas. 1919) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan v. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing. is invalid.R. which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province. 11 G. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916.’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality.

The controlling purpose of Act No. 169 G. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. No. with interest. ISSUE: W/N Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. costs. becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. Page 13. to which the Government appealed. L-32613-14 (December 27. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. 4122.47 with interest.8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A. 4122. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 51d . entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. He failed to pay some of the installments. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 43263 (October 31. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. v. and liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. Ferrer Case No. After applying this sum. and need not recite the details of the Act. 1935) Chapter I. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. Page 13. 208 G. 9d. having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage. Footnote No. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly. and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. 1700. He pleaded as a defense that the company. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with. HELD: Yes. No. the latter owed the company a balance of P275. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. as provided by Act No. The cases were dismissed. 1972) Chapter I. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements.R.50 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him.” is valid. HELD: Act No. Reyes Case No. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided. 37 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature.R.

and for Other Purposes. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself. Page 14.” ISSUES: 1. and both Resolutions No. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. 9d. 55 FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. Carbonell. No.” did not include weapons other than firearms. 33 G. 1 of both Resolutions. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. Footnote No. W/N Act No. 230 G. et al.R. Case No. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. 1780 on October 12. use. 51d FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No.9 Del Rosario v.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 36a. pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. HELD: No. and transfer of firearms. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. 1907. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act. L-32476 (October 20. HELD: No.” which phrase is reiterated in Sec.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. 46a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. possession. which was “an Act to regulate the importation. Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen.R. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. 1957) Chapter I. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. L-9659 (May 29. Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. 50 . the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only. and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. At the time of the enactment of Act No. and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title. acquisition.

4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 4003. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time. Apolonio Carlos Case No. Although FAO No. guilty of treason. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. No. Footnote No. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title. such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. 210 G. the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. Footnote No. FAO No. HELD: No. but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. trial and judgment of treason cases. Page 19. (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. Leoncio Lim. Page 16. 37–1 was invalid. (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail. No. and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment. 1947) Chapter I. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: In March 1954.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. FAO No. 38a . L-239 (June 30. 1960) Chapter I. challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No.63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. 37–1 was valid. it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it. the accused in violation of said order. 37.10 People of the Philippines v. 37–1.83 FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant. Leoncio Lim Case No. L-14432 (July 26.R. the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law.R. 204 G.

The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. the basic law prevails. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation.R. 68 G. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1. 1995. 1988) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 1973. 1972. No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1.June 30. 2. 1973. 2. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: Congress approved RA No. No. HELD: 1. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. Central Bank Case No. ISSUES: 1. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares.June 30. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. L-34526 (August 9. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase.June 30.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. 57 G. without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB. 1972. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court.11 KMU Labor Center v. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 1972. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1. 1973. Garcia Jr. v. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. PBOAP. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. Case No. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. 1972 to June 30. 1974. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. 115381 (December 23. as provided in the Act. Inc.

1993. plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees. LATIN MAXIM: 30.R. 2. The Commission. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans.A. of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. Honorable Estenzo Case No. So Ching. W/N Administrative Order No. ISSUE: 1. v. in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. 59 G. ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply. and its president. 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. L-14740 (September 26. 2. Footnote No. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3. Administrative Order No. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3. On April 28. 3135 is the governing law. No.494. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. After 5 years. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. HELD: 1. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec. 121158 (December 5. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. CA Case No. instead of Administrative Order No. Page 19. the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent. cannot amend an act of Congress. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. They were appealing that Act No. or any of its rules. Furthermore. No. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.40. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R. 2. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. 1. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. 3135 was the governing rule in their case. Respondent. 3 as So Ching was contending. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. 2. ISSUE: 1. HELD: Petition was dismissed.R. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted. 46a . 140 G. No. 35. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. Act No. 1996) Chapter I. Thus.12 China Banking Corp. 1960) FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp.

Municipal of Caloocan Case No.” “and internal organ fees. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees.13 Grego v. unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. No. Commission on Elections Case No. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner. if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others. Footnote No. who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings. 655.98 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v.R. 46c rd FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees. this does not fall under the scope of the term. which has a technical meaning.” “meat inspection fees. 24. ISSUE: W/N Respondent. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. Since Respondent was reelected. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively.R. Page 23. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. 1997) Chapter I. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT. 1963) FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees. L-15807 (April 22. 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a. it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. No. 120 G.” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141 G. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. Incidentally. exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.” “corral fees. referring only to an appointive position. 125955 (June 19. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. 37 . in the issuance of Ordinance No.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains.

00 pursuant to PD 42.000 sq/rn. and hence. but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. 87047 (October 31. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6.600.R. the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. 73 G. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments. 26. .400. subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA.14 National Housing Authority v. 11a. After it expired. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation.00. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired. On the second issue. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. 1990) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25.600. and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. res judicata does not apply. Reyes Case No. 49439 (June 29. whichever is lower. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof. No. and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982. the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The petition for Certiorari is granted. Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises.00.R. On the compromise agreement. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v. and hence. 85 G. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. No. ISSUE: 1. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. LATIN MAXIM: 1. then from 1982 to 1985. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy Case No.

37. No. In 1998. an “Iglesia ni Cristo”. Lim v. No. 115044 (January 27. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union Case No. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2.O. Felipe G. Then President Aquino issued an E.R. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union. as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. license or permit. 0. No. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. No. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R.D. Alfredo S. Pacquing. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. ISSUE: 1. 6c. ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai. And E. 74 G. 2. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. 40b . 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.A. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise. L-25246 (September 12.D. No. but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P. 50 FACTS: Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 5a.15 Hon. which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.O. to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. 44. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 1995) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victoriano v. HELD: R. provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.A. 1974) FACTS: Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. 169 G. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. Case No.

R. HELD: No. the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed. there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. 1986) Chapter I. 9a FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13. 31025 (August 15. 287 G. it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. and on the day from which it should be counted. Tuvera Case No. HELD: No. No. August 13. L-63915 (December 29. the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included. Page 37. the ownership would vest in the Defendants.16 Tañada v. 13 of the Administrative Code. unless otherwise provided. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. Footnote No. therefore. 39a . LATIN MAXIM: 2a. In computing any fixed period of time.159 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v. 1929) FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. Carpio Case No. No. 1928. 1928. which cannot in any event be omitted. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. The court. the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se. Publication in full should be indispensable. the Defendants appealed that by that time. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties. 55 G. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec.R. according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land. the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it. Without such notice or publication. declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule.

However. the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. 161 G. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. 1921) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.17 Guzman v. 25c . Lichauco Case No. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month. or to deposit in court.R.R. it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal. in this case.S. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days. On Feb 28. 2588. L-17986 (October 21. The term “month” must now be understood to refer to calendar month. 88 of the CCP. the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. LATIN MAXIM: 6c HELD: The payment made on August 11. No. v. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. as amended by Act No. Paniaga Case No. By various orders of the court. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7. 1914) FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. 9. to pay the Plaintiff. set aside the order of forfeiting the bond. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. HELD: Sec. 1912. 8223 (March 4. 1912. the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court. it shall be excluded. the sale was postponed from time to time. there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided. and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. On July 10. and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. On July 13. 1921 was one day late. and finally occurred on July 8. setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. No. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. The sale here of the property must stand. with government as the purchaser. on application of the sureties. As a result. if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday. 56 G.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. the principal was arrested. 1912. “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”. the court. and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale.

The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 98382 (May 17.195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. 124 G. Then. respectively. No. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. No. The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28. Section 3 of Act No. In Concepcion v. while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday. No. the section would have expressly said so. Page 47. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Agrarian Court dismissed petitions. 1970) and G. injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. Footnote No. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity. April 11 and April 12. 1993) Chapter I. L-25327 (May 29. L-25326 (May 29. the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises. The date March 28. 11a. 9a.R. Hidalgo Case No. 36a. 1970) Chapter II. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. Footnote No. Moreover. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants.R. claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. 30b. 43 .18 PNB v. 12a. a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. 9b FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication.19 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans. 1969 falls on a Friday. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Page 52. 238 G. Andueta. For failure to pay the obligation. CA Case No. reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”.R. 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. 37. 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. 9c.

ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. did not own property of the assessed value of P500. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. from voting. 13. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. 28. it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. 20a. 24a HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter. v. 1911) Chapter II. Both qualifications are under a single head. Evidence showed that the Appellants. 6160 (March 21. 1977) Chapter II. Navarro Case No. Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this.R. Eduvala Case No. property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. Page 53. required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. No. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof. Footnote No. 2. and of the statute as a whole. 1898. No. In the statute.R. 300 G. FACTS: Respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. L-41106 (September 22. 36a. 9c. 37 . Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro. Petition denied. LATIN MAXIM: 10.22 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. Page 52. 11a. If the property qualification is actual/market value. 12a. Footnote No. suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 149 G.S.19 U.

De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517. Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. 80223 (February 5. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code. While it may depart from its source.R. amended further by Act. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. No. 203 of the Administrative Code.R. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. Footnote No. said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land. Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. 1935) Chapter II.E. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. Footnote No. L-42293 (February 13. 25a . 3899). No. v. CA Case No. 1986. which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction. 1931. San Diego Inc. the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Petitioner. 26 G. 1993) Chapter II. 46a FACTS: On March 3.20 Regalado v. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. 3899. 3899). Yulo Case No. 1934. as further amended by Act No. as well as unjust eviction. 255 G. Villar assumed office. A few years later. In her defense.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. 27 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao. On December 17. Page 55. Page 56. Albay.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. Shortly thereafter. On November 16. PD 1517. Esteban T. Act No.

Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. Page 56.R. 8. 7a. 9a FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax. That when Congress convened again on Jan. No. such a task must be done by the Judiciary.21 Araneta v. payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. No. were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. 1. Dinglasan Case No. 24a . by the Legislature. L-6355-56 (August 31. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. HELD: No. to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. Footnote No. said proclamations were also terminated. 671 (Emergency Powers Act). Through the separation of powers. Page 56.R. While Art. 84 G. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. 1953) Chapter II. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public. Sec. 1949) Chapter II. 98 G.33 FACTS: Executive Orders. 6c. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1942. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. David Case No. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v. L-2044 (August 26. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No.

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

LATIN MAXIM: 1. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. 40a FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10. No. 46a. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. Furthermore. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation.30642 (April 30. However. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. Petitioners. 1990. 1990) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining operations. No. However. Therefore.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. with the exception of Floresca. L. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. 40 G. then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. Thereafter. 47 G. in a concurring opinion. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Salazar Case No.R. applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts. recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. 48 . 17. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. Philex Mining Corporation Case No.26 Floresca v. Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and wanton negligence. Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion. the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather. 92163 (June 5. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion.

1716-A states: “The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.R. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone. 35 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga. LATIN MAXIM: 1. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. HELD: No.R. Footnote No. HELD: No.D. theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Hermosisimo Case No. No. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. Tanodbayan Case No. Under RA No. 1956) Chapter II. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee. 3a. 7a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.D. Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No.D. the use of “sole” in P. 1984) Chapter II.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. L-10662 (December 14. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner. No. Cebu.74 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. 65097 (February 20. especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Footnote No. RA No. Section 7 of P. 6b. it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. Hence. Page 67. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. 1716-A refers to police authority. 162 G. even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. 7a .27 Manikad v. the decision against him was invalid. 278 G.65 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. Page 63.

Mapa Case No. 213 G. No. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1967) Chapter II. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. Defendant. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Macarandang. admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions. 6c. L-22301 (August 30. HELD: No. Page 69. Footnote No.87 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. 7a. invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. 24a FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. 46c . 35. 30a. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1959) Chapter II. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v.28 People of the Philippines v.R. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. Page 69. Moro Macarandang Case No.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. 211 G. HELD: Yes. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms.R. No. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. L-12088 (December 23.

37. Page 69. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. 65 G. Que v. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale.29 Co v. the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense.R. 43 . At the time of the issuance of the check. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. 1993) Chapter II. Sometime in September 1948.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. No. 150 G. 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566. 1983. According to them. 24a. Sarmiento Case No. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 46a FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. 1984. L-2934 (November 29. an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.R. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. HELD: No. 1951) FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1. Footnote No. It was dishonored two days later. CA Case No. 100776 (October 28. the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT. The check was deposited on January 3. 7a.91 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. 2a. in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter. postdated November 30. LATIN MAXIM: 1.

1941) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Capiz v. “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 56 G. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.8 FACTS: On September 15. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. L-16197 (March 12. Page 79.” LATIN MAXIM: d . 48634 (October 8. Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga.R. The land involved is a private agricultural land. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. 37. and for other purposes. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties.R. in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned.” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. 2874. No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands. cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Ramirez Case No.30 Sumulong v. Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner. the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled. which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land. Commission on Elections Case No. Eleven days later. 1941. d FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years. a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation. the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. No. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 1920) Chapter III. 149 G. LATIN MAXIM: 36a. Footnote No. and binding to all future owners of the same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject.

or rebellion. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.D. erred in applying P. 9.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed. “The intent of the statute is the law. L-42050-66 (November 20. No. HELD: No.R.D. the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property.31 Eugenio v. organized lawlessness or public disorder. Page 81.D. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. b2 . No. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. insurrection. 221 G. Applying P. Petitioner claims that the Exec. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.D. Drilon Case No. reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.D. pointed. 957 will be given retroactive effect. No. Nos. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. two lots.D. No. Sec.R.16 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner. 1978) Chapter III. Footnote No. 9. ISSUE: W/N P. 9.D. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. connected with or related to subversion. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P. 1996) Chapter III. but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. Page 76. P. or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of. Footnote No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P. viz. Purisima Case No. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P. 109404 (January 22.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. 104 G. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”. It failed to state one essential element of the crime.D. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.

L-14526 (March 31. Nos. HELD: The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves.D.R.R. the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. thus bringing the case at hand.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1980) Chapter III. ISSUE: Whether or not P. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No.D. through its ordinance. 772. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. 4 G. L-47757-61 (January 28.23 FACTS: The issue is whether or not P. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did. 25a. 207 G. City of Cebu Case No. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P. Footnote No. Page 82.D. has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. Hence.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court. 1965) Chapter III.D. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage.32 People of the Philippines v. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain. declaring that P. Page 77. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu. 36b FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently. No. Echaves Case No. 36b .22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. According to Respondent. both fall within the scope of the power granted. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.

Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. Tarlac. after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the election”. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code. that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the quarterly payment made. 9d. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal.28 FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. The Respondent contends. Case No. “Sec. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. The Supreme Court said that. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. not capacity to assume office. Inc. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Footnote No. does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office. 80 G.R. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings. No reason is shown why. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment). 36b . Aquino claimed that age requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. 105 G. Page 83. TMX Sales. challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Footnote No. 1992) Chapter III. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section. HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. Four days after the proclamation. He appealed that the existence of a semi-colon. Aquino Case No. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. taking part in the election is meant. Page 83. 83736 (January 15.” LATIN MAXIM: 11a. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. 36b. 1957) Chapter III. on the other hand.R. 11e. 10201 (September 23. No. 11a. the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. 36d FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion. No.

a citizen of the U. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 11e. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. Petitioner. “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses. allowed by the law of his own state or country. attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature.” The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court.R. is covered by Sec. or heading. 159 G. which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner. No. 26. thus an alien. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. 519. being a US citizen. Page 86. v. Sec. 1918) Chapter III. 1913) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. Inasmuch as defendant had. is covered by Sec. may be proved. 48 . 636. L-8327 (March 28. allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. 33 FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila. The will duly probated. 636. and which might be proved. but Petitioner contends that Sec. 12767 (November 16. of a section being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision.S and therefore an alien. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens. separated by the comma. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. Hart Case No. No. therefore was not a viable defense. defendants are acquitted. or inserting others when necessary. it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. 37. separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support.34 US. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks. 25a. 42a. 131 G.38 FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No.R. and in this connection. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will. The epigraph.

consulted to remove. Yabut Case No. They were tried and convicted.43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. d . 160. HELD: No. which are mere catchwords or reference aids. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box.R. Judgment was reversed.112 G. his conviction for murder is not different because it involved homicide. Page 87.R. According to him. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the text. not create doubts. he killed another prisoner.35 People of the Philippines v. Footnote No. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Mendoza Case No. 7a FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. he was punished with the maximum period for murder. After conviction. While serving sentence. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. 231 G. 85472 (September 27. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous. or from the Spanish caption. No. and suggests that the law is applicable only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. heading. there is no need to resort to the preamble. in accordance with Art. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. LATIN MAXIM: 50. L-38076 (November 4. He was consequently charged for murder. 1933) FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. 160. 1993) Chapter III. No. HELD: No.

because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. v. The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. it shall prevail over its translation. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. L-39037 (October 30. Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter. 1761.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo. 1910) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. 110 G.R. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. because the complaint was not signed by the offended party.S. the “Opium Law”. Subsequently. in violation of Sec. Quintanar Case No. No. but it was denied and he was convicted. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party. it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law. Manaba Case No. and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter. On appeal. No. 1908”. Art.36 People of the Philippines v. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. 5654 (August 27. HELD: No. After trial. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 162 G. 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium. 1933) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. The English and original text says: “on and after March 1.R. 32 of Act No. and defendant was never in jeopardy. Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del primero de Marzo. on the night of March 1. LATIN MAXIM: 6c .” HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. 36a FACTS: Defendants. the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.

One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law.R. Sec. 496. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. No. there was yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17. 7896 (March 30. it is simply reversed. are a term exceeding three years. rent to corresponding years paid in advance. ISSUE: With these two cases. The preference on Mata was based on Art. Even if there was a new judgment. there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment execution is.666. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because it is not a real right. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure. 1934) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION McMicking v. v. Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. in the duration of Mata’s judgment. 40188 (July 27. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Footnote No. Page 88.R. 39 G. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. The only exceptions. China Banking Corporation Case No. Act No. orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure. should prevail. However. 1914) Chapter III. No. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. Inc. strictly. or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. not destroyed. who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. 175 G. drawn in part from American and English precedents. only real rights can be registered. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. 49 . or the Torrens system. until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken. And likewise.37 Employees’ Club. which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). 49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments. 496. the judgment.49 FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. But the English enacted by the Legislature. Lichauco Case No. However.60. which it does not harbor. 51 and 52. and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons.

HELD: Yes. W/N there was a valid notice. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed. Racquel. 37 . While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. L-27489 (April 30. the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. representing the portions bought. By virtue of such agreements. 11 G. the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice. the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. 12a. 1987) Chapter III. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. 9a. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 156 G. 10. Footnote No. which led to his death 16 days later. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale. No. Page 89. 17 FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12. Footnote No.38 Alonzo v.57 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. and unmarried. whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. they were lawfully wedded. to the posthumous daughter of the deceased. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the Petitioners occupied after the said sales. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. No. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. despite their obvious knowledge of it. a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter. 2. Page 89. However. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale. 2/5 of the lot. 7a. 11e. 1970) Chapter III. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. are still considered dependents under the Act. 1962. HELD: Although there was no written notice. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. De Macabenta v.54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vda.R. 11d. L-72873 (May 28.R. 12a. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. 1961. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. 8. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8. on the day following the accident. with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. 9c. W/N Art. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death. ISSUE: 1.

No. but because Sergio Nicolas died. In 1943. Case No. the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants. he was substituted by his heirs. 11a.39 Tinio. Page 91. In this regard.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance Company v. 34382 (July 20. in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction. and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. 36a. et al. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. 9b. 37 .R. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Frances. no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No. and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. 125 G.R. prove legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines. et al. the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor. represented by his widow. heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. In the case at bar. Otherwise.64 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. HELD: Yes. Therefore. 1955) Chapter III. v. such as Plaintiff Company. No. In 1947. said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to public policy. 1983) Chapter III. 37. the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. L-7747 (November 29. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. 290 G. 38b. HELD: No. 48 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. Page 90. must. together with the fruits of the land as damages. LATIN MAXIM: 4. In 1953. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. Footnote No. 8. 9c.

and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant. 154 G. Trinidad Case No.800.000. Therefore.800.33. with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only a month later and with a check for only P600. he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1. Again.71 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. Thus. 2992). 37 . He now executed a new promissory note.000.850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15. Footnote No. Martinez Case No.000 to Respondent. Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and sent a check of P1. 1462 of Act No. Page 93. 11a. 9c. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25. the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. 28 FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40. one may consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo. the intent of the framers is clear. the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. he must give back P11. the Internal Revenue Collector. again due within the next three months. 36a. since only the interest is forfeited. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation. 2711. Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1. After three months. 5b. 1923) Chapter III. Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest.40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v.R. 1462 of Act No. which had been paid under protest.000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15. 2711. On the same day. 1462 of Act No. the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor. 19864 and 19685 (October 17. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law. 4. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No.800 to Petitioner. 113 G. doing business in the City of Manila. unlike the previous law.422. In a previous law RA 2073. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. As a rule of construction. 9c.81. HELD: No. Engaging in a stevedoring business. 281. with its gross receipts from the said business amounting to P242. 18316 (September 23. Under the provisions of Sec. Therefore.93 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports.R. Page 91. Petitioner filed a complaint. the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. Footnote No. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times. No. the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. and with this note. when the intent of a law is ambiguous. 2711. No. which was cashed. They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. However. 1922) Chapter III. the sum of P2.

it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. disclaimed such consent. No. 36b .” An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid. Footnote No. 30a.R. 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna. 1981) Chapter III. Army Corps of engineers. a corner of approved public. HELD: Sec. a clear disregard of their agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. or location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands. or other government agencies. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. No. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records. Footnote No. 19 and 20 are constitutional. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers.R. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. 33. Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. However. Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey. Petitioner prospected 183 claims. along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling. private or mineral land survey. looking at the legislative history of the statute. 1915) Chapter III. 31 G. 47 par. HELD: Sec. Luna Case no.102 FACTS: Defendant. a kilometer post of public road. De Guzman Case No. Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie points. L-34135-36 (February 24. Bureau of Mines. Upon reaching the witness stand. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. a junction of known rivers or creeks. Consequently. 2 of the Mining Law (C. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Finally. Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner however. 22a. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. b2 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. L-9144 (March 27. discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. 137) provides: “For the purpose of this section.41 US v. a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads. was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. nevertheless. Nos. and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. Page 94.A. Page 95. a known public or private structure. 297 G.

RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore. the Court revealed that the records of Batasan. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. The Civil Code does not prevail. No. HELD: No.110 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 Sec. CA Case No. the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. 17. No. Petitioner alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 87416 (April 8. he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank.R. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. Thus. 1991) Chapter III. RA 390 provides that a guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. 43. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22. L-9695 (September 10. Footnote No. 1956) Chapter III. Vol. 24b. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. and is therefore.103 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa v. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship.42 Baga v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 88 G. 27 G. Footnote No. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. 26. 50. Page 95. b2 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check.R. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians. b2 . Page 96. not covered by the said law. it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. PNB Case No. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. However. ISSUE: W/N Art.

No. Tan Kim Liong. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. by invoking RA 1405. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. 27. He refused to disclose the sought information.” laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. Jr. Page 96. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. Case No. Furthermore. L-34964 (January 31. Indeed. Had it been otherwise. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 12b. 43. 1994) Chapter III. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. De Guzman.R.110 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v. Footnote No. HELD: No. Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police.R. The trial court declared the said corporation in default. 11a. No. Thus. a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier. 185 G. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current Petitioner Bank. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor. ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. 1973) FACTS: RA 6975. 30b. of the Interior and Local Government. Hence. In other words. citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. 106724 (February 9. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 38b. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). 21 G. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. 12a. RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. b2 FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the collection of a sum of money. 89 includes the members of the PC. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC.43 National Police Commission v. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. b2 . Ortega Case No. 11e. otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. 35. the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec.

