San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS RELATION WITH THE COURTS FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003] Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

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San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83 The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least onethird of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997] Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

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San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. PEOPLE VS. POMAR [46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924] Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision. Issue: Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

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nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change. Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. It has been decided several times. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral. provided they are not contrary to law. morals or public policy The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. 1. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state. The contracting parties may establish any agreements. health. 174153. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2. 2. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state. failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. for the preservation of the public peace. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The Initiative Violates Section 2. 25 Oct 2006] Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution. SY ’06-‘07 . LAMBINO VS. No. terms. inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 3. Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative. COMELEC is Not Necessary Page 4 Section 1-C. and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter. Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete. The police power may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes. and morals. and conditions they may deem advisable.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police Power. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions. therefore a constitutes a revision. that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual.parliamentary. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision. COMELEC [G.R.presidential form of government to unicameral. they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. A Revisit of Santiago v. protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution.

Jesus Delfin.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid. Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. the IBP. GONZALES VS. and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.R. such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections. A revision cannot be done by initiative. through People’s Initiative. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. No such law has been passed. Held: Sec. the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: Page 5 Section 1-C. which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory. not to revision thereof. must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed. the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision.127325. considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106. SANTIAGO VS. Sec. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right. At the hearing. 2. On March 16. Senator Roco. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. with preliminary injunction. No. the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service. and prohibiting political dynasties. (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution. 9 Nov 1967] Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition. the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments. The main facts are not disputed. Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials. it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative.R. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. is void. the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid. without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. G. president of People’s Initiative for Reforms. cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Public Interest Law Center. therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Art. However. SY ’06-‘07 . thus. G. 1967. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago. 2. He based this petition on Article XVII. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision. No. 19 Mar 1997] Facts: Private respondent Atty. Issue: Whether or not Sec. Alexander Padilla. L-28196. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774.

B. As a consequence. 1. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. H. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333. acting as a constituent assembly. at the general elections which shall be held on November 14. B. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. 3. 1971. B. SANIDAD VS. if within the competence of his office. SY ’06-‘07 . 4913. without special pronouncement as to costs. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid. Congress passed a bill. Subsequently. H.R. B. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators. the petitions in these two (2) cases must be. insofar as the public is concerned. and (2) the acts of a de facto officer. No. to a maximum of 180. . dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied. one (1) member. Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress. H. for approval by the people. 1967. providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. of the Constitution of the Philippines. to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants. calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution. Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. 2. as provided in the present Constitution. on June 17. may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. Article VI. . And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office. It is so ordered. 1 and 3 be submitted. 2. of the same Constitution. "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. Article VI. 1967. be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120. No. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. From our viewpoint. upon approval by the President. violates the Constitution. be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention. 90878. are valid. Nos. the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. proposing that Section 16. as they are hereby. R. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. It may not be contested except directly. by quo warranto proceedings. H. proposing that Section 5." and 3. G." Article XV of the Constitution provides: . to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November. at least. the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district. No. H. R. The Congress in joint session assembled. 29 Jan 1990] Facts: Page 6 Section 1-C. which. although each province shall have. R. became Republic Act No.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests 1.

views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. The Commission on Elections. 2226 dated December 27. Section 11(b) R. This is also the reason why a "columnist. promulgated Resolution No. commentators or announcers. for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. 1989 which was. neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b). Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite. his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions. media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity. no mass media columnist. 2167 is unconstitutional. However. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises. it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information. Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.A. and hear. time and space. of R. however.A. equal rates therefor. by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution. the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881). as well as ventilate. said R. It is clear from Art. announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue. herein petitioner Pablito V. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. including reasonable. Sanidad. Mountain Province. all sides of the issue. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. petitioner maintains that as a columnist.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. Pursuant to said law. all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region. shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27. 2167. 2167 is unconstitutional. On October 23. who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. — During the plebiscite campaign period. 1989. In a petition dated November 20. including the forum. It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. commentator. 6766. 1989. who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news. 2nd par. assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. reset to January 30. to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. on the day before and on the plebiscite day. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue. Abra and Kalinga-Apayao. SY ’06-‘07 . Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. and the right to reply. announcer or personality. 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No.A. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views. Prohibition on columnists. which provides: Section 19. 2167 has no statutory basis. Therefore. a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. 1989. In fact. commentator. Page 7 Section 1-C. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. 6646). Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. 6766 and other pertinent election laws. Ifugao. permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities. Republic Act No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. 2167.

as sole judge of congressional election contests. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. 26 Sep 1991] Facts: In the elections held on May 11. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. 1987. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment. Hence. No. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. permanent disability. a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops. BONDOC VS. Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. G. As judges. his death. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The instant petition is GRANTED. 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. 97710. impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal. Members of the HRET. null and void. On the day of the promulgation of the decision. short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44. therefore. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is. No. 128448.R. Thereafter. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements. may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office. 1 Feb 2001] Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. PINEDA [201 SCRA 792. membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause. resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal. and a Real Estate Page 8 Section 1-C. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc. the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. G. a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. devoid of partisan consideration. Pineda was proclaimed winner. the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. at the request of the dominant political party therein. the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion. are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. which is composed of 9 members. formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. Therefore. the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP.R. such as. the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office. disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. SY ’06-‘07 .

15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute. treaty. As a result. the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Petitioners contend that P. SY ’06-‘07 . notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. G. DUMLAO VS. or regulation not only in this Court. there is no room for construction. Second. the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting. instruction.D. presidential decree. 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co. Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. specific performance. President Marcos issued PD 579 in November. Sec. petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. treaty. Fourth. Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. or executive order. contrary to petitioners' stand. The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64. the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. and lastly. Inc. 579. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional. PNB still had a deficiency claim. if properly liquidated. insisting that said proceeds. all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. ordinance. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. Third. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule. No.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Mortgage in favor of PNB. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. On August 9.D.R. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds. but in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. 22 Jan 1980] Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. international or executive agreement. No. the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. and damages against PNB.. order. order.L-52245. No. could offset their outstanding obligations. presidential decree. 1979. there was nothing to account since under said law. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received Page 9 Section 1-C. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. or proclamation. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. presidential decree. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. petitioners. We must stress that. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First. the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review. Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

As to (2). which are: 1) There must be an actual case or controversy. Petitioner filed for prohibition. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. 38 on May 6. According to Dumlao. the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent. wherein the information against them were filed. and without the benefit of a detailed factual record. 2006. No. would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. including those amounting to subversion. insurrection. mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. 4. 3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court. In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the Page 10 Section 1-C. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. the provision amounts to class legislation.R. 38) on May 1.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. G. also assail the validity of Sec. One class can be treated differently from another class. 147780 . No. rebellion. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr.10 May 2001] Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. PEREZ [357 SCRA 756. LACSON VS. 2001 as well as General Order No. 2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus. shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them. employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. or other similar crimes. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. and 4) The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. No. His question is posed merely in the abstract. Sec. SY ’06-‘07 . along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State. 38 is valid. In this case. accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. should be declared null and void Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with Held: No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry. it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. neither Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with acts of loyalty to the State. injunction. nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Therefore. As to (1). As to (4). Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. but the institution of a taxpayer’s suit per se is no assurance of judicial review. or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. there is no cause of action in this particular case. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit. Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc.

Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. and by virtue of Proclamation No. v. (4) Pimentel v. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5. 38. some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP. Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to. and Proclamation No. representatives. and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. 159085. 2003. 2001 siege of Malacañang. none of the petitioners here have. together with their agents. No. the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention. otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant. they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. Publicly. however. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders. supported their Page 11 Section 1-C. Suplico et al. 2001. et al. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. 4 are constitutional? Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. Hon. Article VII. 435. both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted. Petition is dismissed. Finally. petitioners contending that Sec. SANLAKAS VS. Section 18. 427 and General Order No. 2003. the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.R. If the detention should have no legal ground. by way of proof. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. et al. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo. petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18. 3 Feb 2004] Facts: During the wee hours of July 27. acting upon instigation. Article VI of the Constitution. nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. providing for preliminary investigation. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [421 SCRA 656. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. 4 are constitutional. and all persons acting in their behalf. On August 1.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. Executive Secretary. In the interim. commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. SY ’06-‘07 . (2)SJS Officers/Members v. consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to. Respondents. 427 and General Order No. are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1. (3) Rep. G. petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2). providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities. furthermore. No. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government. demanding the resignation of the President. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. Romulo. not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. 427 and General Order No. 4. thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.

Mateo A. PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines. Enriquez. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality. and. 24 Aug 1993] Facts: On 9 August 1990. then Chairman of PCGG. as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2). Inc concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos. since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. On 26 October 1990.. PCGG [225 SCRA 568. as Members of Congress. These are purely executive powers. their disposal was prohibited by law. his relatives and cronies. and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. No. Manson and Woods International. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President. Pimentel. then President Aquino. PCGG. was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation". Page 12 Section 1-C. According to the agreement. Caparas.302. signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code. 96541. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired. and Sen.T. Article VI. Jr. and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement. On 14 August 1990. we issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. JOYA VS. Article VII. petitioners Sanlakas and PM.S. in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces. Aquino. PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U. so is the power of each member thereof. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable. the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance.. After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991. Only petitioners Rep. the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C.R. G. the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government.604. through Chairman Caparas. On 11 January 1991.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests assertion that the President acted without factual basis. requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. have standing to challenge the subject issuances. through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig. and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18. hence. wrote then President Corazon C. SY ’06-‘07 . authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990. the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13. Based on the foregoing. Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Suplico et al.

The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items. Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic. an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree." On the other hand. Anent the second requisite of actual controversy. an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. 2. there must be an actual case of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights. and if so. SY ’06-‘07 . Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress. Rule 3. petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale. The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures. petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. If these properties were already acquired by the government. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication. The term "interest" is material interest. yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. Moreover. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof. They lack basis in fact and in law. the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court. or a mere incidental interest. although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. Obviously. petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole. such as the case before us. any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil. Held: This is premised on Sec. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past. Page 13 Section 1-C. There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing. a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. possessing outstanding historical. as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution. Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic.

Section 16. On 18 July 1991. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines. filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds. a domestic. for lack of merit. Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion. No. OPOSA VS.O. Again. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action. WHEREFORE.. His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary. FACTORAN. was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy). Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. JR. it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires. Inc.) No." On 22 June 1990. Jr. G. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E. (PENI). engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. Section 4 of Executive Order (E. taxpayers. 101083. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause. the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. the original defendant. the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In the said order. 192 creating the DENR. to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. inter alia. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.O. Factoran. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests cultural. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations). but have also joined the latter in this case. namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and. then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.R. [224 SCRA 792. Jr. use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 30 Jul 1993] Facts: Principal petitioners. the Honorable Angel C. the petitioners maintain that. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause. Alcala. and entitled to the full benefit. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network. the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of.) No.. not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained. the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children. Secretary Factoran. 192. Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P. Page 14 Section 1-C. No. SY ’06-‘07 .D. are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court. artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation.

at the same time. the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed. as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos. it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Once issued. a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. SY ’06-‘07 . for the first time in our nation's constitutional history. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. development and utilization of the country's natural resources. development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights. but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. if not totally impossible. Hence. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which. No.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit. but to all citizens of the Philippines. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter. the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation. During its effectivity. Consequently. Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition. the latter being but an incident to the former. including those in reservation and watershed areas.O. to bring all of them before the court. 192. As a matter of fact. however. mineral. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. after due notice and hearing. Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled. Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation. since the parties are so numerous. it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself. Section 16. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. it. becomes impracticable. these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process. Article II of the 1987 Constitution. then President Corazon C. is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy: The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment. respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12. and lands of the public domain. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation." Section 2 of the same Title. specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR. management. Page 15 Section 1-C. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes. specifically forest and grazing lands. on the other hand. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E. Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs. resources. thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second.

Branch's legal office concluded null and void. but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. furthermore. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. In the second place. filed a motion for intervention. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire. the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. Because of that. Issue: Page 16 Section 1-C. G. This is because by its very nature and purpose.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests It may. It must. In Nov. hence. how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving. which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion. granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications. development of facilities and proceeds. Pres. Bidders were invited. Finally. six business leaders.O. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo. AGAN JR. and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. Petition is hereby GRANTED. the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. PIATCO [402 SCRA 612. It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Thus. Hence. renewing or approving new timber licenses for. it has a contract with several service providers. 155001. (PIATCO). specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. P. it incorporated into. and the service providers joined them. and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. Intl. No. such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. however. promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts. be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer. so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. Moreover. it is difficult to imagine. and the termination of contract. Airport Terminals Co. the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E. save in cases of renewal. No. violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology. as the trial court did. No. 5 May 2003] Facts: Some time in 1993. the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. nonetheless.D. 1152 were issued. with respect to renewal. fees and charges. 90-777 is hereby set aside.R. On 6 June 1977. the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job. SY ’06-‘07 . No other matter should be considered. accepting. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Nevertheless. They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl.D. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. VS. the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II. No. Phil. 1151 and P. processing.

1994. 152 Held: Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer. 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. On October 6. And was directed him to send in his answer. misfeasance and nonfeasance. No. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. His failure to do so is fatal. After a careful study. November 29.R. for investigation. it was only posed by petitioner Page 17 Section 1-C. we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue.. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service. SY ’06-‘07 . as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue. UMALI VS. President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws. and Liabilities for the past three years (3). upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum. copies of his Statement of Assets. Consequently. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations. petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. and Personal Data Sheet. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them. 1994 to August 4. G. Ramos. The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available. Issue: Whether or Not AO No. he can only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987. Initial hearing was set on August 25. The 1997 concession agreement. at the PCAGC Office. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure. finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner.m. the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23. he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. He assigned him in Manila. the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. 1994. 21 Mar 1999] Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. On August 1. acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC. together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution. However. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533. Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. To be sure. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately. more particularly the following malfeasance. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner. 1994. Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 131124. with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC. 1993 to March 15. the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record. 1994. March 16. and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. petitioner theorized. then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 1994 and Makati. rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director. he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure. The petitioners have local standi. Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision. former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). On August 23. at 2:00 p.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void. 1994.

Senate Bill No. the Court. However. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. according to its author. 18 Mar 1954] Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972. and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without. (a) House Bill No. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional. Resolution.. viz. the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case. 152. there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. In sum. that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No.A. 21505 and Senate Bill No. those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration. intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. in the exercise of its equity powers. 988. No. It is obvious. Issue: Whether or Not RA No. as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked. irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution. SY ’06-‘07 .” In accordance with the said law. disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. 17 and Page 18 Section 1-C. while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. 17 solely. The charges included in Administrative Order No. dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. 972. 972 is constitutional and valid. IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534. the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT R. the admission. the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. 497. to admit to the Bar. 6735 was. however. many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions. As to last issue. commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953. suspension. 17. therefore. merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved. the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. 497. or as other authorities may say. the admission. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners. invoking the law in question. taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned. Held: RA No. the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. as its history reveals. The former was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it. which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. REPUBLIC ACT 6735. 972 has for its object. On this matter. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived. and the position taken by the Solicitor General. suspension. and (b) House Bill No. After its approval.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests House Bill No. which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives.A. 21505 into a draft bill. 6735. This approved bill is now R. No. SY ’06-‘07 . Page 19 Section 1-C.

G. G. SY ’06-‘07 . Because of such contentions. EDU [88 SCRA 195. 2 Feb 1979] Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. Juinio. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. Minister of Public Works. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals. 229 which states that all owners. Transportation and Communication and Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation. L-49112. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. Wherefore. Specifically. health and prosperity of the State. Petitioner’s allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Also. Pres. Held: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety. Minister of Public Highways. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit. According to him. L-7995. HERNANDEZ [101 Phil 1117. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu. Hon.R. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. Issue: Page 20 Section 1-C. the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law. users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on the owner’s choice. In the case at bar. 31 May 1957] Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed.R. Minister of national Defense.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE THE POLICE POWER AGUSTIN VS. No. No. our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that “the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the land. Land Transportation Commissioner. it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. the petition is dismissed. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Aquino. ICHONG VS. Hon. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.

G. regardless of length. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose. and advancement. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. thus this appeal before the Supreme Court. no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional. the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate. RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition. protection. ARANETA [98 Phil 148. No.R. the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional. A month after the promulgation of the said Internal Revenue Code provided that: Presidential Decree. Hence. No. SY ’06-‘07 . Under Section 3 of said Act. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty. Antonio Araneta. L-75697. L-7859. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid. the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. 1987. the Collector of Internal Revenue. 18 Jun 1987] Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. as the case may Page 21 Section 1-C. ready for playback. Provided. In addition. Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Furthermore. Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208. to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. 22 Dec 1955] Facts: Walter Lutz. Video Tapes. said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. TIO VS. it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma. Tax on Sale. seeks to recover from J.R. Taxation may be made with the implement of the state’s police power. LUTZ VS. therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation. its promotion. the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. G." "Section 10. Held: According to the Court. Therefore. an annual tax of five pesos. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. the amended the National "SEC. “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. 134. It follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Lease or Disposition of Videograms. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.

Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional . L-78742. the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry. 14 JUL 1989] Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: a. PROVIDED. NO. EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof. the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. G. lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. among others. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance. sales and disposition of videograms. for every sale. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. ASSO. particularly because of the rampant film piracy. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests be. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. SEC. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences. and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry. b. have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry. considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy. and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. OF DAR [175 SCRA 343. amusement and other taxes." WHEREFORE. No costs. and these earnings have not been subjected to tax. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. contractor's specific. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. the tax remains a valid imposition. videotapes.” “Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province. c. That in Metropolitan Manila.R. discs. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Page 22 Section 1-C. thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. SY ’06-‘07 .” The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including. Issue: Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment. not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

The Solicitor General. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares. under pain of penal sanctions. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests d.R. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. No. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. 18 Dec 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made. No. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec.R. 15972. LOZANO VS. not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community. and RA were constitutional. 11 Oct 1920] Facts: Page 23 Section 1-C. there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. KWONG SING VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323. as the statute is unconstitutional. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. hence. G. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103. Such motion was denied by the RTC. RA 6657 is likewise valid. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. SY ’06-‘07 . L-63419. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid. but an offense against public order. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. However. The thrust of the law is to prohibit. contending that no offense was committed. PD. G. it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

All. as amended. In view of the foregoing. convenience. 31 July 1987] Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education. without exception. good order. the furtherance of the prosperity. 532 savors of class legislation. whether they belong to Americans. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. SY ’06-‘07 . and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. Filipinos. or any other nationality.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Kwong Sing. with costs against the appellants. the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right. dated 23 Page 24 Section 1-C. an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. Under the guise of police regulation. Culture and Sports. must comply with the ordinance. 78164. and MECS Order No. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. as amended by Act No. The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. Issue: Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances.) In whether the ordinance is class legislation. Yet. it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. G. The obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. comfort. and each every one of them without distinction. (ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety. and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English. 532 by the city of Manila. filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied. judgment is affirmed. this is an appeal with the Supreme Court. series of 1985. peace. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt. this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body.R. and the promotion of the morality. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights. Although. Ordinance No. TABLARIN VS. authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila. Finding that the ordinance is valid. with the approval of the mayor of the city: (l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx. (Considering that in the year 1920s. an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English. It applies to all public laundries without distinction. in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest. paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. 2744. Chinese. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730. 2382. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. 532 is based on Section 2444. even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint. No. 52. and impairs no personal privilege.

s.” Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. an aptitude test. beginning with the school year 1986-1987. 1985 are constitutional. and (d) birth certificate. shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population. Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985. This Order goes on to state that: "2. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education. The police power. is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word. The cutoff score for the successful applicants. and MECS Order No. created a Board of Medical Education. Held: Yes. Republic Act 2382. and (c) the supervision. based on the scores on the NMAT. 1985. The NMAT. 4224 and 5946. 52. the securing of which no one Page 25 Section 1-C. from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. among other things.” MECS Order No. Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education. known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: "SECTION 1. (b) the examination for registration of physicians. (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts. issued by the then Minister of Education. 2382. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. Objectives. as amended." The statute. and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission. The NMAT rating of each applicant. established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines. control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. x x x (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate. SY ’06-‘07 . We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines. other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible. shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts. it is commonplace learning. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine. as amended by Republic Acts Nos. the public order — of the general community. 52. in addition to the preceding. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing. s.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA [122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983] Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. Held: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and

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San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows: “To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.” The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000] Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of BelAir Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers. Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.

