PEARL HARBOR

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE?

A Historical Analysis of the ‘Surprise Mass Attack on Pearl Harbor’ By William P. Litynski

Pearl Harbor: Satanic Ritual?
1941: Year of the Snake

“Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific…It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago…I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.” – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his “Day of Infamy” Speech to Congress, on December 8, 1941

“My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.” – Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, in a diplomatic cable message to the U.S. State Department on January 27, 1941
Joseph C. Grew

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Double Agent?: Members of the Imperial Japanese delegation to the World Economic Conference in London bid goodbye to U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. on May 27, 1933. Left to right: Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, head delegate and former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. (1918-1919); Juukuio Kabono, Economic adviser; President Roosevelt; Japanese banker Eigo Fukai (Governor of the Bank of Japan from 1935 to 1937); and Katsuji Debuchi, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. (Image: © Bettmann/CORBIS)

United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph Clark Grew (left) and Foreign Minister of Japan Admiral Teijiro Toyoda smile for camera on October 2, 1941 when Minister Toyoda made the customary call upon the dean of the Tokyo diplomatic Corps after he assumed office. Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, who opposed the Tripartite Pact and war with Soviet Union, served as Foreign Minister of Japan from July 18, 1941 to October 18, 1941. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

Captured Japanese image shows Imperial Japan’s Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo (center, in uniform) visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, Japan in October 1941. (Photo: Time Life)

Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu (left) and Imperial Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura laugh while waiting for talks with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull about reducing tensions between America and Japan at the State Department in Washington, D.C. in 1941. Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House on November 17, 1941 and again on November 27, 1941. Saburo Kurusu arrived in Washington, D.C. by ship on November 15, 1941 from Japan via Honolulu. Saburo Kurusu was the Imperial Japanese Ambassador to Nazi Germany from 1939 to November 1941. Saburo Kurusu’s wife Alice Jay [Kurusu] was an American of European descent; Saburo Kurusu and his wife lived in Japan throughout the remainder of World War II. (Photo: Thomas D. McAvoy/Time Life)

Franklin Delano Roosevelt (left), President of the United States of America, greets Winston Churchill (right), Prime Minister of Great Britain, on board HMS Prince of Wales at Placentia Bay during the Atlantic Conference on August 10, 1941. (Photo: Imperial War Museums)

and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden Cherubims. What is this that thou hast done? And the woman said. whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? And the man said. And he said. and ye shall be as gods. We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden. and clothed them. and take also of the tree of life. for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art. and live for ever: Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden. And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life: And I will put enmity between thee and the woman. And Adam called his wife's name Eve. Unto Adam also and to his wife did the LORD God make coats of skins. and I was afraid. and did eat. and made themselves aprons. lest he put forth his hand. And unto Adam he said. Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife. to keep the way of the tree of life. till thou return unto the ground. Ye shall not eat of it. Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent. and I did eat. and I hid myself. Behold. Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake. because she was the mother of all living. and they knew that they were naked. Unto the woman he said. and gave also unto her husband with her. in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. saying.Faustian Bargain: Faust makes a pact with the Devil “Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. and eat. neither shall ye touch it. and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. knowing good and evil. and a tree to be desired to make one wise. and thou shalt bruise his heel. Yea. lest ye die. I heard thy voice in the garden. And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God amongst the trees of the garden. because I was naked. to know good and evil: and now. and above every beast of the field. And the LORD God called unto Adam. And he said unto the woman. God hath said. The woman whom thou gavest to be with me. And the LORD God said unto the serpent. thou art cursed above all cattle. upon thy belly shalt thou go. And the serpent said unto the woman. Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree. The serpent beguiled me. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread. I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception. then your eyes shall be opened. the man is become as one of us. she gave me of the tree. hath God said. and that it was pleasant to the eyes. to till the ground from whence he was taken. and he shall rule over thee. And the LORD God said. and thy desire shall be to thy husband. and they sewed fig leaves together. Old Testament (King James Version (KJV)) . Where art thou? And he said.” – Genesis 3:1-24. So he drove out the man. she took of the fruit thereof. of which I commanded thee. in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children. and I did eat. Ye shall not surely die: For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof. Because thou hast done this. and he did eat. it shall bruise thy head. And the eyes of them both were opened. and unto dust shalt thou return. And the LORD God said unto the woman. and a flaming sword which turned every way. and between thy seed and her seed. and hast eaten of the tree. and said unto him.