173 G. Morato Case No. v. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on the automobiles. lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. Acting CIR Case No. Page 96. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan. HELD: No. lotteries and other similar activities. Footnote No. when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority. association or joint venture” with others or “by itself. this request having been denied. v. No. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. 1961) Chapter III. 36b . as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169. said court modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund.” LATIN MAXIM: 34. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration.R. Hence this appeal. 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments.R. 118910 (November 16. but also the phrase “by itself. It is deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. HELD: No. Guingona. 67 G. races.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. 15000 (March 29.44 Mayon Motors v. Inc. controlling in the interpretation of the law.111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan. et al. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B). ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes. After the hearing. No. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and.

shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.133 FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. 34.D. Sec. the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely.D. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work. A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory. Sec. and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original.R. 48886-8 (July 21. 9265 (April 29. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only.. v. Page 101. provides that “when the work is not continuous. it being enough that he “cease to work. Nos. 72. No. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E. 25d. as amended by P. Sec.R. Inc. 71 G.A.O. HELD: The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. it is obvious that the private ports are not included. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 444. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only. given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime.” and may rest completely. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree. four hours overtime). LATIN MAXIM: 6c. known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer. ISSUE: 1. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. 1957) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Customs v. 30a . No. 2. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec.45 Luzon Stevedoring Co. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. 26 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan. 1 of C. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted. 77 G. Iligan City. 1993) Chapter III. as amended by P.

Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. Footnote No. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. 47 G. Secretary Flavier Case No. Within three months. while Sec. Case No. Footnote No. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Page 104. the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. L-46908 (May 17. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. Page 106. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. Sec. the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners. carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. who were employees of the national center for mental health. In response. No. 9 of the 1987 Constitution. the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission.46 Buenaseda v. 9 . while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. 13(8) of Art. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. 1993) Chapter III.R. 106719 (September 21. and how these statutes are interpreted.R. LATIN MAXIM: 27. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. v. it is the duty of the broker to do so. as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases.146 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act.141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Carolina Industries Inc. No. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 28 FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading. 40 G. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself. 1980) Chapter III.

1951.00 on Feb. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . for P68. 1944. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora. representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. Footnote No. 1916) Chapter III. to pay the sum of P235.00 on March 5. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo. 176 G. 9. No 10765 (December 22. owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila. 1963) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. HELD: Yes. They also purchased a lot located in Q.47 Zamora v. R. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No.C. The injury was attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. Page 106. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. Gsell Case No.959. being of American origin. 1944 which they sold for P94.00 and sold it for P75.000. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora.000. R. HELD: No. for P132.000.149 FACTS: Mariano Zamora. No L-15290 (May 31. 282 G. 1951. 11-year old son of the Plaintiff.00. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16.00 on January 19. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952.

the additional income tax for the income from her paraphernal property. Sta. for lack of jurisdiction. No. 93 G.246. on the ground that the amount of two notes. which the Defendant. 1956) FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56.125 and P1.203. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action. but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action.075. without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual declaration. No. returning the sum of P56.R. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1. one against the Plaintiff. and Felix Case No.59 to said plaintiff. was in excess of its jurisdiction. Cruz Timber Co. Posadas Case No. according to the complaint. collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income tax. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property.72. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax. not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the complaint. holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2. The jurisdiction of a court depends. which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action. L-31088 (December 3. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Rueda Corp. 17 G. 7a . in accordance with law.R. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. v. L-6884 (March 21. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.48 Ossorio v.000.

posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places. upon the land itself. 99 G. the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question.49 Ang Giok Chio vs. to wit.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states. more particularly on the 2nd. and 15th of February.R. In pursuant thereof. No. is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 1929. 33637 (December 31. and on the municipal building of Pasay. the sheriff on January 30. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication. at the market. 1929 and the sale took place on February 19. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 692 of the California Code. HELD: Yes. 1929. Case No. Kette and Sellner Case No. b2 FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. 1931) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . 7a. “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof. 1930) FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10. 8 G. HELD: Yes. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. 32124 (March 27. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. No.R. 9th. and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.000 was in force.

in the absence of any special reason justifying departure from the policy or practice. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument. L-22405 (June 30. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. Due to the failure of J. He managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. v. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Therefore. b2 FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office.000. 2252. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the Bank of America. the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due.156 FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23. The prohibition contained in said law against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person. we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. is substantially the same as that contained in Sec. Northcott. 1971) Chapter III. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid. are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Guerrero. and on June 29. Northcott to pay said amount of P12. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. LATIN MAXIM: 1. as amended by Act No. the former endorsed the mortgage deed. 135 G. and deducted from the bank’s clearing account the said amount. Page 107. Educ. Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office notified the Bank of irregularity.50 Reyes v.R. in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner’s account with the same amount. However. Rader and J. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but was denied. 9a. Wells Case No. 1922. neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. No. Soriano Case No. These are also in line with Sec.R. LATIN MAXIM: 2b. Respondent. or to any of his co-Plaintiffs. No. However. Plaintiff Guerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. 30587 (December 4. b2 . Footnote No. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. E.000. 235 G. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US’s own postal statutes. Co.

LATIN MAXIM: 17. 40b . 9 of RA 610 and Sec. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. The claim for damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. upon his failure to do so.900. No. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. 1972) FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan. L-8257 (April 13. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees. considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. with legal interest from the date of the decision. 7a FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6.000. Defendant Belizo was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4. the P3. for P4. of the national. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence. Pahati Case No.R. HELD: Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car.900 and pay the sum of P5. 39. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Sec. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610. 132 G. It is difficult to construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received.R. without deducting the P3. 28 G.000. ISSUE: W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC.900 which he paid in check. The court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No.51 Cruz v. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v.00 plus attorney’s fee of P600.000. No. provincial or municipal government” in Sec. 38b. 19b. It was also contended that the phrase “or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation benefits under other laws. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a result. to pay him the sum of P4. Furthermore. generally.000 as moral damages. L-29019 (May 18.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC.00 under the WCC. 29. Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect in the title. HELD: The resolution of the WCC is modified. he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for cancellation.

As a matter of fact. Moreover. not for the purpose of creating it. HELD: RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country’s international reserve.00 for 1959 and P434. it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal. Hipolito et al. Two days after.234.52 Garcia et al. Garcia to Congress as part of. 70037 (July 7. LATIN MAXIM: 1. since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7a . the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions. No. 19b. 27. it cannot be extended. The term of the court in which the case was tried expired on May 30. 1903) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. v. there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute. after the right to remove the case has been secured. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 48 FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Petitioner’s claims for refund of the margin fees P102.R. and in order to balance. No. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period. Moreover. which was denied on July 23. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601. given the physical impossibility to comply with it in many cases. at least two cases had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. 1903. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk’s office. But that period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers. The Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May 21.R. Case NO. L-1449 (November 30. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. they excepted to the judgment and presented a motion for a new trial. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appeal—the preparation of the papers for transmission to the Supreme Court.246. 1989) FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1. Therefore. entitled “An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks’ Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange”. v.92 for 1960. the language of which is plain and unambiguous. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to extend the term. is a police measure or a revenue measure. 53 G. the budget for 1959-1960. which on August 5 was allowed and signed by the court. 41 G. considering when the law was adopted. On July 28. The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become important.

To the contrary. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. No. 102 C.R. Case No. 26 G. 1975) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight. in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. 33.A. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer. C. or the Special Import Tax Law. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner. and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry was correct. namely. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". without the record disclosing in our opinion. validity and operation. until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had. Director of Lands Case No. L-28329 (August 17. it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not. it should be the actual occupants who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. 100 G. 141). either expressly or by implication. 36b. pursuant to the provisions of Sec. No. HELD: No.53 Commissioner of Customs v. 1964) FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code. b2 FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents. or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. in cases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupation. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. L-15816 (February 29. 141. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes thereon since 1947. unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other. In the present case. and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. No. The policy in the disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant.A. No. If anyone should be given prior right of entry at all.R. Thus. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. and of facts which affect their derivation. 38a. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided.

Certainly. we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes. The Chief of Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. 1933) FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. Hence. increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions. and being a new position created under RA 4040. Respondents filed their answer. that Respondent. 1931. one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate. he was a delinquent in the payment of P2. this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Enrile Case No. Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law. to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner. Sec. has an ambiguous aspect. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and public office. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Under these circumstances. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. ISSUE: W/N Sec. the answer was not in doubt. being a lawyer. and he has been performing functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as such until RA 4040. taxes had been paid for. And in this case. HELD: No. on the condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. 92 G. among others. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office.54 Orencia v. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23. he was charged for violating Sec. and after usual admissions and denials. The Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor. such a contemporaneous construction. However. 32. 107 G. is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary.R. they chose to follow the principle that a public office is a public trust. LATIN MAXIM: 2a FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October 16. it was not. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. 42b . Since there was a new legal provision to be construed. should be followed unless clearly erroneous. was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation. 1932. one which admittedly.R. who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility. HELD: For Respondent officials. By September. the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief. while not conclusive. Nos. is more qualified than Petitioner. Hernandez Case No. At this time. the same can only be filed by a qualified person. No. and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission.000 for land taxes to the government. in April 1932. L-28997 (February 22.

Footnote No. 236 G. there is no obligation of Respondent Corporation. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation Case No. before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. Footnote No. In the case at bar. other stations or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. Petitioners decided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq m.R. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners. Moreover. aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. applicant shall cease its operations. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. maintain. the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes. 1988) Chapter III. low cost housing for those who are unable to provide themselves with this. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest. and operate. Page 112. Inc. 36b . No. which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. Relova Case No. Thus.181 FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent. apart from its principal station in Makati. No. 1 of RA 3802.R. in reference to Sec. This can be seen in Sec. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. 1986) Chapter III. v. Page 112. Manila was designated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is being offered. 9a FACTS: In 1976. However.. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision. subject to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities. clear and certain. In January 1979. In 1971. HELD: No. the price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the lots is at least P120. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. under RA 3802. Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication.55 Sagun v. Petitioner’s rights should be well-defined. 73603 (June 22. which was in violation of RA 3802. now NTC.180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Global Communications. In 1977. For mandamus to lie. BOC gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu. LCH Project 3. Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose. This is a petition seeking to set aside the ruling rendered. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the lots located in Block 330. L-60548 (November 10. 266 G. an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. In accordance with RA 3208.

Sugar Central Agency v. the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. 37. free from import duties. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so “would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government. 24 No. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid. Under the law in effect at that time. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties.56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Footnote No. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec.183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. The first gives him the privilege of importing. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. provided the articles mentioned are exported within three years from importation. Commissioner of Customs Case No. 4. 6 1927) Chapter III. Collector of Customs Case No. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government.186 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III. it is non-extendible. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended. the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1year period. 27761 (Dec. 11d . offer two options to an importer. 38b. Page 112.629. in and by which millions of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves. and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. 5b. Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. Page 113. 241 No.42 which the Petitioner paid under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. Footnote No. shipped 5. 4. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. 43 FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.124.” Dissenting Opinion: Historically. Defendant collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf.416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United States in a wharf on Pulapandan. wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed or levied upon. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.

ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the price of palay. Thus. 164 No. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. Footnote No. which was possessed with a distinct and separate corporate existence. There has been consistent administrative interpretation by the Office of the President as to what may. the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. v. such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983. No. that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). 6g. HELD: While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts. by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act. it is entitled to great weight and consideration. 37. HELD: No. RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation. RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. Also. ISSUE: W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created – for the said obligation. 253 G. Games and Amusement Board Case No. Page 115. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Not a matter of right. and corn. L-12727 (February 29. it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. L-22753 (December 18. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable.193 FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC.190 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramos v. 4 of RA 309. 1967) Chapter III. CA Case No. 38b FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for additional compensation for overtime work. RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. To carry out this function. night work and work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. they are merely an office directly under the President. Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation. rice. 11a. and not for profit.R. 38b . Page 114. be granted to RCA workers and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. under law. 1960) Chapter III.57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. as amended by RA 983.

No. the Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U. 20c. Page 115. Page 115. the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. Under RA 51 and E. independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. L-45642 (February 28.R. Footnote No.193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION University of the Philippines v.P. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is final. the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. 38b FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 94.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. 267 G. 9b. 1971) Chapter III.58 Salaria v. the President transferred them under herein Respondent. On appeal. Footnote No. After the trial. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. possess full and final authority in disciplining. namely.195 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. 970 was issued by the President stating that “except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. CA Case No. No. Thus.R. suspension. A formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission. a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service Commissioner. 6c. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.O. 1978) Chapter III. 305 G. particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case. L-28153 (January 28. and removal of the civil service employees of the University. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 38b . including those of the Philippine General Hospital. Buenviaje Case No. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. 30a. HELD: No. Memorandum Circular No. Thus.

LATIN MAXIM: 2a . Inc. No. which is 432. 881. ISSUE: 1. Bautista Case No.R. etc. 120 G. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote. their receipts were P15. W/N Regulations No. contemporaneous construction is given weight. 39a FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queen’s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937. As such. 1458. 1939) FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills. No. 1976) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Everett v. 94. L-43760 (August 21. Sec. Company. Bureau of Labor Relations Case No. which they refused to pay. Also. The partnership charged admission fees of P0. whose admission price exceeds P0. 46505 (November 7.70 per seat. At that time. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of the law.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. 1&3 of C. During the first Quarter of 1937. which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. 43 G.40 but not more than P0. the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters. 94 is in accordance with law.A. No.R. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. LATIN MAXIM: 1. They were asked to pay P992. which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. HELD: Yes to both. the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar.40 (Sec. cinematographs. 2a. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. 1458 of the Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec.41.50. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act. 128). CIR. 2.

1123 granted a P60. if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P. Sec. 2. on May of the same year. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. 1988) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. 1977. the same must be declared null and void. However. 1123. 9 are valid. IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. Later. 1977. ISSUE: 1. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. HELD: No. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor supporting the PAI Management. there has been an agreement to a P22. Management argues that since on April 2. the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpretation by PAI Management.00 will be given the difference. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1. No. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. (PAI) on April 2. 1977 and was signed on September 7.D. 37. And also. 1123 has been passed. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for reconsideration. provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE).60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. 17. IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. PAI only had to pay the difference of P38. 40c FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. L-50320 (March 30. 1977. Moreover. NLRC Case No. No.D.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that will retroact from April 1. In the case at bar. At this point.00 increase. There was no formal agreement on April 2.R. ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P. Moreover. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. L-52415 (October 23. 119 G. 62 G. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . W/N Sec. CBA stipulated a P22.R.00. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. Inciong Case No.D. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. 1977 regarding the increase. P.

upon knowledge thereof. Laurel. It would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality. It is sufficient that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. it has no legal authority to condone. 30187 (November 15. However. No. claiming that the assessed penalties were inequitable. his hometown. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act. Nevertheless. establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people… to provide employees against the hazards of disability. The reason of the law is “to develop. “qualified electors” and “qualified voter” the law means what it says. 26 FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain.R. 316 G. The same was the case and decision of the Executive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 3a.214 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations.R. old age. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. The conclusion to which was. Page 118. HELD: Yes. 6c. However. In a previous case contested in the Philippine Assembly. 9a. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. Social Security Commission Case No. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties. 1969) Chapter III. waive. Footnote No. “qualified elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter and need not be register. Page 206. Abaño Case No. they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances. 293 G.61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. 7a. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec. 1928) Chapter III.” Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. 11a . Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. Footnote No. waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late payment of remittances.206 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Yra v. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone. he is a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate. or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. He is qualified to run for local office. it is not least to disregard the forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases. sickness. therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them. No. one of the qualifications is that he/she who is running should be a “duly qualified elector therein”. there is no room for interpretation. 6b. Fernando Ma. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. L-26712-16 (December 27. and death. 432 of the Election Law.

Page 120. “When the provisions of Act No. Pursuant to Sec. 2113 and Sec. Sec. there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 1. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. L-6741 (January 31. v. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation.. 69 of the Administrative Code. Page 120-121. No. the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. No. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value of the goods transported. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. impost. the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press. 4. 134 G. 1956) Chapter III. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.” In the interpretation of reenacted statutes. 2113 were enacted and ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. The regulation (Sec. 1918) Chapter III. Footnote No. 129 G. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18.R. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had. 3a.223 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The regulations were approved on September 16. Inc. the same provisions of stamp tax. assessment or tolls. 2. 1924. the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax. W/N the Court of Appeals’ decision is erroneous. filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. bills of landing and receipts were re-enacted. or any penalty in relation thereto. 1939.62 Interprovincial Autobus Co. HELD: Yes. L-13862 (April 15. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment.R. the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. ISSUE: 1. Before the Governor-General gave his order. CIR Case No. 9a . Petitioner asked for a refund and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in their favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code.222 & 227 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: McCulloch Dick Case No. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Petitioner. 121 and 127 of the Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance. 4 FACTS: Petitioner. b. Footnote No.

2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. 21 does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax. the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor. This took place within the Philippines. 4. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Only the tax rate was amended. the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions without substantial changes. paid income tax on the premiums.225 FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. the vice-mayor shall assume office. 53 and 54 were “substantially re-enacted” by RA 1065. No. 21 of the Revised Election Code. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. thus subject to income tax.. stating that it was exempted from withholding tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. entered into reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. such action is confirmatory to an extent that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. upon re-enacting Sec.R. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance premiums and. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-19392 (April 14. (CIC). the Provincial Governor. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor. Respondent should assume the vacated position. By virtue of Sec. However. 2180 in Sec. No. 1965) Chapter III. 50 . which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code.R. Plaintiffs stated that since Sec.63 Howden & Co. Finally. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. Baltazar Case No. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 144 G. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished letters. said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative approval by re-enactment. Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. 1952) Chapter III. Footnote No. Page 121. A special provision overrides a general one. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. Hence. 38b.222 and 224 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Laxamana v. 21 of the Revised Election Code. applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. the incorporation of Sec. the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted. 2180. a domestic corporation. Page 120. HELD: No. on behalf of Plaintiff. L-5955 (September 19. by virtue of Sec. 1291 and 2343. Ltd. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. This principle is not applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Also. 9 G. 4 FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office. Sec. v.

232 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen. 38a. the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void. 49 . Thus. the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Hence. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence. Footnote No. Province of Lanao del Sur Case No. 7 was valid. ISSUE: 1. Furthermore. Page 121. the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. 5b. 96700 (November 19. that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. 5a. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the vetoed Sec. 6c FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt status was revoked by P.226 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NPC v. In the present case. Pangasinan. since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. Footnote No. 3a. 2.R.D. the tax exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. With the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). 187 G. including its exemption from payment of RPT. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace to gratuities. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges. 37. Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions. 2b. L-42821 (January 18. Note however. However. 1936) Chapter III. Page 122. Also. 32 G. 9a. HELD: Yes.R. the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. 1996) Chapter III. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to pay. No. was not subject to item-veto. they must be given great respect. 20a. No. It is clear from reading Sec. Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts. the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status. but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. 3899. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against. LATIN MAXIM: 1.64 Bengzon v. Furthermore. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. but its privileges were only suspended. Secretary of Justice Case No. 1931. He relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisions of Act No. the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes.

The validity of OCT No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. 1978) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J. laches and prior judgment. as long as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality.65 J. 1914 in Case No. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. Tuason & Co.7 FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. Sec. The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova Case No. v. Tuason. Tuason v.M. 735 is valid. Tuason. 8. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: OCT No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. improper venue. 37. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. 9c. upon payment of just compensation. HELD: No. Page 434. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. No. 40c . 1970) Chapter XI. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates. 735 is valid. The question is one of constitutional construction. Alcantara vs. No.R.R. It has a broader scope. Tuason and Pili vs. prescription. The Constitution clearly states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated. 64 G. L-33140 (October 23.M. “The Congress may authorize. The law does not distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the estate. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 5b FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. Under Art. allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. 4 of the Constitution. 26. 24a. Land Tenure Administration Case No. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. 135 G. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. L-21064 (February 18. Footnote No.

4 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Also. seeks prohibition of such because it violates Sec. This proposal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the November 1971 elections relying on Sec. 1971) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aglipay v. 13.” ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. 4052. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. ISSUE: W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. Commission on Elections Case No.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. In this case. Act.R. Ruiz Case No. Art. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. Petitioner. 7a FACTS: Respondent. 1 of Art. 1937) FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. 36a. 5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. “An election” only means one. Art. 45459 (March 13. 1. 6 of the Constitution. no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. What it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. L-34150 (October 16. Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election.66 Tolentino v. No. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. HELD: There was a violation. announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 37 . 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.R. 154 G. who is the Director of Post. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. HELD: Act No. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. 1 of Art. No. 15 of the Constitution: “The Congress in a joint session assembled. 1.

25a. COMELEC Case No. 192 G. In fixing the price. permanent and substantial. the law is dealing with private property and private rights. No.R. Mountain Province. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. As known. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region.S. it can be derived that the term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. legally and validly constitute a region. Ang Tang Ho Case No 295 G. The provisions of R. No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. HELD: Art.O. which are sacred under the Constitution. Page 437. Footnote No. only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor General. Out of the provinces. 93054 (December 4. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.67 U. This power is exclusive to the legislative. Resolutions and memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. 28 . The Constitution is something solid. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. Defendant will not be charged. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are. v. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “there shall be created autonomous regions… consisting of provinces. No. cities. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone.A. No.24 FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E. 53 follows Act No. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government.A. X. Abra and the city of Baguio. 17122 (February 27.R. ISSUE: W/N Act No.12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ordillo v. E. Sec. Ifugao. Footnote No. 1990) Chapter XI. municipalities and geographical areas…” From this. Page 435. no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 11g. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. 1922) Chapter XI.O. Kalinga-Apayao. 7a.

in effect. L-3045-6 (August 31. their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. Footnotes No. 450 and 454. rights and privileges. and their deputies and assistants shall not. No. 1950) Chapter XI. the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the sense they have in common use. Page 440 and 450. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. Sec. the Members of the Cabinet. 177. 284 is therefore declared null and void. allows members of the Cabinet. particularly during the Marcos era.O. The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”. Vice-President. Executive Secretary Case No. he can not be removed against his will and without cause. it is clear that Sec. and that Respondent’s appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated. 7. hold any other office or employment during their tenure.R. b2 . citing Sec. this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. 2545 of the Revised Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein. Furthermore. Nos. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. HELD: No. Reading Art. 2. 13. Art. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments. Sec. Vice-President. 1 of the Constitution. 89 G. 9a. one of who is the city engineer. until he resigns or is removed for cause.33 and 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Civil Liberties Union vs. 4. 51 and 71 FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioner’s removal from the same office which would be the effect of Respondent’s appointment. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.R. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President. The two provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. 9-B. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. Sec. their deputies and assistants. No. 7. 64 G. Sec. Art. Footnote No. 41. par. 1991) Chapter XI. LATIN MAXIM: 39 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which.A. Mallare Case No. but notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Pages 443. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President. According to Lacson vs.” Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer “belongs to the unclassified service”. 4 protects those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: “policydetermining. This is confirmed by the enactment of C. 12 of the Constitution which reads: “No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. HELD: No. Romero. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. Petitioner contends that under the Constitution. 12. This runs counter to Art. 83896 (February 22. E. all officers or employees in the unclassified service are protected by the above provision. unless otherwise provided by the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 7. members of the Cabinet. Art. 7. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. As a contemporaneous construction.68 De los Santos vs.

42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Nitafan v. even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. No. which does not follow the Masangkay ruling. Endencia vs. Page 447. Page 446. 1989) Chapter XI. income taxes are part of the diminution of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No.” ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods. Footnote No.e. Muñoz Case No. 10 Art. Footnote No. Meer.R. 1987) Chapter XI. as the alter ego of the people. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. In the case at bar. 3.69 People of the Philippines vs. Art.R.46 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. 78780 (July 23. L-38969 (February 9. the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. contrary to the provision of Sec. 10. David confirmed Perfecto vs. to wit. 8 of the Constitution mandating that “during their continuance in office. 217 G. Meer. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. that is. Concepcion. The penalty for murder under Art. their salary shall not be decreased”. LATIN MAXIM: 3. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that “…any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal. have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. the minimum and the medium. and Bernas). to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable. and that would be reclusion perpetua. b1 . 20a FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries. Sec. 190 G. According to Perfecto vs. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i. Fox. 8 of the 1987 Constitution. LATIN MAXIMS: 1. 6c. No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: Yes.

LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Then. 451. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). 19 G. HELD: No. Consequently. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. 11a FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa. 25a .R. is mandatory. Respondent’s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department. Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET.” Hence. Page 452. 1973. 1957) Chapter XI. Respondents alleged. Upon nomination of the Citizens Party. This highlights the 1973 Constitution’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. No.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aratuc v. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners. the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari. “if the judgment of the court. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. 9b. Lopez.62 FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel. 286 G. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel. that six members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives”. Cuenco. The Supreme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935. however. HELD: No. the other Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Page No. et al Case No. and Primicias. 6b. L-49705-09 (February 8. No.70 Tañada v. COMELEC Case No. Lopez. even in a doubtful case. 9a. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. it may be rejected. L-10016 (February 28. 1979) Chapter XI.R. Footnote No. errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari. and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET.

who has not been informed of his right to counsel. On the one hand.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb. L-37201-02 (March 3.79 FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998. within 2 months before the election. No. 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days. 8. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The prohibition is for public policy purposes. 50. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Footnote No. the appointments were void. During the trial. b FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. Yes. Page 457. 1973. is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. 35. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. 17. such confession is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution. Manguera Case No. to prevent “midnight appointments” – which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. 36b. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. 2. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. 23. 15. HELD: No. 15.71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. Nos. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively. Art. The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation.M. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible. 46a . W/N Sec. HELD: 1. except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days of such vacancy. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections. 1973. and to be informed of such right…. 20 Art. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtoto v. ISSUE: 1. Conversely. 20. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. 7. On the other hand. Art. 159 G. 2. 1972 is admissible as evidence. 9a. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 59 A. 98-5-01-SC (November 9. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. No. Sec. Art.R. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. 38a. Sec. which occurs only once every six years. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan. but this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections. 1975) Chapter XI.

Yes.. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 2. 4 Sec. elected representative of Northern Samar. 2. When Petitioner was captured. by such argumentation. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively.R. 1982. 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative). 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. No. Footnote No. children born of Filipino mothers before January 17. Nos.72 Filoteo v. They need not perform any act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957. LATIN MAXIM: 8a.82 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. ISSUE: 1. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30. Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened). Sandiganbayan Case No.80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Co v. 5a. is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father. On May 30. waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should. Accordingly. 106 G. No. when he was only 9 years old. Under of Art. 1991) Chapter XI. HELD: 1. as a natural born Filipino citizen. Page 457. 1 par. 1996) Chapter XI. be admissible. HELD: Yes. he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. Page 457. 46a FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr. Upon the capture of his co-accused. 3 of the Constitution. 79543 (October 16. even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. House of Representatives Case No. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 9a. Jose Ong. Electoral Tribunal. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. 2. who was born on June 19. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. without the presence of a counsel. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. 66 G. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively. 42a . he was pointed out as the mastermind. Jr. Footnote No.R.

Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. 1987) Chapter XI.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Domingo v. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of the first group. 112371 (October 7. other public ministers and consuls. Commission on Audit Case No. 16 Art. 16 Art. The word “also” in the second sentence of Sec. Page 458. 277 G. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the requirement of CA approval. 32. 1998) FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. HELD: No. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988. Footnote No. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Nos. by the President of “heads of executive departments. 16. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 7a. 24a . Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trading”.73 Sarmiento v. Mison Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. 24b. ambassadors. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Art. ISSUE: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle. 7 only provides for the appointment. she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. No. for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle. 80519-21 (December 17. b FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 37 G. 39a.R.R.

3316. justify her dismissal. 13 of the Public Service Law. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. 1932. the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. 1932) FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. Respondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in Sec. Public Service Commission Case No. 36b . 76 G. On May 9. she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term “public service” introduced by Act No. HELD: The omission from Sec. 3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business.74 Globe-Mackay v. 2. No. No. 3108 by Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1992) Chapter IV. although it is not a common carrier. Footnote No. Moreover.R. 13 of Act No. Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. Page 124. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. thereby. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. ISSUE: 1.R. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. NLRC and Salazar Case No. 112 G. L-37661 (November 16. Also. 82511 (March 3. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. On appeal. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. Public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the intent either.3 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Luzon Brokerage Co v.

75 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROUND 2 .

and authority must cease.76 Aparri v.A. Petitioner’s term of office is deemed expired. the Board approved Resolution No. “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Footnote No. L-30057 (January 31.D. HELD: 1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. No. 6c FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. the penalty of death shall be imposed.D.A. the term of office is not fixed by law. 1866 states that. his rights. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA).R. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. 1962. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. Tiozon. etc. People v. Tac-an. Page 124. On January 15. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. He was convicted of 2 offenses. Court of Appeals Case No. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31.R. Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. In this case.” ISSUE: 1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. the Board approved Resolution No. but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”. People v. 115008 (July 24. 1996) FACTS: R. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. HELD: No. G. It does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. 1960. 1984) Chapter IV. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. 15 G. On March 15. duties. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P. The word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term. 1962. but by the Board. Nos. Caling. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P. R. Barros. Quijada Case No.

In the case at bar. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that. on appeal to the CA. he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing. The Court. which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Gustillo Case No. Footnote No. due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. Page 125. If the instrument cannot be registered.R. 1994) FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land. and imprisoned. 109445 (November 7. unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment. ISSUE: 1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning. of Justice Case No. 77 of P.77 Baranda v. Lot No. 4517. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot. …” 2. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1. However. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. 1988) Chapter IV. 2. 11a. ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused. he does not fall under RA 7309. Dept. among other things. No. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. convicted.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: RA 7309. Office of the Secretary. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son. L-81163 (September 26. whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. 30 G. stating the ground therefore. “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. he is not. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty.5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basbacio v.D.R. Thus. 25a . and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta. after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment. No. G. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.

Sandiganbayan.78 Segovia v. he was transferred to Perez. Footnote No. G. The lowest bidder. 1933. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect. no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment. et al. Sandiganbayan. 2. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tanada v. HELD: Yes. Mariano. 7a Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. The judge of First instance.11 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC’s Mindanao project.” For this. Socrates v. acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice. a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35. Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in “one way or the other. Tayabas. Hence. ISSUE: 1. assigned to Alabat. Luciano. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. the committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. v. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. his transfer is not a new appointment. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it. Under the act. 288 No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1. No. No. Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 5a. 3899. but for reasons not on record. 1935) Chapter IV. not thereafter. 1934. Yulo Case No. 124067 (March 27. Tayabas. Joint Venture was disqualified after the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder. Page 127. petitioners were suspended from office. 43575 (May 31. extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission.R. shall be suspended from office. Gen. Later in his service. Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project. Urban Consolidated Constructors. with the consent by the Philippine Commission. were “downgraded” thereby ineligible as bidders. The project was eventually cancelled. subsequent to the approval of Act No. Sandiganbayan Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. it is mandatory. NPC Board approved. directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated. one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information. 7a . regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation. Therefore.

you have to look at the entire Act. 30. 32 of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony. governed by the Public Service Commission. owner of another ice plant already in the same area. L-3629 (March 19. Case No. After which. Atty. radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. they need such certificates to validly operate. the delegation is unlawful. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest. opposed Respondent’s application. Under EO 546. 49 . after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by Kayumanggi. 146 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radio Communications of the Philippines v. the reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. which replaced the PSC. Com. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. 129 G. Belen Cabrera Case No. L-68729 (May 29. Sec. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. where the law is clear. the Respondent.R. However.79 Eliseo Silva v. No. In 1980. Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon. Petitioner claimed that under the law. 7a. HELD: Yes. 46a. authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). claiming that public convenience did not need another ice plant. in applying the law. National Telecom. which is necessary under EO 546 for any public service to operate. circumvent. because it didn’t have a certificate of public convenience. 8a. 36b FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communications system. ordered Petitioner to stop operating. and not just specific provisions. Thus. P. thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. Although Sec. to be able to operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates.D. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. Petitioner. 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience. no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. or interpret the law any other way. Mindoro. HELD: No. Petitioner was created under RA 2036. though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases.R. 6c. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Respondent. and Samar. No. the Commission nor the Court may not disregard. 1987) G. Respondent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. Plus. Under it. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.

the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Sec. HELD: In Diaz v. P. full blood brother of their father. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. BP 130 amended the same section. 1367 amended Sec. Hon.R. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. which states that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. 1691 amended Sec. legitimate.16 FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. Footnote No. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. 7b.D. In the process. 84 G. adopted or spurious children. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. L-61236 (January 31. can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. 84240 (March 25. No. 992.R. 1992) Chapter IV. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. this Court ruled that “Art. but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-employee relations. respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. 7a. ISSUE: W/N Art. Thereafter. Pascual-Bautista Case No. Thus the law is clear. vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal.” Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.D. 198 G. acknowledged natural. 6c. who died intestate without any issue.80 National Federation of Labor v. 7a FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes. In the Labor Code. No. Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. Page 127. IAC. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. But again P. They may have a natural tie of blood. 36b . Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide. they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. Eisma Case No. 217. Additionally. However. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”.

Footnote No. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. Art. Santayana Case No. 116719 (January 18. the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. L-22291 (November 15.16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.81 People v. 1996) Chapter IV. Muñoz.R. and to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N Sec. At the time of appellant’s apprehension. 7b FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years. Page 127. 115 No. 19 (1). HELD: Yes. the death penalty had been abolished and hence. No. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec.” LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 201 G. exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. 19 (1). which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms. and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879”. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS. LATIN MAXIM: 46a . Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. HELD: In People vs. Amigo Case No. 1976) FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

"When the laws speak of years . on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. from December 21. Miguel D. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2. No. No. 2. the month of February in both had 29 days. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R.18 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santiago v. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). it could have provided for a subtitle therefore. (NAMARCO) v. Case No. 1960. considering that in the order of things. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. No. it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint. On 21 December 1965. 90 G. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from December 21. defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA. 7b FACTS: On December 6. Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution. 1960 and 1964 being leap years. Page 127.. 1997) Chapter IV.82 National Marketing Corp. or an aggregate of 3. it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. The complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.R. 13 of our Civil Code.200 plus 7% interest until the amount was fully paid until May 25. expired on December 19. L-29131 (August 27. Tecson Case No.A. 43 . 1955 expired was considered to be December 21. Footnote No. Page 129. 184 G. Footnote No. or hierarchy of values.. 1969) Chapter 4. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. so that ten (10) years of 365 days each. Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. on statutes. unlike in the other modes of initiative.26 FACTS: On 14 November 1955. the sum of P7. HELD: NO. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. Commission on Elections. 1965. Art. which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. et al. However. If Congress intended R. 127325 (March 19. and on local legislation. 1996.650 days. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial case. 1965. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. HELD: NO. 1955. the primacy of interest.

Footnote No. the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase. During construction. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. COMELEC Case No. L – 54718 (December 4. but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. No. Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the approval of the Minister of Education. who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 95398 (August 16. 12a . Page 133. The school accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a witness to the contract. Consequently. 9a.R. 177 G. For this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. it was highly inequitable for the Court to compel the Petitioner. Melchor v. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. ISSUE: 1. 2. HELD: No. 1991) Chapter IV. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. Petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect. The chief accountant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. 170 No. Commission on Audit Case No. 1986) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mario R. Also. 39c FACTS: On July 15. 1983. even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. which was approved by the Minister of Education. which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. HELD: No. as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Leyte. his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day. 9a.35 FACTS: On January 25.83 Villanueva v. to shoulder the construction cost of the building. Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4. Also. the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of one of the school buildings. and that assuming it was effective. which was being utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. W/N the contract was null and void. 1980.

and interest of P2. Instead of obeying the writs. 1963 and another on Feb. 9a. asking Private Respondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. the time during which the writs of execution could not be served.R. 17. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 649. No. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision dated Oct. 11. 11a. Hence Private Respondent’s motion for execution was not time-barred. Thus. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 50 G. 11. and Exequiel Magsaysay Case No. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. Page 134. Petitioner paid the taxes. Court of Appeals. 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory. For this reason. 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes. Soon after.R.41 FACTS: Petitioner was ordered. 43. the original owner incorrectly declared the size of the land. 1964. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed.38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Jesus v. City of Manila Case No.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-1910. 38b. 11e . 26. 1963. 26. from 1901 – 1907. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. or a period of 3 years. the Court issued two more writs on May 6. No. on Oct. 1956. Consequently. 11d. 6. the Petitioner filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales. Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the Torrens system.84 Mateo Casela v. 096. From this period. 9c. L – 26754 (October 16. 1914) Chapter IV. a period of 6 years. to Dec. Petitioner refused to comply.82. 86 G. 1970) Chapter IV. only 3 years. Apparently. L-9337 (December 24. Page 134. fees. FACTS: In 1907. HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. 1959. So. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was time-barred. the date when Private Respondent’s motion for execution was filed. to vacate the premises and remove his house. Petitioner was awarded P1. From Dec. the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 – 1910. he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. 11 months and 24 days elapsed. 50 HELD: No. Footnote No. 1958 and April 14. Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. Footnote No.

Inciong Case No. Moreover. 42 FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. 45 G. No. ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 9a. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . While the Motion was still pending. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 1930) FACTS: In April 1977. The purpose of the PD is to protect wages and income.85 Federation of Free Workers v. 83 G. 1988) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Morales v. ISSUE: 1. only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay.R. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. LATIN MAXIM: 8. the application was not a strict rule. HELD: No. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allowance. their recommendations will be respected by the courts. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion. 1977. Paredes Case No. as well as the rules issued on the same day.R. L-34428 (December 29. Sec. that action should be finished first. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. 1977. L-48848 (May 11. No. 513 if there are other adequate remedies available. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. the company was able prove their financial situation by giving financial statements. On September 27. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure. No. the company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. 2. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such incapability may happen anytime within the year. therefore. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The increase was set at May 1.

It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 104712 (May 6. HELD: No. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child.R. No.R. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Republic of the Philippines Case No. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. b2 . 30 G. 8a. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 11a. they should be allowed adoption. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. 3 of RA 7166. Par (d) Sec. 39b FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec.86 Prasnik v. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. 12. LATIN MAXIM: 2. 125 G. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. 335. 9c. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Guia v. 36a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 37. 36b. 37. 26. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. 1992) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. L-8639 (March 23. No. COMELEC Case No. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children. members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. 9.

constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit. 1989) Chapter IV. Petitioners’ contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.119 of the Public Land Act.500. the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. of RA No. Page 135. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property.87 Salenillas v. 1973. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. 27. 68 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. For foreclosure sales. 276 G. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. 5185. the elected Mayor of Barobo. vs.R. 6d. the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. No. With regard to prescription. No. to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. Angeles. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. 49 . l969) Chapter IV. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. ISSUE: 1. 7a. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. 6c. Surigao del Sur. the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. And on the basis of such administrative complaint. Page 136. For failure to pay their loan.R. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 5. 9b. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 9a. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. The act. 26. was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent. Footnote No. Court of Appeals Case No. Castillo Case No. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. Footnote No.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sarcos v. the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2. 36b. L-29755 (January 31. 42a FACTS: Petitioner. 78687 (January 31. 48 FACTS: On December 4.

W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine. v. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. No. a new doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 6c. l997) Chapter IV. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. l993. Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. 49 FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9. During their trial. No. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. R. 1991) Chapter IV. Renato S.88 Ala Mode Garments. 93177 (August 2. the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may be referred to them. In connection with their prosecution.R. tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. Footnote No. l993. they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 7 G. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. NLRC Case No. l993. But when the same was lifted. and then required to submit written explanations as to their absence. the right to peremptory challenge was revived. ISSUE: 1. 5a. On May 6. Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner. De Villa Case No. 69 G. Page 142. ISSUE: 1. 6a. 122165 (February 17. 10 . On May 10. a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. 3. 61 FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders. The reason being. Footnote No. 2. all the line leaders did not report for work. the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6. Despite their explanation. Page 138. However. Inc. so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolished. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Comendador v. the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. l993. 9a. 7a. l989. LATIN MAXIM: 1. On May 5 and 6. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.

9c FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. Petitioner. it is not the letter. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice.89 Matabuena v.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. 1957) Chapter IV. Footnote No. however. Thereafter. Footnote No.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. 9a. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. the court did not engage in judicial legislation. During this period. L-28771 (March 31. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code. said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. under Sec. Cervantes Case No. It merely rectified an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the Legislature. the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 16a. Provision says that “the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. his sister. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 143.69 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez & Sons. Under the rule of statutory construction. there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. 151 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. L-9274 (February 1. No.R. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Customs. Court of Tax Appeals Case No.R. v. HELD: Yes. 16c. there is indeed a disparity between Sec. The duties were paid and the shipment released. To support this. However. the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and imposed additional duties. Later the two were married. sought the nullification of the donation citing Art. the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby. The court. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other.76 FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. 172 G. After the death of Felix Matabuena. Inc. No. 1971) Chapter IV. HELD: Yes. ‘the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. 11 of same Act. Page 144. In this ruling. 36a .

90 Lamb v. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. 1960. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 11e. 12a. Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18. of Internal Revenue v. 1964. 8b.” ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. 2. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. “there is no plain. Moreover. a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. L-7806 (July 12. 1989) FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. would render the law nonsensical. In Spanish. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. 1964. 1964. Page 144. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221. 11a. such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. However. On its face. claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment.R. which arises from the moment that payment is made. ESSO Case No. 12a. as provided by law. arguing that it was more than what was properly due. such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion.” The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. Having been paid and received by mistake. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5. 37 FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. L-28502-03 (April 18. No. 1912) Chapter 4. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367. 36d. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. However. in respect of which no interest could be charged. It protested the computation of interest. it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper since there is no showing that. 9d. and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. 1961 to April 18. … it may if there is no other plain. 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July. 36a. Statutes should receive a sensible construction. 11d. 12b . No. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal. Since the amount of P221. 27 G. Footnote No. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund. Spanish translation of said Sec. the said section in the California Code reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”.78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Com. the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts of law”. 11d. Thus. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. which. 36f. Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. 143 G. 36b. if uncorrected.R. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. 222 of Act No. this evident typographical error. 11a. ISSUE: 1. whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construction. Phipps Case No. On August 10. 994 with interest. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount.

97 FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to property in amount of P2. held that jurisdiction was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. “Institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”. 1992) Chapter IV. R. there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property. 100285 (August 13.636 fine for the damage to property committed. it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. 116 G. Page 149. 11a. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance. 12. Also. which also declared itself without jurisdiction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. and even applied to its maximum degree. According to Accused. 2 but Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. POEA. and if the same be not known at the time. There is absurdity in Sec. It must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results.91 People v. since such fine cannot be less than the amount of the damage. ISSUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”. Footnote No. 106 G. Sec. The Justice of Peace. 11 . Angeles et al vs. 38 HELD: Yes. The case was considered beyond the court’s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. 3326 provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. Jose. The Labor Code provides that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how to compute it. Moreover. L-15014 (April 29. would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2. 2 of Act No.362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. since the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property. FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. if given jurisdiction. R. 15. Villanueva Case No. a similar case. Duque Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 5. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 11d. 1961) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.

The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C. 11a. 15 G. and in favor of the accused. 3 as an analogous provision. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. 11a. 41a . it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”. They dismissed the petition. which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. 11h. No. 9c. C.112 FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance. Sec. Oscar Perez. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50.R. L-38161 (March 29. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state. Page 152. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1996) Chapter 4. had to attend some personal matters. defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. No. 9d. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. 306 G. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Court of Appeals Case No. At the Office of the Ombudsman. 8b FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: Yes. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. 36. 9e. Likewise. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute. he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez. 11g.A. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cesario Ursua v. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court.A.92 Bello v. 112170 (April 10. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger. R. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. No. Court of Appeals Case No.A. 12a. 142. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. 12. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision.

Republic Case No. and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school. 95 G. 245 G. Footnote No.D.16. it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the entire period of residence. suppress the mischief. 36a FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for exemption. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed.R. L-1715 (July 17. page 156 FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. Court of Appeals Case No. The drafters of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situation. No. HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. 19a . 111107 (January 10.93 Paat v. 705. he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object. and secure the benefits intended. He insists that only the Court can do so. Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the aforementioned provision. HELD: No. equipment… which are illegally used…” ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pritchard v.114. 1948) Chapter 4. 68 of P.R. 68a. citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery.

stating Art.16. where foreign investments were minimal. it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. page 156 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Demafiles v. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election. such is the law and stood firm on the policy. the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. 26 . some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424. the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent. in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws. Central Bank of the Philippines Case No. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. L-28396 (December 29. 91 G. 14. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. considering that they were reelectionists. justice would be undermined. Galido then asked for reconsideration. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. However. 1967) Chapter 4. 94723 (August.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. Footnote No. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank. stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal.114. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit. LATIN MAXIM: 15. 35. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.94 Salvacion v. In light of this. Comelec Case No. As. since there is a possibility of fraud. vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. No. as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh. there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. 10 of the Civil Code. 3. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election. No.18. ISSUES: 1. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427. 1997) Chapter 4.R. No. the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis. garnishment or any other process of any court. 39 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns.R. 43. page 159 FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. 245 G. which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment. 21. despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. Footnote 126. In order to pay for moral damages. shall be incompetent to act on the said body. LATIN MAXIM: 2. 2. Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. HELD: RA 4970 reads “the first mayor.

Juco Case No. 26. Nos. 43. 26. irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken. when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things. the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. The 1935 constitution’s section 1 article 12 states that “A civil service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law. whether it is homicide or murder. P. 38b FACTS: Sec. No. the Labor Code states that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. Private Respondent was terminated. 111 G. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. No.D. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of persons”. 118940-41 and G. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service. when the owner. 807 Sec. 48 . 56 implements the said provision. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder.” Clearly.” ISSUE: 1. 7. Respondent Court however. and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. despite past decisions. driver. HELD: The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder. decided in favor of the Private Respondent. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall. Furthermore. subdivision and instrumentality of the government. and not frustrated murder. L-64313 (January 17. including every government owned or controlled corporation. The killing. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: • “Sec. In addition to this. 1997) FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner. 2. 14. 38a. If the crime was frustrated murder.R.95 National Housing Corporation v. Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned.” While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that “The civil service embraces every branch. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons. 86 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. Mejia Case No. 7a. 119407 (July 7. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 24.R. agency. or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3.R. cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping.

No. 20b. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: • Sec. and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. filed an application on January 30. 20a. 60 G. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. temporary. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. 1989 with Respondent Administration. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447). ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). Page 164. 88979 (February 7. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. 23 G. 11e. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447. 1981) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chua v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Case No. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. 1969. Respondent Corporation paid the tax. 1. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. regardless of age. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular. 37 . the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. Inferentially. denied the same. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. 2.146 FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18. Footnote No. L-37251 (August 31. 43. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua. No. 12a. which. HELD: The petition is granted. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. 20a. however. Civil Service Commission Case No. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. Coverage. 1949.96 City of Manila v. which took effect on Jan. the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law. 49 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. but protested the Ordinance.R. effective beginning the third quarter of 1972. 38b. casual and emergency employees. imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. R. 7125. 1992) Chapter IV.

2. ISSUE: The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drugstores. Teresita Payawal Case No. Page 169. the Mayor however did not. 1989) Chapter IV. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 29. a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure.R. 20c. the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction).97 Solid Homes Inc. 1980.R. 8. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: 1. Footnote No. L-55230 (Nov. 38b . wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription. 50 FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. 116 G. v. 280 G. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently. Footnote No. Upon knowledge of this. gave rise to the closure ordered by the FDA. Regino Veridiano II Case No.171 FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. 1988) Chapter IV. Before such order was promulgated. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however.164 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Richard Gordon v. A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore. FDA approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). RULING: The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore. No. Petitioner contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC. On May 7. Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. No. LATIN MAXIM: 20c. Page 170. 84811 (Aug.