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San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992] Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

Page 28 Section 1-C, SY ’06-‘07

in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest. Hence. instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain. Pursuant thereto. and PHRDC and CMDC. duly represented by then Undersecretary Gloria M. electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives. dated June 25. it is manifest that the petitioner. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708. seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. the CMDC took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary for its operations. In the instant case.490. The Philippine Government. Dasmariñas. PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale with Benitez. the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. Benitez. Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale. PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter hereof based on defendant’s 1990 tax declaration. SY ’06-‘07 . its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title. 1985. through the Department of Trade and Industry. petitioner. A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it subsequently. The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. No. Arroyo. Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated. 129079. that Benitez undertakes to lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site. as vendor.R. not all. among others. Under Section 7 of EO 1035. which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property. when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit.331 square meters more or less. 2 Dec 1998] Facts: Private respondent Helena Z. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question and to undertake land development. TAGLE [299 SCRA 549. Benitez in her own capacity did not sign the deed of absolute sale. of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership. signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides. was made. to which CMDC is attached. through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC). Cavite containing an area of 483.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN REPUBLIC VS. pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the Philippines. there may also be compensable taking of only some. G. for the signature of Benitez. 1035. In exercising this power. In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III (Construction Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC). Held: No. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in Barangay Salawag. as vendees. Page 29 Section 1-C.

L-18841. it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. SY ’06-‘07 . prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Subsequently. the Bureau of Telecommunication. Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement. is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority. and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. No. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349. REPUBLIC VS. the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. PLDT [26 SCRA 320. 14355. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. Held: Yes. the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff. G. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into. in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. No.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests CITY OF MANILA VS. Thus. 31 Oct 1919] Facts: The City of Manila. plaintiff herein. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. Herein defendant. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. FAJARDO Page 30 Section 1-C. may. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. After its creation. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. 27 Jan 1969] Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable.R. PEOPLE VS. the same filed an appeal. the state.

The appellants would.1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. regardless of its own beauty. but again the mayor turned down the request.R. which will destroy the view of the plaza. assuming that it does.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests [104 Phil 443. G. stands condemned under the ordinance in question. because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. But it is a property of a Page 31 Section 1-C. NAWASA [106 Phil. in effect. 31 Aug 1959] Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation. The Baguio water works system is not like a public road. camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building. is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership.R. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their efficient management. in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property. appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit. CITY OF BAGUIO V. it oversteps the bounds of police power. because they needed a place of residence very badly. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Thereafter.A. every structure that may be erected on appellants' land.A. defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. L-12172. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. It is not a valid exercise of police power. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system. No. Hence this appeal. 29 Aug 1958] Facts: The municipal council of baao. As the case now stands. and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation. No. It merely directs that all water works belonging to cities. be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited. their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. being urban in character. Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit. Held: No. Sec. To legally achieve that result. created under Act. but in so doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA. destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. control and operation of said water works without just compensation and due process of law. enacted an ordinance. Whereupon. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. hence. street other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. Held: R. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal. SY ’06-‘07 .1383. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name. the park. shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner. L-12032. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. 8 of R. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer. the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The request was denied. The act does not confiscate. G.

4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. The “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their proprietary rights. L-20620. the republic.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests municipal corporation. REPUBLIC VS. however. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336. SY ’06-‘07 . G. Issue: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be entitled just compensation. the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956. G. 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the transmission lines. danger to life and limbs cannot be discounted. In 1959. New Civil Code). Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines. The Supreme Court. the AFP refused. or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. on August 10. and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.R. DULAY [148 SCRA 305.R. through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). 60077. did not apply Art. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time. 18 Jan 1991] Facts: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the construction of transmission lines. ceases upon the day fixed. GUTIERREZ [193 SCRA 1. No. Judgment affirmed. No. NATIONAL POWER CORP. In the instant case. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation. by authority of court. 1959. 29 Apr 1987] Page 32 Section 1-C. without need of a demand (Art. be reckoned as of June 26. 15 Aug 1974] Facts: In 1947. G. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947. 1669. EPZA VS. Held: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property. therefore. L-59603. the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. however. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way. VS.R. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. No. Under Sec. 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale. since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the Page 33 Section 1-C. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation. claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio. G. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated. Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines. in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. SY ’06-‘07 . Held: In the case of Ministerio v. for brevity). decree. In the case at bar. According to them. which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533. On 1958. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter. the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. Court of First Instance of Cebu. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. According to the defendants. in which these lands are registered under. but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Issue: Whether or Not. and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. No.R. requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed. under the facts of the case. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca. 1972] Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. L-26400. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. 29 Feb. it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924). The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. AMIGABLE VS. appellant may properly sue the government. whichever is lower. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation. no statute. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. or by the assessor. that the Government had not given its consent to be sued.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute. GR NO. On behalf of the respondent Comelec. Moreover. considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights Page 34 Section 1-C. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution. REYES VS. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272. 119694. then she remains the owner of the lot. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. However. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units.R. a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes. petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. 22 May 1995] Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. G. 20 JAN 2003] Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. In the case at bench.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government. as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Hence. but not without payment of just compensation. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. free of charge. Also Resolution No. the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair. SY ’06-‘07 . The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec. the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. impartial and credible election. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [395 SCRA 494. their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. (PPI). there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. No. 147511. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime. among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications. Inc. A few years later.

a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. NO. the former is only an opinion of a law-making body. EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Moreover.R." "public benefit. the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. G. the latter is a law.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners. ASLP VS. for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337. 20 JUL 1998] Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council. A resolution is not an ordinance. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest. which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain. 78742. Page 35 Section 1-C." and "public convenience. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160). the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners." In addition. which was the previous Local Government Code. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice. G. 127820. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. NO. Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. 27. Accordingly. Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose. SEC. R. entertainment and service companies. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules. petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake. Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. OF AGRARIAN REFORM [175 SCRA 343. Held: Under Section 19. commercials firms. VM REALTY CORPORATION [292 SCRA 676. it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. and other private concerns. which is obviously no longer in effect." Thus." "public welfare. SY ’06-‘07 . 14 JUL 1989] Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: e.

00 as right of way damages. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4.R. Eslaban jr. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Cesar Gonzales. RA 6657 is likewise valid. and RA were constitutional. 146062. NO. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. G. Held: The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC but modifications shall be made regarding the value of the just compensation. Santiago Eslaban Jr.60 as just compensation for the 24. while the verification or certification were signed by Mr. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed. Nino. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. 28 JUN 2001] Facts: Clarita Vda. First. Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests f. SY ’06-‘07 . h. there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. ESLABAN VS. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Mr. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. The petition for review was filed by Mr. Roxas. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. South Cotabato. g. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. ONORIO [360 SCRA 230. PD. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The following are the points to be considered in arriving in this decision. respondent demands that petitioner pay P111. 180. 299. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. is the project manager of NIA. 141.660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the certification against forum shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. Sto. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107. respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. After which. 517. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares. Subsequently. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s. an Page 36 Section 1-C. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. PD NO. However. As a consequence of this deficiency. On the land. the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. The court is not a trier of Page 37 Section 1-C. In 1979. As defense. Blg. Salem was included and received partial payment. the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after the property had been registered in May of 1976. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. private way established by law. 340. or any government canal where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. Issue: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject. the Knechts constructed eight houses. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and improvements that were damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land. In 1982. way.R. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son.61 per hectare. Lastly.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests administrator of the agency. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B. Such case is a sufficient ground for dismissing this petition. the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the land therefore exempting NIA to pay the value of the land taken. COURT OF APPEALS [290 SCRA 223. prior expropriation proceedings must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken for public use. decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just compensation in the amount of P16. NO. SY ’06-‘07 . Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. 047. Subsequently. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house. The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B. G.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981. Rene Knecht. just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in 1991. 20 MAY 1998] Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F. 108015. Held: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In this case. The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. 340. In the case at bar.P. Blg. On February 17. 1983.B. Second. Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer.P. Harrison in Pasay City. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court. In this case. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government the easement of a “public highway. the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts’ property. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such certificate for they are not the plaintiff or principal. Third. KNECHT VS. the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. Wherefore. The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given just compensation. The Municipal Trial Court however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished. this question has been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982.

(2) the judgment or order is one on the merits. MANOSCA VS. Issue: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.R.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests facts. it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be taken into consideration. (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. REPUBLIC VS. or an opportunity for such trial has been given. of subject matter and of cause of action. represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. Page 38 Section 1-C. identity of parties. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. 106440. 29 JAN. Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted. 4 Section 4. because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo. 2 JULY 2002] Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However. Res judicata has already set it. On this matter. KER [383 SCRA 584. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government. so long as it remains unreversed. Held: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final. 136171. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. the judgment of the court. (4) there is between the first and second actions. To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility. In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings. Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. and another. that there should be a limit to litigation. NO. NO. public policy and necessity. the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose. the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim. and is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law — one.P. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence. Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. 1996] Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values. COURT OF APPEALS [252 SCRA 412. SY ’06-‘07 . G. For the purpose of appraisal. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J. the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.R. the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed. G.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. Page 39 Section 1-C. SY ’06-‘07 . The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.

on the other hand. PUNSALAN VS. providing P85. prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. assail Ordinance No. 26 MAY 1954] Facts: Petitioners. SY ’06-‘07 . NO. Act appropriating funds for public works. In the case at bar. SEC. and authorize what amounts to double taxation. paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46. repair. subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. Petitioner. Issue: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional. However. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council. null and void. who are professionals in the city. the governor of the Province of Rizal. G. 3398. The decision appealed from is reversed. the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence. filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation. Held: Page 40 Section 1-C. the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. NO. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation. 29 DEC 1960] Facts: Petitioner. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore. Held: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. Petitioners. were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. OF PUBLIC WORKS [110 PHIL 331. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. void ab initio. the donation was not executed. The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes nonpayment of the same. which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent.L-10405. reconstruction.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests THE POWER OF TAXATION PASCUAL VS. having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code. did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920. The district engineer. a member of the Senate of the Philippines.L-4817.R. The land which was owned by Zulueta. Jose Zulueta. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila).000 for the construction.

in its discretion. although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. 1987. "the limits. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund. reading as follows: (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. import and export quotas. Page 41 Section 1-C. limitations and restrictions must be quantitative. designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). Marcos issued P. such amounts belong to the State. who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for. Pres.' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose. Aquino. NO. . 137 on February 27. 1956. Article VI of the Constitution. tonnage and wharfage dues. as amended. 99886." He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). authorize the President to fix. and. No.D. 1024." 12 Issue: Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy (now. Pres. She promulgated Executive Order No. paragraph 1. viz. and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . Article VI of the Constitution.D.: (2) The Congress may. "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3). and not channeled to another government objective. inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation. that is.' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund. if any. the Office of Energy Affairs). It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. created pursuant to § 8.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The Legislature may. must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND. and leave others untaxed. ORBOS [220 SCRA 703. amended P. SY ’06-‘07 . That matter is within the domain of political departments. 1984. P.D. and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose. select what occupations shall be taxed. 1956. the balance.O. 31 MAR 1993] Facts: On October 10. Article VI of the Constitution." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State. Subsequently. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax.R. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it. the law must not only specify how to tax. expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. and in its discretion may tax all. within specified limits. G. The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3). shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned. The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. OSMEÑA VS. or select classes of occupation for taxation. the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account. tariff rates. the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated. of P." in virtue of E. by law. 1956.D. as amended.

paragraph 1 (c) of P. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. the standard as it is expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power. and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund.O. What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite. for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board. As such. but as already discussed. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund. NO.D. this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources: a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment. No. as amended by Executive Order No. it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation. and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account. taking account of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised. 137. the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy. Held: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. Hence. manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292.L-19201. 137. as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy. 1956. No. § 8(c) of P. that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E. the practice is not without precedent.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8. c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing. they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund. The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum products. 137 dated 27 February 1987.D." Under P.D. d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy. 1956. Moreover. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. or "a specific limit on how much to tax." Indeed. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates. as amended by Executive Order No. b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations. It is segregated from the general fund. 16 JUN 1965] Page 42 Section 1-C. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation. quantitative restriction." the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State. With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power. LLADOC VS. this is not the case. SY ’06-‘07 .

Sec. 9. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.000. 1960.00 pesos in cash to Fr. donated 10. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant.B. The donated amount was spent for such purpose. Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Facts: Sometime in 1957. The plaintiff paid under protest. contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of sec. for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos. 1958. Held: Yes. The plaintiff is now the owner of those mines. M. 164 is void or valid. Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. imposition of the gift tax was valid. No. The obligation of which contract was impaired by the enactment of sec. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation. Negros Occidental. under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution.B. of Bacolod City. 600 paid by him as taxes. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. 22 Mar 1907] Facts: The Spanish Govt. Estate Inc. the donor M. Judgment reversed.134 of Act No. Issue: Whether or Not Sec. and predecessor of Fr. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made by the Spanish Government. On March 3. HORD [8 Phil 125. the parish priest of Victorias. The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.. 3473. Page 43 Section 1-C. Under date of April 29. Held: The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law infringing sec. SY ’06-‘07 . Crispin Ruiz. He brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the sum of Php. CASSANOVAS VS. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. 5 of the Act of Congress which provides that “no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted”. Lladoc. so the plaintiff appealed. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties.

SY ’06-‘07 .San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests THE BILL OF RIGHTS Page 44 Section 1-C.

consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication. the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. liberty. characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13. the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. in the very nature of things. null and void. the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. Page 45 Section 1-C. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts. Sec. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. G. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels. or property without due process of ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. SY ’06-‘07 . Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. The lower court on July 6. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. NO. by enacting the ordinance.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests DUE PROCESS OF LAW Art 3. Held: A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. no reference is made to motels. motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor. or the Chief of Police. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 1963. law…” “No person shall be deprived of life. approved on June 14.. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity. The local legislative body.R. Hotel del Mar Inc. filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels. VS. 4760. or their duly authorized representatives. in both procedural and substantive aspects. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. MAYOR OF MANILA [20 SCRA 849. The councilors must. 31 JULY 1967] Facts: Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character.L-24693. 4760 from and after July 8. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional. 1963 by the then acting City Mayor. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. 1963. the president and general manager of the second petitioner. and Go Chiu. 1. has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x ." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case. therefore.

as ruled in Fariñas vs. NO. who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. SY ’06-‘07 . 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory. Held: It is a revenue measure. the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. The proclamation on May 20. hence constituting a violation of the due process principle. NAMIL VS.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law Department.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. Page 46 Section 1-C. Issue: Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the effects thereof without notice and hearing. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. NO.R. Furthermore. the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate installation of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Private respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the winners. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no. Hence.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not accorded due notice and hearing. While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character. Ordinance no. G. once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. All of them found the second proclamation valid. The following day. 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the same. Hence. 28 OCT 2003] Facts: On May 20. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Held: No. COMELEC. Upon receipt of such letter. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests VILLEGAS VS. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho. even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have assumed office. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50. 10 NOV 1978] Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. herein private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Sultan Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. the proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50. 2001. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. COMELEC [414 SCRA 553. 150540.L-29646. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee. 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. and not the petitioners.

hence. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. petitioner could have. midwives. However. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Reyes vs. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. COMELEC. excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process. (PMPI for brevity). instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. 31 MAY 1957] Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155. 17 MAR 1994] Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress. if it so desired. professional (engineers. RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. mechanics. the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. as applied to administrative proceedings. Page 47 Section 1-C. G. an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties.R. petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor. alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under. COMELEC and Gallardo vs. Held: According to the Court. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. VS. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. Moreover. the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. Specifically. as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. PHIL. nurses. NO. Besides. etc. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. L-7995. and confidential employees. filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner. analysts. Held: There was no denial of due process. TORRES [231 SCRA 335. SY ’06-‘07 . If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty. ICHONG VS. According to him. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.98050. But it did not. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner. technical.). The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or. Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory. the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. Inc. the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. accountants.

the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. 7 MAR 1919] Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. Also. In that case. The Solicitor-General adds the following. that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days. assigned as reasons fort the action. which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Naujan Lake. SY ’06-‘07 . against their will. NO. and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. (3) The protection of the Manguianes. it will be read. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests RUBI VS. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam. the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province. to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board”. Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is Page 48 Section 1-C. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized. Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. and to introduce civilized customs among them. indeed. G. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660. Further. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code. and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. an unusual exercise of that power. the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. Considered purely as an exercise of the police power. (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. 14078. 2.R. Thereafter. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation. Mindoro. in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. It is. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao.

SY ’06-‘07 . They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. 11 OCT 1920] Facts: Kwong Sing.) In whether the ordinance is class legislation. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. Under the guise of police regulation. 532 by the city of Manila. without exception. In view of the foregoing. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English. Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. and the promotion of the morality. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. therefore. Habeas corpus can. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power Whether or not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights. 2744. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole." as has been often held. as amended by Act No. authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila. It applies to all public laundries without distinction. (Considering that in the year 1920s. Issue: Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no. putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. (ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety. 15972. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. as we have said. Filipinos. an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. convenience. Therefore. Chinese. and each every one of them without distinction. and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. 532 savors of class legislation. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right. for their own good and the good of the country. whether they belong to Americans. filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. All.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests considered. and impairs no personal privilege. comfort. The obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt. Although. CITY OF MANILA [41 PHIL 103. must comply with the ordinance. with the approval of the mayor of the city: (l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx. good order. it seems that the same burdens are Page 49 Section 1-C. KWONG SING VS. 532 is based on Section 2444. NO. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. must be confined for a time. an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English. To constitute "due process of law. this is an appeal with the Supreme Court. not issue. peace. or any other nationality. a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest. The Manguianes. Ordinance No. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. G. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. the furtherance of the prosperity. in order to fulfill this governmental policy. paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code.R. In some instances. petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.

