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EEE381B Aerospace Systems & Avionics

Electronic Warfare
Ref: Moir & Seabridge 2006, Chapter 6 Dr Ron Smith

Outline
1.
2. 3.

4.
5. 6. 7.

Introduction Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Defensive Aids Jam resistant radar design Exercises
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1. Introduction

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1.1 Electronic Warfare Roles

Electronic warfare (EW) plays both a strategic and tactical role in any modern military operation. Assets are employed in supportive, protective and offensive measures. Specific capabilities and equipment specifications are usually highly classified.

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1.2 The EW spectrum

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1.3 The intelligence cycle

The picture below depicts the typical, continuous cycle of intelligence gathering and application.

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1.4 EW elements

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2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Military intelligence typically involves the following sources:


human

intelligence (HUMINT) image intelligence (IMINT) photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) signals intelligence (SIGINT)

SIGINT is further broken down into:


communications

intelligence (COMINT) electronic intelligence (ELINT)

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2.1 COMINT

Communications intelligence operations involve the collection of:


the locations and numbers of specific communication transmissions, their signal characteristics, their messages, as well as any communication patterns (including silence).

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2.2 ELINT

Electronic intelligence operations involve the collection of the source and direction of arrival (DOA) of a broad range of radar emitters. Signals are analyzed for such things as:
frequency, pulse and PRF, signal strength, modulation schemes, scan parameters, and usage patterns.

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2.3 Airborne intelligence gathering

A typical airborne intelligence operation involves highflying specialized aircraft gathering emissions data on long patrol flights along national borders and outside missile engagement range.
In the 1980s and 1990s Canada employed CE144 Challengers in a national ELINT role

one specially equipped aircraft commonly referred to as the Manitou was operated by the CF.

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2.4 Typical COMINT/ELINT architecture

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3. Electronic Support Measures

Similar to an ELINT system, an Electronic Support Meausres (ESM) systems role is to detect and classify received radar emitters. The difference being that an ESM is generally employed tactically (for use against immediate threats). An effective ESM will identify the location, type of transmitter, mode of operation (search, track, engaged) and level of threat of each emitter. Real-time signal analysis is performed against received signals, comparing them with known emitter characteristics stored in its threat library

the library having been developed based upon intelligence data


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3.1 ESM employment

Electronic support measures may be employed in formation support role aircraft such as that of an AWACs or a coastal patrol aircraft. Alternatively, it may be employed tactically in a radar warning mode such as in an attack aircraft. Canadas CP140 Aurora Incremental Modernization Program (AIMP) includes the fitment of the AN/ALQ-217 ESM suite in block 3 of the program. This suite will be used in both formation support and self-defence roles. ~$50M (US) for 24 systems

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4. Electronic Countermeasures

Electronic countermeasures (ECM) involve taking actions to interfere with or deceive the enemys radar system. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) involve taking actions to interfere with or deceive the countermeasures so as to restore radar use.
and

so on, and so, in a classic cat and mouse game.

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4.1 Noise Jamming

Active noise jamming involves the transmission of high power white noise directed at the enemy radar with the intent of interference. Effectiveness is based upon such parameters as:

jammer power antenna gain transmitter bandwidth


barrage jamming swept-spot jamming multiple-spot jamming

Typical types of noise jamming techniques include:


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4.1.1

Effects of noise jamming

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4.1.1.1

Effects of noise jamming [2]

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4.1.2

Burnthrough range

With any noise jamming technique there is some range at which the strength of the radar echo becomes stringer than the jamming noise, this is known as the burnthrough range.

The range of the radar return is a function of 1/R4, whereas the range of the jamming signal is a function 1/R2. Therefore the closer the jammer gets to the radar, the more likely it is that the radar breaks through the noise signal; this is depicted on the graph in the next slide. A radar with low gain and poor sidelobes is susceptible to jamming, conversely a high power noise jammer becomes a target and is susceptible to home-on-jamming attacks.
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4.1.2.1 Burnthrough depicted

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4.2 Deception Jamming

Radar deception techniques are more sophisticated and can often be achieved without the radar (operator) knowing that jamming is being used. Typical techniques include:
false

target generation range gate stealing velocity gate stealing angle track breaking

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4.2.1 False targets & range gate stealing

By knowing the radar pulse parameters, false targets can be injected into a radar by replicating or repeating well timed pulses so as to appear as spurious random targets. Range gate stealing (RGS) is a similar deception jamming technique that begins by transmitting a strong enough signal to mask the true radar return. Once this is achieved the pulse is walked off the echo range until the radar loses accurate range information. Jamming may then stop and repeat the process making it difficult for the radar to gain lock.
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4.2.1.1 Range gate pull-off (RGPO)