9a. 1922) Chapter IV. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. Further. 155 G. The position. The question raised is purely one of law. however. 2938 approved on January 30. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? 2. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo Case No. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 205 G. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense. 2938. wherein the Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. which were repealed by Act No.R. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. 31. 25 of Act No. a co-partnership. No. such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try. Footnote No. the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. was abolished. then held by the Petitioner. Concepcion Case No.178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. No.202 FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the ’60-’61 salary appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. 3a of RA2264). 35 of Act No. Page 171. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. it is not void. Such action was. Petitioner came to the court on mandamus. 37. S. 1966) Chapter IV. 32. HELD: In the interpretation and construction. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 1921. 20a. Footnote No. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. en C.R. directly or indirectly. The legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. which can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 6b. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No.98 Eufronio Llanto v. Page 176. 19190 (November 29. L-21905 (Mar. convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law. ISSUE: 1. 37. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no. 38b . 2747. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not. 49 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion.

99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo
Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.” Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b

100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe
Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a

FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits and render the ‘option’ under the law meaningless and nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: “There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage” ISSUE: W/N the words “products of the Philippines” excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43

102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut
Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the transfer of Appellants’ empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50

FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43

HELD: No. al Case No. 722). In People vs. HELD: Yes. the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50. 12263. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court.. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. Salico (84 Phil. and Printers. Page 188. respectively.1981) Chapter V. 11531. was "unnecessary. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co.52 G. The Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. The case was dismissed due to his death. 25a. Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor. and while the case was pending. Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation.103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v.000 damages. should do was intervene in Case No. in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. Inc. 36b FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. With the filing of this suit.. 12263. a daily newspaper. managing editor and reporter. 163 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Malanyaon v. Manila Herald Publishing Co. editor. the right to intervene. and Printers. Inc. Lising et. 25a . Borres. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. unlike the right to bring a new action.000. Footnote No. asking damages aggregating P90. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. 30. 36a. L-4268 (January 18. L-56028 (July 30. Inc. docketed as Civil Case No. Footnote No. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides. R. against Aproniano G. of the Daily Record. 7a.000 bond.51 FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit. Page 188... “Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law. 11531. Ramos Case No. but if he is acquitted. is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. 1951) Chapter V. in case No. Inc. He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency. Respondent Judge declared that the suit. he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension”. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 160 GR No.

7a. the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution. Soon after. Footnote No. when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his record. tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. which includes residential lands. for under the Constitution. the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed C.53 FACTS: Petitioner was accused. L-69810-14 (June 19. It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. L-360 (November 15. 9 of the Probation Law. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. The trial court denied his application on the belief that since the crimes were committed on different dates. he was guilty on each of those dates. 139 G. bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted by the war. Hence. R. No. In 1945. Page 189. No.R. HELD: Under the Constitution. No. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision. b . Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. 139 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Krivenko v. ISSUE: W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands. Footnote No. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. 2a.60 G. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural. 25a. he has not yet been previously convicted. 5a. aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. 1985) Chapter 5. the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of “public agricultural lands”. which disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from applying for probation. only agricultural lands may be alienated.104 Rura v. he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense.A. ISSUE: How should the word “previously” be construed? HELD: The word “previously” refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. 9a. 30a. an alien. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that “residential lots” are included in “agricultural lands”. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Page 190. Register of Deeds Case No. The fiscal invoked Sec. 1947) Chapter 5. Lopena Case No. Only a single decision was rendered. 48 FACTS: Petitioner. In addition.

1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. 109 G. Gianzon. 11a. L-7785 (November 25. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum (Sec. Page No. 50 . Footnote No. they should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word “immigrant” is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and referendum. includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiative. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Government Code of 1991. 192 FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C. the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. etc. 36b FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. No. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution).A. a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. etc. Petitioners contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”.105 Chang Yung Fa. No. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum. v. 9a. 111511 (October 5. RA 6735. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines. 10. 7227.R. et al. ISSUE: W/N the word “immigrant” only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence.R. COMELEC Case No. 19 G. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. Also. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its definition. other than a nonimmigrant. Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. A review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines.67. Respondent Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. 1993) Chapter V. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be limited to two years. Serye 1993. 9c. the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. No. and De la Cruz.

decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case. And obviously. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness.” The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. 1 Ordinance No. ISSUE: 1. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. on motion. Quezon. decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. 6c. logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. the ordinance is constitutional. the Government never shared in the profits they generated. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words.R. Footnote No. 180 G. and on such terms as it may deem just. No. HELD: Yes. decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court. Footnote No. an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. Nazario Case No. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. order. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award. 12a. he comes within the term “manager”. 31.81. No. L-44143 (August 31. ruling. order. It is therefore. Page No.R. Accordingly. Page No. the word court refers to the trial court. Sec. order. 2. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug.73. As the actual operator of the fishponds. While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the fishpond. “The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award.” He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional. order. 1990) Chapter V. after hearing should provide otherwise. 37 .52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands.106 Motoomull v. 1988) Chapter V. dela Paz Case No.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. 36a FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes worth P362. 1974. 195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. ISSUE: 1. 197 FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3. The law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. L-45302 (July 24. award. ruling. 218 G. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. should provide otherwise. after hearing. the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes. or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. or the court on motion. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: No.

No. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. including nonnegotiable checks. 49 FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC. Equitable Banking Corporation Case No.982. Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.R. 106 G. 12 G. 1996) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. 1988) FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. after PD 1990 had taken effect.” Clearly. 84332-33 (May 8. 25a. 24b. he had already waived his right to make his application for probation.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check. LATIN MAXIM: 6. No. 1993. Philippine Clearing House Corp. Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial.R. However. 26. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. HELD: Yes. the term “checks” refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC’s jurisdiction.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23. 74917 (January 20. Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. 25b. HELD: Yes. 26 . Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28. Evangelista Case No. 1992.107 People v. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. its operation extends to “clearing checks and other clearing items.

leaving a last will and testament. year. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. 26 FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code.R. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. Upon violation of the terms of agreement. La Union on December 4. 7a . Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land.90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Velasco v. et. Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: “The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. HELD: Yes. Page 199. 308 G. Book III. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land. shall be void. 261 G. Case No. we should not distinguish. Chapter I.” (art 695) “Any will. Lopez Case No. day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud. ISSUE: W/N Sec..108 Robles v. including mineral lands. most importantly that the hour is not stated. 905 (February 12. No. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds.” (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such formalities aren’t met. stating the place. 1895. whether agricultural. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. 1903) FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Petitioner who was to extract. mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties. residential or mineral. L-12560 (September 30. 1. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. HELD: Yes. month.R. No. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land. 1958) Chapter V. Footnote No. in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed. the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Title II. al.

4 1963. In July 30. cattle. Page 199. Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. 191 G. 119 of C. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act. not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent. poultry feed. No. Footnote No. Footnote No. as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent. Plaintiff offered to repurchase.A. 36 FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan. the law must be seen in its entire context. Under such law. On May 31 1963. 5 of RA 720. and should abide by the conditions of the times. he was entitled to repurchase the land. the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those Petitioner imports. namely: food products. LATIN MAXIM: 1. No. and industrial starch.” The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. Because such items will be used for toothpaste. not two (2). 29. No. 119 of C. No redemption was made within that time. it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. vitamin concentrate. transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601. b. they should be unified. LATIN MAXIM: 26. Lamadrid Case No.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Oliva v. the property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class. books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. it was also provided that: “Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost.109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products. Petitioner. 67 G.A. under RA 720. transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors … shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. Inc v. 141. 141 of Sec. the Court had already decided that Sec. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. therefore. 1951. Therefore.R. 50. the land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale. the Exchange Tax Law. claiming that under C. L-14787 (January 28. 39a. HELD: No. 1969) Chapter V. 38a. The “stabilizers and flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer. 1961) Chapter V.96 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Page 200. No. Feb. Gimenez Case No.A. is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not subject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. b2 . No. L-23196 (October 31.R. 30a. However. For every importation.

HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. During the pendency. The Social Security Act. fell ill. 100 G. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation. the employee cannot avail of the privileges under the Social Security Act. which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. L-72005 (May 29. they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. However.99 FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employment. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. 38b FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc.R. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act. the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. 5. Welfare and Retirement Plan. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian. the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Page 200. 3a. 36a . The rule therefore.97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court Case No. Footnote No.R. Inc. having been enacted for the welfare of the employees. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. Respondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay. 234 G.110 Escosura v. would be to enable the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. 2b. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. Page 200. cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. No. is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan. Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. 1987) Chapter 5. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. 26. No. 1962) Chapter V. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Case No. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 26. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its Health. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. Footnote No. San Miguel Brewery.

242 G. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”. As a result. 7a. b2 . 7a. R.100 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilar v. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person.100 FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent. Footnote No. 251 G. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. Sec.000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Footnote No. Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”. 9a. he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign. Where the law makes no distinctions. respondent and filed a criminal case. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Court of Appeals Case No. having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. and should have either won or lost. 26. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus. No. B2 FACTS: On March 22. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest.R. in a confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed. insulted and humiliated him. 115245 (July 11. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.111 Ramirez v. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 37. 11a. one does not distinguish. 13 of Resolution No. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same. 1995) Chapter 5. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. No. 1962) Chapter 5. not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. Commission on Elections Case No. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". 1992. 24a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Page 201 . HELD: Yes. Three days later. but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Page 201.

68709 (July 19. 9a. 36b FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorney’s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between January 14. Despite repeated demands. he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association.112 Sanciangco v. 116356 (June 29. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. R. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of candidacy. he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan elections. ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. 37 49 . Court of Appeals Case No. 28. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. No. 38 G. Court of Appeals. R. Later. Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint. attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. He was not successful in the said elections. The Court’s holding clearly debunks Petitioner’s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14. the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. 1985) Chapter 5. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member.18. 273 G. 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703. 5a.106 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Eastern Shipping Lines. v. Roño Case No. No. Inc. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. 9c.290. 7a. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1984. HELD: No. 1998) FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Footnote No. Administrative or Executive Acts. 1987 to July 22. Page 203 .

LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1971) Chapter 5. No. 15b . Emilio A. No. 37.R. Barbers Case No. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage.113 Castillo-Co v. 129952 (June 16. placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months. Martin Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension. HELD: No. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The word OR in C. Page 204. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts.110 FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. The word “or” is clearly disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. 7a. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. G. L-33487 (May 31.R. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. and Jesus Guerrero. ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. No. 7a FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. They are two separate offenses. and disparate meaning. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union. Each act possesses its own distinctive. specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. No. 46 of C.A. The items purchased were “reconditioned” instead of brand new and included other irregularities. Footnote No. Director. No. different. Gonzales III.A. 214 G. C.A.

28. 1896.R.. Pryce Properties Corp. Footnote No. Phil. Case No. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Casino gambling is authorized by P. 50 . Case No. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar. 1994) Chapter V.R. 1869 and the LGC. 7a. Inc. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law.D. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. 37. like the other prohibited games of chance. No. 15a. ISSUE: W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. On the assumption of a conflict between P.114 GMCR v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. No.” Since the world “gambling” should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. Under the LGC. Page 208. religious elements. 130 FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. must be prevented or suppressed. 158 G. 1869. 49 G. 11e.. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling and other prohibited games of chance. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. 126496 (April 30. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC). 38. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority vote. Various civic organizations. Bell Telecommunications Inc. the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. Amusements and Gaming Corp. In Basco v. 111097 (July 20. 24a FACTS: PAGCOR. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. 9c. and even the local officials angrily denounced the project.D.D. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtajas v. women’s and youth groups. created by P.

RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation. imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it to the company’s plant in Manila. 358 of the Revised Penal Code. all of which have a common characteristic. their permanent nature as a means of publication. L-17663 (May 30. it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries in general. Santiago Case No. manager of Respondent Company. 211 FACTS: Charles Butler. 1971) Chapter V. No.. in relation to Art. b2 . Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. 355. 25a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 28. or libel. namely. LATIN MAXIM: 11h. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. It has also been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons. Footnote No. under Art. 135 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 353. The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated. HELD: The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. 224 G. while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. Footnote No.115 Commissioner of Customs v. may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec. of the same Code.R." The accused delivered false. under Art. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co. 72 G. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. Page 136. Philippine Acetylene Company Case No.R. which is any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. Page 210. 11a. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture. In granting the exemption. malicious. No. and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver. 11d. 28. L-22443 (May 29. 43 FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel. 1962) Chapter V. Inc. and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and general definition. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. 9c.

No. 80774 (May 31. 36e . The scope of par. 1966) Chapter V. Footnote No. There being no element of consideration in said contest. HELD: No.). par. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. 1 (unfair labor practices). NLRC Case No. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery. 2 (terms and conditions of employment). 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. 5 (prohibited activities). Hence. The unifying element of pars. No. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. Page 211. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. Inc. 3 refers to “all money claims of workers. SMC denied utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law. or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. Palomar Case No. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid. and (3) prize. v. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement…” While par. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration. 211 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Miguel Corp. 4 (household services). HELD: No. Page 137. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled “Modified Grande Pasteurization Process” and claimed entitlement to the cash award. chance. said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. 45 G. par. said contest is not a gift enterprise. 36b.R. nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest.R. v. Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Par.” it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. overtime compensation. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 138 FACTS: Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. (2) chance. LATIN MAXIM: 28. 3 “all money claims of workers. enterprise. gift. the spirit of the law is preserved. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.116 Caltex (Phil. Footnote No. 272 G. 1988) Chapter V. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot. 19650 (September 29. Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief. par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. 28 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation.

LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap. Sec 6 of R. 122 G. the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not judicial. not against perils of the ship. losses. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. A loss which. Oil Industry Commission Case No. Thus. Of Camilon Case No. results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea. jettisons. and of all other perils. and misfortunes…” The trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. thieves. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. 1919) Chapter V. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f.R. and misfortunes” are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship. enemies. 114 G. 30. L-41315 (November 13. Plaintiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Perils… of the seas. losses. 31. fire. HELD: No. Soc. pirates. 1986) FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. Footnote No.” The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils.117 Gotiaco v. rovers. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. 13983 (September 1. Union Ins. men of war. The words “all other perils. What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. 141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.… barratry of the master and mariners. No. 36 . A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company.R. in the ordinary course of events.A. the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. The phrase. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25. The rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Page 213. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. ”to set the conditions” means the right to prescribe rules and conduct. No. or from the negligent failure of the ship’s owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea.

it is within the purview and coverage of RA 623. 43 G. Footnote No. HELD: No. 36b. Thereafter. 123248 (October 16. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. referring to all beverages not prohibited by law.158 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. Hon. the term “subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife. as amended. dummy. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law.R. an agency of the PCGG. white flint bottles with the mark “La Tondeña. 257 FACTS: La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office. colonel. both retired and in active service. Hard liquor. or nominee in EO 2. is not prohibited by law. LATIN MAXIM: 28. relative. hence. agent. Inc. and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative.” ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board. of the Philippines vs. without La Tondeña’s written consent. Court of Appeals Case No. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as “Ginebra San Miguel”. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel. together with his supporting evidence. ISSUE: W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700. vs. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. the 350 c. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700. 38 . which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income.” and “Ginebra San Miguel” stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner’s liquor product bearing the label “Sonny Boy” for commercial sale and distribution. Migrinio and Tecson Case No. Page 217. for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.. 29 FACTS: Acting on information received. and in violation of Sec. was unable to produce his supporting evidence. the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment. because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.c. HELD: The words “other lawful beverages” is used in its general sense.c. 1997) Chapter V. a retired lt. Inc. pursuant to RA 6231.118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises. a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c. 26. Private Respondent. similar to the immediate family member. Applying the rule in statutory construction. 30. despite several postponements. No. although regulated. business associate.

Sto. Page 220. among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 302 Chapter V. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. 1993) Chapter III. the rule must give way. the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. Footnote No.172 FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. and are not as stated by Respondent Court. such that if the intent is clear. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond.R. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. 48886-88 (July 21. 29 . 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. HELD: Yes. dirk dagger. ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. 2301 of the same code.133 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION United States vs. 1780. Nino Case No. using the principle of ejusdem generis. He was prosecuted under Act No.119 Commissioner of Customs vs. kris or other deadly weapons. Page 101. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. 71 G. which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of this Act. Nos. HELD: No. The trial court ruled that. In this case. Footnote No.

175 Rep. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. No. wholly or partially. L-15045 (January 20. Social Security Commission Case No. the job of the judiciary is to apply laws. HELD: No. 1980) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities. 29 FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No. 263 G.R. 7a. not interpret it. The Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable. G. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. industry. No. or which are pursued for profit or gain. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. business. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. 1961) Chapter V. and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations. Estenzo Case No. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. v. HELD: No.R. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land.be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain.120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. undertaking. operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. Page 221. otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade. Footnote No. which are directly or indirectly. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 30. L – 35376 (September 11. 32 . Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.

repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. LATIN MAXIM: 29. 35. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabilities or obligations of the decedent. Since Vicente was born in 1905 after the said law was enacted. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. Rafael and Josefa. 9351 (January 6. The liabilities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Page 223. No. 30a. Petra. he is considered an acknowledged natural child. Pascuala. Petra had 2 legitimate children.121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Case No. 1899. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child. and had begotten a natural child by a priest. Vicente. Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. HELD: Yes. 45a . The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the estate of Francisca. 130 G. No. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. Petra and Pascuala. 68. but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. Footnote No. 180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Empire Insurance Co. Page 223. Almost 1 year later. Footnote No.R. Aurea. L – 38268 (May 31. 97 G. Rufino Case No. G.R. which was promulgated on December. 181 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. 18. v. and Aurea have since died. 1979) Chapter V. 1915) Chapter V. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent. E. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. 49 FACTS: Vicente A.

the children are considered Filipino Citizens. Flor Case No. as a result of said election. The petition was later granted. R. as the case may be. Art. Also. (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter. 1905) Chapter V. Nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he. Galang Case No. not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Page 224. the right to bring such action. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said office? HELD: No. 2122 (September 13. LATIN MAXIM: 30a . LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag.122 Ching Leng v. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office. 254 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of the said enumeration. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. No. Furthermore. No. Footnote No. 187 FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. (3) since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter. 200. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisition of citizenship. Art. 1958) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acosta v. was entitled to the office of Municipal President of Laoag. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. G. 49 of a special law that provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it. the children are now considered as Filipino citizens. He and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adoption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. now held by Defendant. R. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. Ilocos Norte. Art. 5 G. L-11931 (October 27. However. 199. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization. it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. Art. or for any other reason. and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals.

146 G. Page 225. declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city. Council. as provided in Sec. R. which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354. asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said barrio. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590. Sec. Thus. 1950) Chapter V. L-2783 (November 29. Lerum and Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. No. contract or other written instrument. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: On August 29. Under Sec 1. also called barrio Central. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz’s testimony? HELD: No. or who is interested “under a deed. pursuant to RA 2370. there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City. L-25811 (April 3. 1962. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Cruz Case No. declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance. Among these were barrios Agdao. the City of Davao passed Resolution No. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City’s Treasurer. amending the charter of Davao City. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Barrio v. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was correct. cannot be determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. which did not include the Petitioner. Thus. Bucana and Poblacion. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. 55 G. barrio Poblacion. 732. the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. City Treasurer of Davao Case No. Subsequently. in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana. the assailed order is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM: 30 . 1968) Chapter V. 3 of RA 3590. is not included in the enumeration. Footnote No. Page 225. will. 193 FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief.” The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony. No. Attys.R. Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao. which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case.123 Lerum v.

Footnote No. 35. 2.R. etc. 42 . Fernandez Case No. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government. Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority. 20c. such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumerated therein. the city was able to collect P5. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.L-31364 (March 30. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Tongoy.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. 4. Page 226. the ordinance is valid. No. before the inheritance has been passed to the heirs. 30. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent created by law.824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964. which is not among the exceptions listed in Sec. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. 1979) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 27. penalties. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that “no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax”. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests. 55 G. even without its having been presented under Sec. 193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villanueva v. ISSUE: 1. No. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under Sec.R.254. By virtue of the ordinance. the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected. 44 FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court’s judgment declaring Ordinance No. Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed. 5. Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. 30. Footnote No. 312 G. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 1. Par. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva. Thus. 197 FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental. are owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. The Petitioners. City of Iloilo Case No. 5. No. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3. No. which should not apply. Page 225. as provided in the Tax Code. RA 2264 confers on local governments’ broad taxing authority. 11 as illegal. the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax. 1968) Chapter V. No.124 Vera v. L-26521 (December 28. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax. Yes. 3.

LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Court of Appeals Case No. No. despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office. the Respondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. In addition. and that Santo To was not a penitent offender. Mr. Page 226. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. L-43182 (November 25.125 Santo To v. and appointed Mr. it would have included them in the enumeration. In a motion for reconsideration. he can only be removed for a cause and after due process. Cruz-Paño. which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. 36b FACTS: Petitioner Samson. the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders disqualified to avail probation. Hon. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Talens. 200 FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. Cruz-Paño Case No. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes. No. on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. The nature of functions attached to a position determines whether such position is highly confidential. declaring the order null and void. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. Talens asserts his position was not covered by the said act and. terminated the services of Respondent.D. 1986) Chapter V. Page 226. the legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated. 9. co-Petitioner. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Samson v. Besides. 1983) Chapter V. where the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.R. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision. He is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. because of lack and loss of confidence. 30 . for otherwise. as Assistant Secretary. the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. 3. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. to said position. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge. Footnote No. his position is not among those expressly declared by law as highly confidential. Talens’ termination was illegal. 275 G. 270 G. Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service. Footnote No. being permanently appointed. except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydetermining. Liwag. 968) Sec. L-55130 (January 17. Talens. the mayor of Caloocan. as enumerated in the probation law (P.R. through Administrative Order No.

1988. Furthermore. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. Page 228. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD. it was contended that Centeno violated P. and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. The term “charitable” should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for “religious” purposes. Footnote No. 11g. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. chairman of the group. 30. Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound.R. saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. 27. However. 54 G. 1994) Chapter V. 1992) Chapter V. it may not. vs.D. the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. No.R. be extended to others. by interpretation or construction. approached Judge Angeles. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters. 48 . 30 FACTS: In 1985.500. Court of Appeals Case No. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.000. Since P. Villalon-Pornillos Case No. Martin Centeno. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company. President of Tikay. Footnote No. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result. Page 228. 25.” ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P. Moreover.126 Finman General Assurance Corp. the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company. 113092 (September 1. The 1987 Constitution treats the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently from each other. the latter denied the claim. penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. and the latter solicited P 1. 11i. On October 18. 203 FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries. 1564. No 100970 (September 2. HELD: No.D. 202 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centano v. since this is a criminal case. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15. 107 G.D.

11e. Thus. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. Avila Case No. wherein the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. they filed for an appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that same year. 12a . ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. 205 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manabat v. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22. 1953) Chapter V. HELD: Yes.127 Escribano v. The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. De Aquino Case No. Petitioners filed their appeal just in time. However. 1978) Chapter V. No. 37 FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1.74 plus interest for usury. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Footnote No. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days. when they were deposited by registered mail. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. Rule 27 Sec. 11d.R. Page 229. ISSUE: 1. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation. 208 FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 12. the papers were actually received by the court on September 24. L-5558 (April 29. 161 G. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. Page 229.261. 9c.R. filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. L-30375 (September 12. or Sept 24. when they were actually received by the court. 101 G. 2. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. the Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal was late and dismissed it. No. 1951. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. Thus. Notified of the decision on September 7. Footnote No.

115 No. Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet. “balisong” or clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. 1989 FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. Plaintiff should not have his license restored. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. CA Case No. 30a . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Case No. 1930 Chapter V. 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. would be punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. 32441. March 29.R. the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. Page 229. 48468-69. which is less lethal than a bayonet. HELD: No. Nos. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored. November 22. Footnote No. 126 G. the prohibition against fan knives. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. The subsequent Opium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or remove said prior laws. the bladed weapon he was carrying. It would make no sense if possession of a fan knife.128 Gomez v.209 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Primero v.

