2008 Political Law and Public International Law

Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
POLITICAL LAW
That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the
governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the
inhabitants of its territory.
Scope/Divisions of Political Law:
1. Constitutional Law—the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between
authority as represented by the three inherent powers of the state and liberty as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
2. Administrative Law-- That branch of public law which fixes the organization,
determines the competence of administrative authorities who executes the law,
and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his right.
3. Law on Municipal Corporations
4. Law of Public Officers
5. Elections Law
Basis:
1. 1987 Constitution
2. 1973 and 1935 Constitutions
3. Organic laws made to apply to the Philippines—
a. Philippine Bill of 1902
b. Jones Law of 1916
c. Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934
4. Statutes, executive orders and decrees, and judicial decisions
5. US Constitution
Constitution Statute
·legislation direct from the people;
·states general principles;
·intended not merely to meet existing
conditions;
·it is the fundamental law of the State
·legislation from the people’s representative;
·provides the details of the subject matter of
which it treats;
·intended primarily to meet existing conditions
only;
·it conforms to the Constitution
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Constitution—it is the document which serves as the fundamental law of the State; that
body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the power of sovereignty are
habitually exercised.
That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the
fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by
which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.
It is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be
valid, however noble its intention, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution
must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Right or wrong, the
Constitution must be upheld as long as the sovereign people have not changed it.
Classification:
1. Written or unwritten
Written Unwritten
-one whose precepts are embodied in one
document or set of documents
-consists of rules which have not been
integrated into a single, concrete form but
are scattered in various sources
Examples: a. statutes of fundamental
character;
b. judicial decisions;
c. commentaries of publicists;
d. customs and traditions;
e. certain common law principles
2. Enacted (conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative)
Enacted (conventional) Evolved (Cumulative)
-formally struck off at a definite time and
place following a conscious or deliberate
effort taken by a constituent body or ruler
-the result of political evolution, not
inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather than by any
systematic method
3. Rigid or Flexible
Rigid Flexible
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-one that can be amended only by a formal
and usually difficult process
-one that can be changed by ordinary
legislation
The Philippine Constitution is written, conventional and rigid. It is embodied in
one document and can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.
Interpretation:
1. Verba Legis—whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
2. When there is Ambiguity—ratio legis et anima--A doubtful provision shall be
examined in the light of the history of the times and the conditions and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. (Civil Liberties Union
vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317)
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat—the Constitution has to be interpreted as a
whole. (Francisco vs. HR, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available—construe the Constitution from what “appears upon its face”. The proper
interpretation, therefore, depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.
In case of doubt, the provision should be considered as self-executing;
mandatory rather than directory; and prospective rather than retroactive.
Self-executing provision—one which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected.
Essential Qualities of the Written Constitution:
1. Broad;
2. Brief; and
3. Definite.
Essential parts of a good written Constitution:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
a. Constitution of Liberty —sets forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the
citizens and imposes limitations on the powers of the government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of those rights. e.g. Bill of Rights
b. Constitution of Government —outlines the organization of the government,
enumerates its powers, lays down certain rules relative to its administration and
defines the electorate. e.g. Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments,
Constitutional Commissions
c. Constitution of Sovereignty —the provisions pointing out the mode or procedure
in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought
about. e.g. Art. XVII-Amendments or Revisions
Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality:
2 Views:
a. ORTHODOX VIEW—
i. an unconstitutional act is not a law;
ii. it confers no rights;
iii. it imposes no duties;
iv. it affords no protection;
v. it creates no office;
vi. it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all.
b. MODERN VIEW—Courts simply refuse to recognize the law and determine
the rights of the parties as if the statute had no existence. Certain legal effects
of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Thus, a public officer who implemented an unconstitutional law prior to the
declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be held liable (Ynot vs. IAC).
Partial Unconstitutionality
Requisites:
a. The legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by
the presence of a separability clause in the law—INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE; and
b. The valid portion can stand independently as law—INDEPENDENCE OF
THE PROVISIONS.
PREAMBLE
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
WE, THE SOVEREIGN FILIPINO PEOPLE, IMPLORING THE AID OF ALMIGHTY
GOD,
IN ORDER TO BUILD A JUST AND HUMANE SOCIETY AND ESTABLISH
A GOVERNMENT THAT SHALL EMBODY OUR IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS,
PROMOTE THE COMMON GOOD, CONSERVE AND DEVELOP OUR PATRIMONY,
AND SECURE TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY THE BLESSINGS OF
INDEPENDENCE
AND DEMOCRACY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW AND A REGIME OF
TRUTH, JUSTICE, FREEDOM, LOVE, EQUALITY, AND PEACE,
DO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE THIS CONSTITUTION.
The Preamble is not a source of power or right for any department of
government. It sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. It bears
witness to the fact that the Constitution is the manifestation of the sovereign will of the
Filipino people.
The identification of the Filipino people as the author of the constitution calls
attention to an important principle: that the document is not just the work of
representatives of the people but of the people themselves who put their mark approval
by ratifying it in a plebiscite.
1. It does not confer rights nor impose duties.
2. Indicates authorship of the Constitution; enumerates the primary aims and
aspirations of the framers; and serves as an aid in the construction of the
Constitution.
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves,
and other submarines areas. The waters around, between and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part
of the internal waters of the Philippines.”
Two (2) Parts of the National Territory:
1. The Philippine archipelago with all the islands and waters embraced therein; and
2. All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
- Do you consider the Spratlys Group of Islands as part of Philippine
Archipelago? ESpratlys Group of Islands is not part of the Philippine
Archipelago because it is too far away from the three main islands of the
Philippines. It is found, geographically, almost in the middle of the South China
Sea. It is not part of the Philippine Archipelago. Historically, when we talk about
Philippine Archipelago, we refer to those islands and waters that were ceded by
the Spain to the United States by virtue of Treaty of Paris in 1898. And that did
not include the Spratlys Group of Islands yet. Under the treaty, the islands that
were ceded by Spain were identified—the main islands—Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. Clearly, it did not include the Spratlys Group of Islands.
Spratlys Group of Islands was only discovered sometime in the 1950’s by a
Filipino, Tomas Cloma. The latter waived his rights over the islands in favor of the
Philippine Government. In effect, the government stepped into the shoes of the
discoverer. By then President Marcos, what he did the moment Tomas Cloma waived
his rights over the Spratlys Group of Islands, is to have the islands immediately
occupied by Philippine troops. He then issued PD 1596, constituting the Spratlys Group
of Islands as a regular municipality claiming it the Municipality of Kalayaan placing it
under the Province of Palawan. And then he had the elections immediately held in the
islands so from that time on until now, we continue to hold elections there. The
Philippine exercises not only jurisdiction but also sovereignty over the Spratlys Group of
Islands, yet it is not part of the Philippine Archipelago. Geographically, it is too far away
from the Philippine Archipelago.
On May 20, 1980, the Philippines registered its claim with the UN Secretariat.
The Philippine claim to the islands is justified by reason of history, indispensable need,
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
and effective occupation and control. Thus, in accordance with the international law, the
Spratlys Group of islands is subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines.
-Do you consider the Spratlys group of Islands as part of our National Territory?
EYes. Article I of the Constitution provides: “The national territory comprises the
Philippine archipelago, x x x, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, x x x.” The Spratlys Group of islands falls under the second
phrase “and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction”. It is part of our national territory because Philippines exercise sovereignty
(through election of public officials) over Spratlys Group of Islands.
-What was the basis of the Philippines’ claim over the Spratlys?
¦Through discovery of Tomas Cloma and occupation
Modes of acquiring territories:
1. Discovery and Occupation—which are terra nullius (land belonging to no one)
Doctrine of Effective Occupation—discovery alone is not enough. Mere discovery gives
only an inchoate right to the discoverer. For title to finally vest, discovery must be followed by
effective occupation in a reasonable time and attestation of the same.
2. Cession by Treaty. Examples are Treaty of Paris, treaty between France and US
ceding Louisiana to the latter and treaty between Russia and US ceding Alaska to
the latter;
3. Prescription—which is a concept under the Civil Code. Territory may also be
acquired through continuous and uninterrupted possession over a long period of
time. However, in international law, there is no rule of thumb as to the length of time
for acquisition of territory through prescription. In this connection, consider the
Grotius Doctrine of immemorial prescription, which speaks of uninterrupted
possession going beyond memory.
4. Conquest or Subjugation (conquistadores)—this is no longer recognized,
inasmuch as the UN Charter prohibits resort to threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state; and
5. Accretion—another concept in the Civil Code. It is the increase in the land area of
the State, either through natural means, or artificially, through human labor.
Philippine Archipelago: G _
1. Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898—Cession of the Philippine Islands by
Spain to the United States;
2. Treaty between Spain and US at Washington, November 7, 1900—inclusion
of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibuto;
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Treaty between US and GB, January 2, 1930—inclusion of Turtle and
Mangsee Islands.
Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction:
1. Batanes—(1935 Constitution);
2. Those contemplated under Article I, 1973 Constitution—belonging to the
Philippines by historic right or legal title;
3. PD 1596, June 11, 1978-- constituting the Spratly’s Group of Islands as a
regular municipality claiming it the Municipality of Kalayaan, placing it under
the Province of Palawan.
“xxx The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.”
-This second sentence of Article I is not the Archipelago Doctrine. This is only
our restatement/reaffirmation of our adherence to the Archipelago Doctrine
simply because we are an archipelago consisting of 7,107 islands. It is essential
for our national survival that we adhere to the archipelago principle.
Archipelago Doctrine—merely emphasizes the unity of lands and waters. It is a body
of waters interconnected with other natural features. Under the United Nation
Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), it consists of drawing imaginary baseline
connecting the outermost islands of the archipelago in which all waters, islands is
considered as one integrated whole. An archipelago is defined as group of islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that
such islands, waters and natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economical
and political entity, or which historically been regarded as such.
Correlate this doctrine to right of innocent of passage, right of arrival under stress
and UNCLOS requiring the designation of archipelagic seaways so that foreign vessels
may pas through an archipelago.
2 Kinds of Archipelago:
1. Coastal Archipelago—situated close to a mainland and may be considered a
part thereof.
2. Mid-Ocean Archipelago—situated in the ocean at such distance from the
coasts of firm land. The Philippines is classified as mid-ocean archipelago just
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
like Indonesia. The Philippines is not in any way connected physically with the
Asia mainland.
Components of National Territory:
I. Terrestrial—land mass on which the inhabitants live; m Q
II. Fluvial—maritime; .
a. Internal or national waters—bodies of water within the land mass,
among them are:
i. Rivers —which may be:
1. National
2. Boundary—divides the territories of States
3. International—flows thru various States
a. Thalweg Doctrine—for boundary rivers, in the
absence of an agreement between the riparian states,
the boundary line is laid on the middle of the main
navigable channel.
b. Middle of the Bridge Doctrine—where there is a
bridge over a boundary river, the boundary line is the
middle or center of the bridge.
ii. Bays and gulfs —a bay is a well-marked indentation whose
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to
contain a land-locked waters and constitutes more than a curvature
of the coast. Also referred to as juridical bay. The area must be as
large as, or larger than, a semi-circle whose diameter is a line
drawn across the mouth of such indentation, or if the mouth is less
than 24 miles wide.
e.g. Hudson Bay in Canada, one whose waters are
considered internal because of the existence of a historic title.
iii. Straits —narrow passageways connecting 2 bodies of water. If the
distance between the 2 opposite coast is not more than 6 miles,
they are considered internal waters.
- In international law, when a strait within a country has a width of more
than six (6) miles, the center lane in excess of the three (3) miles on both
sides is considered international waters.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
iv. Canals —the most famous is the Suez Canal, which is neutralized,
and the Panama Canal, which is open to everyone in times of war
or peace.
b. Archipelagic waters—are the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
Archipelagic State—a state made up wholly of one or two
archipelagos. It may include other islands.
Straight Archipelagic Baseline—to determine the archipelagic
waters, the state shall draw straight baselines connecting the
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs,
provided that the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the
land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and 9:1. The length of such
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except up to 3% of
the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may
exceed that length, up to a maximum 125 miles. The baselines
drawn should not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the
general configuration of the archipelago. All the waters within the
baselines shall then be considered internal waters. The breadth of
the 12-mile territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall then be measured
from the archipelagic baselines.
-Vessels may be allowed innocent passage within the
archipelagic waters, but this right may be suspended, after
publication, in the interest of international security. The coastal
state may also designate archipelagic sea lanes for continuous,
unobstructed transit of vessels.
c. Territorial Sea—the belt of the sea located between the coast and the
internal waters of the coastal state on the other hand, and the high seas
on the other, extending up to 12 nautical miles from the low-water mark, or
in the case of archipelagic states, from the baselines.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Baseline—is a line from which the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone is measured in order to
determine the maritime boundary of the coastal state.
Types of baseline:
i. Normal Baseline Method
ii. Straight Baseline method
d. Contiguous Zone—extends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial
sea; this shall not exceed 24 nautical miles from the archipelagic
baselines.
The coastal state may exercise limited jurisdiction over the
contiguous zone:
1. To prevent infringement of customs, fiscal immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial
sea; and
2. To punish infringement of the above laws and regulations
committed within its territory.
e. Exclusive Economic Zone—shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from the archipelagic baselines.
f. Continental shelf—it is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
extending beyond the Philippine territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of the land territory. It extends up to:
i. The outer edge of the continental margin; or
ii. A distance of 200 nautical miles from the archipelagic baselines,
whichever is the farthest.
The continental shelf does not form part of the Philippine territory. The
Philippines has the sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
g. High Seas—treated as res communes, thus, not territory of any particular
State. These are the waters which do not constitute the internal waters,
archipelagic waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zones of a
state. They are beyond the jurisdiction and sovereign rights of States.
Freedom of navigation—refers to the right to sail ship on the high sea,
subject to international law and the laws of the flag of the state.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
(See also discussion on UNCLOS)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
III.Aerial—this refers to the air space above the land and waters of the State.¬
(See Discussions under International Law)
ARTICLE II
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Sec. 1, Article II
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
(Relate this to Article XI)
1. Essential features: Representation and Renovation.
2. Manifestations:
× Ours is a government of law and not of men (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39
Phil 778).
× Rule of the majority. (Plurality in elections)
× Accountability of public officials
× Bill of rights
× Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws.
× Separation of powers.
Republicanism
ºWhat is a republican form of government?
-It is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, a representative
government wherein the powers and duties of government are exercised and
discharged for the common good and welfare.
#Characteristics of a republican form of government:
1. The people do not govern themselves directly but through their representatives;
2. It is founded upon popular suffrage;
3. There is the tripartite system of the government, the mutual interdependence of
the three departments of the government.
STATE—a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a
definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a
government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (CIR vs.
Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23)
State Nation
-is a legal or juristic concept -is an ethnic or racial concept
State Government
-possesses a government to which a great -merely an instrumentality of the State
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
body of inhabitants render habitual
obedience
through which the will of the State is
implemented and realized.
Republican state—one constructed on the principle that the supreme power resides in
the body of the people. Its purpose therefore is to guarantee against two (2) extremes:
1. On the one hand, monarchy and oligarchy;
2. On the other, pure democracy.
Elements of State:
1. People m—the inhabitants of the State; the # of which is capable for self-
sufficiency and self-defense; of both sexes for perpetuity.
a. Inhabitants;
b. Citizens;
c. Electors.
2. Territory —a fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of
the State.
3. Government—the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is
formulated, expressed and realized. g
Government of the Philippines—refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various
arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
#De Jure vs. De Facto
De Jure De Facto
·Has a rightful title but no power or
control, either because the same has
been withdrawn from it or because it
has not yet actually entered into the
exercise thereof.
·Actually exercises the power or control
but without legal title.
a. De facto proper—government
that gets possession and control
of, or usurps, by force or by the
voice of the majority, the rightful
legal government and maintains
itself against the will of the latter;
b. Government of Paramount
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15
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Forces—established and
maintained by the military forces
who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the
course of war;
c. Independent Government—
established by the inhabitants of
the country who rise in
insurrection against the parent
State.
#Presidential vs. Parliamentary
Presidential Parliamentary
·There is separation of legislative and
executive powers. The first is lodged in
the President and the second is vested
in Congress.
·It embodies interdependence by
separation and coordination.
·There is fusion of both executive and
legislative powers in Parliament,
although the actual exercise of the
executive powers is vested in a Prime
Minister who is chosen by, and
accountable to, Parliament.
·It embodies interdependence by
integration.
#Unitary vs. Federal Government
Functions of the government:
a. Constituent —compulsory because constitutive of the society;
b. Ministrant —undertaken to advance the general interest of the society; merely
optional.
Doctrine of Parens Patriae—the government as guardian of the rights of the people
may initiate legal actions for and in behalf of particular individual. (Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738; Cabañas vs. Pilapil, 58
SCRA 94)
4. Sovereignty—the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which
that State is governed.
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16
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
It is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other
State.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing
on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws.
“Government of Laws and Not of Men.”—sovereignty of the people also
includes the concept that government officials have only the authority given them
by law and defined by law, and such authority continues only with the consent of
the people.
Kinds of Sovereignty:
a. Legal—the power to issue final commands;
b. Political—the sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law;
c. Internal—the supreme power over everything within its territory;
d. External—also known as independence—freedom from external control.
Characteristics:
a. Permanence
b. Exclusiveness
c. Comprehensiveness
d. Absoluteness
e. Indivisibility
f. Inalienability
g. Imprescriptibility
Sovereignty, often referred to as Imperium—is the State’s authority to govern; it
includes passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and
defending it against foreign invasion.
It is the government authority possessed by the State expressed in the concept
of sovereignty.
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17
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Dominium—is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and
natural resources. (Lee Hong Hok vs. David, No. L-30389, December 27, 1972;
Separate Opinion of Justice Kapunan in Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No.
135385, December 2000)
It necessarily includes the power to alienate what is owned. It was the foundation
for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia that all lands
were held from the Crown.
Effect of Belligerent Occupation—there is no change in sovereignty. However,
political laws, except those of treason, are suspended; municipal laws remain in force
unless changed by the belligerent occupant.
Principle of Jus Postliminium—at the end of the occupation, when the occupant is
ousted from the territory, the political laws which have been suspended shall
automatically become effective again. (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, No. L049,
November 12, 1945)
Effect of Change of Sovereignty—political laws of the former sovereign are abrogated
unless they are expressly reenacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Municipal laws remain in force. (Macariola vs. Asuncion, Adm. Case No. 133-J, May
31, 1982)
Effect of Revolutionary Government—it is bound by no constitution. However, it did
not repudiate the Covenant or Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directives and orders issued by government officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives or orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 104768, July 21, 2003)
Jurisdiction—is the manifestation of sovereignty.
a. Territorial —power of the State over persons and things within its territory
subject to its control and protection.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
b. Personal —power of the State over its nationals, which may be exercised by
the state even if the individual is outside the territory of the State.
c. Extraterritorial —power of the State over persons, things or acts beyond its
territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory.
Sec. 2, Article II
(Incorporation Clause)
The Philippine renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
Three (3) parts:
1. Renunciation of war—the power to wage a defensive war is of the very essence
of sovereignty;
2. Adoption of the principles of international law;
3. Adherence to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation & amity.
The second part is nothing more than a formal acceptance of a principle to which all
civilized nations must conform.
The third part is called the “selfish policy”—the guiding principle of Philippine foreign
policy is the national interest. However, this is tempered with concern for “equality,
peace, freedom and justice.
Section 23 (1), Article VI: The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
join session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
Doctrine of Incorporation—the doctrine where the generally accepted principles of
international law are made part of the law of the land either by express provision of the
Constitution or by means of judicial declaration or fiat. The doctrine is applied whenever
municipal tribunals or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the Constitution
or statute of a State.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them so as to give effect to both. In
case of conflict between international law and municipal law, the latter shall prevail.
However, the doctrine dictates that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, and are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Lex posterior derogate priori—in States where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the Constitution. (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18,
2000)
Philip Morris, Inc. vs. CA, the fact that the international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere.
Doctrine of Autolimitation—
It is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres to principles of international law
as a limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.
ºWhat war does the Philippines renounce?
-The Philippines renounces an aggressive war because of its membership in the
United Nations whose charter renounces war as an instrument of national policies of its
member States.
Sec. 3, Article II
(Civilian Supremacy Clause)
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
Civilian Supremacy Clause
Sec. 18, Art. VII—installation of the President as the highest civilian authority, as the
commander-in-chief of the AFP—external manifestation that civilian authority is
supreme over the military.
Sec. 5(1), Art. XVI—members of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution,
which is the fundamental law of the civil government.
Civilian supremacy is not a guaranteed supremacy of civilian officers who are in
power but of supremacy of the sovereign people. The Armed Forces, in this sense, “is
the protector of the people and the State”.
Sec. 6, Article XVI—The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which
shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by
a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the deployment of the
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military asset for civilian law
enforcement. x x x The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
the Letter of Instruction (LOI) itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones charge of
the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the
Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Marines joint visibility patrols.
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistic support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not
averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution
of certain traditionally “civil” functions. x x x Some of the multifarious activities wherein
military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and
the military together in a relationship of cooperation are:
1. Elections;
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
5. Development of the culture and the arts;
6. Conservation of the natural resources;
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
8. Enforcement of customs laws;
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
11. Conduct of nationwide test for elementary and high school students;
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
13. Sanitary inspections;
14. Conduct of census work;
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautic Board;
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress
and, yet, never before questioned. What we have here is a mutual support and
cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian
supremacy.
Sec. 4, Article II
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal military or civil service.
ºDoes the Philippines renounce defensive war?
ENo, because it is duty bound to defend its citizens. Under the Constitution, the prime
duty of the government is to serve and protect the people.
Posse Commitatus—it is the power of the state to require all able-bodied citizens to
perform civic duty to maintain peace and order.
In People vs. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13, the accused in this case, prosecuted for
failure to register for military service under the National Defense Act, assailed the
validity of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the law on the basis of the compulsory
military and civil service provision of then 1935 Constitution. It said that: “x x x. The duty
of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army.
To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this
duty to the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein…x x x the right of the Government to require compulsory military service
is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend
the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. x x x.”
Sec. 5, Article II
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
Right to bear arms: It is statutory and not a constitutional right. The license to carry a
firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right.
Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond
the reach of police power. The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of
the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear
firearm is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.
(Chavez vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004)
Sec. 6, Article II
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The State should not use its money and coercive power to establish religion. It
should not support a particular religion. The State is prohibited from interfering with
purely ecclesiastical affairs. But it does not mean that there is total or absolute
separation. The better rule is symbiotic relations between the church and State.
Constitutional provisions evidencing the Separation of Church and State:
1. Sec. 6, Art. II
2. Sec. 5, Art. III—No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
3. Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-C—religious sect cannot be registered as political party
4. Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI—no sectoral representative from the religious sector
5. Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI—Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
6. Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI—No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
7. Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV—At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians,
religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the
religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without
additional cost to the Government.
8. Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIV—Filipino ownership requirement for educational institutions,
except those established by religious groups and mission boards.
Austria vs. NLRC and CPU Mission Corp. of the 7
th
Day Adventists, G.R. No.
124382, August 16, 1999, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the
church and its members and relates to matter of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. Examples of these affairs in which the State cannot
meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordination of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments, and other activities to which is attached religious
significance. In this case, what is involved is the relationship of the church as an
employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation
whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrine of the church.
STATE POLICIES
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Sec. 7, Article II
(Independent Foreign Policy)
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
The word “relations” covers the whole gamut of treaties and international
agreements and other kinds of intercourse. This is the closest reference to military
bases.
There is a marked antipathy in the Constitution towards foreign military presence
in the country, or of foreign influence in general. (Lim vs. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 151445, April 11, 2002)
Sec. 8, Article II
(Policy of Freedom from Nuclear Weapons)
The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a
policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Clearly, the ban is on nuclear arms—that is, the use and stockpiling of nuclear
weapons, devices, and parts thereof. And this includes not only possessing, controlling
and manufacturing nuclear weapons, but also nuclear test in our territory, as well as the
use of our territory as dumping ground for radioactive waste.
The provision, however, is not a ban on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nor
is it a ban on all “nuclear-capable vessels.” For a vessel to be banned, it is not enough
that it is capable of carrying nuclear arms; it must actually carry nuclear arms.
Nuclear weapons, if stored in our territory, may invite threats of foreign invasion
and there is a danger to the life and limbs of the people because of the threat of
explosion.
Sec. 9, Article II
(Just and Dynamic Social Order)
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment,
a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
It reflects a preoccupation with poverty as resulting from structures that mire the
people in a life of dependence.
Sec. 10, Article II
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
(Social Justice)
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
(Read Sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII)
Sections 1&2 of Article XIII:
Section 1—The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2—The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
The Constitution covers all phases of national development but with more
emphasis not only on economic inequities but also on political and cultural inequities.
Sec. 11, Article II
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights)
The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
(Read Sections 17-19 of Article XIII)
Section 12, Article II
(The Family as Basic Social Institution)
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the government.
(Read Article XV)
The family here is to be understood as a stable heterosexual relationship
whether formalized by civilly recognized marriage or not. Calling the family “a basic
social institution” is an assertion that the family is anterior to the State and is not a
creature of the State. The categorization of the family as “autonomous” is meant to
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
protect the family against instrumentalization by the State.
Protection of the Unborn—
The unborn’s entitlement to protection begins “from conception”, i.e., from the
moment of conception. The intention is to protect life from its beginning, and the
assumption is that human life begins at conception and that conception takes place at
fertilization.
The provision is intended to prevent the State from adopting the doctrine in US
Supreme Court decision of Roe vs. Wade, 410 US 113, which liberalized abortion laws
up to the 6
th
month of pregnancy by allowing abortion at the discretion of the mother any
time during the first 6 months when it can be done without danger to the mother.
Natural Right and Duty of Parents
Parents are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid them in the discharge
of their responsibility.
The provision also highlights the inherent duty of the State to act as parens
patriae and to protect the right of persons and individuals who, because of age or
inherent incapacity, are in an unfavorable position vis-à-vis other parties.
People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998, RA 7610, which penalizes child
prostitution and other sexual abuses, was enacted in consonance with the policy of the
State to “provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse”, thus, the Court
grants the victim full vindication and protection granted under the law.
Section 13, Article II
Vital Role of the Youth in Nation-Building
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14, Article II
(Equality of Women and Men)
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
(Read Section 14, Article XIII)
PT&T Co. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997, the SC held that the petitioner’s
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage, runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, which
is guaranteed all women workers under the Constitution. While a requirement that a
woman employee must remain unmarried may be justified as a “bona fide occupational
qualification” where the particular requirements of the job would demand the same,
discrimination against married women cannot be adopted by the employer as a general
principle.
Section 15, Article II
(Right to Health)
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
(Read Sections 11-13 of Article XIII as an aspect of Social Justice)
Section 16, Article II
(Right to A Balanced and Healthful Ecology)
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792, it was held that the 34 minors duly joined by
their respective parents pleading the cause of “inter-generational responsibility” and
“inter-generational justice”, had a valid cause of action in questioning the grant of
Timber Licensing Agreements (TLAs) for commercial logging purposes. The minors filed
the action for themselves as representing “their generation as well as generations yet
unborn”. The SC, on the basis of Section 16, Article II linked with the right to health,
recognized a “right to a balanced and healthful ecology” and “the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment”.
C&M Timber Corporation vs. Alcala, G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997, on the issue
that the “total log ban” is a new policy which should be applied prospectively and not
affect the rights of petitioner vested under the Timber Licensing Agreement (TLA), the
Sc held that this is not a new policy but a mere reiteration of the policy of conservation
and protection the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Section 17, Article II
The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
(Read also Section 2, Article XIV)
In PRC vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004, while it is true that
the SC has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements, the exercise of this right may be regulated pursuant to the police power of
the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and general
welfare. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation assumes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, in order to protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance.
PMMS, Inc. vs. CA, 244 SCRA 770, the Court said that the requirement that a
school must first obtain government authorization before operating is based on the
State policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and,
therefore, shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching
staff, physical plant and facilities and administrative and management viability.
Section 18, Article II
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
right of the workers and promote their welfare.
In the case of Bernardo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999, the SC
held that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled
persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-
bodied employees; thus, once hey have attained the status of regular workers, they
should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal
contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely in charity or
accommodation, but in justice for all.
Section 19, Article II
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The Constitution does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in
the international community”.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity”, the
fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic
trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. (Tañada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18)
Section 20, Article II
The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
(Read Article XII)
Doctrine of Free Enterprise—
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PCA, G.R. No. 110526,
February 10, 1998, the SC said that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise
as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene
whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare as reflected in Sections 6
& 19 of Article XII.
Pest Management Association of the Philippines vs. Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority, G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007 and Pharmaceutical and Health
Care Association of the Philippines vs. Sec. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, October
9, 2007, it was held that despite the fact that “our present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy”, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not
call for removal of ‘protective regulations’. It must be clearly explained and proven by
competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the
restraint of trade.
Section 21, Article II
The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Rural development encompasses a broad spectrum of social, economic, human,
cultural, political and even industrial development.
(See the case of Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Section 22, Article II
The state recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.
[Read Section 5(2), Article VI; Section 5, Article XII; Section 17, Article XIV]
Section 23, Article II
The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
(Read Sections 15-16 of Article XIII)
Section 24, Article II
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-
building.
(Read Sections 10-11, Art. XVI; Sec. 23, Art. XVIII)
Section 25, Article II
The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
(Read Article X)
Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, The SC held that the local autonomy under the
1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization”, and does not make the local
governments sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio.
Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
Decentralization of Administration Decentralization of Power
-delegation of administrative powers to the
local government unit in order to broaden
the base of governmental powers.
-abdication by the national government of
governmental powers
Lina vs. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001, the Sc said that the basic
relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains control of
the LGUs although in a significantly reduced degree now under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True there are notable innovations in
the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the LGUs of the power to tax which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of LGUs, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of
autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within
the extent allowed by the central authority.
Judge Dadole vs. COA, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002, even as we recognize
that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to LGUs, the exercise of local autonomy
remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of general
supervision by the President. xxx The President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a LGU if he finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President or
any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned LGU acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the
President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a LGU is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of
local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
Section 26, Article II
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, the SC said that this
provision does not bestow a right to seek the Presidency; it does not contain a judicially
enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action.
The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many as possible into public office. The privilege may be subjected to
limitations. One such valid limitation is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on
nuisance candidates.
Section 27, Article II
The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Section 28, Article II
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
----PRINCIPLE OF TRANSPARENCY—
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
This principle operated as an implicit limitation on legislative powers as on the
two other powers.
In essence, separation of powers means the legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the executive, settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of the others. But the separation is not total. The
system allows for “checks and balances” the net effect of which being that, in general,
no one department is able to act without the cooperation of at least one of the other
departments.
Purpose: To prevent concentration of powers in one department and thereby to avoid
tyranny. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of governmental powers among the three departments, to
save the people from autocracy.
1. To secure action
2. To forestall overaction
3. To prevent despotism
4. To obtain efficiency
In La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882,
December 1, 2004, the court restrained itself from intruding into policy matters to allow
the President and Congress maximum discretion in using mineral resources of our
country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding
poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the
country. “The Judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches
of government of their official functions.” Let the development of mining industry be the
responsibility of the political branches of the government. The questioned provisions of
RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.
In Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, in the absence of any administrative
action taken against the RTC Judge by the SC with regard to the former’s certificate of
service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the SC’s
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
doctrine of separation of powers.
Principle of Blending of Powers: Instances when powers are not confined exclusively
within one department but are assigned to or shared by several departments.
Principle of Checks and Balances: This allows one department to resist
encroachments upon its prerogative or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the
other departments.
-The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given power has been validly
exercised by a particular department is whether or not the power has been
constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise—since the
conferment is usually done expressly. However, even in the absence of express
conferment, the exercise of the power may be justified under the doctrine of
necessary implication. The grant of express power carried with it all other powers that
may be reasonably inferred from it.
Justiciable question- implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said
breach of right. (Casibang vs. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642)
THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
1. Police Power
2. Power of Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation
Similarities:
1. Inherent in the State, exercised even without need of express constitutional
grant.
2. Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective without them.
3. Methods by which State interferes with private property.
4. Presupposes equivalent compensation.
5. Exercised primarily by the legislature.
Distinctions:
Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation
·Regulates both liberty and
property
·may be exercised only by
·Affects property rights
·may even be exercised by
·affects property rights
·may be exercised only by
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
government; cannot be
delegated to administrative
body
·property taken is usually
noxious(unpleasant and
harmful) or intended for
noxious purpose and may
thus be destroyed
·compensation is the
intangible, altruistic feeling
that the individual has
contributed to the public
good
private entities
·the property is wholesome
and devoted to public use
or purpose
·compensation is the full
and fair equivalent of the
property taken
government; cannot be
delegated to administrative
body
·the property is wholesome
and devoted to public use
or purpose
·it is the protection and/or
public improvements
instituted by government for
the taxes paid
Limitations: Generally, the Bill of Rights, although in some cases the exercise of the
power prevails over specific constitutional guarantees. The courts may annul the
improvident exercise of police power.
These powers must not be exercised arbitrarily, to the prejudice of Bill of Rights.
In Ericta vs. City Government of Quezon City, 122 SCRA 759, the City
Government of QC was not exercising police power when they required private
cemetery owners to reserve 6% of the burial lots for pauper’s burial ground. The SC
held that in police power, the property to be taken is to be destroyed. The 6% are
private property of the cemetery owners. This is a taking of private property. Sec. 9, Art.
III: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
Clearly, this is an invalid exercise of police power. The City was made to pay the
owners just compensation.
In Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272, Sec. 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772, which mandates newspapers of general circulation in
every province or city to provide free print space of not less than ½ page as COMELEC
space, was held to be an invalid exercise of police power there being no showing of the
existence of a national emergency or imperious public necessity for the taking of print
space, nor that the resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated response to such
necessity. This was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent domain, albeit
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
invalid, because the COMELEC would not pay for the space to be given to it by the
newspapers.
-Police power and power of taxation—cannot be delegated to administrative bodies.
-Police power and power of eminent domain both involved taking. They differ in purpose.
-Police power—to destroy; because the property is harmful, obnoxious, poses a risk to the
public.
-Power of eminent domain—only private property is the subject of taking; the purpose is to
convert the private property to public use.
POLICE POWER—
It is the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property.
It is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people (now common good).
(Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508)
It has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is the power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and for the subjects of the same. (Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD, G.R. No.
166494, June 29, 2007)
Cabrera vs. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, a careful reading of the
questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner’s criminal
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State
when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the
declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. in the words of the Ombudsman, “those who
participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to
serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good.
Requisites (Limitations):
1. Lawful subject—the interests of the public in general as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of this power.
2. Lawful means—the means employed are reasonably for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.
“Affected with public interest”—an industry is subject to control for the public
good; it has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of police
power”.
Construction: construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant.
Scope/Characteristics:
It is the most pervasive, least limitable, and the most demanding of the three
powers. The justification is found in: salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property
so as not to impair others).
1. It cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
2. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power
3. Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police power
objective (Association of Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343).
4. In Ortigas & Co. vs. CA, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000, non-
impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power.
5. In PRC vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004, the exercise of
the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard
health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the
people. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine,
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
to protect the public from the potentially dead effects of incompetence and
ignorance.
In Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534, the right to bear arms is merely
statutory privilege. The license to carry firearm is neither a property nor a property right.
Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry outside one’s residence may be
revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute
as to be beyond the reach of the police power.
Who may exercise police power?
The power is inherently vested in Congress. However, they may validly delegate
this power to the following:
1. the President
2. administrative bodies—public and quasi-public corporations
3. the lawmaking bodies of local government units
Local government units exercise the power under the general welfare clause.
CANORECO vs. Torres, G.R. no. 127249, February 27, 1998, while police
power may be delegated to the President by law, RA 6939 and PD 260, as amended,
do not authorize the President or any other administrative body, to take over the internal
management of a cooperative. Accordingly, Memorandum Order No. 409, issued by the
President, constituting an ad hoc committee to temporarily take over and manage the
affairs of CANORECO is invalid.
In MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000,
there is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its council to “enact
ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus, MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St. in
the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it does not possess delegated police power.
Section 11, Article X—the Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the
metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination.
MMDA is not a special metropolitan political subdivision.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
However, in MMDA vs. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005, although the
law (RA 7924) does not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any legislative enactment, the same law vests
the MMDA the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. Thus, where there is
a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative power has been delegated, the MMDA is not precluded—and in fact is duty-
bound—to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs.
Additional Limitations (When exercised by delegate):
a. express grant by law
b. within territorial limits (for local government units, except when exercised to
protect water supply)
c. must not be contrary to law
For municipal ordinance to be valid:
1. it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. it must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. it must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. it must not prohibit, but may regulate, trade;
5. it must not be unreasonable; and
6. it must be general in application and consistent with public policy.
In City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, the SC
declared as an invalid exercise of the police power the City of Manila Ordinance No.
7783, which prohibited “the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area”,
for being contrary to the Constitution, infringing the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws.
In Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 (1994), solicitation for
religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power.
In Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000), the
issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially
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38
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units, to
issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power
of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the LGC.
The implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is an
exercise of police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is also taking under the power of eminent domain. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is
the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of rights provides
that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of
law.” The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law.
The exercise of power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the
taking of private property. [Roxas and Co., vs. CA, 321 SCRA 106 (1999)]
Republic vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 141314, November 15,
2002, the regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
power of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulations of public
utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When a private property is used for a public
purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and
becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good.
Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as
long as the use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against
arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services
rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to
prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on
investment.
Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272, Section 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772, which mandates newspapers of general circulation in
every province or city to provide free print space of not less than ½ page as COMELEC
space, was held to be invalid exercise of police power there being no showing of the
existence of national emergency or imperious public necessity for the taking of print
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
space, nor that the resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated response to such
necessity.
Public purpose and use has broader concept now. It now includes VICARIOUS
BENEFITS that society may derive from a particular measure.
e.g. CONCERN FOR THE POOR—SC recognized this as one for public purpose
and use.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN— also known as the power of expropriation
The power of eminent domain is the power of the State to forcibly take private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
It is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare.
It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the
State, private property for public use or purpose. (Moday vs. CA, 268 SCRA 586)
The ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public, but
even the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, for public
purpose.
Power of Eminent Domain Destruction Due to Necessity
·involves public rights
·the property is converted to public use
·there must be payment of just
compensation
·undertaken by the State
·involves private rights such as self-
preservation and self-defense
·there is no need for the conversion to
public use
·no need for just compensation
·may be validly undertaken even by
private individuals
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Object of Expropriation:
1. anything that comes under the dominion of man
2. real, personal, tangible and intangible
3. property right
4. churches and other religious properties
5. property already devoted to public use
Except: money- because compensation is also money
Who may exercise?
Generally, the legislature, but also upon valid delegation to:
1. the President;
2. lawmaking bodies of LGUs;
3. administrative bodies—public and quasi-public corporations
4. Private enterprises performing public services.
In the case of Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, the power of
eminent domain must, by enabling law, be delegated to local governments by the
national legislature, and thus, can only be as broad as the real authority would want it to
be. The grant of the power to local government units under RA 7160 cannot be
understood as equal to the pervasive and all encompassing power vested in the
legislative branch of government.
JIL School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig, G. R. No. 152230, August
9, 2005—Sec. 19, of the LGC requires the LGU to tender a prior written definite and
valid offer to acquire the property before the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
Filstream Int’l Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716—the exercise of the power of
eminent domain is clearly superior to the final and executor judgment rendered by the
court in an ejectment case.
RP vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620—services were considered embraced in the
concept of property subject to taking under the power of eminent domain. Republic, in
the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, may require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.
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41
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Where Expropriation Suit Is Filed:
In the Regional Trial Court—because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation
Requisites:
1. Necessity—when exercised by:
a. Congress—it is a political question; (Municipality of Meycauayan,
Bulacan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640)
b. Delegate—the determination of whether there is a genuine necessity for
the exercise is a justiceable question (Republic vs. La Orden de Po.
Benedictinos, 1 SCRA 649).
The RTC has the power to inquire to the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it (Bardillon
vs. Brgy. Masili of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003).
Lagcao vs. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004—there was no
showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city
ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. The ordinance
stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized
housing project.
2. Private property—all private property capable of ownership may be
expropriated except money and choses in action; may include services.
(Republic vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620)
In City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349, a cemetery open to
the public was already in public use and no part of the ground could be taken for other
public uses under a general authority. The City of Manila was without authority to
expropriate the property. (The Congress itself should expropriate or there must be
special grant.)
3. Taking— there is taking when:
a. The owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
b. There is practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the
property;
c. The owner is deprived of the ordinary use of his property;
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42
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
d. The owner is deprived of jurisdiction, supervision and control of his
property.
Requisites for a valid taking: (EMADO)
a. The expropriator must enter a private property;
b. Entry must be for more than a momentary period;
c. Entry must be under warrant or color of authority;
d. Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected;
e. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
(Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336)
The taking of private property may include the impairment of the use of the
property for which it was intended. In US vs. Causby, 328 US 256, the flight of planes
from a nearby military airport over plaintiff’s property below the navigable airspace
resulting in the ruin of plaintiff’s chicken farm was considered compensable taking. So
also were low landing and take-off flights which made nearby residential area unlivable
(Griggs vs. Allegheny County, 369 US 84). This is taking in the constitutional sense.
ºAvenida, Rizal used to be the commercial center of Manila. However, when
the Light Railway Transit (LRT) was built, the commercial value of Avenida was greatly
diminished. The shops and stores had to close. The owners of these establishments
suffered losses because of the operation of the LRT along Avenida, Rizal. Are they
entitled to be paid just compensation?
®No. SC held that the kind of injury or loss that one must suffer that will justify
the payment of just compensation must be a special kind of injury or loss as in the
case of Causby. If the injury or loss that one suffered is one which he suffered together
with the rest of the community, his only compensation in such a case is the altruistic
feeling that somehow he is able to contribute to the common good.
CANORECO vs. CA, G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000, The owner of the
property cut the electric lines alleging that it impaired him of the use of his property. The
SC held that the property owner was not justified in cutting the electric lines. His
property becomes the servient estate subject to the encumbrance, and the acquisition
of an easement of right of way filed by an electric power company for the construction of
transmission lines falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. However,
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43
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
since there was an impairment of the use of the property, he is entitled to the payment
of just compensation.
The establishment of an easement is a form of compensable taking. In
NAPOCOR vs. Sps. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, January 18, 1991, the owner of the
land was awarded full compensation against the NAPOCOR’s argument that the owners
were not totally deprived of the use of the land and could still plant the same crops as
long as they did not come into contact with the wires. The Court said: “the right of way
easement perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by
the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no
plant higher than 3 meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current
conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused
beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays
the fee to defendant once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said
affected portion of their property.
In People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 44, a municipal ordinance prohibiting a building
which would impair the view of the plaza from the highway was considered taking. The
property owner was held to be entitled to payment of just compensation.
In Velarma vs. CA, 252 SCRA 400, the owner of the property can recover
possession of the property from squatters, even if he agreed to transfer the property to
the Government, until the transfer is consummated or the expropriation case is filed.
Taking under Eminent Domain
Proceeding
Taking under Police Power
·Only private properties may be taken
·The private property is taken in order to
convert it to public use
·All properties are subject to taking
·The purpose of taking is to destroy the
property because it is harmful or
obnoxious to the public.
Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272, Section 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772, which mandates newspapers of general circulation in
every province or city to provide free print space of not less than ½ page as COMELEC
space, was held to be an exercise of power of eminent domain, albeit invalid, because
the COMELEC would not pay for the space to be given to it by the newspapers.
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44
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
TELEBAP, Inc. vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 1998, the constitutionality of Sec. 92
of BP 881 (requiring radio and television station owners and operators to give to the
COMELEC radio and television time free of charge) was challenged on the ground that
it violated the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution
by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just
compensation. The SC held that all broadcasting, whether by radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwaves frequencies have to be allocated as
there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there frequencies to assign. A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted x x
x shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires” (Art. XII, Sec.11).
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter
supervising radio and television stations, the State spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even require the
licensees to render public service by giving free airtime. x x x As radio and television
broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide airtime to the COMELEC.
PPI vs. COMELEC TELEBAP vs. COMELEC
·there was taking of property
·newspaper space is the private property
of the newspaper owners
·print media do not enjoy privilege
·there was no taking of private property
·airwaves are scarce resources, the use is
regulated by the State
·franchise (privilege) is issued by the State
(Art. XII, Sec. 11)
÷Shifting argument alleged in TELEBAP: both PPI and TELEBAP are media of communication
and information. Equal protection clause was raised as an issue. The SC ruled that equal
protection clause does not guarantee absolute equality. There may be classification. Persons or
things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treated differently if there is a basis for
valid classification.
4. Public use—“public interest”; “public benefit”; “public welfare”; “public
convenience” (Reyes vs. NHA, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003).
The general concept—meeting public need or public exigency; may include
indirect public benefit or advantage.
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45
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
In Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240, public use is whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare.
It has been broadened to include not only uses directly available to the public but
also those which redound to their indirect benefit; that only a few would actually benefit
from the expropriation of the property does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use. (Manosca vs. CA, 252 SCRA 412)
In Filstream Int’l Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716, the fact that the property is less
than ½ hectare and that only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation does
not diminish its public use character, inasmuch as “public use” now includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including, in particular, urban land reform
and housing.
By express legislative authority granted by Congress in Sec. 19, RA 7160, LGUs
may expropriate private property for public use, or purpose, or welfare, for the benefit of
the poor and the landless. Thus, in Moday vs. CA, 268 SCRA 568, the SC held that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur was without authority to disapprove
Bunawan Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 because, clearly, the Municipality of Bunawan
has authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and its Sanggguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate the assailed resolution.
However, in the case of Municipacility of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty
Corporation, 292 SCRA 676, the SC declared that there was lack of compliance with
Sec. 19 of RA 7160, where the Municipal Mayor filed a complaint for eminent domain
over two (2) parcels of land on the strength of the resolution passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan, because what is required by law is an ordinance and not mere
resolution.
In Francia, Jr. vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432, March 24,
2008, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a public purpose for the
expropriated property is not a condition precedent before a court may issue a writ of
possession. Once the requisite in Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code are satisfied,
the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial matter for the court.
5. Just Compensation—the full and fair market value of the property taken; it is
the fair market value of the property. It is settled that the market value of the
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46
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
property is “that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to
buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on a price to be
given and received therefor.”
Medium: money except: payment other than money (Association of Small
Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343), payment is allowed
to be made partly in bonds, because under the CARP it deals with the revolutionary kind
of expropriation.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function and factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and reviewable only
when the case falls within the recognized exceptions. (NAPOCOR vs. San Pedro, G.R.
No. 170945, September 26, 2006)
Land Bank vs. CA (and DAR vs. CA), 249 SCRA 149—Sec. 16(e), RA 6657—
the deposit of compensation must be in “cash” or in “Land Bank bonds” not in any other
form, and certainly not in a “trust account”.
Reckoning point of market value of the property:
FMV at the date of: a) filing of the complaint; or
b) the taking –whichever is earlier.
Rules in Just Compensation-Rule 67, Sec. 6:
1. Determine the actual or basic value of the property.
2. If entire property not expropriated:
Value of property - consequential benefits + consequential
damages
(basic or actual) (CB) (CD)
If consequential benefits exceed consequential damages, CB and CD should be
disregarded because the BASIC VALUE of the property should be paid in every
case.
Basic/market value—the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but not
compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
- Factors to be considered:
·Cost of acquisition ·Actual or potential uses
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47
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
·Current value of like properties ·in particular case: size of lands, shape, location
and tax declaration
Consequential damages—injuries directly caused on the residue of the private
property taken by reason of expropriation
Example: the property left is in odd shape or with area virtually unusable
Consequential Benefits—the remainder is, as a result of the expropriation, placed in a
better location, such as fronting a street where it used to be an interior lot.
Association of Small Landowners vs. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)— the power of
eminent domain could be used as an implement of police power. The expressed
objective of the law was the promotion of the welfare of the farmers, which came clearly
under the police power of the state. To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the
expropriation of agricultural lands (subject to minimum retention limits for the
landowners) to be distributed among the landless peasantry.
·DARAB determines just compensation (exception to the general rule that courts decide
the value)
·DAR may make initial valuation; owner goes to court if not satisfied.
-Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation. In both instances,
just compensation is determined by the courts.
´In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 137569, June 23,
2000, the Supreme Court held that it is only upon payment of just compensation that
title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for
expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being
expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise
all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to
the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.
The Dela Ramas make much of the fact that ownership of the land was
transferred to the government because the equitable and the beneficial title were
already acquired by it in 1983, leaving them with only the naked title. However, xxx the
recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of just compensation.
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48
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Legal interest for expropriation cases—6%
-from the time of taking until just compensation is actually paid
-interest must be claimed, otherwise, it is deemed waived
-Title to the property shall not be transferred until after actual payment of just
compensation is made to the owner.
Genuine Necessity—
National legislation—question of necessity is POLITICAL; judiciary has no power
to inquire.
Delegate—liberally in favor of the private property owner; judiciary can inquire
into whether the authority conferred upon such delegate correctly and properly
exercised/ whether expropriation contemplated by the delegate necessary or wise.
May eminent domain be barred by “res judicata” or “law of the case”?
EThe principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agents to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State,
dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police
power, can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use”. All
separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit
agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent
domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in
the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to
resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it. Thus,
the State or its authorized agents cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to
exercise eminent domain, it does not apply to specific issues decided in a previous
case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that
there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot,
however, bar the State or its agent, from thereafter complying with this requirement, as
prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the
same property. [Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678
(1998)]
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49
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
When may the property owner be entitled to the return of the expropriated
property in eminent domain cases?
´ In Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Villaroya, the unpaid landowners were
allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property. The Court ruled that “under
ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the
obvious remedy.”
However, in cases where land is taken for public use, public interest must be
considered. (Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240)
Right of landowner in case of non-payment of just compensation—as a rule, it
does not entitle the landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots, but only
to demand payment of the fair market value of the property. (Republic vs. CA, G.R.
No. 146587, July 2, 2002; Reyes vs. NHA, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003).
However, in RP vs. Vicente Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005, the SC said
that the facts of the case do not justify the application of the rule. In this case, the
Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation
proceedings, and the second, in the action for recovery of possession. Fifty-seven (57)
years have passed since then. The Court construed the Republic’s failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstances, recovery of
possession is in order. It was then held that where the government failed to pay just
compensation within 5 years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property.
Plaintiff’s right to dismiss the complaint in Eminent Domain
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s “matter-of-right” to
dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner may have already suffered
damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff’s right to dismiss the complaint has
always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions. (NAPOCOR & Pobre
vs. CA, G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004)
Right to repurchase or re-acquire the property
The property owner’s right to repurchase the property depends upon the
character of the title acquired by the expropriator, e.g., if the land is expropriated for a
particular purpose with a condition that when the purpose is ended or abandoned, the
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50
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
property shall revert to the former owner, then the former owner can re-acquire the
property. In this case, the terms of the judgment in the expropriation case were very
clear and unequivocal, granting title to the lot in fee simple to the Republic. No condition
on the right to repurchase was imposed. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority vs. CA, G.R. No. 139495, Novermber 27, 2000)
Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, in arguing for the return of
their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignored the fact that the right of
the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales to which
the remedy is rescission may perhaps apply. Expropriation is an in rem proceeding, and
after condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent
title.
POWER OF TAXATION—is the power to demand from the members of society their
proportionate share/contribution in the maintenance of the government.
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51
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
It is the power by which the State raises revenue to defray the necessary
expenses of the Government.
Scope: covers persons, property or occupation to be taxed within the taxing jurisdiction.
It is so pervasive; it reaches even the citizens abroad and their income outside the
Philippines; all the income earned in the Philippines by a citizen or alien.
Basis: power emanating from necessity (lifeblood doctrine)
Importance of Taxation:
1. No constitutional government can exist without it;
2. It is one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based;
3. It is necessary for the existence and prosperity of the nation; and
4. It is the lifeblood of the nation.
Who may exercise? Generally, the legislature, but also upon valid delegation:
1. Lawmaking bodies of LGUs (Sec. 5, Art. X);
2. President (limited extent-delegated tariff powers), under Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI of
the Constitution or as an incident of emergency powers that Congress may
grant to him under Sec. 23 (2), art. VI.
Purpose: unavoidable obligation of the government to protect the people and extend
them benefits in the form of public projects and services.
Public purpose—proceeds must be devoted to public use. It includes INDIRECT
public advantage/benefits. The mere fact that the tax will be directly enjoyed by private
individual does not make it INVALID so long as the same link to public welfare is
established.
Requisites:
1. It must be for public purpose;
2. It shall be uniform;
3. Person or property taxed shall be within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority;
4. In assessment & collection, notice and hearing shall be provided.
Limitations on the Power of Taxation
Inherent limitations:
1. Public purpose;
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52
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. Non-delegability of power;
3. Territoriality or Situs of taxation;
4. Exemption of government from taxation;
5. International comity—generally accepted principles of international law
Constitutional limitations:
1. Due process of law—tax should not be confiscatory.
-Due process does not require previous notice and hearing before a law
prescribing fixed/specific taxes on certain articles may be enacted.
-If the tax to be collected is to be based on the value of the taxable property—ad
valorem tax—the taxpayer is entitled to be notified of the assessment proceeding
and to be heard on the correct valuation.
2. Equal protection of law—taxes should be uniform and equitable.
3. Uniformity—persons/things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate
Equitability—taxes should be apportioned among the people according to their
capacity to pay
Progressivity—
4. Non-impairment of contracts
5. Non-imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax
6. Revenue and tariff bills must originate in the HOR
7. Non-infringement of religious freedom
8. Delegation of legislative authority to the President to fix tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues
9. Tax exemption of properties actually, directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable and educational purposes
10. Majority vote of all the members of Congress required in case of legislative
grant of tax exemptions
11. Non-impairment of the SC’s jurisdiction in tax cases
12. Tax exemption of revenues and assets of, including grants, endowments,
donations, or contributions to, educational institutions.
Double taxation—additional taxes are laid:
1. On the same subject;
2. By the same taxing authority;
3. During the same taxing period; and
4. For the same purpose.
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53
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Double taxation is allowed by law. However, it will not be allowed if the same will
result in violation of the equal protection clause. What is prohibited is direct double
taxation.
In Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil. 46, there is no double
taxation if one tax is imposed by the LGU and the other by the National Government.
Taxes—the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the
State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all public
needs.
TAX LICENSE
1. AS TO BASIS
Power of taxation—to raise revenue Police power—to regulate
2. AS TO LIMITATION
Rate or amount to be collected is unlimited
provided it is not confiscatory
Amount is limited to cost of: a)issuing the
license; and b)necessary inspection of
police surveillance
3. AS TO OBJECT
Imposed on persons or property Paid for privilege of doing something but
privilege is revocable
4. AS TO EFFECT OF NON-PAYMENT
Business or activity does not become
illegal
Business becomes illegal
Tax Debt
·due to the government in its sovereign
capacity
·due to the government in its corporate
capacity
Taxes cannot be subject to off-setting or compensation for the simple reason that the
government and the taxpayers are not creditors and debtors of each other.
(Philex Mining Corp. vs. CIR, 294 SCRA 687)
Tax exemptions:
-discretion of the legislature
1. Sec. 28 (4), Art. VI
2. Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV
4. Sec. 4 (4), Art. XIV
5. Where tax exemption is granted gratuitously, it may be revoked at will; but not if
granted for a valuable consideration—deemed to partake of the nature of
contract and obligation thereof—protection against impairment.
In Lladoc vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 292, a parish priest accepted a donation to be used
for the construction of a church. The money was spent for the purpose. The CIR
imposed tax. The objection was based on constitutional exemption of church properties
from taxes. The SC rejected. Exemption referred only to property taxes imposed on
lands, buildings and improvements used for religious purposes. The tax in this case is
not an ad valorem tax on the church itself but an excise tax imposed on the priest (not
on the properties) for his exercise of the privilege to accept the donation.
Territoriality in Taxation—the power to tax operates only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the taxing authority. It cannot be exercised beyond the boundaries except
under certain circumstances.
Taxable Situs of Real Properties—the place where they are situated
Mobilia Sequntur Personam—the intangible personal property such as credits, bank
deposits, bonds, corporate stocks which do not admit of actual location and do not have
inherent value but mere evidence of debts or property are usually taxable in the state of
residence of the owner.
Uniformity in Taxation—all taxable articles, or kinds of property of the same class,
shall be taxed at the same rate. There is uniformity when a tax operates in taxation with
the same force and effect on its subject wherever found.
Equality of Taxation—taxes shall be strictly proportional to the relative value of the
taxable property.
Article III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Significance. Government is powerful. When limited, it becomes tyrannical. It is a
guarantee that there are certain areas of person’s life, liberty or property which
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
government power may not touch.
·All the powers of the government (police power, power of eminent domain and power
of taxation) are limited by the Bill of Rights.
Classification of Rights:
1. Political Rights—granted by law to members of a community in relation to their
direct or indirect participation in the establishment or administration of
government.
2. Civil Rights—rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of private
individuals for the purpose of securing them the enjoyment of their means of
happiness.
3. Social and Economic Rights—these are the rights which generally require
implementing legislation. (Article XIII)
-Doctrine of Preferred Freedom (Hierarchy of Rights)—some rights are preferred
PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189
· While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government
regulation only “with narrow specificity.”
· Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
4In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
· The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the
law and its object or purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights.
· On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a
more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Sec. 1, Art. III
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights,
notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of
limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect
individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government,
telling it what it cannot do to the individual.
A. DUE PROCESS OF LAW
That which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.
-Applies to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or nationality
-Artificial persons—covered but only insofar as their property is concerned.
-Extends to aliens
-Includes the means of livelihood
“Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.”
(Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA
849)
Life—includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from
dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life
enjoyable.
Liberty—includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. x x x It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660)
Property—is anything that come under the right of ownership and be the subject of
contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to
secure, use and dispose of them.
Public office is not a property which one may acquire a vested right, it is
nevertheless a protected right. (Bince vs. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782)
Scope/Aspects of Due Process:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Procedural Due Process —the method or manner by which the law is enforced.
It serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the
government.
Requisites: (non-criminal cases)
a. An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine matter before it;
b. Jurisdiction properly acquired over person of defendant and over
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
c. Opportunity to be heard; and
d. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing and based on evidence
adduced.
Impartial Court or Tribunal—Judges must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just.
In Anzaldo vs. Clave—Jacobo Clave, acting as Chairman of CSC, rendered a
decision against petitioner. When petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, the
same Jacobo Clave, but this time acting as Presidential Executive Assistant, upheld his
own earlier decision. The SC held that this violates fundamental fairness required by
due process. A public officer who decided the case should not be the same person to
decide it on appeal because he cannot be an impartial judge.
People vs. Mendenilla (2001), judges have as much interest as counsel in the
orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions
that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by
witnesses and address the points overlooked by counsel.
Questions which merely clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence are
within the prerogative of a judge to ask.
Sec. 14 (1), Art. III—No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law. ---This is procedural due process in criminal cases
Requisites of Criminal Due Process:
a. Accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;
b. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;
c. Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard;
d. Judgment rendered within authority of constitutional law
If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty
of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by
the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
(Mejia vs. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April 15, 1988)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. Substantive Due Process —it requires that the law itself, not merely the
procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable and just.
This serves as a restriction on the government’s law and rule-making powers; a
prohibition of arbitrary laws.
-The heart to substantive due process is the “reasonableness”, or the absence
of exercise of arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts which
depend on the circumstances of every case.
-As a general rule, when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty, or property,
the presumption is that the action is valid. In rare cases, as in “prior restraint”,
there is a presumption of invalidity.
Requisites:
a. Interest of the public;
b. Means employed are reasonably necessary for accomplishment of purpose
and not unduly oppressive.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest,
arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary
restrictions upon lawful occupations.
Void-for-vagueness Rule—a criminal statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions
is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the
injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is
given no fair warning.
A law is “vague” as not to satisfy the due process need for notice when it lacks
comprehensible standards that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as
to its meaning and differ as to its application” or is so indefinite that “it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”
It is injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of
which he is given no fair warning.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 aspects:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by
either saving clause or by construction. (People vs. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163,
January 24, 2001)
Overbreadth Doctrine—decrees that a governmental purpose may not be
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
Facial Challenge—a facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected
speech.
“On its face” invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), Motion for reconsideration. xxx
[T]he clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, w/o its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed w/ altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it.
Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.-- The conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all.
The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of Pres. Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization.
RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Coverage: Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. in
the exercise of legislative powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
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60
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number
of the PD, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
-Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. It is imperative to the validity of
laws, PDs, EOs, Administrative rules and regulations except interpretative legislations.
(Tañada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986)
Notes: In the original case Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), the SC ruled that
as a matter of substantive due process, any law must be published before the people can be
expected to observe them. But, according to a split decision, publication need not be made
in the Official Gazette. It is enough that it be published in a newspaper of general circulation.