1637. 1743. 1565. 1435. 1677. 2072. 1670. 1578. 1816. 1764. 2066. 1926. 1834. 2073. 1770. 1556. 1974. 1815. 1464. 1695 1707. 1792 1804. 1794 1806. 1719. 1993 2005. 1424. 1997 2009. 1432. 1551. 1648. 1797 1809. 1964. 1492 1504. 2093 Year of the Tiger: 1410. 1452. 1549. 1632. 1517. 1530. 1888 1900. 1487. 1971. 1895 1907. 1843. 1446. 1762. 1975. 1780. 1413. 1474. 1673. 1883. 1658. 1829. 2026. 2097 Year of the Horse: 1402. 2068. 1698 1710. 1838. 2060. 1885. 2091 Year of the Rat: 1408. 1496 1508. 1749. 1563. 1951. 1433. 1898 1910. 1739. 1443. 1734. 1923. 1916. 1814. 1774. 1484. 1940. 1548. 1450. 1462. 1616. 1418. 1459. 1884. 1626. 1476. 1682. 1851. 1619. 1942. 1886. 1680. 1561. 1683. 1726. 1784. 1586. 1917. 1891 1903. 1841. 1919. 1615. 1924. 1537. 1863. 1675. 1566. 1854. 1599 1611. 2046. 1580. 1416. 1823. 1581. 1922. 2085. 1518. 1465. 1654. 1421. 1881. 1625. 1956. 1998 2010. 1935. 1986. 1644. 2098 Year of the Goat: 1403. 1641. 1744. 1874. 1890 1902. 2035. 1624. 1812. 1929. 1635. 2032. 1735. 1742. 1832. 1591 1603. 1415. 1672. 1567. 1828. 1535. 1712. 2033. 2087. 1962. 1661. 1423. 1991 2003. 1598 1610. 1928. 1981. 1732. 2028. 1799 1811. 1818. 1945. 1697 1709. 1713.The Chinese Zodiac (Calendar) Year of the Dragon: 1400. 1456. 1437. 1412. 2041. 1777. 1499 1511. 1524. 2057. 1850. 1532. 1867. 1663. 2031. 1527. 1562. 2020. 2099 Year of the Monkey: 1404. 1642. 1775. 1466. 1470. 1628. 1787. 1442. 1952. 1631. 1491 1503. 2070. 1513. 1653. 1689 1701. 1861. 1574. 1448. 1788 1800. 1643. 2017. 1671. 1724. 1996 2008. 1622. 1568. 1856. 1481. 1684. 2014. 1583. 1516. 1999 2011. 1495 1507. 1925. 1849. 1936. 1715. 1647. 1766. 1569. 2080. 1425. 2016. 1880. 1840. 1420. 1489 1501. 1497 1509. 1691 1703. 2053. 1436. 1954. 1440. 2013. 1920. 1482. 1966. 1434. 1984. 1676. 1536. 1970. 1960. 1879. 1767. 1757. 1873. 1933. 1833. 1953. 1538. 1995 2007. 1746. 1968. 1634. 1690 1702. 1522. 1558. 1887. 1560. 1612. 1882. 1528. 1438. 2043. 1983. 1731. 1994 2006. 1543. 1772. 1519. 1725. 2081. 1899 1911. 2065. 1858. 1478. 1948. 1741. 1664. 1668. 2061. 1692 1704. 1947. 1866. 2023. 1813. 1475. 1588 1600. 1955. 2071. 1944. 1822. 1553. 1593 1605. 1539. 2036. 1727. 1830. 1667. 1754. 1431. 2042. 2048. 2064. 1555. 2059. 1573. 1847. 1779. 1988 2000. 1943. 1860. 1485. 1638. 1514. 1572. 2062. 2088 Year of the Rooster: 1405. 2012. 1980. 2096 Year of the Snake: 1401. 2086. 1594 1606. 1934. 1868. 1584. 1645. 1669. 1872. 1646. 1835. 1576. 1837. 1892 1904. 1520. 2058. 1564. 2019. 2063. 1526. 1621. 1745. 1447. 1756. 1463. 2079. 1595 1607. 2030. 1523. 1855. 1623. 1977. 1544. 2015. 1545. 1957. 1696 1708. 1458. 2022. 1963. 1761. 1678. 1785. 2076. 1921. 1613. 1760. 1875. 1662. 1771. 1897 1909. 1845. 1927. 1915. 1579. 1839. 2077. 1755. 1918. 1817. 1949. 1821. 1781. 2067. 1469. 2052. 1547. 1428. 1461. 1985. 1651. 1660. 1468. 1978. 2024. 1751. 1869. 1740. 1722. 2021. 2056. 2054. 1557. 1681. 1931. 1796 1808. 1896 1908. 1950. 1932. 1987. 2044. 1674. 1571. 1597 1609. 1480. 1639. 1498 1510. 1894 1906. 1825. 1973. 1467. 1427. 1490 1502. 1990 2002. 2075. 1714. 1472. 1759. 1914. 1590 1602. 2083. 1552. 1848. 2050. 1429. 1620. 1958. 1776. 1657. 1717. 1521. 1665. 2039. 1587. 1967. 1414. 1976. 1493 1505. 1439. 1577. 1575. 1417. 1972. 1525. 1473. 1449. 1699 1711. 1859. 1965. 1819. 1685. 1912. 1836. 1758. 2094 Year of the Rabbit: 1411. 1488 1500. 1453. 2038. 1782. 2051. 1846. 1445. 1844. 1857. 1913. 1721. 1483. 1693 1705. 1747. 2018. 1630. 2037. 1730. 2034. 2069. 1515. 1959. 1592 1604. 1871. 1790 1802. 1862. 1795 1807. 1629. 1655. 1686. 1694 1706. 1737. 1529. 1636. 1649. 1752. 1494 1506. 1720. 1486. 1930. 1512. 1614. 1753. 1748. 1451. 1864. 1738. 1750. 1542. 2090 Year of the Pig: 1407. 1889 1901. 2027. 1559. 1736. 2047. 1531. 1666. 2049. 1820. 1786. 1659. 2078. 1534. 1541. 1596 1608. 1718. 1938. 1979. 1627. 1617. 1853. 1679. 1877. 1457. 1969. 1778. 1533. 1937. 2089 Year of the Dog: 1406. 1723. 1783. 1827. 1831. 1852. 1460. 1982. 2092 Year of the Ox (Bull): 1409. 1946. 1941. 1729. 1656. 1798 1810. 1422. 1992 2004. 1765. 1878. 1585. 2040. 1554. 1870. 1589 1601. 1989 2001. 1540. 1546. 1793 1805. 1826. 1441. 1763. 1479. 1582. 1650. 1842. 1430. 2025. 1477. 1865. 1454. 1893 1905. 1824. 1769. 2084. 1687. 1550. 1426. 1640. 1728. 2074. 1876. 2095 . 2055. 1471. 2029. 1789 1801. 1688 1700. 1455. 1733. 1939. 1768. 1444. 1419. 1961. 1652. 1570. 1633. 1716. 1791 1803. 2045. 1618. 2082. 1773.