Respondents then instituted a certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner. 23. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio members. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing with the trial. but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision.R. Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. During the trial. There is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they are automatically made ex officio members of the board. 46825 (October 18. Case No. Page 234. 142 Oct. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. the rule in the interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found in a law. 36b.129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc. HELD: No. Moreover. which held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process. 1939) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Judge Roldan. Footnote No. No. 9c. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. impugning the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. the same should be made extensive to the whole. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. 6d.” This ruling is in conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. 33. b2 . LATN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas. 229 FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board members or are merely ex-officio board members. CFI of Laguna. the Petitioner. 262 G. 1987 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Roldan v Villaroman Case No.

” and (b) “previous association with the enemy. The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities. Page 234. And under the same charge during all the time referred to. and. she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. 42a FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. 11g. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities. except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government. and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans. To hold that the People’s Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all.R. no further written commitment was made by the developer. No. Hon.D. 1944. making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent. Page 234. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable. Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P. Footnote No. but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. improvements. but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. which is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction. is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution.130 Herras Teehankee v. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. 35. and infrastructures for the lots. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved. she was detained by said Government under that charge. and since the language used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject. 12a. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case No. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. The word “and” is not meant to separate words. 6d. 78585 (July 5. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale. 230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Antonio Mapa v.D.” When she. pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. 231 FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. HELD: Yes.D. other than those provided in Clause 20. was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29. 37. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Japanese. 170 G. 38b. Petitioner contends that P. Footnote No. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. 33 . No. 1989) Chapter V. within 3 years from the date of the contract. P. 122 G. along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case. 1946) Chapter V. Director of Prisons Case No. L-278 (July 18. improvements. 7a. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled.R. 26. and infrastructures”. HELD: No.

the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment”. They invoked Sec. the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso.R. No. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. The word “appointed” in the proviso should be given its meaning in the ordinary sense. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis. the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13. 6. should mean “the nomination or designation of an individual”. 155 of the Administrative Code. forty-eight days from July 24th. “provided”. 25. L-22161 (January 21. 12a. Page 234. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis of Sec.131 People of the Philippines v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Upon receipt of a copy of this order. The concluding part of Sec. Page 236. 1914. L-16808 (January 3. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. not 47. which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. No. No. 8a 11g. 1963. 240 FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14. The power to appoint lies on the appointing officer. 1963. L-22160 and G. he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. 227 G. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10. and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. 1974) Chapter V. Nonetheless. Hence. Footnote No. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. Footnote No. and thus. 9a. 1920. while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. effective July 1.R. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state’s separation of powers. 34 FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judicial District. 7a. Fermin Mariano Case No. 7a. which was denied. his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1. They hold these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late. Teodoro Tamani Case No. 1963 through the counsel’s wife. 1921) Chapter V. 9c.R. retire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. 232 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Andres Borromeo v. which states that “nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. appointee’s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. On February. 38 G. as Appellees contend. although it did not start with the usual introductory word. 37 . HELD: Yes. 24a. 1963. HELD: Yes.” ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee.

132 ALU-TUCP v. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. 109328 (August 16. and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 1994) Chapter V. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000. Once that “project” is done.000. Since Petitioners were considered project employees. b2 . NLRC Case No. 6. Page 240.R. 43. this provision does not apply to them. Pangasinan Case No. 251 FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. Footnote No. No. The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached. No.48. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business. whether a proviso or not. the latter provision. The provision calls for casual employees. is given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislation. City of San Carlos. the proviso in par.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. vs. their services will no longer be needed. 1978) Chapter V. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers. as a general rule. 2 of Art. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. 250 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arenas v. 1. P350 of which was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city government. Footnote No. 33 FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of P18. Moreover. they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants. exceptions. HELD: No. the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees.000 to P18. should be strictly but reasonably construed. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but the Respondent City refused. Moreover. and not to other sections thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 33. the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. NLRC. 2 G. but more so because provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone. L-34024 (April 5. 280 of the Labor Code.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 240. Sr. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12. as the NSC and NLRC ruled. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision.) In Mercado. and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees.000. 20 G.00.

Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. 115852 (August 25. has been constitutionally passed. (March 23. she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. 272 FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. In other words.. VI. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and obligations to the Defendant Corporation. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor children. there is no longer a need to be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. 266 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ALDECOA v. The President had certified S. etc. LATIN MAXIM: 49 . confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid. Footnote No. Aldecoa & Company. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i. while Zoilo’s mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed the mortgage. Secretary of Finance Case No.e. Page 245.R. 292 G.133 Tolentino v. Footnote No. 1994) Chapter V. 228. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. LATIN MAXIM: 33 FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs. The said firm." in Art. No. 1915) Chapter V. the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716. In order to mortgage these properties. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. 126 30 Phil. however. an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. No. and in so doing. According to the Code of Civil Procedure. Isabel Palet. and to mortgage certain real properties of her sons. was heavily indebted to the Defendant corporation. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Case No. At the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents. was a general partner in the firm. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903. printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. Page 243. 1630 did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readings were done on the same day. because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence.

R. and not separately and independently. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the policemen. 2 to the agent in par. the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the ordinance was to attend a birthday. On appeal. L-32293 (January 24. and commission of a felony. HELD: The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. Sec. 36d. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 189 of the Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. which is considered as a wholesome assemblage. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aisporna v. 189. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act (September 8. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 2 of the same section. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving police service and personnel. 36c. and that she did not receive any compensation. Roberto Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct. 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for the same grounds. 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. Court of Appeals and People Case No. The power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 228 which fixed curfew hours. 1 of Sec. however. Page 248. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions wherever possible. ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec. Buenaventura Case No.134 Ocampo v. 28. 8 FACTS: On September 11. 37 . No. 189 is defined in par. 6c. 88 G. According to Commission v. On March 17. Aisporna. 1969). Hon. a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment. 36b. 189. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. 9c. Mrs. grave abuse of authority. 1982) Chapter VI. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent. Bello. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. L-39419 (April 12. 6d FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. Footnote No. maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted her husband. Sec. and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. No. 6 G. The term “agent” used in par.

the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. that is. 1 of RA 4200. 20 FACTS: Atty. 1 of RA 4200. Rufino. Inc. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1986) Chapter VI. Laconico called the Appellant. 29. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature. there is no conflict between Sec. 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec.135 Gaanan v. 11g. 75222 (July 18. the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. Also. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation. HELD: No. Page 252. 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Intermediate Appellate Case No. Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the extension phone.R. In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. 30a. v.R. Footnote No. 249 G. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 36c. 36d. L-69809 (October 16. Under the circumstances. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. Sec. 1991) Chapter VI. Page 249. 1 RA 4200. 79. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device. 48. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore. Footnote No. 36a. 32 and Sec. held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. Atty. No. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. When complainant Pintor called up. That same day. No. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. However. 108 G. Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. 37 . b2 FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

Footnote No. sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. Footnote No. Lopez and Javelona. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law. as used in the Usury Law. L-22678 (January 12. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA.R. 000 and posted a cash bond of P100. 1993) Chapter VI. No. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that. the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word “void”.R. as used in the Usury Law. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond. did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. 223 of the Labor Code. 223 of the Labor Code. 000 and a surety bond of P50. 1925) Chapter VI. 36a. 109835 (November 22. as required by the POEA Rules. but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof. El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. No. in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money. as required by Art. The intention of the legislature must be ascertained. an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. From the very context of the law. NLRC Case No. Page 251. 7a. El Hogar Filipino Case No. 37 . in using the word “void”. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION JMM Promotions v. 136 G. 12a. 25a. Page 251. 152 G. in whose favor the loan was made. 37 FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30. considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond.136 Lopez v. as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. the legislature.000. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. as compared with the whole. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. 21 FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage. They contended that the court erred in holding that the word “void”. 6d.

P300 for a house. 50 . 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. Sec. and P2. Note. However. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. Sec. a monthly allowance of P2. 37 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. L-9667. as amended by Act No. Footnote No. 3052. which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1762 of the Administrative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant. 23 FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. Page 252.R. 147 G. the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle. 36c. 1762. As such. After the issues were joined. A recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one another.000 as attorney’s fees. 1762. it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art. a monthly support of P5. 36a. HELD: No. Apostol Case No. No. The judge refused to reconsider the order. 17 G.000 for herself and said children.R. has been repealed by the implication in Sec. and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. 1762 of the Administrative Code. the legislature’s intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. 27. 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lichauco vs. Page 252. 38b. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure the custody of their three minor children. Footnote No. except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No.300 for support for her and the children. 1770. Sec. being a special law having special contingency not dealt within Sec. however. and the return of her passport. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. 1762. 1762. 103 of the Civil Code. No. while Sec. Concepcion Case No. to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. (July 31. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition. 1956) Chapter VI. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect. 36d. 1770 of the Administrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. is of a general nature. the determination of the custody and alimony must have been given force and effect. 36a. as amended. provided it did not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. 3052 – Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec.137 Araneta v. HELD: No. that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal separation case. 1762 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. L-19628 (December 4. 1922) Chapter VI.

87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. 37 . known as the Public Land act. Before the arraignment of the accused. No. Page 257. which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively. the CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months. while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years. Palmon Case No. 50 FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period – 2 yrs. 51 G. 36d. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property. Footnote No. 4 mos.R. thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. 220 G. 38a. Hence. Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist. 1951) Chapter VI. the latter is paramount to the former and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage.3540 (July 30. However. LATIN MAXIM: 36c. the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 31 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.R. the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. 40b. L-2860 (May 11. Footnote No. 35 FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135.138 Cassion v. 38b. L. Banco Filipino Case No. 1950) Chapter VI. 1 day – 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296. Page 256. Sec. No. as when general and special provisions are inconsistent.

Plaintiff asserted that since the insolvent had been declared as such. 7 only provides invasion. rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. ISSUE: 1. which is “imminent danger of invasion. 36c. 60 of the insolvency law. 1952) Chapter VI. Also. W/N Proclamation No. while Art. Castañeda and Balao Case No. which is not under the Constitution. No. 36d. Page 257. Footnote No. Aruego. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 17222 (March 15.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. “Sedition” should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. 2. the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. L-4221 (August 30. and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of said Defendant. 36f. Page 258. Moreover. 179 G. all civil proceedings against him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 57 G. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law. provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every other. 20b. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Imperial and National Bank Case No. 15a. In an earlier case. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is imminent danger. the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger. 39 FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff. Thus. No. Sec. every section. Quirino issued Proclamation No. Footnote No. b2 .139 Chartered Bank v. Maximino’s father then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. 37. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Montenegro v. HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include “sedition. insurrection or sedition.R. 60 as stated in the other provision of the same law. 1921) Chapter VI. b2 FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion. 36e. Pres. as posed by Prof.” Art. during the Constitutional Convention. insurrection or rebellion. insurrection. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. Three days after. the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause.

distributor of gas. and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent.R. the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. lubricating oils. 1996) Chapter VI. there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. Since Sec. (b). 50 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. L-37684 (September 10. diesel fuel oils. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. 25b. 36b. contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. 2264. with the exception of gasoline. and petroleumbased products. which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. no recall may be instituted. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance. 1975) Chapter VI Page 259. 7160. is entitled to a refund. (a) and par. 20a FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras. 16 G.R. 11d. 11e. Thus. 2 of RA No. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline. to a refund. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paras v. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. Footnote No. The spirit. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax. No. No. COMELEC Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. oil and other petroleum products. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. 196 G. 123169 (November 4. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006. in excluding gasoline. HELD: No. Arabay Inc.. meaningless. 14. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated. 37. determines its construction. 12a. inoperative or nugatory. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. rather than the letter of a law. In interpreting a statute. The evident intent of Sec. v. no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. 38 . ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.140 Arabay Inc. Page 259. as provided in par. 74 of RA No. 27. who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.

under Sec. 188 G. 2. this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines. it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. 40c FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. House Bill No. which became RA 4585. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. No. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market. ISSUE: 1. 2. it is a substantial amendment. Footnote No. 38b. 21 of the City Charter to that effect. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to vendors. 6d. Page 262. Since the city mayor under Sec. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city department. shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments “all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment.60 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago. 21 of said RA. originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec. Bago City. maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person. 21 of RA 4858 (the City Charter).R. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution. but also those coming from other municipalities. No. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership. b2 . NO. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. Branch II Case No.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Niere v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: 1. entity. Private Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City. CFI of Negros Occidental. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public. Kintanar Case No. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that by public market. 138 G. Footnote No. 2a. or corporation other than the local government. who. 32. 29. NO. 1982 Chapter VI. L-30324 November 29. After the enactment of the Decentralization Act.R. 9711. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No.141 Javellana v. 30a. it could have easily re-phrased Sec. whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. 21 is without authority to appoint the city engineer. but during the period of amendment in the Senate. not only in Bago City. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. Page 262. L-33169 July 30. 21. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not. 1973 Chapter VI.

In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. ISSUE: 1. Republic of the Philippines Case No. Court of Appeals Case No. which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. 25a. as amended. had to be postponed. 307 G. 1927. together with all the improvements. of Chinese parents in Dumaguete. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila. In the case at bar. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1951. originally scheduled to take place on July 12. HELD: 1. he went to the United States to further his studies from the year 1947-1950. if included. Hence. would defeat the policy of legislation. Footnote No.L-41012 (September 30. 63 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which. and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. On July 15. 1976) Chapter VI. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. or temporary occupation. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines. Negros Oriental n October 6. 165 G. the original date of hearing the case. to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). 37. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. 36b. not legal residence or domicile. L-6379 (September 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 263. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used interchangeably. in strict legal parlance. Hence. 9a.142 Uytengsu vs. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. Residence indicates permanency of occupation. No. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources.A. he filed for naturalization. is required. Footnote No.R. 2. 37 FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No.L-41001 and G. No. Later. 1954) Chapter VI. No. 1950. 6c. the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. No. 2. 43 .R. he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13. Page 264. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines. 7. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. 176 v. each has. No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. distinct from lodging or boarding. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. Section 7 of C. 1360.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Lodge No. ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. Forthwith. 11a. a meaning distinct and different from that of the other.R. The grant made by Act No. 1951. No. Then Petitioner sold the land. in order to unravel the legislative intent.

L-23800 (December 21. the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. 33 of the Civil Code. X. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. par. Page 266. which found Petitioner guilty as charged. Thus.5 of the 1973 Constitution. 14 of R.R. 7 of Rule 123. literal construction of the law is not favored. 3 G. Repeals by implication are not favored. 50 FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The very next day. Lastly. the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 1947). LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 1960.L-27760 (May 29. Florentino Case No. 12 of RA 183. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. 67 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abellana v.143 Almeda v. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. No. give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art. 5. in turn. a separate and independent civil action for damages. Marave Case No. purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm. 14 that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18. 1974) Chapter VI. particularly a procedural rule. unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. No. Page 265. Sec. Footnote No. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal. appointed Respondent Florentino to the position. ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. provides in its Sec. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. increase or modification of substantive rights. 12 of the Pasay City Charter. 1965) Chapter VI. there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. 71 FACTS: RA183. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI.R. 37 . 12a. 49. Footnote No. or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. Such interpretation. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City.2 As stated in Art.A 183. does likewise. it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. RA 2709 amended Sec. as amended. At this stage. 10 G. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec. the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution. in the case at bar. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. alter. 37. the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and.

78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Naga v. 9c.R. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. or a local dialect. 2309). L-36049 (May 31. L-20479 (February 6. Sec. The Naga City government. Footnote No. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No. claimed that under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264). Footnote No.R. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 317 G. No. then the Courts shall do so. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in Chinese. There is a presumption against implied repeal. tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication. 83 FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a language other than English. was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. City of Manila. RA 2264 only applies for entirely new tax provisions. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year. FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. Trinidad Case No. If two laws can be harmonized. Spanish. or have a duplicate in any of these languages. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. Page 268. Agna Case No. 1925) Chapter VI. pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 1a. 1976) Chapter VI. or a local dialect. 63 G. No. 38a. this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code. a Chinese merchant. 11e. It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. Yu Cong Eng. Page 267.144 Yu Cong Eng v. 38b ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. it did not. Spanish. on the other hand. This liberal interpretation is reasonable and it upholds constitutionality. a subsequent provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. ISSUE: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 6d. He and other Chinese merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law. it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English. where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts written in Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. 37 .

LATIN MAXIM: 12a. 37 . Page 268. Footnote No. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional? HELD: It is unconstitutional. were not included in the plebiscite. 152 G. 118 G. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and for the public good. 1916) Chapter VI. L-10202 (March 29. Municipality of Binangonan Case No. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Government v. 112093 (October 4. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authority and that this legislation was not for the public good. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units. COMELEC Case No. and not just the new areas. No. The parent provinces. facts need not be stated to prove it. which will get also affected. No. LATIN MAXIM: 12a FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional barrios.R. but the final bill only limited it to the latter. The plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively composing the new province. ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. including the parent province. and not just the areas constituting the new province.R.145 Tan v. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in all units affected. 84 FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte.

13 of the CC. the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed. G. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. the law has always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. Tomas. 1144 of the same Code? 2. a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. 90 and Art. Hence. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code. 1953.R. 1391 of the new CC or Art. Bartolome. information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done. instead of the civil/calendar month. the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. Hence. 6c. 46a FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers.R. Thereafter. No. done with evident bad faith. m. His estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28. HELD: 1. In accordance therewith. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was. 91 of the RPC. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail. 1996) FACTS: On July 27. therefore. 7a . and Macario. ISSUE: 1. and a 149-sq. L-7234 (May 21. 26. mts. W/N the term “month” in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days. resort must be had to Art. 26. 2. or from the day following that in which it was committed. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. m of Lot 26. 38b. No. HELD: 1. It turned out. Art. Del Rosario Case No. W/N there was a double sale. an “extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs of Enrique. mts. 2. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed. Thus. the term month used in Art. Macario sold the 405 sq. & 27). 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions. out of the 749 sq. Court of Appeals Case No. Hence. the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. There was no double sale. Eventually. Venancio sold Lot No. 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salvatierra v. and a sister. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo. Art. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10 years. as held in previous cases. Marcela. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition). 13. Anselmo. ISSUE: 1. total area of Lot 26 to his son. Art. Venancio. Civil Code). 105 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. however.146 People v. that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. 107797 (August 26. 2. 1144 of the CC prevails. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. which consisted of the aforementioned lots. 1953.

practicable and usable. 1930) Chapter VI. during her lifetime. L-27275 (November 18. 37. Footnote No. 35. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases. During the pendency of the case.147 Pasno v. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. No. Accordingly. one of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost. 107 FACTS: Labitoria. ISSUE: 1. Two laws are being considered in this case: C. C & C Commercial Corporation. works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First policy). Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. However. The law does not require that the will shall be dated.R. 1967) Chapter VI. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term “government” under RA 912. a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and testament. HELD: Yes. The CFI ruled in favor of the special administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands. 36. practicable and usable. W/N the will is valid 2. The said law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced materials is in relation to the “construction or repair work undertaken by the Government.” NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term “Government” as used in the said law. an erroneous date will not defeat a will. No. When Labitoria died. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage. local material should be given preference whenever available. Page 274.A. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis.R. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. Page 273. 42 G. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term “government” found in RA 312. Davao and Iloilo. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. 104 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C & C Commercial v. 31581 (February 3. 199 G. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. NAWASA Case No. 138 and RA 912. HELD: 1. filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. Footnote No. which should give preference to local materials that are available. 38b . mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. 38a. 1 of RA 912. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempted from RA 912. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. a special administrator of the estate of the deceased was appointed by the court. Ravina and Ravina Case No. Yes. No. it would be logical to suppose Sec. 38b FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila. 2.

Page 277. the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms. 1966) Chapter VI. Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise. together with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a private contract. HELD: No.R. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. the earlier special and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the general as a general law of the land. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. Respondent maintained that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950. the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. Footnote No. 50 . Butuan Sawmill. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light. City of Butuan Case No. the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11.148 Butuan Sawmill. while the other as the law of a particular case. 1919) Chapter VI. 41 G. considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do so. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter. LATIN MAXIM: 25. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation. L-21516 (April 29. Rafferty Case No. 14205 (September 30. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. heat. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Railroad Co. and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran. Page 279. Footnote No. Agusan. v. unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts and circumstances. Inc. Inc. Inc. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have modified or altered the charter. Where the general act is later. No.R. v. Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. Where there are two statutes. HELD: No. On the other hand. unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill. On the other hand. However. 168 G. No. d FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congress in 1913. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. 50.

Almond. R. 87 G. was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. to the landing of the alien. and that if the landing was made. 1983) Chapter VI. HELD: Sec. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. HELD: No. No.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 41a. must be favored over provisions of P. 1906) FACTS: The Petitioner. COMELEC registrar of Casiguran. No. 48 . XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power “to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. 9.149 De Jesus v. Almond Case No. L-61998 (February 22. either tacit or express. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The word “permit” implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power is to insure the free.D. prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the COMELEC. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent. agent or person in charge of the vessel. 157 G. 1606 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. and. officer. 37. Sec. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. Footnote No. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officers. master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan. Sec 184 of the Election Code.W. Page 277. 2517 (June 2. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to investigate. the Court of First Instance (now RTC). 11e. is an alien of East India who is afflicted with trachoma. which deals specifically with election offenses. ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers. People of the Philippines Case No. orderly and honest conduct of elections. 38. coincidentally. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan. 2 of Art. it was made without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent. 50 FACTS: The complaint alleges that R.” while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punishable under the same Code. At the same time.

R. No. ISSUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the contemplation of the law. 298 G. 480. Estapia Case No. 48 .S. LATIN MAXIM: 41a. 1917) Chapter VII. 48 FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5.R. 23 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. Page 290.150 US v. LATIN MAXIM: 25. 37. 1 of Act. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing near a grove of buri palms. Abad Santos Case No. Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent. No. in violation of Sec. including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. 28 FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting. 12891 (October 19. Page 289. 294 G. No. v. unless the law clearly so provides. Footnote No. Footnote No. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. 12262 (February 10. 1917) Chapter VII. 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. The prosecution argued that the term “cockpit” should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. HELD: The term “cockpit” as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants. He had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position.

151 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROUND 3 .

and criminally evaded the provisions of Art. illegally. 1998) Chapter VII. Sec. ascendant.A. 1941) Chapter VII. entitled “An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights. franchise or privileges. One of such legal provision is Art. 138. No. 4 of C. Page 290. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.” Under Act No. It is contended. No. 6c. 108. and relative by affinity in the same degrees. 2. natural or adopted brother or sister. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C. 2. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 15 of the RPC encompasses only “the spouse.152 People v. 202 G. legitimate. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed. Page 291. 1 of the same Act applies punishment provided therein to “all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enjoyment of a right. the common-law wife of the Appellant. that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. Nos. which requires Philippine or U. is guilty of violation of C. 4. 47027 (February 4. 138 may be prosecuted under C. a Filipino citizen. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Footnote No. HELD: 1. and to death for the third. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. voluntarily. 138. Atop Case No. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C.” Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused. any legal provision. franchises or privileges. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights. is the granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos. 124303-05 (February 10. 12 years old. 113 G. 4 of Act No. holding that his common-law relationship with the victim’s grandmother aggravated the penalty. No. however. would fall within its scope. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 9a . Footnote No. and Von Arend. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: Appellants Padilla. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. 108.A. The scope of the relationship under Art.A. Padilla Case No.” HELD: Yes. franchise or privilege.A. No. 138. The very title of Act No. ISSUE: 1. descendant. The offended party’s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. a German citizen.A. as well as any alien profiting thereby. No. Private complainant Regina Guafin. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating.R. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts. 108. of Act No. 138. 30 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter. the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. acting jointly and conniving with each other. No.S. no other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. The trial court erred.R.