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4.2.1.2 Range gate pull-off (RGPO)

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4.2.1.3 Range gate pull-off (RGPO)

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4.2.2 Other deception techniques

Velocity gate stealing (VGS) works much the same as range gate stealing except that the transmitted jamming signal contains false Doppler frequency shifts causing errors in the radars velocity calculations. Angle track breaking requires knowledge of the radar tracking method and scan parameters (perhaps from an on-board ESM, or previous intelligence). Angle track can then be affected by appropriate signal modulation (as the case of conscan). Other techniques include terrain bouncing, cross-polarization, and sidelobe jamming.
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4.3 Airborne jamming platforms

Airborne jammers (and their platforms) are generally employed in one of two common modes:

Self-screening mode is provided by on-board jammer(s) as protection suites. These systems are generally highly integrated into the mission suite. Escort and stand-off mode is provided by support aircraft, with stand-off aircraft usually operating outside harms way. These systems are generally stand-alone and often more powerful and capable than self-screen ones.
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The EA-6B Prowler is being replaced with the EA-18G Growler (escort / stand-off role)

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4.3.1 Airborne jamming platforms [2]

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5. Defensive Aids

When operating in a hostile environment an aircraft must be equipped with appropriate selfdefence measures.
In

Canada these are collectively referred a defensive electronic warfare (DEW) suite

Common threats faced by aircraft include:


Small

arms fire Radar guided anti-aircraft missiles (AAA) Shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM) SAM from ground sites, vehicles or ships
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5.1 Radar warning receiver (RWR)

The goal of an RWR is to detect the presence of a hostile radar prior to the radar detecting you. A typical architecture includes 4 sensors located at the wing tips with each providing up to 90 conical coverage. A typical antenna would be a spiral with ~75 beamwidth and ~10 dB gain.

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5.1.1 A typical RWR architecture

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5.2 Other warning receivers

A missile warning receiver (MWR) is designed to detect the infrared (IR) or ultraviolet (UV) emissions of a missile.
This

system may employ up to 6 sensors, each with 110 of coverage (providing front and rear protection.

Similarly a laser warning receiver (LWR) provides detection against missiles that emit signals in the laser band.

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5.3 Countermeasure dispensers

While warning receivers are designed to detect the presence of a threat, countermeasure dispensers offer a defence against an imminent (launched) attack. Typical dispensers include:
Chaff Flares Towed

Decoys

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5.3.1

Chaff

Chaff is the oldest form of radar EW, dating back to WWII, then known as window. Chaff consists of tiny pieces of reflective metal foil or plastic. It is cut into wavelength strips and dispensed in cloud bursts behind the aircraft, thus forming a brief but large RCS so as to break the lock of an incoming missile. Usually used in conjunction with evasive manoeuvres.
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5.3.1.1

Chaff

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5.3.2

Flares

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5.3.3

Towed decoys

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5.4 F/A-18E/F Defensive EW

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5.5 Modern active decoys

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6. Jam resistant radar design

Modern radar designs include features which make them less vulnerable to traditional EW techniques including:
Low

antenna sidelobes Sidelobe blanking Wide dynamic range with fast automatic gain control Constant false alarm rate (CFAR) reduction

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6.1 Jam resistant radar design

Modern radars also include low probability of detection techniques in order to prevent being detected (before any EW can begin). Typical techniques include:
A

purposeful reduction in peak power Frequency agility along with an increase in receiver bandwidth (with advanced low loss, low noise floor receivers) Very high gain antennas 55dB above the first sidelobe

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7. In-class exercises

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7.1 Quick response # 1

How might a frequency agile radar be able to

defend itself against spot noise jamming?


What

noise jamming mode will the jammer have to resort to and at what cost?

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7.2 Quick response # 2

Range gate pull-off (RGPO) injects false targets at ranges beyond that of the jammer. How could false targets be injected between the jammer and the radar?

What key radar parameter must be known for this to work?

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7.3 Quick response # 3

How could knowledge of a radars scan pattern and antenna characteristics be used to effectively jam the radar?

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References
1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Moir & Seabridge, Military Avionics Systems, American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics, 2006. [Sections 2.6 & 2.7] Radar in an Active Target Environment, student laboratory manual, 38542-00, Lab-Volt (Quebec) Ltd, 2006. David Adamy, EW101 - A First Course in Electronic Warfare, Artech House, 2000. [Chapters 3,4 & 6] George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar, Second Edition, SciTch Publishing, 1998. Mark A. Hicks, "Clip art licensed from the Clip Art Gallery on DiscoverySchool.com"

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