Major Historical Events in the Year of the Snake
January 16, 27 B.C.: Roman Empire is established; Augustus Caesar becomes the first Emperor of the Roman Empire August 9, 117 A.D.: Death of Trajan, Emperor of the Roman Empire August 23, 1305: The Conviction and Execution of Scottish rebel William Wallace in London for High Treason June 28, 1389: Ottoman Turkish Muslim army attacks the Serbian Christian army at the Battle of Kosovo. August 22, 1485: King Richard III of England is killed in action at the Battle of Bosworth Field in England. May 25, 1521: Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, issued the Edict of Worms declaring Martin Luther a heretic. August 1521: Battle of Tenochtitlan and the Fall of the Aztec Empire [present-day Mexico] November 5, 1605: Gunpowder Plot in London (Guy Fawkes) October 1641: The Irish Rebellion of 1641 February 13, 1689: Ascension of King William III of England and his wife Queen Mary II of England January 18, 1701: Establishment of the Kingdom of Prussia 1701: Establishment of Yale University in Connecticut February 8, 1725: Death of Czar Peter I of Russia (Peter the Great) in St. Petersburg, Russia December 16, 1773: Boston Tea Party October 18, 1797: The Fall of The Most Serene Republic of Venice March 25, 1821: Beginning of the Greek War of Independence May 5, 1821: Death of Napoleon Bonaparte September 27, 1821: Conclusion of the Mexican War of Independence 1821: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s book Elements of the Philosophy of Right is published in Berlin 1833: Establishment of Skull and Bones, a Satanic secret society at Yale University March 3, 1845: Florida became a State within the United States of America December 29, 1845: Annexation of Texas March 6, 1857: Dred Scott v. Sanford case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 1869: Establishment of the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, Japan March 13, 1881: Assassination of Czar Alexander II of Russia in St. Petersburg, Russia July 2, 1881: Assassination of U.S. President James A. Garfield January 17, 1893: Abdication (overthrow) of Queen Liliuokalani of Hawaii October 28, 1893: Assassination of Mayor of Chicago Carter Henry Harrison Sr. May 27-28, 1905: Imperial Japanese Navy defeats the Russian Navy at the Battle of Tsushima January 22, 1905: Bloody Sunday Massacre in St. Petersburg, Russia July 1905: Taft-Katsura Agreement is established, leading to the Japanese colonization of Korea September 5, 1905: Signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth (peace treaty ending Russo-Japanese War) by Japan and Russia March 15, 1917: Abdication of Czar Nicholas II of Russia November 2, 1917: British politician Arthur Balfour writes a letter to Lord Rothschild, later known as “Balfour Declaration” November 7, 1917: Beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution (October Revolution) in Russia December 11, 1917: British Field Marshal Edmund Allenby’s grand entrance into Jerusalem June 14, 1929: Young Plan (German war reparations payment plan) is finalized at Paris, France October 3, 1929: Death of German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann October 28-29, 1929: Stock Market Crash in New York City and Beginning of the Great Depression June 4, 1941: Death of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany June 22, 1941: Nazi German Invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) August 25, 1941-September 17, 1941: Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran (Operation Countenance) December 7, 1941: Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) March 5, 1953: Death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin July 27, 1953: Korean War Armistice August 19, 1953: Overthrow (Coup d’etat) of Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh January 24, 1965: Death of former Prime Minister of Great Britain Sir Winston Churchill November 11, 1965: Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Ian Smith declares a “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” from Great Britain January 7, 1989: Death of Emperor Hirohito of Japan June 3, 1989: Death of Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Supreme Leader of Iran) June 4, 1989: Tiananmen Square Massacre in Beijing, Communist China November 9, 1989: Fall of the Berlin Wall September 11, 2001: 9/11 Tragedy in New York City (World Trade Center) and Washington, D.C. (Pentagon)

Pearl Harbor: Prior Knowledge?

A navy photographer snapped this photograph of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on Sunday, December 7, 1941, just as the USS Shaw exploded. (National Archives)

“My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.” – Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, in a diplomatic cable message to the U.S. State Department on January 27, 1941
Joseph C. Grew

Adm. Harold R. Stark’s confidential Pearl Harbor Memorandum (February 1, 1941)

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark’s February 1, 1941 confidential memo acknowledging U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew’s January 27, 1941 “Pearl Harbor” cable to the State Department Source: http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2010/01/15/pearl-harbor-evidence-shady-biz-or-just-letter-ambassador-warning-attack Document: http://www.hongpong.com/files/attackrumor.gif

“There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all-out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. I rather guess that the boys in Hawaii are not precisely asleep.” – U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, from his diary entry on January 27, 1941 (Source: Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945, Volume 2 by Joseph C. Grew, p. 1283)

Lt. Com. Arthur H. McCollum’s Eight-Action Memorandum (October 7, 1940)

U.S. Navy sailors in a motor launch rescue a survivor from the water alongside the sunken battleship USS West Virginia (BB-48) during or shortly after the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. USS Tennessee (BB-43) is visible behind West Virginia. (Photo: U.S. Navy/National Archives)

“Relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time.” – U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, during a Cabinet meeting on November 7, 1941
Cordell Hull

The Imperial Japanese Navy Attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941. View from Pier 1010, looking toward the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard's drydocks, with USS Shaw (DD-373) in floating drydock YFD-2 -- and USS Nevada (BB-36) burning at right, 7 December 1941. In the foreground is the capsized USS Oglala (CM-4), with USS Helena (CL-50) further down the pier, at left. Beyond Helena is Drydock Number One, with USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) and the burning destroyers Cassin (DD-372) and Downes (DD-375). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection.) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-nyd.htm

“The President brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” – U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, November 25, 1941, from his own diary
Henry L. Stimson

1941. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear. listing to port after receiving two torpedo hits.” – U.history. Navy Photograph. shortly after the Japanese torpedo plane attack on December 7. USS California (BB-44) is at left. from his own diary Henry L.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-bbs. USS Neosho (AO-23) is at right. Stimson Source: On Active Services in Peace and War by Henry L.navy. 393 . Most smoke is from USS Arizona (BB-39). 1941.View looking down "Battleship Row" from Ford Island Naval Air Station. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. backing clear of the area. In the center are USS Maryland (BB-46) with the capsized USS Oklahoma (BB-37) alongside. (Official U. Stimson.S. December 7. my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. p.htm “When the news first came that Japan had attacked us. National Archives Collection) http://www. while the apathy and division stirred by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.S.

mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-bbs. Navy Photograph. 1941.navy. Prange. Stimson.htm “[I]t was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this [fire the first shot] so that there should remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors.” – Henry L.history. To the left of her are USS Tennessee (BB-43) and the sunken USS West Virginia (BB-48). after the Japanese attack. p. NHHC Collection) http://www.S. Stimson . U. Secretary of War Source: At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. 372 Henry L.S. USS Arizona (BB-39) is in the center. burning furiously.View looking up "Battleship Row" on December 7. (Official U.