After the EDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC, the original
judgment was reconsidered, and the SC now ruled that publication must be made in the
Official Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code, unless a law "provides otherwise"
that is, a different mode of publication.

What must be published are (1) all laws of general application, and even those not of
general application like (2) private laws affecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislative
grant of citizenship, (3) laws of local application, and (4) rules and regulations of a
substantive character. This means not only the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith, that
is, immediately. Where? Only in the Official Gazette
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (2000), an extraditee is not entitled to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an
extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is
filed in court. During the evaluation stage, right to know is withheld to accommodate the
more compelling interest of the State—to prevent escape of potential extradite which
may be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition.
Roxas vs. Vasquez (2001), lack of notice to, participation of complainants at the
REINVESTIGATION does not render the resolution of the Ombudsman null and void.
(But in preliminary investigation, their participation is needed.)
Exceptions to Notice and Hearing Requirements
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz (1989)—without conducting any hearing, NTC ordered
PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by 15%. PHILCOMSAT challenged the validity of the
order on the ground that it is an exercise of a quasi-judicial power without the required
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61
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
hearing. NTC replied that the order was merely interlocutory. The SC held that fixing
rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, unlike in the exercise of quasi-legislative power,
it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does
not alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the period
covered.
BUT, in Radio Communications vs. NTC (1990)—the Court upheld the temporary
rates granted by the NTC asserting that the law allows the NTC to approve temporary
rate requested by public service agency provided hearings are held within 30 days
thereafter.
-As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural
due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its QUASI-
JUDICIAL function.
In the exercise of its EXECUTIVE or LEGISLATIVE functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing.
Suntay vs. People (1957)—the passport of a person sought for the commission of a
crime may be cancelled without notice and hearing.
Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004, the Sc
ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Bank’s dishonor of Calderon’s credit card,
inasmuch as the dishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreement which provided
that the cardholder agreed not to exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the card
privilege would be automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder.
Appeal and due process—
Appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process; generally, it may be
allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion. But where the Constitution gives a
person the right to appeal, denial of the right to appeal constitutes a violation of due
process. Where there is statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also
constitutes a denial of due process.
Preliminary Investigation and due process—
Preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28,
2003). It may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it (Benedicto vs. CA, G.R.
No. 125359, September 4, 2001). The right may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot be
invoked for the first time on appeal (People vs. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8,
1997).
Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138, when there is statutory grant of the right to
preliminary investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due process
clause. The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
technical. To deny it to the petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to
due process. (Yusop vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001)
Prejudicial Publicity—
To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity…
because these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. (Webb vs. De Leon,
1995)
ºDoes the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?
E No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and
in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to
a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature
of charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative
proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintain the dignity of government service.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or law. (Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125)
ºIs an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest once the petition for extradition is filed in court?
E Both on statutory and constitutional grounds, the answer is “no”. In Government of
USA vs. Hon. Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002:
1. On the basis of Extradition Law
Sec. 6 of PD 1069—Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting
for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to
the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them
time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered “immediate”. The law could not have
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63
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
impairing a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant or arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase “if it appears”, the law further conveys that accuracy is not
as important as speed at such an early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression—a
prima facie finding—sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accused.
2. On the basis of the Constitution
Even Sec. 2 of Article III does not require a notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only examination--under oath or affirmation—of complainants and
the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrant of arrest.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE—
The equal protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Section 1 of Article III to provide for
a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
It simply requires that all persons or things, similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.
It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where,
for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. (Philippine Judges
Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Who are protected—all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical persons
are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons, they enjoy the
protection only insofar as their property is concerned.
Scope:
Political, Economic and Social Equality
Art. XIII, Secs. 1&2 (social justice)—political & economic
Section 1—The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2—The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (protection to labor)—
Article XII, Section 10 (nationalization of business) FILIPINO FIRST POLICY—The
Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum (60%) of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.
The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Art. XII, Sec. 2(2) (reservation of marine resources)—economic
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)—political & economic
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
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65
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to the poor)—xxx Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)—political
Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.
Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)—The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.
Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and men)—The State recognizes the role of
women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.
There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. The
Constitution itself acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth
(Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2), certain areas of investment (Article XII, Section 10),
to name a few.

In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of
the law which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be
observed by the national interest.

But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that
they cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they are
admitted to the country as immigrants.
Valid Classification:
Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treated
differently if there is a basis for valid classification. The requisites are:
1. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences;
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. The distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law—the distinctions which
are the bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of
the law;
3. Not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It must apply to all members of the same class.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, The withdrawal of franking
privileges formerly granted to the judiciary but remained with the executive and
legislative departments, was declared unconstitutional, because the three branches of
government are similarly situated.
Villegas vs. Hui Chiong, the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon all
aliens desirous of obtaining employment in the City of Manila was declared
unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and excessive, and it
failed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who
were required to pay it.
Sexual Discrimination
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, female domestic
working abroad were in a class by themselves because of the special risks to which
their class was exposed.
Administration of Justice
Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1988, Special grant of exemption in
favor of the Marcoses as contained in the agreement entered into by PCGG with
Marcos Family to compromise the ill-gotten wealth cases (exempt from all taxes) filed
by the former against the latter is a CLASS LEGISLATION, vilative of the equal
protection clause.
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, petitioner’s and
intervenor’s right to equal protection was not violated by the enactment of RA 8249
because the law was not directed only to Kuratong Baleleng cases. Every classification
made by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness.
Public Policy
Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763, The law excluding residents of Mandaue City
from voting for provincial candidates was justified “as a matter of legislative discretion”
and that equal protection would be violated only if group within the city were allowed to
vote while others were not.
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67
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Olivares vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700, when the mayor issued permit in favor
of unidentified vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon Baclaran Credit
Cooperatives, he violated the equal protection clause when failed to show that the two
were not similarly situated.
Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, the executive order granting tax and
duty incentives only to business and residents within the “secured area” of Subic
Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the zone but outside
such “fenced in” territory is VALID.
The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough
that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges
and required to follow the same obligations.
Classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the
equal protection clause.
International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845,
June 1, 2000, there were no reasonable distinctions between the services rendered by
“foreign-hires” and “local-hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to those
teachers.
Relative Constitutionality:
Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15,
2004, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a
mere comparison of its provisions of the Constitution since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement
benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violate
equal protection, for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidates
convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as
unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the
equal political protection.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Sec. 2, Article III
Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Scope: The protection is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of
crime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee, although they may be
required to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of
police and taxing powers.
The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383). As such, the right may be waived either
expressly or impliedly, but the waiver must be made by the person whose right is
invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver. (People vs.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 457)
SEARCH WARRANT—may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described
are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued.
WARRANT OFARREST—said to particularly describe the person to be seized if it
contains the name of the person to be arrested.
Requisites of a valid warrant:
1. It must be based upon probable cause—such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to
induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.
It consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to be
committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense.
· For a search warrant—such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
be searched. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800)
· For a warrant of arrest—such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested (Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23,
1995)
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issued
for alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and
the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was
impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws
alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. How could he even know what
particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this, how could it
be determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably guilty
thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicile
and privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of probable cause, the
rule is: One crime, one warrant.
2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge.
The judge shall:
a. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the public prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
b. If the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and
much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the
1973 Constitution has been removed.
Search warrant Warrant of arrest
· The judge must personally examined
in the form of searching Q&As, in
writing and under oath, the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them.
· The determination of probable cause
depends to a large extent upon the
finding or opinion of the judge who
· It is not necessary that the judge
should personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses; the
judge would simply personally review
the initial determination of the
prosecutor to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
· Judge determines the probability, not
the certainty, of the guilt of the accused
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70
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
conducted the required examination of
the applicant and the witnesses.
and, in so doing, he need not conduct a
de novo hearing.
3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions.

The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone
else, like the clerk of court.
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971).
In this case, when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a
hearing, the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and
take the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. After he was through with the
hearing, he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished,
asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to,
after which he issued the search warrant in question.
The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based
on the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies.
The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report.
Otherwise, the warrant is void.

Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We
Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was
inadmissible.

Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the testimony based on
investigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive were
held to be not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was not valid.
4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Search warrant Warrant of arrest
· The description of the property to be
seized need not be technically accurate
nor necessarily precise, and its nature will
necessarily vary according to whether the
identity of the property or its character is a
matter of concern; the description is
· General warrants are proscribed and
unconstitutional. However, a John Doe
Warrant (a warrant for the apprehension
of a person whose true name is unknown)
satisfies the constitutional requireme3nt of
particularity if there is some descriptio
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71
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
required to be specific only insofar as the
circumstances will allow.
personae which will enable the officer to
identify the accused.
Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized
makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void.

In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read "subversive documents,
leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the
Light a Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular
descriptions, thus making the warrant a general warrant.

In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of
Philippine Times, subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,
banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the description
was not at all particular or specific, thus making the warrants general warrants.

When it comes to printed matters, the offensive material need not be set out in
full. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to
seize "subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a
material is subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide; no unfettered
discretion must be granted to him.
The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their
intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched
for the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the latter
case, a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid
delegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.
Properties subject to Seizure:
1. Property subject of the offense;
2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Permissible Area of Search
In People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2002, the warrantless search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence
Articles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence. The rule has been
constitutionally affirmed in Section 3(2), Article III, which provides that such evidence
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
“shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.” Such evidence is the fruit of
the poisonous tree. However, it is submitted that it may nonetheless be used in the
judicial or administrative action that may be filed against the officer responsible for its
illegal seizure.
It has also been held that where the accused did not raise the issue of the
admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized,
such omission constitutes a waiver of the protection granted by Section 3, and the
illegally seized evidence could then be admitted against him. (People vs. Exala, 221
SCRA 494)
WARRANTLESS ARREST—
1. When a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is an escapee or a detention prisoner. (Section
5, Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
The Rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (People vs. Tudtud & Bolong, G.R. No.
144037, September 26, 2003)
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles

The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for
the mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are specifically
authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a warrant.

Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e.g.
apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the
criminal is inside the car). There is no question that when a child has been reported
kidnapped in a community, the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child is
in any one of them.
(b) When search is an incident to a valid arrest.
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73
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest-- A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that
proves the commission of the offense. It follows that the search can only be made
within the area of control of the arrested person, and within the time of the arrest.

In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985), Milagros Roque and Cynthia
Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30
a.m., having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque's
apartment located 2 blocks away, was searched and some documents seized. The SC
at first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing to
describe with particularity the things to be seized, because it was an incident of a valid
arrest.
But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that
the search was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be "incidental" to the arrest,
i.e., not separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental
searches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid
incidental search.

The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by
frisking him for instance) because (1) a weapon held by the arrested person may be
turned against his captor and (2) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrested
officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge.

If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest,
there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor; and if the
documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer be
justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the
documents, having been arrested already.
In People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, while a contemporaneous search
of a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or
implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the
area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or
evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot
be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority
of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
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74
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made—the process cannot be reversed.
In the case of People vs. Go, 354 SCRA 338 (2001), the police saw the gun
tucked in appellant’s waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search
was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license
for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was
necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the
Rules.
As a consequence of appellant’s valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section
12. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his
car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which, was later identified as
shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearms was
committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal. As such, the seized
items do not fall within the exclusionary clause. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous
tree, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the
drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidenced against appellant. Besides, it has been
held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence.
In People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 (2001), to constitute a valid in flagrante
delito arrest, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and 2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
In People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003, the arresting
officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the
latter’s person that which:
1. Was used in the commission of the crime;
2. Was the fruit of the crime;
3. May provide the person arrested with the means of committing violence or
escaping;
4. May be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
The search, however, must be contemporaneous to the arrest and made within a
permissible area of search.
Requisite: the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in
effecting the arrest which could be considered as one in cadence with the instances of
permissible arrest enumerated in Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
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75
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
In the case of People vs. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, the
officer could reasonably assume—since the informant was by their side and had so
informed them and pointed out the culprit—that the drugs were in the appellant’s
luggage, and it would have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd, for them to
adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude at the risk of eventually losing their quarry.
(c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party
People vs. Hedishi Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003, whenever the right
against unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to
the search and seizure. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of the case.
Plain View Doctrine—finds application only when the incriminating nature of the object
is in the “plain view” of the police officer.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object
seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA
668)
Requisites:
1. Valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are;
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
(d) Stop-and-Frisk
It is defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons where a police officer
observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to
approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause
to make an actual arrest.
Requisites for Stop-and-Frisk
1. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make the initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,
in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.
2. The apprehending officer must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him.
- It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for the principle of stop-and-frisk to apply.
(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently.

Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not
object to the search, for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the
authorities. The waiver must be expressly made. It must be given by the person whose
right is violated.
In People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in the
baggage of the accused was found by (private) security officers of the interisland
passenger vessel who then reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and contraband items were carried out without
government intervention. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not be invoked.
(f) Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs law
(g) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders for violation of
immigration and smuggling laws
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
(h) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations
(i) Conduct of “areal target zoning” and “saturation drive” in the exercise of military
powers of the President
(j) Visual search at checkpoints
Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings"; doctrine of exigent
circumstances
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right and can be invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to “free passage without
interruption,” but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question
or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by
the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose
for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period
would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.
There is no need for checkpoints to be announced. Not only it would be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges
of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the
regularized manner in which they are operated. (People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754)
Knock and Announce Principle—
General Rule: Police officers are obliged to give notice, show their authority and
demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand,
such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search.
Exceptions: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand,
to open it;
2. When such person already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and
persons;
3. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or
limb;
4. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside, are then
engaged in an activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted. (People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Lee,
G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004)
In People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
ºDo the ordinary right against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to searches
conducted at the airport pursuant to routine airport security procedures?
E In the case of People vs. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18,
2000, persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage, are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protection against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002, a search made
pursuant to a routine airport security procedure is allowed under RA 6235, which
provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried luggage,
etc., shall be subject to search, and this condition shall form part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier. To limit the action of the airport security
personnel to simply refusing the passenger entry into the aircraft and sending her home
(as suggested by the appellant), and thereby depriving the security personnel of “ability
and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such
circumstances, would be sanctioned impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement,
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
to the detriment of the society.” The strip search in the ladies’ room was justified under
the circumstances.
Procedure for Seizure of Pornographic Materials:
To justify a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must
be on account of a crime having been committed;
1. There must be a criminal charge against the person for purveying the porno
materials;
2. Application for search warrant must be obtained from the judge;
3. Materials must be brought to court in the prosecution of the accused for the crime
charged;
4. Determination whether the items confiscated are pornographic materials;
5. Judgment rendered by the court. (Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362)
Sec. 3, Article III
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well as
intangible objects. (See RA 4200 below)
Exceptions to inviolability:
1. Lawful order of the court;
2. When public safety or orders requires otherwise, as may be provided by law.
ºIs there a constitutional right to privacy?
EYes. The essence of privacy is “the right to be left alone”. It is expressly recognized in
Section 3(1) of Article III. Other facts of the right to privacy are protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Sections 1 (right to due process clause), 2 (right
against unreasonable searches and seizures), 6 (right to liberty of abode and of
changing the same, as well as the right to travel), 8 (freedom of association) and 17
(right against self-incrimination). (Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1988)
Zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws:
1. The Civil Code provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons” and punishes as
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy
of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,
and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.
2. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
3. Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200) —invasion of privacy.
4. Secrecy of Bank Deposits (RA 1405)
5. Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293)
6. Rules of Court —on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information [Sec. 24, Rule 130(c), Revised Rules on Evidence]
RA 4200 Anti-Wire Tapping Act
It prohibits any person not being authorized by all parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or record the same, or to communicate the
content thereof to any person.
The use of said record may be permitted in the following instances:
1. In civil or criminal proceedings involving certain specified offenses principally
affecting national security; and
2. When authorized by the court which may be issued under the following
conditions:
a. The constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant should be
complied with; and
b. The authority shall be effective only for sixty (60) days.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this law is not admissible in any proceeding.
RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communications by
means of a tape recorder. The law does not make any distinction. A telephone
extension is not among the devices covered by this law. (Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA
112)
Navarro vs. CA, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999, two local media men in Lucena
City went to the police station to report alleged indecent show in one night
establishment in the City. At the station, there was a heated argument between police
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
officer Navarro and Lingan, one of the two media men, which led to fisticuffs. Lingan fell
and his head hit the pavement which caused his death. During the trial, Jalbuena, the
other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between accused
police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the
knowledge of the two. The SC held that Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of RA
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law prohibits
the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.
Exempted acts:
A. Use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned below: [Secs. 1, par. 2]

B. Any peace officer, who is authorized by the written order of the Court (RTC
within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be
executed), to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving the
crimes of: [Sec. 3, par. 1]
1. treason
2. espionage
3. provoking war and disloyalty in case of war
4. piracy
5. mutiny in the high seas
6. rebellion
7. conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
8. inciting rebellion
9. sedition
10. conspiracy to commit sedition
11. inciting to sedition
12 kidnapping as defined by the RPC
13. violations of CA 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security
The WRITTEN ORDER shall only be issued or granted upon written application
with the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and must show:
a) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes
enumerated herein has been committed or is being committed provided, that in cases
involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting
to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, such authority shall be granted only
upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually
been or are being committed;
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
b) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence may be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,
any of such crimes;
c) That there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

Contents:
1. The identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the
case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line and the telephone
number involved and its location;
2. The identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record
the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
3. The offense or offenses sought to be committed or prevented; and
4. The period of the authorization.

Effectivity: The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order
which shall not exceed 60 days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended
or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the
public interest.

Procedure: All recordings made under court authorization within 48 hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the order:

1. Shall be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package;
2. shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such
authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each
recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit and certifying
that no duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the
court;
3. shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence or their
contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except
upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons
whose conversations or communications have been recorded.
PENALTY
Any person who violates the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by:
1. imprisonment for not less than 6 months or more than 6 years; and
2. with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public
office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the
offense; and
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. If the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
ADMISSIBILITY
Any communication or spoken word, or the existence contents, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and
correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for
the suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken.

The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of
Sections 2 and 3 (1), Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding." The evidence is
absolutely useless. This has not always been the case.

In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf
V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. In such case, the evidence admitted,
without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally
seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality
of the means by which it was acquired.

It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio
1969, when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that
the total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the
constitutional right which it seeks to preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of the
other remedies (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment, resistance), especially in
the Philippines where violations were committed by those in power and were thus
equipped with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the other penalties
imposed to violators of those constitutional rights.

The victim may or may not get back the thing seized, depending on whether it is
contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it would not be returned, and only its
suppression can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for its return,
even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Civil Action for Damages
A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.