Mr. the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese language. even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. YU CONG ENG VS. Later. wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. company. Petitioner then instructed his driver. organizing special strike forces. SY ’06-‘07 . The PNP set up a checkpoint. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194. on their own behalf. 6 FEB 1925] Facts: The petitioner. G. carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards. NO. ANIAG VS. and the trial was about to proceed. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”. was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. and the collector of internal revenue engaged in the prosecution. with costs against the appellants. He then explained the order of petitioner.R. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied. industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands. or prosecuting attorney of Manila. 2327 is unconstitutional. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance. or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce. and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations. and establishing spot checkpoints. He was arrested. the COMELEC issued Resolution No. Yet. He argues that “gunrunning. Arellano. in accordance with existing law. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint. Issue: Page 50 Section 1-C. to keep its account books in any language other than English. Spanish or any local dialect. because it would be oppressive and arbitrary. and on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines. Thus. 2323. according to petitioner. judgment is affirmed. Issue: Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional. his books were seized. Co Liam. and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position.R. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature. Arellano was apprehended and detained. using and transporting of firearms. filed the petition against the fiscal. Resolution No. and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the status of their business and directing its conduct. 7 OCT 1994] Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. Yu Cong Eng. Serrapio Taccad. with a violation of Act 2972. Finding that the ordinance is valid. to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. “Gun Ban”. 20479. which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person. when he and the other petitioner. COMELEC issued Resolution No. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections. Held: Yes. 2327. Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning. and in the Chinese characters. and against the judge presiding. this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests cast upon the them. NO. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban. 104961. promulgating rules and regulations on bearing. and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. G. TRINIDAD [47 PHIL 385.

including respondent Pacificador. proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election. and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. To bolster that requirement. there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. JAVIER VS. otherwise they will not go to him at all. Thus. However. the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. allegedly by the latter's men. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation. set aside. G. There cannot be equal Page 51 Section 1-C.R. Seven suspects. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. NOS. the eve of the elections. They must believe in his sense of fairness. as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. the search could not have been valid. and therefore. L-68379-81. Resolution No. the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed. Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. Fair play cans for equal justice. Without such confidence. Consequently. SY ’06-‘07 . Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. They must trust the judge. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court. otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Hence. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13. 22 SEPT 1986] Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. 1984. the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Meanwhile. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano. we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. COMELEC [144 SCRA 194. 92-0829 is unconstitutional. on the strength of his proclamation. 1984. In the case at bar. the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. are now facing trial for these murders. Given these circumstances.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987] Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding. Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process. Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ [180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989] Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondent’s contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE. EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.

Page 52 Section 1-C, SY ’06-‘07

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985] Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case. Issue: Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE. Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression. Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented The decision must have something to support itself. Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid. The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940] Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme

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San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993] Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious

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Jimenez filed an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion. where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University. 24 SEPT 2002] Facts: The United States of America. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. Dean of the Ateneo Law School. in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal.R. Instead of filing a reply. after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee." praying that his application for Page 55 Section 1-C. Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Upon receipt of the request. However. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. requested the extradition of Mark B. thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Held: There was no denial of due process. notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. Thereafter the US government. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. to avoid flight. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court. the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. the RTC held that Jimenez shell be deprived of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. such as petitioner university herein. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law. found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline. G. Before the RTC could render its decision. they failed to file a reply." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. JUDGE PURUNGAN [389 SCRA 623. This was granted. (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Accordingly. Fr. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. filed Petition for Extradition and Jimenez’s immediate arrest. and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice. pursuant to the existing RP-US extradition treaty. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. copies of the charges. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. In such event. thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. SY ’06-‘07 . more particularly procedural due process. Jimenez. In the meantime. they were placed on preventive suspension. 148571. as in this case. respondent students requested through their counsel. US GOVERNMENT VS. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. NO. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. through DOJ.

Held: By nature. Issue: Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued. Thus. Consequently. 2001. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. During which. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state. Since the applicants have a history of absconding. Page 56 Section 1-C. available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition. After being taken into custody. the lower court issued its questioned July 3. directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody. an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. SY ’06-‘07 . the cancellation of the bond. Hence. After Jimenez had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. and (b) there exist special. humanitarian or compelling circumstances. he was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4. they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community. Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order. bail is not a matter of right. In extradition cases. potential extraditees may apply for bail. extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. he immediately Issue a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition. 2001 Order. the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed. which was granted.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests an arrest warrant be set for hearing. if the judge is convinced that a prima facie case exists.

or drink. have in his possession. The classification between the members of the non. Sec.Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. receive. providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The distinction is reasonable. 30 JUN 1988] Facts: Petitioner. any intoxicating liquors of any kind. male and female of overseas employment. exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. DRILON [163 SCRA 386. Issue: Page 57 Section 1-C.” PEOPLE VS.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. 1639. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non. G. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. Phil association of Service Exporters. Further. 5 MAY 1939] Facts: “Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy.” The law. CAYAT [68 PHIL 12. PASEI VS.Christian tribes” The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.R. Order No. it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. “…nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.. SY ’06-‘07 . Held: No. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non. 1. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept.Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution. Act No. L-81958. and that it is in violation of the right to travel.Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. Inc. NO. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests EQUAL PROTECTION Art 3. is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers. 45987.

Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. It was declared to be Page 58 Section 1-C. 2. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights. 4. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392. 1. Order No. 21 APR 1998] Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines. rest on substantial distinctions. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions That they are germane to the purpose of the law They are not confined to existing conditions They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar. It admits of classification. because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. as the right to travel is subjects among other things. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. 4 of BP.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. NO. 132922. WHEREFORE. Issue: Whether or Not Sec. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. 1 does not impair the right to travel.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337. L-52245. the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Held: No. SY ’06-‘07 . Dept. Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired. Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. There is no question that Order No. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. provided that: 1. VS. G. to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. DUMLAO VS. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. Inc. the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.R. In the present case. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger employees. 3. the classifications made.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves. Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. 881.850. Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. 128096. NO. 20 JAN 1999] Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time.560. in this year’s elections. during the period of campaign. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92. it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and. LACSON VS.” Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment. do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.980. free of charge. B. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. on the other hand. were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. No. No. No. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. Radio and television broadcasting companies. According to petitioners. All broadcasting.P. among other reasons.R. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations. Petitioner GMA Network. No. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests without legal standing to sue in this case as. which are given franchises. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [301 SCRA 298.P. no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. in 1992 it lost P22. it stands to lost P58. SY ’06-‘07 . the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. B. 881 which provides: “Comelec Time. Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. whether radio or by television stations. an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. For this purpose. Page 59 Section 1-C.The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. Thus. G. is licensed by the government. had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.498.

7975.A. 8249. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. they did not qualify under said requisites. and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.A.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. pending resolution of their motions.A. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. all of which are present in this case. including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.A. Montejo. R.” There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan. charged as accessories. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R. R. the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R. where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. provides retroactive effect of penal laws. its mode of appeal and other procedural matters. SY ’06-‘07 . or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. However. the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases.A. R. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. upon examination of the amended information. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R. However. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction. Ex post facto law. generally.A. Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7. Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction. has been declared by the Court as not a penal law. 7975. In People vs. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. 8249 is not a penal law. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration.A. there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their Page 60 Section 1-C. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher. but clearly a procedural statute. asserting that under the amended informations. (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law. to “all cases pending in any court. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner. a member of the Criminal Investigation Command. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Thus.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes. as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.A. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. Issue: Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R. it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. charged as principal. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. However. that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only. 7975. and herein petitioner-intervenors.A. the retroactive application of R. 8249. Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute. Not being a penal law. Held: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R. After a reinvestigation.

QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13. of course. it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. Held: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work. the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty. therefore. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. should be paid similar salaries. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank. namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. G. INT'L. classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. Inc. These include housing. and home leave travel allowance. skill. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. for short). The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. 128845. from Philippine or other nationalities. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with Page 61 Section 1-C. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732. The employer has discriminated against that employee. therefore. such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure. This rule applies to the School.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests official duties as police officers. shipping costs. (the School. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. cry discrimination. Private respondent International School. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest. For the same reason. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is. within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan. transportation. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction." "to afford labor full protection. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. Likewise. beside the point. Consequently. taxes. 1 JUN 2000] Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. SY ’06-‘07 . its "international character" notwithstanding. the local-hires of private respondent School. That would be adding insult to injury. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires. the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.R." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications. NO. Accordingly. Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad. mostly Filipinos." The State. for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers. We agree. the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and. effort and responsibility. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. Issue: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. under similar conditions.

we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment. and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences. On June 1. with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General. the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.. Series of 1964. In this case. SY ’06-‘07 . Constitution. licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. 1[1]. 1964 for P5. III. As it is now. Wherefore. Art. collective bargaining agreements included. Ormoc Sugar Company. Art." (Sec. or a total of P12. The petition is hereby granted in part. (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 087. Inc. must yield to the common good. Inc. of the same class as plaintiff. Still. III) In Felwa vs. 17 FEB 1968] Facts: On January 29. III.50. Constitution. . The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10. on August 6. 22[1]). 1 [1]. We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. Constitution). 22[1]. Inc. 087. Page 62 Section 1-C. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. . Inc. Art. Municipal Board and Mayor. Art. it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS. it is true. alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1964. Inc. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central. by Ormoc Sugar Company. Ormoc Sugar Company. should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. even if later a similar company is set up. Sec.. to be reasonable. Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". for the coverage of the tax.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests public interest that labor contracts. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Inc. 1964 for P7. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them. VI. 000. rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes. Answering. VI. 1964. 1997. courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY [22 SCRA 603. under protest. and none other. (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law. was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. the classification. (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present. the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. on March 20. Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 1[1]. as the entity to be levied upon. Salas. Art. a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer." Payments for said tax were made. 4. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. the petition is given due course. 1996 and march 19. imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company. the Court of First Instance. 1964. L-23794. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy.50 and on April 20.

the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness. SY ’06-‘07 . PRADO [227 SCRA 703.087. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. RTCs. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice. the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. is not entitled to interest. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Binalbagan).San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Appellant. however. Senator & members of the House of Representatives. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary. Circular No. 105371. on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v.R. the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12. as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. So ordered. No costs. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process. it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines. Wherefore. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC. NO. 6 At the time of collection. G. 11 NOV 1993] Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. CA. MeTCs. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. COMELEC.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. VS. 92-28 is set aside insofar Page 63 Section 1-C.

and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof. “The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person. were found to be marijuana flowering tops. may an act of a private individual. he took several grams of its contents. after examination by forensic chemists. “The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It was Mr.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Art 3. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. the NBI took custody of said packages. he refused.” No. The appellant. 2. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 18 JAN 1991] Facts: Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich.” Art 3. the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. The contents . 5(m). who made search/inspection of the packages. the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office. Later on. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons. allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights. MARTI [193 SCRA 57. Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages came to his possession. houses. Issue: Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized. acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Second.” PEOPLE VS. the proprietor of the forwarding agency. Under the circumstances. can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. three agents went back with him. Held: No. papers. Afterwards. Job Reyes. When the NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. In the absence of governmental interference. Stated otherwise. However. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Sec. He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. Sec. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. be invoked against the State. From that inspection. Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied. SY ’06-‘07 . included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity. “(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. Initially. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. is not search. 81561. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts. In their presence. Having observed that which is open. was invited by the agents for questioning. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. G. 3.” Page 64 Section 1-C. there being no evidence to the contrary. Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence. the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. NO. the husband totally opened the packages. the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.R.

the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. Page 65 Section 1-C. Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated. Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. Hence. WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro. Co asked Catolico to explain. Irene Soliven. illegal dismissal. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." and to show that any investigation was conducted. 16 OCT 1997] Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. It concluded: With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible. appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. and illegal suspension. in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990. she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.NO. However. In its decision of 30 September 1993. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation. which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640. On 31 July 1989. On the same date. WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. On 5 March 1990. 113271." On 29 January 1990. As regards the first memorandum. In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989. Rule 131). G. Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice." since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept. SY ’06-‘07 . her side of the reported irregularity. she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990. “Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses. Nevertheless. within twenty-four hours. Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence. through her counsel. or exercises acts of ownership over. it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests No. he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty. Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement. Forthwith. Catolico. On 5 May 1990. as this would impair the company's control of purchases and.R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal. At this point. on 2 February 1990.” WATEROUS DRUG VS. explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice. But. NLRC [280 SCRA 735 . Inc. are owned by him (Sec. by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants. as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant. 5 [j]. In his decision of 10 May 1993. Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services. WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals. In a letter dated 2 February 1990. the dismissal was without just cause and due process. and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990.

caprices. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense. Besides. SY ’06-‘07 . Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion. and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. as correctly held by the NLRC. although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side. to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. including legal representation. the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication. Finally.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee. and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. The check in issue was given to her. Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution. whims. and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness. or suspicion. allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee. Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy. she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. It is not true. aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules. and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. STONEHILL VS. In the case at bar. Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. as counsel for Catolico claims. in NLRC-NCR CA No. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. or probably from other suppliers. given reasonable time to answer the charge. he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside. In her Comment.86. such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check. WHEREFORE. Besides. Catolico was also unjustly dismissed.. however. respectively. except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision. Catolico was denied due process. and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients. Held: As to the first and second grounds. As such. hence. In this case. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him. petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP. DIOKNO Page 66 Section 1-C. but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35. since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties. under the Bill of Rights. and as said counsel admits.401. And contrary to the findings of NLRC. it was inadmissible in evidence. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment." constituted breach of confidence. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED. viz. On the contrary.

typewriters. to be disposed of in accordance with law — Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law. Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code. to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices. separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision. and (5) the documents. the aforementioned resolution of June 29. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. warehouses and/or residences. and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups. papers. in any event. on different dates." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents. 19 JUN 1967] Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges — issued. L-19550. restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate. books and things to be seized. if any." which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws. lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court. namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations. in effect. stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense. papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests [20 SCRA 383. papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein. receipts. and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof. and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed. it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them. were cured by petitioners' consent. credit journals. correspondence. portfolios. (2) that the defects of said warrants. 1962. as "the subject of the offense.3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers.5 directed to the any peace officer. financial records. the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had Page 67 Section 1-C. and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties." or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense. vouchers. Tariff and Customs Laws. were actually seized. (2) cash money. and (3) that. namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). With respect to the documents. Issue: Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. thereby. and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts. The documents. not mentioned in the warrants. and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners. (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner. journals. Indeed. regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations. regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. ledgers. SY ’06-‘07 .

As a consequence. SY ’06-‘07 . Tariff and Customs Laws. Page 68 Section 1-C. Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation. Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila. 3. Industrial Business Management Corporation. Real properties were seized. were seized. 5 U. Investment Management Corporation.S. respectively. Project 6. Hon. or committed specific omissions. to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws. Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case. no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. 2. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 64261. books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos. and office and printing machines. Road 3. Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants: 1. As a matter of fact. 4. Quezon City. 26 DEC 1984] Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7. Stonehill. 1962. Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City. Tariff and Customs Laws. RMS Building. Amado Roan. the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy. it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause. 4.. Brooks. V. 3 Covering the period from March 3 to March 9. publication and distribution of the said newspapers. 2 Hon. Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News). Hon. Special Prosecutors Pedro D. 4 Harry S. Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila. were searched. The application along with a joint affidavit. under which the premises known as No. from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3. in his capacity as Secretary of Justice.. Pasig Branch. equipment. Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Investment Inc. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. Brooks and Karl Beck. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Tobacco Corporation. Quezon City Branch. Atlas Development Corporation. Reyes. SR. 5. Damian Jimenez. Quezon City. and Hon. As a consequence of the search and seizure. and 784 Units C & D. Quezon Avenue. could or should have been done earlier.R. documents. The Philippine Tobacco-FlueCuring and Redrying Corporation. Jr. G. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it). upon which the warrants were issued. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former abovementioned address. by exercising due diligence. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Roman Cansino. Cenzon. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts. AFP [133 SCRA 800. Jr. as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. CHIEF OF STAFF. Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper. paraphernalia. of the highest order. with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. John J. these premises were padlocked and sealed. Atlas Cement Corporation. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Eulogio Mencias. Plana and Manuel Villareal. Industrial and Business Management Corporation. United Housing Corporation.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. General Agricultural Corporation. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses. Holiday Hills. Efren I. Republic Glass Corporation. NO. in his capacity as Acting Director. 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. American Asiatic Oil Corporation. 1 BURGOS. Inc. Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. Robert P. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which. business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers. violating a given provision of our criminal laws." — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or __________________________ Hon. as well as numerous papers. National Bureau of Investigation. Jose Lukban. Hermogenes Caluag. Hon. 19. Jose W. Diokno. City of Manila.

5. dynamite sticks and subversive documents”. President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners. 3. academy Page 69 Section 1-C. of the existence of probable cause. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in his possession at his house “M-16 Armalite rifles. P/Sgt.45 Cal. Precisely. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic. because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. there is an absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Rule 126. regulator supply. transceiver with antennae. 4. 2. 885. said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. 89103. while in fact bolted to the ground. It may or may not be owned by him. that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. The application was granted. which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. With the contention pertaining to laches. NO. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general. In Alvarez v. . remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. negating the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property. Furthermore. searched the house of petitioner and seized “2 envelopes containing P14000. In September. 14 JUL 1995] Facts: In August 1988. this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional Issue raised. On the enumerated reasons: 1. Abadilla and his witnesses. This being the case. PEOPLE [246 SCRA 184. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. of the Rules of Court. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. as amended. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. hand grenades. a police team. not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant. handset with antennae. G. two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. 1983. does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. SY ’06-‘07 . this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses.R. TAMBASEN VS. as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9. the machineries in question. not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. which were “used or intended to be used” for illegal purposes. Section 2. Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885. the petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Court of First Instance. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. pistols. The search warrants are declared null and void. Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court.

They contended that the fiscal’s certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest. After the hearing. such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination of legality of seizure of the articles. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized. it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not be committed. the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. PLACER VS. by the President. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant was legal. for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest. to leave the officers of the law with no discretion. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function. In October. in its order. he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause. Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof. respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. MTCC.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests notebook and assorted papers and handset battery pack”. Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may. SOLIVEN VS. Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. 29 DEC 1983] Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. RTC granted the petition. Petition dismissed. SY ’06-‘07 . issue a warrant of arrest. Petition granted. directed Lt. G. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized. Col. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463.R. If on the face of the information. The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described in the search warrants. the judge finds no probable cause.R. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and. In December. 14 NOV 1988] Facts: In these consolidated cases. compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393. NO. subsequently. NOS. Upon receipt of said informations. But. they should remain in custogia legis. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be limited to the specified items covered thereby. respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. G. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. L-60349-62. and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were Page 70 Section 1-C. 82585.