2 of Art. When he entered the plea of guilty. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. Footnote No. in that. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public or private. Footnote No. benevolent or charitable institution. that he “willfully. he thereby admitted.897. did willfully. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par. He was sentenced to be imprisoned.153 People v. 2 of the RPC. par. 1950) Chapter VII. 38b . RA 47 which amended Art. but also all the material facts alleged in the information. 80 as amended. which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. HELD: Yes. Page 293. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer. par. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68. he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. 68. “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification. misappropriate. and as such. 223 G. as it now stands and Art. LATIN MAXIM: 7b. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. to indemnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.77. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. 1959) Chapter VII. 41a. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded.897. 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. misappropriate.” thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. the Appellant pleaded not guilty. has given rise to the controversy. from said funds. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk. unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. 209 No.” ISSUE: W/N the Appellant. was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof. Salazar Case No. Garcia Case No. sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years. LATIN MAXIM: 37.R. 68 of the RPC. and to pay the costs. No. 43 FACTS: The lower court. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. the sum of P13. namely. Upon arraignment. accountable for the funds collected and received by him. ignoring the Appellant’s minority. 11e. to pay a fine. misapply. from said funds. 2. embezzle. and convert to his own personal use and benefit.77. but always in the proper period. HELD: No. the sum of P13. 41 FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds.” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison. not only his guilt. The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the crime. which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. L-2873 (February 28. L-13371 (September 24. Page 292.

154 People v. Terrada, et. al.
Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
US v. Toribo
Case No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48

FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48

FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, “An Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle.” It appears that in the town of Carmen in Bohol, there aren’t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the State’s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37

155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52

FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isn’t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient that they had “actual” knowledge. Statutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC
Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office…or within six months immediately preceding or following an election.” ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily “to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government.” Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a

157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.
Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64

FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43

FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43

158 Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43

FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person. HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43

160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Although separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43

FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institution’s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an “independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor’s tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contractor’s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43

197 of same law. and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. manufactures of wool. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P. Under par. 141 of Sec.283. 23. vehicles for use on railways and tramways. they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. 43. 50 FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as “manufactures of wool.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. 84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. Page 301. 1991) Chapter VII. the particular enactment must be operative. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. Insular Collector of Customs Case No.161 Manila Railroad Company v. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. under par.D. 8-72 was null because P. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. 621.” Upon appeal. On the other hand. 26 . 8-72 was null and void. Footnote No.D. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No.D. 84 FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty. because Revenue Regulation No. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909.R. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. L-69344 (April 26. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. 213. their debt even decreased to about P12. Page 301. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.000. not otherwise provided for. They applied for tax amnesty under P. 256 G. 197. In case of doubt.R. No.117. 213 and 370. Due to this. and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 8.08. 30264 (March 12. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to P17.D. then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree. 1929) Chapter VII. 167 G. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. Footnote No. the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. No. HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par. however. If Revenue Regulation No.

103(b). 85 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. Under Sec. although copra is from coconut. Department of Finance Secretary Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Under Sec. copra per se is not intended for human consumption. v. copra was classified as a food product under Sec. Footnote No. 8th Edition. b RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. 3 G. the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages.R. No. b . The law frowns on exemption from taxation. Footnote No. Page 301.R. including distribution. Page 301. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. HELD: No. Manila Electric Company Case No. In fact. No. it is not an agricultural food product. 103(a). thus it is not exempt from VAT. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91.162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders. and 80% of the coconut plant is edible. HELD: No. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. 42a. 1977) Chapter VII. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. 108524 (November 10. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. L-23623 (June 30. hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. insulating oil is different from insulators. 82 G. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages. Inc. 43. 85 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acting Commissioner of Customs v. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. Brady. 1994) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.

370 took effect. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a fiscal or special prosecutor.D. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. as the case may be. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P. 102 FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. 43 . The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. are corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. the lessee. the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P. the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are subject to the 20% amusement tax.D. Page 306. singly and not all at one and the same time. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. No. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor. but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward. 370 which declares tax amnesty. Respondents argued that they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available under P. 25a.R. Where the disclosure was not voluntary. 1956) Chapter VII. Case No. the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth. 27 FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. L-46881 (September 15. Footnote No. or the operator. L-8755 (March 23. the White Cross. Case No. the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage of P. the PCSO. HELD: The law refers to “gross receipts” and not “gross income”. 104 G. 7a. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec. of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax. 370. the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive conjunction “or”. No. 68 G. thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor. 370. or operator.D. lessee.163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc.D. 1988) Chapter VII. In the instant case. Footnote No.D.R. Page 304. Castañeda Jr.D. 97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers. This clause is plain demonstration that the “gross receipts” refer to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charged. 1(a)(4) of P.

L. it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article. in the determination of the value of such finished article. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.17 because materials purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. Page 306. This rule is not without its exceptions and limitations. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: No. so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative intent. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Flour Mills. part of which was not used in the business that year. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23. 82 and 551. 9f. Sec. 1907) Chapter VII.25602 31 (February 18.275. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the word “land” should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon. Inc.R. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. Petitioner prays that the word “land” in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean “land including buildings and improvements thereon”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.170. Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains.55. but the cost of wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into flour and sold in 1959. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. 259 G. 9d. No. 27. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37.R. 1970) Chapter VII. nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted. Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901. 175 G. v. and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. 3433 (March 2. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. Page 306. and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. Footnote No. In 1958. 43 . 7a. 123. it is disregarded in Act Nos. 103 FACTS: Act No.164 Zamora v. providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. While some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification. City of Manila Case No. b2 FACTS: In 1957. It is a remedial statute. the law must be taken as it is. No. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case.

Court of Appeals Case No.165 Ajero v. Page 309.” Accordingly. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.R. 117 G. the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. but not its probate. 106720 (September 15. and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Page 309. said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. but not its entirety. 814. which she shares with her father’s other heirs. requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses. for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy Case No. 117 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late Annie Sand.R. No. citing Sec. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed. 618 of Act No. the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. It was also opposed by Dr. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. This requirement is mandatory. as amended. we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore. 61 G. HELD: Yes. The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law. 7a . otherwise it is entirely void. HELD: No. cancellations or insertions. 6c. L-14322 (February 25. 190. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. Footnote No. On appeal. 7a. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Art. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Thus. and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. 1994) Chapter VII. 1960) Chapter VII. notwithstanding noncompliance with Art. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. as amended. cannot be admitted to probate. 9a FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu. In case of alterations. 190. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. The CA. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. No. Footnote No. however. correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the house and lot. 618 of Act No.

LATIN MAXIM: 9a . 123 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lazo v. 1962) Chapter VII. Footnote No. and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement. No. 70 G. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code. 626 but was denied by the GSIS. L-17750 (August 31.” and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. ISSUE: 1. because the reliever did not come on time. it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off.L. Defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. 1 G. 2. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P. No. and damages. 626 was valid.D. 78617 (June 18.D. 2. he claimed for disability benefits under P. On his way home. the Petitioner rendered full duty. we cannot agree. Pending this. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was “separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants. In the case at bar. Inc. the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day.166 A. For injuries sustained. Page 310. Ammen Transportation Company. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm.R. 1986. W/N the scope of the term “action” falls under RA 1994. Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations.R. Footnote No. The Petitioner contends that the phrase “action already commenced” employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow interpretation. he sustained injuries. 1990) Chapter VII. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office. 123 FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for overtime work rendered. Page 310. HELD: 1. regular homeward route. On June 18. it is significant that the liberality of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. But. HELD: No. v. as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. Borja Case No. he met an accident and as a result.

in Negros Occidental for a period of ten years. 284 of the Labor Code. The court held such contention untenable as the issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. No. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. 1981) Chapter VII.167 Villavert v. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. 626. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abella v. The applicable law on the case is Art. who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert. the worker’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. 313 G. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights. L-48605 (December 14.R. which she opted to do. employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. HELD: From the foregoing facts of record. including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. because when she leased the farm land. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. Petitioner dismissed the two Respondents.D. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code. 9d . and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. NLRC. Moreover. Page 310. The prohibition is general. HELD: Yes. 71813 (July 20. Without such law. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts. it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. Footnote No. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. Hacienda Danao–Ramona. Footnote No. It was stated in the said case that “the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. 2 G. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. During the existence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. No. as amended. for another ten years. neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the lease. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment.” The court further stated that the purpose of Art.R. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC which affirmed the denial. with the GSIS. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P. it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier. 1987) Chapter VII. computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. It is renewable at her instance. Page 310. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. 9a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land. employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled.

died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. L-64204 (May 31. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. However. ECC. ISSUE: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. Jr. According to Art. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. 124 FACTS: Petitioner. Footnote No. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. 1981) Chapter VII. “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters. the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice. 9d. The latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made. 221 of the Labor Code. 9a. Page 310. it was still paid. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. Again she was denied by the GSIS. 79 G. the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be applied. herein Respondents. Moreover. 36 No. The claimant. HELD: Yes. No.. filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation. 9d. ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. a logging company. 1985) Chapter VII.” The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even though the payment was late. GSIS denied such claim. the case should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manahan v. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. it is well settled that in case of doubt.168 Del Rosario & Sons v. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment. 40b . Footnote No. Bernabe. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. Page 310.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment. L-44899 (April 22. The security guards. he was treated for Epigastric pain. 40b FACTS: Nazario Manahan. thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. the widow of the deceased.and ulcer-like symptoms. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever.

No. The WCA should be construed fairly. owner of first class agricultural land. 75 G. Page 310. 9c. 36. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No. are similar to those expressly mentioned. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. it should be construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. 1959) Chapter VII. though not specified. which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3. the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which. The net produce was to be divided equally. 38.40 to the claimant in lump sum. However. Altar Case No. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec.R. Page 310. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. L-12164 (May 2. 125 FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy. Being a remedial statute. HELD: No. which declared the contract illegal as against public policy as contemplated in Sec. L-1916 (April 30. entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 7 of the Tenancy Law. No. the liability of business partners should be solidary. Footnote No. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly. for the reason that instead of receiving 60% of his total share. the tenant shall receive 50% only. and one of them happens to be insolvent. The purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. Art. which he argues to be an exhaustive list. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. 12a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sibulo v. 7 of the Tenancy Law. Petitioner claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Sec. HELD: No. It was taken to the Court of Industrial Relations. Footnote No. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation. The contract was disapproved by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. 7 of the Tenancy Law.169 Liwanag v. 1949) Chapter VII. 9c.R. 9d. ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally.494. 279 G. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases. 36. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary. other provisions of law show how their liability is solidary. reasonably and liberally for the employee and dependents. they claim that because the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partners. the award would only be partially satisfied. who was killed in the line of duty by criminals. the compensation should be divisible. 40 . 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec.

he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. The Petitioners appealed to the CA. the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. 12a . the Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations. 11b. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. especially the humble rank and file. Afterwards. At the course of his employment. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. The application was supported by a physician’s certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total disability. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the suit was a share tenancy agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. But assuming that they were. He shared 1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Later the Petitioners ordered Benitez out. 85024 (January 23. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers. the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. 126 FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vicente v. which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reform’s decision. the decisions lost their validity. which ordered his reinstatement. he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to “income benefits” under the GSIS retirement program. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. 12. 32. 168 G. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform. L-44570 (May 30. Court of Appeals Case No. Footnote No. 127 G.1986) Chapter VII. the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. Footnote No.170 Guerrero v. HELD: No. No. 38 FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. 1991) Chapter VII.” The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. So at the age of forty-five.R. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only “permanent partial disability”. Pending appeal.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Page 310. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Page 310. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. No.

1957) Chapter VII. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS.171 Tamayo. she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. 83 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.. An hour later. Footnote No. On her 5th pregnancy. v. 283 G. During the course of her work. as amended by RA 611. But said agency denied. L-8975 (June 29. 128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Corporal v. Footnote No.R. she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a “hilot”. 15 days before they were separated from the company. herein Petitioner. as later amended by RA 1081. it can only be given effect from the date of its approval.R. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. et al. Page 311. 43 . No. brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel Co. 1954. No. that is to say. Her husband. she suffered complete abortion. who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect. On her 4th pregnancy. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of his wife’s death was non-work-related. 266 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative Code. approved on June 15. LATIN MAXIM: 46a FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. 1954. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. Art. HELD: No. 1994) Chapter VII. 131 FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co. Manila Hotel Company Case No. 86020 (August 5. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body. she had several pregnancies. HELD: No. Page 311.

it is also presumed that the purchaser has examined the instruments of the record. 7. 22 and 7 of the RPC. This should also apply to criminal cases. Footnote No. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. When the statute makes no distinction. 22 should still apply to special laws. 3030. 17905 (January 27. 1961. 216 G. as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed. 48 FACTS: On June 1983. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. Furthermore. Nos. ISSUE: W/N Act No. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Moran. 74226-227 (July 27. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is the one to be adopted. Footnote No. Reyes Case No. However as the deed was registered on May 26. 46a. should the circumstances warrant. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. LATIN MAXIM: 48 .R. The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones. When the decision was published. pursuant to Sec. No. in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes. Art. it makes no exception. Moran Case No. which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9. 222 G. LATIN MAXIM: 26.R. 1923) Chapter VII. the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. 37. 168 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. it was increased to 6 months.172 People v. Furthermore. 167 People v. 71 of Act No. HELD: Act No. Hence with regard to Art. Under this. the SC contends that Art. always susceptible possible challenges. Page 320. the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed. 1922. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. 1989) Chapter VII. as stated in People v. Page 320. HELD: The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court. Also.

L-36153 (November 28. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms Case No. Petitioner expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844. 186. due to the lack of funds. 1971. failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and only after January 15. 1957 to August 7. and P20 per minor from January 16. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C. and then P100 plus P10 per minor. 1957 up to August 7. and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein. 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each minor. No.A. and RA 3844. as amended by RA 1616. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an employee. Page 321. it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. 9 and RA 1920.A. 38b . GSIS approved his retirement gratuity under C. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22. on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under C. Footnote No. However. for P100 a month and an additional P10 per minor. the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes. 186.A. HELD: Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. starting from December 18. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension. Footnote No. 1971 up to December 31. as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds. as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim for gratuity under RA 3844. be construed in relation to C.A. as amended by RA 6389. No. 1969 to January 14. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees. L-37867 (February 22. 173 FACTS: Respondent Gasilao. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision. 186. 1955 at the rate of P50. After finally complying with all the necessities. 186 and in the light of its provisions. on June 22. No. The difference from June 22. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C. the judgment of the lower courts is modified as. 1975) Chapter VII. 40b FACTS: Petitioner. No. 1971. increased to P100 from June 22. 1971. 1969. sent a letter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department.R. the difference of P75 plus P22. Granting such pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. from June 22. an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms. Bautista Case No. as amended by RA 6389. 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the government.A. one under its provisions and another pursuant to C. 1968.50 per month for his wife. which should all be construed together. he was awarded with the full benefits of RA 65. RA 5753 was approved. in case of ambiguity. No. that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits. 1968. as amended by RA 6389. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. No. 170 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Legaspi v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1982) Chapter VII. 145 No. 186. But. as amended by RA 1616. as amended by RA 6389. 37 G. effective December 18. There is nothing in RA 3844. a veteran.A. No. 1969 up to January 15. HELD: No. Conrado Estrella. Sec. all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should. Page 322. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao’s pension. Later.

09-9-019-SC (October 4. 128 A.A.D. and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. No. 2 months. However. No. of which 10 years. 74 of the Official Gazette. 1438 was published in Vol. No. being remedial in character. in the same manner as it has done since 1978. BP 129). Britanico of the IAC Case No.23 years. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation. requiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. 43c .M. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary. not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. 1438. Footnote No. No.” They fall into three categories: XXX 2. Footnote No. 30. plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA). 40b. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. As provided in Sec. should have rendered “at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both. COMELEC). Justice Britanico served the government for 36. 74 of the Official Gazette. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910. 1438 must be followed. pursuant to Proclamation No. 41 provided that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement.D. more so. 1 of RA 910. retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Since 1978 however. in Vol. 1438 which was published in Vol. ISSUE: Which version of P. which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement. This is definitely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that. (May 15. 30.D.D. 177 FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). 1. 1990) Chapter VII. 1986. 74 of the Official Gazette. The basis was the copy of P. No. P.174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. 1989) Chapter VII. 40b FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termination of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino. Page 323. plus 3) longevity pay (which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. Page 322. 1 dated February 25. 60 A. not only for those who have retained their vigor but. 42. for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.M. No. the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement benefits with their lifetime annuity. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security. 174 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Re: Application For Retirement Under R. as amended by P. 6484-Ret.

1990) Chapter VII. Moreover. the defect in the appeal bond. there are ample reasons behind each grant. 11b . namely Pineda. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. as amended. Footnote No.D. it should suffice. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect. No. 9e. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases. de Lara. 178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramirez v. asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910.175 Re: Gregorio G. 1962) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. Montecillo. Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. 9e. in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P. it did. integrity and dedication to the public service. The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it. Page 323. Montesclaros. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the SC. The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges. 9d. 6789-RET (Jul 13. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. According to the Rules of Court. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Arrieta Case No. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. 37. Pineda Case No. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. The CFI dismissed the complaint. the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. 42a FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. 29. it would suffice that the court approves such. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal bond. Footnote No. HELD: No. the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. Page 325. 1146.R. 130 G. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. 132 A. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations. even if indeed 2 sureties were needed. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. Furthermore. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting.M. a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties. id est courtesy resignations. 181 FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges. L-19183 (Nov. No. HELD: Yes. Paredes and Gerochi. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day.

The debt of P6. Private Respondent made a money market placement. L-6970 (Jan. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest. and/or additions. Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial justice. which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. The court issued a writ of execution against Petitioner’s property. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Del Rosario v. 9d. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. 9d. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. 18b . 63 G. mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. Footnote No. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. Page 326. The decision of the CA is affirmed. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Thus. Page 326. 30. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 35 No. The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. Such bond was therefore rendered without force and effect. HELD: Yes. 1290 of the Civil Code.R. 181 FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner’s predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her other obligations to Petitioner. 11b FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. fortified by jurisprudence. the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided.176 International Corporate Bank v. 1987) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. Footnote No. applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Hamoy Case No. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. By such rigidity. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement. alterations. in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff. 18a. No. the Respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. 1988) Chapter VII.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. L-77154 (June 30. Meanwhile. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures. private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan.

22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. L-68568 (December 26.D. 5b. However. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. 1984) Chapter VII. HELD: Yes.D. is still in force. a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. save in exceptionally meritorious cases. thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review. for the guidance of Bench and Bar. The SEC ruled that the 30-day period provided for in Sec. may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 38b . 22(b) of the Interim Rules. Footnote No. Sec. 1986) Chapter VII. that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as follows: … (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision. 7a. The 30-day period fixed by P. 24a. Page 326. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 902-A. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case. 69 No. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of the Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final order. The SEC is not a court. L-73146-53 (August 26. 181 FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC. Repeals by implication are not favored. 52 No. It is an administrative agency. 27 FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The SEC denied their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. ISSUE: W/N Sec. resolutions. 6 of P. Securities and Exchange Commission Case No. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. awards of decisions of any court. HELD: No. an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA. Page 326. 37. The Court rules. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gimenez v.177 Lacsamana v. the organic law of the SEC.

1936) Chapter VII. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. L-832 (October 14. 49 G. No. The fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. 9d . LATIN MAXIM 6d. HELD: Yes to both issues. 190 on how appeals are perfected. In lieu of such bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Internal Revenue). the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. 1946) Chapter VII. Jugo Case No. 7a FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with. Case No. 36 G. Footnote No. With such. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with the requirement. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petitioners. 183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case and Nantz v.R. HELD: Under Sec. 187 FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none.178 Blanco v. the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office. 6d. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. Due to unfortunate circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy. Page 326. Page 327. L-44970 (March 31. Footnote No. “… The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace …. No. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner’s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. On the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such.R. There was substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff’s office the Defendant’s counterbond. 9a. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. 76 of Act No.

Viuda de Ordoveza v. which had been effected in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana). LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Page 327. 189 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuñez Case No. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. 65 G. having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. Page 328. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. Footnote No. 1936) Chapter VII. was attacked in this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in other litigation. L-45155 (July 31. 41 . HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property. 1920) Chapter VII. Footnote No. Under the Rules of Court “the court may. 91 G.R. to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. Raymundo Case No. 14881 (February 5.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief. Any ordinary creditor. HELD: Yes.179 C. No. No. or assignee as such. LATIN MAXIM: 9d FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale. on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. 192 FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her brief.R.

with his head hitting the rope of the ring. caused by his participation in a boxing contest. No. 25a. as used in insurance contracts. left. as indemnity for the death of the insured. and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation.000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage. 30a .. intracranial. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured. Part I of the provisions of the policy. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1.180 Del Rosario v. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning.000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1.. 1963) Chapter VII. The failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death. L-16215 (June 29. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. Page 328. have not acquired any technical meaning.000. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario. 34 G. Footnote No. Petitioner. binding itself to pay the sum of P1.000 to P3. 1. and Casualty Co. 156 G. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De la Cruz v. LATIN MAXIM: 3. father of the insured. causing Eduardo to fall. Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head. 192 FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death.000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional. & Surety Co. the father of the insured. filed a claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. ISSUE: W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or disability caused by accidental means. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy.R. was not accidental and. L-16138 (April 29. 1961) Chapter VII. therefore. Equitable Ins. Case No. Page 328. ISSUE: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario.000. which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Inc.R.” HELD: The terms “accident” and “accidental”. Inc. not covered by insurance. 38 FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. Footnote No. Capital Ins. No. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured. filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Simon de la Cruz. Case No. unexpected.

HELD: No. Footnote No. Inc. Plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. L-28742 (April 30. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue. 8 FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct. it does not connote certainty. a resident of Pampanga. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. First National Surety & Assurance Co. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Capati v. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff. As the terms of the policies are clear. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty. or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides. Under ordinary circumstances. Page 328. 1961) Chapter VII. a resident of Naga City. 1953. b . The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. 9c FACTS: Plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand. the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy.. the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. However. No. 25a. which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found. 1982) Chapter VIII. an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. Page 330. the term "may be" connotes possibility.R. Fighting his way out of the factory. among which being the eight above named Defendants. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies. Ocampo Case No. which issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand. Hence. 2(b). Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. 46 G. opportunity.R. No. at the election of the Plaintiff. entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant. Case No. Footnote No. 156 G." In addition. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. 7a. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. On December 24. which is not disputed on appeal. L-16138 (April 29. All that was found by the trial court. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. permission or possibility.181 Ty Vs.

The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private. Figueroa Case No. 17 FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only. Page 333. 9a. Gopez.R. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. Sec.R. unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein. and two new accused were included. After the reinvestigation.182 Chartered Bank v. 36a.” A perusal of Act No. No. 58 G. 25a . 1954) Chapter VIII. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons. 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Guiao v. National Government Auditing Office Case No. Page 331. HELD: Yes. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full. 36b undated memorandum of FACTS: In the trial of People v. Footnote No. 2709 states that. namely. Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. except in the cases determined in Sec. No. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 2 of this Act. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in the information. L-6481 (May 17. Footnote No. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1. L-38513 (March 31. involving the installation of a new postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks. must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila. ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory and permissive in nature. an amended information was filed. 121 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. 9a. 1968. regardless of location. 1987) Chapter VIII. 1968." effective October 1. 1 is mandatory. the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders. not merely directory. the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. On 1968. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information.

as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. v. 153 G. However. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. Inc. b FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”. Footnote No.183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association. 102858 (July 28. 25a. 22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Director of Lands v. HELD: It is mandatory. Later. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. HELD: No. it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. it was found that the applicant had been in open. Page 334. Hence. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. 9a . Footnote No. Court of Appeals Case No. 1997) Chapter VIII. No. he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. Page 334. No. Thus. During the pendency of the said petition. 23 FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.R. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. 38b. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. 36a. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. Court of Appeals Case No. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. 1997) Chapter VIII. 117188 (August 7. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 95 G. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”.

in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question. the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo.R. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same. and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. 34 G. stated that.184 Bersabal v. 51765 (March 3. Page 335. the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents’ preferred shares HELD: Yes. “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock. 6b. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption. 1978) Chapter VIII. 7a. 133 G. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. 36a . Respondent Judge. 1997) FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. No. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Salvador Case No. 30b. L-35910 (July 21. the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may". Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. Footnote No.000. Furthermore. 25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Planers Bank v. R.” After receipt. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional". Agana Sr. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion. an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of P8.