In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended,
the court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even
against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to recover damages for the
illegal searches and seizures made in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can
indirectly inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege.
Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA 590, RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly
record such communications by means of a tape recorder. The law does not make a
distinction.
Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699, the right may be invoked against the wife who went to
the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private
communications between her husband and his alleged paramour.
ºShould in camera inspection of bank accounts be allowed?
 Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before
a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to
be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank vs. CA, Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as
amended, declares bank deposit to be absolutely confidential except:
1. In an examination made in the course of special or general examination of a
bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity
has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into deposit to
establish such fraud or irregularity;
2. In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct
its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the
results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank;
3. Upon written permission of the depositor;
4. In case of impeachment;
5. Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials; or
6. In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
In the case of Marquez vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, there is
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge
Amado Lagdameo, et al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case
in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Human Security Act of 2007
Section 3, HAS of 2007, provides that the authorities may, upon a written order
of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form,
kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking
devices, or with the use of any suitable ways and means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words
between members of terrorist group. Provided, That surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctor and patients,
journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be
authorized.
Sec. 4, Article III
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
The rule on privileged communications has its genesis not in the nation’s penal
code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
the press. As early as 1918, in US vs. Cañete, 38 Phil 253, the SC ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be
abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the
statute punishing libel. (Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)
The freedom to speak includes the right to be silent. This freedom includes also
includes the right to an audience, in the sense that the State cannot prohibit the people
from hearing what a person has to say, whatever be the quality of his thoughts. This
right, however, is not demandable against those unwilling to listen, who may not be
herded by the government into a captive audience.
Types of Privileged Communications:
1. Absolutely privileged communications—those which are not actionable even
if the author acted in bad faith. An example is found in Article VI, Section 11
which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications—those contained defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong “private communications” and
“fair and true report without any comments or remarks.”
Freedom of Expression—
Aspect:
1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and
2. Freedom from subsequent punishment.
Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is
to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability
whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. (Chavez vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338, February
15, 2008)
Restrictions on Free Speech:
1. Content-based Restrictions—are imposed because of the content of the
speech itself; distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually
imposed because of fear how people will react to a particular speech.
-Subject to the Clear-and-Present danger Rule Test
In Sanidad vs. COMELEC, a rule prohibiting columnists, commentators,
and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite
must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny.
These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional validity. In addition, they will be tested for possible
overbreadth and vagueness.
2. Content-neutral Restrictions—are those which are not concerned with the
content of the speech.
-The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for
determining the constitutional validity of laws.
Tests for a valid Governmental Interference:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Clear and Present Danger Rule—when words are used in such circumstance
and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about
substantive evil that state has the right to prevent.
2. Dangerous Tendency Rule—words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an
evil which State has the right to prevent.
3. Balancing of Interest Test—when particular conduct is regulated in interest of
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2
conflicting interests demand greater protection under the particular
circumstances presented.
In the case of Adiong vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 713, the SC held that the
posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the
citizens becomes crucial in this kind of propaganda, not the financial resources of the
candidate. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his
personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment
of his liberties. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the COMELEC
becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Doctrine of Fair Comment—
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or slander. It means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from the facts. (Borjal
vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)
Right to Assemble and Petition Government
The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint and may not be conditioned
upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities.
However, the right must be exercised in such a way as will not prejudice the public
welfare.
If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such place, and
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
not for the assembly itself may be validly required. Power of local officials is merely for
regulation and not for prohibition. (Primicias vs. Fugoso, L-1800, January 27, 1948)
Permit for public assembly is not necessary if meeting is to be held in:
a. A private place;
b. The campus of a government-owned or operated educational institution; or
c. A freedom park.
The provisions of BP 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985) are not absolute ban on
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. The Court referred to it as content-neutral regulation.
Test for Lawful Assembly:
1. Purpose Test—the purpose for which the assembly is held regardless of the
auspices under which it is organized; and
2. Auspices Test.
In the case of Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Calibrated
Pre-emptive Response (CPR) serves no valid purpose if it means the something else.
Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means “the highest degree of restraint
that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in dispersal of the same.
Sec. 5, Article III
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Religion—any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc., often involving a code of
ethics and a philosophy
It is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator. (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201)
Freedom of Religion—
1. Non-Establishment Clause
Scope:
a. State cannot set-up church;
b. Cannot pass laws which aid one religion, all religions or prefer one over
another;
c. Nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will;
nor
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
d. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
2. Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship
Dual aspect of Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship:
a. Freedom to believe—absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought; and
b. Freedom to act on one’s belief—subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
Ecclesiastical Affair—it involves the relationship between the church and its members
and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation to which the state cannot meddle.
Benevolent Neutrality—recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interest but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
T
hree (3)-Step process of the compelling State Interest Test
1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of
religion?
2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of
religious liberty?
3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state? (Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-
1651, June 22, 2006)

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent, 219 SCRA 256, to compel students to take
part in a flag ceremony when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom. Petitioners have the right to refuse to salute to the Philippine flag on account
of their religious freedom.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529, the INC’s postulate that its religious freedom
is per se beyond review of the MTRCB should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TV of
its religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public
welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
continues to be a volatile area of concern in our society today. “For sure, we shall
continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a
heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of a
man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand
still.”
Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005,
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities
in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the
members of the religious institution/organization to conform to just church regulations.
Religious Tests
The constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed against clandestine
attempts on the part of the government to prevent a person from exercising his civil or
political rights because of his religious beliefs.
Sec. 6, Article III
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Liberty of Abode and Travel
The purpose of the guaranty is to further emphasize the individual’s liberty as
safeguarded in general terms by the due process clause. Liberty under that clause
includes the right to choose one’s residence, to leave it whenever he pleases, and to
travel where he wills.
Limitation on Liberty of Abode: upon Lawful order of the court
Restrictions on Right to Travel:
1. Interest of national security;
2. Public safety;
3. Public health; or
4. Any person on bail.
In Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil 851, a maid has the right to transfer to another
residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced for her transportation from
the province by an employment agency which was then effectively detaining her.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the Mayor of Manila was not sustained by the
SC when he deported some 170 women of ill-repute to Davao, for the admittedly
commendable purpose of ridding the city for serious moral and health problems. These
women are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guarantees as are other citizens—to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality.
Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660, the respondents were justified in requiring the
members of certain non-Christian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their better
education, advancement and protection. The measure was held to be a legitimate
exercise of police power.
Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil 595, health officers may restrict access to
contaminated areas and also quarantine those already exposed to the disease sought
to be contained.
Zemel vs. Rusk, 381 US 1, the Secretary of State may regulate or even prohibit the
travel of citizens to hostile countries to prevent possible international misunderstanding
and conflict.
Section 26 of HAS of 2007—cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the
person charged with the crime of terrorism as therein defined is entitled to bail and if
granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right to
travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the
case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety.
Sec. 7, Article III
The right of the people to information on matters of public concerned shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public Concern
The citizen has a right to know what is going on in the country and in his
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
government so he can express his views thereon knowledgeably and intelligently. One
cannot question the extravagance of the government, for example, if is denied
examination of official vouchers. A citizen may not expose anomaly if those responsible
for it may validly prevent him from investigating their activities. In the interest of truth
and fairness, the citizen should not be made to guess only at what is being done by
public functionaries and to base his views and conclusions on mere rumors, half-truths,
conjectures and even canards.
Recognized restrictions:
1. National security matters and intelligence information—this jurisdiction
recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters;
2. Trade or industrial secrets—(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code, RA
8293 and other related laws and banking transactions—pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act, RA 1405);
3. Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution
and the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such
arrest, detention and prosecution; and
4. Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits
public officials and employees from using or divulging “confidential or classified
information to the public.” [Section 7 (c), RA 6713] Other acknowledged
limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either House of congress, as well as
the internal deliberations of the SC. (Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744)
Rights guaranteed:
1. Right to information on matters of public concern; and
2. Corollary right of access to official records and documents
BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314, May 4, 2007, the right to
information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise. The people’s right to know is limited to matters of public concern
and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy
of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving “public interest’ and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRa 256—the information sought must be “matters
of public concern,” access to which may be limited by law. The information sought by
petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasan Pambansa
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
belonging to the opposition were able to secure ‘clean’ loans from the GSIS immediately
before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady
Imelda Marcos. x x x The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of
public interest and concern.
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the SC affirmed the right of the petitioner to
secure from the Civil Service Commission information regarding the civil service
eligibility of certain persons employed in the health department of the Cebu City
government.
Sec. 8, Article III
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.
Right to Form associations—shall not be impaired without due process of law;
guarantees the right not to join an association. (Sta. Clara Homeowners Association
vs. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002)
This right is especially meaningful in a free society because a man is by nature
gregarious. His disposition to mix with others of the same persuasions, interests or
objectives is guaranteed by this provision. It also expressly guarantees to those
employed in the public and private sectors the right to form unions.
This right is available also to those in the government sectors.
It is a settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sectors do
not enjoy the right to strike. The general rule in the past and up to present is that the
‘terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.’ x x x. Since the terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. x x x In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. (Alliance
of Concerned Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124
SCRA 1)
In the case of Jacinto vs. CA, 281 SCRA 657, the SC held that petitioners were
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found
them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their school during regular school days, in
order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-
holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were
responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time—recess, after
classes, weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the
proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one—not the DECS, the CSC or even
the SC—could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their
activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by
the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature was
enjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore,
be made answerable.
GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G. R. No. 170132, December 6,
2006, it was against the backdrop of the provisions of the Constitution that the Court
resolved that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted
and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize
is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
It may be, as the appellate court urged, that the freedom of expression and assembly
and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a level
higher than economic and other liberties.
Sec. 9, Article III
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
(See discussions Under Eminent Domain)
Sec. 10, Article III
No law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to
the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or the circumstances may
change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid
contractual agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they
should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws that
will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must not
be impaired.
However, the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute. There are
instances when contracts valid at the time of their conclusion may become invalid, or
some of their provisions may be rendered inoperative or illegal, by virtue of supervening
legislation.
Limitations:
1. Police power—prevails over contracts;
2. Eminent domain—may impair obligation of contracts; and
3. Taxation—cannot impair obligation of contracts.
Impairment—anything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract
There is impairment when there is change in the terms of a legal contract
between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,
or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different
from that provided in its terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922)
Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November
29, 2006, in unequivocal terms, the SC have consistently held that such licenses
concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered
contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
Sec. 11, Article III
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Inspired by t social justice policy and covered by the equal protection clause, this
rule has been implemented by several provisions of the Rules of Court in favor of the
pauper litigant. The IBP provides deserving indigents with free legal aid, including
representation in court, and similar services available from the DOJ to litigants who
cannot afford retained counsel, like the accused in a criminal case who can ask for the
assistance of counsel de officio. There are also private legal assistance organizations
now functioning for the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be unable to
resort to the courts of justice because only of their misfortune of being poor. This
provision makes them the equal of the rich before the law.
Sec. 12, Article III
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
Rights of an Accused under Custodial Investigation
Exist only in custodial interrogation
Available when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that tend to elicit incriminating
statements.
Custodial Investigation—
Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
It shall include the practice of issuing “invitation” to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of the law. (RA 7438)
People vs. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253, February 21, 2001, the accused should
have been entitled to Miranda rights, because even assuming that he was not yet under
interrogation at the time he was brought to the police station, his confession was elicited
by a police officer who promised to help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when he
allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, the atmosphere was highly intimidating and
not conducive to a spontaneous response as the whole police force and nearly 100
townspeople escorted him there. Not having the benefit of counsel and not having been
informed of his rights, the confession is inadmissible.
Miranda rights—
(Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436)
x x x The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminations. By custodial
interrogation, it means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for
the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
informed accused-persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuations of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage
of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of
the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney
and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the
purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused.
People vs. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002, it was held that this guarantee
does not apply to spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admitted having
committed the offense. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a
suspect before he was placed under custodial investigation. In this case, the narration
before the Barangay Captain prior to custodial investigation was admissible in
evidence, but not the admissions made before Judge Dicon, inasmuch as the
questioning by the judge was done after the suspect had been arrested and such
questioning already constituted custodial investigation.
Rights guaranteed:
1. Right to remain silent;
2. Right to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
at all stages of the investigation;
Independent and competent counsel—willing to safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused
3. Right to be informed of such rights;
Rationale:
a. to make him aware of it;
b. to overcome the inherent pressure o the interrogating atmosphere; and
c. to show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to invoke it.
4. Right to be provided with counsel, if the person cannot afford one;
These rights cannot be waives except in writing and in the presence of counsel; it is not
required in a police-line up as the latter is not part of a custodial inquest.
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
5. No torture, force, etc. which vitiate free will shall be used;
6. Secret detention places are prohibited; and
7. Confession/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in
evidence.
Ways of identifying the suspects During Custodial Investigation:
1. Show-ups (out-of-court identification)—where the suspect alone is brought face
to face with the witness for identification;
People vs. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35, January 16, 2002, the accused,
having become the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to
by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, it was held that when
the out-of-court identification was conducted by the police, the accused was
already under custodial investigation.
2. Mug shots—where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect; and
3. Police Line ups—where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose. It is not considered a part of any custodial
inquest because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached
(People vs. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999). The process has
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory stage, and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the
course of the line-up (People vs. Amestuzo, July 12, 2001).
Factors in Resolving the Admissibility of and Relying on Out-of-Court Identification of
Suspects: TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
1. The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. The witness’ degree of attention at that time;
3. The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
5. The length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Two (2) kinds of Involuntary or Coerced Confessions:
1. Those which are the product of 3
rd
degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12;
and
2. Those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
Extrajudicial Confessions—are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing the declarant’s consent in executing the same has been
vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
To be admissible, it must be:
1. Voluntary;
2. Made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Express; and
4. In writing.
Investigations not considered custodial interrogation
1. Those conducted by an audit examiner
2. Those conducted by the Court Administrator
3. Those conducted by the employer
For the reason that these people are not law enforcement officers
However, in the case of People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001, after an
audit, the accused was summoned to appear before the Assistant Accountant of
MetroBank and, in the course of the interview, accused admitted having issued the
subject cashier’s checks without any legitimate transaction, the written confession was
held admissible in evidence inasmuch as the interview did not constitute custodial
investigation.
Ladiana vs. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 24, 2002, the counter-affidavit
submitted by the respondent during preliminary investigation is admissible because
preliminary investigation is not part of custodial investigation. The interrogation by the
police, if any would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case
in court or in the public prosecutor’s office.
Spontaneous statements—those elicited through questioning by law enforcement
officers, but given in an ordinary manner where the appellant verbally admits to having
committed the offense, are admissible. (People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786,
January 20, 2004)
WAIVER—
It must be in writing and made in the presence of the counsel. The burden of
proving that there was a valid waiver rests on the prosecution. The presumption of
official duty has been regularly performed cannot prevail over the presumption of
innocence.
What may be waived?
1. Right to remain silent
2. Right to counsel
Exclusionary Rule—
Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sections 12 and 17 of Article III
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Fruit of the poisonous tree—once the primary source is shown to have been lawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is inadmissible.
Evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
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100
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
evidence because the originally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained.
Sec. 13, Article III
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released or recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Right to Bail
Bail—the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be
required.
× The right to bail may be invoked by any person once detention commences even
if no formal charges have yet to be filed;
× It can availed of by a person who is in custody of law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty;
× Suspension of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus does not suspend the
right to bail;
× Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail
before conviction if it is a matter of right. The remedy is to increase the amount of
bail;
× Right to bail has not been recognized and is not available to the military.
Standards for fixing amount of bail:
1. Financial ability of the accused;
2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Age and health of the accused;
6. Weight of evidence against the accused;
7. Probability of appearance at trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bonds by him;
9. He was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. Pendency of other cases where he is also under bail.
Bail as a matter of right—
All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law:
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101
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and
2. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
3. The evidence of guilt is not strong.
Bail when discretionary—
1. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused
to bail.
2. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty after the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent
of the bondsman.
3. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
shall be cancelled, upon showing by the following or other similar circumstances:
a. That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion;
b. That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
c. That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or
under conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicates the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.

Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion—reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his
recommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into
account a number of factors.
When bail shall be denied—
× No person, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, shall be admitted
to bail if:
a. Charged with capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment; and
b. Evidence of guilt is strong.
× When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or higher, a hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
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102
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
× Without a hearing, the judge could not possibly asses the weight of the evidence
against the accused before granting the latter’s application for bail.
(See the cases of Government of USA vs. Hon. Purganan and
Government of Hongkong vs. Judge Olalia)
Sec. 14, Article III
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rights of the Accused:
1. Criminal due process:
a. Opportunity to be heard in court of competent jurisdiction;
b. The accused must proceed against under orderly processes of law;
c. He must be given notice and opportunity to be heard; and
d. The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.
2. Presumption of innocence—
Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken
into account. The proof against him must not be permitted to sway
judgment and the presumption that official duty was regularly performed
cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.
3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel
4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
Objectives:
a. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make the defense;
b. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and
c. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
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103
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-Description, not designation, of the offense is controlling.
Void-for-Vagueness Rule—the accused is denied the right to be informed of the
charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is
couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary
intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and,
hence, shall be avoided.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, every
legislative measure is presumed constitutional. Petitioner failed to discharge the
burden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial—
Impartial—the judge must not be bias and not motivated by malice or bad faith
6. Right to meet witness face to face—
Witnesses not submitted for cross-examination are not admissible as evidence.
However, right to cross-examination may be waived.
7. Right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production
of evidence
8. Trial in Absentia
× After arraignment;
× Due notice; and
× Absence is unjustified.
Plea of guilt to a capital offense—
1. There must be searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension of the consequences thereof;
2. Presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability;
3. The accused must be asked if he desire to present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he so desires.
Sec. 15, Article III
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires.
(Relate this to Section 18, Article VII)
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104
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Writ of habeas corpus—
A writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever court or
judge awarding writ shall consider in his behalf.
It lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged to
be illegal or unlawful.
A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that
petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. (SP02 Manalo vs.
PNP Chief Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007)
Sec. 16, Article III
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Enriquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174902-06, February 15, 2008,
this right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simple
mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. In ascertaining whether the
right to a speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be
considered:
1. The length of delay;
2. The reasons for the delay;
3. The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
4. The prejudice caused by the delay. (Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165975, September 13, 2007)
Sec. 17, Article III
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Right against self-incrimination—
Availability:
Not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings,
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105
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations
May be claimed not only by accused but by any witness to whom an
incriminating question is addressed.
Scope:
It applies only against testimonial compulsion and production of documents,
papers and chattels in court except when books of account are to be examined in
exercise of power of taxation and police power.
Two (2) types of Immunity Statutes:
1. Transactional Immunity Statute—testimony of any person or whose possession
of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in
any investigation conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offense
to which such compelled testimony relates; and
2. Use Immunity Statute—prohibits the use of a witness’ compelled testimony and
its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
Sec. 18, Article III
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Right against Involuntary Servitude
It is a condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and
against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.
General Rule: No involuntary servitude shall exist.
Exceptions:
1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted;
2. Service in defense of the State;
3. Naval enlistment;
4. Posse commitatus;
5. Return to work order in industries affected with public interest; and
6. Patria potestas.
Sec. 19, Article III
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
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106
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against
any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Prohibited Punishments
Mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. To violate
constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive,
disproportionate to nature of offense as to shock senses of community.
Sec. 20, Article III
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Coverage:
1. Debt—any civil obligation arising from contract
2. Poll tax—a specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class
without regard to property or occupation.
-A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law hence, its non-payment
may be validly punished with imprisonment.
Sec. 21, Article III
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Right against Double Jeopardy
Requisites:
1. A valid complaint or information;
2. Filed before competent court;
3. To which defendant has pleaded; and
4. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Two (2) types:
1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense;
2. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
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107
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
Legal Jeopardy Attaches Only:
1. Upon a valid indictment;
2. Before a competent court;
3. After arraignment;
4. When a valid plea has been entered and
5. The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused.
General Rule: Dismissal of action, when made at the instance of the accused, does not
put the accused in first jeopardy.
Exceptions:
1. When ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence; or
2. When the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the right
of the accused of a speedy trial.
Crimes covered:
1. Same offense; or attempt to commit or frustration thereof or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
original complaint or information; and
2. When an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall bar another prosecution for the same act.
Doctrine of Supervening Event—prosecution for another offense if subsequent
development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have
already been charged or convicted.
Conviction of accused shall not bar another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense originally charged when:
1. Graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission;
2. Facts constituting graver offense arose or discovered only after filing of
former complaint or information; and
3. Plea of guilty to lesser offense was made without the consent of prosecutor or
offended party.
Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169509, June 16, 2006, for double jeopardy to
attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the said
charge.
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108
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
People vs. Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, et al., G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006, after trial on
the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where
there is finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
Sec. 22, Article III
No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Right against Ex-Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder
Ex-Post Facto Law—
The equivalent of the impairment clause in criminal matters is the prohibition
against the passage of the ex post facto law. This is because the ex post facto law, like
the law impairing the obligation of the contracts, operates retroactively to affect
antecedent acts. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operates
prospectively since its structures would cover only offenses committed after and not
before its enactment. Basically, an ex post facto law is one that would make a previous
act criminal although it was not so at the time it was committed.
Kinds:
1. Law criminalizing act done before its passage;
Example: A law passed in 1990 raising the age of seduction from 18 to 25
years, effective 1980
2. Law aggravating penalty for crime committed before passage;
Example: A law passed in 2000 designating the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence as murder, effective 1990
3. Law that changes punishment, and inflicts greater or more severe punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
Example: A law passed in 2000 increasing the penalty for libel from prision
correccional to prision mayor, effective 1990
4. Law altering legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than
law required at the time of commission, in order to convict accused;
Example: A law passed in 2000 requiring for conviction merely preponderance
of evidence instead of proof beyond reasonable doubt, effective 1990
5. Law assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty of deprivation of right for something which when done was lawful; and
Example: A law passed in 2000 depriving professionals of the right to practice
for failure or refusal to vote, effective 1990.
6. Law depriving accused of some lawful protection to which he had been entitled,
such a protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a proclamation of
amnesty.
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109
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Example: A law passed in 2000 lengthening the period for prescription of
blackmail from 5 to 10 years, effective 1990.
Characteristics:
1. It refers to criminal matters;
2. It is retroactive in application; and
3. It works to the prejudice of the accused.
In the case of US vs. Gomez Colonel, 12 Phil 279, an information for adultery
filed by the prosecutor was dismissed by the SC on the ground that at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, prosecution could be commenced only on complaint
of the offended spouse. It was held that the amendatory law permitting the prosecutor to
initiate the charge was ex post facto.
Bill of Attainder—
• It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial
• It is a legislative declaration of guilt
• Essential:
1. Specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals;
2. The imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise; and
3. Lack of judicial trial.
It substitute legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Thus, it is only
when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members
of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial that it
becomes a bill of attainder.
Article IV
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship- is membership in a political community which is personal and more
or less permanent in character.
Nationality- is membership in any class or form of political community. Thus,
nationals may be citizens [if member of a democratic community] or subjects [if
members of a monarchial community]. It does not necessarily include the right or
privilege of exercising political and civil rights.
Usual modes of acquiring citizenship:
a. By Birth
i. Jus sanguinis-by blood
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110
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
ii. Jus soli-by birth
b. By Naturalization
c. By Marriage
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of JUS SANGUINIS.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his birth, as opposed to the doctrine of JUS SOLI which determines the
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. (Valles vs. COMELEC, 337
SCRA 543)
Modes (by birth) applied in the Philippines
A. Before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
i. Jus Sanguinis. All inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899, and residing in the islands who did not declare their
intention of preserving Spanish nationality between said date and October
11, 1900, were declared citizens of the Philippines [Sec. 4, Philippine Bill
of 1902; Sec. 2, Jones Law of 1916], and their children born after April 11,
1899. (en masse Filipinization)
ii. Jus Soli. Those declared as Filipino citizens by the courts are recognized
as such today, not because of the application of the jus soli principle, but
principally because of the doctrine of res judicata.
B. After the adoption of the 1935 Constitution: Only the Jus Sanguinis doctrine.
Section 1, Article IV— The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution; (February 2, 1987)
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (jus sanguinis)
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2, Article IV— Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia, to spouses
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Is she a Filipino citizen and, therefore, qualified to run for
Governor of her province?
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111
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
#Historically, she was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the organic
acts by which the US governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones
Law.
These laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine Islands.
Xxx Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo, was born on January 5, 1879
in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in
the registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the law in force at the time of her birth, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is likewise a
citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship xxx. This principle confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship. It was subsequently retained under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting
to her possession of dual citizenship. (Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, August
9, 2000)
Maria Jeanette Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004 (on the
controversy surrounding the citizenship of FPJ) –The Court took note of the fact that
Lorenzo Pou (grandfather of FPJ), who died in 1954 at the age of 84 years of age,
would have been born sometime in 1870, when the Philippines was under the Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization”
that the Philippine Bill of 1902 effected. That Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (father of FPJ). The 1935
Constitution, during which regime FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to
all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Marriage by Filipino to an alien: “Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law,
to have renounced it” [Sec.4, Art. IV].
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112
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter
No. 914, October 1, 1999— Vicente Ching, a legitimate child, having been born on
April 11, 1964 of Filipino mother and an alien father, was already 35 years old when he
complied with the requirements of CA 625 on June 15, 1999, or over 14 years after he
had reached the age of majority. By any reasonable yardstick, Ching’s election was
clearly beyond the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. All his acts
(passing the CPA and Bar Exams) cannot vest in him citizenship as the law gives him
the requirement for election of Filipino citizenship which he did not comply with. (He was
not allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath)
The proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the US government to the effect that the
election should be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority.
The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority except when there is
justifiable reason to delay.
The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached 21 until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority”.
®(If his parents were not married, he will follow the citizenship of his mother and he need not elect Philippine citizenship. )·©
Caram provision. Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Islands are
considered citizens of the Philippines. In Chiongbian vs. de Leon, the SC held that the
right acquired by virtue of this provision is transmissible.
Re: 1973 Constitution: Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Provision is
prospective in application; to benefit only those born on or after January 17, 1973 (date
of effectivity of 1973 Constitution).
- If born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, the person must elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. [Within reasonable time=3 years except
when there is justifiable reason to delay]
Procedure for election of Philippine citizenship:
1. Election is expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any official authorized to administer oaths.
2. Statement to be filed with the nearest Civil Registry accompanied with the
Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines
[Sec. 1, CA 625].
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines—Prospective
application, consistent with the 1973 Constitution.
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113
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-The right to elect Philippine citizenship is an inchoate right; during his minority, the
child is an alien [Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration 80 Phil. 541].
-The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. In Republic vs. Chule Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004,
it was held that the respondent, who was concededly an illegitimate child considering
that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married, is not required to
comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements. Being an illegitimate child of
a Filipino mother, respondent became a Filipino upon birth. Record shows that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of electing Philippine citizenship.
Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under CA No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and
by RA 530.
To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision
granting Philippine citizenship becomes executor only after 2 years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant:
1. Has not left the Philippines;
2. Has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession;
3. Has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; or
4. Has not committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary
to any government announced policies. [Sec. 1, RA 530] (Bengzon III vs.
HRET, G.R. No. 142840, may 7, 2001)
Qualifications that must be possessed by an applicant:
1. He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of petition;
2. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
10 years; may be reduced to 5 years if:
a. he honorably held office in Government;
b. He established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the
Philippines;
c. He is married to a Filipino woman;
d. Has been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines (in a public or private
school not established for the exclusive instruction of persons of a
particular nationality or race) or in any of the branches of education or
industry for a period of not less than 2 year; or
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114
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
e. He was born in the Philippines
3. He must be of GMC and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation
with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living;
4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000.00,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation;
5. He must be able to write and speak English or Spanish and any of the principal
languages; and
6. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of private Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Filipino citizen. (Bengzon III vs. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, may
7, 2001)
Disqualifications:
1. Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
2. Those defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success of predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers of polygamy;
4. Those convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5. Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease;
6. Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of Filipinos;
7. Those citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during
the period of such war;
8. Those citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Procedure:
1. Filing of declaration of intention- 1 year prior to the filing of the Petition with the
OSG
Persons exempt from filing declaration of intention :
a. Those born in the Philippines and received their primary and secondary
education in public or private schools recognized by the Government and
not limited to any race or nationality;
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115
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
b. Those resided in the Philippines for 30 years or more before the filing of
the petition, and enrolled their children in elementary and HS recognized
by the government and not limited to any race or nationality;
c. Those widows and minor children of aliens who have declared their
intention to become citizens of the Philippines and die before they are
actually naturalized.
2. Filing of the Petition, accompanied by the affidavit of 2 credible persons, citizens
of the Philippines, who personally know the petitioner, as character witness;
3. Publication of the Petition in the O.G. or in a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. Failure to comply is fatal. (Po Yo Bi vs.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400)
4. Actual residence in the Philippines during the entire proceedings.
5. Hearing of the Petition.
6. Promulgation of the decision.
7. Hearing after 2 years. During the 2-year probation period, applicant has:
a. Not left the Philippines;
b. Dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
c. Not been convicted of any offense or violation of rules; and
d. Not committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
government-announced policies.
8. Oath taking and issuance of Certificate of Naturalization.
Modes of Naturalization:
1. DIRECT - through:
d. Judicial or administrative proceedings- e.g. RA 9139 The Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000—grants Philippine citizenship to aliens born
and residing in the Philippines
e. Special act of legislature- this is discretionary on Congress; usually
conferred on an alien who has made an outstanding contribution to the
country
f. Collective change of nationality, as a result of cessation or subjugation
g. Some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State
where they are born
2. DERIVATIVE -Citizenship conferred on:
a. Wife of naturalized husband;
b. Minor children of naturalized person;
c. Alien woman upon marriage to a national.
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116
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Edison So vs. RP, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007—Naturalization signifies the
act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or
her with privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are 3 ways by
which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization:
a. Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139;
b. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA No. 473, as amended—covers all aliens
regardless of class; and
c. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
It is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character
but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.
A naturalization proceeding is nota judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleadintg
the court upon any material fact.
RA 9139—not all aliens may avail of this remedy. Only native born aliens who have
been residing here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country
and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty
to the Philippines, and affinity to the customs and traditions of the Filipinos.
Naturalization Repatriation
-mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of citizenship
-governed by CA 473 (for acquisition) and
CA 63 (for reacquisition)
-consists a lengthy process
-mode for reacquisition for those who lost
their citizenship
-governed by various statutes
-consists of taking of an oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering said oath in the
LCR of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided
Effects of Naturalization:
1. Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized; (She need not
go through the naturalization process; if she doesn’t suffer from any disqualification, no need to
prove the qualifications)
2. Minor children born in the Philippines before the naturalization shall be
considered citizens of the Philippines;
3. Minor children born outside the Philippines who were residing in the Philippines
at the time of naturalization shall be considered Filipino citizens.
4. Minor children born outside the Philippines before parent’s naturalization shall be
considered Filipino citizens only during minority, unless they begin to reside
permanently in the Philippines;
5. Child born outside the Philippines after parent’s naturalization shall be
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117
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
considered Filipino citizen, provided that he registers as such before any
Philippine consulate within one year after attaining majority age, and takes his
oath of allegiance.
Denaturalization
Grounds:
1. Naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. Within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and
establishes residence there;
-Prima Facie evidence of intent to take up residence:
a. Native country- 1-year stay
b. Foreign country- 2-year stay
3. Petition was made on an invalid declaration of intent;
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents either by
neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school;
5. Allowed himself to be used as a dummy;
In Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244, although misconduct was committed after the 2-
year probationary period, conviction of perjury and rape was held to be valid ground for
denaturalization.
Effects of Denaturalization:
1. If the ground affects the intrinsic validity of the proceedings, denaturalization
shall divest the wife and children of their derivative naturalization;
2. If the ground was personal to the denaturalized person, his wife and children
shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
Policy against Dual Allegiance : “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law” [Sec. 5, Art. IV].
The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160, Section 40(d) LGC must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon filing of their Certificates of
Candidacy (COC), they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time, forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
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118
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment.
The filing of a COC suffices to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification as dual citizen. This is so because in the COC, one declares that he
is a Filipino citizen and that he will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain
true faith and allegiance to the same. Such declaration under oath operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case, the Court adopted the liberal
interpretation of the rule. Manzano is not really prohibited to run due to dual citizenship.
Dual allegiance is the one prohibited. Dual citizenship referred to under Section 40 (d)
of the Local Government Code refers to dual allegiance under Section 5 of Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution.[Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999]
Section 5, Article IV—Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.
This section is not a self-executing law. It needs an implementing law.
Section 40 (d), LGC—Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from
running from any elective local election:
x x x
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
x x x.
The provision prohibits dual citizenship but the Supreme Court ruled that it refers to
prohibition on dual allegiance.
Doctrine of INDELIBLE ALLEGIANCE: an individual may be compelled to retain his
original nationality even if he has already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the
second State whose nationality he has acquired.
Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance
·arises as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of 2 or
more states, a person is simultaneously
considered as a national of said states
·involuntary
·refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to 2 or more states
·voluntary
Calilung vs. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007, what RA 9225 does is
allow dual citizenship to natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces its foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, RA 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country.
What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.
Instances when a citizen of the Philippines may possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their father’s country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. [Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May
26, 1999]
Res judicata in cases involving citizenship:
General Rule: It does not apply to questions of citizenship.
Exception: In Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248, an exception to the general rule was
recognized provided the following must be present:
1. A person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party;
2. The Solicitor general or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and
3. The finding on citizenship is affirmed by SC.
Although the GR was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may
somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to
make the effort easier or simpler. (Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, August 9,
2000).
Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
A. Loss of citizenship:
1. By naturalization in a foreign country (Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA
245) However, this was modified by RA 9225—An Act Making the Citizenship
of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent—
September 15, 2003 which declares the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
× They may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance
× Those Filipino citizens who, after the effectivity of RA 9225, become
citizens of a foreign country, may reacquire Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance
× Unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18
years of age, of those who reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon the
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120
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
effectivity of RA 9225 shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
× Those who reacquire or retain Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
o Meet the requirements of RA 9189, The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, and other existing laws
o For those seeking elective public office and appointive office, meet
the qualifications, make personal and sworn renunciation,
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the RP
o For those intending to practice their profession, apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice
2. By express renunciation of citizenship
× Conscious, voluntary and intelligent renunciation
Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1, Labo lost Filipino citizenship because
he expressly renounced allegiance to the Philippines when he applied for
Australian citizenship.
× Express renunciation means a renunciation made known distinctly and
explicitly, and not left to inference or implication.
× Mere registration of alien in BID and mere possession of foreign passport
do not constitute effective renunciation. (Valles vs. COMELEC)
× In Willie Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364, obtaining a
Portuguese passport and signing commercial documents as a Portuguese
were construed as renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country upon attaining the age of 21; provided, however, that a Filipino
may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in this manner while RP is at war
with any country. –an application of the principle of Indelible Allegiance.—by
virtue of RA 9225
4. By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country EXCEPT:
× If RP has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
foreign country; and
× The said foreign country maintains armed forces in Philippine territory with
the consent of RP
5. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
6. By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the
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121
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Philippine armed forces in time of war UNLESS subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted.
B. Reacquisition of citizenship:
1. Under RA 9225, by taking an oath of allegiance
2. By naturalization
3. By repatriation
4. By direct act of Congress
Effect of repatriation:
It allows the person to recover or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship. Thus, the respondent, a former natural-born Filipino citizen who
lost his Philippine citizenship when he enlisted in the US Marine Corps, was deemed to
have recovered his natural-born status when he reacquired Filipino citizenship through
repatriation. (Bengzon III vs. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001)
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa vs. CA, G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006, the only
persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a) Filipino women who
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b) Natural-born Filipinos
including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity.
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122
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article V
S U F F R A G E
Section 1
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Section 2
The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballots as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to
vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to
vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Right of Suffrage—
Right to vote in election of officers chosen by people and in the determination of
questions submitted to people.
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123
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
ELECTION—is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people.
It is the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed
period and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of
government.
Kinds:
1. REGULAR ELECTION—refers to an election participated in by those who
possess the right of suffrage and not disqualified by law and who are registered
voters. It is the election of officers either nationwide or in certain subdivisions
thereof, after expiration of full term of the former members.
a. National Election —
i. for President and VP—every 6 years
ii. for Senators—every 3 years
Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996, the SK Election is
not a regular election because the latter is participated in by youth with ages ranging
from 15-18, as per RA 9164, some of whom are not qualified voters to elect local or
national elective officials.
b. Local Elections —
i. For Members of HOR—
ii. Party-List Representatives—
iii. Provincial Officials— Every 3 years from the
2
nd