Following established doctrine and procedure. through the Executive Secretary. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. III. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7. On appeal.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. 2. gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. if any. With these developments. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed. The pertinent provision reads: Art. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and. Thus. calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. 1988. 1988. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. to determine probable cause. the President. 1988. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. SY ’06-‘07 . or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The second issue. to determine probable cause Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran. Page 71 Section 1-C. On March 30. a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.affidavits. the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter." in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16. houses. affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2. Sec. through their separate acts. petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. 1988. This is not an accurate interpretation. Hence. Sound policy dictates this procedure. by the President. the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. on the basis thereof. issue a warrant of arrest." has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. raised by petitioner Beltran. the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. if any. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. subsequently. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents.

the petition is GRANTED. China. Hence. we declare Article 38. The said Order violated due process. it is the sole domain of the courts. finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents. the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. The group. WHEREFORE. paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. L-22196. it having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment. charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.R. The Supreme Court held. and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors. . The team confiscated assorted costumes. MORANO VS. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment. paragraph (c). 82585. “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. G. Under the Constitution. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. To that extent. of the Labor Code. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. Nos. SALAZAR VS. Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code Held: Under the new Constitution.R. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”. Chan Sau Page 72 Section 1-C. 30 JUN 1967] Facts: Chan Sau Wah. the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. 81510. because she was not given prior notice and hearing. no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. went to petitioner’s residence. like the one at bar. “. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights. not being a judge. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties. SY ’06-‘07 . Article 38. 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26.” Furthermore. (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to visit her cousin. in the care of neighbors in Fukien. R. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. 1988 is LIFTED. 1205.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests WHEREFORE. VIVO [20 SCRA 562. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases. the authorities must go through the judicial process. accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen. 82827 and 83979. . The court held that the warrant is null and void. For a Salazar. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145. unconstitutional and of no force and effect… The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is. after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency. On the same day. public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. Public respondent Atty. They served the order to a certain Mrs. 1205 to petitioner. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. who let them in. 14 MAR 1990] Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA. NO. exceptional. because it must identify specifically the things to be seized. obviously. G. Samuel Lee Malaps. a Chinese citizen born in Fukien.

and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. On January 1962. NO. Chan Sau Wah. Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano. This Court in a number of cases has ruled. SY ’06-‘07 . We cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation. a native-born Filipino citizen. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Page 73 Section 1-C. the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. in the care of neighbors in Fukien. she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country. Jr.69 of Revised Administrative Code. 1962. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout. China. She is a nonimmigrant. G. 82544. we are confident. to leave the country on or before September 10. ply a pernicious trade. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. married in Manila a native-born Filipino. Such a flanking movement.000 pesos. 28 JUN 1988] Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage. On 4 March1988. she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa. first. Esteban Morano. second.Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines. This is a field closed to judicial action. but actually live with another man as husband and wife. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. No breadth of discretion is allowed. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. To prolong their stay in the Philippines. Held: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. and consistently too.Then. go through a mock marriage. Laguna. she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. her minor son also by the first marriage.R. he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond. Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor. HARVEY V. the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. 1962. seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Fu Yan Fun. a woman of undesirable character may enter this country. Also. The last extension expired on September 10. In a letter dated August 31. One released for lack of evidence.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun. Under Section 13 just quoted. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840. 58. another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan. deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey. and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Therefore. and third. 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do. is impermissible. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. since her entry. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. marry a Filipino. both minors.

Furthermore. Therefore. the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation (p. for brevity). Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.i. 1. spiritual and social well being of the youth. NO. moral. After the shooting. 16 NOV 2001] Facts: The petitioner. SY ’06-‘07 . The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months.R. Benemerito. The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p. affidavit of witnesses and other supporting documents. the search done was incidental to the arrest. Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. While proceedings are ongoing. he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action.e.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code. the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.) Search in a moving vehicle. it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical. therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126. he surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. He did it the following day. he filed a petition for Page 74 Section 1-C. 3. In view of the foregoing. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. Lastly. Issue: Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. for brevity) found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 2. Petitioner received a subpoena directing him to file his counter affidavit. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal. 143802. Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty. it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. SALES VS.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37. SANDIGANBAYAN [369 SCRA 293 G.

cabinets.231. proper. Moreover he did not complete it. cartons and containers to look for said illegal drugs. then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No. Judge Nickarter Ontal. as maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves.R. The graft investigator recommended the filing of information for murder which the OMB approved. the preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators. SILVA VS.A. SY ’06-‘07 . The warrant authorizes Sgt. Thirdly. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1. it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMB’s certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of the latter’s flawed report and one side factual findings. cases of passing the buck. Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed because of the following reasons. 81756. Secondly.i. And lastly.i. the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination of probable cause. lockers. Tama Silva at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors. He did a worse job than the judge. and the p. This fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. The gravity of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary investigation. PRESIDING JUDGE [203 SCRA 140. He only examined the witness of the complainant. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. 21 Oct 1991] Facts: Sgt. which merely rekied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense. In the course of the search. by actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. This is now a petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest. Villamor. the p. Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972.e. the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The C.40. Issue: Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary investigation. considering the OMB’s defective report and findings. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. G. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesn’t have jurisdiction on the case.i. granted the petition holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd degree to the private respondent and the p. The proceeding now consists only of one stage. Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. No. chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. cigarette and joint. a person under preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration. and the p. none of whom completed the preliminary investigation There was not one continuous proceeding but rather. The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan’s assertion of having found probable cause on its own.i. The OMB did nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. But the prosecution instead of conducting p. he conducted has 2 stages. Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests habeas corpus with the C.e. but he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence. Issue: Page 75 Section 1-C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p. Firstly. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit.

two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. 1988. cigarettes. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. VEROY VS. SY ’06-‘07 .etc. Petitioner Ma. Obrero recovered a . in the house. men's brief. Gandhi brand. in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits. an officer of the PC/INP. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house.45 cal. Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos. Hence. Police Officers had an information that the petitioner’s residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers. only the key to the kitchen. Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house. two (2) pairs men's socks. No.A.. a towel made in U. a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no. 1 is declared null and void. a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June.S. 18 Jun 1992] Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. The following day. Capt. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard. *** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court Examination of the complainant. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized. a telescope.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not Search Warrant No. since 1988. Capt. Skyline Village. where the circuit breakers were located.. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money. The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. Luisa Veroy. Sgt. Held: Search Warrant No. Petitioner Ma. one blanket. Capt. East Kamias. a small black bag. 95630. 13 Isidro St. sweat shirt. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room.. Page 76 Section 1-C. The questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided. where they are presently residing. who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet. was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma.. G. Davao City. record -the judge before issuing the warrant. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. LAYAGUE [210 SCRA 97. containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation". Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Quezon City. However. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen.1 is invalid. Search Warrant No. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt.R. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves. and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon. a road map of the Philippines. Catalunan Grande. he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St.

Obrero was able to enter the compound.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. 1990. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. therefore. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. No bail was recommended. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. SY ’06-‘07 . "acquire". Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. (Roan v.R. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy. 1990 (181 SCRA 648). January 30. is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. G. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Issue: Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. they are inadmissible in evidence against them.R. 1991 [193 SCRA 122]). While Capt. assuming that there was indeed a search warrant. products of an illegal search. the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. 83341. However. Panga. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). (2) a search of a moving vehicle. G. where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. houses. he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. 1866 is bereft of merit. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. 88017. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. 1866. A search warrant is still necessary. there is no room for construction. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence. he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. Lo Ho Wing. Obrero had permission from Ma. The terms "deal in". its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed. and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Gonzales. Besides. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. still in mala Page 77 Section 1-C. Held: The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The items taken were. Undeniably. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. No. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest. violative of their constitutional rights As such. and where there is no ambiguity in the words. the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. hence. the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant. In a resolution dated August 6. Hence. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III. January 21.

She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. she saw Sgt. a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. They confronted the accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. She was made to sign a prepared document.R. The police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The police still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. Accused denied the accusation and told them that she doesn’t know anything about it. particularly methamphetamine or shabu. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. Sec 2 art. The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty. The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. After the issuance of the search warrant.R. Held: No. 89373. NO. SY ’06-‘07 . PEOPLE VS. He actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. there must be knowledge that the same existed.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests prohibita. She invited Sgt. While inside the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as a search warrant. In herein case. Issue: Page 78 Section 1-C.22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. PREMISES CONSIDERED. 17. G. when someone coming from the kitchen uttered “eto na” They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. 20 JUL 1994] Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs. According to the accused. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. GESMUNDO [219 SCRA 743. 1986. PO Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. 109633. the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. She was brought to the police station and was detained. its paraphernalia’s and of a . G. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246. the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED. in the morning of Nov. an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu. PEOPLE VS. when the police arrived at her house. NO. while there is no need of criminal intent. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. 19 MAR 1993] Facts: According to the prosecution. which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s. The police also recovered from a native “uway” cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper. About 2pm that day.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter. Bagong Barrio. but it also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. However. 3 OCT 1991] Facts: On 1 February 1988. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon. an outlawed subversive organization. Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police. As held in PP vs. UMIL VS. Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged. Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant." twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10. together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon. Quezon City. Held: In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect. Caloocan City. rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of a house. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before. Biñan. 81567. Judgment is reversed. these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties. The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted. While confined thereat. in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. the trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. subversion. before a road hump along Macanining St. It was not proved that the marijuana belonged to her. conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes. Again.. as to what was recovered and where. The guilt of the accused was has not been established. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound.R. Roosevelt Avenue. and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes. to verify a confidential information which was received by their office. there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7. Lot 4. Agnes Hospital. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311. The crimes rebellion. Remorosa. SY ’06-‘07 . There must sufficient evidence that the marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. for security reasons. Subversion being a continuing offense. G. There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned. Page 79 Section 1-C. military agents were dispatched to the St. NO. In view of this verification. the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. South City Homes. there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their testimonies.

SUCRO [195 SCRA 388. based on which. No.R. without a search warrant. However. G. PEOPLE V. Fulgencio told Lt. Issue: Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful. The lower court.(People v. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. 18 Mar 1991] Facts: Pat. herein accused. There was no authorization by any search warrant. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante.R. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. the Don. 4 Feb 1992] Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Quimpo and Veterans. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance. a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. During the raid. Rule 126. Seraspi to intercept. G. One of the agents went to said location. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. SY ’06-‘07 . RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791. Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a Page 80 Section 1-C. Albay. warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed.Seraspi proceeded to the area. P/Lt.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests PEOPLE VS. it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties. Thereafter. considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution. Seraspi. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas. From that moment. the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report. Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything. No. Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible. asked for a certain Don. 93239. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). 95902. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Page 81 Section 1-C. Rubio. this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. i. because they easily could. their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations. then they should. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time.22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Evidently. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Exh. Exh.A. The other group acted as their back up. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag. fronting the hotel. as amended by R. SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657. Angeles City. "E"— One plastic syringe. G. Angeles City. Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure. Exh. have first secured a search warrant during that time. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted. since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. 6425. PEOPLE VS. testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson". and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams. 7659. these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodrigueza’s father. the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. No. Forthwith. Exh. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. the twenty (20) pieces of . "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag. when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. Surprisingly. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest. SY ’06-‘07 . as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant. what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items: One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following: Exh.136066-67. he saw that it contained a crystalline substance.e. Afterwards. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet.A. who acted as the poseur buyer. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accusedappellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago. Article III of R. the Zest-O juice box.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests person posing as a buyer. In People vs. 4 Feb 2003] Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant: CIC Taduran.22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. As such. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid. the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant. SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .R. So. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito.

there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed. At this time. The Page 82 Section 1-C.815 grams of shabu. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. Finally. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. the legality of the arrest is questioned. In this instance. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. and (2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Accordingly. He refused. Issue: Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”. He felt sleepy. whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions. as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. PO2 Nulud.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident. interrogate him. In the presence of reporters. or is attempting to commit a crime. To reiterate. When he called the attention of the onlooker.. who ordered his men to call the media.955. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street. e. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. this appeal to the Court. Col. Guttierez arrived. to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. SY ’06-‘07 . Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. while the others searched his car. is actually committing. and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank. in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions. the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. For all intents and purposes. While at the store. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila.g. With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stopand-frisk”. absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers. is actually committing. During the course of the arrest. for this exception to apply. the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. “Reliable information” alone. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest. so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Hence. yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1. he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. or is attempting to commit a crime. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. Thereafter. A genuine reason must exist. who just arrived at the scene. a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause.45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. the man immediately pulled out a . he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col.

membership in an outlawed organization. where the same is required appear thereat.R. 6 days after the shooting. neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. NOS. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5. Petition granted. shot the driver of the other vehicle. According to petitioner’s counsel. the police detained him. petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation. NO. Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. as when he walked in the police station. Petitioner was not arrested at all. denied the motions to quash the complaints. G. and drove off. falls under Section 5. accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted. 20 JUN 1977] Facts: Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully. setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court. Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. GO VS. does not apply. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138. 11 FEB 1992] Facts: Petitioner. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car. Rule 113 and Section 7. wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses. Further. trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation. there was jurisdictional infirmity.R. VILLANUEVA [77 SCRA 377. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor. petitioner Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. necessarily in a criminal charge. arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. Rule 113. thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Wherefore. petitioner presented himself in the police station. Petitioner posted bail. petitioner posted Page 83 Section 1-C. Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. In the case at bar. Thus. who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600. 24646 & L-24674. etc. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Ramos. Section 7. G. while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street. Prosecutor made a substantive error. accompanied by 2 lawyers. Felipe Villanueva. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent.” i. SY ’06-‘07 . which however constituted “continuing crimes. preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond. The City Judge of Dagupan City. CALLANTA VS. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police. 101837.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation. almost had a collision with another vehicle. Rule 112. subversion. he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.e.

Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation. a smoke (tear gas) grenade. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation. argues that under Section 12. 770196. in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. and agreed with the complaints filed. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.R. it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. SY ’06-‘07 . In the course of the same. and may release. Davao City. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit. Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. there is no question that. he has waived whatever defect. Such an exercise may prove to be useless. if any. “where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper. “the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense. Page 84 Section 1-C. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances. thus obtaining her provisional liberty. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner. because she posted the bail bond. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber . the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. Didoy the officer then on duty. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Petition for certiorari is denied. Pat. POSADAS VS. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. NO. 2 AUG 1990] Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force.38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street. it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. futile and much too late. 89139. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests the bail bond. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. indeed.22 caliber gun.38 caliber gun. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan. G. without regard to the limits of punishment. in the case at bar. In the case at bar. and two (2) live ammunitions for a . two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a . Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant.

The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations.4 art. whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them.R. Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution.D. while his companion had a fan knife. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was convicted for violation of P. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The suspects were then searched. the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed. Judgment is reversed and set aside. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. NO. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. PEOPLE V. according to the arresting officers themselves. carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously.L-63630. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. 6 Apr 1990] Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. TANGLIBEN [184 SCRA 220. or is attempting to commit an offense. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen. and there they found marijuana leaves. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop. Rule 113 sec. (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed. is actually committing.5 of the Rules of Court. and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. G. and hence. he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. which he reported to the police including the revolver. Page 85 Section 1-C. At the time of the arrest in question. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. No. one of whom holding his abdomen. Medel Tangliben. Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant. They confronted him. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed. 87059.R. Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. For his part. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. Manila. Accused-appellant is acquitted.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Clearly.38 caliber with live ammunitions in it. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a . G. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person. PEOPLE VS. SY ’06-‘07 . 22 JUN 1992] Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo. the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. inspected his bag.

SY ’06-‘07 . Accused Mikael Malmstedt. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed. the officers got the bags and opened them. PEOPLE VS. the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Held. entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. Feeling the teddy bears. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun. a derivative of marijuana. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers. Captain Alen Vasco. accused left for Baguio City. accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa. as ordered. In the evening of 7 May 1989. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.R. At the investigation room. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. In the present case. as amended. Moreover. 19 Jun 1991] Facts: In an information filed against the accused. Rule 113 sec. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11. accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Thus. II of Republic Act 6425. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day. a Swedish national. La Trinidad. Art. prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. or is attempting to commit an offense. for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag. that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. Benguet for further investigation. he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. G. is committing. Thereafter. Mountain Province. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. 91107. the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. No. the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa. the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. During the inspection. information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. In the chemistry report. the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Acop. When accused failed to comply. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Tublay. ACCUSED’S DEFENSE Page 86 Section 1-C. Upon stepping out of the bus. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. 1989. as amended. MALMSTEDT [198 SCRA 401. Benguet. for violation of Section 4. But before he alighted from the bus. ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14. in coordination with Tublay Police Station. No. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989). it was established that the objects examined were hashish.appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad.

he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him. PEOPLE VS. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. arrest a person: (a) When. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused. The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. G. however. and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed. there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. when lawful.R. they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing. Thus.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests During the arraignment. Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged. –– A peace officer or a private person may. shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening. accused-appellant was arrested on June 25. The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and. under the circumstances of the case. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him. inspected his bag Page 87 Section 1-C. but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid." For his defense. therefore. However. without a warrant. houses. there is no need to obtain a search warrant. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 11 and attempted to flee. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). accused entered a plea of "not guilty. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant. 6 Jul 1988] Facts: Idel Aminnudin. because of existence of probable cause. where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus. in his presence. or is attempting to commit an offense. and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. SY ’06-‘07 . the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him. L-74869. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law. where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. in Iloilo City. Costs against the accused-appellant. 1984.

The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a." The motion was granted. 5 SEPT 1994] Facts: On or about 8 July 1992. who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. In his defense. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto. the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen. and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. He willingly went with them. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. Then Saycon.R. who was eventually convicted . and the latter willingly obliged. and trial proceeded only against the accusedappellant. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. PEOPLE VS. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. 110995. Inside that maong wallet. two shirts and two pairs of pants. At the PC headquarters. Later. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested. To all appearances. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained. Held: Page 88 Section 1-C. the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag. the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. SY ’06-‘07 . However the RTC rejected his allegations. the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation. there was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. more widely known as "shabu. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant. Upon receipt of the information.m. he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana. consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride. At the headquarters. he was not committing a crime. G. at about 6:00 in the morning." Issue: Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid. the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin. Saycon merely bowed his head. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin. When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. NO. averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4. Held: The search was illegal. which could allow warrantless arrest or search. the Coastguard personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia. At the moment of his arrest. the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. SAYCON [236 SCRA 325. Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. instructed them to intercept the suspect. a certain Miagme.2 grams in total. Subsequently.

SY ’06-‘07 . pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila. PITA VS. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object.00 marked money. Belarga. Bagatsing. Musa went into the house and came back. Belarga could see what was going on. as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest. 5 OCT 1989] Facts: On December 1 and 3. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. This must be taken into account in determining probable cause. There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. 27 JAN 1993] Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville. Ani opened and inspected it. Belarga and Sgt.R. The warrantless search and seizure. as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. As Ani proceeded to the house. a buy-bust was planned. seized and Page 89 Section 1-C. 80806. From his position.00. NO. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable. agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine hydrochloride from him.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. Ramon D. 96177. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Sgt. T/Sgt. the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object. INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila. 1983. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. The next day. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. NO. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object..San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The warrantless search was valid. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Auxilliary Services Bureau. An agent of the Narcotics Command reported that the accused would be arriving on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride with him. inadmissible as evidence. Therefore. may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10. Western Police District. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with some external sign indicating that they are transporting prohibited drugs. hence.R. elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Furthermore. In the case at bar. giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). Musa was then placed under arrest. Held: Yes. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. MUSA [217 SCRA 597. Zamboanga City. G. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents. PEOPLE VS. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. the ‘plain view’ does not apply. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Three weeks earlier. G.

Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The court provides the following guidelines to be observed: 1. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure was illegal. 3. The residents also reported incidents of maulings. newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks.R. was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. probable cause exists. confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera. If in the opinion of the court. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. 6. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the RPC (Obscene publications). artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene. Any conviction is subject to appeal. G. and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. 4. and later burned. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests confiscated from dealers. publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene. 30 JAN 1990] Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. First of all. pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.M. 80508. Manila. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge. as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila. Recto Avenue. 5. tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and Page 90 Section 1-C. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623. SY ’06-‘07 . distributors. Held: The Court ruled that the government authorities have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature. spot-beatings and maltreatment. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. by way of a search warrant. magazines. pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C. they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography. 2. Among the publications seized. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed obscene. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. GUANZON VS. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. it shall issue the search warrant prayed for. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. This was affirmed by the CA. if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order. and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure. seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent.

and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. Page 91 Section 1-C.R. no search warrant was presented.Based on the facts stated by the parties. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. 13. the latter handed it out to the police. Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law: 1. 7. 5. the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. Instead of presenting its evidence. the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12. Consented warrantless search. the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. 120515. the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. 6. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. 1988. P/Lt. The next day. Customs search. 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence Seizure of evidence in "plain view. Search of a moving vehicle. Stop and Frisk. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. SY ’06-‘07 . Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event. Rule 2. PEOPLE VS. when she was later on arrested by the police. Highly regulated by the government. Also. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila. In her testimony. 4. 13 APR 1998] Facts: On Dec. NO. G. However. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”. when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was. 3." the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant. there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. in his presence. and other actions of the judge. — The officer. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court. the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. is actually committing. Section 12. may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. the person to be arrested has committed. and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. SY ’06-‘07 . — A peace officer or a private person may. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag. without a warrant. or is attempting to commit an offense. arrest a person: (a) When. The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. return and proceedings thereon. shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) When an offense has just been committed. the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above. However. RULES OF COURT Section 5. If the return has been made. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. when lawful.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. RULES OF COURT Section 2. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. RULE 113. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. b) For compelling reasons stated in the application. or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. RULE 126. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return. if the criminal action has already been filed. the result. if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority. and if none. Page 92 Section 1-C. the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. Arrest without warrant. she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime.

respondent herein. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851. to founded or groundless fear. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement." stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing. which was disallowed by the employment agency. 6. denying his leave to travel abroad. as may be provided by law.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Art 3. However. to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed. Sec. has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. freedom to transfer from one place to another. He posted bail. public safety. both trial judges denied the same. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149. “The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment. L-62100. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. or public health. 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission.R. respectively. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. for her to work as a maid. Page 93 Section 1-C. SY ’06-‘07 . NO. MANOTOC VS. owned by Julia Salazar. of Judges Camilon and Pronove.” CAUNCA VS. "motion for permission to leave the country. regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave? Held: An employment agency. which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency.L-2690. "relative to his business transactions and opportunities. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another. NO. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion. 1 JAN 1949] Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau. to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. 1982. freedom to choose one’s residence. G.

etc. Essentially. in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution. as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. the right to leave the country. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Indeed. the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. including his own.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right. public health or morals or the separate rights of others. the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country. a distinct right under international law. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. Issue: Whether or not. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. MARCOS VS. if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. They contended that Pres. 15 SEPT 1989] Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs. G. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. independent from although related to the right to travel. They further assert that under international law. Thus. right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. specifically Sections 1 and 6. their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. SY ’06-‘07 . NO. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. On the other hand. which has been ratified by the Philippines. the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668.R. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Page 94 Section 1-C. 88211. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered. Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated. However. he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security. and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. public order.

it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order.. 25 April 1980.. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. ]). Sec. 20 [2nd par. So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid. 97 SCRA 121). The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport. Vol.R. 15. 53622. with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. 138). public safety. which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. p. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court..J. 94284. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php. Apparently. 27 JAN 1993] Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. I. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. 1987 Edition. compelled to return (Constitutional Law.S. or public health" and "as may be provided by law. COURT OF APPEALS [195 SCRA 760 . They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SY ’06-‘07 . 8 APR 1991] Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court. In the instant motion she submitted before the S. G. The Sandiganbayan deferred it.C.S. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay. Isagani A. 000. No. Cruz. if abroad. 263). There is a valid restriction on the right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or. the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. Page 95 Section 1-C. SILVERIO VS.R. Article III. Joaquin G.. she argues that her right to travel is impaired. G. Bernas. Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order. NOS." a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center. First Edition. the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center. Her arraignment was set. 1987.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines. 99289-90. p.15. by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond.

Held: No. decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court. Page 96 Section 1-C. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice President Joseph E. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. Patacsil. The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of the motions.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired.A. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.) MARCOS VS. when she posted bail bond. (Manotoc v. G.R. Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center. 9 AUG 1995] Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment. NO. Gregorio B. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them. Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. 115132-34. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration. Also. The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. SANDIGANBAYAN [247 SCRA 127. and later wrote him a letter. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. contacted Dr. The presiding justice. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. SY ’06-‘07 . Garchitorena. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here. Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement. the petitioner assumed obligations. asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad. that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. C. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions.

that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days. and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. and to introduce civilized customs among them. 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province. based on her heart condition. Naujan Lake. On the third issue. and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad. pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam. NO. Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code. Further.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests In disregarding the medical reports. Wherefore. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Anastacio. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution. 14078. SY ’06-‘07 . Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao. Thus. were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao. the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. Also. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases. (3) The protection of the Manguianes. against their will. in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. 7 MAR 1919] Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. RUBI VS. In that case. in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration. and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. The Solicitor-General adds the following. Page 97 Section 1-C. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. should petitioner still desire. petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Mindoro.

Page 98 Section 1-C. Habeas corpus can.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. Therefore. therefore. petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. “Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. not issue. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. SY ’06-‘07 . No man can do exactly as he pleases.

G. for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church. instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration.” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.R. G. contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila. 5. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. or vice versa. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. being the seat of that congress. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. GARCES VS. with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church. Page 99 Section 1-C. 6. SY ’06-‘07 . without discrimination or preference.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests FREEDOM OF RELIGION Art 3. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. 45459. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510. “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion.R. Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council. system of religion. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state. Resolution No. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. Sec. etc. after a mass. providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The postage stamps. However. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day. NO. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. and said projects were implemented. as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition. b. Resolution No.” AGLIPAY VS. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters. 4052. The phrase in Act No. as a weapon to further their ends and aims. any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. Ormoc City were passed: a. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. shall forever be allowed. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. L-53487. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201. 5.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila. 13 MAR 1937] Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists. 25 MAY 1981] Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia.

subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution. there is no violation of the Constitution. a member of the Aglipayan Church. 9637. shall forever be allowed. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. The priest. Page 100 Section 1-C. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. cannot be applied to appellant. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state. as amended. Held: Section 1. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The New York Court of Appeals. SY ’06-‘07 . Held: No. Practically. Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated. in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. NO. contends that Sec. 3000. With respect to Ordinance No. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. since private funds were used. Right of the determination of custody is their right. Resolution No. freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. CITY OF MANILA [101PHIL 386. the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution. provides that: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. G. 12 appointed Brgy.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Resolution No. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. For this reason. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. 30 APR 1957] Facts: New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. as amended. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship.R. ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional. The Board of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. 2529. which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant). The priest with Andres Garces. nor tax the exercise of religious practices. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. and even if they decided to give it to the Church. for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. therefore it is their property. without discrimination or preference. including those in private schools.

Jude Chapel. is also not applicable. BARANGAN [135 SCRA 514. 1 MAR 1993] Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. Caracar. public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. Pinamungajan. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society. raised their clenched fists and shouted anti. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious worship is: 1. Secretary of Education. however inapplicable to said business. SY ’06-‘07 . DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU [219 SCRA 256 . Besides. which adjoined Malacañang.891. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St.R. the exercise must be done in good faith.government slogans. Respondents were in full control and had the capability to stop any untoward move. G. WHEREFORE. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag.P.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated. 2529 of the City of Manila. Respondent barred them for security reasons. defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5. Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for raising same issue. Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan. public morals. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The only limitation to Page 101 Section 1-C. 95770. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional. as amended. NO. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. EBRALINAG VS. As to Ordinance No. G. GERMAN VS. 68828. Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent. trade or occupation of the plaintiff.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests It seems clear.45 unduly collected from it. therefore. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. 2. of a serious evil to public safety. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. that Ordinance No. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom. NO.R. 27 MAR 1985] Facts: Petitioners converged at J. sing the national anthem and recite the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family. government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang.

represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca. CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes. then that should be followed. Jr. soldiers in active service. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail. In the case at bar. Jones. civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration CA affirmed the decision of the CFI Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws To finally dispose of the property issue. G. Therefore. persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds. Petitioner. Also. COURT OF APPEALS [96 PHIL 417. also an aspirant for said office. TELECOM [86 SCRA 413. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free education. By observing the ceremonies quietly. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop. or contractors for public works of the municipality. health and interests where State has right to prevent. Bohol. the Court.R. in sustaiing Fr. 20 NOV 1978] Facts: Fr. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. citing Watson v. Gonzaga’s right to the office. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes. that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America. the Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. 28 JAN 1955] Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI). SY ’06-‘07 .R. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes. Expulsion is ANNULLED. expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified. morals. The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and worship.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety. 34854. FONACIER VS. ruled that the Page 102 Section 1-C.368 declared that the rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. G. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. L-5917. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque." The respondent Judge. then filed a suit for quo warranto for Gonzaga’s disqualification based on the Administrative Code provision: “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics. Jr. What the petitioner’s request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. it doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. Held: Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. PAMIL VS. if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the congregation. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr.

Third. respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. First. the 1935 Constitution stated. Petitioner on the other hand argues that there was no implied repeal. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor. Issue: Whether or Not Fr. On the other hand. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. AM NO P-02-1651.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests provision had already been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. According to complainant. Held: No. “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. However. the controlling five argued: Section 2175 of the Administrative Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the Election Code. Seven others voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. there are three reasons for the said provision to be inoperative. 22 JUN 2006] Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. In the case at bar. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. said section 2175 is superseded by the Constitution. Page 103 Section 1-C. 23 of the Election Code (1971): “Appointive public office holders and active members of the Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office”. it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 . Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the said Election Code. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. so it was not controlling. Held: The court was divided. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.” Second. Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement. section 2175 has been repealed by Sec. for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. According to the dissenting seven. SY ’06-‘07 . a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. according to law. Furthermore. the minority vote overruled the seven. The provision of the Administrative Code remained operative. She has been living with Quilapio. Also. The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. a man who is not her husband. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. ESTRADA VS. Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is constitutional. section 2175 of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to freedom of religion because it did not give any requirement for a religious test. As Jefferson put it. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [405 SCRA 497. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office.GR 153888. respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. for a fee. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Under the EO. only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars. petitioner began to issue. Held: It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations. entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. Petitioner alleges that. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Thus. Also. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development. In that same year.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. SY ’06-‘07 . a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion. Thus. inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. properly labeled and safe. it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications. of their religious right to classify a product as halal. petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food. 9 JUL 2003] Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines. Without doubt. EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest. In the case at bar. Inc. especially to Muslim communities. a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations. Unlike EO 46. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal. certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. like herein petitioner. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption. even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. provided it does not offend compelling state interests. On 2001. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. According to petitioner. Page 104 Section 1-C. Issue: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Sec.” Art 3. whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free Page 105 Section 1-C. Hence the appeal. including those employed in the public and private sectors. is that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal. he was charged with gross neglect of duty. One member of the grand jury was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. and papers pertaining to official acts. who. or decisions. Now defendants challenged the Minnesota statute which provides for the abatement. “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. 8. these officers are not left to their ordinary remedy in a suit for libel.” Art 3. and that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing their duties. illicit relations with gangsters. scandalous and defamatory news paper. and that they were chiefly devoted to charges against public officers and in relation to the prevalence and protection of crime. or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. magazine or other periodical. The mayor was accused of inefficiency and dereliction. Sec. the proof was that nine editions of the newspaper or periodical in question were published on successive dates. 18. associations. 1927. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained. transactions. as a public nuisance. but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse. of a malicious. MINNESOTA [283 US 697] Facts: A complaint alleged that the defendants.' In the present instance. 7. and. one of the original defendants.' Public officers. “(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. and racketeering in Minneapolis. Sec. A special grand jury and a special prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in general. The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which tends to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of crime is unavailing. in substance. bootlegging. mischievous or illegal.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Art 3. and with participation in graft. 4. is to destroy the freedom of the press. Held: Yes. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. as the state court has said. The county attorney was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take adequate measures to remedy them. provides that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling. to form unions. 1927. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical. to investigate an attempt to assassinate one Guilford.” NEAR VS. Issue: Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein constitutes an infringement of the freedom of the press. and to documents. Most of the charges were directed against the chief of police. published and circulated editions of “The Saturday Press”(published in Minneapolis) which were 'largely devoted to malicious. it appears from the articles. The reason for the enactment.” Art 3. shall be afforded the citizen. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. but if he publishes what is improper. to forbid this. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development. on September 24. of expression. or the authorities to a prosecution for criminal libel. The District Court ruled against defendants. scandalous and defamatory articles'(based on Session Laws of Minnesota). but to put the publisher under an effective censorship. and on eight subsequent dates in October and November. Access to official records. “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. The articles charged. SY ’06-‘07 . or of the press. Sec. In such a case. in particular. “The right of the people. was shot by gangsters after the first issue of the periodical had been published. he must take the consequence of his own temerity.

This is plain enough when we consider that. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. Freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character. GROSJEAN VS. on proof of truth. as this court has said. if it were increased to a high degree. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.S.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests discussion in the press. AMERICAN PRESS CO. The Government argues that "the authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-inChief." Said articles reveal the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war. UNITED STATES [403 US 713] Facts: The court granted certiorari in the cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U. In such case the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication. The Act operates as a restraint in a double sense. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. The court ruled in favor of the newspaper companies hence the appeal. Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied: The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely. Held: Yes. NEW YORK TIMES VS. The suit assailed Act No. 231 of the Louisiana Legislature. does not depend. The preliminary freedom. Page 106 Section 1-C. and the business as a nuisance. second. by virtue of the very reason for its existence. its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. [297 US 233] Facts: The nine publishers(corporations) who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers and these thirteen publications are the only ones within the state of Louisiana having each a circulation of more than 20. First. The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint.000 copies per week. The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers. find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment. and. SY ’06-‘07 . Characterizing the publication as a business. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the advertisements are carried. Issue: Whether or Not Act 23 unconstitutional. as their freedom of the press was abridged in contravention to the due process clause. and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals. Nor can it be said that the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges are made of derelictions which constitute crimes. safeguarded by the due process of law clause. its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising. as it could be if valid it well might result in destroying both advertising and circulation. but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well. it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. It is bad because.

is a private individual. injunctions. Law Center and the U. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. petitioner Gonzales. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae. on the other hand. a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press. violence. The Philippine Bar Association. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. or prior restraints. The language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news. being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning. Held: Yes. at the time of the filing the petition. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. 1967.P. whether for national or local officials. in the absence of clear and present danger to the state. To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment (Bill of Rights) and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make "secure. the U. L-27833. then such words are punishable. G. excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. or unlawfulness. freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. violence. the Civil Liberties Union. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent. Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional. means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. or unlawfulness be advocated. More precisely. Held: Yes. GONZALES VS.R. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. whatever the source. The first. As held in Cabansag v. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. 1967. and elucidated that Act No. would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. without censorship. of assembly and of association. 18 APR 1969] Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. the basic liberties of free speech and free press. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. SY ’06-‘07 ." No branch of government could abridge the people's rights granted by the Constitution including the freedom of the press. there being the substantive evil of elections. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835. prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power. Senator Lorenzo M.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force. It is Page 107 Section 1-C. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Issue: Whether or not the freedom of the press was abridged.P. Petitioner Cabigao was.

115. CA however reversed it hence this petition. especially the fanatics. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Sr. 119673. This is true in this case. Held: Yes. respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. announcements or commentaries. 121 and 128. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. If it fails to discharge this burden. As in the case of freedom of expression. however. 119. Amante. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. addressed for Henrietta S. it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. SY ’06-‘07 . The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529. its act of censorship will be struck down. republican in form. unclean they may be. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers. it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. In their Answer. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. the Page 108 Section 1-C. except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. 116. Under our constitutional scheme." On November 28. this right is not to be limited. implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.. or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. G. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms. 26 JUL 1996] Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. 1992. 119. dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. As the author Tañada clearly explained. The very idea of a government.R. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. The prohibition of any speeches. doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. NO. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. much less denied. such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship. 121 and 128. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion.

Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Page 109 Section 1-C. NO. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. Prior restraint on speech. another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.R. the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio. Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. and orderly elections. by displaying it on his car. In consequence of this prohibition. In addition. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification. place or manner of speech. honest. COMELEC [207 SCRA 712. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. he. Section 1.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. the expression becomes a statement by the owner. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle. should lean in favor of freedom. 103956. exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property. The socalled balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and. its impact cannot be measured. to convince others to agree with him. even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. including religious speech. Issue: Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application. Allegedly. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time. primarily his own and not of anybody else. ADIONG VS. G. local officials and COMELEC. which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. the police. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections. a senatorial candidate in the May 11. and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. public or private. SY ’06-‘07 . Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. television and print political advertisements. unless the speech is first allowed. if it cuts off the flow of media reporting. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. 31 MAR 1992] Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. prohibiting posting in "mobile" places. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas. 1992 elections now assails the Resolution.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. G. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion." In our own society. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates. Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates. and programs and so forth. or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 5 MAR 1992] Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. US VS. opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. their qualifications. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. Further. political parties and programs of government. in responsible media.e. is clearly an important value. is not paid for by candidates for political office. so long at least as such comments. because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions. L-12592. their qualifications. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. "during the election period. Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal. and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts. function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections. 6646 constitutional.R. Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.. and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. NO. petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates. freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i. SY ’06-‘07 . Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship. Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. 1026653. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role. equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period.R. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1. 731. Held: Yes. In sum. 8 MAR 1918] Page 110 Section 1-C. only publications of a particular content. Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that. G. media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II. Moreover. namely.

Recto Avenue. they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. of course. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. 1983. to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. Page 111 Section 1-C. Pampanga. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Ramon D. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362. therefore. NO. In no way did they abuse the privilege. newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks. Now. without fear of penalty. and libelous against him. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien. Auxilliary Services Bureau. 5 OCT 1989] Facts: On December 1 and 3. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila.80806.R. the welfare of society. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. distributors. elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group. G. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. assume responsibility for the charges made. justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol. with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. seized and confiscated from dealers. defamatory. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. charging Roman Punsalan. INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila. Privilege destroys that presumption. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Held: Yes. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Good faith surrounded their action. Bagatsing. in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. scandalous. publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene. PITA VS.M. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply. numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled. malicious. was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Public policy.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Facts: In the latter part of 1915. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. Western Police District. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer. public opinion will be effectively suppressed. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. and later burned. Among the publications seized. The persons assembling and petitioning must. magazines. Manila. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace. Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. SY ’06-‘07 . and five individuals signed affidavits. a fit subject for proper comment. pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.