” – President Franklin D. West Virginia. Tennessee (BB-43) with West Virginia (BB-48) outboard. and the first two are listing to port. Roosevelt. Navy. Neosho (AO-23) and California (BB-44).S. American ships located on “Battleship Row” are.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.Torpedo planes attack "Battleship Row" at about 0800 on 7 December.navy. Oklahoma and California have been torpedoed. Grey smoke in the center middle distance is from the torpedoed USS Helena (CL-50). from lower left to right: Nevada (BB-36) with flag raised at stern. but do not take a chance on losing five or six. as marked by ripples and spreading oil. Torpedo drop splashes and running tracks are visible at left and center. NHHC Photograph) http://www. Maryland (BB-46) with Oklahoma (BB-37) outboard. (Photo: U. I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers. as seen from a Japanese aircraft. at the Navy Yard's 1010 dock. Japanese writing in lower right states that the image was reproduced by authorization of the Navy Ministry. Arizona (BB-39) with Vestal (AR-4) outboard. 1941 Franklin Delano Roosevelt .history. White smoke in the distance is from Hickam Field.htm “I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing.

history.navy. 1941 soon after Wheeler Army Air Field was attacked.htm “Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war.A photograph taken by an Imperial Japanese Navy airman during the Pearl Harbor air raid shows airplanes and hangars burning at Wheeler Army Air Field in Oahu.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air. Roosevelt.” – President Franklin D. NHHC Photograph) http://www. (Photo: U. Hawaii on the morning of December 7. 1942. October 1940 Franklin Delano Roosevelt . Donation of Theodore Hutton. Navy.S.

When first we practice to deceive!” – Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832).navy. (Official U.S.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-shw. watching as USS Shaw (DD-373) explodes in the center background on December 7. but I shall say it again and again and again. Roosevelt.Sailors stand amid wrecked planes at the Ford Island seaplane base. Stanza 532-533 . USS Nevada (BB-36) is also visible in the middle background. Canto Sixth. OS2U and SOC types. 1941. Navy Photograph. with her bow headed toward the left. Marmion (1808). your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.history. Wrecked wing in the foreground is from a PBY. 1940 Franklin Delano Roosevelt “Oh! What a tangled web we weave. Planes present include PBY.htm “I have said this before.” – President Franklin D. National Archives Collection) http://www.

S. Epigrams.” – Sir John Harington (1561-1612). nothing happens by accident. none dare call it treason. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (left) shakes hands with Henry L. Henry L. you can bet it was planned that way. if it prosper. Book IV. If it happens. Stimson: Guilty of Dereliction of Duty? U. (Bettmann/CORBIS) “In politics. Epistle 5 .President Franklin Delano Roosevelt & Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson served as Secretary of War for the second time from July 10. Stimson at the White House on July 10. 1940 to September 21.” – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt Franklin Delano Roosevelt “Treason doth never prosper: what’s the reason? Why. 1945. 1940 after the Senate confirmed his nomination as Secretary of War.

Nimitz. (seated.S. center) poses with Hawaii Territorial Governor Ingram M. right) on board USS Baltimore (CA-68) at Pearl Harbor. 1944. Standing directly behind them are Vice Admiral Robert L. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www. was the Military Governor of Hawaii Territory (1943-1944) and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Army General Douglas MacArthur (far left) and Admiral William D. Army Lieutenant General Robert C.S.htm . Hawaii on July 26.history. Stainback (seated.President Franklin D. left) and Army Lieutenant General Robert C.navy. U. Leahy. Roosevelt (seated. (Collection of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Ghormley (left) and Rear Admiral William R. Richardson Jr. Conversing in the left background are U. Furlong (right).mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-g/r-ghorml. Richardson Jr.

with USS California (BB-44) in right center.Scene on the southeastern part of Ford Island. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Nazi Germany. National Archives Collection) http://www.S. 1941 – President Roosevelt imposes an oil and gasoline trade embargo on Japan. November 29. November 27. Fleet to stay in Hawaii (Pearl Harbor). March 27.htm Pearl Harbor and Prior Knowledge January 26. looking northeasterly. October 8. March 31. October 7. 1941 – Pres. 1940 – Imperial Japan. October 29. 1941). . September 16. December 7. 1940 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 into law. 1940 – U. 1940 – Imperial Japan invades French Indochina [Vietnam]. 1941 – Japanese government issues the “Part 14” message and “1:00 P. Stimson begins his duty as Secretary of War for the second time.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ca. Navy Photograph. March 11. June 16.S. 1940 – Henry L.S. 1941 – Martin-Bellinger Report (a report describing a simulated Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) is issued.navy. (Official U. November 4. September 22. Grew sends a ‘Pearl Harbor warning message’ to the State Department. listing to port after being hit by Japanese aerial torpedoes and bombs. August-Oct. 1940 – Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 between America and Japan is terminated July 10. 1940 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt orders U. State Department orders the closure of all German consulates (and Italian consulates on June 21. July 26. 1941 – Department of War and the Department of the Navy issue war warnings to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. September 27. 1940 – Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson draws the first numbers for draft under the Selective Service Act. 11. 1941 – Japanese Foreign Ministry issues the “winds” (weather) dispatch to Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura. January 27. Senator Guy Gillette and U. 1941 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Bill. 1941 – U. McCollum’s eight-action (provocation) memorandum is issued. 1941 – Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa enters Honolulu aboard Japanese ship Nitta Maru. September 24. 1941 – U.S. and Fascist Italy sign the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.history. Congressman Martin Dies attempt to investigate Japanese espionage in Hawaii.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. September 26. 1941 – Japanese Foreign Ministry issues the “bomb plot” dispatch to the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu. 1941 – Japan begins withdrawing all its merchant vessels from the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt orders seizure of all Japanese assets in America in response to Japanese conquest of French Indo-China August 1.S.S.” message to Ambassador Nomura. 1940 – America imposes a total embargo on all scrap metal shipments to Imperial Japan. 1941 – U.M.