iv. City Officials— Monday of May 1992
v. Municipal Officials—
c. Barangay Elections —every 3 years after July 2002 to be held on the last
Monday of October, synchronized with the SK elections
d. ARRM Elections —
i. For Regional Governor—
ii. Regional Vice Governor— Every 3 years from March 1993
iii. Regional Assemblymen—
e. Sanggguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections -- every 3 years after July 2002 to
be held on the last Monday of October, synchronized with the Barangay
elections
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124
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. SPECIAL ELECTION—when there is a failure of election on the scheduled date
of regular election in a particular place or which is conducted to fill up certain
vacancies, as provided by law. This is being held to fill any vacancy in an office
before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected.
a. Plebiscite —electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people.
b. Initiative —power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through election called for the
purpose
i. Initiative on the Constitution
ii. Initiative on Statutes
iii. Initiative on Local Legislation
c. Referendum —power of the electorate to approve or reject a piece of
legislation through an election called for the purpose.
i. Referendum on Statutes
ii. Referendum on Local Laws
d. Recall —mode of removal of an elective public officer by the people before
the end of his term of office
Components:
× Choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote
× Conduct of the polls
× Listing of voters
× Holding of electoral campaign
× Act of casting and receiving the ballots from the voters
× Counting he ballots
× Making election returns
× Proclaiming the winning candidates
COMMISSION ON ELECTION (COMELEC)
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body charged with the exclusive
power to administer and enforce laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections and other political exercises, such as plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and
recalls.
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125
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The periodic political exercises give meaning to the declaration in the
Constitution that, “sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.”
Powers and Functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, referendum, initiative and recall.
2. Exercise—
a. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective provincial and city officials;
b. Appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving—
i. Elective municipal officials decided by the trial courts of general
jurisdiction
ii. Elective barangay officials decided by the trial courts of limited
jurisdiction
-Decisions, final orders, or ruling of the COMELEC on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final and executory,
and not appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment
of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the government, including the AFP for the exclusive purpose
of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Registration of political parties, organization, or coalition/accreditation of citizens’
arms of the COMELEC.
6. File, upon verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for the
inclusion or exclusion of voters, investigate and where appropriate, prosecute
cases for violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
7. Recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
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126
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to it.
9. Submit to the President and Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscites, initiative, referendum, or recall.
POLITICAL PARTY—
A political party is any organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidate in public office.
To acquire juridical personality and to entitle it to rights and privileges granted to
political arties, it must be registered with COMELEC.
Party-List System Act (RA 7941)
(See Discussions under the Legislative Department)
VOTERS—
Qualifications:
1. Filipino citizen
2. At least 18 years of age on the day of the election
3. Resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately before the election
4. Resident of the city/municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election
5. Not otherwise disqualified by law
Requisites of Acquisition of Domicile by Choice
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
2. An intention to remain there; and
3. An intention to abandon the old residence.
Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, the meaning and purpose of residency
requirement—the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
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127
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
In Marcita Mamba Perez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, October 28, 1999, the fact
that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled
in another district. Thus, in Faypon vs. Quirino, the SC held that the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to
have abandoned or lost his residence.
Disqualifications:
1. Sentence by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year,
unless pardoned or granted amnesty; but right is reacquired before expiration of
5 years after service of sentence
2. Conviction by final judgment of any of the following crimes:
a. Crime involving disloyalty to the government
b. any crime against national security
c. Firearms laws
But right is reacquired before expiration of 5 years after service of sentence.
3. Insanity or incompetence declared by competent authority (Section 18, OEC)
REGISTRATION—
It refers to the act of accomplishing and filing a sworn application for registration
by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he
resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval of the
Election Registration Board (ERB).
Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to
the exercise of the right. Registration is a regulation, not a qualification. (Yra vs. Abano, 52
Phil 380)
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 (RA 8189)—General Registration of Voters
Continuing Registration—the personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours.
Registration shall be conducted everyday except 120 days before a regular election and
90 days before election (Sec. 8, RA 8189)
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128
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
In the case of Akbayan Youth vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26,
2001, the SC upheld the COMELEC’s denial of the request for two (2) additional
registration days in order to enfranchise more than 4 million youth who failed to register
on or before December 27, 2000. It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that
the determination of administrative agencies as to the operation, implementation and
application of law is accorded great weight, considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what
they can possibly do or not do under prevailing circumstances.
Petition for Inclusion (Sec. 34, RA 8189) and Exclusion (Sec. 35, RA 8189) of Voters in
the List
1. Jurisdiction
a. MTC—original and exclusive
b. RTC—appellate jurisdiction
c. SC—appellate jurisdiction over RTC on question of law
2. Petitioner
a. Inclusion
× Private person whose application was disapproved by the ERB or
whose name was stricken out from the list of voters
× COMELEC
b. Exclusion
× Any registered voter in the city or municipality
× Representative of political party
× Election officer
× COMELEC
3. Period of Filing
a. Inclusion—any day except 105 days before regular election or 75 days
before a special election
b. Exclusion—anytime except 100 days before a regular election or 65 days
before a special election
Annulment of Book of Voters—
1. Upon verified complaint of any voter, election officer or registered political party
or motu proprio, the COMELEC may annul the list of voters which was not
prepared in accordance with RA 8189 or whose preparation was affected with
fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or other similar
irregularity or is statistically improbable.
2. No list of voters shall be annulled 90 days before an election.
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129
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Ututalum vs. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335, annulment of the list of voters shall
not constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation contest.
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (RA 9189)
Absentee Voting—process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad
exercise their right to vote pursuant to the constitutional mandate that Congress shall
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad(Sec. 3a, RA 9189
and Section 2, Article V of the Constitution)
-It is an exception to the 6-month/1-year residency requirement.
Overseas Absentee Voter—citizens of the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of
election
Coverage: All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law at least 18 years of age on the day of elections, may vote for President, VP,
Senators and Party-List Representatives. (Sec. 4)
Disqualifications:
1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
2. Those who have expressly renounces their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged their allegiance to a foreign country;
3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than 1 year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of disloyalty, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty. Provided
however, that any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall
automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of 5 years after service of
sentence;
4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he executes, upon registration, an affidavit for the purpose by the
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130
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
COMELEC declaring that he shall resume actual physical residence not later
than 3 years from approval of his registration. Such affidavit shall also state that
he has not applied for citizenship in another country; and
5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by Philippine
embassies, consulate or foreign service establishment concerned.
Requirements for registration:
1. Valid passport
2. Accomplished registration form containing the following information:
a. Last known residence of the applicant in the Philippines before leaving for
abroad;
b. Address of applicant abroad or forwarding address in the case of
seafarers;
c. Where voting by mail is allowed, the applicant’s mailing address outside
the Philippines; and
d. Name and address of applicant’s authorized representative in the
Philippines.
-In case of immigrants and permanent residents not otherwise disqualified to vote, an
affidavit declaring the intention to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of his registration.
Makalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, Section 18.5 of RA
9189, insofar as it grants sweeping authority to the COMELEC to proclaim all winning
candidates, it is unconstitutional as it is repugnant to Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution, which vest in Congress the authority to proclaim the winning Presidential
or Vice-Presidential candidates.
CANDIDATES—
QUALIFICATIONS—continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of
the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required qualification is lost, his title to the
office may be seasonably changed. (Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245)
DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES
Under Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)
1. Any person declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent
Removal of DQ: declaration of removal of DQ by competent authority
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131
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. Any person sentenced by final judgment for any of the following offenses:
a. Subversion, insurrection or rebellion
b. Offense for which he was sentenced to penalty of more than 18 months
c. Crime involving moral turpitude
Villaber vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001, violation of BP
22 is a crime involving moral turpitude, because the accused knows at the time of the
issuance of the check that he does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon presentment. A conviction thereof
shows that the accused is guilty of deceit, and certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of the person.
Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
involves moral turpitude, and the only legal effect of probation is to suspend the
implementation of the sentence. Thus, the disqualification still subsists.
Removal of DQ: plenary pardon, amnesty, lapse of 5 years after service of
sentence
3. A permanent resident to or immigrant to a foreign country unless he waives such
status (OEC, Sections 12 and 68)
In the case of Caasi vs. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229, the SC said that a “green
card” is ample proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of, or immigrant to,
the United States.
4. One who has violated provisions on:
a. Campaign period;
b. Removal, destruction of lawful election propaganda;
c. Prohibited forms of propaganda;
d. Regulation of propaganda through mass media; and
e. Election offenses.
In Pangkat Laguna vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002, the
acts of Laguna Governor Lazaro in ordering the purchase of trophies, basketballs,
volleyballs, chessboard sets, and the distribution of medals and pins to various schools,
did not constitute a violation of Section 80 on premature campaigning. Respondent
Lazaro was not in any way directly or indirectly soliciting votes; she was merely
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which duties she had sworn
to perform as Governor of Laguna.
Codilla vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, when a
candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and
was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
Under Local Government Code (RA 7160)
1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or an
offense punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year, within 2 years after
service of sentence;
2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
Reyes vs. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514, the Mayor who had been ordered
removed from office by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, was disqualified, even as he
alleged that the decision was not yet final because he had not yet received a copy of the
decision, inasmuch as it was shown that he merely refused to accept delivery of the
copy of the decision.
3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
4. Those with dual citizenship;
(See the case of Mercado vs. Manzano and Valles vs. COMELEC)
5. Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In
the case of Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996, petitioner
cannot be considered a fugitive from justice, because his arrival in the Philippines from
the US preceded the filing of the felony complaint in LA Court and the issuance of the
arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost 5 months.
6. Permanent residents in foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code.
See Caasi vs. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229.
7. The insane or feeble-minded. (Sec. 40, LGC)
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133
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Under Revised Administrative Code (EO 292)
1. Ecclesiastics;
2. Persons receiving compensation from provincial or municipal funds; and
3. Contractors for public works of the municipality.
Under the Lone Candidate Law (RA 8295)
1. Any elective officials who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive
office or for whatever reason which he previously occupied but has caused to
become vacant due to his resignation; and
2. Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses,
intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury,
punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons
aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family,
his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidates.
Ocampo vs. Crespo, G.R. No. 158466, June 15, 2004, there must be final judgment
before the election in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered
stray.
The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner.
Certificate of Candidacy (COC):
Rules:
1. No person shall be elected into public office unless he files his COC within the
prescribed period;
2. No person shall be eligible for more than one office. If he files for more than one
position, he shall not be eligible for all unless he cancels all and retains one.
3. The COC shall be filed by the candidate personally or by his duly authorized
representative.
4. Upon filing, an individual becomes a candidate, he is already covered by the
rules, restrictions and processes involving candidates. (Section 73, OEC)
Effects of Filing COC:
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134
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Candidates holding appointive office or position shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office. (Sec. 66, OEC)
Candidates holding elective office shall not be considered resigned from his
office. (Sec. 67 of OEC repealed by Section 14 of RA 9006)
Formal defects in the COC—the election of a candidate cannot be annulled on the
sole ground of formal defects in his COC, such as lack of the required oath. (De
Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil 211)
Duty to receive COC: ministerial duty of the COMELEC
When a candidate files his COC, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge its receipt pursuant to Section 76, of the Election Code. The
COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a COC filed in due form. (Luna vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165983, April 24,
2007)
Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil 136, the COMELEC has no discretion to give or
not to give due course to a COC filed in due form. While it may look into patent defects
in the COC, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face.
Exceptions:
1. Nuisance candidates
2. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC—Sec. 78 of the OEC
3. Filing of a disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated in Section
68, OEC.
Where the decision of the COMELEC disqualifying the candidate is not yet final
and executory on election day, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), in the exercise of
its ministerial duty, is under obligation to count and tally the votes cats in favor of the
candidate. (Papandayan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002)
Cipriano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, the COMELEC
may not, by itself, without proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a COC filed
in due form. Section 78 of OEC, which treats of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a COC on the ground that any material representation therein is false, requires
that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him, and he should be given
the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.
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135
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Effects of Filing Two (2) COC:
Filing of two COC for different offices renders ineligibility for either position. (Section 73,
OEC)
Death, Disqualification and Withdrawal:
If after the last day of filing of the COC, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a COC to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Section 77, OEC)
The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be
substituted. For how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or
who never was. The existence of a valid COC seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua
non. There was no valid substitution. The existence of a valid COC seasonably filed is a
requisite sine qua non. It is as if he was not a candidate, he may not be substituted.
Abaya was not proclaimed. (Miranda vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999)
Doctrine of the Rejection of the Second Placer—
Labo doctrine—the disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the 2
nd
highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated as
a result of the disqualification. (Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1)
Albana vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost in the
election.
Exceptions: A second placer may possibly be declared elected when the
following conditions are met:
1. The one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and
2. The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of the candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety
but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
(Grego vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)
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136
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
In Fr. Cayat vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, April 24, 2007, the
law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory
provision of law under Section 6 of RA 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. The
SC did not apply this doctrine of the rejection of second placer which triggers the rule on
succession. There was no second placer because Palileng is not a second-placer but
the only placer. There is only one candidate.
Withdrawal of the COC—shall effect the disqualification of the candidate to be elected
for the position. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 81 Phil 773)
The withdrawal of the withdrawal, for the purpose of reviving the COC must be
made within the period provided by law for the filing of COC. (Monsale vs. Nico, 83
Phil 758)
The affidavit of withdrawal can be filed directly with the main office of the
COMELEC, the office of the Regional Election Director concerned, office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality belongs, or the
office of the municipal election officer of the municipality.
Nuisance Candidates—
They are candidates who have no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the COC has been filed and would thus prevent a faithful election.
COMELEC may refuse to give due course to or cancel a COC of a nuisance
candidate. This can be done motu proprio or upon verified petition of an interested
party.
There should be a showing that:
1. The COC has been filed to put the election process in mockery/dispute;
2. The intent for filing is to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of
the names of the registered candidates;
3. There are other circumstances which clearly demonstrate that the candidate
has no bona fide intention to run for the office.
Garcia vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121139, July 12, 1996, proclamation of the
winning candidate renders moot and academic a motion for reconsideration filed by a
candidate who had been earlier declared by the COMELEC as nuisance candidate.
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137
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel COC (Sec. 78, OEC)—a verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a COC may be field by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required in Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the
time of filing the COC and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
15 days before the election.
Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a COC lies with the COMELEC in division, not
with the COMELEC en banc. (Garvida vs. Sales, G.R. No. 122872, September 10,
1997)
Salcedo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, material
misrepresentation contemplated in Section 78, OEC refers to qualifications for elective
office. Aside from that, false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for
public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public
as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of the provision.
Lone Candidate Law (RA 8295)
Upon expiration of the deadline for filing of COC in a special election called to fill
a vacancy in an elective position other that for President and VP, when there is only one
qualified candidate for such position, the lone candidate3 shall be proclaimed elected to
the position by proper proclaiming body of the COMELEC without holding the special
election upon certification by the COMELEC that he is the only candidate for the office
and is thereby deemed elected.
The lone candidate so proclaimed shall assume office not earlier than the
scheduled election day, in the absence of any lawful ground to deny due course or
cancel the COC in order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for under Section 69
and 78 of OEC.
Loong vs. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760, the petition for cancellation of the COC of
Loong for alleged misrepresentation as to his age, filed by Ututalum beyond the 25-day
period from the last day for filing COC cannot be given due course. Neither can it be
treated as quo warranto petition since there has been no proclamation yet.
The evident purpose of the law in requiring the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, and in fixing the time limit therefor are:
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138
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. To enable the voters to know, at least 60 days before the regular election, the
candidates among whom they are to make the choice; and
2. To avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cats. For if
the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered
candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and
votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify
the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Miranda
vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999)
CAMPAIGN
Election and Campaign Periods (Sec. 3, OEC)
Election period begins 90 days before the day of election and ends 30 days
thereafter—period of time with respect to a scheduled date of election when the conduct
of certain political activities are regulated by election laws, and the violation of which
constitutes election offense subject to penalties.
Campaign Periods:
1. President and VP—90 days before the day of election
2. Members of Congress, Senatorial, Provincial and City/Municipal—45 days
3. Barangay Election—15 days
4. Special Election—45 days (Section 5, paragraph 2, Article VIII)
-The campaign period shall no include the day before and the day of the election.
-Period of time within the election period specified by law when bona fide candidates
can legally conduct campaign activities and other election propaganda in relation to the
scheduled date of election.
Fair Election Act of 2001 (RA 9006)
Lawful Election Propaganda
1. Written/printed materials which does not exceed 8 ½ inches x 14 inches
2. Handwritten/printed letters
3. Posters not exceeding 2x3 feet
4. Print ads
·1/4 page in broadsheets and ½ page for tabloids published 3x a week per
newspaper during the campaign period
5. Broadcast ads on TV and radio
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139
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
a. National positions—120 mins. for TV, 180 mins. for radio
b. Local positions—60 mins. for TV, 90 mins. for radio
(See the cases of PPI vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995 and TELEBAP vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998—page 45 of this review notes)—payment of just
compensation is now expressly provided under Section 7 of RA 9006; payment of just
compensation is not necessary since it is a valid exercise of police power.
Prohibited Campaign:
1. Public exhibition of movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or
biography of a candidate during the campaign period.
2. Public exhibition of a movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an
actor or media personality who is himself a candidate.
3. Use of airtime for campaign of a media practitioner who is official of any party or
member of the campaign staff of a candidate of political party.
Limitation on Expenses
Candidates:
1. President and VP—P10/voter
2. Other candidate with party—P3/voter
3. Other candidate without party—P5/voter
Statement of Contribution and Expenses
Every candidate and treasurer of a political party shall, within 30 days after the
day of election, file with the COMELEC the full, true and itemized statement of all
contribution and expenditures in connection with the election.
Election Surveys
Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006—surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published within 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published 7 days before an election. This section was declared unconstitutional
in the case of Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001,
for it violated the constitutional rights of speech, expression and the press.
Reasons:
1. It imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression
2. It is direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period.
3. The government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than the suppression of freedom of expression.
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140
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Substitution of Candidates
In case of valid substitution after the official ballots have been printed, the votes
cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not
invalidate the whole ballot. This rule shall not apply if the substitute candidate is of the
same family name. (Section 12, RA 9006) See the case of Luna vs. COMELEC
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid
and seasonably filed COC, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a
candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC. (Miranda vs. Abaya,
G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999)
Rule Against Premature Campaigning
The use of lawful election propaganda is subject to the supervision and
regulation of the COMELEC in order to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize,
as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich
candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity.
Chavez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004, all propaganda materials
including advertisements on print, in radio, or on television showing image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office, be immediately removed, otherwise, this shall be
presumed as premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the OEC.
CASTING OF VOTES
(Read Sections 190-198 of OEC)
Postponement of Election (Sec. 5, OEC)
Causes:
1. Violence;
2. Terrorism;
3. Loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records;
4. Force majeure;
5. Other analogous causes.
COMELEC can postpone the election:
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141
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Motu proprio; or
2. Upon a verified petition by any interested party, after due notice and hearing.
COMELEC shall call for the holding of the election on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Failure of Election (Section 6, OEC)
Pre-conditions for declaring failure of elections—
1. No voting has been held or election has been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting in any precinct because of:
a. Force majeure
b. Violence
c. Terrorism
d. Fraud
e. Other analogous cases.
2. Votes not cast are sufficient to affect the results of the elections. (Tan vs.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 148575-76, December 10, 2003)
COMELEC shall call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.
The cause for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the
casting of votes or on the day of the election. (RA 7166, Synchronized National and
Local Elections Act)
The postponement, declaration of a failure of election and the calling of special
elections shall be decided by the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
members. (Section 4, RA 7166, Synchronized National and Local Elections Act)
Batabor vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160428, July 21, 2004, the power to declare
a failure of election is vested exclusively upon the COMELEC. x x x There is failure of
election only when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained.
Loong vs. COMELEC, the petition for annulment of election results or to declare
failure of election in Parang, Sulu, on the ground of STATISTICAL IMPROBABILITY
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142
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
and massive fraud was granted by the COMELEC. Even before the technical
examination of election documents was conducted, the cOMELEC already observed
badges of fraud just by looking at the election results in Parang. Nevertheless, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition for annulment of election results or to declare failure
of elections in the municipalities of Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and
Kalinggalang Calauag. The dismissal was on the ground of untimeliness of the petition,
despite a finding that the same badges of fraud evident from the results of the election
based on the certificates of canvass of votes in Parang, are also evident in the election
results of the five (5) mentioned municipalities. The SC ruled that the COMELEC
committed grave abused of discretion in dismissing the petition as there is no law which
provides a reglementary period to file annulment of elections when there is yet no
proclamation. The election resulted in a failure to elect on account of fraud. Accordingly,
the Court ordered the COMELEC to reinstate the aforesaid petition.
Banaga, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701, the circumstances in the above
case are not present in this case so that reliance in Loong by petitioner Banaga is
misplaced. A prayer to declare failure of election and a prayer to annul the election
results are actually of the same nature. Whether an action is for the declaration of
failure of elections or for annulment of election results, based on allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence or analogous cases, the OEC denominates them similarly.
Petition to Declare Failure of Election Election Protest
·A special action under Rule 26, Comelec
Rules of Procedure
·Docket number starts with SPA
·An En Banc decision of the COMELEC in
a special action becomes final and
executory after 5 days from promulgation,
unless restrained by the SC
·An ordinary action under Rule 20,
Comelec Rules of Procedure
·Docket number starts with EPC
·En Banc decision of the COMELEC in an
ordinary action becomes final and
executory within 30 days from its
promulgation
COUNTING OF VOTES
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143
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Principle of Ballot Secrecy—voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their
official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting
distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. The reason behind this is to avoid
vote buying through voter identification.
Rules for the Appreciation of Ballots: (Section 211, OEC)—a function of the Board
of Election Inspectors
In reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed valid unless
there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. In the appreciation of the ballots,
the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could
be determined with reasonable certainty. (Ferin vs. Gonzales, 53 SCRA 237)
A ballot which has been cast carries the presumption that it reflects the will of the
voter. And the purpose of the election law is to give effect, rather than frustrate, that will.
For this reason, extreme caution should be observed before a ballot is invalidated and
doubts are to be resolved in favor of their validity.
1. Where only first name or surname is written—the vote for such candidate is
valid, if there is no other with the same name or surname for the same office.
Gonzaga vs. Seño, 7 SCRA 741, where there are 2 or more candidates having
the same first name or the same surname, writing only the first name or the surname is
not a valid vote for either of the candidates. In order that his vote may be counted, the
voter should add the correct name, surname, or middle initial that will identify the
candidate for whom he is voting.
2. Where only first name is surname of another, or where incumbent’s full
name, first name or surname is same as another—the first part of the rule, the
vote is counted in favor of the candidate whose surname corresponds to the
word. The second part refers to a situation where there are 2 or more candidates,
one of whom is an incumbent or re-electionist whose full name, first name, or
surname is the same as the full name, first name, or surname of the other
candidate or candidates.
Example: the incumbent’s name is Jose Santos, while the other’s candidate’s name
is Jose Santos, or Jose Cruz, or Ronaldo Santos. A vote for Jose Santos will be
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144
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
counted for the incumbent candidate; a vote for Jose will be counted in favor of the
incumbent; or a vote for Santos will be counted in favor of the incumbent candidate.
3. Where candidate is a woman using her maiden or married surname or both
which is same surname of incumbent—a ballot bearing only such surname
shall be counted in favor of the candidate who is an incumbent. Where none of
the candidates is an incumbent, a ballot bearing only such surname cannot be
counted for any of them.
Where a ballot contains only the maiden surname of a candidate, and there is
another candidate bearing the same surname, such ballot shall be counted in her favor.
(Conui-Omega vs. Samson, 9 SCRA 493)
4. Where 2 or more words are surnames of 2 or more candidates—when 2 or
more words are written on the same line on the ballot, all of which are the
surnames of 2 or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of
them.
Exceptions:
a. Unless one is a surname of an incumbent in which case it shall be
counted in favor of the latter.
b. If the word or words written on the appropriate blank on the ballot is the
identical name or surname or full name, as the case may be, of 2 or more
candidates for the same office none of whom is an incumbent, the vote
shall be counted in favor of the candidate to whose ticket all the other
candidates voted for in the same ballot for the same constituency belongs.
c. When 2 or more words are written on different lines on the ballot all of
which are the surnames of 2 or more candidates bearing the same
surname for an office for which the law authorizes the election of more
than one and there are the same number of surnames written as there are
candidates with that surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of all
candidates bearing the surname.
5. Where single word is first name of candidate and surname of his opponent
—the vote shall be counted in favor of the latter (surname of the opponent).
(Corpus vs. Ibay, 84 Phil. 184)
6. Where 2 words are written, one of which is the first name of the candidate
and the other is the surname of his opponent—the vote shall not be counted
for either.
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145
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
7. Idem sonam—a name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a
sound similar to the name or surname of a candidate when correctly written shall
be counted in his favor. It is based on the principle that the misspelling of a name
or lack of skill in writing it, should not be taken as a ground for rejecting the votes
apparently intended for a candidate, so long as the intention of the voter appears
to be clear. This rule is liberally construed.]
8. Repetition of names in 2 or more line—when the name of a candidate appears
in a space of the ballot for an office which he is a candidate and in another space
for which he is not a candidate, it shall be counted in his favor for the office for
which he is a candidate and the vote for the office for which he is not a candidate
shall be considered as stray, except when it is used as a means to identify the
voter, in which case the whole ballot shall be void.
9. Erroneous initial—the erroneous initial of the first name accompanied by the
correct surname of a candidate or the erroneous initial of the surname
accompanied by the correct first name of a candidate shall not annul the vote in
his favor.
10. Prefixes or suffixes—ballots containing prefixes such as “Sr.”, Mr.”, “Datu”,
“Hon.”, “Don”, or suffixes “Jr.”, “II” are valid. The use of these prefixes does not
invalidate the ballot, the vote is counted in favor of the candidate whose name is
with a prefix, the rule does not apply where the prefixes are used as identifying
marks.
11. Use of nicknames and appellations—if accompanied by the first name or
surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they are used
as a means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is invalid.
However, if the nickname used is unaccompanied by the name or surname of a
candidate and it is the one by which he is generally or popularly known in the
locality, the name shall be counted in favor of said candidate, if there is no other
candidate for the same office with the same nickname.
12. Descriptio Personae—it does not invalidate the ballot.
13. Vote in favor of disqualified candidate—it shall be considered as stray vote
and shall not be counted, but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
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146
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Alfonso vs. COMELEC, 232 SCRA 777, a vote in favor of a candidate
who died just before the election and was accordingly substituted by his daughter
is a stray vote and cannot be counted in favor of the latter. However, a vote cast
with only the family name can be counted in favor of the daughter who bears
such name.
Certificate of Votes
Balindong vs. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 567, the Certificate of Votes (CV) is
evidenced not only of tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly in the
preparation of the election returns but also of the votes obtained by the candidates.
Garay vs. COMELEC, 261 SCRA 222, the CV can never be a valid basis for
canvass; it can only be evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any other
anomaly in the preparation of the election returns concerned, when duly authenticated.
A CV does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the
elections; only election returns are. In like manner, neither is the tally board sufficient
evidence of the real results of the election.
CANVASSING
Canvassing Bodies:
1. Congress—for President and VP
2. COMELEC—Senators and Regional Officials
3. Provincial Board of Canvassers—for Congressmen, Municipal Officials
4. District Board of Canvassers—Congressmen, Municipal officials
5. City and Municipal BOC—Congressmen, City and Municipal officials
6. Barangay Board of Canvassers—Barangay officials
COMELEC has direct control and supervision over the Board of Canvassers
except Congress. It may motu proprio relieve at any time and substitute any member of
the board of canvassers. (Section 227, OEC)
Prohibited Relationship: Related within the 4
th
civil degree by consanguinity or affinity
to any of the candidates whose votes will be canvassed by the Board, or to any member
of the same Board
Agujetas vs. CA, 261 SCRA 17, petitioners, members of the Board of Canvassers,
who proclaimed as the 8
th
winning candidate one who did not obtain the 8
th
highest
number of votes, may be criminally prosecuted for violation of Section 231 of the OEC,
failure to proclaim the winning candidate.
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147
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY—Section 241, OEC
Any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. (Bandala vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 159369, March 3, 2004)
COMELEC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies. (Section 242, OEC)
Belac vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 145802, April 24, 2001, Section 241 of the OEC
provides that a pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the
Board or directly with the COMELEC.
In a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an
examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind
them and investigate election irregularities.
The policy consideration underlying the delimitation of both substantive ground
and procedure is the policy to determine as quickly as possible the result of the election
on the basis of the canvass.
It is for this reason that pre-proclamation controversies are mandated by law to
be summarily disposed of.
Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy:
1. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
2. The canvassed election returns (ER) are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in authentic copies thereof.
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148
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. The ERs were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufacture, or not authentic.
4. When substitute and fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidates. (Section 243, OEC)
- Issues #s 2, 3 and 4 are not applicable to election of President, VP, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives. Only #1 is applicable to them.
General Rule: Candidates and registered political parties involve in an election are
allowed to file a pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC.
Exception: Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, VP,
Senators, and Members of the HOR. However, this does not preclude the authority of
the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors, question the composition or proceeding of the board
of canvassers and to determine the authenticity and due execution of certificates of
canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA 9369. (Pimentel III
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008)
“manifest errors”—the error must appear on the face of the Certificates of Canvass or
Election Returns sought to be corrected. It is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to
the understanding; that which is open, palpable, incontrovertible, needing no evidence
to make it more clear. (O’Hara vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148941-42, March 12, 2002)
Correction of manifest errors has reference to errors in the election returns, in the
entries of the statement of votes by precinct per municipality, or in the certificate of
canvass. Some of the definition given for the word “manifest” are that “it is evident to the
eye and understanding, visible to the eye, that which is open, palpable, and
incontrovertible, needing no evidence to make it more clear, not obscure or hidden.
(Dela Llana vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152080)
Espidol vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164922, October 11, 2005, COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. The fact that a
candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such
power. It is also true that as a general rule, the proper remedy after proclamation of the
winning candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or
quo warranto except where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed
candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare
such proclamation a nullity.
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149
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, January 26, 2000, the authority to rule on
petitions for correction of manifest error is vested in the COMELEC EN BANC. Section
7 of Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu proprio, or upon
verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political
parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. The aggrieved party
may appeal the decision of the board to the COMELEC and said appeal shall be heard
and decided by the COMELEC EN BANC. Section 5, however, of the same rule states
that a petition for correction of manifest errors may be filed directly with the Commission
en banc provided that such errors could not have been discovered during the
canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning
candidate had already been made.
Pre-Proclamation Controversy Petition for Failure of Election
· There was election
·Jurisdiction: Division of a COMELEC
· Once proclaimed, the pre-proclamation
shall be dismissed
· There was no election
·Jurisdiction: COMELEC En Banc
·
Lagumbay vs, COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175, the election return was an obviously
manufactured return. The returns were palpably false as it was indeed statistically
improbable that all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes each of them
received exactly the same number, whereas all the 8 candidates of the other party got
precisely nothing. The Supreme Court enunciated the DOCTRINE OF STATISTICAL
IMPROBABILITY. It states that where there exists uniformity of tallies in favor of
candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking out of the opposing
candidates, as when all the candidates of one party received all the votes, each of
whom exactly the same number, and the opposing candidates got zero votes, the
election returns are obviously manufactured, contrary to all statistical probabilities, and
utterly improbable and clearly incredible.
The doctrine applies only when the improbability is shown on the face of the ER itself
and without regard to evidence aliunde or to evidence outside of the return.
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150
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Simultaneous Prosecution of Pre-Proclamation Controversies and Election
Protests—
There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous prosecution or adjudication of
pre-proclamation controversies and election protests. Allowing the simultaneous
prosecution scenario may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation controversies
and election protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence admissible
in each case and the objective each seeks to achieve. (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
166143-47, November 20, 2006)
Piercing the Veil of Election Returns—
The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is,
logically, no longer viable after a proclamation has been made. However, this rule
admits of exceptions, as when the proclamation is null and void. The proclamation of
petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons: 1) it was based on a canvass that
should have been suspended with respect to the contested election returns; 2) it was
done without prior COMELEC authorization which is required in view of the unresolved
objections of Talib to the inclusion of certain returns in the canvass; and 3) it was
predicated on a canvass that included unsigned election returns involving such number
of votes as will affect the outcome of the election. In this regard, it has long been
recognized that among the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullify a
proclamation or suspend the effect of one.
It is a well-entrenched rule in jurisprudence that in a pre-proclamation
controversy, the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or
behind election returns which are on heir face regular and authentic returns. (Jainal vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007)
PROCLAMATION—
In the absence of an appeal, the Board of Canvassers shall proclaim the winner.
ELECTION OFFENSES
Prohibited Acts: (Sections 261, 262, OEC)
1. Vote buying and vote selling;
2. Conspiracy to bribe voters;
3. Wagering upon result of election;
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151
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
4. Coercion of subordinates;
5. Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion;
6. Coercion of election officials and employees;
7. Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, giving of salary increases;
8. Intervention of public officers and employees;
9. Undue influence;
10. Unlawful electioneering;
11. Others.
-Good faith is not a defense. Election offenses are generally mala prohibita. Proof of
criminal intent is necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is not a defense; the
commission of the prohibited act is sufficient.
Jurisdiction:
1. Investigation and prosecution—COMELEC—the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within five (5) days from submission.
2. Trial and decisions:
RTC—exclusive original jurisdiction any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of OEC
Exception: offenses relating to failure to register or failure to vote (MTC)
Prescription: 5 years from the date of their commission
ELECTION CONTEST—
Nature: special summary proceeding—to expedite the settlement of controversies
between candidates as to who receive the majority of legal votes.
Purpose: to ascertain the true will of the people
Election Laws, how Construed—laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court has the
imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate
elected by the electorate. (Dela Llana vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152080)
Original Exclusive Jurisdiction
1. Supreme Court (PET)
× President
× Vice-President
Tecson vs. COMELEC, , G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, the word
“contest” refers to either Election Protest or Quo Warranto which are two
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152
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
(2) distinct post-election remedies. They have one objective, i.e., to unseat
the winning candidate.
2. Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
× Senators
3. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
× Congressmen
4. COMELEC
× Regional officials
× Provincial officials
× City officials
5. Regional Trial Court
× Municipal officials
6. Metropolitan Trial court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court
× Barangay officials
× Sangguniang Kabataan
-HRET Rules of Procedure shall prevail over the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code. (Lazatin vs. HRET, 168 SCRA 391)
Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008, the SC has no
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari and mandamus on matters which may be
threshed out in an election contest. It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act
on the complaint involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of a now
member of the Senate.
Appellate Jurisdiction
1. For decisions of RTC and MTC—appeal to COMELEC whose decision shall be
final and executor
2. For decisions of COMELEC—Petition for Review on Certiorari with SC within 30
days from receipt of decision on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction or violation of due process
3. For decisions of Electoral Tribunal—Petition for Review on Certiorari with SC on
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or
violation of due process
ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE FIELD:
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153
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. ELECTION PROTEST—filed by any candidate who has filed a COC and has
been voted upon for the same office on the grounds of:
× Fraud;
× Terrorism;
× Irregularities; or
× Illegal acts, committed before, during or after casting and counting of
votes
-Filed within 10 days from proclamation of results of election
Death of Protestant—does not necessarily extinguish an election protest
Poe vs. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005, the widow of the
protestant has no status of real party in interest to substitute or intervene for the latter
who died during the pendency of the election protest.
De Castro vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125249, February 7, 1997, an election
protest is imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above
ordinary civil actions, because it involves not only the adjudication of the private interest
of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the
uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall
discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift.
Villamor vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 169865, July 21, 2006, the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
2. QUO WARRANTO—filed by any registered voter in the constituency on the
grounds of:
× Ineligibility; or
× Disloyalty to the Republic
-Filed within 10 days from proclamation of results of election
ELECTION PROTEST QUO WARRANTO
·A contest between the defeated and
winning candidates, based on grounds
of election frauds or irregularities, as
to who actually obtained the majority of
·Refers to questions of disloyalty and
ineligibility of the winning candidates.
It is a proceeding to unseat the
ineligible person from office, but not to
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154
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
the legal votes and therefore is entitled
to hold the office.
·Filed by filed by any candidate who
has filed a COC and has been voted
for.
· A protestee may be ousted and the
protestant may seat in the office
vacated.
install the protestant in his place.
· Filed by any registered voter in the
constituency.
·The respondent may be unseated but
the petitioner will not be seated.
(Dumayas, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
Quo Warranto in Elective Office Quo Warranto in Appointive Office
The issue is the eligibility of the officer-
elect; the court or tribunal cannot declare
the protestant as having been elected.
The issue is the legality of the
appointment; the court determines who of
the parties has legal title to the office.
-The period for filing an election protest is suspended during the pendency of a pre-
proclamation controversy. (Gatchalian vs. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 208)
COUNTER-PROTEST—
A protestee may incorporate in his answer a counter-protest. It is tantamount to a
counterclaim in a civil action and may be presented as a part of the answer within the
time he is required to answer the protest, i.e., within five (5) days upon receipt of the
protest, unless a motion for extension is granted, in which case it must be filed before
the expiration of the extended time.
The counter-protest must be filed within the period provided by law, otherwise,
the forum loses its jurisdiction to entertain the belatedly filed counter-protest. The period
to be observed is within five (5) days from the time of the receipt of the copy of the
protest. The 5-day period is not only mandatory requirement of the law but also
jurisdictional so that the court is ousted to entertain counter-protest belatedly filed.
(Kho vs. COMELEC, 279 SCRA 463, September 25, 1997)
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155
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Francis King Marquez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127318, August 25, 1999, any
contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK),
including the Chairman—whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their
election—is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 which provides that cases involving the eligibility or qualification of
SK candidates shall be decided by the City/Municipal Election Officers whose decision
shall be final, applies only to proceedings before the election. Before proclamation,
cases concerning the eligibility of SK Officers and members are cognizable by the
Election Officer. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases become quo
warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. The distinction is based on
the principle that it is the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from
the jurisdiction of election officials.
Gementiza vs. COMELEC, 353 SCRA 724, March 6, 2001, the COMELEC EN BANC
shall decide motions for reconsideration only for “decisions” of a Division, meaning
those acts of final character. The interlocutory order ruled by the Division of
COMELEC should be brought up to the Supreme Court thru Certiorari.
Rule 3, Section 5c of COMELEC Rules of Procedures—Any motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which shall
be resolved by the divisions which issued the order.
Only final orders of a Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc is in
accordance with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution which mandates that only
motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc.
Counter-Protest erroneously filed and accepted by the COMELEC—remedy:
1. Erase from the record;
2. Certiorari.
Execution Pending Appeal—the trial court may grant a motion for execution pending
appeal because the mere filing of an appeal does not divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over a case and to resolve pending incidents. Since the court and jurisdiction
to act on the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter
was resolved, and was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party.
(Edding vs. COMELEC, 246 SCRA 502)
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156
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Dulce Ann Hofer vs. HRET, G.R. No. 158833, May 12, 2004, by the very nature and
given the public interest involved in the determination of the result of an election, the
controversies arising from the canvassing must be resolved speedily, otherwise, the will
of the electorate will be frustrated.
Procedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but
also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate.
Article VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Legislative Power—
It is the power or competence of the legislative to propose, enact, ordain,
amend/alter, modify, abrogate or repeal laws. It is vested in the Congress which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
SENATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Composition: Twenty-four (24),
elected at large by the qualified voters
of the Philippines, as may be provided
by law.
Qualifications:
Composition: not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise provided by law, consisting
of:
a. District Representatives—
elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the
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157
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
a. Natural-born citizen of
the Philippines;
b. At least thirty-five (35)
years of age on the day
of the election;
c. Able to read and write;
d. Registered voter;
e. Resident of the
Philippines for not less
than 2 years immediately
preceding the day of the
election.
Term of office: 6 years—shall
commence, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the 30
th
day of June
next following their election.
Disqualifications:
a. No Senator shall serve for
more than 2 consecutive
terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not
be considered as an
interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
(Section 4, Article VI)
b. One who has been declared
by competent authority as
insane or incompetent
c. One who has been
sentenced by final judgment
for:
i. Subversion;
ii. Insurrection;
iii. Rebellion;
iv. Any offense for which
he has been sentenced
to a penalty of not more
than 18 months; or
provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area. (Sec.
5, par. 1, Article VI)
b. Party-List Representatives—
constitutes 20% of the total
number of representatives
elected through a party-list
system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or
organization.
c. Sectoral Representatives—1/2
of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or
election from the:
i. Labor;
ii. Peasant;
iii. Urban poor;
iv. Indigenous cultural
communities;
v. Women;
vi. Youth; and
vii. Such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the
religious sector.
Term of office: three (3) years, which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon of June 30 next following their
election.
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines;
2. At least 25 years of age on the day
of the election;
3. Able to read and write;
4. Registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected except the
party-list representatives;
5. Resident of the district for a period
of not less than 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election;
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158
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
v. A crime involving moral
turpitude, unless given
plenary pardon or
granted amnesty
(Section 12, BP 881—
Omnibus Election
Code)
Electoral Tribunal: Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET)—composed
of three (3) Supreme Court Justices
and six (6) Senators—to act as sole
judge of all contest relating to election
returns and qualifications of their
respective members.
Removal: Thru EXPULSION by
the Senate with the concurrence of
two-thirds (2/3) of all its members
(Section 16, par. 3, Article VI)
6. For party-list representatives or
organizations:
a. Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines;
b. A registered voter;
c. A resident of the Philippines
for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the
election;
d. Able to read and write;
e. A bona fide member of the
party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the
election;
f. At least 25 years of age on
the day of the election;
g. The political party, sector,
organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized
and underrepresented
groups.
h. Must comply with the
declared policy of enabling
Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to
be elected to the House of
Representatives;
i. Religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list
system;
j. A party or an organization
must not be disqualified
under Sec. 6, RA 7941;
k. The party or organization
must not be an adjunct of, or
a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by
the government;
l. The party must not only
comply with the requirements
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159
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so;
m. Not only the candidate party
or organization must
represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees; and
n. The nominee must likewise
be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a
whole.
Manner of Voting: (Sec. 10, RA 7941) Every
voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: (1) for
candidate for member of the HOR in his
legislative district, and (2) for the party,
organizations, or coalition he wants
represented in the HOR: provided, that a vote
cast for a party, organizations, or coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted.
Disqualifications:
a. Shall not serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. (Sec. 7, Article VI)
b. One who has been declared by
competent authority as insane or
incompetent
c. One who has been sentenced by final
judgment for:
i. Subversion;
ii. Insurrection;
iii. Rebellion;
iv. Any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a
penalty of not more than
18 months; or
v. A crime involving moral
turpitude, unless given
plenary pardon or granted
amnesty (Section 12, BP
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160
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
881—Omnibus Election
Code)
d. For Party-List Representatives:
i. It is a religious sect or
denomination,
organization or
association organized for
religious purposes;
ii. It advocates violence or
unlawful means to seek its
goal;
iii. It is a foreign party or
organization;
iv. It is receiving support from
any foreign government,
foreign political party,
foundation, organization,
whether directly or
through any of its officers
or members or indirectly
through third parties for
partisan election
purposes;
v. It violates or fails to
comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to
elections;
vi. It declares untruthful
statement in its petition;
vii. It has ceased to exist for
at least one (1) year;
viii. It fails to participate in the
last two preceding
elections or fails to obtain
at least 2% of the votes
cast under the party-list
system in the two
preceding elections for the
constituency in which it
had registered. (Section 6, RA
7941)
Canvassing Board: COMELEC
Electoral Tribunal: House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)—composed of nine
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161
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
(9) members: 3 Supreme Court Justices and
six (6) members of the Congress–Section 17,
Art. VI
Removal: EXPULSION by the House with the
concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of all its
members (Sec. 16, par. 3, Art. VI)
Vacancy—Section 9, Article VI—In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Salaries—Section 10, Article VI—The salaries of Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Inhibitions and Prohibitions:
a. Incompatible office—may not hold office or employment in government
during his term without forfeiting his seat;
b. Forbidden office—may not be appointed to any office created or
compensation thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
(Sec. 13, Article VI)
c. Cannot appear as counsel before any court or before the Electoral Tribunals,
quasi-judicial or other administrative bodies;
d. Shall not, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with,
franchise or special privilege granted by the government;
e. Shall not intervene in any matter before any office in government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office (Sec. 14, Article VI).
CONFLICT OF INTEREST—all members of the Senate and the HOR shall, upon
assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise
from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are author.
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162
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Incompatible Office—no Senator or member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
The purpose is to prevent him from owing loyalty to another branch of the
government, to the detriment of the independence of the legislature and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The prohibition is not absolute, what is not allowed is the simultaneous holding of
that office and the seat in the Congress. Any legislator may hold another office or
employment in the government provided he forfeits his position in the Congress.
Forfeiture of the legislator’s seat, or cessation of his tenure, shall be automatic
upon holding of the incompatible office.
Forbidden Office—no Senator or member of the House of Representatives shall be
appointed to any office, which may have been created, or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
With this, even if the member of the Congress is willing to forfeit his seat therein,
he may not be appointed to any office in the government that has been created or the
emoluments thereof have been increased during his term. Such a position is forbidden
office. The purpose is to prevent trafficking in public office.
The provision does not apply to elective offices.
The appointment of the member of the Congress to the forbidden office is not
allowed only during the term for which he was elected, when such office was created or
its emoluments were increased. After such term, and even if the legislator is reelected,
the disqualification no longer applies and he may therefore be appointed to the office.
Privileges:
a. Freedom from arrest—while Congress is in session for offense punished by
not more than 6 years imprisonment (Article 145, RPC; Sec. 11, Art. VI)
b. Speech and Debate clause—not to be questioned nor held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee
thereof. (Section 11, Article VI)
(See discussion under Parliamentary Immunity)
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163
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-Composition and Qualifications—they are exclusive under the principle of expressio
unios est exclusio alterius, with the result that it is not competent for the Congress to
provide by mere legislation for additional qualifications no matter how relevant they may
be. (Justice Isagani Cruz, Philippine Political Law)
In Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300, the Court upheld the qualification of
Imelda Marcos, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had
resided in the district for only seven (7) months, because of the following:
a. A minor follows the domicile of his parents; Tacloban became her domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought their family to Leyte;
b. Domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the
absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;
c. The wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law;
when Mrs. Marcos married Ferdinand Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium;
d. Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban,
her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
Coquilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, the SC ruled that he
petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one year prior to
the May 14, 2001 elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner lost the
same when he became a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy. From then on, until
November 10, 2000, when he re-acquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines.
In Caasi vs. COMELEC, it was held that the immigration to the US by virtue of the
acquisition of a “green card” constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
REPUBLIC ACT 7941—
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Nature of Party-List System
1. The party-list system is a social tool designed not only to give more law to the great
masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment
of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of he State’s benevolence, but
active participants in he mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to
have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanisms into an atrocious
veneer for traditional politics.
2. Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one
such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of
our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and
the prejudiced, and even those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions xxx that the party-list
system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken
the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope,
it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further
weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001)
Inviolable parameters to determine the winners in Party-List election:
1. The Twenty Percent (20%) Allocation—the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total membership of
the House of Representative, including those elected under the party-list;
2. The Two Percent (2%) Threshold—only those garnering a minimum of 2% of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in
the HOR;
3. The Three (3) Seat Limit—each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats; that is, one (1)
qualifying and two (2) additional seats.
4. The Proportional Representation—the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.
(Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6,
2000)
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words—it must show in its constitution, by-laws, articles of incorporation,
history, platform of government and track record—that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it
must demonstrate that in a conflict of interest, it has chosen or likely to choose
the interest of such sectors.
2. They must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to
the House of Representatives.” In other words, while they are not disqualified
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however,
that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
3. In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the
party-list system. The prohibition is on any religious organization registering as
political party not against a priest running as a candidate.
4. A party or organization must not be disqualified under section 6 of RA 7941
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification.
5. The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by the government. The party or organization must be a
group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government.
6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so;
7. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees; and
8. The nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Ang
Bagong Bayani—OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June
26, 2001)
Aklat vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162203, April 24, 2004, the COMELEC has the
power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce and administer
election laws. This power includes the determination, within the parameters fixed by
law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system. This is exactly what the COMELEC
did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the
deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system.
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167
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Choosing Party-List Representatives—they are proclaimed by the COMELEC based on
the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations or coalitions to the
COMELEC according to their ranking in the list.
Effect of change of affiliation—
Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within 6 months before an election, he shall not be
eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Vacancy: In case of vacancy in the seat reserved for party-list representatives, the
vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees
in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization or coalition,
who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization or
coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172103, April
13, 2007, the correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the
first party and other qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans
wherein the multiplier used was the “number of additional seats allocated to the first
party.”
- LABO DOCTRINE—doctrine of the rejection of the second placer—not applicable in
Party-List System
Apportionment of legislative Districts: (Section 5, paragraphs 3 and 4, Article VI)
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000), or each province, shall have at least one representative. This
is intended to prevent gerrymandering.
Gerrymandering—the creation of representative districts out of separate
portions of territory in order to favor a candidate.
Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
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168
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Mariano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118627, March 7, 1995, the Court held that the
Constitution does not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law other than a general apportionment law. In fact, in Tobias vs. Abalos, 239 SCRA
106, the case involved the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two (2)
representative districts. With the elevation of Mandaluyong from municipality into a
highly urbanized city, both Mandaluyong and San Juan were recognized by RA 7675 as
distinct representative districts. This was challenged on the ground that RA 7675 did not
mention any census indicating that San Juan and Mandaluyong had the minimal
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants needed to constitute a district. Neither did the
challengers, however, give any evidence that the respective populations of each of the
two political units were less than the number required. Hence the court presumed that
Congress had made due consideration of the minimum requirement. It ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law. To hold that
reapportionment can be made only through a general law would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation would
deprive the people in the city or province a particle of that sovereignty. Sovereignty
cannot admit subtraction; it is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.
In Montejo vs. COMELEC, it was held that while concededly the conversion of Biliran
into a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and
inhabitants in the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves reapportionment of legislative
districts, and Petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. This Court cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want.
SESSIONS (Section 14, Article VI)
1. Regular—convene once every year. The 4
th
Monday of July until 30 days before
the start of new regular session (Section 14, Article VI)—adjournment is allowed
—30 days before the opening of its next regular session—this is compulsory;
2. Special—
a. Called by the President (Sec. 15, Article VI)—the President has the power
to call special session; without the call of President—impeachment
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
b. Due to a vacancy in the offices of the President and VP at 10:00 am on
the 3
rd
day after the vacancies (Sec. 10, Article VII)
c. Decide on the disability of the President because the majority of all the
members of the Cabinet has disputed his assertion that he is able to
discharge the powers and duties of his office (Section 11, par. 3, Article
VII)
d. To revoke or extend the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law or
suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Section 18, article VII)
3. Joint—
a. Voting separately—
i. Choosing the President (Section 4, Article VII);
ii. Determine the President’s disability (Section 11, Article VII);
iii. Confirming nomination of Vice-President (Section 9, Article VI);
iv. Declaring existence of state of war (Section 23, Article VI); and
v. Proposing constitutional amendments (Section 1, Article XVII).
b. Voting jointly—
i. To revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus (Section 18, Article VII); and
ii. To revoke or extend declaration of martial law (Section 18, Article
VII).
4. Adjournment—Neither Chamber during session, without consent of the other,
adjourn for more than 3 days, nor any other place than that in which the two
Chambers shall be sitting (Section 16, par. 5, Article VI)
Adjournment Sine Die—the interval between the session of one Congress and that of
another; congress must “stop the clock” at midnight of the last day of session in order to
validly pass a law
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170
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The Senate is a continuing body while the House is not.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS (Section 16, par. 3, Article VI)
Each house may punish its members for disorderly behavior and, with
concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend (for not more than 60 days) or expel a
member.
The interpretation of disorderly behavior—is the prerogative of the House
concerned and cannot be judicially reviewed.
In Osmeña vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863, the determination of the acts which
constitutes disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary authority of the House
concerned, and the Court will not review such determination, the same being a political
question.
Members of Congress may also be suspended by the Sandiganbayan or by the
Office of the Ombudsman. (Paredes vs. SAndiganbayan, G. R. No. 118364, August
10, 1995; Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001)
The suspension in the Constitution is different from the suspension prescribed in
RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The latter is not a penalty but a
preliminary preventive measure and is not imposed upon the petitioner for misbehavior
as a member of Congress. (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364, August
10, 1995)
In Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18,
2001, Section 13 of RA 3019 (where it appears to be a ministerial duty of the court to
issue the order of suspension upon a determination of the validity of the criminal
information filed before it) does not state that the public officer should be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts charged. Furthermore,
the order of suspension provided in RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks. Neither does the order of suspension encroach upon the power
of Congress. The doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have
effectively excluded the members of Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions.
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
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171
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
A Senator or member of the HOR shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any other committee thereof.
Two (2) Kinds:
a. Freedom from arrest or detention—while Congress is in session for
offense punished by not more than 6 years imprisonment (Article 145, RPC;
Sec. 11, Art. VI)—it is intended to ensure representation of the constituents of
the member of the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from
attending its sessions. The present Constitution adheres to the restrictive rule
minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the Member of the House of
Representatives to the custody of law. The requirement that he should be
attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For
relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session. (People
vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, February 20, 2000)
“in session”—not day to day; refers to the entire duration of the session from
its opening until its adjournment.
b. Speech and Debate clause—not to be questioned nor held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee
thereof. (Section 11, Article VI)—it enables the legislator to express views
bearing upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls
of the legislature for his inability to support his statements with the usual
evidence required in the court of justice.
“in any other place”—but not in the Senate or Congress itself
Section 16, par. 3, Article VI—Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed 60 days.
People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, the immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and Members of the HOR arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
beyond the ordinary meaning of its term. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations. x x x
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title 11 of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliament immunity from arrest. He
was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation
of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
Accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states
that—
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for absence is
legitimate a one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE; Varieties of:
It is the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress. (Schwartz)
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173
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
It is also the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. (Rozell)
1. State secret privilege—invoked by Presidents on the ground that the
information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military
or diplomatic objective.
2. Informer’s privilege—privilege of the government not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information in violations of law to officers charged with
the enforcement of the law.
3. Generic privilege—for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intra-
governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.
In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked
is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges,
but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, executive privilege,
whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in
relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege
is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by
the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure.
General rule: DISCLOSURE—(policy on transparency)
Exceptions: Disclosure would subvert crucial diplomatic or military objective.
1. Supreme Court
2. Executive Secretary
3. President—must invoke executive privilege
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174
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
PROTOCOL DE CLOTURE—a final act; an instrument which records the winding up of
the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the
text of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed
by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place
over several years. It will not require the concurrence of the Senate. The documents
contained therein are deemed adopted without need for ratification. (Tañada vs.
Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 1997)
Commission on Appointments—(Section 18, Article VI)
The Commission is independent of the two Houses of Congress; its employees
are not, technically, employees of Congress. It has the power to promulgate its own
rules of proceedings.
Powers: Act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of Congress
from their submission; to act on Presidential appointments; has power to promulgate its
own rules of proceedings.
Composition:
Senate President—acts as Ex-Officio Chairman
12 Senators and 12 Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each house
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
Chairman shall not vote except in case of a tie.
In Guingona vs. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, a political party must have at least
two (2) elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments. Thus,
where there are two or more political parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in
the Commission on Appointments. It is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the
Commission; what the Constitution requires is that there must be at least a majority of
the entire membership.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
Classification:
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175
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. LEGISLATIVE—
· General plenary power;
· Specific power of appropriation;
· Taxation and expropriation;
· Legislative investigations (Section 21, Art. VI); and
· Question hour (Section 22, Art. VI).
2. NON-LEGISLATIVE—includes power to:
· Canvass presidential election (Section 4, Art. VII);
· Declare the existence of state of war (Section 23, par.1, Art. VI);
· Exercise delegation of emergency powers;
· Call special election for President and VP (Section 10, Art. VII);
· Give concurrence to treaties and amnesties (Sections 19 and 21, Art. VII);
· Propose constitutional amendments (constituent power) (Sections 1-2, Art. XVII);
· Confirm certain appointments (Section 9 and 16, Art. VII);
· Impeach (Section 2, Art. XI);
· Decide the disability of President because majority of the Cabinet disputes his
assertion that he is able to discharge his duties (Section 11, Art. VII);
· Revoke or extend proclamation of suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law (Section 18, Art. VII);
· Set the rules regarding the utilization of natural resources (Section 2, Art. XII).
Limitations on the Powers of Congress:
1. SUBSTANTIVE—
a. Express:
i. Bill of Rights (Article III);
ii. On Appropriations (Sections 25 and 29 paragraphs 1 and 2, Article VI);
iii. On taxation (Sections 28 and 29, paragraph 3, Article VI);
iv. On Constitutional appellate jurisdiction of SC (Section 30, Article VI);
v. No law granting title of royalty or nobility shall be passed (Section 31,
Article VI);
vi. No specific funds shall be appropriated or paid for use or benefit of any
religion, sect, etc., except for priests, etc., assigned to AFP, penal
institutions, etc. (Sections 29, paragraph 2, Article VI).
b. Implied:
i. Prohibition against irrepealable laws;
ii. Non-delegation of powers.
2. PROCEDURAL—
a. Only one subject , to be stated in the title of the bill (Sec. 26, par. 1, Article VI);
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176
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
b. Three (3) readings on separate days; printed copies of the bill in its final form
distributed to members 3 days before its passage, except if President certifies to
its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency; upon its last
reading, no amendment allowed and the vote thereon taken immediately and the
yeas and nays entered into the Journal (Section 26, paragraph 2, Article VI;
c. Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives.
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177
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
How a bill becomes a law?
1. Approved and signed by the President;
2. Presidential veto overridden by 2/3 votes of all the members of both Houses;
3. Failure of the President to veto the bill and to return it with his objections to the
House where it originated, within 30 days after the date of receipt;
4. A bill calling a special election for President and Vice-President under Section
10, Article VII becomes a law upon third and final reading.
Bills exclusively originated in the House of Representative: (APRIL)
1. Appropriation bills;
2. Private bills;
3. Revenue or tariff bills;
4. Bills authorizing Increase in public debts; and
5. Bills of Local application.
However, although these bills are required to originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, the Senate may propose or concur with amendments (Sec. 24, Art.
VI). Amendments may include amendments by substitution. (Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance)
What is required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives is the
bill, not the law itself. (Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance)
-If the nays prevail, then it is about time that a new bicameral committee be
created until the bill will be accepted by both houses. (Bill is not killed.)
-If yeas prevail, the bill is signed by the Executive Secretary.
Two (2) Rules to be observed—Section 26, Article VI:
1. One (1) subject, One (1) Title Rule—to prevent RIDERS—totally unrelated matters
2. Three (3) Readings on Separate Days
Except: when the President certifies to the necessity of the immediate enactment of
the bill to meet the public calamity and emergency political question—not subject to
judicial review
Section 26 (par. 1), Article VI—every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
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178
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The objectives of the above provision are:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in
bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
3. To fairly appraise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by
petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
-Literal interpretation—the subject or title need not be an index or catalogue. It must be
germane and related to the subject matter.
Agripino A. De Guzman, Jr., et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000,
Section 26 (1), Article VI is sufficiently complied with where the title is comprehensive
enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the
statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as
the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
Section 26, par. 2 of Article VI—No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency.
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
It is one duly introduced and finally passed by both houses, authenticated by the
proper officer of each, and approved by the President. It is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President.
Once the bill becomes an enrolled bill, it is conclusive upon the court of its due
enactment. Courts may no longer validly inquire into the bill because of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Casco (Phil) Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, if a mistake was made
in the printing of the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the
President, the remedy is amendment or corrective legislation, not a judicial decree.
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179
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
x x x As the President has no authority to approve a bill no passed by
Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by the Congress. the respect due to co-equal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
(Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 US 649)
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE—the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House—capable of producing unexpected
result—bill will have to be sent back to both houses and subject to votation.
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted in to the conference
bill. But occasionally it produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These
e4xcursions occurs even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference
committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of an authoritarian power of conference
committee. (Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, November
11, 1993)
DOCTRINE OF SHIFTING MAJORITY—
For each house to pass a bill, only the votes of the majority of those present in
the session, there being a quorum, is required.
Quorum—A majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as such house may determine.
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180
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17, the basis in determining the existence of a
quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and
within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998, the SC declared that
the question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when a quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL—regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the journals have also been accorded conclusive
effects. Thus, in US vs. Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding the Journals as “public memorials of the most permanent character,” thus:
“They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be
law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting
only in memory of individuals. (Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268)
Matters that are required to be entered on the Journal:
1. The yeas and nays on the 3
rd
and final reading of a bill;
2. The yeas and nays on any question, at the request of 1/5 of the members
present;
3. The yeas and nays upon re-passing a bill over the President’s veto; and
4. The President’s objection to a bill he had vetoed. (Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277
SCRA 268)
Journal entry vs. enrolled bill—
Enrolled bill prevails, except to matters, which under the Constitution, must
entered into the Journal. (Morales vs. Subido, 26 SCRA 150)
President’s Options:
1. Sign and the bill becomes a law.
2. Vetoes the bill, it does not become a law.
2/3 votes of all its Members (for Congress to override)
3. Inaction—the bill automatically becomes a law within 30 days upon receipt of the
bill from Congress.
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181
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-There is no such thing as “pocket veto” here in the Philippines because inaction by
the President for 30 days never produces a veto even if Congress is in recess. The
President must still act to veto the bill and communicate his veto to the Congress
without need of returning the vetoed bill with his veto message.
Pocket veto occurs when:
a. The President fails to act on the bill;
b. The reason he does not return the bill to the Congress is that Congress is not
in session.
PRESIDENTIAL VETO—
VETO—Section 27, Article VI
1. General veto of the President—paragraph 1 of Section 27, Article VI
2. Item/Line veto of the President—paragraph 2 of Section 27, Article VI
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also
provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
x x x
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines,
provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto
power, it is generally veto, however, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of the government and it
can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President
is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable
parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power”
to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measures.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The
power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
item. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133, April 15, 1992)
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182
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
General rule: Selective/partial veto is not allowed. The President may not veto a
provision of the bill without vetoing the whole/entire bill itself.
Exception: Paragraph 2 of Section 27, Article VI—Item/Line veto
Only Appropriation, Revenue and Tariff Bills (ART)—selective veto is
allowed here provided the vetoed bill shall not affect the items which was not vetoed.
Item—Refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It
is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose.
Exceptions to the Exception:
1. DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION—Section 25 (2), Article VI
A provision that is constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be
singled out for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue item.
It was invoked in the case of Gonzalez vs. Macaraig wherein President Aquino
vetoed a provision of the general appropriation bill. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the veto power of the President. Section 25 (2), Article VI—No provision or enactment
shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein.—Items which the President does not object, otherwise it
becomes an inappropriate provision—it may be treated as an item—subject to the item
veto of the President.
2. Executive Impoundment—refusal of the President to spend funds already
allocated by Congress for specific purpose. It is the failure to spend or obligate
budget authority of any type. This power is derived from Section 38 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 on suspension.
Appropriation Reserves—
Section 37 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Budget Secretary to
establish reserves against appropriations to provide for contingencies and
emergencies which may arise during the year. This is merely expenditure
deferral, not suspension, since the agencies concerned can still draw on the
reserves if the fiscal outlook improves.
3. Legislative Veto—a congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can
block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of
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183
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
legislative control in the implementation of particular executive action. The form
may either be:
a. Negative—subjecting the executive action to disapproval by Congress; or
b. Affirmative—requiring approval of the executive action by Congress.
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the separation of
powers.
-Local Chief Executives have veto power except the Punong Barangay.
POWER OF APPROPRIATION—
The spending power, called the “power of purse” belongs to the Congress,
subject only to the veto power of the President. it carries with it a power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law.
Appropriations Law—A statute, the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize release of public funds from the treasury.
The existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable
pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.
(COMELEC vs. Judge Quijano Padilla and Photokina Marketing Corp., G.R. No.
151992, September 18, 2000)
Classification:
1. General Appropriation Law—passed annually, intended to provide for the
financial operations of the entire government during one fiscal period.
2. Special Appropriation Law—designed for a specific purpose.
Implied (Extra-Constitutional) Limitations on Appropriation Power:
1. Must specify public purpose; and
2. Sum authorized for release must be determinate, or at least determinable.
Constitutional Limitations on Special Appropriation Measures:
1. Must specify public purpose for which the sum was intended; and
2. Must be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer or to be raised by corresponding revenue proposal included therein.
Constitutional Rules on General Appropriation Laws: Section 25, Article VI
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184
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Congress may not increase appropriations recommended by the President for
operation of the Government—to prevent big budget deficits;
2. Form, content and manner of preparation of budget shall be provided by law;
3. No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriations therein;
4. Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall be the same as that of
other departments—to prevent sub rosa appropriations by Congress;
5. Prohibition against transfer of appropriations (Doctrine of Augmentation),
however:
a. President;
b. Senate President;
c. Speaker of the House;
d. Chief Justice; and
e. Heads of Constitutional Commissions—
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.
6. Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit; and
7. Automatic re-appropriation.
POWER OF TAXATION
Limitations:
1. Rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
2. Charitable institutions, etc., and all lands, buildings and improvements
actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties.
4. Law granting tax exemption shall be passed only with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL— Section 17, Article V—Senate and House of
Representatives—sole judge of all contest relating to the election returns and
qualifications of their respective Members
No appeal lies. Appeal is merely statutory. The remedy is Rule 65, Certiorari (Special
Civil Action) based on Grave Abuse of Discretion.
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185
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
HRET—although attached to the Congress, has separate and distinct personality. It was
created as a non-partisan court. It must be independent of Congress and devoid of
partisan influence and consideration. Members of HRET, once appointed thereto, they
shall be accorded thereto of security of tenure to ensure their impartiality and
independence.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, “Disloyalty to the party” and “Breach of party
discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member. HRET members enjoy
security of tenure; their membership may not be terminated except for a just cause such
as the expiration of congressional term, death, resignation from the political party,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid causes.
Pimentel vs. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002, the SC said that even
assuming that the party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and Commission on
Appointments, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives
and not with the Court. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and
Commission on Appointments can the party-list representatives seek recourse from this
Court through judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
prior recourse to the House is necessary before the petitioners may bring the case to
Court.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300—As to the HRET’s
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives
(Article VI, Section 17 1987 Constitution). Petitioner not being a member of the House
of Representatives, it is obvious that HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction. See also Section 6 of RA 6646.
Guerrero vs. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458 (July 26, 2000)— While the Congress is
vested with the power to declare valid or invalid certificate of candidacy, its refusal to
exercise the power following the proclamation and assumption of Fariñas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has the sole and exclusive
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186
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the HOR, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his elections, returns and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the
HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.
Appeal from SET or HRET Decision
The Constitution mandates that the HRET and the SET shall each, respectively,
be the sole judge of all contest relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
their respective members.
The Court has stressed that so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restricts it or curtail it or even
affect the same.
In Robles vs. HRET, the Court has explained that while the judgments of the
Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only “in the
exercise of the SC’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction upon determination that the
Tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of
law, or upon demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting
such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be remedy for such abuse.
The Court does not venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors
of independent branches of government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a
denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action. (Libanan vs. HRET, 283 SCRA
520)
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187
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Section 21, Article VI—The Senate or the HOR or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
and procedure. The right of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Constitutional limitation on inquiries in aid of legislation
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION—(Section 21, Article VI)
Power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation—Investigatorial Power—not
absolute; subject judicial review in view of the expanded power of the court to determine
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Limitations:
1. The inquiry must be in aid of legislation;
2. It must be in accordance with duly published rules and procedure of the House
concerned; and
3. The right of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Remedy: invoke the Right against Self-Incrimination
Section 21 (Legislative investigation) vs. Section 22(Question Hour)
1. Inquiry in aid of legislation—they may not validly refuse to appear:
·It will impair the work of Congress
·It will violate the rights of the people to information on matters of public
concern (Section 7, Article III)
2. Members of the executive cabinet in view of EO 464
-These two (2) sections should not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Section 21 (Legislative
investigation)
Section 22(Question Hour)
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188
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Any person may appear
2. The Committees conduct the
investigation
3. The subject matter is any
matter for the purpose of
legislation
4. Appearance is mandatory
1. Only department head may
appear
2. The entire body conduct the
investigation
3. The subject matters are
matters related to the
department only
4. Appearance is Discretionary
Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No., 169777, April 20, 2006, while attendance to
Congressional hearings is discretionary on the part of the department heads during
“question hour,” such is not in the case in inquiries in aid of legislation, except upon a
valid and express claim of “executive privilege.”
The principle of separation of powers is the reason why executive officials may
not be compelled to attend hearings when Congress exercises its oversight functions.
Though, this is not the case when the Congress exercises its power of inquiry in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress. one specifically relates to the power to conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the object of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Sabio vs. Sen. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, the Congress’ power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. A mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
QUESTION HOUR—integral in a parliamentary government; the heads of departments
may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either house, as the rules of each house shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such house on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House at least 3 days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpolations shall not be limited to written
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189
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the scrutiny of the State or the
public interest so requires, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session
Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29—the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
(The power to conduct Inquiry is integral and implied of legislative power)
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173,
December 27, 2007, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before
a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or administrative
complaint.
Congressional Oversight Functions (Makalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013,
July 10, 2003)
It embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding
of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:
a. To monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives;
b. To determine whether agencies are properly administered;
c. To eliminate executive waste and dishonesty;
d. To prevent executive usurpation of authority; and
e. To assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government.
The oversight power has also been used to ensure the accountability of
regulatory commissions like the SEC. Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies,
these bodies are independent from the executive branch and are outside the executive
department in the discharge of their functions.
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190
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Categories of Congressional Oversight Functions:
a. Scrutiny—implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative
operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the
operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny,
Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration
of the agency involved.
It is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress. xxx But
legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask the heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either the House of Congress on any
matter pertaining to their department.
Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation to
find out whether the nominee possesses the necessary qualifications, integrity and
probity required of all public servants.
b. Congressional investigation—involves a more intense digging of facts. It is
recognized under Section 21, Article VI. Even in the absence of constitutional
mandate, it has been held to be an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative functions.
c. Legislative supervision—it connotes a continuing and informed awareness on
the part of congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area. It allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated
law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated
authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress,
which retains a “right” to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect.
Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become
a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute
provides that a proposed regulation will become a law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.
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191
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
POWER OF CONCURRENCE—
The Constitution requires the concurrence of the Congress to an amnesty and to
a treaty.
THE WAR POWER
The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
LAW-MAKING POWERS OF CONGRESS—
Pertinently, the power to make laws—legislative power—is vested in Congress.
Congress may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any
other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void,
on the principle of delegari potesta non potest delegari—delegated power may not be
delegated. The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons,
municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors,
bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate
necessary rules and regulations. (Chavez vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9,
2004)
Article VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE POWER—
It is the legal and political functions of the President involving the exercise of
discretion. It is vested in the President of the Philippines. It is the power to enforce and
administer laws.
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192
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. (Section
1, Article VII) In National Electrification Administration vs. CA, G.R. No. 143481,
February 15, 2002, the President is vested with the power to execute, administer, and
carry out laws into practical operation. Executive power, then, is the power of carrying
out the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
The President may not veto a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her
term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory
judgment of the Supreme Court through the exercise of veto power. (Bengzon vs.
Drilon, 208 SCRA 133, April 15, 1992)
PRESIDENT VICE-PRESIDENT
Q U A L I F IC A T I O NS
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. Registered voter;
3. Able to read and write;
4. At least 40 years of age on the day of election; and
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the
election.
T E R M O F O F F I C E
Six (6) years
D I S Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S
1. Not eligible for any re-election;
2. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such
for more than 4 years shall be
qualified for election to the same
office at any time (Sec. 4, Art. VII);
1. Shall not serve for more than two (2)
consecutive terms (Sec. 4, Art. VII)
General Disqualifications*
a. One who has been declared incompetent or insane by competent
authority;
b. One who has been sentenced by final judgment for:
vi. Subversion;
vii. Insurrection;
viii. Rebellion;
ix. Any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of not more
than 18 months; or
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193
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
x. A crime involving moral turpitude, unless given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty (Section 12, BP 881—Omnibus Election Code)
INHIBITIONS AND PROHIBITIONS
1. Shall not receive any other emolument from the government or any other source
(Section 6, Article VII);
2. Shall not hold any other office or employment unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution;
3. Shall not practice any other profession;
4. Shall not participate in any business;
5. Shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government, including GOCCs;
6. Shall avoid conflict of interest in conduct of office;
7. Shall avoid nepotism. (Section 13, Article VII)
P R I V I L E G E S
1. Official residence;
2. Salary is determined by law and
not to be decreased during his
tenure (Section 6, Article VII);
3. Immunity from suit for official acts.
1. Salary shall not be decreased during
his tenure;
2. No need for Commission on
Appointment confirmation for Cabinet
post (Section 3, Article VII)
CANVASSING BOARD
Congress (Senate and House of Representatives); in case of tie, Congress by
majority vote shall select.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Supreme Court (en banc)
R E M O V A L
Impeachment only
ELECTION—
(Section 4, Article VII) Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to
perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential
election results without need of any call for special session by the President. The joint
public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and proclaim the newly-elected
President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
has completed its functions it is rendered functus officio. (Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint
Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for President and VP, G.R. No.
163783, June 22, 2004)
There is no constitutional or statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a
separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically. By
conducting such “unofficial” tabulation, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private
organization, spending public funds for the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of
the envelopes containing the election returns and the election returns themselves. Thus,
if the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for
the President and VP, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an
“unofficial” canvass of said votes. (Brillantes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June
15, 2004)
Immunity from suit:
After his tenure, the President cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages
arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the
exercise of his official duties. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March
2001)
Rules on Succession:
a. Vacancy at the beginning of the term
i. Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: VP-elect shall become
President
ii. President-elect fails to qualify: VP-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect shall have qualified
iii. President shall not have been chosen: VP-elect shall act as President until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
iv. No President and VP chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall died or
become permanently disabled: The President of the Senate, or in case of his
disability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President
until a President or a VP shall have been chosen and qualified. In the event of
inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the
manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or VP shall have qualified.
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195
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
At 10 o’clock in the morning of the 3
rd
day after the vacancy occurs, Congress
shall convene without need of a call, and within 7 days enact a law calling for
a special election to elect a President and a VP to be held not earlier than 45
nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. The bill shall be deemed
certified and shall become a law upon its approval on 3
rd
reading by
Congress. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election.
b. Vacancy during the term
i. Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President: VP shall become the President
Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001, the SC declared that
the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement,
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them
as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are:
1. Intent to resign;
2. Act of relinquishment.
Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
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196
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence—
bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned—
constructive resignation
Resignation—may be written, oral, express, or implied, for as long as it is clear it must
be given legal effect.
Vacancy in the office of the VP:
Whenever there is vacancy in the Office of the VP during the term for which he
was elected, the President shall nominate a VP from among the Members of the Senate
and the HOR who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Section 9, Article VII)
Powers of the President:
1. Executive power (Section 1, Article VII)
2. Appointing power (Section 16, Article VII)
3. Control power (Section 17, Article VII)
-Section 4, Article X—Power of general supervision over local governments
4. Calling-out power, power to place the Philippines under martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Section 18, Article VII)
5. Pardoning power, reprieves, commutations, amnesty, remit fines and forfeitures
(Section 19, Article VII)
6. Borrowing power (Section 20, Article VII)
7. Diplomatic/Treaty-making power (Section 21, Article VII)
8. Budgetary power (Section 22, Article VII)
9. Informing power—State of the Nation Address (Section 23, Article VII)
10. Veto power (Article VI)
11. Power of general supervision over local governments (Section 4, Article X)
12. Power to call special session (Section 15, Article VI)
13. Unstated Residual Power—not found in the Constitution
14. Power to Reorganize the Office of the President (Administrative Code)
15. Power of Impoundment
APPOINTING POWER—carries with it the Removal Power
Appointment—is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
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197
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Designation—simply means imposition of additional duties on a person already in the
public service.
Binamira vs. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, when a person is merely designated
and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold office in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will of the appointing authority. In this sense, a designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
Appointing power is executive in nature. It is vested in the President. The power
carries with it the power to remove except in some cases like Justices of the Supreme
Court, the President appoints them but he cannot remove them. They can only be
removed through impeachment.
Officers to be appointed by the President that require the confirmation of Commission
on Appointments: (the list is exclusive)
1. Heads of the executive department
Except: Vice-President—may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation. (Section 3, Article VII)
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
3. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution
Example: JBC, Constitutional Commissions
5. All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law
6. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, not all appointments made by the President
need CA confirmation. Only those enumerated in paragraph 1 of Section 16, Article VII
need confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The appointment of Salvador
Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation by the CA, because the
Commissioner of Customs is not among the officers mentioned in the 1
st
paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII.
Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain—refers to
military officers alone
-PNP is now under the DILG (civilian in character, national in scope)—no longer part of
the AFP, therefore, no need for CA confirmation
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198
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Soriano vs. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003, the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the AFP but is not under the DOTC, a
civilian agency, the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will
not require confirmation by the CA.
Calderon vs. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, Article 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715, insofar as it requires the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the NLRC
Chairman and commissioners, is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16 of
Article VII. The Congress, when they enacted the law, added to the exclusive list
another category of officers to be appointed by the President that need the confirmation
of the CA.
Manalo vs. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239—a law was enacted creating the PNP, RA 6795. It
provides that the Director, Deputy Director General, and other top officials of the PNP
shall be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The SC declared it as
unconstitutional.
In the above two cases, Congress cannot add/remove anything from the list of
officers to be appointed by the President that require confirmation of the CA. The list is
exclusive. The Congress cannot add or remove anything by a mere legislative act.
Officials subject to the Appointment of the President:
A. With the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments—
1. Heads of the executive department
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
3. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution
B. Prior recommendation or nomination by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)—
1. Members of the Supreme Court and all lower courts
2. Ombudsman and hid 5 Deputies
C. Appointment of VP as Member of the Cabinet
D. Appointment solely by the President—
1. Those vested by the Constitution on the President alone
2. Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3. Those who may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. Those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in the
President alone
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199
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Appointing Procedure:
1. Nomination by the President;
2. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
3. Issuance of commission; and
4. Acceptance by appointee. Deemed complete upon acceptance. Pending such
acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the appointment may still be
validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon citizen
except for purposes of defense of the State under Section 4, Article II of the
Constitution, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.
Classifications:
1. Permanent—those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and
are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
2. Temporary—those given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and
without necessity of just cause or a valid investigation, made on the
understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent
appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a
permanent choice is made.
-Temporary appointment and Designation are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not
make the incumbent permanent appointee. (Valencia vs. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692)
3. Regular—Appointment by the President when Congress is in session. It takes
effect only after confirmation by the CA, and once approved, continues until the
end of the term of the appointee.
4. Ad Interim—(2
nd
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII )—Appointment by the
President when Congress is not in session. It takes effect immediately but
ceases to be valid if disapproved by the CA or upon the next adjournment of
Congress. It is deemed by-passed through inaction. It is intended to prevent
interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from the
prolonged vacancies in government offices.
It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.
a. Recess—one made while the Congress is not in session, before
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment; immediately effective;
and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by CA upon the next
adjournment of Congress;
b. Midnight—made by the President before his term expires, whether or not
it is confirmed by the CA
-Ad interim appointment disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments—can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval
is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
checking power on the appointing power of the President. The disapproval is a
decision on the merits, being a refusal by the CA to give its consent after
deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does
not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and
binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the
President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional
prohibition on appointment, but because of a final decision by the CA to withhold
its consent to the appointment.
In the case of Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, ad interim means “in
the meantime” or “for the time being”. An ad interim appointment means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is
in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed
office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the
civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that he cannot be suspended
or removed except for causes provided by law. The withdrawal or revocation of
an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee
before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires
a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing,
consistent with the requirements of due process.
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201
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Ad Interim regular
·Takes effect immediately
·Appointee assumes office immediately
and later on the appointment should be
confirmed by the CA
·Made while Congress is not in
session
·Does not take effect immediately
·Appointee assumes office only after
confirmation by the CA
·Made when Congress is in session
-The distinction lies in the effectivity of the appointment
-Ad interim appointee by-passed by the CA is no longer subject to re-
appointment. He is deemed to have vacated the office.
'Case of First Impression
2
nd
issue in the case of Matibag vs. Benipayo —whether ad interim appointees
by-passed by Commission on Appointments may be subject to re-appointment?
The SC held that an ad interim appointment that is by-passed by the
Commission on Appointments because of lack of time or failure of the latter to
organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the CA at the close of the session of
Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give
or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-
passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments. Hence, under the Rules, a by-passed
appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments
because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewal of
appointments will also not breach the 7-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will
not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no
danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the
twin prohibition of the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim
appointment of these three respondents for so long as their term of office expires
on February 2, 2008 does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Four (4) Situations where Section 1 (2), Article IX-C will apply:
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides: The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Member for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.
1. Where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by
the CA, serves his full 7-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to
the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then
be actually serving more than 7 years.
2. Where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and
then resigns before his 7-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be
reappointed. Whether as a member or as a chairman, to a vacancy arising
from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also
serving more than seven years.
3. Where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of
someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as member or
chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will
result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
4. Where the appointee has previously served a term less than seven
years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not
result in his serving more than 7 years, a reappointment of such person to
serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar
to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. This provision refers to the 1
st
appointees under the
Constitution, whose terms of office are less than 7 years, but are barred from
ever being reappointed under any situation.
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203
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
In Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 164798, October 13, 2005,
Congress commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004, the Commission
on Appointments was constituted on August 25, 2004. Meanwhile, President
Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments. Respondents took their oath and assume duties as
acting secretaries. Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004. On September
23, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an
acting capacity. A petition was filed to declare unconstitutional the appointments
issued by the President to the respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
while Congress is in session. The SC held that as a rule, the writ of prohibition
will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition
does not bar its resolution. The question of constitutionality of the President’s
appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in
session will arise in every such appointment. The office of a department
secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is an alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity
a person of her own choice even while Congress is in session. The person may
or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The
law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section
17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) states
that: The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
Ad interim appointment Appointment in an acting capacity
·Made if congress is not in session ·Made any time there is vacancy, i.e.,
whether Congress is in session or not
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204
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
·Requires confirmation of CA
·Permanent in nature
·Appointee enjoys security of tenure
·Does not require confirmation of CA
·Temporary in nature
·The appointee does not enjoy security
of tenure
Limitations on Appointing Power:
1. Prohibition against nepotism—(Section 13, par. 2, Article VII) The spouse and
relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4
th
civil degree of the President
shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
2. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless
revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption of office.
(section 14, Article VII)
3. The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through
its power to prescribe qualifications for public office.
4. The judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee
is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
5. Section 15, Article VII—2 types of appointment: Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
'Case of First Impression
In Re: Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta, 298 SCRA 409, Section
15, Article VII is directed against two (2) types of appointment:
1. Those made for buying votes—those appointments made within 2 months
preceding the Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code;
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205
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. Those made for partisan considerations—consist of the so-called midnight
appointments and those presumed made for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of the presidential election.
- a. If made within the 2-month election period=election offense
b. If made by an outgoing President before his term of office ends, it is MIDNIGHT
appointment.
Exception: temporary appointment to executive positions
'Case of First Impression
De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA, 94, Mayor Evelyn Abeja run for reelection
but lost. Before she vacated her office, though, she extended permanent appointments
to 14 new employees of the municipal government. The incoming mayor, upon
assuming office, recalled said appointments contending that these were “midnight
appointments” and, therefore, prohibited under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution. The SC held that the records reveal that when the petitioner brought the
matter of recalling the appointments of the 14 private respondents before the Civil
Service Commission, the only reason he cited to justify his actions was that these were
“midnight appointments” that are forbidden by the Constitution. However, the CSC
ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Rufino vs. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, a statute cannot
circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a
public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling
vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis. And since the pertinent section
is unconstitutional, the President has the power to appoint the trustees by virtue of
Section 16, Article VII which gives the President the power to appoint officers whose
appointments are not provided for by the law.
POWER OF REMOVAL—
General Rule: This power is implied from the power to appoint.
Exceptions: Those appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain
methods for separation from public services.
Example: Members of the Constitutional Commissions, Justices of the SC—may
only be removed through impeachment
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206
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the
President may be directly disciplined provided that the same is for cause and in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends
upon the pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking,
their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term. (Aparri vs.
Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231)
POWER OF CONTROL—
Sec. 17, Article VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Faithful Execution Clause
As Chief Executive, the President holds the steering wheel that controls the
course of her government—she lays down policies in the execution of her plans and
programs, and whatever policy, she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement
them. (Chavez vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004)
Control—is the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
Supervision—means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them
perform these duties.
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the Alter Ego Doctrine—
Acts of the Secretaries of executive departments when performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business or unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief executive.
In the case of DENR vs. DENR Region XII Employees, G.R. No. 149724,
August 19, 2003, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government
may validly be delegated to his Cabinet members exercising control over a particular
executive department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary can validly
reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from
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207
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Cotabato City Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be the act of the President
because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
However, in the case of Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August
15, 2000, the SC held that even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President,
he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him,
inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President.
- The power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts not
over the actor (Angangco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619)
POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Section 4,
Article X)—the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he
finds that the latter acted contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned LGU acts within the parameters of the
law and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter
egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a LGU
is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the
doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations. (Judge Dadole vs. COA, G.R. No. 125350,
December 3, 2002)
- The President exercises general supervision, not control, over local governments. The
power is generally to see to it that the LGUs perform their powers and functions in
accordance with law.
MILITARY POWERS—
Section 18, Article VII:
1. The Commander-in-Chief Clause—
·To call out the Armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.
·Organize courts martial for the discipline of the armed forces and create military
commissions for the punishment of war criminals.
Calling-out power—lawless violence declare martial law & suspend the writ of HC
Rebellion invasion “when the public safety
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208
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Invasion rebellion so requires”
' Gudani vs. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006 (Tinga), the ability of the
President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing
before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of
presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition
and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive
privilege or executive control.
2. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus—
Grounds: invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.
Duration: not to exceed 60 days, following which it shall be lifted unless extended
by Congress
Duty of the President: To report action to Congress within 48 hours, personally or
in writing
-The Congress may revoke or extend, on request of the President, the effectivity
of proclamation by a majority vote of all its Members, voting jointly.
The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three (3) days, otherwise he
shall be released.
3. Proclamation of Martial Law—
Constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the power of the President to
proclaim martial law
a. There must be actual invasion or rebellion;
b. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed 60 days;
c. Within 48 hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. if
Congress is not in session, it must convene within 24 hours;
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209
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
d. Congress may, by majority vote of all its members voting jointly, revoke
the proclamation, and the President cannot set aside the revocation;
e. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon initiative of the
President, Congress may extend the proclamation if the invasion or
rebellion continues and public safety requires it;
f. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30
days from its filing;
g. It does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
confinement of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
Olaguer doctrine—aka OPEN COURT DOCTRINE—civilians cannot be tried by
military courts if the civil courts are open and functioning (Olaguer vs. Military
Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54448, May 22, 1987)
4 ways for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:
1. Lifting by the President himself;
2. Revocation by Congress;
3. Nullification by the SC;
4. Operation of law after 60 days.
PARDONING POWER—
Exercise by the President: Discretionary; may not be controlled by the legislature
or reversed by the courts unless there is violation of the Constitution.
Section 19, Article VII is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after the finality. In truth, an accused
that has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in the state of
insanity. (See Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code)
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210
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article 81 of the Revised Penal code, as amended, which provides that the
death sentence shall be carried out without prejudice to the exercise by the President of
his executive clemency powers at all times. For instance, the President cannot grant
reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain in the absence of a
precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might
even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution, and
the applicable statute as when the date of execution set by the President would be
earlier than that designated by court. (Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA
96)
1. Pardon—an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed
from punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
a. Plenary or partial
b. Absolute or conditional
Conditional pardon—is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power
or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will
release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the
terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentence or an additional one.
2. Commutation—reduction or mitigation of penalty
3. Reprieve—postponement of sentence or stay of execution
4. Parole—release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as
parolee is in custody of the law although not in confinement
5. Amnesty—act of grace, concurred in by the Legislature, usually extended to
groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the
offense itself.
Limitations:
a. Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
b. Cannot be granted in violations of election laws without favorable
recommendations of the COMELEC;
c. Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (except amnesty);
d. Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt;
e. Cannot absolve convict of civil liability;
f. Cannot restore public offices forfeited.
Amnesty Pardon
·addressed to political offenses ·refers to infractions of laws of the state or
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211
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
·granted to a class or classes of persons
·it need not be accepted
·it requires the concurrence of Congress
·it is a public act
·it looks backward and puts the offense
into oblivion
ordinary offenses
·granted to individuals
·it must be accepted
·it does not need the concurrence of
Congress
·it is a private act of the President
·it looks forward and relieves the pardonee
of the consequences of the offense
- Judicial admissions
Matters of judicial notice no need of proof
Judicial presumptions
In Llamas vs. Orbos, pardon is available also to one found guilty of administrative
offense.
Section 19 of Article VII did not distinguish between a criminal and administrative
offense.
Effect of grant of pardon:
In the case of Monsanto vs. Factoran, the accused was convicted of
malversation thru falsification of official documents. She was granted absolute pardon.
She demanded for reinstatement and back salaries. The SC held that pardon may
mean forgiveness but not forgetfulness. What was remitted is the penalty and not the
fact of one’s guilt. In the eyes of law, she was still a convict.
Exceptions:
1. Unless the grant expressly so provides for her reinstatement and payment of
back salaries.
2. If the grant of pardon was based on the fact of the innocence of the one charged
of the crime.
BORROWING POWER—
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
with the concurrence of the Monetary Board, subject to such limitations as may be
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212
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
provided by law. The Monetary Board shall submit to the Congress report on loans
within 30 days from end of every quarter.
Limitations:
1. There must be prior concurrence of the Monetary Board
2. It is subject to such other limitations
DIPLOMATIC/TREATY-MAKING POWER (Section 21, Article VII)
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R.
No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements
and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties or
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the
Senate to be valid and effective.
But see Section 25 of Article XVIII. Under this provision, the concurrence of the
Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.
BUDGETARY POWER—
Within 30 days from opening of every regular session, President shall submit to
Congress a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.
The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the
President. However, its form, content, manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by Congress.
INFORMING POWER—State of the Nation Address (Section 23, Article VII)
The President shall address Congress at the opening of its regular session (4
th
Monday of July). He may also appear before it at any other time.
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213
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
VETO POWER (Article VI)
RESIDUAL POWER— Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative, is
residual power exercised by the President.
OTHER POWERS—
1. Power to call special session (Section 15, Article VI)
2. Power to deport aliens
3. Consent to deputization of government personnel by COMELEC
4. To discipline such deputies
5. By delegation from Congress, exercise emergency and tariff powers—
Conditions for the exercise of the President of Emergency Powers:
a. It can be exercised only in times of war or national emergency;
b. There must be a law authorizing the President to exercise emergency
powers;
c. It must be for a limited period;
d. It must be subject to restrictions which Congress may provide; and
e. It must be necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
6. Power to Reorganize the Office of the President—under EO 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987
The law grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