2. the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene. artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. presented in a "docu-drama" style. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. Ayer Productions. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release. envisioned. creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events. reproduction and/or exhibition of his name. Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play. is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent. or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. appropriation. a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila. However. the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. G. and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure. publishers and sellers of obscene publications. This was affirmed by the CA. film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. sometime in 1987.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera. L-82380. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which Page 112 Section 1-C. by way of a search warrant. that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. 1. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure. and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. 29 APR 1988] Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker. and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script. However. if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO.R. It is easier said than done to say. NO. and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. and his movie production company. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. or picture. SY ’06-‘07 ." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all. as indeed we have laws punishing the author. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script. they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography. pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.

However a correction was published immediately. 1956. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror. Unfortunately. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle but when the news quiz format was prepared. may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. Fidel Cruz. clearly of public concern. Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost. Hence the appeal. Held: Yes. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz’ story turned out to be false it brought attention to the government that people in that most people in the area are sick sick. sanitary inspector. Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle. a man named Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. SANDIGANBAYAN [34 SCRA 116. The court ruled in his favor. food and clothing being scarce. L-26549. the pictures that were published were that of private respondent Fidel G. to some extent at least. among other things." the report of respondent. 1956.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests nevertheless is based on. there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy. Issue: Page 113 Section 1-C. then edited by Gatbonton. SY ’06-‘07 . Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit. the two photographs were in advertently switched. their right to privacy. The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands. as well as on other dailies. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers. Losing no time. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15. instead of the alleged killers. only two individuals able to read and write. no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Upon arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found. Cruz. Defense interposed that they are beating the deadline. In view of this finding. that petitioners propose to film were taking place. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz. a businessman contractor from Santa Maria. a two-way radio set. At all relevant times. There was. of which petitioner Lopez was the publisher. Hence the appeal. Bulacan. due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. 31 JUL 1970] Facts: In the early part of January. Major Encarnacion branded as a "hoax. during which the momentous events. Respondent sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. LOPEZ VS. An American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing. in other words. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
Whether or Not petitioners abused the freedom of the press. Held: No. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, since the error in this case could have been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine and not a daily. The ruling: "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news item under consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. “No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys.” PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948] Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1 Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated. Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in

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destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [170 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 79690-707; 1 FEB 1989] Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers. Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges." Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression. Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society. REYES VS. BAGATSING [125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983] Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the

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exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves. Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated. Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial. BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA [488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006] Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

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and that no law. KMU. they argue that it is preemptive. Held: No question as to standing. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal.P.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests They argue that B. Second. No. aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation..P. FERNANDO VS. No.. Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional. B. is directly affected by B. Petitioners Jess del Prado. NO 159751. the limits provided are unreasonable: First. subject to the giving of advance notices. No. argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right.R. that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. likewise. no prior restraint. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies. place and manner of holding public assemblies. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. No. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Thus. the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights. in turn. this was declared null and void. no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. as guaranteed by the Constitution. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments.P. place and manner of the assemblies. No.P.P. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. ESTORNINOS [G. Furthermore. allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. According to Atienza RA. otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. 6 DEC 2006] Facts: Page 117 Section 1-C. There is. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit.P.P.As to the CPR policy. 880. Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Regarding the CPR policy. otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. It is content-neutral regulation of the time. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. SY ’06-‘07 . it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes. argue that B. No. 880. and that B. are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision. et al. 880.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time. et al. No. No. it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. ordinance or executive order supports the policy. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade.P. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.M. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures. there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. NO. they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. Then on September 9. Playhouse. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. QUI). They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS). their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state. Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTC’s decision.M. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education. no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. SY ’06-‘07 . They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A. Held: No. on August 27. Penthouse. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. 1982. officers of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region conducted police surveillance on the store Gaudencio E.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials. Held: Yes. 1982. they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. Petitioners were charged and convicted. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. Hence this petition. 21 MAY 1984] Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. MALABANAN VS. immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation. b. has a right to present. (Kottinger Rule Applied)." The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Gallery. As a corollary. Swank. the State in pursuing its mandate to protect the public from obscene. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is “Kahit sa Pangarap Lang” with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different magazines(Dalaga. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair) in Quiapo. along with other students. CA affirmed the decision hence this appeal. Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures. Culture.62270. Necessarily. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate. The same day. c. It was outside the area covered by their permit. and Sports. to 12:00 P. and Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows. the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards Page 118 Section 1-C. G. the place indicated in such permit. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. Erotic. Pursuant to such permit. A Search Warrant for violation of Article 201 of RPC against petitioner and a certain Warren Tingchuy and the seizure of the following items: a. which they deemed pornographic. Rave.R. d. "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. 17 APR 1990] Facts: In Oct. which was also applied in the case. justice and Page 119 Section 1-C. Issue: Whether or Not Tulfo is in contempt. in Daet. but the trial court dismissed the petition. however. If the assembly is to be held in school premises. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. 90-4-1545-0. there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the nonacademic personnel. Inc. whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. therefore. the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court. which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. signed. NON VS. where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. Even if. Held: Yes. The power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. In granting such permit. and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. Lastly. 13. and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise. 20 MAY 1990] Facts: Petitioners. SY ’06-‘07 . Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school.R.M. and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys. place. 1989. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student. NO. the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon. made clear in the pleadings. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. 16. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted. permit must be sought from its school authorities. At the time Tulfo wrote the article. DAMES [185 SCRA 523. and since the case had been decided and terminated. and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA. Issue: Whether or Not the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed. PSBA1. by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent. NO. Camarines Norte. there was not contempts. IN RE: TULFO [A. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassment in the checkpoints. However there are limitations. 1989. Students. Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints. however. Contempt of court is defiance of the authority. The subject of the protests is not. the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. students in private respondent Mabini Colleges. however. who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Held: Yes. 89317. and again on Oct. Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. in class or out of it. there be violations of its terms. which for any reason whether it stems from time. G.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests displayed or utterances made.

Quoting is not an excuse also. for a violation of Republic Act No. Tulfo's article constituted both. 1969.M. watch out!" Also. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting.. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. he said he was not sorry for having written the articles. 1969. and take up the cudgels for. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case. SY ’06-‘07 . Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. As above intimated. on March 4. the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig. 1969. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon. but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule. PBM [51 SCRA 189. therefore. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. G. in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting.R. of peaceful assembly Page 120 Section 1-C. Tulfo said. hence this appeal. Nothing constructive can be gained from them. so that they can report to work free from harassment. NO. L-31195.. would be amounting to an illegal strike. Held: Yes. vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests dignity of the courts. informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. because at the end of his article. C. the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company. Inc. thru Atty. Company personnel manager. 875(Industrial Peace Act). de Leon. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. particularly . As heretofore stated. was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. to 2 P. 5 JUN 1993] Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co. and petitioners. who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed. they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4. filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift. b. PBM EMPLOYEES VS. is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith. harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used. and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout. its employees. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.S. the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused. the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of. utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. There are two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt: a. because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion. "So you bobo justices. Petitioners claim that on March 1. This is not present in the case. It brings disrepute to the court. The Management.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. not against the employer. Moreover. as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees. stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement. of peaceful assembly and of petition. then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. The more the participants. Page 121 Section 1-C. To regard the demonstration against police officers. is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression. SY ’06-‘07 .

On March 4. ORTIGAS VS. a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. To secure the payment of said balance of P4. 25 and 32. However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice. declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive. (a) of strong materials and properly painted. SY ’06-‘07 . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally. 10. Sec. but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos.800. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes. 2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be. Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Art 3. as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due.600 of which P4. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68. NO. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that: 1. 1952. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature.L-3708. payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. developing and selling lots to the public. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law.400 on or before August 27. 18 MAY 1953] Facts: On August 20. with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. plaintiff. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price. and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. and the balance was made payable as follows: P2. 1943. and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law). stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller. NO. the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9.400 on or before August 7. entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision.” RUTTER VS. as vendor. having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war. and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles. 1962. particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. as vendees. fairness and righteousness. The complaint was dismissed. or directly or indirectly. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer. Held: Yes.L-24670. the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon. A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342. and P2. (b) provided with Page 122 Section 1-C. On July 19. 1942.800 were paid outright. the interest due and the attorney's fees. FEATI BANK [94 SCRA 533. Its essence is the application of police power. and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil. 14 DEC 1979] Facts: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business.

Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. as the statute is unconstitutional. Checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. NO. a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area.L-63419. Whether or not BP 22 transgresses the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. hence the appeal. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. under pain of penal sanctions. EDSA. noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health. Held: No. and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. in this modem day and age. It is a commercial instrument which. safety or welfare of the residents in its route. which was later dismissed. The thrust of the law is to prohibit.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank. LOZANO VS. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of EDSA. safety. Held: The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. which forced him to file a case. However. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. SY ’06-‘07 . Motion for recon was denied. peace. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The Solicitor General. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Health. Issue: Whether or Not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. upholding police power. Page 123 Section 1-C. has become a convenient substitute for money. Issue: Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. good order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity. Such motion was denied by the RTC. Plaintiff demand to stop it. It should be stressed. with same restrictions. that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed. since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. contending that no offense was committed. the rule is not absolute. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 18 DEC 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made.

dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.” PEOPLE VS. Sec.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. Thus. instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. the following requisites must be present: 1. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law. 2. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. 27 DEC 1972] Facts: Hon. assembly and association. “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. SY ’06-‘07 . It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men. Page 124 Section 1-C. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. and Fraud. Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. 3.) In the case at bar. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought.) The statute specifies persons. to be UNLAWFUL.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Why is membership punished.L-32613-14. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. 2.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests EX POST FACTO LAWS Art 3. subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. for being members/leaders of the NPA. subversion and other illegal means.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers. Craft.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2. inciting. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. and for other purposes. groups. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein. not only by force and violence but also by deceit. Furthermore. Membership to this organizations. The trial court is of opinion that 1. it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. FERRER [48 SCRA 382. the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. NOS. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. 22.

with some other employees from the said ministry. which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. 23 MAR 1984] Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. the following elements must also be established: 1. On Mach 16. In fact. it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. 2. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. BAYOT VS. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion. if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act.L-61861. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law. NO. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other coaccused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. 1987. careful investigations by the Congress were done. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195. Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.L-61776 TO NO. In case of CPP. SY ’06-‘07 . SANDIGANBAYAN [128 SCRA 383. is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended Page 125 Section 1-C.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980.

Now the motion to quash was being assailed. period of prescription was 10 years. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. 3326. NO. Issue: Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted. 3 JUL 1992] Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28. shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. 1986.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests from office. which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco.1986 and December 9. PEOPLE VS. as it is prejudicial to the accused. 29 of Act No. 1976. SANDIGANBAYAN [211 SCRA 241. 101724. G. Page 126 Section 1-C. amending Sec. SY ’06-‘07 . 1982. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable lands.R. a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza. 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Said motion was granted. On August 10. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes. Held: Yes. BP 195 which was approved on March 16. being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. Additionally. Agusan del Sur. The crime was committed on January 21. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes. wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur. thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free patent. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. RA 3019.

” SERAFIN VS.) Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt? Held: Yes. commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. Complainant admitted complaint. However. NO. 18 DEC 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made. not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness. Page 127 Section 1-C. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. 30 SEPT 1975] Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza. hence. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise.L-63419. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. Sec. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as. his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property. LINDAYAG [67 SCRA 166. the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. they could get her valuable things at her home. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged. but an offense against public order. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. under pain of penal sanctions. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. since elements of estafa are not present. “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. 297-MJ. contending that no offense was committed. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. LOZANO VS. it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. 20. then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation." respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly. The thrust of the law is to prohibit. SY ’06-‘07 . ADM. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The Solicitor General. NO. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323. Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. MATTER. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT Art 3. Under the Constitution she is protected.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Page 128 Section 1-C. SY ’06-‘07 .

However. SY ’06-‘07 . owned by Julia Salazar. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE Art 3. “(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. to founded or groundless fear. for her to work as a maid. freedom to transfer from one place to another. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement.” CAUNCA VS. which was disallowed by the employment agency. the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. 18. NO. respondent herein. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave? Held: An employment agency. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion. has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid. which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another. 1 JAN 1949] Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency. freedom to choose one’s residence. Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence.L-2690. Sec. to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed. Page 129 Section 1-C.

889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. because of said plan. 11 Dec 1971] Facts: In the evening of August 21. Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No.. two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Art 3. Sec. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations. (d) that the President's alleged apprehension. for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8. inserting the word “actually staging”. L-33964. Page 130 Section 1-C. 1971. A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto.m. 889-A. however it became moot and academic since it was amended. 1971." and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors. 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police. has actually taken place after August 21. is nonexistent and unjustified. Proc. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces. Issue: Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations. Proc. and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. SY ’06-‘07 . insurrection. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces. while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda. 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Of the two other alternatives. (c) that no untoward incident. the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. Incidentally. Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. 889-A was issued as an amendment. and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. proved inadequate. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant. called out the armed forces. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority. or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof. at about 9 p. “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability. Manila. 15. as were the courts. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448.” LANSANG VS. (b) that. He had. Proc. (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege. already. Proc. confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. the Government was functioning normally. 1971.

to have a speedy. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. impartial. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense.” Art 3. “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” Art 3. Sec. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. “(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed.” Art 3. violence. he Page 131 Section 1-C. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance. “(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. CRUZ [162 SCRA 642. The court denied said motion. or administrative bodies.” Art 3. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. hence the petition. Held: No. Sec. SY ’06-‘07 . 27 JUN 1988] Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time. he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery. and public trial. 21. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. Neither shall death penalty be imposed. psychological. intimidation. 16. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Sec. 17. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. and their families. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED Art 3. for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.” Art 3. “Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest. incommunicado. thereafter he was charged. Secret detention places. Hearing was set. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated. unless. after arraignment.” Art 3. he must be provided with one. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. nor cruel.” GAMBOA VS. However.L-56291. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. solitary. or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. “(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Sec. Sec. quasi-judicial. threat. (2) In all criminal prosecutions. the Congress hereafter provides for it. 12. to meet the witnesses face to face. Sec. petitioner was not yet entitled. (2) The employment of physical. (2) No torture. “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. force. 11. without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up. hence. Sec. 14. to counsel. at such stage. conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. from said suspect. 19. “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

The findings of the Audit team were given to him. NO. petitioner was not. criminal. MAQUEDA [242 SCRA 565. and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. threat. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena. deprived of this substantive and constitutional right. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts.112983. Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. G. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. or administrative proceeding. violence. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. 22 MAR 1994] Facts: shall be used against him.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests should then and there be assisted by counsel. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. It cannot be claimed at any other time. to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial. NO. Held: No. 85215. unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged. no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.R. PEOPLE VS. This is accorded to every person who gives evidence. Hence this appeal. is actually put to the witness. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. G. incriminatory in character. whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena. only that he chose not to. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused. On the right to due process. to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. 7 JUL 1989] Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived. as he was duly represented by a counsel. in any civil. 2) nor force. or any other means which vitiates the free will 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. assigned at its Baguio City station.000.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. SY ’06-‘07 . A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76." the right can be claimed only when the specific question. in any way.not present in case at bar).R. Page 132 Section 1-C. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216. PEOPLE VS. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. and to be informed of such right. or to refuse to testify altogether. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. intimidation. unless he waives the right. Ramos pleaded not guilty.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba. when the two accused asked them for directions. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. They ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. Garay was killed. Negros Oriental. such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence. Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. 27 MAY 1994] Facts: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay." Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa. Appellant was convicted. he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. And yet. Second. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case. PEOPLE VS. the accused was already facing charges in court. Page 133 Section 1-C. and as to the other admission (Salvosa). Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation. Held: No. — The act. Atty. While he was under detention. despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court. but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness. security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty." Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore. NO. he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. or of any offense necessarily included therein. According to SPO3 Molleno. is untenable. including accused. 89223. Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan. He was taken to Calauag. the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. may be given in evidence against him. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged. Benguet while his Filipino wife. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail.R. Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC: Admission of a party. Garay. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already. SY ’06-‘07 . Quezon. At the time of the confession. Accused-appellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. First. BANDULA [232 SCRA 566. it was given to a private person therefore admissible. he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Confession. it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case. he still confessed when he did not have to do so. counsel of plantation. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. Salva and Pastrano. The armed men were identified by Security Guard. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense. G. Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.

by the nature of his position. It was already signed by Lucero. Reason for Accused Sedigo’s "black eye" which even Pat. LUCERO [244 SCRA 425. PEOPLE VS. The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero. and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer. On top of this. armed with handgun. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. Issue: Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him. Pag-asa. 29 MAY 1995] Facts: Alejandro Lucero. as well as Bandula’s fractured rib. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. Peralta. hence. He observed no reaction from Lucero. public or private prosecutor. one solid gold bracelet. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest. was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He cannot be a special counsel. NO. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. 12. III. MADRID. Certainly. one 3 karat gold ring. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Consequently. without the extrajudicial confessions. Counsel must be independent. Ruben Zerna. If at all. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City. these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. belonging to DR. Art. a driver of the said offended party. counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. They chased him. in due time. or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. counsel of the police. thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds. QC. one 2 karat gold ring. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance. preferably of their own choice. 2. even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them. rob and carry away cash money. domino style. Bienvenido Echavez. DEMETRIO Z. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions. one gold Rolex watch. Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Irregularities present include: 1. the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. all worth P363.97936. The prosecution: Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car). 7 karat. appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities.600. Mindanao Avenue. Atty. Atty. Atty. Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14. handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a Page 134 Section 1-C.00. which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA. inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation. Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Now. Held: No. Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. G. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA. And. the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. Peralta's house. one gold necklace with cross pendant. Baldejera admitted is not established. counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao. and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who. they had no counsel present. Peter Doe. The next morning. SY ’06-‘07 . 3. Balbino Echavez. Nonetheless.R.