Summary of the Pearl Harbor Attack: # 2.S. three cruisers (USS Helena (CL-50). 128 damaged) # Bombardment and attack on Pearl Harbor. 31 damaged. and the Navy Yard . USS Honolulu (CL-48). Marines. USS Pennsylvania. Navy sailors. several women and children) # 1. CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet) headquarters building. and Ford Island # Japanese failure to attack oil storage tanks. Navy aircrafts – 92 lost.282 American people wounded # USS Arizona and USS Oklahoma were sunk. USS Maryland.S. Army aircrafts – 77 lost.S. the submarine base. Wheeler Field.S. Schofield Barracks. Hickam Field [later Hickam Air Force Base]. USS California and USS West Virginia were sunk and later raised # Four battleships (USS Nevada. U. USS Tennessee). and four destroyers were damaged # 169 American military aircraft lost (U. 218 U. Army soldiers. 109 U. and USS Raleigh (CL-7)).402 American people killed in action (2008 U.S.

Secretary of the Navy (July 11. 1942 edition of Time magazine. Left: Frank Knox. U. President of the United States and Time magazine’s Man of the Year.S. 1940 edition of Time magazine.Left: Franklin Delano Roosevelt (January 30. Right: Secretary of Cordell Hull. Right: Henry L. 1945). 1944). Stimson. U. 1882-April 12. 1944). Luce were members of Skull & Bones. 1942 edition of Time magazine. 1945). . appears on the front cover of the September 7. Secretary of War (July 10. 1940-April 28.S. Secretary of War Henry L. a secret society at Yale University. appears on the front cover of the August 25. Stimson and Time magazine Editor-in-Chief Henry R. U. Secretary of State (March 4. 1940-September 21. appears on the front cover of the January 8.S. 1933-November 30. appears on the front cover of the January 5. 1941 edition of Time magazine.

appears on the front cover of the February 15. 1941 edition of Time magazine. Hideki Tojo was tried as a “Class A” war criminal in Tokyo. appears on the front cover of the November 3. 1943 edition of Time magazine. 1941 edition of Time magazine. 1944). . Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (April 1941-February 1944). Osami Nagano was tried as a “Class A” war criminal in Tokyo. Minister of the Navy (October 18. appears on the front cover of the July 3. Japan after World War II. Right: Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano. Prime Minister of Japan (1941-1944) and Minister of War (1940-1944). Left: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto appears on the front cover of the December 22.Left: General Hideki Tojo. 1944 edition of Time magazine. 1941-July 17. Japan after World War II. Right: Admiral Shigetarō Shimada.

] Grew. at the same time that it was sufficiently important to justify his passing it on…” Crocker straightway relayed it to Ambassador [Joseph C.B. p. and at 1800 [Japan time] on January 27 [.S. This rumor may have had nothing to do with either Yamamoto’s scheme or Uchida’s work. Ambassador to Japan from June 14.”” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Nevertheless. was the U.” But what steps did Grew or other American officials in Japan take to track the rumor to its “many sources” and try to determine whether the Japanese actually had such a plan under way? On the basis of information currently available. one of the most remarkable ever to flash between an American ambassador and the State Department. in the event of trouble with the United States. 1965. “In any case. a mere twenty days after Yamamoto wrote his historic letter to Oikawa. sometime near the end of January a rumor reached Ricardo Rivera-Schreiber. It may have been merely a coincidental upsurge of a swashbuckling notion which had intrigued Japanese fiction writers for years.Joseph Clark Grew (May 27. 1932 to December 8. 1880-May 25. Harvard 1902). one disturbing enough for him to go immediately to his friend Edward S. A. and I was quite certain that he would not mislead me in anything that he might pass on to me. to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. Peru’s veteran minister to Tokyo. 1941] they sent it off: “My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned. So. somewhere along the line. the hint of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor came out. 31 . I had known him for years. “I knew him very well. he had “full confidence” in Rivera-Schreiber. Rivera-Schreiber said that “he considered it a fantastic rumor. whose credulity it strained to the utmost. appeared on the front cover of the November 12. 1934 edition of Time magazine. Crocker. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information. on the advice of his naval attaché Grew composed a dispatch. Prange. the answer appears to be “none.” Grew testified. first secretary of the United States Embassy. He handed it over to his encoding staff. 1941. Whatever the source.

Hawaii in 1941 (Source: At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. Stinnett) . Prange) Right: Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa in 1941 (Source: Day of Deceit by Robert B. Japanese Consul General at Honolulu.Japanese Espionage in Hawaii & ‘Operation Hawaii’ The Consulate General of Japan at Honolulu in 1941 (above) was located within 7 miles of Pearl Harbor. Source: Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. Stinnett) Left: Nagao Kita. (Photo: FBI Files.