Hence. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P. Inc. v. L-63318 (November 25. v. 36. L-63318 (August 18. No. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. HELD: Yes.D.D. HELD: Yes. “The Department of Public Works. 1984) FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. 9d. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent. innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable.. the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must".185 Phil. therefore.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus. 6d. 2 of P. LATIN MAXIM: 8b. Inc. 217 should be reconsidered. the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. P. Consumers Foundation . because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec.. 217 to the then Department of Public Works. NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No. 217 deals with matters so alien. 94 G. 9f. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. 217 which provides. Nat’l Telecommunications Commission Case No. 121 G. 12a FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. Petitioner states that SIP schedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and. 30b. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning. Considering the multi-million profits of the company. 39c . 24. No. unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. illegal and baseless. Consumers Foundation. Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated . which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said Section 2.R. Transportation and Communications as mandatory. the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits.D.D. 11b. the consumers and the government itself.

Footnote No. The Office of the President stayed execution. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. In the absence of an express repeal. No. A. FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi.186 Diokno v. Page 337. ISSUE: W/N R. Case No. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds.R. acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. suspended in both cases. The modifier. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. and 2) dishonesty. with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. the word “shall” is imperative. 34 FACTS: Petitioner. Page 336. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent. According to Petitioner. The first sentence of Sec. It is true that in its ordinary signification. it was by implication which is not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. Respondent mayor was convicted. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. Footnote No. 93 G. Sec.”. the interest to be charged.” In other words. 67(b) of the LGC. can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. No. the governing law is RA 7160. His basis was Sec. No. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or directory. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made. and accordingly.O. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. However.O. 7160 repealed A. al. The lower court sustained Respondent company. No.R. 6. 6 of A. which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes. 25a. L-4712 (July 11. 33 G. 50 HELD: No. 32 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Berces v. depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found. it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case No. the rule is not absolute. to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders. it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds. citing Sec. If there was any repeal. et.” It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay execution. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. 1995) Chapter VIII. 26 . “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years. There is none in this case. for whose benefit the same have been issued. 18. Albay for 1) abuse of authority. RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.O. No. 26. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed. 530(f). Guingona. the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304.A.O. 18. the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. HELD: No. Petitioner further contends that A. No. 112099 (February 21. 1952) Chapter VIII. 2 of RA 304.

he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. Therefore. penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Because of the word “shall”. LATIN MAXIM: 9d . No. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Footnote No. Instead. v. HELD: The CA erred. Alleging serious business decline. prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Upon the hearing. thus in violation of BP 22. Despite the reduction granted. 37 FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to work. Sec. 26 FACTS: Petitioner. the rule is mandatory. and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides. No. Inc. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. resulting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. Petitioner appealed to Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. et al. the Bouncing Checks Law.R. “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. and on appeal. He was convicted by the trial court. Case No. L-79094 (June 22. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. 1998) Chapter VIII. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fule v. the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days.R. 223 of the Labor Code. 48 G. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioner’s stoppage of operations. 123669 (February 27. in its language. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. Page 337. 81 G. Under Art. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice. issued and made out check No.187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed. the Appellate Court. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Court of Appeals Case No. Page 337. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Footnote No. Also. 1988) Chapter VIII. National Labor Relations Commission. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal.

Inc. Virata Case No. Republic Case No. L-44004 (March 25. 174 G. However.188 McGee v. “In order to entitle an informer to a reward. wants to adopt her children by her first husband. the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation … and results in the recovery of collection of revenues …. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been falsely declaring their gross earnings – on the basis of a parity rate of P2. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. invoking Art. 1983) Chapter VIII. 101 G. Page 337. under the laws of statutory construction. However.00 – defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child.R. 335. According to Sec. 9d . negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Footnote No. an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo. HELD: No. legitimated. Art. 338 meaningless and a surplusage.00 to US $1.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a FACTS: Confidential Information No. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted. acknowledged natural children. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption. 1954) Chapter VIII. Now the Petitioners seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies – as provided by RA 2338. One of these was Pan Fil Co. HELD: Yes. Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confidential Information. this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. or natural children by legal fiction” cannot adopt. 338 should be considered in relation to each other. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child.R. a company which is not included in the Confidential Information.” Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation. Page 338. Further. statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. L-5387 (April 29. No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. recovery of collection. it must be noted that Art. Inc. Therefore. In addition. consequently. Footnote No. No. While Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. Despite Art. 338 which states that “a step-child. which led to further investigations and. by the step-father or step-mother” can be adopted. 4 of RA 2338. he is barred from doing so under Art. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art. 335 and Art. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Penid v. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. In jurisprudence. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that “those who have legitimate.

124 G. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballots which would have made him win. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who. No. L-2327 (January 11.R. Footnote No. when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. Page 342. and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any “notice of appeal” from Petitioner. 9d. HELD: 1. 7b. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. 40b FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. ISSUE: 1. Footnote No. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor. 110170 (February 21. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees. No. as provided by the Constitution. member of the provincial board or councilor. 43 . A name can be counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. 63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pimentel v. 2. Camiguin. Within the 5-day period to appeal. Petitioner filed a “verified appeal” brief. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. Appellant’s name in the 59 ballots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor. No.189 Pahilan v. Tabalba. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. HELD: No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. 2. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. et al. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R. Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. 9c. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. Festejo Case No. 1994) Chapter VIII. The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. is able to read. W/N the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed. 1949) Chapter VIII. No. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. Case No. 64 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban. 96 G. Page 342. filed as of the date of mailing.

requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. 1915. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. under the date of December 1. Rafferty Case No. thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Building for the year 1915. Apparently. OCT No. 1987) Chapter VIII.1676 hectares situated in Sagay. 19 FACTS: A parcel of land. 118 of C. 1914. 121 which governs sale to corporations. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during November. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title. the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. which did not present the documents for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds.R. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the petition of Baltazar. Page 345.000. 1914. sent Plaintiffs notice. 141. Footnote No. the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. Since the grant was more than 5 years before. which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. 28985. Casamayor sold the land in favor of Nemesia Baltazar. Footnote No. TCT No. received by them on December 25. In 1945. TCT No. 40858 (September 15. which amounted to P3. was not given during the time fixed by statute. Upon registration of said patent. HELD: No. Negros Occidental. On the same day. Baltazar sold the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central. applying Sec.190 Roxas v. L-12182 (March 27. in the name of Petitioner. 1914. Furthermore. 1839 was issued by said office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. No. It was finished in all respects on February 15.R. His attempted notification on December 25. The city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. 264 G.A. No. HELD: No. consisting of 21. Page 345. Court of Appeals Case No. the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of Casamayor. 1918) Chapter VIII. In the latter part of 1913. LATIN MAXIM: 37b. 14-R. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and void from the beginning. 44139. 145 G. 43 . under protest. and not Sec. 75 FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. The city assessor and collector of Manila. the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. under Homestead Patent No. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes. In 1951. OCT No. 75 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Serfino v. was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No.

The loan was to be released in installments. As a minor. Page 347. 1995) Chapter VIII. for election purposes. HELD: No. when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.983. including interests. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Romualdez-Marcos v. Although Mr. she did not lose her domicile of origin. Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. 39a . when she married then Congressman Marcos. petitioner was obliged. 137 G. In spite of the being born in Manila. Leyte. Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20. 110 of the Civil Code. and even if he had designated one. 37. 1 FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. 26419 (October 16. 1953.84 FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved.R. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent.59.191 Quijano v. The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. No. 1953 when RA 897 was approved. 897 (RA 897). Commission on Elections Case No. HELD: Yes. Private respondent Montejo. 7a. Parenthetically. Footnote No. G. out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban. No. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. Marcos has different places of residence. it is retained until a new one is gained. R. filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with respondent COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him.000 for his outstanding obligation. amounted to P13. once acquired. 119976 (September 18. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14. Therefore. ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. by virtue of Art. Hence. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. such corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. 6c. LATIN MAXIM: 28. As domicile. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position.

178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within three months after filing. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. L-32181 (March 10. Footnote No. Court of Appeals Case No. Decision was rendered on August 15. No. 1930) Chapter III. Appellee Portillo. b2 FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. this provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 101. 18b. No. L-2581 (December 2. 43. 247 G. Footnote No. 5b. However. One year having already elapsed. Sec. Page 332. 243 G. 9a. 1948) Chapter VIII. his nearest opponent. the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction. 7a. filed an election protest on July 9. Salvani should be abandoned. 45. 130 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Querubin v.R. lost and filed an appeal thereafter. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. 14 FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. 39b . 7b. 1929 declaring appellee Portillo the winner. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. HELD: No. The doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani Case No.192 Portillo v. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court. 1928.

59 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salcedo and Ignacio v. however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitled to social justice. because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 1971 removing “personal cultivation” from the grounds for ejectment. 1 thereof amended Sec. HELD: No. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. By virtue of this law. Carpio and Carreon Case No. 4007. to abolish all the pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof. to rule against the small landowners would be thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. 9c. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10. 189 G. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Footnote No. whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. 1951) FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. 49 . The legislation involves social justice. 4007. that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation.R. 1968. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. RA 546 was approved and Sec. a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the President. Art. Private respondent then filed for ejection citing “personal cultivation” on March 7. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. 1984) Chapter III. L-34586 (April 2. in enacting RA 546. imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past.193 Nilo v.R. 46a. 138 G. L-4495 (June 6. Furthermore. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. In the case of Camacho vs. Court of Appeals Case No. 46b FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. Page 89. No. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception. but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress. 46. or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage.

” thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. but made it “in lieu of any and all taxes. Sec. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. held that the landowner’s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. Borromeo Case No. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive.. and power. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution. 49 FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter carrier. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. L-36007 (May 25. 14 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gallardo v. 1988) Chapter IX. R. 6389 eliminated this ground. 9c. HELD: It is valid. Page 355. Upon appeal.194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. The newer law. HELD: No.A. it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect.R. L-23771 (August 4. 78 G. Inc. 50 G. all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. Pending the case. heat. No. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. RA 3843 was passed. granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light. 46e . 7 of RA 6389. the CA applying Sec. 4 of the New Civil Code. Case No. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 46. In applying Art. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law.R. 1988) FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. 7 of RA 6389. No.

and on January 1953. 41 FACTS: The case involves petitioner’s claim for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955. 76 G. As a rule. Filipinas Compaňia de Seguros Case No. HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively. Page 355. No. the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.195 Cebu Portland Cement v. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. Footnote No. Respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. an insurance company. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. this took effect on August of 1956. petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement. In every case of doubt. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of Tax Appeals. 46e . 1960) Chapter IV. considering that RA 1612. producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax. HELD: No. as mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955). expressly provides that said Act shall take effect upon its approval. laws have no retroactive effect. however. was not only to “accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms. it also protested the payment of the ad valorem taxes. 46c. Footnote No. was engaged in business as a real estate dealer. 15 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.R. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar. unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. unless the contrary is provided. 20563 (October 29. 1968) Chapter IX. Since 1952. 46e FACTS: Respondent. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale of graduated rates. 14880 (April 29. 46c.R. No. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. CIR Case No. While the purpose of the amendment. and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. Page 134. 52 G. which imposes the new and higher taxes.” it certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government. Petitioner assessed against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612.

7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. Footnote No. L-36378 (January 27. No. 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Balatbat v.196 Laceste v. 36(1) of RA 3844.R. thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future. 46e . LATIN MAXIM: 48 FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. 73 FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus. pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 46b. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity. 344 of the RPC. Santos Case No. Footnote No. HELD: No. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. Lachica married the victim. HELD: Yes. Page 363. 7 of RA 6389 since.490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. LATIN MAXIM: 20. 1932) Chapter IX. Page 351. Ana. Court of Appeals and Passion Case No. petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. Conscience and good law justify this exception. 140 G. No. The petition for habeas corpus was granted.R. 1992) Chapter IX. and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. 126. However. Pampanga containing 18. 29 G. Magdalena de Ocampo. Art. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 36886 (February 1. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. However. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted.

A.197 People v. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. No. Zeta Case No. 1951. 1946 to March 14. 46e FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre-war loan with defendant. L-7140 (December 22. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff by the defendant. strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. 271 G. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. L-7766 (November 29. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. Footnote No. 104 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. 1955) Chapter VI. The lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1. 72 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Jose v. 46e . Page 369. HELD: Yes. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 401. HELD: No. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C. Footnote No.R. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. Case No. Where a statute was amended and reenacted. LATIN MAXIM: 20. Page 266. 1955) Chapter IX. No. the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act. Furthermore. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. 232 G. No.R. LATIN MAXIM: 11b. 20.

as appellants. BP Big. 1983. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs. Camilon.198 People v. Ruled in Alday vs. 46e FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. 129 is now in full force and effect. Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. 226 G. Being procedural in nature. and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case. 97 G. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent. those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners. Based on the records.R. Sumilang Case No. L-68043 (October 31. the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. On appeal. "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed. L-49187 (December 18.R. No. Sumilang. Footnote No. No. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11. as principal defendants. 1946) Chapter IX. a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 77 Phil. both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. Page 371. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. HELD: No. 764 [19461. However.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Palomo Building Tenants Association v. HELD: Yes.

intimidation. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting.D. 1 of P.D. HELD: Yes on both counts. 1989) FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages.199 MRCA. or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner. (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. otherwise known as the Anti– Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land. Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that “after prosecution has rested its case. Sec.” ISSUE: 1. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 45a. while being informed of P. Inc. exemplary damages.R. Court of Appeals Case No. No. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner. 772. 15. (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. 89 G. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence. 1989) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ocampo v. v. 7960 (December 8. 772. 2. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court. Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. 46b . ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 86675 (December 19. Court of Appeals Case No. petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. No. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.R. 78 G. Sec.

Court of Appeals Case No. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 21 G. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. 46e .R. 46e FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 90501 (August 5. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws. 315 G. Page 372. cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art. HELD: Yes. 223 of the Labor Code. HELD: Yes on both counts. reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. respectively. 91856 (October 5. being without malice. 1991) Chapter IX. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. 223 of the Labor Code.200 Yakult Philippines v. No. Footnote No. and the contested provision “is then a police legislation”. 33 of the Civil Code. Page 372. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. 1990) Chapter IX. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. v. No. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aris (Phil.) Inc.R. 119 FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence. Footnote No.

Cebu. 61 of Act No. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. v. ISSUE: W/N P. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . During the pendency of this appeal. lands claimed by the Government. 25 G. Sec. Act No. 61 of Act No. Pangasinan on two parcels of land. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER. at most. 61 of Act No. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Government of the Philippine Islands v.R. Due to the promulgation of P. a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 926. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. 61 of Act No. Page 373. 1281 prevails. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. or. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings. CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 12 of P. 1281. 926. seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan. L-8243 (December 24. 61 of Act No. No. 1990) Chapter IX. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. Footnote No. However. Cadastral Act (No. of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands. 1915) Chapter I. HELD: Act No.R. Page 12.D. entered into a compromise agreement.D. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. 117 G. L-54305 (February 14. Footnote No. subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City. 9 mining claims overlap. the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. Cebu.201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. 7(a)(c) and Sec. Municipality of Binalonan Case No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won.D. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 1281. HELD: P. Court of Appeals Case No. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject.D. ISSUE: Whether Sec. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission. No. 44 FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec.

46e .30. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147. among which was Sec. 1980) Chapter IV.O. which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. No. Footnote No. However. HELD: Yes. 83225 (June 29. without the knowledge of the DBP. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. by amending Sec. Court of Appeals Case No. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice.R. In its appeal to the NLRC. Page 376.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage. overtime pay. Footnote No. It is. night shift differential pay. 1989) Chapter IX. No. were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5. 13 of RA 85.369. by RA 3147. 217 of the Labor Code. ECOLA. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands. and dela Cruz. 136 FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. RA 3147 was enacted. dela Serna. This was clear from the proviso: “The provisions of Art. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters. 9. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. therefore. amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85). 13 of RA 85. Hon. et al. Page 175. 39 G. 111 amending Art. a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Briad Agro Development Corp. by force of Art. v. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. 13 of RA 85. Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director’s authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 92 G. a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC.202 Development Bank of the Phil. L-28774 (February 28. HELD: The Court held that E. Then. Case No. was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. 217 of this Code notwithstanding…” The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction.909. legal holiday pay. 13. However. which NLRC dismissed on the strength of E. v.O. 30b. 38b. 128(b) of the Labor Code.O. E.

1955. 1965) Chapter IX. and Burgos Case No.O. Page 376. Footnote No. 99 G. No. 104215 (May 8. Furthermore. Gaanan and Aguilar.R. On August 3. the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage under Art. ISSUE: W/N E. Jr. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial court. E. 1691 and 1391. HELD: It is a mortgage. For convenience. a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up.O. No. plus his contractual bonus. the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned. L-20901 (August 31. Andres. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.R. these were P. Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him. No. Santos denied the spouses’ ownership. 46a. creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). the daughter of the Duata spouses. Art. The lot was purchased by Santos. HELD: No.203 Erectors. vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase. 17. 46e FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. 46c. private respondent Duata. 797 was passed.O. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessitated. 274 G. Inc. 1996) Chapter IX. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. the title was issued in Santos’s name. National Labor Relations Commission. another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. 46e . The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. When private respondent returned to the Philippines. 134 FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. in this case. intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. in executing the said private document. 37. 37. Upon appeal. and in order to secure the payment of the loan. Page 377. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. Footnote No. v. instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. LATIN MAXIM: 35. Hon. claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. 140 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. 21. Duata and the Court of Appeals Case No.D. Months after.

issued E. 150 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ortigas & Co. they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law. The latter refused to comply. It was then attacked of its validity. Footnote No. Case No. 174. No. Then by virtue of E. good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Macapagal. Page 381.O. 5 and 6. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres. Footnote No. contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.O. 27. and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant. No. as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. 5 and 6. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Quezon v.204 Municipality of San Narciso. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991. the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec.O. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. Page 312. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. 5 and 6. to be devoted to banking purposes.O. 1994) Chapter IX. 1979) Chapter VIII. 133 FACTS: President C. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health. Quezon. safety. 442(d) of RA 7160. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. and any attempt to apply Sec. 182 G. is also curative statute. defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. v. in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. Sr. petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E. prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Feati Bank & Trust Case No. L-24670 (December 14. Sec.R. Resolution No. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 46e . among others. 6c FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone. HELD: Yes. 103702 (December 6. 353. Garcia.R. Mendez. 2 of RA 1515. creating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec. 193 G. ISSUE: W/N the E. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 27. peace. LATIN MAXIM: 46e. issued by President D.

LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 9c . 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. No. before the case was decided. 237 G. which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. As the statute shortened the period of action accrued. Page 387. claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims. Moreover. Page 372. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. 7-A of C. ISSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 1965) Chapter IX.R. 3 FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. 144. Thus. Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo. 144. Manuel Barredo passed away. 1216. Court of Industrial Relations Case No. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. 35 G.A. L-46095 (November 23. PNB filed a case against all 4 signatories. the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. Art. it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from their accrual. Asuncion Case No. Footnote No. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued.205 Billones v. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors. or all”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. 1977) Chapter X. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. the choice is left up to PNB to decide. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Footnote No. 6. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M. No. L-17566 (July 30. In this case. However.A. 46e FACTS: On January 1963. HELD: It would have applied. To require PNB to go against the estate would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. or some. as amended by RA 1993. Sec. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased debtor. 6. provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed.R. increase of modify substantive rights. By May. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process. No. No. HELD: No. 7-A of C. otherwise it shall be barred forever. the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish.

it must be taken as it is.R. Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. During liquidation. 968. However. In the past. the former prevails. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial.D. However. 8 of Act 4054. 49 FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.D. 9a. 7 G. Act 4054 was amended by RA 34. No. Petitioner then filed for probation alleging P. Because of this. Ongsiako insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect.R. Where the law is clear and unambiguous. L-1867 (April 8.D. laws concerning this issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore. No. the petition was denied because P.D. later that same year. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits should be followed. 79010 (May 23. 1990 was promulgated after P. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren’t.206 Ongsiako v. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect. Because P. Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of Sec. 43. This act provided that the palay would be divided equally by the 2 parties. 25a. 7a.D. People Case No. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. HELD: Yes. 49 . 7b. 6b. it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that “this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants… The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating. producing retroactive effect. 1990 had repealed P. Moreover. 36a. 1950) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Amandy v. 1988) FACTS: In 1946. HELD: No. 90 G.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a. no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy’s petition for probation. he was given a sentence of six years and 1 day (the minimum time for his offense). 22a.6 grams of marijuana. 968. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been “sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years” are excluded from the benefits of the Probation Law. Gamboa Case No. 968.

Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing. 115213 (December 19. private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7.R. L-16011 (July 26.D. Sec. Footnote No.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case.0000. LATIN MAXIM: 11. 197 G. while admitting indebtedness. 9a.R. pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising.227. the sum of P57. Private respondents in their Answer. 1995) Chapter X. Nevertheless. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. 32. 28 FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office.D. they failed to reach an amicable settlement. 114 of Act 496. 36b . 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. 5b. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sec. Page 390. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec.55.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. and (2) another for P12. No. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Diu v. Page 391.862. 1960) Chapter X. No. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. ISSUE: 1. but private respondents failed to appear. Court of Appeals Case No. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. 38b FACTS: On several occasions. 2. When the parties met. of the latter law. It must be noted that P. 1508. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC. 96 G. otherwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners.207 Parras v. Land Registration Commission Case No. Footnote No. otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". W/N petitioner can be exempted. LATIN MAXIM: 4. 410(b) and 412 respectively.

The second sentence of Art. 4 of Act No. 166 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mecano v. 37. Page 395. 45 FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. 103982 (December 11. two from the legislative and one from the executive.208 Government v. 1921. three members of the government appeared.R. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 2. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. 173 of the Labor Code. and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. However. as amended by Sec. 2705. on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. 2822. it ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. 1927) Chapter I. Commission on Audit Case No.R. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. 176 G. expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. however. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Footnote No. 699 of the RAC … whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government. 1990. 30a. as amended. L-26979 (April 1. HELD: Petition was granted. 2 of Act No. W/N Sec. 38b. Footnote No. Sec. as amended by P. No. However. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7.D. 1992) Chapter X. 49 . ISSUE: 1. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine Government. the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. No. as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal. 38b FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 119 G. Springer Case No. is unconstitutional and void. Page 38. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company.” LATIN MAXIM: 30a. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. During the election of directors. 32. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareholders. 9a.

Likewise. 49 FACTS: The petitioner. 2614. 2614 was not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Stanley Case No. 1312 of the Administrative Code. 1917) FACTS: The accused. one Chan Sam. The Philippine Legislature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs. 33281 (March 31. Concepcion and Lee Voo Case No. any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art.R. 8. 174 G. Act No. The converse proposition equally holds true. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal. Sec. No 12330 (January 25. of the Penal Code. 1048 of the Administrative Code. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. No. par. none is presumed to be intended. 50 . The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor’s reports. sought to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement. when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together. It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. 49. which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel.209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. 2614 being specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. In issuing the order of release the respondent judge relied upon Art. a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. 9c. 4. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Art. 20 G.R. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict between Act No. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ynchausti & Co v. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. On the other hand. this should be done. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be committed to an asylum. Thus.

and object of both. and in the light of the reason. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No.R. 44 G. Tantoco Case No. 1987) FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture.210 U. R. Laya Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The Education Act of 1982. 25 valid. 451. 49 FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in Sec. The Government appealed. entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232. LATIN MAXIM: 4. which was granted to them.D. HELD: That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. 25. 3(a) of P. relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. Then Minister of Education Jaime C. 39b .S.D. P. v. et al. Under P. and thereafter. Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations. However. 164 G. purpose. there was a repeal. Whether or not an Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by an examination of both statutes.D. v. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium.D. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school. 451. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that Act No. Hence. 70832 (December 18. four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P. No. No. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. 1916) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fabros. HELD: Yes. which the Court thereby lifted. 451. while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. where Sec. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the United States Congress. 451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisions relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P.D. under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). 11338 (August 15.