SY ’06-‘07 ." During the investigation. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. and a certain "Jimmy. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation. The man approached the Brasilia. He denied engaging the services of Atty. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. The next day.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests jeep. Constitution requires the right to counsel. Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He claimed that he was tortured. Cajucom. it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. AGUSTIN [240 SCRA 541. Anthony. He said he only met Dr. Agustin was apprehended. with the assistance of Atty. Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. Jr. convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano. G.R. He likewise confirmed that Atty. NO. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. Danny went home and was then brought to the Hospital for treatment. Lucero denied knowing Dr. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at Page 135 Section 1-C. 25 JAN 1995] Facts: Dr. together with his son. Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. aimed his armalite rifle through its window. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. Later. Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed. 110290. Reynaldo Cajucom.. a dentist. Madrid. who provided the armalite. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away. The men turned out to be police officers. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The records show that Atty. Baguio City. Anna Theresa. she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Whereof. PEOPLE VS. however. Atty. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Accused Quiaño. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Peralta. The following day. his daughter. it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. who engaged him to kill Dr. Peralta. and fired at the passengers. and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Cartel. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed. Bayquen for a fee. Bayquen. More so. The trial court. Peralta. Anthony's girlfriend. an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities. and Danny. After trial. were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street. who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. He implicated Abenoja. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible. Dominic. a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. he learned he was in Camp Crame. a family friend.

if he could not. In short. NOS. waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. 24 NOV 1994] Facts: Prosecution’s version: On Aug 18. asked for his uncle Atty. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant. 91011-12. Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor). other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In a confession. 3 JUL 1992] Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply. Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. Yet. G. Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Balagtas Bulacan. while an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262. however expressly includes admissions.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests gunpoint in the Kennon Road. appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III. one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano escaped. not just confessions. there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused. NO. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao. Firstly. contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Eduardo Macam. PEOPLE VS. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano. 3. PEOPLE VS. in fact. MACAM [238 SCRA 306. Antonio Cedro. The appellant. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer. He had. 101808. he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. more particularly par. 1 and par.R. the City fiscal. who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade. Held: No. after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel. The rule on inadmissibility. he nevertheless. G. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records.. and that Atty. whether he could afford to hire his services.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant.1987. therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1). Cajucom was ready to assist him. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. since conspiracy was established.R. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. RTC convicted him hence the appeal. if so. immediately informed him that Atty. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted. Oliver Tabin. They boarded accused along with Magtibay. Eugenio Cawilan Jr. to read or decipher its contents. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Page 136 Section 1-C. SY ’06-‘07 . Moreso said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor. whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. According to Pat. Article III of the Constitution. no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. deceased was with two companions on the previous night. the dialect he understands. However the RTC convicted him. specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and. Held: Yes. and. through suggestive language. Hence the appeal. The appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice.

Upon arriving. together with his brother. while remaining outside the house served as a looked out. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q. betamax rewinder. On the following day. The court believed the version of the prosecution. WON the arrest was valid. he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. Things taken: 2 toygun. betamax tapes. TV. Cawilan and D. he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. They were also forced to admit certain things. Also. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy.C. he together with all the accused. airgun riffle. A. he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. they are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.22 gun and money. Roque remained in the tricycle." at Sitio Angol. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua. with caliber . Cedro. DY [158 SCRA 111. maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case. assorted jewelry. Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up.00. HOWEVER.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Ferma Road QC. G. Benito invited the former to have lunch. Instead of paying him. After which. E. the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam).R. decision of lower court is Affirmed. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible. CO2 refiller.38 as suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar. CAS-997. 74517. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. After all the accused had taken their lunch. chessboard. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. 700. in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation. TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. Cedro. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up. PEOPLE VS. SY ’06-‘07 . typewriter. A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which Page 137 Section 1-C. Wherefore. 23 FEB 1988] Facts: Pat. Roque entered the house while E. The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Upon the arrival of the accused. The total value of the items taken was P536. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. Samsonite attache case. Manoc-Manoc Malay. Defense’s version: Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a fee of P50. HOWEVER. Ernesto Roque. Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. Benito. children. they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50. Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial.00. accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. .

24 years old and a Swiss nationale. 97214. preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees. and remittance of collections exceeding P500. Aklan. His duties included the collection of tuition fees. but given in ordinary manner. SANDIGANBAYAN [234 SCRA 177. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga. which school is also located at del Carmen. He was found guilty in the RTC. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case. he pleaded not guilty. Navallo was finally arrested. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. but accused-petitioner could not be found. Hence the appeal. it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: Page 138 Section 1-C. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Held: No. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. NAVALLO VS. Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. if it were so. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint. SY ’06-‘07 . He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat.00 to the National Treasury. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for. Accused posted bail which was granted. Presidential Decree No. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. On 15 November 1984. NO. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter. Surigao del Norte. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.R. on 10 December 1978. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. G. tourist. Upon motion of the prosecution. 18 JUL 1994] Facts: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School. Special Prosecutor Luz L.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe. Held: YES." What was told by the Accused to Pat. the same would be inadmissible in evidence. Navallo filed a motion to quash. An information for malversation of public funds was filed. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985. A warrant of arrest was issued.

The court must be sure. There could be no presumption. a pair of gold earrings. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested. as ordered by Espino. the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. Further. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case. NO.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. In any case. a minor. the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. 2 DEC 1995] Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla. Khazie Mae's green slippers. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. 117487. When life is at stake. a buri mat. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116. four years of age. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law.R. whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation. SY ’06-‘07 . PEOPLE VS. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Appellant pleaded guilty. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. A neighbor. neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. how and where he was interrogated. ALICANDO [251 SCRA 293. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped. Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations. there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. who arrested him. No. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper. choking her with his right hand. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. Held: No. Page 139 Section 1-C. Moreover. The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. etc. G.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. The RTC convicted him. (3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge.

This was denied. Lorna. (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. In the case at bar. At such point or stage. Then the gunmen hijacked another jeep and took off. son. that is. Furthermore. WHEREFORE. Major Antonio Carteciano was driving his private jeep Camp General Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug. gunshots were heard from the left side of the street. When the jeep stopped. Therefore. and skull. Jose Bantug. The other 8 accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. 5 JUN 1991] Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2. and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. and at the backseat are his mother in law. the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased to P50. Issue: Whether or not the accused Nuñez’s constitutional right was violated Held: No. Nuñez demanded Lorna to give Nuñez her husband’s pistol. find that the conviction of accused-appellant for the crimes charged has been established beyond reasonable doubt and the penalty imposed is in accordance with law. In the front seat with him is his wife Lorna.000. However. and her son Reiser Carteciano positively identified the accused. (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. and Major Carteciano. and the frustrated murder of Lorna V. neighbor Bantug. Then. therefore. Near the intersection. NOS. his brother Francisco. We. Lorna identified Nuñez as the one who shot her husband. NO. The facts shown by evidence are: One morning. Carteciano. so he cannot question the credibility of the witnesses.79269. several gunmen approached them. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130.45 cal pistol and fired. G. However. The victim Jose Bantug was found with gunshots in the head. DE GUZMAN [224 SCRA 93. while Victor Nuñez was found guilty. her mother Juanita Ricaplaza. accused-appellant is still convicted of the four charges against him. brother Francisco. the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. body. and he should not be convicted with the charges filed. Cebu City where he was stationed as medical officer of the PC/INP Provincial Command. to the heirs of each victim who died is hereby increased to P50.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests PEOPLE VS. Accused-appellant also argued that since his coaccused were acquitted. Nuñez pleaded not guilty at the arraignment. the Court held that conspiracy was still proven by the evidence.R. he is estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest. and his wife Lorna were hit. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. when accused was subjected to a paraffin test. Nuñez shot Major Carteciano’s head point blank. with costs against accusedappellant PEOPLE VS. SY ’06-‘07 . the Supreme Court held that-. Nuñez claimed that his arrest was illegal and that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel.000 in conformity with our recent rulings on the matter. The witnesses also positively identified the accused. the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation. G. May 9. The other three informations charged them with the murder of Francisco Carteciano y Sorilla and Antonio S. and the other co-accused were acquitted only because there was reasonable doubt. Major Carteciano took his . then their acquittal negates conspiracy among them. Lorna asked to take her valuables instead. 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Carteciano. and Bantug’s son. Jr. 30 JUN 1993] Facts: All the accused were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu with three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in four Informations. Regarding his right to counsel. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. he was not then under custodial investigation. 98321-24. Therefore. However. gunshots were fired in succession. the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects.R. except for the modification that the civil indemnity to be paid by accusedappellant Victor Nuñez. 1987 Page 140 Section 1-C.the right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation.

Cesar Diego who acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Respondent filed a petition for bail. Nos. Ergo.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. G." turned out to be also a false address. Held: Yes. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false. Judge Donato now granted the bail. NO. that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other accused and Page 141 Section 1-C. is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. This was granted. Pat. with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. P. Escaño filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family and counsel could have easy access to him. or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. SY ’06-‘07 . It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense. The address he gave "Panamitan.000.D. morals. or good customs. Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. stating therein that accused was still under investigation. (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. public policy. MAGLALANG [196 SCRA 41. among others. 135 of RPC. This however was denied. 1996. 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No.000. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 . whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately. 19 APR 1991] Facts: On January 8. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity. there was a waiver. the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of arrest against Escaño recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990. 6. 3. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. which was fixed at P30. providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion. Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody. 187 repealing. It was contended that: 1. Republic Act No. Said petition for HC was dismissed. therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. CARPIO VS. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. 5. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court. Through counsel Rolando T. Hence the appeal. 942 and 1834 amending ART. Kawit. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996. a reward of P250. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). 4. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested.R. public order. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical custody of Escaño for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the objects of a manhunt by NBI agents. Four days later. information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan was filed against Escaño and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC of Bataan at Balanga. Cavite. 78162. 1987.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Cainoy.

in the exercise of said discretion. and that the NBI would produce the person of Escaño before the court whenever required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. and that during the custodial investigation. in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to bail. and that during the custodial investigation. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take into account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escaño PEOPLE VS. 1986 when the 1973 Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made on March 5. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. also without a warrant. the court should have proceeded accordingly: i. Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua. that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons. The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2. the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the order granting bail to Escaño. In the case at bar the RTC erred in not summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail. alleging that he did not authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. and third. thereafter. Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons. Article III of the Constitution. In opposing said application. the prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and. resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13. 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death penalty. Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escaño was arrested by NBI agents on December 7. Otherwise. Held: No. FORTES [223 SCRA 619. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused. 90643. SY ’06-‘07 . be bailable by sufficient sureties. the court should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying bail is based. the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of. Also. the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes. 1987 that "capital punishment" in Section 4. but also because Escaño jumped bail and did not appear on the date set for his arraignment. The facts. Issue: Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper. second. The court granted the application for bail fixing the same at P30.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's Army. are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all accused. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the court is controlled by the following: first." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. Section 13.R. and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escaño. the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. 25 JUN 1993] Facts: Page 142 Section 1-C. should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with the Constitution and procedural rules. Notwithstanding. that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20. he was represented by counsel.000. having found no sufficient evidence against accused. he was not represented by counsel. in the judicial determination of the availability of said right. G. the order is defective and voidable. shall before conviction. All it had to do was to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong in the light of the provision of Section 13. it was for the best interest of Escaño that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where security measures were adequate. the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies. searched his house when he was arrested. NO. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his actions and so as not to be considered in contempt. by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. Thus. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been released from NBI custody. that said agents. It did not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative enactment restoring it in justifying the grant of bail. However. when evidence of guilt is strong.. Escaño's counsel Rolando T. 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been detained in the lock-up cell of the NBI. by the rules which this Court may promulgate. However another motion was executed by Escaño stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI. however. that the reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence. Article III.e. 25 crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty.

No. Now. 95020. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. as amended. to submit their counter-affidavits.R. 93177.R.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court. A motion for dismissal was denied. The petition was referred to RTC. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. the trial court ordered their release. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty. The private respondents in G. * The Regional Page 143 Section 1-C. Nos. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional release. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. their motion for reconsideration. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3.R. 1990. bail also becomes a matter of right.R. 1989. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence. On that date. Alleging denial of due process. COMMENDADOR VS. G. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9. but the application was denied by GCM No. to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation. Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Following this. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80. It is clear from Section 13. that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. However he was not released immediately. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. accompanied his 13-year old daughter. the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. Province of Sorsogon. 1990. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. 2 AUG 1991] Facts: The petitioners in G. To that extent the right is absolute. NO. and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21. An appeal to RTC was filed. when they were given until March 7. Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5. No. 1990. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. first at the scheduled hearing of February 12. SY ’06-‘07 . The MCTC found him guilty. Municipality of Matnog. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong. the accused was apprehended and charged. Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated. Held: NO denial of due process. Issue: Whether or Not there was a denial of due process." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. This is without merit. 1990. In G.14. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM) It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War. Held: No. Merelyn.

No. "motion for permission to leave the country. No costs. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.R. both trial judges denied the same. respectively. 24646 & L-24674. 96948. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. The City Judge of Dagupan City. He posted bail. G. G." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing.R. there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission. prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military. and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. 93177. "relative to his business transactions and opportunities. he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. the petitions are also granted. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right. in G. Held: The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26. as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. 20 JUN 1977] Facts: Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. MANOTOC VS. if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest. SY ’06-‘07 . The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. CALLANTA VS. In G. NO. denying his leave to travel abroad. NOS. petitioner Page 144 Section 1-C. of Judges Camilon and Pronove. denied the motions to quash the complaints.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. 1982. VILLANUEVA [77 SCRA 377. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.R.R. No. Indeed.R. Felipe Villanueva. 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G. the petition is granted. Nos. Issue: Whether or Not the right to bail a matter of right. L-62100. Accordingly. 95020 and 97454. Thus." stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149.

1982. (1) Section 3. 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation. Presidential Security Command. On June 16. and may release. TATAD VS. petitioner posted the bail bond. (2) Violation of Section 3. unwarranted benefits. Tatad. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation. Held: YES. Act No. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. 1976 and 1978. However. or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. if any. it was only on June 5. a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit. as it were. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70. Petition for certiorari is denied. G. SY ’06-‘07 . On December 12. only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan. all against petitioner Tatad alone. the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Page 145 Section 1-C. it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 1985. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation. In the case at bar. which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses.00 from Roberto Vallar. he has waived whatever defect. without regard to the limits of punishment. It was denied hence the appeal. there was jurisdictional infirmity.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside. Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court. because she posted the bail bond. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12. 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1. containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. According to petitioner’s counsel. 1979. the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS. and agreed with the complaints filed. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions. NOS. By October 25. “where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper.000. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. for investigation and report. all affidavits and counteraffidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588.000. (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. Antonio de los Reyes. Firstly. arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation. the complaint came to life. thus obtaining her provisional liberty.R. paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125. paragraph (e) of RA. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent. 21 MAR 1988] Facts: The complainant. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. L-72335-39. 1980. in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. “the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense. Secondly. 3019 for giving D' Group.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth. " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Thus. NO. GALMAN VS. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. No. respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43. petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. on the other hand. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Jr. same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit." yet. However. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. But ten days later. the instant case had become moot and academic.R.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy. Held: Page 146 Section 1-C. with absolute impunity. The law (P. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. SY ’06-‘07 . A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.72670. not a communist plot. the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse. Aquino could have shot him. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it. Thereafter. justice and freedom.D. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory. Hence. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman. G. that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy. 12 SEP 1986] Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino. it can not be disregarded or ignored completely. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired pointblank into the back of his head by an assassin. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Then Pres. declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.

Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. and after an agreement was reached. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst. decided that the presiding justice. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. in legal effect. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. SY ’06-‘07 . such a procedure would be a better arrangement because. There was no double jeopardy. deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. By it no rights are divested. petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Page 147 Section 1-C. in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. In this case. A void judgment is. It was. "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. (First Division) would personally handle the trial. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. Pres. instead of in a civilian jail. More so. During the conference. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction." and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. therefore. not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp. if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice. would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case. no judgment at all. mag moro-moro na lamang kayo. In rendering its decision. but by a communist hired gun. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran." Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. therefore. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. No double jeopardy attaches. except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held. Herrera. According to J. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Pres. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Marcos told them 'Okay. the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Justice Pamaran. presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. at the same time.

and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense.R. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. also assail the validity of Sec. according to the Constitution. 29 OCT 1971] Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents'. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people. to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt." The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants. including the Sandiganbayan's. according to the fundamental law. who was returning from Sapao. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. did hold the party or parties. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required. Hence the appeal Issue: Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Accusation is not. after such investigation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. The others were to station themselves nearby. Sec. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. synonymous with guilt. Although no restraining order was issued anew. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. DUMLAO VS. So it must be. According to Dumlao. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. L-21325. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. G. the provision amounts to class legislation. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency. What is required then is moral certainty. including those Page 148 Section 1-C. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings. the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present. the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time. but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability. SY ’06-‘07 . respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. comments. guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. is to fill the public posts. PEOPLE VS. there had been cases where this Court. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60. Held: Yes. responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged. which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392. under our system of government. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence. 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office. L-52245.

is not synonymous with guilt. Appellant was brought to the Headquarters at Camp Crame where he confessed. insurrection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. one of them poked a gun at Venancio and grabbed the steering wheel. as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal.” And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests amounting to subversion. drove a ten-wheeler truck a Coca-Cola plant in Antipolo to load cases of softdrinks. Furthermore. One class can be treated differently from another class. rebellion. Venancio survived but Salvador did not. no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts. Sec. for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. accompanied by Larry Salvador. 4. employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV. 44. a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. to the extreme detriment of a person charged. In ultimate effect. Ascertaining that Salvador knew appellant. Additionally.. section 19. Venancio and Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to the fence of the expressway. At the North Diversion Road. yet. Venancio Patricio. 1973 Constitution). “Explicit is the constitutional provision that. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto. Revised Penal Code). will thereby be avoided. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 1988. 91283. Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus. NO. should be declared null and void Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence. An accusation. except as to the degree of proof. as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. or other similar crimes. Page 149 Section 1-C. time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. It condemns before one is fully heard. shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act. Sgt. may be rebutted. Appellant had four companions. a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. 52 which can stand by itself. or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. PEOPLE VS. Being infected with constitutional infirmity. it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. 17 JAN 1995] Facts: On July 19. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. They were about to leave the plant at 10:00pm when several men approached them to hitch for a ride. Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to the MCU hospital and was presented to Venancio for identification.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan. it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A few days later. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections. SY ’06-‘07 . thereafter they were stabbed and left bleeding to death. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Venancio accommodated appellant's request. ALCANTARA [240 SCRA 122. which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. G. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. Wherefore. At Ortigas Ave. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void. in all criminal prosecutions. In this case.R. according to the fundamental law. Manila. and therefore.