Stinnett) .(Source: Day of Deceit by Robert B.

over many generations the men aware of the value of such intelligence have handed down a mighty commandment: Thou Shalt Not Establish a Habit Pattern. Schedules and routines! How beguiling they are.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Yoshikawa had graduated from Japan’s naval academy. awaiting Customs clearance. including Roosevelt. At first Kita. The Japanese planners had to know where to put their finger on target ships. Yoshikawa presented the consul general with a letter from Captain Bunjiro Yamaguchi of the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff. In August 1940 his chief. He was moping unhappily when a Navy personnel officer told him that the service still held a place for him. The letter enclosed six $100 bills for use in Yoshikawa’s mission…After a flurry of bows and assorted pleasantries Okuda escorted Yoshikawa from Kita’s office to meet the rest of the staff. Pacific Fleet and the American bases at Guam. He was flexible and adjusted to the needs and circumstances of the moment. and Pearl Harbor. he could devote his abundant energies exclusively to his job in Honolulu. in the late 1930s. Pacific Fleet. Roosevelt had circulated a secret memorandum declaring: “Every Japanese citizen or noncitizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or who has any connection with their officers and men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.S. 72-75 . 1936. Yoshikawa received simple but compressive instructions: He must improve his English and become an expert on the U. A graduate of Eta Jima. a luxurious passenger liner…He hurried along Bishop Street to Pier 8. he must forgo all hope of future advancement. a trained intelligence agent. Japanese naval authorities decided that a navy officer was needed to observe military operations on Oahu and spy on the Pacific Fleet. p. chubby body gave him the look of a prizefighter. and then to assemble them into an intelligence picture for use by Japanese torpedo and bombing pilots…Morimura was allowed to operate freely throughout 1941. On December 6 Morimura’s work was complete. Okuda immediately took him to the consulate and ushered him into Kita’s office.S. if average. the Japanese Navy had slipped ashore its top secret spy as unobtrusively as any tourist. Honolulu’s new Japanese consul general. and was something of a social lion. However.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. The position was a responsible diplomatic job. Emanuel’s target was the Japanese spy Tadashi Morimura. Yoshikawa was a walking encyclopedia of the United States Navy. directing him to place major emphasis on Oahu. Stinnett. assigned to maintain surveillance on suspected Japanese agents. On this particular Boat Day. he had appeared well on the way to advancement in his chosen career when a serious stomach ailment forced his retirement.S. disembarked from Tatsuta Maru on March 14. to obtain Hawaiian maps including photographs. 1941. Fleet and its bases.S. and alert. After four years of intensive study he took the Foreign Ministry’s English-language examinations. American authorities. after being duly wined and dined. Eta Jima. When Okuda draped a welcoming lei around Yoshikawa’s neck and shepherded his charge through customs. This seemed to Yoshikawa a small price to pay for a return to his beloved Navy. But by early December 1941 the American commanders had neglected this cardinal rule. informed him that he was going to Honolulu as a diplomat and would report by diplomatic code on the daily status of the U. Now he had the necessary cover for his true mission. thick hair. She had arrived during the night and was anchored offshore in Mamala Basy. played an enthusiastic. game of golf. including Short. In the Intelligence Division of the Naval General Staff. and a few weeks later he became a junior diplomat.“As early as August 10. p. Prange. Nagao Kita. wondered whether this man could make a good spy. Captain Masao Nishida. These people would know him only as Tadashi Morimura.” Emanuel was the Navy’s senior undercover agent in Hawaii. like Okuda. Kita’s broad face. But Tokyo had not been mistaken. Morimura’s posting aroused suspicions within America’s intelligence community. detached. Morimura was able to supply Admiral Yamamoto with highly accurate bombing charts of Pearl Harbor and other U. Actually he was Takeo Yoshikawa. His real name was Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. To assist him. always calm. He dressed well. His job called for him to gather fleet operational details. Captain Bunjiro Yamaguchi gave him his final instructions just before he sailed. 84-85 “Here began what would persist throughout the year – report after report accurately identifying the schedules and routines of the U. because he was young and not listed in the official Japanese Diplomatic Registry. Japan rarely sent twenty-seven-year-olds to fill such important consular posts. he paid courtesy calls on local dignitaries. experienced members of the foreign service. who was scheduled to assume the post of chancellor in the Japanese Consulate. Army and Navy targets on Oahu. The Nitta Maru was scheduled to dock earlier than expected. so easy to follow! What a comforting sense they give of security and predictability! For this reason. bushy brows. Manila. patterns plus excellent reporting from the consulate enabled them to do just that. never curtailed his espionage. his superiors sent him a young man whose name appeared as “Tadashi Morimura” on the passenger list of the liner Nitta Maru as she nosed into Pier 8 in Honolulu Harbor on March 27.S. A widower whose only son attended school in Japan. reliable U. His years on the Asian mainland had given him the Chinese gentleman’s gift of infinite leisure. under the cover name of Morimura he had been detailed to Hawaii for espionage purposes. usually assigned to seasoned. and flat pug nose above a short. his mission was to obtain a surreptitious photograph of a suspected Japanese navy spy arriving under diplomatic cover on the Nitta Maru.