“to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency”. The Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies.
Power to reorganize the Office of
the President [Sec. 31 (2&3), EO
292]
Power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper [Sec. 31 (1), EO
292]
· The President’s power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the
· The President can reorganize the
Office of the president Proper by:
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214
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
President Proper is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from
the Office of the president to
Departments or Agencies, and vice
versa.
a. Abolishing;
b. Consolidating or merging units;
c. Transferring functions from one
unit to another.
Domingo vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) vs.
Executive Secretary Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007, the President has the
authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under the Constitutions and statutory
laws. This authority is adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and
17. The President’s power to re0organize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers. However, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the
reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department.
IMPOUNDMENT POWER—
Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of
the authority of the President.
1. authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress
2. the executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief
3. Faithful Execution Clause
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the
President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest.
An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project,
substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to
spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER
It is the power to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the
right to sue in courts of law and equity. Corollary to this dictum is the principle of locus
standi of a litigant. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and
substantial has the standing to sue. Thus, a party must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and justify the
exercise of judicial power on his behalf. (Domingo vs. Carague, G.R. No. 161065,
April 15, 2005)
Section 1, Article VIII JUDICIAL POWER
The judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes:
1. The duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable (TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF
JUDICIAL POWER); and
2. To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (GADALEJ) on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (EXPANDED POWER)
Jurisdiction: The power to hear and decide cases.
Section 2, Article VIII—The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members.
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216
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Constitutional Safeguards that guarantee independence of Judiciary:
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and may not be abolished by law;
2. The members of the SC are removable only by impeachment;
3. The SC may not be deprived of minimum original and appellate jurisdiction;
appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and concurrence;
4. The SC has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel;
5. The SC has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts;
6. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure;
7. The members of the SC may not be designated to any agency, performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions;
8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy;
9. The SC alone may initiate Rules of Court;
10. The SC alone may order temporary detail of judges;
11. The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.
Fiscal Autonomy—means freedom from outside control. The Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the SC, of the independence and separation of powers upon
which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208
SCRA 133, April 15, 1992)
Appointment to the Judiciary:
Qualifications: Of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. In addition:
A. Justices of the SC
a. Natural-born citizen;
b. At least 40 years of age;
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
c. 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or has been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines for the same period.
B. Justices of the Court of Appeals
·Same qualifications as those provided for SC Justices
·Congress may prescribe other qualifications
C. RTC Judges
a. Citizen of the Philippines;
b. At least 35 years of age;
c. Has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 5 years or has held
public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as
an indispensable requisite
D. MTC, MeTC, MCTC Judges
a. Citizens of the Philippines;
b. At least 30 years of age;
c. Has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 5 years or has held
public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as
an indispensable requisite.
Procedure for Appointment:
1. Appointed by the President from among a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for every vacancy.
2. For lower courts, President shall issue the appointment 90 days from submission
of the list.
Tenure of Justices and Judges:
A. Supreme Court —Hold office until they reach the age of 70 or become
incapacitated to discharge their duties. They may be removed only through
impeachment.
B. Lower Courts —Hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 or
become incapacitated to discharge their duties.
·By majority vote of members who actually took part in the deliberation on the
issues and voted thereon, SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts or order their dismissal.
·No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members.
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218
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Composition:
Ex-Officio Chairman—Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Ex-Officio Members —Secretary of Justice
—Representative of Congress
Regular Members—Representative of the IBP
Professor of Law
Retired Member of SC
Representative of private sector
Secretary de Officio—Clerk of the Supreme Court
Appointment:
The President shall appoint regular members for a 4-year term with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments
Powers and Functions:
1. Recommend appointees to the Judiciary;
2. Recommend appointees to the Office of the Ombudsman and his 5 Deputies;
3. May exercise such other functions as may be assigned by the Supreme Court.
SUPREME COURT
Composition:
• Chief Justice and 14 Associates Justices
• May sit:
o En Banc; or
o In its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5, or 7 members
• Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof.
Powers of the Supreme Court
A. Original Jurisdiction
1. Over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
2. Over petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, mandamus, Quo Warranto, and
Habeas Corpus;
Certiorari Jurisdiction of the SC—limited to decisions rendered in actions or
proceedings taken cognizance of by the Commissions in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.
It does not refer to purely executive powers. Hence, questions arising from the
award of a contract for construction of voting booths can be brought before the
trial court. (Ambil vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 5, 2000)
3. Review of factual basis for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus.
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219
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
B. Appellate Jurisdiction
• Over final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which constitutionality or validity of any treaty international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower courts is in issue;
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher; and
e. All cases in which only a question of law is involved.
C. Electoral Tribunal for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Contests, over all
contests relating to the election, return and qualification of the President or Vice-
President.
D. Temporary assignment of judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Not to exceed 6 months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
E. Order change of venue or place of trial, to avoid miscarriage of justice
F. Rule-making power—promulgates rules concerning:
1. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights;
2. Pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
3. Admissions to the practice of law;
4. IBP; and
5. Legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Limitations on rule-making power:
a. Provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for speedy disposition of
cases;
b. Uniform for all courts of the same grade;
c. Shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC,
January 21, 2002, it was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement
and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which
will hear and decide the plunder case against former President Estrada.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,
1999, Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. The SC declared that the
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220
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
G. Power of Appointment—SC appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary
in accordance with Civil Service law.
H. Power of Administrative Supervision—SC shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and personnel thereof.
Administrative proceedings before the SC are confidential in nature in
order to protect the respondent therein who may turn out to be innocent of the
charges; it can take years to build a reputation and only a single accusation,
although unfounded, to destroy it. (Godinez vs. Alano, A.M. RTJ-98-1409,
February 18, 1999)
I. Yearly Report—Within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of
Congress, SC shall submit to the President and Congress an annual report on
the operation and activities of the Judiciary. (Section 16, Art. VIII)
Cases to be heard by the SC En Banc:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Cases raising novel questions of law;
3. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
4. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Election, and Commission on Audit;
5. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or both;
6. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed;
7. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members
thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of
the actual membership of the court en banc; and
8. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may
deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs.
CA, 334 SCRA 465, June 28, 2000)
Consultations/Decisions of SC—
The conclusions of the SC in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division
shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and
a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member
who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall observe by all lower collegiate courts. Section 13,
Article VIII
This requirement does not apply to administrative cases
Section 14, Article VIII—No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
 It does not apply to a minute resolution dismissing a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and
mandamus, provided a legal basis is given therein. Neither will it apply to administrative
cases.
People vs. Baring, G.R. No. 137933, January 28, 2002, the trial court’s
decision may cast doubt on the guilt of the accused, not by the lack of direct evidence
against the accused but by:
1. the trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts;
2. the weight of the admissibility of the evidence;
3. the assessments made from the evidence; and
4. The conclusion drawn therefrom, after applying the pertinent law as basis of the
decision.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court
shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
 “Lack of merit” is sufficient declaration of the legal basis for denial of petition for review
or motion for reconsideration.
Tichangco vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004, when the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments or
motions, decides to deny due course to a petition, and states—in a minute resolution—
that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court’s
decision is shown or some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
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222
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
WRIT OF AMPARO
The Rule on Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
It was drafted pursuant to the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules and regulations for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights.
WRIT OF AMPARO—it is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,
and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or office, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
It is a writ which may be issued by the courts based on this constitutional power
of the SC to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. It is a remedy to enforce fundamental rights.
It would compel state agents to look for the missing person and the agents would
be held liable if they did not exert adequate effort in finding the person.
“amparo”—means protection, from “amparar” meaning “to protect”
Who may file?
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or
entitiy in the following order:
× Any member of the immediate family, namely:
i. Spouse
ii. Children
iii. Parents of the aggrieved party
× Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the 4
th
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned above; or
× Any concerned citizen, organization, association, or institution, if there is
no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved
party.
- The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party
on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the rights of all others, observing the order
established by the law.
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223
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Where can be filed?
The petition may be filed on any day at any time with the:
• RTC of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or
any of its elements occurred;
• Sandiganbayan
• Court of Appeals or any Justice of such courts
• Supreme Court
- The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on the face of the petition it ought to
issue. It is served on the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the
court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service.
- In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on
substituted service shall apply.
A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge
for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.
Return of the Writ—the respondent shall file a verified written return together with the
supporting affidavits within seventy-two (72) hours.
If he fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the
petition ex parte or even without the appearance of the respondent.
RTC—returnable before such court or judge
·Returnable before such court or any justice thereof; or
SB/CA ·To any RTC of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred
·Returnable before such court or any of its justices;
SC ·Before the SB or CA or any of their justices; or
·To any RTC of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred
Hearing on the Petition—
The hearing shall be summary in nature. However, the court, justice or judge
may call for a preliminary conference to clarify or simplify some issues and determine
the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
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224
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Available Interim Reliefs:
1. Temporary Protection Order—upon motion or motu proprio, the court, justice or
judge may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety
2. Inspection Order—issued to any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or
operation thereon. The movant must show that the order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. It
expires five (5) days after date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.
3. Witness Protection Order—the witness may be referred to the DOJ for
admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, or to other
government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of
keeping and securing their safety.
- Only the first two interim reliefs are available to the respondent after he filed a verified
motion supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge
of the defenses of the respondent, and after due hearing.
The Court shall render judgment within 10 days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
deemed proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
If the court determines that it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure
of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives, it shall not dismiss the
petition. The court shall archive it instead. The amparo court may, on its own or upon
motion by any party, order revival of the petition when ready for further proceedings.
The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after
the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
ºDoes the filing of the petition preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or
administrative actions?
E No. However, when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for
the writ shall be filed, but the reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the
criminal case, and the procedure under this rule shall govern the disposition of the
reliefs available under the writ of amparo.
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225
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ,
the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the
disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW—
It is the power of courts to test validity of executive and legislative acts if the
same are in accordance with the Constitution. It is an expression of supremacy of
Constitution.
Justiciable Question—a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted by law for said breach of right
Political Questions—those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branches of government.
Political Question Doctrine has been greatly diminished.
•Political questions are questions of policy. They involve the wisdom of an act or the
efficacy or the necessity of a particular measure. These are questions which are better
left for the political branches of the government to determine or resolve.
•Arose from doctrine of separation of powers
Two (2) Types of Political Question
1. Those to be decided by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity
2. Full discretionary authority has been delegated by the Constitution to the
Legislative or Executive branch of the government
¦Legislative and Executive—political branches of the government—where laws are
enacted and enforced
RECALL- a mode of removing a local official from his post even before his term ends
due to lack of confidence. It is a political question which can not be intruded by the
courts.
Ybardone vs. COMELEC- lack of confidence is to be decided by the people thru a
special recall election
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226
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Lawyer's League vs. Aquino—Petitioner questioned the legality of the Aquino
Government.
-the SC dismissed the petition that it has gone outside the ambit of judicial review
- the mere presence of the people, without inquiring to their motive in going to
EDSA, caused Marcos to fly to Hawaii.
Estrada vs. Desierto (2001)
·The Petition questioned the legitimacy of the assumption of office by then Vice
President GMA
·Lawyer's League case was cited by respondents; that the case presented a
political question, hence not subject to judicial review
·SC held that the case of Lawyer's League is inapplicable; the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign
people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution declared that the
Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." It is familiar
learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not
revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under
1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the
presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
The case at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably Sec. 1 of Article II and Sec. 8 of Article VI, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of
political question is but a foray in the dark.
EDSA I EDSA II
-involves the exercise of people power of
revolution which overthrows the whole
government
-extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review
-involves the exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected
the office of the President
-intra constitutional and the resignation
of the sitting President that it caused and
the succession of the VP as President are
subject to judicial review
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227
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-presented a political question -involves legal questions
IBP vs. ZAMORA (2000)
The SC said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress
lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the President's discretion or
substitute its own. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary", the
President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot
decisions may be necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives
and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the armed forces must
be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
Section 18, Article VII- Powers of the President
1. Calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP
2. Power to proclaim martial law
3. Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
CALLING-OUT POWER - full discretionary power of the President. In effect, it is
a political question not subject to judicial review UNLESS it can be shown that
there is GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION (GAD) in the exercise of such power.
-expanded power of the judicial review
-mere abuse of discretion will not do. The abuse must be
grave. To doubt is to sustain the power of the
President.
Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction—
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
(Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. IAC, February 13, 1989)
General Rule: Calling out power is not subject to judicial review and is
considered a political question.
Exception: When there has been a GAD.
-#s 2 and 3- are not political questions. They are subject to judicial review as
expressly provided in Sec. 18 (3), Article VII:
xxx
The SC may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
30 days from its filing.
xxx
Randolf David, et al. vs. GMA, et al. (2006)
·Petitioners failed to rebut the assertion that GMA acted with grave abuse of discretion
·SC uphold the constitutionality of PP1017 insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is
sustained by Sec. 18, Art. VII and other relevant jurisprudence. However, PP 1017's
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue
decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Sec. 17, Art. XII, the president, in the
absence of legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.
ultra-vires acts and unconstitutional:
a. warrantless arrest of petitioners David and Llamas;
b. the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members;
c. imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press;
d. warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of
some articles for publication and other materials
Section 23 (2), Article VI:
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident
in the tenor of the above provision authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable
for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of the Constitution deemed
it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be war or other emergency
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only
(3) The delegation must be subject to restrictions as the Congress may
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
prescribe
(4) The emergency power must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President
cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article XII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
*emergency power must be authorized by Congress (thru an enactment of law)
*she is not exercising emergency power because there was no law enacted by
Congress authorizing her to exercise such power
General rule: POTESTA DELEGATA NON DELEGARE POTEST- what has been
delegated cannot be re-delegated. It is based on ethical principle that delegated
powers constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or
management contracts, it is not allowed to relinquish or share its franchise, much less
grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. In Lim vs. Pacquing, 240
SCRA 649, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from Congress to
operate jai-alai, it cannot, even if it has license or permit from the City Mayor, operate
jai-alai in the City of Manila”. By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate
legislative franchise, and not “ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate
on-line internet gambling (Jaworski vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14,
2004).
Exceptions: Permissible Delegation of Powers (PETAL)
P-eople power thru plebiscite and initiative- (Sec. 32, ART VI; Sec. 10, Art. X; Sec. 2,
Art. XVII; RA 6735) Under the 1987 Constitution, there are specific provisions where the
people have reserved to themselves the function of legislation.
Referendum vs. Plebiscite
Referendum Plebiscite
-the power of the electorate to approve or
reject legislation through an election called
-the electoral process by which an initiative
on the Constitution is approved or rejected
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
for that purpose by the people
E-mergency power of the President. (Sec. 23(2), Art. VI)
T-ariff Powers to the President. (Sec. 28(2), Art. VI)
A-dministrative agencies- “The power of subordinate legislation.”
L-ocal government. (RA 7160) “Such legislation (by LG) is not regarded as a transfer of
general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe
local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject, of course, to the
interposition of the superior in cases of necessity” (People vs. Vera). This
recognizes the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the
national lawmaking body on matters of purely local concern, and are in better
position to enact appropriate legislative measures thereon.
Tests for Valid Delegation:
1. Completeness Test —The law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the
delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it.
2. Sufficient Standard Test —intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under
which it is to be pursued and effected. This is intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from the legislature to the delegate.
Three (3) Important Functions of Judicial Review
1. Checking
2. Legitimating
-Rule on Double Negative—uses the term “not unconstitutional”; the court
cannot declare a law constitutional because it already enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality
3. Symbolic - educating the bar and bench and the people on the extent of protection
given by the constitutional guarantees
-Proclamation No. 1021 was issued lifting PP 1017- it becomes moot and academic but
SC did not agree as the case is capable of repetition.
Requisites for the proper exercise of Power of Judicial Review
1. Actual case or controversy- must be definite, concrete, bearing upon the legal
relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal
interests.
-susceptible of judicial determination
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-Philippine courts may not render advisory opinion. There must always be an
actual case or controversy EXCEPT: Int'l Court of Justice-principal judicial organ of the
United Nations- ICJ may render advisory opinions. Its 2 main functions are: (a) to
decide contentious cases; and (b) to render advisory opinions upon request of the
General Assembly, or the Security Council, or the other organs of the UN when
authorized by the General Assembly.
-A request for an advisory is not an actual case or controversy. But an action for
declaratory relief is proper for judicial determination.
-The issue raised in the case must not be moot and academic, or because of
subsequent developments, have become moot and academic.
MOOT and ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE
General Rule: Court will have to dismiss the case. There is no more actual case to be
resolved.
Exceptions: (David vs. GMA)
a. Grave violation of the Constitution
b. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved
c. Constitutional issue raised requires formulation of guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules and the symbolic function to
educate the bar and bench and the people on the extent of protection given by the
constitutional guarantees
d. Case is capable of repetition yet evading review—it presupposes that:
i. The life of the controversy is too short to be fully litigated prior to its termination,
and
ii. That there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff will again be subjected
to the same problem
2. The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party—A proper party
is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
the act complained of. (LOCUS STANDI)
"Legal Standing"- personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of governmental act.
A party's standing in court is a procedural technicality which may be set aside by the
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Court in view of the importance of the issues involved. Thus, where the issues raised by
the petitioners are of paramount public interest, the Court may, in the exercise of its
discretion, brush aside the procedural barrier. (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA
110)
In Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, Rep.
Suplico, et al., and Senator Pimentel were considered as proper parties to contest the
constitutionality of Pres. Arroyo’s proclamation of a “state of rebellion” after the
Oakwood incident.
In IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the petition seeking to nullify
the order of Pres. Estrada for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP
in visibility patrols around Metro Manila area, was dismissed on the ground that the IBP
had no legal standing to question the presidential act.
Lim vs. Executive Secretary (2002)—Because of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised in the Petition, the Court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, brushed aside the procedural barrier and took cognizance of the
petitions.
Information Technology Foundation vs. COMELEC (2004)— the subject matter of
the case is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest; it is of paramount
public interest and of transcendental importance.
Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, the petitioners do not posses the legal
capacity to institute the action for annulment of the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
because they are without a “present substantial interest”, as distinguished from mere
expectancy, or future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
“present substantial interest” means such interest of a party in the subject
matter of the action as will entitle him, under substantive law, to recover if the evidence
is sufficient, or that he has a legal title to defend and the defendant will be protected in
payment to or recovery from him.
In Domingo vs. Carague, G.R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005, the petitioners failed to
show any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan;
there was no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its implementation; and they admitted that they do not
seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the
respondents. Clearly, then, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.
In Cutaran vs. DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001, the SC refused to give due
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
course to a petition seeking to enjoin the DENR from processing the ancestral land
claim of private respondent over a property located at Camp John Hay reservation in
Baguio, on the ground that there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioner’s
asserted right. Court will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there
has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse
effect on the legal right of the person contesting its legality. Until such time, petitioners
are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at a future time.
-General rule: A party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it
is unconstitutional.
Exception: FACIAL CHALLENGE. The statute is absolutely unconstitutional under
no circumstance. But the only time a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it
operates in the area of freedom of expression.
Invalidation of the statute “on its face”, rather than “as applied” is permitted in
the interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
Overbreadth Doctrine—permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute
even though as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to
others not before the Courts whose activities are constitutionally protected.
In Francisco, Jr. vs. Bayani Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006,
a citizen can raise a constitutional question only when 1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury.
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportune time—
generally, the question must be raised in he pleadings; however, in criminal cases, the
question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the court; in civil cases, the
question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the
determination of the case itself; and in every case, except where there is estoppel, it
can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.
In Umali vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 131124, March 21, 1999, the question of
constitutionality of the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)
was not entertained because the issue was raised by the petitioner only in his motion for
reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the issue for the first
time at that stage of the proceedings.
4. The decision on the constitutional question must constitute the very LIS MOTA
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
—must be determinative of the case itself/entire controversy
In Arceta vs. Judge Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004, in a new
challenge to the constitutionality of B.P. 22, the SC did not find the constitutional
question to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy. Every law has in its favour
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.
PERIOD FOR DECISION
Section 15, Article VIII—(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four (24) months from date of
submission for the SC, and, unless reduced by the SC, twelve months (12) for all lower
collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.
 The above provision does not apply to Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to
regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the
Court of Appeals.
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals
and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial
court.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one. (Re: Problem
of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. 00-8-05-SC, November 28,
2001)
MEMORANDUM DECISIONS—
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
A specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the
provisions of Section 40, BP 129 on the grounds of:
1. Expediency
2. Practicality
3. Convenience
4. Docket status of the Court
To be valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law
of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision
is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum
decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct
access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized
under Section 40 of BP 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.
Distinctive Features and Purpose:
1. It is rendered by an appellate court.
2. It incorporates by reference the findings of facts or the conclusions of law
contained in the decision, order, or ruling under review. This is to avoid
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof,
in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the
body of the higher court decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court
since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
3. The purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the
approval of the finding of facts by the lower court may lead to a different
conclusion of law by the higher court. (Yao vs. CA, 344 SCRA 202, October 24,
2000)
Article IX
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Independent Constitutional Commissions:
1. Civil Service Commission
2. Commission on Elections
3. Commission on Audit
Safeguards that guarantee the independence of the Commissions:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by a statute;
2. Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by
statute;
3. Each expressly described as independent;
4. Chairmen and members are given fairly long term of office for seven (7) years;
5. Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment;
6. Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting
capacity;
7. Salaries of chairmen and members are relatively high and may not be decreased
during continuance in office;
8. Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy;
9. Each commission may promulgate its own procedural rules;
10. Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to
strengthen their integrity; and
11. Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with
Civil Service Law.
Prohibitions and Inhibitions:
No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure:
1. Hold any other office or employment;
2. Engage in the practice of any profession;
3. Engage in the active management and control of any business which in any way
may be affected by the functions of his office; and
4. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in other contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its subdivision, agencies
or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
CHR Employees Association vs. CHR, G.R. No. 155336, November 24, 2004, the
Commission on Human Rights, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Civil Service Commission vs. DBM, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005, the “no report,
no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy, without violating Sec. 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution. The “automatic
release” of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission
vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed. However, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be
reduced by Congress below the amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the
case of Judiciary, must be rejected. The provision in Section 3 of Article VIII, prohibiting
the reduction in the appropriation for the Judiciary below the amount appropriated for
the previous year does not appear in Section 5, Article IX-A. The plain implication of this
omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
year.
Certiorari Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
 Limited to decisions rendered in actions or proceedings taken cognizance of by the
Commissions in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. It does not
refer to purely executive powers. Hence, questions arising from the award of a contract
for construction of voting booths can be brought before the trial court. (Ambil vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 5, 2000)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Composition:
• 1 Chairman;
• 2 Commissioners
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 35 years of age at the time of appointment;
3. With proven capacity for public administration; and
4. Not a candidate for any elective position in the election immediately preceding
the appointment.
Term: Seven (7) years without reappointment
Scope of the Civil Service: Embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters [Section 2(1), Article IX-B]
Classes of Service:
× Career Service—characterized by:
a. Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined by competitive
examination or based on highly technical qualification;
b. Opportunity for advancement; and
c. Security of tenure.
Kinds of Career Service:
• Open Career Positions —prior qualification via examination;
• Closed Career Positions —those highly technical position;
• Career Executive Service —Undersecretaries, Bureau Directors;
• Career Officers —those appointed by the President like those in the
foreign service;
• Commissioned Officers and enlisted men of the AFP —governed by
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
separate merit system;
• Personnel of GOCCs— whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, with original charters; and
• Permanent laborers —whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
× Non-Career Service—characterized by:
a. Entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merits and fitness
utilized for the career service; and
b. Tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, which is co-terminus
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
Kinds of Non-Career:
• Elective official and their personal or confidential staff;
• Department heads and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff;
• Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms
of office and their personal or confidential staff;
• Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government
is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or
job; and
• Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Exceptions to the requirement of Competitive Examinations:
1. Policy-determining Position—one charged with laying down of principal or
fundamental guidelines or rules;
2. Primary Confidential Position—one denoting not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state, or one
declared to be so by the President upon recommendation of the Civil Service
Commission.
3. Highly Technical Position—requires the appointee to possess technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree.
CSC vs. Engr. Darangina, G.R. No. 167472, January 31, 2007, where a non-eligible
holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not
prohibited. When a temporary appointee is required to relinquish his office, he is being
separated precisely because his term has expired.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Tanjay Water District vs. Quinit, Jr. G.R. No. 160502, April 27, 2007, it is an
established rule that the tenure of office of those holding primarily confidential positions
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as longs as
confidence in them endures. Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of
confidence, in which case, their cessation from office involves no removal but the
expiration of their term of office.
Power to approve/disapprove appointments—
The authority of CSC to approve appointments—to check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualification
—does not include the authority to make the appointment itself or to direct the
appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can
only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the
person qualified, it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved.
(Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, G.R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995)
In the case of Lopez vs. CSC, 194 SCRA 269, the SC held that the CSC has no power
to revoke an appointment simply because it believes that the person protesting the
appointment or somebody is better qualified, for that will constitute an encroachment of
the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION
Composition:
• One (1) Chairman
• Six (6) Commissioners
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 35 years of age at the time of appointment;
3. With proven capacity for public administration; and
4. Not a candidate for any elective position in the election immediately preceding
the appointment.
5. Majority, including the Chairman, must be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Term: Seven (7) years without reappointment
Section 1, par. 2, Article IX-C—Chairman and Commissioners of COMELEC are not
subject to re-appointment
(See the case of Matibag vs. Benipayo re: ad interim appointment)
The COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3, Article IX-
C which expressly requires that:
1. All elections cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be
decided by the COMELEC in division, and
2. The motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the
COMELEC’s administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve
the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for double
registration against violators. There is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the
criminal information be first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC. (Baytan
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003)
In Vinzons-Chato vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, once the
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
In Quizon vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February 17, 2008, the denial of
due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the
administration powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Hence, the Court may compel COMELEC to exercise such discretion
and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of exercising such discretion.
Powers and Functions:
1. Enforce and administer law and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum or recall;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials;
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by the RTC, or involving elective barangay officials by MTC;
4. Decide, except those involving right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including the determination of number and location of polling places, appointment
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
of election officials and inspectors and registration of voters;
5. Deputize, with concurrence of President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities for exclusive purpose of insuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
6. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations or coalitions
which must present their platform or program government; accredit citizen’s
arms;
7. File upon verified complaint or motu proprio petitions in court for inclusions or
exclusions of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws;
8. Recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
limitation of places and prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractice and nuisance candidates; and
9. Submit to the President and Congress, comprehensive reports on conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum or recall.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Composition:
• One (1) Chairman
• Two (2) Commissioners
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 35 years of age at the time of appointment;
3. CPA with at least ten (10) years auditing experience or members of the
Philippine Bar with at least ten (10) years practice of law; at no time shall all
members belong to the same position; and
4. Not a candidate for any elective position in the election immediately preceding
the appointment.
Term: Seven (7) years without reappointment
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Powers and Duties:
1. Examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust or pertaining to
government;
2. Keep general accounts of government and preserve vouchers and supporting
papers;
3. Authority to define scope of its audit and examination, establish techniques and
methods required therefore; and
4. Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for
preservation and disallowance.
Jurisdiction of the Commission: No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the COA. (Sec.
3, Article IX-C)
-Temporary or Acting capacity appointment by the President to the COMELEC, COA,
CSC is prohibited by the Constitution.
In Brillantes vs. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358, the designation of Commissioner Yorac as
Acting Commissioner of the COMELEC was a violation of Section 1, paragraph 1 of Article IX-C.
Fiscal Autonomy—
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only
to Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of Ombudsman. The
Commission on Human Rights has no fiscal autonomy. (CHR Employees’ Association vs.
CHR, G.R. No. 155336, July 21, 2006)
Article X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(In relation to Republic Act No. 7160—Local Government Code)
Public Corporation—one created by the state either by general or special act for
purposes of administration of local government or rendering service in the public
interest.
De Facto Municipal Corporations—those where the people have organized
themselves, under color of law, into ordinary municipal bodies exercising their powers,
with their rights dependent quite as much as on acquiescence as on the regularity of
their origin.
Requisites:
1. Valid law authorizing incorporation;
2. Attempt in good faith to organizing under it;
3. Colorable compliance with law; and
4. Assumption of corporate powers.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Local Government—described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.
These subdivisions are the following:
1. Provinces;
2. Cities;
3. Municipalities;
4. Barangays;
5. Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM);
6. Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR);
7. Special metropolitan political subdivisions;
Created for the sole purpose of coordination of delivery of basic services.
8. Sub-provinces (as recognized by Article XVIII)
Barangay—the basic political and territorial self-governing body corporate and is
subordinate to the municipality or city of which it forms part.
Autonomous region—consists of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of the
constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the republic
of the Philippines.
Administrative regions—are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes. They are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is
not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments.
Devolution—refers to the act by which the national government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities. [Section 17 (e, 2
nd
paragraph), LGC]
Section 4, Article X—The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions. (See the case of Judge Dadole on page 213)
Section 6, Article X—A share in the national taxes collected by the national
government is another source of revenue for local units. The amount will be “as
determined by law.” This is distinct from the taxes which the local government itself
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
might impose.
Section 7, Article X—Another source of revenue for local governments is the share in
the proceeds from the exploitation and development of natural resources found within
the locality. This can take the form of financial benefits for the local units coming from a
share in fees, charges, and other incomes coming from development, and it can also
take the form of direct benefit for the population coming in the form, for instance, of
cheaper electric power rates of energy sourced in the locality, or priority in employment.
This can be effected either through national or local laws.
Section 8, Article X—the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such officials
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 8 cannot be more clear and explicit—the term of office of elected local
officials, shall be 3 years and no such officials shall serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms. Upon the other hand, Section 43 (d) of the Local Government Code clearly
provides than no local official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. (Atty. Rivera III vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 167591 and 170577,
May 9, 2007)
Section 10—Creation, division, merger, abolition, substantial change of boundaries are
not only subject to the criteria established in the local government code but also subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Authority to Create Local Government
A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered:
1. Province, City, Municipality or any other political subdivision—only by Act of
Congress
2. Barangays—ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Panglungsod concerned in the case of any barangay within its territorial
jurisdiction
The creation or conversion of an LGU from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators:
a. Income—must be sufficient, to provide for all essential facilities and
services commensurate with the size of its population;
b. Population—based on total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the LGU;
c. Land area—must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands
or is separated by an LGU; properly identified by metes and bounds; and
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities.
Division and Merger—LGU shall comply with the same requirements for their creation,
provided it shall not reduce the income, population and land area of LGUs concerned to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed; plebiscite be held in LGU affected; and
the assets and liabilities of creation shall be equitably distributed between the LGUs
affected and the new LGU.
Province Municipality City Highly
urbanized
Barangay
As to Income
P20,000,000.00 P2,500,000.00 P100,000,000.00 P50,000,000.00 -
As to Population
250,000 25,000 150,000 200,000 2,000 (except
Metro Manila
or in HUCs,
5,000)
As to Land Area
2,000 sq. kms.
(not applicable
if proposed
province to be
created
composed of 2
or more
islands)
50 sq. kms.
(not applicable
if proposed
municipality to
be created
composed of 2
or more
islands)
100 sq. kms.
(not applicable if
proposed city to
be created
composed of 2
or more islands)
100 sq. kms.
Requisites before a province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered:
1. It must be in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code;
2. It is subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Section 10, Article X)
Classification of Cities:
1. Highly urbanized cities as determined by law;
2. Cities not raised to the highly urbanized category but whose existing charters
prohibit their voters from voting in provincial elections; and
3. Component cities—cities which still are under a province in some way. They
cannot be denied a vote in the election of provincial officials.
- Those in numbers 1 and 2 do not vote in provincial elections, they are independent of
the province. Residents are not qualified to run for provincial positions.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Abolition—when the income, population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to
less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation, the LGU, thru a law or
ordinance, may be abolished.
LOCAL OFFICIALS
1. Governor
2. Vice-Governor
3. Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
4. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
5. Mayor
6. Vice-Mayor
7. Members of the Sangguniang Bayan
8. Punong Barangay
9. Members of the Sangguniang barangay
10. Sangguniang Kabataan
QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Citizens of the Philippines;
2. Registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province, or in the case of
a member of the SG Panlalawigan, Panlungsod, or Bayan, in the district where
he intends to be elected;
3. Resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding election;
4. Able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect;
5. On election day, age must at least be:
a. 23 years—for governor, vice-governor, member of the SG panlalawigan,
mayor, vice-mayor, or member of the SG panlungsod of HUC;
b. 21 years—for mayor, vice-mayor of independent component cities (ICC),
component cities (CC), or municipalities;
c. 18 year—members of the SG panlungsod or SG Bayan, Punong
Barangay, member of the Sangguniang Pambarangay
d. 15 years but not more than 18 years—for SK
TERM OF OFFICE: THREE (3) YEARS
MANNER OF ELECTION:
1. For governor, vice-governor, city or municipal mayor and vice-mayor, punong
barangay—elected at large in their respective units;
2. For the SG panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan of HUC—elected in their
respective district;
3. For SK Chairman and Members—elected by the registered voters of the
Katipunan ng mga kabataan.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
DISQUALIFICATIONS: (Read Section 40, LGC)
PROHIBITONS AND INHIBITIONS:
(Read Sections 89, 90 and 94 of the LGC and Article V)
Autonomy—is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
decentralization of administration decentralization of power
· The central government delegates
administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base
of government and in the process to make
local governments more responsive and
accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and
social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure
that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.
· It involves an abdication of political
power in favor of the local government
units declared autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its own
future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. It amounts to self-
immolation, since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.
ºWhat kind of local autonomy is contemplated by the Constitution? What about
the autonomy contemplated insofar as the autonomous regions are concerned?
1. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
“decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
or an “imperium in imperio.” Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of
one sovereign nation; but not intended, however, to be an “imperium in imperio,”
the LGU is autonomous in the sense that it is given more power, authority,
responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in
Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral LGUs to
develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own
resources and assets. (Alvarez vs. Guingona, Jr. 252 SCRA 695)
2. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of LGUs or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
On the otherhand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of
political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions. (Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA 181 SCRA 495)
The dynamic and more important aspect of local autonomy must be measured in
terms of the scope of the powers given to the local units.
Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004, an ordinance
enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippines, or an act of the Legislature, or unless it is against
public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of
common right.
A local government unit cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in
violation of a general law. Municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot
adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general
policy of the state. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative
authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
SJS vs. Atienza, Jr. G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
shall enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order
and promote the general welfare of the community and inhabitants. There is a duty to
enforce the Ordinance as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts.
DAR vs. Saranggani Agricultural Co., January 24, 2007, while the DAR retains the
responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by
individual landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be
confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under existing laws and
regulations. The DAR’s power in such cases may not be exercised in such a manner as
to defeat the very purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain area to achieve
social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare.
Police power of the Local Government—
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
only when the following requisites are met:
5. The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State;
Refers to the equal protection clause
6. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
Refers to the due process clause (Parayno vs. Jovellanos, G.R. No.
148408, July 14, 2006)
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of a common right. (Tayaban vs. People, G.R. No. 150194, March 6, 2007)
ºHave the powers of LTO to register motor vehicles and to issue driver’s
licenses for the operation thereof been devolved to local governments under the
Local Government Code?
E No. The only powers of the Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the
operation thereof had been devolved to local governments under the Local Government
Code (RA 7160). Clearly unaffected by the LGC are the powers of the LTO under RA
4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles “used or operated on or
upon any public highway” in the country. (LTO vs. City of Butuan, G.R. No. 131512,
January 20, 2000)
ºIs the MMDA a local government unit or public corporation endowed with
legislative power? Is it a special metropolitan subdivision contemplated by
Section 11, Article X of the Constitution? May it validly exercise police power?
May it validly order the opening or closure of private subdivision streets to public
vehicular traffic?
The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s function. There is no grant of authority
to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis.
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan
political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. RA 7924
(law creating the MMDA) was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a
plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact,
part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President, whereas in LGUs, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of MMDA.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It
is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, which possesses
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal. (MMDA vs. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. 328 SCRA 836)
LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Public Office—the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some sovereign functions of government to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. (Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas, 234 SCRA 546)
Public office is a public trust—this requires that all government officials and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Public trust—implies a fiduciary relationship between a public officer, who is a trustee,
and the people, who are the beneficiaries, of a public office. Said relationship makes the
public officer the servant of the people, requires of him:
a. Utmost responsibility;
b. Integrity;
c. Loyalty;
d. Efficiency;
e. Fidelity;
f. Good faith; and
g. Accountability in the discharge of his duties
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
and demands that he takes no advantage of his position for his personal benefit or to
the prejudice of the public.
Created by:
1. The Constitution—e.g. Office of the President;
2. Valid statutory amendments;
3. By authority of law.
Elements of Public Office:
1. Created by law or ordinance authorized by law;
2. Possesses sovereign functions of the government;
3. Functions defined expressly or impliedly by law;
4. Functions exercised by an officer directly under the control of law, not under a
superior officer unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created
or authorized by the legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a
superior office or body; and
5. Must have permanency or continuity.
Characteristics:
1. Public office is a public trust;
2. Public office is not a property and is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
subject of a contract.
PUBLIC OFFICERS—individuals vested with public office.
Under RPC, Art. 203—any person who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Under Sec. 2, RA 3019—the term includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt
service, receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Khan, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006, in the case
of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed “public officers” if their corporations
are tasked to carry out governmental functions.
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252
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
“classified, unclassified or exempt service”—Career and Non-Career service under
PD 807
Sec. 2 (14), Administrative Code—“officer” refers to a person whose duties not being
a clerical or manual nature, involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a
particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power,
“officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the
act or exercise that function.
ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION
(Legislative in nature—belongs to Congress)
Two (2) Senses:
1. Endowments, qualities or attributes which make an individual eligible for public
office—the individual must possess the qualifications at the time of appointment
or election and continuously for as long as the official relationship continues;
a. Citizenship—public office is reserved only to citizens of the Philippines
b. Residence—elective office or position; in Civil Law, residence and domicile
are different. One can have 1 domicile but several residences. In Political
Law, they are the same. ANIMUS REVERTENDI—the intent to return
3 kinds of domicile in Political Law:
i. Domicile of birth (original)
ii. Domicile of choice—the person left the original domicile without
Animus Revertendi and established a new domicile
iii. Domicile by operation of law—
Marcos vs. COMELEC—former First Lady Imelda Marcos
originally domiciled in Leyte. She married FM (from Ilocos). Under
the Civil Code, it is the duty of the wife to live with her husband.
She acquired the domicile of her husband, Ilocos Norte, by
operation of law.
But when her husband died, the wife has no more duty to
live with her husband. She automatically reverts back to her original
domicile, Leyte. Animus Revertendi is applied.
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253
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Caasi vs. COMELEC—residence in a foreign country
c. Age
d. Political Affiliation—as a rule, it is not a qualification.
Exceptions: in Party-List, Membership in the Electoral Tribunal, Commission
on appointment
2. Act of entering into the performance of functions of public office—failure of an
officer to perform an act required by law could affect the officer’s title to the given
office. (example: taking the oath of office)
Authority to Prescribe Qualification:
1. Constitution—ordinarily, EXCLUSIVE. The legislature may not increase or
decrease qualifications except when the Constitution itself provides otherwise as
when only minimum or no qualifications are prescribed.
Examples: Sec. 17 (2) Art. XIII (Human Rights)— The Commission shall be
composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of
office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission
shall be provided by law.
Section 7 (2), Article VIII— The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications
of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
2. Statute—Congress has the plenary power to prescribe the qualification but such
must be:
a. Germane to the purpose of the office;
b. Not too specific so as to refer to only one individual.
In Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, an oath of
office is a qualifying requirement for public office. Only when the public officer has
satisfied this prerequisite can his right to enter into the position be considered plenary
and complete. Until then, he has none at all, and for as long as he has not qualified, the
holdover officer is the rightful occupant. An oath of office taken before one who has no
authority to administer is no oath at all.
However, in Mendoza vs. Laxina, G. R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003, once
proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to
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254
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient
basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions.
Sec. 5 (1), Art. XVI—All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
Q: A was elected/appointed to public office. He assumed office without taking the oath
of office as prescribed by the Constitution and relevant CSC rules and regulations. Are
his acts valid?
A: Yes, A’s acts are considered valid, insofar as third parties and the general public are
concerned/rely on his acts—acts of a De Facto officer.
(See the case of Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007)
DISQUALIFICATIONS
The legislature has the right to prescribe disqualifications in the same manner
that it can prescribe qualifications, provided that the prescribed disqualifications do not
violate the Constitution.
General Disqualifications under the Constitution
1. Sec. 6, Art. IX-B— No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any
GOCCs or in any of its subsidiaries.
2. Sec. 7 (1), Art. IX-B—refers to elective officials—“No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.”
In the case of Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993, RA
7227—creating the SBMA, one provision states that Mayor Dick Gordon shall be
appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive of the SBMA. The SC ruled for the
constitutionality of his appointment as the first Administrator of the SBMA. He
was allowed to act as Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. Section 7(1) of Article
IX-B of the Constitution refers to elective officials. The second paragraph, refers
to appointive officials, made two exceptions:
a. Unless otherwise allowed by law; or
b. Unless otherwise allowed by the primary function of his position.
Hence, Mayor Gordon’s appointment is valid.
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255
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Sec. 7 (2), Art. IX-B—Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive officials shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004,
when another office is held by a public officer in an ex-officio capacity, as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of his office, there is no violation, because
such other office does not comprise “any other position”. The ex-officio position is
actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal office. But the official
concerned is not entitled to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.
Specific Disqualifications under the Constitution
1. Sec. 13, Art. VII—The President, VP, Member of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure.
2. Sec. 13, Art. VI— No Senator or Member of the HOR may hold any other office
or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither, shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
Incompatible Office Forbidden Office
- No Senator or Member of the HOR
may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat.
- The purpose is to prevent him from
owing loyalty to another branch of the
government, to the detriment of the
independence of the legislature and the
doctrine of separation of powers.
-what is prohibited is the simultaneous
holding of that office and the seat in
- Neither, shall he be appointed to any
office that has been created or the
emoluments thereof have been
increased during the term for which he
was elected.
-the purpose is to prevent trafficking in
public office.
-what is prohibited is the appointment
to the office during the term for which
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256
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Congress. Any legislator may hold
another office or employment in the
government provided he forfeits his
seat in the Congress.
he was elected, when such office was
created or its emoluments were
increased.
3. Sec. 12, Art. VIII—The Members of the SC and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
4. Sec. 2, Art. IX-A—No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. The same disqualification applies to
the Ombudsman and his Deputies—Sec. 8, Art. XI.
5. Sec. 11, Art. XI—The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run
for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
6. Sec. 1, Art. IX-B; Art. IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D; Sec. 8, art. XI—Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment.
7. Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-B; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-C; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-D; Sec. 11, Art.
XI-- Members of the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are appointed to a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.
8. Sec. 13, Art. VII—the spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including GOCCs.
Public Interest Center, Inc. vs. Magdangal Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007,
the concurrent appointments of respondent as PCGG Chairman and Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel (CPLC) are unconstitutional. The concurrent appointment to these
offices is in violation of Section 7 (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial
legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies
and reviewing investigations involving heads of executive departments. Since the
actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the
review of the CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
Disqualifications under the Local Government Code: (Section 40, LGC)
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
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257
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
4. Those with dual citizenship;
5. Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
6. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code;
7. The insane or feeble-minded.
Caasi vs. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229, to be qualified to run for elective office, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. The waiver should be manifested
by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his certificate of candidacy
for elective office. The reason is that residence in the municipality where he intends to
run for elective office which is at least one (1) year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate must possess. The
mere filing of his COC for elective office in the country is not sufficient. The election of a
candidate who is a green card holder or who has not validly waived his status as a
green card holder is null and void.
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296, the term “fugitive from justice” includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after
being charged in the Philippines or abroad, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on
the part of a candidate must be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. He is not a
fugitive from justice when, at the time of departure from abroad to the Philippines, there
is yet no complaint filed against him abroad. In this case, it was established that the
case was filed against Rodriguez five (5) months after he had returned to the
Philippines. What is controlling is the intent to evade the California court.
DE FACTO OFFICERS—
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258
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
One who has reputation of being an officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not
an officer in point of law.
Requisites:
1. A valid existing office;
2. Actual physical possession of said office;
3. Color of title to the office, either by:
a. Reputation or acquiescence;
b. Known or valid appointment or election but officer failed to conform with
legal requirements;
c. Known appointment or election but void because of ineligibility of officer or
want of authority of appointing or electing authority or irregularity in
appointment or election not known to the public; and
d. Known appointment of election pursuant to unconstitutional law before