L-24022 (March 3. the former from their commencement. sell and encumber her properties situated in the Philippines. refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. 61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Brias de Coya v. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of the insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. It was approved. 39a FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. The two laws. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. Inc. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors. wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice. thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. In order to effect a repeal by implication. At this. 1931) FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. No.R. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. 16 G. is legal and valid.211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 1965) Chapter X. 39a . Feliciano Case No. Tan Lua. No. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has been made. which was registered with a Torrens title.R. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. v. Footnote No. series of 1964. the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law. 127 G. thru a government agency which the President may designate. et al. according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property. Case No. The assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land Registration Act. hence there was no repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. 30756 (September 22. 70. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties. and this is certified by the National Economic Council. both such proceedings and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds. against which they may enforce their credits. although with a common objective. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter. she appointed her son to manage. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. Page 399. the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration.

Respondent. 62 FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. There was.R. L-23894. Petitioner. 1974) Chapter X. Endaya Case No. basing his action. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. series of 1968. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code. 1971) Chapter X. Respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. 50 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. LATIN MAXIM: 1.96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jalandoni vs.212 Villegas vs. 314 G. Reyes. RA 5185.R. he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828. Petitioner. HELD: No. and not by Sec. general in character as to its terms and application. A subsequent statute. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. 9. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. disapproved the appointment. a 1908 decision. 9. ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. (January 24. appointed Manuel D. a negative response. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Mayor of the City of Manila. Footnote No. In an Administrative Order. 137 G. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. Respondent still tried the case. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice. as noted. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. HELD: No. to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Sec. Sec. L-31711. Subido Case No. As is clear from his well-written memorandum. No. (the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense). saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. 49 . During the hearing of the libel case Cruz. No. was thus repealed by implication. through counsel manifested in open court that under Art. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance. Page 411. 360 of the Revised Penal Code. (September 30. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. 4 of the Decentralization Law. directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer. 1963. the provisions of Art.

R. using RA 1435 as basis. 111 G. Footnote No. The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation. 2710 should be applied. sooner or later. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by subsequent statutes. 436 and 711.R.D. While we generally do not favor repeal by implication. It is inevitable that. The Court of Tax Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P. 9 FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974. Negative statutes are mandatory. and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions.64 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Valdez v. representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils. 1920) Chapter X.33. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide application. No.303. Page 400. ISSUE: W/N Act No. HELD: Act No. respectively. it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistency.213 CIR vs. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the miners because they are not directly convenienced. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. 49 . 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachronism. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subsidize the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit. for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. Footnote No. Tuazon Case No. when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws. Page 388. 2710. the later must be given effect.978. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations as a mining concessionaire. The respondent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery. 231.50 and P424. Case No. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon conviction. 79 G. Nos. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause. LATIN MAXIM: 49 FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife. HELD: Yes. 83583-84 September 30. Act No. L-14957 (March 16. then the proviso in Sec. 2710 should be applied in the case. 1991 Chapter X. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation.

In 1920.214 Estate of Mota v. Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. 13 of G. 49 . 42 G. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission. were illegal and void. LATIN MAXIM: 1 FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 4. Concepcion Case No. No. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. ISSUE: 1. so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Sec. Castro.R. vs. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the Philippines. HELD: 1. but it is not conclusive on the courts. The court however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is. much less the archipelago. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run throughout the province. the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish law.R. L-2340 (December 21. a justice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. On the last sale. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. L-34581 (March 31. 155 G. only part of the price was paid. 1932) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Torrente v. wherever he may be in the Philippines. 1905) FACTS: In 1919. Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. In December of the same year. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting parties. 58. Due to contrary provisions. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. According to Standard Oil Co. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. No.O. 2. Grove Case No. discharging the petitioner from detention. 2. it is entitled to respectful consideration. No.

Sec. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. et. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the two. Also. Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute. Footnote No. tenants of Fernando. the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective. 7c. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. himself an aspirant for the office. 37. which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. 1976) Chapter IV. The section also admitted no exception. 30a. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque. 43 FACTS: Almuete. Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution. 32. HELD: The vote was indecisive. 200 G. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. 49 Minor Five: 6c. Though the five were a minority. Bohol. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. filed for Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Sec. No. L-26551 (February 27. Footnote No.215 Pamil v. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. 61 FACTS: Respondent Fr. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. No. The petitioner. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. Seven believed Sec. Page 33. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant’s act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. No such repugnance is discernible. 195 G. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her consent. 1978) Chapter I. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a.R. hence it was presumed valid. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense. al. The accused. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. therefore there can be none. 148 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. HELD: Sec. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The ALRC suspended the ATL. L-34854 (November 20. the supreme law. 2175 was no longer operative. 47. ISSUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. Almuete Case No. Teleron Case No. Page 142.R. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. 10. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. there was no longer any law punishing the act. 49 . 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. 7a.

A general affirmative act will not be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were. Civil Aeronautics Board Case No. 38b . LATIN MAXIM: 37. 226. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2407 of the Administrative Code. No. Furthermore.R. L-32979-81 (February 29. 3422 repealed Sec. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. Municipality of Zamboanga Case No. No. LATIN MAXIM: 37. it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressly repealing Sec. Under RA 776. If the legislature intended its repeal. L-33318 (December 20. No. 148 G. 3422. 50 FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. v. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. implied repeal of statutes is not favored. The defendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. 1972) FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 146. 2625(d) of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment of Act No. under both statutes. 13(a) and 14 of C. On the other hand. HELD: Authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC.216 Smith Bell & Co. joint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677.A.R. the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual. 71 G. jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lechoco v. 2625(d) the Administrative Code.

It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other body. 38b. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove. L-24012 & L. 1965) FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec.217 Villegas v.R. 171 G.R. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. instead of to the President. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Subido. 5a. 4 of the Decentralization Act be given effect. 172 G. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplinary cases. Furthermore. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled. petitioner ignored the provision that the City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act. 37 FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. L-29827 (March 31. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Villegas v. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Enrile Case No. RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law. 50 . 1973) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villegas v. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. No. which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner. HELD: No. Subido Case No.24040 (August 9. No. the construction will be against such repeal. suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila.

11002 (January 17. unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. having died before the testator so as to pass to the heirs. Palacio Case No. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy. Sec. 2238 provides no penalty thus. Act No. v.” ISSUE: W/N Act No. Footnote No. 87 of Act No. Nacianceno Case No. HELD: Yes.R. Page 411. Act No. No. 82 continues in force. 82. then Sec. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. Footnote No. 301 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “When a devise or a legacy is made to a child… and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator.R. 77 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Marin v. 82. 5939 (March 29. No. 18 that states “all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed. The petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 1916) Chapter X. 82 because of the clause in Sec. Repeals by implication are not favored.218 U. leaving issues… such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done… unless a different disposition is required by law. 11 . but the testatrix did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. He posits that Act No. 171 G. Page 406. The construction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. 87 of Act No. 1911) Chapter X. 758 would have no value and might as well have never been written which is an absurd interpretation. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time.” The executor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein. 38b FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix. 100 FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec.S. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act No. 2238 repeals by implication Act No.

The allegation that P. Averia Case No.O. the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner. 1040. It is specifically stated under E. 1040 & 1012.O. 309 G. 20c. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. 2. it is the exercise of “administrative control and supervision” over units of the INP that was transferred to the President. 1012 that it is only the “operational supervision and direction” over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal government. 1966) Chapter X. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Anacorita. Marges. the alleged boat owner. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than just the interest of a public official. ISSUE: 3. No. 1040 is inaccurate. An altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. The fishing boat therein was transferred to the Provincial Sheriff.O.” shot Lozano during the performance of duty. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. the Acting Collector of Customs. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon.D. Yes. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 4. 194 G. “with deliberate intent and with intent to kill. On the same day. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act. HELD: Yes. It has also caught the Supreme Court’s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the boat owner. Footnote No. Footnote No.R. . 37 FACTS: Petitioner. 27. Page 412. No. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clear and precise provision of E. filed a Civil Case for replevin alleging that the boat was stolen.R. 105 FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pacis v. 1988) Chapter X. Averia.O.D. Petitioner contends that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P. 20c. Philippine Constabulary Case No. 49 W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat. L-22526 (November 29. commenced a seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. HELD: 1. Page 413. 1850 was repealed by E. Under E. Chief. L-71855 (January 20. No.219 Velunta v.

Art.M. San Andres Development Corporation. any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding… such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid. Footnote No. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. 123 G. Two years after. Page 414. he cannot be permitted to falsify it. Hence. thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wages. intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. as mortgage-creditor. appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. 80593 (December 18.220 Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines Case No. and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent. this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the employer. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compromise. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R. 108 FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Radio Inc.R. Case No. The petitioner herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation. ISSUE: W/N Herman’s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement. et al. act or omission. No.) agreed to merge. 49 . Footnote No. 110 of the Labor Code provides for “worker preference in case of bankruptcy”. 1989) Chapter X. HELD: Yes. it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of the traffic department. Page 414. 107 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. by his own declaration. 239 G. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. 1815 of the Civil Code. It specifically states that “In the event of bankruptcy… of an employer’s business. ISSUE: W/N Art. 26802 (July 15. it mentions that whenever a party has. Cruz. Sec. In Sec. and Radio Corp. AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T. 49 FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its remaining employees. The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay.” LATIN MAXIM: 6a. No. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later expression of legislative will than Art. AMEX did not appeal but PNB. 1927) Chapter X.

Petitioner contends that P. Commission on Elections Case No. The deletion in P.D.A. which shall be determined by law. 127116 (April 8. P. 2. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. 1959. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the Supreme Court in Paras v. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from income taxation. including all the retirement benefits given to officials and employees of private firms. 85 G. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposits previously given by P. HELD: Yes.221 David v. 5a.D. except barangay officials. The COMELEC’s basis is R. 95022 (March 23. W/N there was a violation of Art. Sec.A. shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. from income tax. R. No. 10. 10. ‘The term of office of elective local officials. Footnote No.A. 105 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. No. 1959 is a general law. 1992) Chapter VII. 9a. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. 73 G. 8 of the Constitution provides that. Also in Villegas v.D. He also contends that there is a violation of Art.R. 10. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983. 20a. Soon after. 2. 8 of the Constitution. hence. should be the one followed. No. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA 4917. 6679. Furthermore. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P. Page 300. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can’t be deemed to be applicable to the employees’ trusts.D. Art. 43.R. HELD: 1. 49 FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income.D. 8 of the Constitution. it can’t repeal a specific provision impliedly. What the term of office of barangay officials is.D. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan. the same having been scheduled in May 1997”. 50 . Subido. R. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in character can’t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. Court of Appeals Case No. ISSUE: 1. Page 413. Footnote No. such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law. Sec. 81 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. 1997) Chapter X. P. and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax.

D. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this court. LATIN MAXIM: 37. No. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. opining that P. After presenting the evidence.R. A month after. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265. a law will always be presumed valid. notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constitution. 13 of the 1987 Constitution. 114307 (July 8. 118 G. respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. ISSUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. in relation to Sec. The said resolution likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action taken by PAL. 108 G.D. National Labor Relations Commission Case No.” ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject criminal case. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested. which provide that. Leachon. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. 50 FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. Case No. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Airlines Inc. the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case. the prosecution rested the cases. v. Thereafter. 34 of RA 265. as amended by CB Circular 383. HELD: Yes. P. 1998) FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P. No. 9 and 10 of Art. Three years and six months after his suspension. 13b . Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality.R. 772 was still effective.222 People v. respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Upon his reinstatement. as amended. the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the RTC presided over by respondent judge. At the time the order was issued by respondent judge. Jr. after which period. If the suspension is otherwise extended. the employee must be reinstated to his former position. the respondent judge dismissed the case again. PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. HELD: Yes.D. 108725-26 (September 25. 772.

19. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction – on the basis of the Judiciary Act – and not the Bureau of Customs. Villanueva. No provision in P. RA 1937 and 1125. the Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment. heat and power system in Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan. demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P. provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. 1967) FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247.D. on the other hand. Inc. Opol. L-24037 (April 27. Case No. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws. 127 G. however. and 6020 to install. 3570. Lantin Case No. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company. However. 3570 and 6020. special laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. operate and maintain an electric light.223 Province of Misamis Oriental v.R. vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms. HELD: No. The Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental. Customs took custody of the shipment. In case of conflict. 45355 (January 12.D. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of “all taxes of whatever authority” except 3% tax on its gross earnings. Also. 231) and pursuant thereto. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax.R. 50 FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. 31 G. and Jasaan. No. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Joya v. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. No.

was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120. When a general and a special law are in conflict. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . whereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila. Joya Case No. 1956) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots. the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code. demolished the houses of the six petitioners in this class suit. the City Engineer of Manila. under RA 409. Joya as administrator. Aquino Case No. The special law must prevail. argues that RA 409. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition. grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. His widow. No.R. L-8500 (February 27.R. The Civil Code is a general law. it is the district health officer who should remove public nuisances. while Act 1120 is a special law. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. because their houses were “public nuisances” built on public streets and river beds. which are contrary to the Civil Code. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited. 701 and 702. 16. the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. L-28067 (March 10. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120’s full conveyance of the property to the widow. 147 G. herein petitioner. and transmission of friar lands. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines.224 Arayata v. HELD: The City Engineer. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances. 1928) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sitchon. Respondent. Sec. the latter prevails. has jurisdiction. 9 G. on the other hand. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. disposition. Art. and he started paying the Government for such. v. No. et al. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: Respondent Aquino. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands.

Art. Tormo. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . which is more specific. who became mentally incapacitated. Relying on Art. 2.R.. being the guardian. died. 16. referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children.. v. L-23678 (June 6. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law). ISSUE: Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. Bellis Case No. which still subsists. filed a motion. 14 G. 1930) FACTS: Amos Bellis. Philippine Trust Co. a citizen of Texas USA. in the inventory of her property. HELD: 1. which was later granted by the Court. which did not provide for legitimes. It is thus evident that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals. 32280 (March 24. The defendant. 123 G. and 2) the Civil Code. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. 1967) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Trust Co. Subsequently. praying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belonging to his ward.R. said half of the conjugal property. her undivided half of the conjugal property. Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife. Macuan Case No. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children. HELD: Texas Law should apply. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. 9c FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F. which is claimed to be conjugal property. 16. A special guardian. et. 1039 provides that the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent.225 Bellis v. Tormo. M. No. was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wife’s property. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership. Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. in intestate or testamentary successions. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Procedure. No. par. As further indication of this intent. Thus. which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated. No. cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same. After the execution of the decedent’s will. which is general in character. and Art. the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements. Art. ISSUE: 1. 2. all surnamed Bellis. al. par 2.

Art. 115 FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of P92. for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935 Constitution. Court of Tax Appeal Case No. barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages. Ltd. 153 G.R. 44007 (March 20. No. claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.R. and thus. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract.226 Tan Liao v. 50 . Case No. it has already prescribed. the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and the corporation. 50 FACTS: Private respondent. No. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal effect. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade. the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of the goods. HELD: No. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with Sec. Page 415. the former being a special act while the latter is a law of general application. with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York. Footnote No. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner’s assessment without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. which included a tax exemption from the payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on its real property. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circumstances.00. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American President Lines. The legislative franchise was valid. a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise. pursuant to RA 808.755. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. USA to the port of Manila. and thereby. L-7280 (January 20. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of the goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases. 1991) Chapter X. the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. 75 G. 8. HELD: Yes.

HELD: No. 242 must yield to P. 1991) Chapter X.D. 50 . v. 150 G. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces.D. a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law. No. claims and controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez. 87 G. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes. Regardless of their date of passage. granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes whereas P. The City Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council.R.227 NPVC v. Footnote No. Presiding Judge RTC Br. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action.D. Page 415. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies of the government including GOCC’s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power. LATIN MAXIM: 37. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city.R. the City Budget of Manila questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. 87119 (April 16. Also. Civil Service Commission Case No. On the other hand respondent invokes P. Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. 116 FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. HELD: Yes. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. Jr. 38b. However. Petitioner contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case pursuant to P. XXV Case No.D. 72477 (October 16. since repeals by implication are not favored. P. No.

50 HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 36d. a junior typist civil service eligible. Pascual. Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts. 50. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed.A. 1998) FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner. 110 G. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. Page 277. the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. When vouchers were submitted to the mayor. Lastly. However. there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court. Municipal Trial.R. 122068 (July 8. 9a. Case No. . 118 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel. the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor. 38. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 80 G. who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. No. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor. 1961) Chapter VI. No. the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. His reason was RA 1551 has repealed Sec. the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC. otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. which is a law of special nature. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R. 32. Also. FACTS: Petitioner. Nueva Ecija.R. Footnote No.228 Manzano v. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. L-16950 (December 22. et al. which is claimed to have repealed Sec. HELD: No. RA 1551 however. 75 of RA 926. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondent’s acceptance of the case for the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Sec. he did not want to approve them. Valera Garcia v.

4986. et al. Ramirez Case No. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila.R. 4986 is FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No.” ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional. RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. Moreover. fees or other charges” in particular. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.A. and d) the ordinance would violate P.” Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 7522. Footnote No. 28 G. 50 . 11a. the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. Footnote No. 7a.R. 17. L-23305 (June 30.D. and null and void. “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. 40b. No. 126 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Bagatsing v. City of Manila. the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic. 11a. ultra vires. 83 FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. 548 and the Public Service Law. Page 420. 50 of Ordinance No. 49. illegal. b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes. Case No. the Local Tax Code controls. 1966) Chapter X. and For Other Purposes. No. Page 268. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. No. 1976) Chapter VI.229 Lagman v. 49. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. In regard therefore. HELD: No. entitled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila. c) Sec. 141 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts. L-41631 (December 17.

9. 3. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. That which was originally void. sed ita lex scripta est. Chapter III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Index animi sermo est. Optimus interpres rerum usus. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION 2. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 8. The best interpreter of the law is usage. What is good and equal is the law of laws. In default of the law. It is exceedingly hard. Stare decisis et non quieta movere.230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Latin Maxims Chapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. Regula pro lege. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate. . Ratio legis est anima legis. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. Hoc quidem perquam durum est. Common error sometimes passes as current law. but so the law is written. Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO. si deficit lex. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. The written word endures. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. Law is the art of equity. Equity never acts in contravention of the law. Verba legis non est recedendum. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. the maxim rules. 5. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. B. OR DEPARTURE FROM. 7. Littera scripta manet. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. Animus hominis est anima scripti. Speech is the index of intention. Dura lex sed lex. When the language of the law is clear. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum. The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Jus ars boni et aequi. The intention of the party is the soul. Things thus standing. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. does not by lapse of time become valid. no explanation is required. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. 4. Contemporary construction is strongest in law. The law may be harsh but it is the law. Communis error facit jus.

si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. Cessante rationi legis. quod voluntas eraum conservetur. False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. Surplusagium non nocet. Lex injusta non est lex. so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Verba intentioni. Nobody is above the law. inest haec exception. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man’s work. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. Laws are to be construed liberally. Benignus leges interpretandae sunt. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus. Concerning similars. Where there is ambiguity. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent. ibi est eadem legis disposition. the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ratio autem generalia. Quando verba statute sunt speciali. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur. 17. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. 14. An unjust law is not a law. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. Falsa demostratio non nocet. The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. 11. cum de corpore constat. 13. When the words used in a statute are special. or analogy. the law itself ceases.231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. Like reason doth make like law. exemption from rigid application of law is implied. there is the same law 12. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. prevails in law. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. . When the reason of the law ceases. ) 16. Where anything is granted generally. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. An argument drawn from a similar case. De similibus idem est judicium. that nothing shall be contrary to law and right. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ubi eadem est ratio. debent inservice. Fiat justitia. 10. Let right be done. statum generaliter est intelligendum. That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. ruat coelum . The letter kills but the spirit gives life. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat. and not the intent to the words. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. Qui haret in littera haret in cortice. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Legis construction non facit injuriam. Where there is the same reason. though the heavens fall. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. cessat et ipsa lex. the judgment is the same. 15. No power must be above the law. it should be read as the general expression. Nemo est supra legis. non e contra. but the purpose of the law is general.

19. 29. Where the law does not distinguish. ibi jus nullum. When jurisdiction is given. B. The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice. Summum jus. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. Ex necessitate legis. Extreme law is often extreme wrong. In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis. IMPLICATIONS 20. there is a remedy for violation thereof. summa injuria. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. simper inest et minus. Noscitur a sociis. Of things dissimilar. Ejesdem generis. Jus summum saepe. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. 26. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo. 27. the rule is dissimilar. Ubi jus incertum. Ex dolo malo non oritur action. all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given. Of the same kind or specie. ibi remedium. Verba artis ex arte. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an impossibility. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. be done directly cannot be done indirectly. In eo quod plus sit. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit. 22. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. there is no right. si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur. Cui jurisdiction data est. General words should be understood in their general sense. summa est militia. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. C. Where there is a right. talis intellectus preferendus est. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 23. by law. The greater includes the lesser. Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum. By the necessary implication of law. 21. the courts should not distinguish. An action does not arise from fraud. Where the law is uncertain. prohibetur et per obliquum. Where the parties are equally at fault. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. IN GENERAL 24. the position of the defending party is the better one. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. 25. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. Verba mere aequivoca. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. What cannot. A general statement is understood in its general sense. Ubi jus. A thing is known by its associates. .232 18. The law does not intend the impossible. Chapter V – INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according to their common and ordinary sense. A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.

Referring each to each. Mutatis mutandis. Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together. Reddendo singular singulis. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. nisi tota lege inspecta. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. Chapter VI – STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A person. 34. 39. With the necessary changes.Times have changed and laws have changed with them. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. . A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule. 32. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.233 30. . Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation.Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis. 31. B. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Injustum est. PROVISOS. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. 33. 37. or let each be put in its proper place. Argumentum a contrario. Of the same matter. thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by itself. C. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. . Pari materia.

potior est in jure. There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Chapter IX – PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES A. Potior est in tempore. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chapter VIII – MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. An act done by me against my will is not my act. Laws should be construed as prospective. Salus populi est suprema lex. Lex prospicit. nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. The law provides for the future. B.234 Chapter VII – STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47. The voice of the people is the supreme law. nulla poena sine lege. odiosa restringenda. for Janus has really no place in the laws. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. There is no crime without a penalty. not those who slumber on their rights. The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. 44.A new statute should affect the future. judex de praeterito. et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in legibus. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. non ad facta praeterita revocari. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. non respicit. there is no penalty without a law. . Strictissimi juris. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. B. IN GENERAL 40. not backward. Leges quae retrospciunt. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. not the past.Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received. . not retrospective. 48. The law looks forward. the judge for the past. He who is first in time is preferred in right. The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending. Renunciation cannot be presumed. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. Favorabilia sunt amplianda. Follow the law strictly. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis. 43. Nullum tempus occurit regi. Renunciatio non praesumitur. The law aids the vigilant. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. Nullum crimen sine poena. . 42. IN GENERAL 46. Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Lex de futuro. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.

When matters are obscure. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. REVISION. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often happens. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. aut quod plerumque fieri solet. The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red). A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato.235 Chapter X – AMENDMENT. REPEAL 49. 50. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur. BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur. Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. De minimis non curat lex. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. . Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. The law does not concern itself with trifling matters. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice. and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. Ignorance of the law excuses no one.

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