the western part of Pearl Harbor held little interest for Yoshikawa. Neither he nor the other consulate members knew for sure whether or not submarine nets guarded the entrance. but they went on that assumption. northwest of the naval base. John Yoshige Mikami…Yoshikawa also had at his frequent disposal [Richard] Kotoshirodo’s 1937 Ford along with its owner.“Soon after his arrival Yoshikawa took several sight-seeing trips around Oahu. However. Mikami and Kotoshirodo often drove Yoshikawa to Pearl City. they flew rapidly out of sight. and each time he did so. he observed that a large number of ships always were in port on Saturdays and Sundays. Prange. Yoshikawa charted every bit of information he secured. contained a second-floor room which commanded a view of Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field. In general. he wore a change of clothes. On his initial expedition and for many other drives around Pearl Harbor. Within a week of his arrival the agent had visited the Pearl Harbor area. the teahouse. deciding that he had pushed his luck far enough or else had seen all he could see. observing the terrain and keeping a sharp eye out for military installations and airfields. The place charmed Yoshikawa. he left the consulate very early and went to some vantage point. He observed that the battleships moored in pairs. and he never developed satisfactory notes on them. As the year progressed. There he observed the number of planes. After using this site ten times. But as the spy became more surefooted. he tried to reach the channel mouth by going west of Waipahu and then swinging south. and Yoshikawa feared to risk moving close enough for a good view. and prowl about. Yoshikawa hired a taxi driver. their general direction of flight. but once the planes took off. He knew this to be a primitive method. but it was the only one he could use. 75-76 . and Kotoshirodo sometimes accompanied them. In these early days Okuda occasionally went along. The cane fields at Aiea gave the best view of all. Occasionally he would take a jitney to Honolulu bound for any point beyond Pearl Harbor. who became Yoshikawa’s trusted and valuable assistant. In due course the consul general introduced him to a Japanese-style teahouse called the Shuncho-ro. Yoshikawa dared not risk visiting the pier more than twice or three times a week. he broke off the habit.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. He dared not risk field glasses. Despite its value. in addition to the trips the two men made together. and times of departure and return. Kita gave Yoshikawa the title Chancellor in the consulate as a cover for his real activities. Yoshikawa coached Kotoshirodo to the point where. so he could never be sure exactly where they went or if they changed direction. the Shuncho-ro had a telescope which Yoshikawa used to advantage. which would have drawn attention to him. Okuda eased out…When Yoshikawa first arrived. he wanted to see the channel which Hickam Field blocked from view on the eastern side. More important. for the proprietress came from his native prefecture in Japan and the geishas reminded him of home. To check air patrols. In time a pattern emerged. Kotoshirodo could scout the Fleet by himself or with Mikami at Yoshikawa’s direction. located in Alewa Heights. Yoshikawa would dress in laborer’s garb and hide amid the cane. Although too far removed for precise checking with the naked eye. p. This area near the West Loch was closely guarded. He recorded patrol flights carefully. On a pier at the end of the peninsula there Yoshikawa could clearly see Pearl Harbor and Ford Island and its airstrips. Seki went with him to observe ships in Pearl Harbor. With true Japanese meticulousness. get off at Aiea. so that the inshore ship was practically impervious to torpedo attack. But one thing he soon discovered – north of Oahu the Americans conducted scarcely any patrols at all. From a point on Aiea Heights he had an excellent view of Pearl Harbor. Spying on the submarines was difficult for Yoshikawa. By the end of April 1941 Yoshikawa had acquired a number of espionage locations. while the best look at the submarine base called for a stop on Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa.

Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa arrived in Honolulu Harbor aboard Nitta Maru on March 27. (Photo: http://digitallibrary.edu/assetserver/controller/view/search/CHS-48069) Nitta Maru (新田丸).Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa arrived in Honolulu Harbor (above) aboard Japanese passenger cruise ship Nitta Maru on March 27. a Japanese ship built by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding & Engineering Co.usc. in Nagasaki from 1938 to 1939. Nitta Maru was anchored at Pier 8 in Honolulu Harbor. (Note: The photo of Honolulu Harbor. 1941. located near the Aloha Tower. appears in the port of Nagasaki in March 1940. including the Aloha Tower and Pier 8. . 1941 under the Japanese pseudonym “Tadashi Morimura”. was taken in September 1931).

Dillon. Katherine V. and J.(Source: The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor. Goldstein. Michael Wenger (published in 1991)) . The Original Photographs by Donald M.

which immediately relayed it to the Naval General Staff. For a time. which. and activities of the U. Pacific Fleet. On June 16 the State Department ordered all twenty-four German consulates. disposition. with Magic intercepts giving a blow-by-blow account of Japanese transactions.S. There it all became grist for the intelligence mill. They would photograph Japanese material and carefully put it back exactly where they found it. too. enjoyed the closest possible relations with the Foreign Office and used its representatives abroad for espionage and other intelligence purposes. Hirohito’s consulates probably were of more value open than closed. and Army Counterintelligence had an ally in the cloak-anddagger business – Chief of Police William A. and Okuda extracted the germane items.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Nor did Roosevelt and Hull want to cause trouble in the Pacific while Hitler was brewing such a storm in the Atlantic. took over as acting consul general…Gunji assured Okuda that he would not find reporting on the U. In turn. as well as certain other agencies. closed not later than July 10. He considered these agents “definitely a source of potential danger. True. it would have been a fearsome blow to Japan’s entire intelligence system. So long as he stayed off the military reservation and avoided restricted areas. Prange. by turning the lock on the door at 1742 Nuuanu Street in Honolulu.“It was a matter of common knowledge that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was the hotbed of espionage in Oahu. sabotage. a frail. checking on Fleet movements presented no special problems.” So from New Year’s Day the FBI. the zealous [FBI agent Robert L. “The Consul General himself was always under suspicion no matter who his errand boys were. p. 1941. 151-152 . But Okuda was too thorough to depend only on newspapers. Navy in Hawaii. What was public information in Hawaii became classified as soon as it reached the Foreign Ministry. He made a practice of taking a taxi to the harbor area. This request originated in the Naval General Staff.] Herron. numbers. late that month.] Shivers took dead aim on the 234 consular agents “who had been appointed by the Consul General of Japan” in Honolulu.S. and movements of Richardson’s warships. the Japanese Foreign Office requested Consul General Kiichi Gunji to send regular reports on the size. Then the Japanese would have had to resort to other methods of gathering their intelligence on Kimmel’s ships and Oahu’s military installations. For various reasons the State Department preferred to keep the Japanese consulates open. Edgar Hoover’s headquarters on this matter since at least April 1940. It also formed a key link in the long chain of Japanese Naval Intelligence. especially to [Rear Admiral Minoru] Maeda’s Third Bureau. the consulate’s treasurer. 1940. 70-71 “While the Japanese Embassy and the State Department were arranging [Lieutenant Commander Itaru] Tachibana’s future. Had Washington closed all Japanese consulates by the early autumn of 1941. with the closing of Kita’s consulate the whole idea of striking the U. Seki set forth to scout the U. Undoubtedly the American housecleaning gave Kita and Okuda many anxious moments. The Foreign Office secured for Seki’s use a copy of Jane’s Fighting Ships. Japanese agents had long been active in Hawaii. Washington could have dried up Japan’s primary source of information on the U. On May 7 the Honolulu Star-Bulletin told its readers that upon request of the FBI the Honolulu Police Department had “created the espionage bureau of one lieutenant and four officers effective January 1.” As an afterthought. then returning to the consulate to draft a report. Seki broke no law. So the consulate remained open. and when Roosevelt based the Fleet in those waters in May 1940. Otojiro Okuda. the Germans felt the weight of American displeasure. fifth columns. The Honolulu press was full of articles on such subjects as espionage. p. and sent them to Tokyo by commercial telegraph. At that time the press consistently reported on the size. rather sickly looking man of thirty-nine.” In 1941 this consulate was one of the busiest in Japan’s diplomatic service.S. conveniently citing exact names and times of arrival and departure. The local press reported them faithfully. un-American activities. as Gunji had predicted. Prange. authoritative information on the United States. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor could have passed from the realm of reality back into the shades of fantasy whence Yamamoto had recently managed to lift it. Okuda swung into his espionage quickly and efficiently. He required no more than an hour to check on Pearl Harbor. the FBI arrested twenty-nine persons accused of spying for Germany. which lay within seven miles of the consulate. 151 “All things considered. After about two months of practice in learning the types of American vessels. watching directly from the taxi windows. Fleet. Fleet difficult because the press covered all its movements.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. but it had to worry about another indirect threat. He sent his agents to check on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and to verify press stories…The only individual present with any qualifications for the task proved to be Kohichi Seki. which needed up-to-date. p. He had attended the Naval Academy at Eta Jima but had been honorably discharged because his health did not meet Navy standards. Prange. Gabrielson and his men. Gunji returned to Japan on September 11. Then. According to one story. The prospect of having the consulate in Honolulu closed was one matter Kita could not accept with his usual insouciance.S. it also closed the Italian consulates on June 21. Pacific Fleet. and his deputy.” said [Major General Charles D. This consulate provided such an excellent source of information that the Military Intelligence agencies begged State to hold off. they had a sleeper spy in Hawaii who had been on ice for several years at a princely salary against just such an eventuality.S.”” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. like its Army counterpart. Determined to track the potential Japanese espionage and sabotage establishment in Hawaii to its source.S. In particular. coded them. Then. None of these moves seriously inconvenienced the Japanese. He had been prodding J. Navy DIO. the United States had hired “a whole gang of burglary experts” to break into the consulate at New York. and foreign agents. for “activities of an improper and unwarranted character. Gunji relied heavily on the Honolulu newspapers for his information on the U.