declaration of unconstitutionality.
De Facto Officer De Jure Officer Usurper/Intruder
·the person is in actual
possession of office but he
merely has a color of title
·acts are valid insofar as 3
rd
parties and the general
public is concern but he is
not suppose to benefit from
his acts—against public
policy.
·challenged in a direct
proceeding where the title
·he has lawful title to hold
office although he may be
unlawfully deprived of his
office
·his acts are valid
·challenged in a direct
proceeding thru quo
·he is in actual possession
of the office without title or
colorable title
·his acts are entirely void
·can be attacked
collaterally
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259
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
will be the principal issue warranto; cannot be
attacked collaterally
Q: Is a de-facto officer lawfully entitled to the salary of the office he is occupying?
A: No, he is not supposed to benefit from his acts. It is against public policy. Otherwise,
it will encourage other people to be a de facto officer that will result to chaos.
Exceptions:
c. If there is no de-jure officer claiming for the same salary;
d. If the assumption/act was done in good faith.
Legal Effects of Acts: Valid, binding and with full legal effect insofar as they affect the
public. It is intended for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of a public office. (Monroy vs. CA, 20
SCRA 620)
General Manager, PPA vs. Monsarate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, a rightful
incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by
the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer)
occupied the office in good faith and under color of title.
Duties of a public officer:
A. Constitutional Duties
a. To be accountable to the people; to serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency; to act with patriotism and justice; and to
lead modest lives (Section 1, Article XI).
b. To submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by
law (Section 17, Article XI).
c. To owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times (Section 18,
Article XI).
B. Specific Cases:
a. The Solicitor General’s duty to represent the government, its offices and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents—except in criminal cases or
civil cases for damages arising from felony—is mandatory. Although he
has discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute a case or even
withdraw therefrom, such discretion must be exercised within the
parameters set by law and with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal. (Gonzales vs. Chavez, 205 SCRA 817)
b. The government is not stopped from questioning the acts of its officials,
more so if they are erroneous or irregular (Sharp Int’l Mktg. vs. CA, 154
SCRA 88).
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260
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Prohibitions:
1. Engaging in partisan political party except to vote
2. Additional or double compensation
3. Prohibition against loans
4. Laborers—shall not be assigned to perform clerical duties
5. Detail or reassignment
6. Nepotism
Rights of public officers:
1. Right to office
2. Right to salary
3. Right to preference in promotion
4. Right to vacation and sick leave
5. Right to maternity leave
6. Right to retirement pay
7. Others—right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in the due performance of
his duty; right to be indemnified; right to longevity pay.
COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
A. By Appointment
B. By Election
APPOINTMENT—
The selection, by authority vested with power, of individual who is to perform
functions of a given office. (Binamira vs. Garrucho, G.R. No. July 30, 1990)
It is an unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority
therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or
trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing
authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion
on the part of the appointing authority.
Bermudez vs. Torres, 311 SCRA 733, the right of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. In the exercise of power to appoint, discretion is an integral thereof.
Commission—is the written evidence of appointment.
Designation—is the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person
already in public office.
It presupposes that the person has already been appointed and merely given
additional function/tasks.
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261
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
- A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the person
designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity. (Sevilla vs. CA, 209 SCRA
637)
Classification of appointments:
2. Permanent—extended to a person possessing the requisite qualification for the
position and thus enjoys security of tenure.
3. Temporary—acting appointment given to a non-civil service eligible; is without a
definite tenure and is dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power;
4. Provisional—one which may be issued upon:
a. Prior authorization of the Commissioner of the Civil Service
b. To a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination
c. But who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position
in the competitive service
d. Whenever a vacancy occurs
e. The filing thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and
f. There is no appropriate register of those who are eligible at the time of
appointment.
5. Regular—one made by the President while Congress is in session and becomes
effective after the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointment
and continues until the end of the term.
6. Ad-interim—
a. Recess—one made while the Congress is not in session, before
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment; immediately effective;
and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by CA upon the next
adjournment of Congress;
b. Midnight—made by the President before his term expires, whether or not
it is confirmed by the CA
Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002—(See discussion under Article VII)
General Manager, PPA vs. Monsarate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, once an
appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a complete appointment, he acquires legal, not merely equitable, right to
the position which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and
cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.
Acceptance by appointee—pending such acceptance, which is optional to the
appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public office
cannot be forced upon citizen except for purposes of defense of the State under Section
4, Article II of the Constitution, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.
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262
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Discretion of appointing authority—appointment is essentially discretionary power
and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee, id issued a permanent appointment, should
possess the minimum qualification requirements, including Civil Service eligibility
prescribed by law for the position. This discretion also includes the determination of the
nature or character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary or
permanent. (Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327)
Acting appointment—a temporary appointment and revocable in character.
Double Appointment—not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not
incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or
double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.
Primarily confidential Positions—denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust and confidential matters of state. It is the fact of loss of confidence, not
the reason for it that is important and controlling. (Santos vs. Macaraig, 208 SCRA 74)
Next-in-Rank Rule—refers to a position which, by reason of the hierarchical
arrangement of positions in the department or agency or in government, is determined
to be the nearest degree of relationship to a higher position taking into account the
following:
1. Organization structure is reflected in the approved organizational chart;
2. Classification and/or functional relationships;
3. Salary and/or range allocation;
4. Geographical location.
A qualified next-in-rank is an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a
position previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled
and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously determined by the
appointing authority and approved by the Civil Service Commission.
- The next-in-rank rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a
ministerial duty on the appointing authority.
The next-in-rank rule applies only if the vacancy is filled by promotion
Transfer—a lateral movement in the same position
Promotion—is a vertical movement of position
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263
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE—
Two (2) Policies:
1. To prevent establishment of political dynasty
2. Enhancing the freedom of choice of the people
-Two (2) conditions that must concur to apply Disqualification:
1. The local official was elected for three (3) consecutive times, for the same
position;
2. He had fully served the three (3) consecutive terms.
Elective local official—3 years and may serve only for 3 consecutive terms
----------------------
1988—Capco was a Vice-Mayor
1989—the Mayor (Borja, Sr.) died, Capco succeeded as Mayor
1992—Capco ran for Mayor and won
1995—he ran for re-election and won again
1998—Is he still qualified to run?
The SC held that Mayor Capco is still qualified in 1998 local election. The right to
be elected for 3 consecutive times for the same position was not present in this case.
Mayor Capco did not fully serve his term in 1989. He became a mayor thru succession
and not election. (Borja, jr. vs. COMELEC & Mayor Capco of Pateros)
-----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected Mayor
1998
However, in December 1, 2000, before his 3
rd
term ends, he resigned. Is he still
qualified to run as mayor for the next election?
No, he is no longer allowed to run. Resignation is not considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service of office for which he was elected.
----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected as Mayor
1998
On December 1, 2000, before his 3
rd
term ends, he was removed for misconduct.
He did not appeal the case. The administrative case attained finality. Is he qualified to
run again for mayor in the 2001 election?
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264
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
No. he has been elected for 3 consecutive times for the same position. Section
40 (b) of the LGC provides for his disqualification—removed as a result of administrative
case. However, if he appealed, he is still qualified because there is no finality of
judgment yet.
----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected as Mayor
1998
On December 1, 2000, he was removed for grave misconduct. He was able to
appeal seasonably. In May 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. His
opponent filed a disqualification case. The COMELEC did not act immediately on the
DQ case. He won as mayor.
Held:
1. The DQ filed in COMELEC should be dismissed as there was no finality yet of
the administrative case.
2. The administrative case should also be dismissed. His re-election should be
considered as a condonation by the people of whatever administrative case filed
against him.
Doctrine of Forgiveness or Condonation—when the people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule
the will of the people.
Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, a public official cannot be removed for
administrative conduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous conduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to
criminal cases pending against petitioner.
Mayor Alvin Garcia vs. Hon. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, a
re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the
electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still
reelects him, such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
1992
1995 Hagedorn was elected as Mayor
1998
In 2001, Hagedorn ran for governor but lost. Socrates was elected as mayor.
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265
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
June 30, 2001—end of Hagedorn’s term for mayor
July 2, 2002—resolution calling for recall of Mayor Socrates
September 2002—COMELEC set special election for Puerto Princesa City; Hagedorn
filed his
COC for mayor. Was he qualified?
Held: the three (3)-term limit rule found in Sec. 43-b, LGC has two (2) parts:
1. Three (3) consecutive terms
2. Any length of time will interrupt
The provision speaks of a regular election and not a special one. In this case, recall is
a special election. It is not considered as immediate election. The immediate election
that prohibits Hagedorn from running for mayor is the next regular election after his 3
consecutive terms has ended, the 2001 election.
“any subsequent election”—is not covered by the prohibition.
He won in the September 2002 recall election. He will continue the term of Socrates.
His term will end on June 30, 2004—a term which is less than 3 years.
What if in:
2004
2007 he was elected as Mayor
May he run again in 2010?
No more. Recall election term is considered as one full term for purposes
of applying the disqualification. Otherwise, Hagedorn will be allowed to serve for
more than nine (9) years.
- The above hypothetical problem was only an obiter dictum in the case of Socrates vs.
COMELEC.
The rule is, service of the recall term will not interrupt the 3-consecutive term rule. In the
case of Mendoza vs. COMELEC, the SC did not abandon the ruling in Socrates
because it was merely an obiter dictum.
---------------------------
1995—Francis Ong ran for mayor, he won
1998—He ran and won again. Alegre filed a protest.
2001—Ong ran and won again. The protest in 1998 was decided by the RTC on July 4,
2001 that it was Alegre who won in 1998 election.
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266
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2004—Ong ran again. Alegre questioned. Ong alleged that his proclamation as mayor-
elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified by the RTC of
Daet.
Issue: Whether or not Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001 may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive 3-
term limit rule?
Held: The assumption of office from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 constitutes “service
for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the 3-
term limit prescribed by the Constitution and LGC, barring local elective officials from
being elected and serving more than 3-consecutive term for the same position. x x x His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term rule.
There was no interruption or break in the continuity of Ong’s service respecting
the 1998-2001 term. Ong was never unseated during the term in question; he never
ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
In the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999), Lonzanida was
elected and served for 2 consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, an election protest was
filed before RTC of Zambales. In a decision dated July 9, 1997, it was held that there
was a failure of elections and the position for mayor as vacant. Lonzanida assumed the
office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. During the 1998 elections,
Lonzanida ran again for mayor. A petition to disqualify under the three-term limit rule
was filed and was eventually granted. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that
he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. He cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998
term because he was ordered to vacate (and in fact vacated) his post before the
expiration of the term. There was an involuntary severance from office as a result of
legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION
Concept of Vacancy:
Two (2) Principles to consider:
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267
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. One who illegally terminated, by legal fiction, is deemed not to have vacated his
position
2. One, no matter how qualified, may not filled a position which is not vacant
Rule on Automatic Succession (Section 44, LGC)
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official:
1. Fills a higher vacant office;
2. Refuses to assume office;
3. Fails to qualify;
4. Dies;
5. Is removed from office;
6. Voluntarily resigns;
7. Or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
-Ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding local election.
Governor Mayor Punong Barangay
Vice Governor Vice Mayor
Highest ranking sanggunian member/2
nd
highest ranking sanggunian member
(in case of permanent inability of the highest ranking member)
- In Case of tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members—it shall
be resolved by the drawing of lots.
- The successors shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
Section 44, LGC—Filling the vacancy
Last-in-rank—the one who will replace him must come from the same political party of
the one who caused the vacancy, upon nomination of the party.
Who shall appoint?
1. President—through the Executive Secretary—in case of permanent vacancies in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUC and
independent component cities;
2. Governor—in case of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of component cities and
the Sangguniang Bayan;
3. City or municipal mayor—in case of Sanggguniang Barangay—upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay concerned.
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268
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
- A nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official
of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non. Any appointment without
such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground
for administrative action against the official responsible therefor.
No political party, how shall the vacancy be filled? (Section 45-c, LGC)
 The local chief executive shall appoint, upon recommendation of the sanggunian
concern, a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
Fariñas vs. Barba, the last-in-rank sangguniang bayan member resigned. Mayor
Barba, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan, appointed somebody.
However, Gov. Fariñas also appointed somebody, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The SC held that neither is entitled to occupy the vacancy.
It should have been Gov. Fariñas who should appoint but the sanggunian who
recommended should be the Sangguniang Bayan where the vacancy took place.
Navarro vs. CA, March 2001
Mayor— Lakas-NUCD
V-Mayor— Lakas-NUCD
1. SB Member
2. SB Member
3. SB Member came from Reforma Party
4. SB Member
5. SB Member
6. SB Member—Lakas NUCD
7. SB Member—Reforma Party
8. SB Member—Lakas NUCD
The Mayor died. Vice Mayor succeeded. The #1 SB Member became the Vice Mayor.
The #8 slot became vacant. The Governor appointed somebody from Reforma Party.
The SC held that the appointment made by the governor is valid. The last ranking shall
be filled by Reforma Party to maintain party representation in the Sanggunian as willed
by the electorate.
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269
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Gamboa, Jr. vs. Aguirre, July 1999
The Vice-Governor acted as Governor. Can he (V-Governor) preside over the sessions
of Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
No. The creation of temporary vacancy in the office of the governor creates a
corresponding vacancy in the office of the vice-governor. Section 49-d, LGC, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.
The rule on permanent vacancy should not be applied to temporary vacancy.
Who appoints the Barangay Secretary or Treasurer?
In the case of Alquisola, Sr. vs. Gallardo Ocol, August 1999, the SC held that
the Barangay secretary or treasurer shall be appointed conjointly by the Punong
Barangay and the Sanggguniang Barangay.
Situations covered by the Law on Nepotism:
One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within
the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a. Appointing authority;
b. Recommending authority;
c. Chief of the bureau of office; and
d. Person exercising immediate supervision.
In the last situations (c and d), it is immaterial who the appointing or
recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the 3
rd
civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805,
April 29, 1999)
Exemptions:
1. Persons employed in confidential capacity;
2. Teachers;
3. Physicians;
4. Members of the AFP;
5. Member of any family who, after his appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed.
In Section 79 of the Local Government Code, the prohibition is up to the 4
th
civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
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270
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Laurel V vs. CSC, Governor Laurel appointed his brother as Civilian Security
Officer, hence it is exempted, no violation as it is primarily confidential in character.
However, the governor subsequently designated the same brother as Acting Provincial
Administrator. The SC ruled that appointment and designation are two different matters.
But for purposes of the law on nepotism, the two are now the same. Hence, there is
now a violation of the law on nepotism.
Debulgado vs. CSC, it was alleged that the law applies only to original appointment
and not to promotional appointment. The SC did not agree. The law applies to all kinds
of appointment. The law does not distinguish.
TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP:
1. Expiration of term or tenure
2. Reaching the age limit—compulsory retirement age: 70 years of age for members of the
Judiciary; 65 for other government officers and employees
3. Resignation
4. Recall
5. Removal
6. Abandonment
7. Acceptance of an incompatible office
8. Abolition of office
9. Prescription of the right to office
10. Impeachment
11. Death
12. Failure to assume elective office within 6 months from proclamation
13. Conviction of a crime
14. Filing a certificate of candidacy
Term—the period of time during which a public officer has the right to hold the public
office
Tenure—the period of time during which the public officer actually held office
Hold-over principle—[See the case of Lecaroz vs. SB (1999)]—in the absence of any
express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the public officer
is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been duly chosen and shall
have qualified. The purpose is to prevent a hiatus in public office.
It implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant
upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume
it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified,
even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
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271
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition
which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of
time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions.
This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover
is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering of a vacancy and to
avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. (Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999)
RECALL—the termination of official relationship of an elective official for loss of
confidence prior to expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.
It is exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official subject to such recall belongs (Section 69, LGC)
Prohibition from resignation:
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the
recall process is in progress.
Limitations on Recall (Section 74, LGC)
1. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.
2. No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s
assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996, it was held that the
SK Election is not a regular election within the contemplation of the LGC as
would bar the holding of a recall election. Neither will the recall election of the
Mayor be barred by the Barangay Election.
Angobung vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126571, March 5, 1997, the “regular local
election” referred to in Section 74, LGC, means that the approaching local
election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is actually
contested and to be filled by the electorate.
RESIGNATION— is the act of giving up or the act of a public officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the
incumbent in some form, expressed or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce,
and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must
be:
1. An intention to relinquish a part of the term;
2. An act of relinquishment;
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272
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Acceptance by the proper authority.
The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the revised Penal Code.
(Sanggguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276)
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, resignation is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to for. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE—it is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, it is
a specie of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment,
abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser.
It springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. The
concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office, can no longer legally repossess
it even by forcible re-occupancy.
ABOLITION OF OFFICE—it connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly
and permanently, as the word “abolished” denotes. Where one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
In the case of UP Board of Regents vs. Rasul, the renaming and restructuring
of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of
the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices
created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. The abolition
which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the
removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the
PGH Director and the creation of the UP-PGH Medical center Director are valid, the
removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions
of the two positions are basically the same.
Canonizado vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000, the substantial identity
in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of
petitioner pursuant to a re-organization.
REORGANIZATION—takes place when there is alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally,
it may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office.
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273
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
To be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith.
Circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of
reorganization and which may give rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment:
1. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
2. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created;
3. Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
4. Where there is a reclassification offices perform substantially the same functions
as the original offices; and
5. Where the removal violates the order of separation provided for by Section 2 and
of RA 6656.
GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION—(Section 23, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of 1987 Administrative Code)
1. Grave Offenses
2. Less Grave offenses
3. Light Offenses
Preventive Suspension—
It is not a penalty itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee
who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated. It is not an action by itself but merely
an incident in an action.
It is different from administrative penalty of suspension from office. The latter is
the penalty which may only be meted upon the respondent at the termination of the
investigation or the final disposition of the case. Preventive suspension is imposed on
the respondent during the investigation of charges against him.
Governing Laws:
1. Preventive Suspension in Administrative Cases
a. Civil Service Law—
Maximum duration: 90 days
After 90 days: automatic reinstatement
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274
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Certiorari: period will not be included in the 90-day period computation
Gloria vs. CA (199), there are two (2) kinds of preventive suspension under
CSC:
i. Pending investigation
ii. Pending appeal & the respondent is exonerated on appeal
“payment of back salaries”
Pending investigation Pending Appeal
(Respondent is not entitled (Reinstatement with full payment
to back wages) payment of back salaries)
Gov. Plaza vs. CA, G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008, the law provides for
preventive suspension of appointive local official and employees pending investigation
of the charges against them. The suspension given to private respondents, cannot,
therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which holding a
public office requires for the public good. To be entitled to back salaries, private
respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their suspension must
likewise be unjustified.
b. Local Government Code—
i. Sec. 63—those holding local elective office
Preventive Suspension placed by:
1. Mayor—concerning the elective barangay officials
2. Governor municipal elective officials
Component city elective official
3. President highly urbanized/independent component city officials
Provincial officials
-Every administrative charge: maximum: 60 days
Several administrative cases: maximum: 90 days w/in a single
year
-90 days before the next local election—PS shall be lifted
automatically
ii. Sec. 85—those appointed officials
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275
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Duration: maximum of 60 days
c. Ombudsman Act—RA 6770
Duration: Maximum of 6 months
2. Preventive suspension in Criminal Cases
a. Section 13, RA 3019—Suspension and loss of benefits
Authority to impose:
i. Court where the information was filed
Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, since the law is silent, the court where the
information was filed shall impose the preventive suspension
ii. Salary Grade 27 or over—Sandiganbayan
iii. Below Salary Grade 27—RTC
- It is mandatory for the court to impose the preventive suspension. However, it
is not automatic. In the case of Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that
the court must conduct first a pre-suspension hearing to determine the validity
of criminal information filed against the public officer
Duration: the law is silent
In the case of Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, since the law is silent, apply
by analogy the Civil Service Law, the maximum duration would be 90 days.
Deloso vs. SB Section 13, RA 3019 does not state that the public
officer may be suspended in the office where he
committed
Bayot vs. SB the crime.
Segovia vs. SB The term “office” indicates that it applies to “any other
Santiago vs. SB office”.
Paredes vs. SB the suspension imposed is merely preventive. There
Santiago vs. SB is no encroachment.
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276
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1, Article XI
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
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277
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Public office is a public trust, and as such, the same is governed by law, and
cannot be made the subject of personal promises or negotiations by private persons.
Security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second
level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the
position to which they may be appointed. (Collantes vs. CA, G.R. No. 169604, March
6, 2007)
Who are impeachable officers?
(The list is exclusive)
1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Members of the Constitutional Commission
4. Justices of the Supreme Court
5. Ombudsman
-Justices of the Sandiganbayan cannot be removed by impeachment.
- Impeachment of President—the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will preside; the
Senate/HOR will prosecute
Grounds for impeachment:
1. Culpable violation of the constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Betrayal of public trust
5. Graft and corruption
6. Other high crimes
Procedure in Impeachment—
Initiation:
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment.
Process:
1. Verified complaint filed by any member of the House or any citizen upon
resolution of endorsement by any member thereof;
2. Included in the order of business within ten (10) session days;
3. Referred to the proper committee within three (3) session days of its inclusion.
If the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of all its members, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
proceed.
4. The Committee, after hearing, and by majority vote of all its members, shall
submit its report to the House together with the corresponding resolution;
5. Placing on calendar the Committee resolution within ten (10) days from
submission;
6. Discussion on the floor of the report;
7. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee or override its contrary resolution.
Trial and Decision—
1. The Senators take an oath or affirmation;
2. When the president is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside but shall not vote;
3. A decision of conviction must be concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate.
Effect of Conviction—
1. Removal from office;
2. Disqualification to hold any other office under the Republic of the Philippines;
3. Party convicted shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law.
Limitation:
1. Not more than one impeachment case shall be initiated against the same official
within a period of one (1) year.
2. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20, 2001, the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be held liable under an “Agreement” entered into by the PCGG with
another party where the republic did not authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract.
Where the sale of an aircraft to a third party by the PCGG is void, it follows that the
“Agreement” between the PCGG and the third party is likewise a nullity, and there can
be no cause of action against the Republic.
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, et al.
G.R. No. 130140, October 25, 1999, Article XI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides
that the “right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel. This provision does not seem to indicate that what is
imprescriptible is the corresponding civil action to recover “ill-gotten wealth” but not the
criminal action that may relate thereto. The criminal action, i.e., violation of Section 3(c)
and (g), RA 3019, can prescribe conformably with the pertinent statute applicable which,
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
in this instance, BP 195, providing for a 15-year prescriptive period and thereby
modifying to the above extent the 10-year prescriptive period under RA 3019.
In Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10,
2003, an impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate while an impeachment proceeding is one that is initiated in the House of
Representatives. For purposes of applying the one-year bar rule, the proceeding is
“initiated” or begins when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action.
Legislative bodies cannot impose the administrative punishment of removal from
office because the power to remove local elective officials has been exclusively granted
to the proper courts. (Sanggguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos vs.
Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008)
SANDIGANBAYAN
The anti-graft court shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now
and hereafter may be provided by law.
Composition:
• One (1) Presiding Justice
• Fourteen (14) Associate Justices with the rank of Justice of the Court of Appeals
- Sits in five (5) Divisions of three (3) members each
Decision and Review—
Unanimous vote of all three (3) members shall be required for the
pronouncement of judgment by a division. Decision shall be reviewable by the SC on
petition for certiorari.
Jurisdiction:
× Original Jurisdiction
B. Violation of RA 3019; RA 1379; and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
RPC where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense:
5. Officials of the Executive branch with the position of Regional Director or
higher, or with SG Level 27 according to RA 6758, specifically including:
i. Provincial governors, vice-governors, board members, provincial
treasures, assessors, engineers and other provincial departments
head;
ii. City mayors, vice-mayors, city councilors, city treasurers,
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
assessors, engineers and other city department heads;
iii. Officials of the diplomatic service from consuls or higher;
iv. PA/PAF colonels, PN captains and all officers of higher rank;
v. Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
vi. City/provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
vii. Presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCC’s state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
6. Members of Congress and officials thereof with SG27 and up;
7. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the Constitution;
8. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions without
prejudice to the Constitution; and
9. All other national and local officials with SG27 or higher.
C. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complex with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection (a)
in relation to their office;
D. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A issued in 1986.
× Exclusive Original Jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibitions, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Provided, that
jurisdiction over these petitions shall be not exclusive of the Supreme Court.
× Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
RTC whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or their appellate
jurisdiction. (RA 8249)
THE OMBUDSMAN
• The champion of the citizens and protector of the people.
• Tasked to entertain complaints addressed to him against erring public officers
and take all necessary actions thereon.
Composition:
• An Ombudsman known as the Tanodbayan
• One (1) Overall Deputy;
• At least one (1) Deputy e3ach for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao;
• One (1) separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
appointed
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 40 years of age;
3. Of recognized probity and independence;
4. Member of the Philippine Bar; and
5. Must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election.
Term: Seven (7) years without reappointment
Disqualifications and Inhibitions—
A. During their tenure:
1. Shall not hold any other office or employment;
2. Engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management and
control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of
his office;
3. Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in other contract with,
or in any franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its
subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries.
4. Shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
- The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. (Section 14, Article XI)
Buenesada vs. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, the power to
investigate also includes the power to impose preventive suspension. This is different
from the power to recommend suspension. The latter is suspension as a penalty;
preventive suspension is not a penalty.
Powers, Functions and Duties:
1. The Constitution and RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) has endowed the
Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutor
powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. The
Supreme Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its
powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and
the preserver of the integrity of public service. (Loquias vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation
and prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only
those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but those within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts as well. (Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105965-70,
March 20, 2001)
Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007, since the
responsibility for the establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification
standards lies with the concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited
to assisting the department or agency with respect to these qualification standards and
approving them. The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the
department or agency, specially in a case like this in which an independent
constitutional body is involved.
Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 166062, September 26, 2006, the incumbent
Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is
supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
Suspension under the Ombudsman Act vis-à-vis the Local Government Code:
o In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24
of RA 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and:
× The charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
× The charges should warrant removal from the service; or
× The respondent’s continued stay in the office would prejudice the case
filed against him.
o The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public
officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation.
o On the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive
suspension prescribed under the LGC of 1991 on an elective local official (at any
time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that:
d. There is a reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of;
e. The evidence of culpability is strong;
f. The gravity of the offense so warrants; or
g. The continuance in the office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
other evidence. (Miranda vs. Sandioganbayan, G.R. No. 154098, July
27, 2005)
Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. No. 168079, July 17, 2007, the SC upheld
the constitutionality of Sections 15, 21 and 25 of RA 6770, thus affirming that the
powers of the Office of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Court
ruled in Estarija case that under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman
has the constitutional power to directly remove from the government service an erring
public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 1, Article XII—Goals:
1. More equitable distribution of wealth
2. Increased wealth for the benefit of the people
3. Increased productivity.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE—Section 2, Article XII
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests, or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and natural resources belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands Investigator or a legislative act or statute.
Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in the DENR stating
that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and disposable
site in a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character
of the land subject of the application. (RP vs. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766,
June 22, 2006)
Classification of Lands of the Public Domain:
1. Agricultural;
2. Forest or timber;
3. Mineral lands; and
4. National parks.
Private Lands—
General Rule: No private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Exceptions:
1. Foreigners who inherit through intestate succession;
2. Former natural-born citizen may be a transferee of private lands subject to
limitations provided by law;
3. Ownership in condominium units;
4. Parity right agreement, under 1935 Constitution.
Stewardship Doctrine—private property is supposed to be held by the individual only
as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owner.
Filipino First Policy—in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
(2
nd
paragraph, Section 10, Article XII)
This provision is self-executing. It is mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—
qualified Filipinos must be preferred. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 118295,
May 2, 1997)
A join venture is an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
some commercial enterprise with all of them generally contributing assets and sharing
risks. Considering more of a partnership, a joint venture is governed by the laws on
contracts and on partnership. The joint venture created between National Investment
and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki falls within the purview of an
“association” pursuant to Section 5 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and Section
11 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Consequently, a joint venture that would
engage in the business of operating a public utility, such as shipyard, must observe the
proportion of 60%-40% Filipino-Foreign capitalization. (JG Summit Holdings, Inc. vs.
CA, 345 SCRA 143)
Temporary Take Over of Business Affected with Public Interest—
The State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest:
1. In times of national emergency;
2. When the public interest so requires; and
3. During the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it.
The temporary take over by the government extends only to the operation of the
business and not to the ownership thereof. As such, the government is not required to
compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of
ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the
temporary take over cannot, likewise, claim for just compensation for the use of the said
business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise
of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain. (Agan vs. PIATCO, G.R.
No. 155001, May 5, 2003)
Right of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People
Constitutional Provisions Recognizing and Protecting the Rights and Interest of the
Indigenous People:
1. Section 22, Article II—the State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development.
2. Section 5, Article XII—the State, subject to the provisions of the Constitution
and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain.
3. Section 1, Article XIII
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
4. Section 6, Article XIII—the State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under
lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead
rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands.
5. Section 17, Article XIV—the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures,
traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national plans and policies.
6. Section 12, Article XVI—the Congress may create a consultative body to advise
the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority
of the members of which shall come from such communities.
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (RA 8371)
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term ICCs is used in
the 1987 Constitution while that of IPs is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the UN Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The ICCs or IPs refer to a group of people or homogenous societies who have
continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds
of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. The
ICCs/IPs also include their descendants who inhabited the country at the time of
conquest or colonization, who have been displaced from their traditional territories or
who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
It recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines
the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept
of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the
right to self-governance and empowerment, social justice and human rights; the right to
preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Ancestral domains—are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. It comprises lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access
to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. Section 3(a), IPRA
Ancestral Lands—are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not
merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
Section 3(b), IPRA
The right of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes:
1. Native title over both ancestral domains and lands;
2. Torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only.
Native Title—refers to ICCs/IPs pre-conquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that
way since before the Spanish conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized
and respected (Section 11, IPRA). Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which
shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.
-Like a torrens title, a CADT is an evidence of private ownership of land by
native title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have
never been public lands and are private.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño
vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935. Cariño firmly established a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has
not been recognized in the Philippines. In the case of Reavies vs. Fianza, 40 Phil
1017, the Court merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of
minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ownership by virtue of native title—presupposes that the land has been held by its
possessor and his predecessor-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successor-in-
interest, the US and the Philippines Government. There has been no transfer of title
from the State as the lands has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes.
Ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription—against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land,
which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person.
Jus Regalia—private title to the land must be traced to some grant, express or implied,
from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government and
thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all
land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from
some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere.
It refers to royal grants, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives.
[Isagani Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000,
En banc, (Puno and Kapunan, Separate Opinions)]
Lands
Public domain Private Lands
1. Forest/timber (A certificate of title had been
2. Mineral lands issued to a Filipino individual)
3. National parks
4. agricultural
Same rules as alienable
The only land (Public Domain) lands as to who may acquire
which may be alienated (Only Filipinos)
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Filipino Citizens Private Corporations Except:
1) Not more than 12 ha. --by lease 1) hereditary succession
(Purchase homestead 2) former natural born
Grant) 3) Americans holding valid title
2) Lease—not more than to private lands as against private
500 ha. persons. Titles to private lands
acquired by Americans before
July 3, 1974 shall be valid as
-But State may recover against private persons
only
Article XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Social Justice
2. Labor
3. Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
4. Urban Land Reform and Housing
5. Health
6. Women
7. Role and Rights of People’s Organization
8. Human Rights
Section 1
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Section 2
The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Labor
Section 3
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the
right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
Section 4 P
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291
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article XIV
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS,
CULTURE, AND SPORTS
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to regulate
educational institutions:
The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and
private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject
to the requirements of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the
regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
(Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs. CA, 348 SCRA 265)
Section 5 (2), Article XIV provides that: Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
Academic Freedom—
The right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and
how best to attain them—free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its
purpose and nullify its intent.
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompass
the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:
1. Who may teach
2. What may be taught
3. How it shall be taught
4. Who may be admitted to study
The right of a school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., “how it shall be taught.” A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in
its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty. Section 3 (2), Article XIV:
All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the
role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the
rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop
moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking,
broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.
Three (3) Aspects of Academic Freedom:
1. From the standpoint of the educational institution—to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experimentation and
creation.
2. From the standpoint of the faculty—
a. Freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the
adequate performance of his other academic duties;
b. Freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, less controversial
matters which bear no relation to the subject;
c. Freedom from institutional censorship or discipline, limited by his
special position in the community.
3. From the standpoint of the student—right to enjoy in school—
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (Non vs. Dames, May 20, 1990)
ºMay a university validly revoke a degree or honor it has conferred to a student
after the graduation of the latter after finding that such degree or honor was
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293
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
obtained through fraud?
~The SC pointed out that academic freedom of institutions of higher learning is a
freedom granted to “institutions of higher learning” which is thus given a “wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students.” If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine
on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. (Garcia vs.
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277)
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained
through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it
has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the
“graduation” of a student, for it is precisely the “graduation” of such a student that is in
question. (UP Board of Regents vs. CA and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,
G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999)
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, there are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are:
1. The student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself:
· Who may teach;
· What may be taught;
· How it shall teach; and
· Who may be admitted to study. (DLSU, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127980,
December 19, 2007)
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294
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Family—is the basic social institution. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation.
Care for the elderly—
The duty to care for the elderly is given to both the family and the State. An
effective social security system is an indispensable component of any effective caring
for the elderly.
Article XVI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Flag—
The design of our flag may be changed only by constitutional amendment.
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Sec. 3, Article XVI The State may not be sued without its consent.
It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. It is derisively called “the royal
prerogative of dishonesty” because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
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295
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which
the right depends (Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83). However, it may be sued if it
gives consent, whether express or implied.
®Does this doctrine apply as well to foreign government? YES, because of the
sovereign equality of all the state. Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with
the public international law principle of PAR IN PAREM NON HABET IMPERIUM. The
head of State, who is deemed the personification of the State, is inviolable, and thus,
enjoys immunity from suit.
®USA vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in
the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had
been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion
that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables
served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective
bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his
complaint against the individual petitioners.
SC: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of our law. Even
without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by
the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to
the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity is
expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that
the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be
implied.
Q: How may consent be given?
A: The State’s consent may be given either EXPRESSLY or IMPLIEDLY.
EXPRESS CONSENT- may be made through enactment by Congress of a general law
or special law waiving the immunity.
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296
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
¯General Law
e.g. Act No. 3083 where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
which could serve as a basis of a civil action between the private parties”.
(correlate Act 3083 with CA 327 as amended by PD 1445)
Commonwealth Act 327 (General Auditing Law, as amended by PD 1445,
requires that all money claims against the government must first be filed with the COA
which must act upon it within 60 days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant
to elevate the matter to SC on certiorari and, in effect, sue the State thereby.
Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, DA may be sued for
money claims based on a contract entered into in its governmental capacity, because of
the express consent contained in Act 3083 provided that the claim be first brought to the
COA in accordance with CA 327, as amended.
Ministerio vs. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, Suit may lie because the doctrine of
State immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice.
Delos Santos vs. IAC, 223 SCRA 11, public respondents’ belief that the
property is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no reason
for the unjust taking of the petitioner’s property; after all, the TCT was in the name of the
petitioner.
USA vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487, where the questioned transaction dealt with the
improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, SC held that the
traditional rule of immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of International
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
Acta Jure Imperii Acta Jure Gestionis
-There is no waiver. The State is acting in
its sovereign governmental capacity.
-There is waiver of State immunity from
suit. The State entered into a contract in its
commercial or proprietary capacity. The
State descended to the level of a private
entity.
RESTRICTIVE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT—not all contracts
entered into by the government constitute a waiver.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
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297
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relate
to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are integral parts of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably
a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.
The contract for the repair of wharves was a contract in JUS IMPERII because
the wharves were to be used in national defense, a governmental function. There is no
waiver. Only the American government can waived. Act 3083 is not applicable. The
remedy is to convince the Department of Foreign Affairs to take up the claim to the US
government (state to state).
USA vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, a contract for restaurant services within the Camp
John Hay Air Station was held commercial in character. The case should not be
dismissed. The cafeteria caters not only Americans but also the general public. There is
waiver of State Immunity from suit. This is a case of Acta Jure Gestionis.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212, Even if, in exercising the power of
eminent domain, the State exercises a power jus imperii, as distinguished from its
proprietary right of jus gestionis, where property has been taken without just
compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up in an
action for payment by the owner.
±Special Law
This form of consent must be embodied in a statute and cannot be given by a
mere counsel.
e.g. Articles 2180 and 2189 of the Civil Code
Article 2180 of the Civil Code—(paragraph 6) The State is responsible in like
manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Article 2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control and
supervision.
Teotico vs. City of Manila, a man fell in a manhole. Sec. 24, Local
Government Code:
“Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property.”
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298
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Q. May the OSG validly waived?
A. Republic vs. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470, a mere lawyer (OSG) may not validly waived
the immunity from suit of the State. Only Congress can.
IMPLIED CONSENT-
1. When the State commences the litigation. It becomes vulnerable to a
counterclaim. Intervention by the State would constitute commencement of
litigation EXCEPT: when the State intervenes not for the purpose of asking for
any affirmative relief, but only for the purpose of resisting the claim precisely
because of immunity from suit. (Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil 345)
2. When the State enters into a business contract. (See USA vs. Guinto & USA vs.
Ruiz)
(This is the RESTRICTIVE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY)
Mun. of San Fernando, La Union vs. Judge Firme,195 SCRA 692, the dump truck,
owned by the municipality, was driven by its official driver. It was used for hauling gravel
for the repair/construction of the municipal road. The truck collided with a jeepney. The
heirs of the jeepney driver sued the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. The SC
held that municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions. Repair of municipal road is a governmental function. Therefore,
should enjoy the immunity from suit. However, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their respective charters provide that they can
sue and be sued.
Sec. 22 (a2) of the Local Government Code- To sue and be sued;
SUABILITY vs. LIABILTY
SUABILITY LIABILTY
State waiving the immunity -gives the claimant the opportunity to prove a
claim against the State for a possible liability
-will have to be determined by the court on the
basis of evidence and the applicable laws
Q. When is a suit against a public official deemed to be a suit against the State?
A. The doctrine of State Immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of their duties within the scope of their
authority.
The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where the
satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state to
perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the
damages awarded to the plaintiff.
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299
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials
are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in
bad faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his
official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have
been committed while he occupied a public position. (Llansang vs. CA, Feb. 23, 2000)
In this case, petitioner was sued for allegedly “personal motives” in ordering the
ejectment of the general Assembly of the Blinds, Inc. (GABI) from the Rizal Park; thus,
the case was not deemed a suit against the state.
Larkins vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 598, private respondents were dismissed from
their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the US government
which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at the
Clark Airbase for USAF Members.
Instances when a suit against a State is proper:
1. When the Republic is sued by name
2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency--inquire into the
principal functions of the agency
a. if governmental, NO SUIT WITHOUT CONSENT
b. if proprietary, SUIT WILL LIE.
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
Republic vs. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, this is not a suit against the state with its
consent. Even as the SC dismissed the suit against the RP, the action for the damages
against the military personnel and the policemen responsible for the 1989 Mendiola
Massacre was upheld inasmuch as the initial findings of the Davide Commission
showed that there was, at least, negligence on their part when they fired their guns.
They exceeded their authority. The military personnel and the policemen were held to
be liable in their individual capacity.
*hauling lumber for the repair of the public market—business enterprise of the
government (local government)
*celebration of town fiesta—Torio vs. Fontanilla—not a governmental function but a
proprietary function
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300
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
´The doctrine of State immunity from suit extends only up to rendition of the judgment.
When it comes to execution to satisfy the judgment, it will require another waiver. The
remedy is to make the necessary representation with the lawmaking authority.
*duty to appropriate—discretionary and therefore cannot be compelled by mandamus.
However, in Mun. of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA 206, where the municipality fails or
refuses, without justifiable reasons, to effect payment of a final money judgment
rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, an action for the recovery of the value of the
property taken by the government and converted into a public street without payment of
just compensation was allowed despite the failure of the property owner to file his claim
with the Auditor General. The government should have followed first its own rule (it
should have filed an expropriation case) before it entered the property. Had it done so,
the suit can be waived. The state opened itself to a possible suit against it.
SCOPE OF CONSENT
Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of judgment
against it.
a. Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the court
ends when the judgment is rendered.
b. But funds belonging to government corporations (whose charters provide that
they can sue and be sued) that are deposited with a bank are not exempt
from garnishment.
Exceptions: Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan vs. Fernandez, 130
SCRA 56, funds of a municipality are public in character and may not be
garnished UNLESS there is a corresponding appropriation ordinance duly
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan.
PNB vs. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595, funds belonging to
government corporations which can sue and be sued that are deposited with
a bank.
Unincorporated Agency Incorporated Agency
-it has no legal personality separate and
distinct from the government. When sued,
it is deemed a suit against the State, there
is no waiver of State immunity.
-it does not have its own charter like
Bureau of Customs, BIR, DA, NBI
-performs governmental functions: not
-It has a personality separate and distinct
from the government
-it has its own charter such as SSS, GSIS,
Land Bank, DBP
-if its charter provides that it has the right
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301
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
suable without State consent even if
performing proprietary function incidentally
(Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of
Printing Employees Association, 1
SCRA 340)
-if performing proprietary functions: suable
(Civil Aeronautics Administration vs.
CA, 167 SCRA 28).
to sue and be sued, it is an express
consent and it is suable (SSS vs. CA, 120
SCRA 707)
-if its charter is silent, inquire into its
function based on the purpose for which it
was created (Malong vs. PNR, 138 SCRA
63)
·proprietary—if the purpose is to obtain
special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit, suable
·governmental—if it is in the interest of
health, safety and for the advancement of
public good and welfare, affecting the
public in general, not suable (Balquera
vs. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366)
Rules Regarding Payment of Interests by Government in Money Judgments
Against It:
G.R.—Government cannot be made to pay interests.
Exceptions:
1. Eminent domain;
2. Erroneous collection of taxes;
3. Where government agrees to pay interest pursuant to law.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP)
The AFP is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
It consist of citizen armed force and a regular force.
One police force—
Republic Act 6975
Mass Media—
It includes:
1. Radio
2. Television
3. Printed media
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302
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Full Filipinization: Section 11 (1), article XVI—the ownership and management of
mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.
It prohibits combination in restraint of trade and unfair competition, and
commands Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media.
Advertising—not treated as mass media but use of mass media.
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
•Amendment vs. Revision
Amendment Revision
-piecemeal or isolated change in the
Constitution. It is the generic term used to
denote change in the Constitution.
- revamp or rewriting of the entire
Constitution. It means overhauling of the
government.
**Lambino vs. COMELEC -changing the form of government from presidential to
parliamentary involves a revision and not amendment.
2 Stages of Amendment:
1. Proposal (Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII)-the adoption of the suggested change in the
Constitution. A proposed amendment may come from—(3 ways of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution under Article XVII):
(a) Congress—
i. (Sec. 1, Art. XVII) Acting as Constitutional Assembly and not as a
legislative body. -One of the non-legislative powers;
ii. By a vote of 3/4 of all its members. (3/4 of the Senate, 3/4 of the House
of Representatives
(b) Constitutional Convention- which may be called into existence either:
i. By directly calling a Constitutional Convention by a 2/3 vote of all the
Members of Congress, or;
ii. By submitting the issue to the people in a plebiscite [if the two-thirds
(2/3) vote is not obtained] by a majority vote of all the members of Congress—
with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the
people in a plebiscite. (Sec.3, Art. XVII)
·superior- people; Theory of Conventional Sovereignty
·inferior- it is a mere creation of Congress;
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303
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
· co-equal to and independent of the 3 branches
Occena vs. COMELEC 104 SCRA 1, the choice of method of proposal, i.e.,
whether made directly by Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the
full discretion of the legislature.
(c) People, through the Power of Initiative (Sec.2, Art. XVII)- A petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein
--This is not a self-executing provision, it will require an enactment of law.
RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Law
INITIATIVE-the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
*3 kinds of initiative:
1. initiative on the Constitution- refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution
2. initiative on statutes- refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation
3. initiative on local legislation- refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, municipal, city, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
[Sec.2(a),RA6735]
Section 2 (b), RA 6735 provides for:
INDIRECT INITIATIVE- exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition
sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action; and
DIRECT INITIATIVE- the people themselves filed the petition with the COMELEC
and not with Congress
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have the power under RA 6735. Reliance on
the COMELEC’s power under Section 2 (1), Article IX-C is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under Section 3
of Article IX-C or a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies
the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard tests”. (Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270
SCRA 106)
2. Ratification- (Sec. 4, Art. XVII) The proposed amendment shall become part of
the Constitution when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not
earlier than 60 nor later than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or
the Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the COMELEC of the
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
sufficiency of the petition for initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.
REFERENDUM- the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation
through an election called for that purpose.
Two (2) Classes:
1. Referendum on Statutes - refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress
2. Referendum on Local Law - refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies
Doctrine of Proper Submission (proper frame of reference)
Because the Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which the plebiscite is to
be held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time given to the people to
determine the merits and demerits of the proposed amendments is adequate.
-The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections.
Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is now regarded as subject to judicial
review because invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the constitutional
provisions had been followed. (Sanidad vs. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333; Javellana vs.
Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 50)
Prohibited Measures: The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum—
1. No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and
2. Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which is
specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject of
referendum until ninety (90) days after the effectivity. (Sec. 10, RA 6735)
Local Initiative: not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions,
1,000 in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in case of
barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body,
respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law,
ordinance or resolution. (Sec. 13, RA 6735)
Limitations on Local Initiative:
a. The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year;
b. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact; and
c. If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in
toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative.
Limitation on Local Legislative Body vis-à-vis Local Initiative
Sec. 125, RA 7160—any proposition or ordinance approved through an
initiative and referendum shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the
Sangggunian within 6 months from the date of approval thereof, and may be amended,
modified or repealed within 3 years thereafter by a vote of ¾ of all its members. In case
of barangays, the period shall be 18 months after approval.