Still. Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our society. he was interrogated and urged to confess his guilt. appellant heard someone say. G. He was made to confront Venancio whom he saw for the first time.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Appelant’s Defense: Denial and alibi.at the hospital and in open . 14 FEB 1991] Facts: Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya. He was also hit on the back with a chair. was familiar to them Issue: Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated. SY ’06-‘07 . The second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio. "Basta ituro mo lang. claimed to have allowed assailants 5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara 6. In this capacity. "Tubigan na iyan. Venancio did not respond.failed to identify Alcantara . Water was slowly and continuously poured on his face. The identification procedure was irregular. stabbing was preceded by a 3. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck he was driving. While he was applying for CONCEPCION TRUCKING located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant. 74259." Sgt. Finally. He balked. Later. where he was handcuffed and left until the following day. he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Appellant could no longer bear the pain caused by the water treatment. mentioned 5 assailants 2. In the midst of his ordeal. Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large) with the crime of robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide." He was then blindfolded and brought to another room where he was made to lie down. REPUBLIC [194 SCRA 73. and electrocuted.only Alcantara was identified . From the hospital. he received collections. Sgt. The testimony of Sgt. he was made to sign prepared statements containing his full confession. to confirm with the truck drivers. Without being apprised of his rights nor provided with counsel. On the third day of his detention. Awanan’s testimony as to the “previous identification” at the hospital. hours after questioning began. He is nearly illiterate(third grade education). He said that he was just applying to be a driver and stayed there even if he was told that no work was available. forced appellant to stand about a foot from Venancio. appellant's interrogators started boxing him and kicking him. disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to Page 150 Section 1-C. He remained in the custody of the police for two days and two nights. Undaunted. he confessed to being one of the hijackers.R. CORPUZ VS. NO. Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law. He was arrested. called to a photographer present. Appellant was the brought to the MCU hospital. and told the latter to just point at the suspect.court (pointed to another person) Held: YES. The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between Venancio’s affidavit and testimony: Affidavit 1. There is no reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. conference by all assailants 4. The people’s evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption. It was also incorrect to give too much weight to Police Sgt. He denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. appellant was brought to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame. He was led to another room. over his mouth. and pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused. Due process demands that the identification procedure of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor. Testimony . he refused to admit to the crime.only 3 assailants had a . CHPG Sgt. Awanan directed.conference . Awanan. At ten o'clock that night. Venancio obeyed. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. On both times.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests government accounts. section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The presumed innocence must yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation.L-2809. PEOPLE VS. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. being a private person. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that the shortage was malversed by other persons. a case of malversation was filed against him. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Wherefore his petition is denied. Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. Rule 112. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave.50.. 22 MAR 1950] Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information. Also. G. On April 13. Held: It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4 checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accused’s cash book 3 months after such encashments. He was able to pay only P10. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive.07 which was not met. After a final demand letter for the total of P50. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds. upon demand by an authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. was not proven. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan. The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balance. 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information Page 151 Section 1-C. Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable.R. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook although he had not received the said amount. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. Also. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". which no evidence was presented to indict the latter. There is no such balance in the case at bar. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752.” This was violated.823. Issue: Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. Held: Yes. Ocampo. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. SY ’06-‘07 . The Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of P72. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned.00.596. Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks. in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in favor of the accused.159.

A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted. Fiscal. Tan was given a Php. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty.R. for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear. In the course of the investigation.L-65952. his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando. 1970. NO.RA. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. 1970 on motion of Atty. to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty.L-32888. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184. neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court. the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R. who was an Asst. hearing was re-set to September 8. despite appointment by the court of Atty. was assigned to investigate. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel. After trial.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests that he had investigated Mr. hence this instant petition. first of which was on August 1. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty. petitioner demanded Php. marked bill. Citing People vs. Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of . At the second hearing on September 8. are not sufficient compliance. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. 12 AUG 1983] Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20. 1970. La Union.2000. 1970. despite a second call of the case. and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony. But above all.3019. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. G. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused. MAGSI [124 SCRA 64.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case.3019). Rivera. the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty. On that date. Prior to the next hearing. 1970. On the third hearing date. PEOPLE VS. the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. Atty. who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment.R. Held: Page 152 Section 1-C. so Atty. Held: YES. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7.A. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times. SY ’06-‘07 . NO. G. The petitioner. SORIANO VS. who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. 31 JUL 1984] Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. and he had supplied the other half.

The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. he was not arraigned. for himself or for other person. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. or administrative in nature. transaction as used hereof. Judgment modified. And this element is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. 20 JUN 1977] Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art. for the first time. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. 3019 Sec.3 (b). to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Senining dated December 28. It is required in the Rules that an accused. Mendoza dated November 16. respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. Wherefore.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests R.L-45667. G. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions.A. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned. is nullified and set aside. the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. However. That not withstanding. 1976. even of his life. is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R. Page 153 Section 1-C. finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries. NO. The court agrees with the petitioner. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face. is not limited to commercial or business transaction. Likewise.3 (b).A. affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining.3019 sec. BORJA VS. 1973. Held: Yes. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. present. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. share percentage or benefit. The respondent claimed that. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. SY ’06-‘07 .210 of the RPC and not a violation of R. he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift.210 of the RPC. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422. but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial. starting with the arraignment of petitioner. with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws. Corrupt practices of public officers . civil. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries.3. is nullified and set aside. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. the petition for certiorari is granted.R.A. At the very least then. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. Also. The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest. a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment. in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. 3019 sec.

only private respondents. as in this instance for more than a year. and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. G. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. there was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650. Pablito Suco. 1991. G. Arsenio Padumon. and now. The case was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. TAMPAL [244 SCRA 202. NO. and Samuel Padumon were arrested.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests CONDE VS. while the others remained at large. secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time. The case was called on September 20. NO. The case was set for hearing on July 26. Domingo Padumon. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified. 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. However. has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection. seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged. We lay down the legal proposition that. and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. without good cause. by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation. Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Luis Tampal. the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information.R. The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. 102485. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial. 22 MAY 1995] Facts: Luis Tampal. Issue: Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases. Samuel Padumon. Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case. Aurelia Conde. 21741. after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed. Arsenio Padumon.R. hence. the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case. SY ’06-‘07 . like all other accused persons. has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free. In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would Page 154 Section 1-C. has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors. has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed. The motion was denied by respondent judge. PEOPLE VS. In the facts above. Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. where a prosecuting officer. but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena. Domingo Padumon. Tayabas. or if he be restrained of his liberty. 25 JAN 1924] Facts: Aurelia Conde. courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.

where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. on the other hand. considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA [360 SCRA 248. the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests bar another prosecution for the same offense. a 60 year old woman. by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. judge or court in which the charge is pending. along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. Estrada should be permitted by the court. more than anyone else. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him. 1992. within the courthouse. 29 JUL 1986] Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of public’s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court. Trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court. 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores. still later. Nevertheless. NO 01-4-03-SC. she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6. San Nicolas. where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice. it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come. When these rights race against one another.M. Mexico. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the 1st day of trial. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial." The request was seconded by Mr. L-66469. identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. where a plea of not guilty is entered. whichever date last occurs. except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. A. SALAS [143 SCRA 163. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. NO. Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Pampanga. G. jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Cesar N. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 “THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT” The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. SY ’06-‘07 . A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. both Page 155 Section 1-C. the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. 29 JUN 2001] Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. PEOPLE VS.R. Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information. conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. Thereafter. but in this case. Therefore. Sarino and. the accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. this does not apply. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. sit in the available seats.

All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused. 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood. either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. 1992. Orlando Pangan heard a shout. 1992 at Arayat. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6. he returned only on September 19.00 as in the morning of March 5. Eduardo Bagtas. of March 6. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.m. on his clothing.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake.00 from her other pocket. 1992. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide Issue: Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house. Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive.500. the parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest. as the author of the crime. Dr. in weight and probative value. who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500. Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake. a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2. The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence which.m. he likewise found on March 9. the purse of Virginia containing about P2.00 money.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead. However.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8. but since March 6. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction. his residence since childhood. one Serafia Gutierrez. The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a. Pampanga. was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake. Pampanga. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect. Held: There was no eyewitness or direct evidence. testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning. to the exclusion of all other persons. a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors. leaving behind an unfinished painting project. on March 6. rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon report. Mexico. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas. just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house. he did not anymore report for work at Sta. the victim's wristwatch. may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court. and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5. Pampanga and up to March 5. Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat. 1992. He was not seen again from said date. on that very date. the date of the crime. recovered at the scene a pin. 1992 when accused left Mexico. another woman. SY ’06-‘07 . Ana. but the following day. Appellant was apprehended Page 156 Section 1-C. and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible. consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. Pampanga. of March 6. Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22. all the circumstances must be consistent with each other. 1992. he asked and was given P50. the doctor claims. a ring and P135. 1992.000. Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with homicide.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat. 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat. not at Mexico. an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound.000. 1992 in going to the wake. came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a. 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of P1. appellant did not present himself to the authorities. was the cause of death of the victim. Pampanga. Virginia likewise gambled at the wake. however. Ana. accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana. one Ramil Talens. earring. Pampanga. direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability.

The other passengers jumped out of the car and went to different directions to escape. was left in side the car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate. (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi. Simeon Calama. Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Ramil Talens. Mangumnang however escaped while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. (b) the property belongs to another. Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. In charging Robbery with Homicide. MAGPALAO [197 SCRA 79. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. which is used in the generic sense. So ordered. The victim was. Galvez died in the hospital. Costs against appellant. Ompa. Rene Salonga. NO. 14 MAY 1991] Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. appellant used the alias Rommel Salas. These circumstances denote flight. Galvez however. came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found. Eduardo Lopez.00. Adolfo Quiambao. we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. The robbers were then apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests only a full six months after the date of the crime. SY ’06-‘07 . was committed. there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2. The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit. Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other passengers and divested them of their properties. Edris. The robbers then escaped. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. instead of his true name Elmer Salas. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities. Anwar Hadji Edris. has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt. the crime of homicide. On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). Aliman Baraakal. and wore gold earrings valued at P750. These were never recovered. the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. 92415.000. Page 157 Section 1-C. When the car was near the precipice. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez. While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed. G. and she refused to leave. While the car was stopped the Bara-akal. Gumanak Ompa and defendant-appelants in this case. Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive. who owned the car helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Jimmy Jetwani. and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof. Omar Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.R. in fact. Quiambao. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. After an hour of driving. following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat. which when unexplained. PEOPLE VS. When hospitalized. enjoying a winning streak when her son.00. Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit credibility. Galvez then stepped to the brakes. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes." Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim. Since Mangumnang was not arrested.

with intent to kill. to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee. accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16 November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. Bulado. Silvano. Philippines. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court. the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO. before it could commence. The prosecution had strong evidence against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. In addition. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Thus. then presided over by Judge Pacifico S. Its rulings are found in the last two paragraphs which read as follows: "The elements of murder in this case. G. considering the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime. The reason is that the lower court has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Magpalao. however. use of fire by burning the house of victim Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death. Since all the requisites of trial in absentia are complete. at Nagbinlod. the accused. the abuse of superior strength. Province of Negros Oriental. conspiring and confederating with one another. MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID. 23 SEP 1993] Facts: The accusatory portion in the information for murder. NO. dated 31 October 1991 but promulgated on 20 December 1991. Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. the Constitutional mandate was not violated.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. SY ’06-‘07 . Bulado. Criminal Cases Nos. Page 158 Section 1-C.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests the trial in absentia continued as to him. ACABAL [226 SCRA 694 . abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated. 103604. unlawfully and feloniously attack. Facts are as follows: "That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to push through on the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang. did then and there willfully. the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua. Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken. that is reclusion perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. including several 'John Does'. and with treachery and evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos and 'pinuti'. this Court believes that simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused Engracio Valeriano only. and allowing her to be burned inside said house which was burned to the ground. and Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina ApatanSilvano having been proved by the prosecution beyond doubt. and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30.000. The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the prosecuting fiscal. But on 16 May 1987.' and did then and there set the house on fire while the aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to escape therefrom. PEOPLE VS. Ompa. Municipality of Sta. 1980. thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano her death and burning her beyond recognition. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A. per Judge Pacifico S.R. a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the records of these two cases were burned. but he remains at large up to the present. Criminal Case No. contained no specific dispositive portion. left leg hacked behind the knee. The decision of the trial court. An alias warrant for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989. After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37. assault and use personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the latter was about to leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries. the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree. the court has jurisdiction over Magumnang. Catalina.

In conclusion. namely: Juanito Rismundo. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt." Issue: Whether or not the judgment complied with the Rules of Court. Accordingly. the trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants. no penalty could be imposed on him since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to reach. Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. 4585. All the other two (2) accused. Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. The bail bond put up by the three accused. it is not only the right of the accused to be freed. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal. Short of this. unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived. it is apparent that their abovementioned contention is highly illogical. the accused-appellants must be acquitted. (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. accused Engracio Valeriano only is nowhere to be found. that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Section 14. hence. and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission. JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from frustrated homicide. he being a fugitive or at large. provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel. (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused. hence. they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently filed their written notice of appeal. Held: We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him. Paragraph (2). just before the retaking of evidence commenced. because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned. he being a fugitive or at large. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found. Since the order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself. SY ’06-‘07 .San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano. Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate confinement. Page 159 Section 1-C. Whether or not the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused is valid. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. not brought to the bar of justice. The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. after the trial in absentia. not brought to the bar of justice. if there are any. At the time the order in question was made. whether as principal. A judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused. Whether or not the accused may be tried in absentia. and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party. or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. if there is any. It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel. accomplice or accessory after the fact. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. Were it otherwise.

SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62.R. The rule that the constitutional guaranty. SY ’06-‘07 . The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. 23 SEPT 1929] Facts: Page 160 Section 1-C. and not an exclusion of his body as evidence. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her.R. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. BELTRAN VS. a seven-year-old girl.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests US VS. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. NO. VILLAFLOR VS. G. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him. NO. TAN TENG [23 PHIL 145. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. when it may be material. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. G. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. 32025. NO. G. 8 SEP 1920] Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination. Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. 7081. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police. that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. Held: No. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. The corollary to the proposition is that. Several days later. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570. an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. 16444. 7 SEP 1912] Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio.R.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969] Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board. Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the SelfIncrimination Clause. Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the

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accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966] Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in selfdefense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed. Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968] Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed. Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy. Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case

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is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ [217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993] Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended. A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal. Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB9207. Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach. Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied. PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976] Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued

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RELOVA [149 SCRA 292. it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises. People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial. convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar.16. legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio. calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. Issue: Page 164 Section 1-C. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them.Opulencia. Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System. where in the case was dismissed. PEOPLE VS.. reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff. 1975. another case was filed against Mr. G. as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr. it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. NO. Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. There was indeed a valid. In the 2 requisites given. The accused on the other hand. it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Feb. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41. Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. 6 MAR 1987] FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second. second would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted.L-45129. Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. SY ’06-‘07 . On Nov 24.1 1975. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance. Before arraignment.062.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed.R.

24. During arraignment. that one. the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. L-54110. G. Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case. In the case at bar. accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.R. the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. 20 FEB 1981] Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. petitioners pleaded “Not Guilty”. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero. it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. In the case at bar. Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2 nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. would place the accused in double jeopardy Held: Yes. which was dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to appear at the trial. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present. the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. as the case filed was grave coercion.16. On Oct. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code. SY ’06-‘07 . After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code. NO. POGOY [102 SCRA 861. filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance. and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another date. there is a valid complaint or information filed second. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug. all three conditions were present. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not the accused Mr. conviction of the accused. ESMENA VS. The fact that Mr. Held: Yes. revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance.1979. Page 165 Section 1-C. it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution. In the case. that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal.Opulencia. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same.

for more than five years. from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.R. Her father. and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests PEOPLE VS. the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father. However. 7659. She was twelve years old at that time. As a consequence. following conviction. Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home. DE LA TORRE [380 SCRA 586. the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper. In People vs. it prevents the State. . Leones. snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts. 7659. has three children from a common-law relationship. Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father. 137953-58. 11 MAR 2002] Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre. She appeared sleepy. SY ’06-‘07 . appellee. the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R. G. However. Held: Under Section 1. NOS. Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold.A. Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. the eldest of which is Mary Rose. an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed. in January 1997. The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. however. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused. The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. Page 166 Section 1-C. any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. Being violative of the right against double jeopardy. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy…When the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision.” The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.A. And finally. a sudden change in Mary Rose’s behavior behavior was noticed. instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R. Issue: Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments of rape. denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter. When confronted by her head teacher. Wilfredo. there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. it declared that: “while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort.

San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests CITIZENSHIP Page 167 Section 1-C. SY ’06-‘07 .

under the law. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests CITIZENSHIP Art. His naturalization. and assumed office in due time. SY ’06-‘07 . 1988. he said. (3) Those born before January 17. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. In their Comment. 1988." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. 4. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Estuye. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Sec. G. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. the League of Municipalities. 3. the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18. Section 9. 5. filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo. 1988. Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245. 23 JUN 1989] Facts: Petitioner Juan G. as provincial governor of Sorsogon. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor. was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad. 1. his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. 1973. 4 Sec. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. Sorsogon Chapter. As an alien. Speaking for the public respondent. 1988. 87193. FRIVALDO VS.R. Sec. On October 27. of Filipino mothers. Sec. election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. having been naturalized in the United States on January 20. (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. represented by its President. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. 1983. Sec. In his answer dated May 22. and the Omnibus Election Code. 2. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship. of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the Page 168 Section 1-C. the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. to have renounced it. who was also suing in his personal capacity. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3). the Local Government Code. 1988. unless by their act or omission they are deemed. NO.

U. it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. Even so. he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected ViceGovernor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. for all its difficulties and limitations. as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. that the candidate was qualified. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws. that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court. pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19. by an express and unequivocal act. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. Once rejected.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. however. Obviously. This country of ours. is like a jealous and possessive mother.R. 26 MAY 1999] Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May. as in this case. 135083. this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. The returning renegade must show. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be. NO. Section 1. which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. Petitioner JUAN G. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. Accordingly. MANZANO [307 SCRA 630. the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. among other qualifications. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. But once it is surrendered and renounced. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children.S.A. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco. Issue: Page 169 Section 1-C. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. 1987. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. 1998 elections. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC. omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V. Petition Dismissed. especially if they mistakenly believed. Northern District of California. he must owe his total loyalty to this country only. California. of the Constitution. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. MERCADO VS. The evidence shows. G. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. SY ’06-‘07 . the renewal of his loyalty and love. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines. a citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.

Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and. as far as the laws of this country are concerned. For instance. is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. USA. even if no such prior marriage had existed. his mother. practiced his profession as an artist. private respondent has. While dual citizenship is involuntary. petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth. Allan F. Poe. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. No. when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood. received his education. Page 170 Section 1-C. second. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ. his parents were foreigners. petitioner asseverated. IV) of our Constitution. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. 161434. private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. G. Such a person.R. ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part.first. married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. a Spanish subject. Bessie Kelley Poe. loyalty to two or more states. Granting. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Allan Poe. was an American. that Allan F. Fornier. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco. Allan F. refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes. was a Spanish national.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Dual allegiance. according to Fornier. and taken part in past elections in this country. Poe was a Filipino citizen. it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli. On the other hand. 3 Mar 2004] Facts: Victorino X. by some positive act. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states. The former arises when. on the other hand. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions . being the son of Lorenzo Pou. TECSON VS. the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation. (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens. private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine. unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. and his father. SY ’06-‘07 . COMELEC [424 SCRA 277.

Allan F. 1994. Page 171 Section 1-C. section 1(4). such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. in turn. he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.” Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou). "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. 1998 elections. Pangasinan. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11. whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen. in the affirmative. if acquired.San Beda College of Law – Alabang Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III. Poe. if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship. and that San Carlos. in relation to Section 74. could have well been his place of residence before death. respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light. Poe. HRET [357 SCRA 545. on April 27. 63. of Filipino parents. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. He was born in San Clemente. the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78. would thereby extend to his son. in the absence of any other evidence. On November 5. The 1935 Constitution. his place of residence upon his death in 1954. G. took an oath of allegiance to the United States. 142840. 2630. who was then running for reelection. On March 17. however. a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. among other. R. On the other hand. father of respondent FPJ. depended on whether or not the father of respondent. SY ’06-‘07 . Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old. No. Allan F. when the Philippines was under Spanish rule. 1985. As a Consequence. would have himself been a Filipino citizen and. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. 7 May 2001] Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization. respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. Tarlac. 1960. BENGZON VS. Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen. of the Omnibus Election Code. which.

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