Revision—
In the case of Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006,
the SC held that a people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. Certainly, the Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles—Article VI on the Legislature and
Article VII on the Executive—affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Article XVIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 7, Article XVIII
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of
nominees by the respective sectors the seat reserved for sectoral representatives
in paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
Quintos-Deles vs. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on
Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, the appointment of a sectoral representative by the
President of the Philippines is specifically provided in the Constitution. Thus, the
appointment of a sectoral representative falls under the 4
th
category—those officers
whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution.
Section 25, Article XVIII—disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
1. It must be under a treaty;
2. The treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and
3. Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
- “Concurrence requirement” must be construed in relation to the provisions of Section
21, Article VII. The concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article
XVIII means that at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the Senate favorably
vote to concur with treaty. This provision is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the
agreement binding on the Philippines. (Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449)
The requisites under the Constitution before foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall be allowed in the Philippines are:
1. There must be a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate;
2. When Congress so requires, said treaty must be ratified by a majority of the
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
votes cast by the pe0ple in a national referendum held for the purpose; and
3. Said treaty should be recognized as a treaty also by the other contracting
State. (Section 25, Article XVIII)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
E.O. 292
That branch of public law which fixes the organization, determines the
competence of administrative authorities who executes the law, and indicates to the
individual remedies for the violation of his right.
Kinds:
1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities.
2. Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities promulgated
pursuant to the purposes for which they were created.
3. Determinations, decisions and orders of such administrative authorities made in
the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.
4. Body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and effect of
determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities.
Administrative Code of 1987
The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document the major
structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and embodies changes in
administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people. It covers the
internal administration, i.e., internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative
officials on private individuals or parties outside government.
Administrative Power
It is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Administrative Order
It is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Administration
a. As a Function
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
It is the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law or will of the State as
expressed by competent authority
b. As an Organization
That group or aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of government
are for the time being.
Government of the Philippines
It refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
Kinds of government:
1. INTERNAL—legal side of public administration, e.g., matters concerning
personnel, fiscal and planning activities.
2. EXTERNAL—deals with problems of government regulations, e.g., regulation
of lawful calling of profession, industries or businesses.
Government Instrumentality
It refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some, if not all, corporate powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. It includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and GOCCs.
Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs)
It refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
percent (51%) of its capital stock.
a. Proprietary—if the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit
b. Governmental—if it is in the interest of health, safety and for the
advancement of public good and welfare, affecting public in general.
(Blaquera vs. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, September 11, 1998)
Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and
its employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. The PNRC was not impliedly
converted to a private corporation simply because its charter was amended to vest in it
the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and
other charges, etc. (Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999)
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Agency of the Government
It refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a
local government or a distinct unit therein.
Administrative Bodies or Agencies
Organ of government, other than a court, and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties either through adjudication or rule-making.
They are created either by:
1. Constitutional provisions;
2. Legislative enactments; or
3. Authority of law.
A body or agency is administrative where its function is primarily regulatory even
if it conducts hearings and determines controversies to carry out its regulatory duty. On
its rule-making authority, it is administrative when it does not have discretion to
determine what the law shall be but merely prescribes details for the enforcement of the
law.
Administrative Regulations—also known as PIECES OF SUBORDINATE
LEGISLATION, QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
It cannot extend the law or amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule
that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. (Land
Bank vs. CA, 249 SCRA 149)
Kinds of Administrative Rules/Regulations
a. Supplementary or detailed legislation —to fix the details in the execution and
enforcement of a policy set out in the law
b. Interpretative legislation —construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to
be enforced
c. Contingent legislation —made by administrative authority on the existence of
certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends
Requisites for A Valid Administrative Regulation
1. Promulgation must be authorized by the legislature
2. The administrative RR must be in accordance with the authority granted by the
legislature—it must not exceed; must be within the scope or purview of the law
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Promulgation must be in accordance with the duly prescribed procedures
× PUBLICATION: (Tañada vs. Tuvera) Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Publication is indispensable. It speaks of laws and refers as well as to
administrative RR promulgated by administrative bodies except:
a. Those merely internal in nature
b. Those merely interpretative
- Article 3 of the Civil Code presupposes that the law has been
published in the O.G. or in a newspaper of general circulation.
4. The administrative RR must be REASONABLE—not whimsical, not capricious,
not oppressive; it must pass the test of reasonableness
 Administrative Rules and Regulations with Penal sanctions; Additional
Requisites:
5. The law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the ARR;
6. The law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the ARR.
Powers of Administrative Bodies
1. Quasi-Legislative or Rule-making power;
2. Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory power; and
3. Determinative powers
Quasi-Legislative function Quasi-Judicial function
·consists of issuances of rules and
regulations
·general applicability
·prospective; it envisages the
promulgation of a rule or regulation
generally applicable in the future
·refers to its end product called order,
reward or decision
·applies to specific situation
·present determination of rights, privileges
or duties as of previous or present time or
occurrence
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Secretary Defensor, G.R. No. 163980,
August 3, 2006, prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. In subordinate legislation, as long as the
passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due
process requirement is deemed complied with.
Quasi-Legislative Power
This is the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to
what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
The rules and regulations (RR) issued by administrative authorities pursuant to
the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law; they are binding on all
persons subject to them, and the courts will take judicial notice of them.
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
PSDSA vs. Sec. De Jesus, G.R. No. 157286, June 16, 2006, it must be
stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.
The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears
stressing, however, that the administrative bodies are allowed under their power of
subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling
in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and
purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the
standards prescribed by law.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforced all
laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities related to transportation, the
Tollways Regulatory Board cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations
governing limited access facilities. (Ames Mirasol vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, 2006)
Necessity of Notice and Hearing
There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in the promulgation of a
general regulation by an administrative body.
In Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R. No.
111953, December 12, 1997, the SC reiterated the rule that prior hearing is not
necessary for the issuance of an ARR.
Doctrine of Legislative Approval by Re-Enactment—the rules and regulations
promulgated by the proper administrative agency implementing the law are deemed
confirmed and approved by the Legislature when said law was re-enacted by later
legislation or through codification. The Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge
of the contents of the regulations then at the time of re-enactment.
Determinative Powers
1. Enabling—to permit or allow something which the law undertakes to regulate
2. Directing—illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or Bureau of
Customs
3. Dispensing—to exempt from a general prohibition, or relieve an individual or
corporation from an affirmative duty
4. Examining—investigatory power—consists in requiring production of books,
papers, etc.
5. Summary—power to apply compulsion or force against persons or property to
effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action
Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The administrative agency is acting as a court of justice, conducting hearings and
rendering decisions. The proceedings partakes the character of judicial proceedings
Sec. 1(1), Article VIII—The judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. –outside of this, they refer to the administrative
agency performing quasi-judicial functions.
Requisites for a valid exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function of Administrative
Agency
1. Conferment of jurisdiction—jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or law;
it cannot be implied, cannot be waived, it cannot be left to the will of the people.
The power to promulgate rules of procedure
Once vested with quasi-judicial power, by virtue of the DOCTRINE OF
NECESSARY IMPLICATION, it provides the power to promulgate the rules of
procedure. The rules of procedure are subject to the review power of the SC.
[Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII]: Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In Cariño vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483, the power to investigate is different from the
power to adjudicate. The court has observed that it is “only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication,” but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
Power to investigate Power to adjudicate
Receiving evidence and make findings of
fact in a controversy (in the case of CHR,
claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights)
The faculty of receiving evidence and
make factual conclusions in a controversy
accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.
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Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
2. Observance of Administrative Due Process—mandatory. The requisites of
administrative due process, as enumerated in Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 40 O.G. 7
th
Supp. 128 are:
7 Cardinal/Primary Rights in ADP:
a. There must be a hearing;
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
c. Decision must have something to support itself;
d. The evidence must be substantial—quantum of evidence;
e. The decision must be based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
f. The Board or its judges must act on its or their independent consideration
of the facts and the law of the case, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
g. The decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the
controversy can know the various issues involved and the reason for the
decision rendered.
Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation (1977)—Montemayor was a
full-time professor. Charged with immoral advances, he was investigated with the
assistance of counsel, and dismissed in accordance with the Manual of policies of the
University. On appeal to the NLRC, he was ordered reinstated. The SC held that his
removal was with due process. There was no violation of due process in the labor
proceeding but it did not preclude Montemayor from suing the University for damages.
In Lumiqued vs. Exevea, G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997, the CAR
Regional Director was charged administratively. He was asked several times if he would
like to be assisted by counsel but he refused alleging that he can handle his case as he
was from UP. After he was found guilty, he died. The heirs now claimed that the entire
proceeding was null and void. They alleged that Lumiqued was not properly assisted by
counsel. It is the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel. The SC held that the
right of the accused that was being alleged by the heirs is a right of the accused during
custodial investigation which is part of a criminal proceeding. This is not a criminal
proceeding. Administrative due process does not necessarily require the assistance of
counsel. A party in an administrative proceeding has the option of engaging a counsel
or not. He may or may not be assisted by counsel. In this case, the Regional Director
was even asked if he would like to be assisted by counsel but he refused to. The right to
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law.
In Gonzales vs. NLRC and Ateneo de Davao University, G.R. No. 125735,
August 26, 1999, the SC held that there was a violation of administrative due process
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Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
where the teacher was dismissed by the university without having been given full
opportunity to confront the witnesses against her.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of (Dela Cruz vs. Abille, G.R. No. 130196, February 26, 2001), or
an opportunity to explain one’s side (Pilipinas Loan Company vs. SEC, G.R. No.
104720, April 4, 2001).
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in
court; one may also be heard through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process (Casimiro vs. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005).
CSC vs. CA, G.R. No. 161086, November 24, 2006, in administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. As long as a party was given opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he was not denied due process.
Power of Contempt—judicial; inherent power of the court. It must be used on
the preservative not on the vindictive principle. An administrative body may exercise the
power of contempt if expressly granted/vested by law to the administrative agency. The
doctrine of necessary implication cannot be applied here.
In Guevarra vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 268, the power to punish contempt must
be expressly granted to the administrative body; and when so granted, may be
exercised only when the administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial
functions.
In Simon, Jr. vs. CHR, 229 SCRA 117, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to
“adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court”. Accordingly, the CHR acted
within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person
in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite
for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The “order to desist” (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) is not
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review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess.
In this case, the power of contempt arose from an erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction. It is not valid. There is grave abuse of discretion to both issues.
Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are not necessary for
due process:
1. Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in a particular line
of business
2. Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of a delinquent
taxpayer
3. Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
4. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of
persons or property
5. Preventive suspension of a public officer or employee pending investigation of
administrative charges filed against him
In PBC vs. CIR, G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999, Article 8 of the Civil Code
recognizes judicial decisions applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal
system of the country. But administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of
recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a
taxpayer with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of
respecting a wrong construction of the law by administrative officials and such wrong
interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the
same.
Administrative Appeal and Review
a. Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be
made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body.
b. By virtue of the power of control by which the President exercises over all
executive departments, the President—by himself—or through the Department
Secretaries (pursuant to the Alter-Ego Doctrine), may affirm, modify, alter, or
reverse the administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees.
(Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328).
c. The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearings in he
appealed case, if deemed necessary. (Reyes vs. Zamora, 90 SCRA 92).
Doctrine of Res Judicata
It does not apply to administrative decisions.
It forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority
acting within their exclusive jurisdiction. (Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190
SCRA 673)
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort)
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been applied to matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in
character. It applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.”
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court
cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor vs. CA,
280 SCRA 287)
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s jurisdiction is fatal to
one’s cause of action.
Sec. 187, LGC—expressly provides that administrative remedies must be
exhausted first before the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance may be
challenged in court.
In Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PhilCoA, G.R. No. 110526, February
10, 1998, only decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of quasi-
judicial powers are subject to the rules of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In like
manner, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory powers.
Thus, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same (Smart
Communications vs. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003).
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317
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (Prior
Resort
Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived;
jurisdiction is conferred by law
Lack of Cause of action; waivable;
premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the COA.
General rule: Exhaustion of administrative remedies must first be made before
resorting to court actions. Failure to exhaust will not affect the jurisdiction of the court
but the complainant is deprived of a COA which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.
However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed to be a waiver.
Exceptions:
1. If the issue involves a pure question of law—useless to exhaust. Only the courts
can declare with finality what are purely legal question.
In Castro vs. Secretary Gloria, G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001, the SC said
that there is a question of law when the doubts or differences arise as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts. There is question of fact when the doubts or differences arise
as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
2. If the law does not provide for an administrative remedy—just go to the regular
courts. In Estuerte vs. CA, 193 SCRA 541, the SC said that in a civil action for
damages, the court’s concern is whether or not damages, personal to the
plaintiff, were caused by the acts of the defendants; it can proceed independently
of the administrative action. Accordingly, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedy does not apply.
3. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency—ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. In Nazareno
vs. CA, 267 SCRA 589, the SC held that when the Undersecretary of DENR
denied the motion for reconsideration, he was acting on behalf of the Secretary
of DENR; accordingly, administrative remedies had been exhausted.
4. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, the inaction of the PCGG on
the motion filed by the respondent and co-respondent [it took 7 years before the PCGG
filed its motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies] gave
rise to unreasonable delay.
5. The administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In Cabada vs. Alunan, 260 SCRA 838, the SC said that the Commissioner of
the NAPOLCOM who denied petitioners’ appeal to the Secretary of DILG acted in a
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
patently illegal manner, because only the Secretary of DILG could act on the appeal
and the NAPOLCOM, being a collegial body, cannot be bound by the act of an
individual Commissioner.
6. When there is irreparable injury or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is
immediately made.
7. When it would amount to a nullification of the claim.
8. When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding.
9. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
10. When due process of law is clearly violated.
11. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned.
In Vda de Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377, petitioner,
as widow of a Chinese guerilla veteran who rendered military service during the
Japanese occupation, filed an application for back pay before the Veterans Back Pay
Commissions. xxx The respondent Commission is in estoppel considering that in its
resolution: “The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in
nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and
any aggrieved party has the court for recourse xxx.” thereby leading the petitioner to
conclude that only final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the
Commission.
Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action
premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that
reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. (Carale vs. Abarintos, 269
SCRA 132)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound policy and practical considerations,
are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions such as unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant and when the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice. (RP ETC vs. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007)
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions; When Made:
1. To determine constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive
order or regulation;
2. To determine jurisdiction of any administrative board, commission or officer;
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319
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. To determine any other questions of facts when necessary to determine either:
a. Constitutional or jurisdictional issue;
b. Commission of abuse of authority; and
c. When administrative fact-finding body is unduly restricted by an error of
law.
4. To determine any other questions of law.
General Rule: Findings of facts of administrative agencies accorded great weight by
the courts.
Exceptions:
1. Factual finding is not supported by evidence;
2. Findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
3. Procedure which led to factual findings is irregular;
4. Palpable errors are committed;
5. Grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
NHA vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 158364, November 28, 2007, the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata.
BRANDEIS DOCTRINE OF ASSIMILATION OF FACTS—where what purports to be a
finding upon a question of fact is so involved with and dependent upon a question of law
as to be in substance and effect decision on the latter, the Court will, in order to decide
the legal question, examine the entire record including the evidence if necessary.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Law that deals with the conduct of States and international organizations,
their relations with each other and, in certain circumstances,
their relations with persons, natural or juridical.
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320
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
International Law—body of principles, norms and processes which regulates he
relations of States and other international persons, and governs their conduct affecting
the interests of the international community of States as a whole.
This concept manifests in the codification of jus cogens or
peremptory norms as part of positive international law. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties specifies jus cogens norms as a ground for nullification or termination of
treaties. For this purpose, article 53 of the Convention defines a jus cogens norm, thus:
“a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.
Basis of International Law
1. Law of Nature School—based on rules of conduct discoverable by every
individual in his own conscience and through application of right reasons.
2. Positivist School—agreement of sovereign states to be bound by it (express in
conventional law, implied in customary law, and presumed in general principles)
3. Eclectic or Groatian School—a compromise between the first 2 schools and
submits that international law is binding partly because it is good and right and
partly because states agreed to be bound by it.
Functions of International Law:
1. Promote international peace and security;
2. Foster friendly relations among nations and discourage use of force I the
resolution of difference among them;
3. Provide for orderly regulation of conduct of states in their mutual dealings; and
4. Ensure international cooperation in pursuit of certain common purposes of
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.
Basic norms or principles of international law:
1. States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.
2. States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.
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321
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. The duty of States not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
any State.
4. The duty of States to cooperate with one another.
5. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
6. The principle of sovereign equality of States.
7. States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them.
Sources of International Law
a. International treaties and conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Hague Convention
Treaty—
Elements:
1. International agreement
2. States
3. Written
4. Governed by international law
Making: General rule: Full powers needed
Exceptions: 1. Heads of states/governments
2. Foreign affairs
3. Heads of diplomatic missions-limited
4. Representatives to international conferences-
limited
(Note: Subsequent confirmation of acts of representatives
without full powers validates action on behalf of state)
Adoption: General rule: if bilateral or few states, all must concur
Exception: international conference (2/3)
Exception to the Exception: if 2/2 provide different rule
b. International customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
Elements of International Custom:
1. General practice, characterized by uniformity and consistency;
Prevailing practice by a # of states, repeated over a considerable period of time
2. Opinio juris sive necessitatis, or recognition of that practice as legally binding.
Doctrine of state immunity, prohibition against slavery, principle of exterritoriality
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322
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Instant Custom—a binding customary rule established by the spontaneous
activity of a great number of states and need not be observed for a considerable
period.
e.g. application of self-defense in invading Afghanistan after 911
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilian nations;
Derived from law of nature and are observed by the majority of states because
they are believed to be good and just.
d. Judicial decisions and the teachings and writings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations and advisory opinions of the ICJ, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
e. Equity —Article 38 (2) provides that the ICJ may decide cases ex a quo et bono
(by what is fair and good)
Sources of law refer to norms derived from international conventions or treaties,
custom, and general principles of law. The distinctive character of these norms is that
they are created, or they acquire binding effect, through the methods pointed out above.
Formal Sources Material Sources
—consists of the methods and procedures
for the creation of norms;
—may refer to customary norms
—are the substantive evidence of the
existence of norms;
—may refer to judicial decisions and the
works of highly qualified publicists or
jurists, which embody norms of
international law
THE LAW ON TREATIES
(See Atty. Sandoval’s 2008 handouts in International Law, page 9)
JUS COGENS—a (peremptory) norm which States cannot derogate or deviate from in
their agreements. It is therefore a mandatory norm and stands on a higher category
than a jus dispositivum norm which states can set aside or modify by agreement.
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323
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
General Rule: Parties cannot enter into a treaty contrary to jus cogens or norms
recognized and accepted by international community; non-derogable
Examples: unlawful use of force, commission of a criminal act, trade in slaves, piracy,
genocide, human rights violations, equality of states, and self-determinations
Principles which determine the order of precedence in the application of rules or
norms of International Law:
1. Lex superior derogate inferiori—rules from one source of law prevail over those
derived from another source.
2. Lex posterior derogate priori—later rules prevail over the earlier.
3. Lex specialis derogate generali—particular rules prevail over the general.
International Law Municipal Law
·Law of coordination
·regulates relation of states and other
international persons
·derived principally from treaties,
international customs and general
principles of law
·resolved thru state-to-state transactions
·collective responsibility because it
attaches directly to the state and not to its
nationals
·Law of subordination (issued by political
superior)
·regulates relations of individuals among
themselves or with their own states
·consists mainly of statutory enactments,
and to a lesser extent executive orders
and judicial pronouncements
·redressed thru local administrative and
judicial processes
·breach of which entails individual
responsibility
÷Rules in case of conflict between IL and ML:
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution.
- If a local court is deciding:
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324
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
-If conflict is with the Constitution, the latter prevails. Sec. 5(2a), Article VIII of
the Constitution provides that the SC has the power to declare a treaty or executive
agreement unconstitutional.
-If conflict is with a statute, IL should be given equal standing with, but not
superior to, national legislative enactments.
- If an international tribunal is deciding:
International law is superior to municipal law, because international law provides
the standard by which to determine the legality of a State’s conduct. By the doctrine of
pacta sunt servanda, a state may not invoke its internal law to avoid a treaty obligation.
Relation of IL to ML: (2 Views)
1. Monist—IL is the same as ML
2. Dualist—they are disctinct from each other by purpose. IL becomes part of
ML by incorporation or transformation.
INCORPORATION CLAUSE—Section 2, Article II of the Constitution-- The
Philippine renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law
of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere.
ºHow is it applied by local courts?
- The doctrine is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the Constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice
has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that
such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal
law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
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325
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect—a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the Constitution. (Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph Lantion, G.R. No.
139465, January 18, 2000)
The incorporation clause assumes the existence of international law which binds
the Philippines as a State. It thus becomes a method by which the Philippines can carry
out its obligations under international law within its territorial jurisdiction.
It creates legal rights and obligations within Philippine territory and regulates the
conduct of government official and organs as well as the relations of individual citizens
with each other and with the government. Questions of international law may be
submitted to Philippine courts for decision. The outcome of litigation, however, does not
affect the binding nature of international law in the relation of the Philippines with other
States and other international persons.
Judicial notice dispenses with the burden of proving “generally accepted
principles of international law”. Theoretically at least, its cumulative effect as combined
with the incorporation clause is to require no proof at all for the application of generally
accepted principles of international law to become operative as Philippine law in a case
before a Philippine court. In short, it is as good as statutory law in terms of probative
value.
Identified Parts of Domestic Law as Derived from “Generally Accepted Principles
of International Law”:
1. Rules and principles of land warfare and of humanitarian law under Hague and
Geneva Conventions
2. Pacta sunt servanda
3. Human rights
4. A foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in
it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place
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326
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
5. Judicial acts not of a political complexion of a de facto government established
by the military occupant in an enemy territory is valid under international law
6. Private property seized and used by the enemy in times of war under
circumstances not constituting valid requisition does not become enemy property
and its private ownership is retained, the enemy having acquired only its
temporary use
7. The State has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its
own territory but extending to the high seas
8. Principle of restrictive sovereign immunity
9. Principle in diplomatic law that the receiving state has the special duty to protect
the premises of the diplomatic mission of the sending State
10. The right of a citizen to return to his country
Holy See vs. del Rosario, the Court has declared in an obiter dictum that even without
affirmation in the incorporation clause of the Constitution, “such principles of
international law are deemed as part of the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations,’ under the doctrine of
incorporation. And upon admission in the international society, the state is automatically
obligated to comply with these principles.
DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION—requires the enactment by the legislative body
of such international law principles as are sought to be part of municipal law.
In the case of Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA, 231, SCRA 292, it
was held that Section 6, Article II of the Constitution was taken from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 recognizing
health as a fundamental human right. Thus, the authority of the LLDA to issue a cease
and desist order to prevent pollution of Marilao River was upheld on the basis of the
principle of necessary implication.
Provisions of the Constitution which concern International Law
1. Article I—National Territory
2. Article II, Section 2—Incorporation Clause
3. Article II, Section 4—defense of state
4. Article II, Section 7—independent foreign policy
5. Article II, Section 8—freedom from nuclear weapons
6. Article III, Section 6—liberty of abode
7. Article IV—Citizenship
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327
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
8. Article VI, Section 23—State of war
9. Article VII, Section 21—treaty
10. Article VIII, Section 5—cases affecting ambassadors
11. Article XII, Section 2—ownership of lands and exploration of resources
12. Article XVIII, Section 4—treaties
13. Article XVIII, Section 25—foreign military troops
Subject of International Law—is an entity with capacity of possessing international
rights and duties and of bringing international claims. This entity is said to be an
international person or one having an international personality, on the basis of
customary or general international law. It includes:
1. State;
2. Colonies and dependencies—they are considered as part and parcel of the parent
state, through which all its external relations are transacted with other states;
3. Territories under international control or supervision—these are non-self-
governing territories which have been placed under international supervision to
insure their political, economic, social and educational advancement;
Mandates—former territorial possessions of states defeated in World War I and
placed under the control of the League of Nations.
Trust territories—some of the mandates that were placed under the Trusteeship
Council of the UN
Condominium—is a territory jointly administered by two states.
4. Belligerent communities—group of rebels under an organized civil government
who have taken up arms against the legitimate government. When recognized,
considered as a separate state for purposes of conflict and entitled to all the rights
and subjected to all the obligations of a full-pledged belligerent under the laws of
war;
5. International administrative bodies—created by agreement among states may be
vested with international personality when two conditions concur:
a. Their purposes are mainly non-political;
b. They are autonomous and not subject to the control of any state.
6. The United Nations—(See discussion below);
7. The Vatican City and the Holy See—
The Holy See has all the constituent elements of Statehood. It has all the rights of a
state, including diplomatic intercourse, immunity from foreign jurisdiction, etc. The
Vatican was constituted as a territory under the Sovereignty of Holy See.
In the case of Holy See vs. del Rosario, 238 SCRA 524, the SC distinguished
Vatican City from Holy See wherein the latter is an international person with which
the Philippines had diplomatic ties since 1957.
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328
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
8. Individuals, to a certain extent—they have also been granted a certain degree of
international personality under a number of international agreements:
a. UN Charter provision on “faith in fundamental human rights, dignity and
worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women”;
b. Universal Declaration of Human Rights provision on the “inherent dignity
and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”;
c. Some treaties—Treaty of Versailles which confer on individuals the right to
bring suit against States before national or international tribunals;
d. The need of States to maintain international standard of justice in the
treatment of aliens;
e. The Genocide Convention which condemns the mass extermination of
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups;
f. The 1930 Hague Convention with its rules to prevent the anomalous
condition of statelessness and the 1954 Covenant Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, which grants stateless individuals certain basic rights;
and
g. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental
Freedoms, which grants private associations and individuals the right to file
complaints before the European Court on Human Rights.
If an entity is not a subject of international law as such, it may still assume certain
characteristics of international personality but in a special or restricted context such as
that defined by agreement, recognition or acquiescence.
An individual may be a subject of international law (independently of his State, an
individual may be tried for terrorism (Bin Laden), war crimes. The Rome Statute has
created a permanent international criminal court.
ºMay individuals assume the status of subjects of international law?
E Yes, but on the basis of agreement or in specific context, and not in accordance with
general or customary international law.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Olalia, Jr. G.R.
No. 153675, April 19, 2007 (See Atty. Sandoval’s 2008 handouts in International Law, page 1)
ºAre international organizations considered subjects of international law?
E Yes, their status is determined by agreement and not by general or customary
international law. The criteria of a legal personality have to be met.
1. A permanent association of states, with lawful subjects, equipped with organs;
2. A distinction, in term of legal powers and purposes, between the organization
and its member states;
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. The existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not
solely within the national systems of one or more states.
STATE—a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a
definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a
government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (CIR vs.
Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23)
It is a group of people living together in a fixed territory, organized for political
ends under an independent government, and capable of entering into international
relations with other states.
Basic Criteria for Statehood (elements):
1. Permanent population;
People—a group of individuals, of both sexes, living together as a community. They
must be sufficient in number to maintain and perpetuate themselves.
2. Defined territory—a fixed portion of the earth’s surface occupied by the inhabitants;
3. Government—must be organized, exercising control over and capable of maintaining
law and order within the territory; and
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other States—refers to independence, that is,
freedom from outside control in the conduct of its foreign (and internal) affairs, which
many highly qualified publicists consider as the decisive criterion of statehood.
5. Civilization other suggested/additional
6. Recognition elements
Creation of State:
1. By revolution;
2. Unification;
3. Secession;
4. Assertion of independence;
5. Agreement; and
6. Attainment of civilization.
Extinction of States:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
1. By extinction or emigration en masse of its population;
2. Loss of territory; and
3. Overthrow of government resulting in anarchy.
Principle of State Continuity—as long as the elements of the State are present, the
State shall continue in existence.
· Succession of States: May be Universal or Partial
Consequences:
1. Political laws are abrogated
2. Municipal laws remain in force
3. Treaties are discontinued, except those dealing with local rights and
duties, such as those establishing easements and servitudes;
4. All rights of the predecessor state are inherited, but successor state
can assume and reject liabilities at its discretion
· Succession of Governments:
The integrity of the State is not affected. The State continues as the same
international person except that its lawful representative is changed.
Consequences:
1. All rights of the predecessor government are inherited by the
successor;
2. Where the new government was organized by virtue of constitutional
reform duly ratified in a plebiscite, all obligations of the predecessor
are likewise assumed; however,
3. Where the new government is established through violence, the new
government may lawfully reject purely personal or political obligations
of the predecessor, but not those obligations contracted by it in the
ordinary course of official business.
Classes of States:
A. INDEPENDENT—has freedom to direct and control foreign relations without
restraint from others states. It may be:
a. Simple—single central government with power over internal and external
affairs.
b. Composite—2 or more sovereign states joined together to constitute one
international person which may be:
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
i. Real Union—2 or more states merged under a unified authority so
that they form a single international person through which they act
as one entity. The states retain their separate identities, but their
respective international personalities are extinguished and blended
in the new international person.
ii. Federal Union—combination of 2 or more states which, upon
merger, ceased to be states, resulting in the creation of new state
with full international personality to represent them in their external
relations as well as a certain degree of power over their domestic
affairs and their inhabitants.
Authority over internal affairs: divided between federal authorities
and the member-states;
Authority over external affairs: handled solely by federal authorities.
B. DEPENDENT—although theoretically a state, does not have full freedom in the
direction of its external affairs, such as a protectorate (which is established at
the request of the weaker state for the protection by a strong power, e.g.
Panama, Andorra, Monaco) or a suzerainty (which is the result of a concession
from a state to a former colony that is allowed to be independent subject to the
retention by the former sovereign of certain powers over the external affairs of
the latter, e.g. Bulgaria and Rumania, both suzerainties of Sultan of Turkey by
virtue of Treaty of Berlin of 1878)
C. NEUTRALIZED—whose independence and integrity are guaranteed by an
international treaty on the condition that such state obligates itself never to take
up arms against other state (except in self-defense), or to enter into an
international obligation as would indirectly involved it in war. e.g. Switzerland
and Austria
ºWho has the power to recognize a State or Government?
· The Executive Head has the power to recognize, as political act, a State or
Government and the recognition is permanent and cannot be withdrawn.
Fundamental rights of States in International Law:
1. Right to sovereignty and independence;
2. Right to property and jurisdiction;
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
3. Right to existence and self-preservation/self-defense—Sec. 4, Article II of Phil.
Constitution & Article 51, UN Charter—recognize the inherent right to individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against such state;
4. Right to equality; and
5. Right to diplomatic intercourse.
Fundamental Duties of States in International Law:
1. Non-intervention;
2. Observe rights of other states;
3. Comply with treaty stipulations and other obligations arising from membership in
international organizations;
4. Maintain peace; and
5. Respect the international laws.
INTERVENTION
It is the dictatorial interference by one State in the internal affairs of another
State, or in dealings with other States, usually backed up by force or threat of force. The
kind of interference must be dictatorial. A State may not interfere unless it has force.
Intervention is not allowed in International Law. However, it must be
distinguished from mere intercession, such as the tender of advice or the filing of
diplomatic protest, which is not prohibited.
Instances of Justified Intervention:
1. Intervention as an act of individual or collective self-defense;
2. Intervention by treaty stipulation or by invitation;
3. Intervention by UN authorization;
4. Intervention on humanitarian grounds (which according to authorities in
international law, has now evolved into an international custom).
DRAGO DOCTRINE—it prohibits intervention for the purpose of collecting contractual
debts. It was formulated by Argentinian Foreign Minister Luis Drago as a reaction to
what happened in Venezuela in 1902 where the ports of Venezuela were blockaded by
the combined naval fleets of Germany, Italy, and Great Britain (the super powers of the
time) to compel the Venezuelan government to pay its contractual debts.
State Sovereignty—is the right to exercise in a definite portion of the globe the
functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State.
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333
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Sovereignty in relations between States signifies independence. Independence in
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any
other State, the functions of a State. (Judge Huber, the Sole Arbitrator in the Island
of Las Palmas Case)
Widely accepted elements of Sovereign Equality of States Principle
1. States are juridically equal;
2. Each State shall enjoy the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
3. Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
4. The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable;
5. Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economical and cultural systems; and
6. Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international
obligations and to live in peace with other States.
Recognition—The act by which the state acknowledges the existence of another state,
a government or a belligerent community, and indicates its willingness to deal with the
entity as such under international law.
Theories on Recognition:
1. Constitutive (Minority View)—recognition is the act which constitutes the
entity to an international person. Recognition is compulsory and legal; it may
be compelled once the elements of a state are established.
2. Declarative (Majority View)—recognition merely affirms an existing fact, like
the possession by the State of the essential elements. It is discretionary and
political.
Basic Rules on Recognition:
It is a political act and mainly a matter of policy on the part of each State; it is
discretionary on the part of the recognizing authority; and it is exercised by the political
(executive) department of the state. Thus, the legality and wisdom of recognition is not
subject to judicial review.
Tobar or Wilson Doctrine—(must show stable government and people support)—the
doctrine precludes recognition of government established by revolutionary means until
the constitutional reorganization by the free election of representatives.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Estrada Doctrine—it provides that if a state will deal with representatives of the
government in actual control of another country for the protection of its citizens in the
territory of the later state, this does not necessarily mean recognition of the said
government.
Stimson Doctrine—no recognition of a government established through external
aggression.
Kinds of Recognition:
1. De Facto—(of fact) extended by the recognizing state which believes that
some of the requirements for recognition are absent. The recognition is
generally provisional and limited to certain juridical relations; it does not bring
about full diplomatic intercourse and does not give title to assets of the state
held/situated abroad.
2. De Jure—(of Law) extended to a government fulfilling the requirements for
recognition. When there is no specific indication, recognition is generally de
jure. The recognition is relatively permanent; bring about full diplomatic
intercourse and observance of diplomatic immunities; and confers title to
assets abroad.
Effects of Recognition:
1. Diplomatic relations;
2. Right to sue in the courts of recognizing state;
In the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba vs. Sabattino, 376 US 398, unfriendly
relations or the lack of reciprocity was held immaterial.
3. Immunity from jurisdiction;
4. Entitlement to property within the recognizing state; and
5. Retroactive validation of the acts of the recognized sate/government.
Conditions for recognition of a belligerent state:
1. Organized civil government having control and supervision over the armed
struggle
2. Serious and widespread struggle
3. Occupation of a substantial portion of the national territory
4. Willingness on the part of the rebels to observe rules/customs of war
-Absence of any of the above conditions, there is no belligerency but only state of
insurgency, which is rarely recognized, because this will be intervention in the domestic
affairs of another state.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Effects of Recognition of Belligerency:
1. Responsibility for acts of rebels resulting in injury to nationals of the
recognizing state shall be shifted to the rebel government;
2. The legitimate government recognizing the rebels shall observe the laws of
war in conducting hostilities otherwise any party that will violate the laws of
war shall be considered as war criminals;
3. Third states recognizing the belligerency shall maintain neutrality; and
4. Recognition is only provisional (for the duration of the armed struggle) and
only for the purpose of hostilities.
Jurisdiction of States—it is the power, authority, sovereignty or legal control exercised
by a state over land, persons, property, transactions, and events in its territory.
1. As a concept—it is the capacity to:
a. Legislate or to prescribe laws/rules
b. Enforce laws/rules
2. As power—it is exercised over:
a. Persons
b. Property
c. Events
Jurisdiction over Territory
i. Title to Territory
Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands vs. USA, 2 RIAA 829) test of title in
international law is “continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty”;
forms of acquisition of title are:
a. Occupation coupled with effectiveness
b. Conquest
c. Cession; and
d. Accretion
- Title is not sufficient without the first element of display of State functions
ii. Airspace (flight space)
Paris Convention, October 13, 1919—State with exclusive sovereignty
Convention on International Civil Aviations—prohibits entry of state aircraft
without authorization by special agreement
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Tokyo Convention of 1963—for extradition purposes, a crime, may be considered
as having been committed in the “State of registry of the Aircraft”; but jurisdiction by
another Contracting State may be had if the offense:
a. Has an effect on its territory;
b. Has been committed by or against its national or a permanent resident therein;
c. Is against its national security;
d. Relates to a breach of its national rules on flight;
e. Is the subject of an exercise of jurisdiction necessary to ensure the observance
of an obligation of such state under a multilateral agreement
iii. Internal and Territorial Waters
Fisheries case—Straight Baseline allowed and delimitation of territorial waters
Corfu Channel Case—innocent passage in international straits allowed
Jurisdiction over Adjacent Maritime Seas
i. Continental shelf
North Sea Continental shelf Cases—what confers title ipso jure to
continental shelf is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be
deemed to be actually part of the territory of the coastal state in the sense
that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation of
that territory.
ii. Exclusive Economic Zone
Fisheries Jurisdiction case—exclusive rights over fishery zone must take into
account interests of other States
(See discussion under UNCLOS below)
Jurisdiction over Persons and Economic Activity
Theories:
1. Nationality—civil law follows national wherever he/she may be;
2. Passive Personality—punish aliens abroad who injures one’s citizen;
3. Security Principle—punish aliens for acts against State’s security, independence
and territorial integrity;
4. Universality—e.g. piracy, crimes against humanity, etc.
5. Objective Territoriality—elements of crime occurred in 2 states
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337
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Areas not subject to the Jurisdiction of Individual States
1. High Seas
2. Deep Seabed
3. Outer Space—the region beyond the earth’s atmosphere
Province of all mankind—not subject to national appropriation; no nuclear
weapons in orbit; astronauts are “envoys of mankind” and State shall obliged to
render assistance to them in emergency landing; there is international
responsibility for national activities in outer space; absolute liability for damage
caused by space objects.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free
for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind, on the
basis of equality and in accordance with international law.
Spatial test—96 up to 110 kms.
Modes of Acquiring Territory—
(See page 7 of this review notes)
Modes of Losing Territory
1. Dereliction
2. Cession
3. Erosion, or other natural causes
4. prescription
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS
Multiple Nationality—It is the possession by an individual of more than one
nationality. It is acquired as a result of the concurrent application to him of the conflicting
municipal laws or two or more states claiming him as their national.
Generally, a state has no jurisdiction over its nationals residing abroad except in
nationality law theory, i.e., Article 15 of the Civil Code; Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code; taxation of citizens abroad.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance—an individual may be compelled to retain his
original nationality notwithstanding that he has already renounced it under the laws of
another state whose nationality he has acquired.
Doctrine of Effective Nationality—a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one—either the nationality of the country in which he is
habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. (Frivaldo vs.
COMELEC, June 23, 1989)
Statelessness—condition or status of an individual who is born without any nationality
or who loses his nationality without retaining or acquiring another.
A stateless person is entitled to, among others, the right to religion and religious
instruction, access to courts, elementary education, public relief and assistance,
rationing of products in short supply and treatment of no less favorable than that
accorded aliens in general.
He is to be treated more or less like the subjects of a foreign state.
Any wrong suffered by a stateless person through the act or omission of a state
would be damnum absque injuria for in theory, no state has been offended and no
international delict committed.
Doctrine of State Responsibility to Aliens—State has the primary obligation to afford
protection to aliens. A state is responsible for injury inflicted upon an alien if caused by
an act or omission imputable to the state, in violation of international standard of justice.
Indirect State Responsibility—where the offense is committed by inferior government
officials or by private individuals, the state will be held liable only if, by reason of its
indifference in preventing or punishing it, it can be considered to have connived in
effecting its commission.
International Standard of Justice—(Elements of due process under ordinary norms of
official conduct) To constitute an international delinquency, the treatment of an alien
should amount to an outrage, bad faith, willful neglect of duty, and insufficiency of
governmental action that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize
its insufficiency.
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339
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The Philippines is not liable for death or injury to alien hostages of the abu
sayyaf, unless it is shown to have participated directly or was remiss or negligent in
taking measures to prevent injury, investigating the case, punishing the guilty, or to
enable the victim or his heirs to pursue civil remedies.
In case of injuries inflicted upon foreigner in the course of quelling a rebellion,
state responsibility will attach only if rebellion succeeds and the rebels will take control
of the state, but not when the legitimate government remains in power as the act of
quelling a rebellion is a valid exercise of defense. State liability will attach only if it fails
to observe the minimum international standard for the protection of aliens.
Calvo doctrine—provision frequently inserted in contracts where nationals of another
state renounce any claim upon his national state for protection. Such waiver can only be
made, legally, by alien’s state.
Right of the State to admit and expel aliens
· No state is under obligation to admit aliens
· State imposes conditions on the admission of aliens
· State can expel aliens from its territory—deportation/reconduction
· Alien must accept the institutions of the State as he finds them
· Aliens may be deprived of certain rights
· Local law may grant aliens certain rights, privileges based on—
a. Reciprocity
b. Most-favored-nation treatment
c. National treatment
· Privileges conferred may be revoked
Deportation—expulsion of an alien considered undesirable by local state, usually but
not necessarily, to his own state.
Reconduction—forcible conveying of aliens back to their home state without any
formalities
ASYLUM in International Law
The right of asylum is the competence of every State inferred from its territorial
supremacy to allow a prosecuted alien to enter and to remain on its territory, under its
protection, and thereby to grant asylum to him.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
The right of asylum is not a right possessed by an alien to demand that a State
protect him and grant him asylum. At present, it is just a privilege granted by a State to
allow an alien escaping from the persecution of his country for political reasons.
Diplomatic asylum—refuge in diplomatic premises
Political asylum—refuge in another state for political offenses, danger to life or no
assurance of due process
Who is a Refugee?
A refugee is a person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had well-
founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion
and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
the government of the country of his nationality, or, if he has no nationality, to return to
the country of his former habitual residence.
To be considered a refugee, the person:
1. Is outside the country of his nationality, or, in the case of stateless persons,
outside the country of habitual residence;
2. Lacks national protection; and
3. Fears persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political
opinion.
Because of the 2
nd
element, a refugee is considered a stateless person.
Only a person who is granted asylum by another State can apply for refugee
status; thus, the refugee treaties imply the principle of asylum.
Non-Refoulement Principle—Article 33 of The Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees provides that no contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee, in
any manner whatsoever, to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened.
This principle was declared to be “a generally accepted principle” by The
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.
Most-Favored-Nation Clause—a pledge by a contracting party to a treaty to grant to
the other party treatment not less favorable than that which has been or may be granted
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341
2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
to the “most favored” among other countries. The clause has been commonly included
in treaties of commercial nature.
Purpose: To grant to the contracting party treatment not less favorable than that
which has been or may be granted to the “most favored” among other countries. The
most favored nation clause is intended to establish the principle of equality of
international treatment by providing that the citizens or subjects of the contracting
nations may enjoy the privileges accorded by either party to those of the most favored
nation. (CIR vs. S. C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25, 1999)
2 Types of Most-Favored-Nation Clause:
1. Conditional
2. Unconditional
According to the clause in its unconditional form, any advantage of whatever kind
which has been or may in future be granted by either of the contracting parties to a third
State shall simultaneously and unconditionally be extended to the other under the same
or equivalent conditions as those under which it has been granted to the third State.
UNITED NATIONS
The international organization which succeeded the League of Nations
Organs of UN
1. General assembly—“Assembly”
2. Security Council
3. Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC) “Council”
4. Trusteeship Council
5. Secretariat
6. ICJ “organs”
2 Functions of International Court of Justice
1. To resolve contentious cases;
2. To render advisory opinions to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and
other organs of the United Nations.
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
Legal disputes which the ICJ may resolve under the “optional clause” of its
Statute:
1. The Interpretation of a treaty;
2. Any question of international law;
3. The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
4. The nature and extent of the reparations to be made in case of breach of an
international obligation.
International Criminal Court (ICC) International Court of Justice (ICJ)
· it is a criminal tribunal
· has criminal jurisdiction to prosecute
individuals
· it prosecutes individuals for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and
the crimes of aggression
· it is independent of the United nations
· it is a civil tribunal
· does not have criminal jurisdiction over
individuals
· it is a civil tribunal that deals primarily
with disputes between States
· it is a principal organ of the United
Nations
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The Rome Statute established the ICC which “shall have the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x
and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” (Article I, Rome
Statute) Its jurisdiction covers the following crimes:
1. Genocide;
2. Crimes against humanity;
3. War crimes; and
4. Crime of aggression. (Article 5, Rome Statute)
General Principles:
1. Nullum crimen sine lege (Ex post Facto law)
2. Nullum poena sine lege (void for vagueness)
3. Double Jeopardy
4. Non-retroactivity
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2008 Political Law and Public International Law
Personal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-R
review materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)
Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos
5. Principle of Superior Responsibility—a superior is held liable for failure to prevent
subordinates from committing unlawful acts, in view of his command and control
over them and liable as well for their crimes
6. Mens rea—material elements of a crime must be committed with intent and
knowledge
· No trial in absentia
· No reservations
· Penalties: Imprisonment—max of 30 years; no death penalty
· Principle of Complementarity—the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions of states. It gives primacy over the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.
The Statute was opened for signature by all States in Rome on July 17, 1988 and
had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the UN Headquarters in
New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN. Its provisions, however,
require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
(Article 25, Rome Statute)
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005—
Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—the SC held that
the power to ratify does not belong to the Senate. In the book of Justice Isagani Cruz,
the usual steps in the treaty-making process are:
1. Negotiation—may be undertaken directly by the head of state but usually
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. The negotiations may be
brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse
in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under
consideration.
2. Signature—if and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the
treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the
good faith of the parties; but significantly, it does not indicate the final consent
of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document
i