We could not censor the dispatches. As chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee. He specifically cited “the activities of Japanese consular officials in Hawaii and in the Western States. On October 3 [Nagao] Kita “referred to Senator Gillette’s allegations as ‘uninformed rumors.” Before taking final action. U.” he “made arrangements for 52 witnesses to proceed to Washington for public hearings early in September 1941. I see no reason why this consulate should be investigated. On October 2.] Wilkinson later testified: “We could not censor the mails. 255-256 Congressman Martin Dies Jr. McGuire. Prange. he told Hull. On October 11 – even as the “bomb plot” message bounced around Washington – Hull told Gillette that he strongly opposed congressional investigation of Japan’s consular officials lest such action interfere with the sensitive American-Japanese diplomatic conversations. September 21.” That included his own bailiwick. Gillette (right. and reports were going back to Japan.” Kita need not have worried. including U. that the plans of the Dies Committee “for exhaustive investigation of Japanese subversive activities” had been called off. p. So he implored Gillette to drop the matter. The secretary agreed that the outlook in the Pacific was dark. And so the story appeared in the American press on Sunday. acting attorney general. Dies wrote to the attorney general on August 27 to ascertain whether the hearings “would be satisfactory from the standpoint of the administration’s plans as they related to the Japanese.Proposed Gillette-Dies Congressional Investigation (August-October 1941) “The fact that the Japanese were spying on military and naval activities was no news to the Americans. By August Dies and his committee had accumulated enough evidence to conclude that Japanese subversion represented a real threat to the United States.” And he added. But they “were helpless to stop it. persuaded Congressman Dies to cancel the public hearings and terminate the investigation. The previous day. After conferring with Roosevelt. the secretary of state. as he had Roosevelt. and all hands knew that espionage was going on all along. Senator Guy M.” No one except the Japanese knew how close to home Gillette’s remarks struck. (left. both men were on the right track. Gillette deferred to the secretary of state’s wishes. and repeated the substance of his conversation with the President. In order “to arouse the whole American people into a sense of impending crisis. Dies was primarily interested in Communist machinations in the United States. in conjunction with Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado. We could not prevent the taking of photographs.S. “The Japanese consulate here was not engaged in any such activities. replied that the President. …Therefore. both had studied it carefully.” But Dies did not accept McGuire’s letter as final and continued to prod the executive branch. however. Secretary of State Cordell Hull.” [Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Commander (later Vice Admiral) Theodore S. were alarmed at what they found. We could not arrest Japanese suspects. and thought action should be taken without delay. And it is another irony of the Pearl Harbor story that at the same time the Japanese intensified their activities on the intelligence front.” he begged. Secretary of State Cordell Hull requested that Senator Gillette terminate the proposed investigation. Both men had been interested in the problem for some time. He also knew that the United States was woefully unprepared for war in the Pacific. Democrat-Texas) planned to hold public hearings on the Japanese espionage in Hawaii in September 1941 until the Roosevelt Administration. 1941 until U. Dies told newspapermen that “the potential Japanese spy system in this country is greater than the Germans ever dreamed of having in the Low Countries.” Several political leaders in Washington longed to do something about this deplorable situation. “I do not know of any subversive activities that Senator Gillette mentions. What is more. Senator. but he feared that such an investigation would upset the diplomatic talks then under way between Tokyo and Washington. he [Hull] could not approve measures that would offend Japan or might even provoke her to action. But he had also been directing an investigation of Japanese propaganda and espionage.” On September 8 Matthew F. he introduced a Senate resolution calling for an investigation of Japanese subversion. According to Dies.S. In view of the tension between the two countries and the critical international situation.S. There was nothing we could do to stop it. “Please.” In less than two weeks Senator Gillette took action.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. that his committee would comply with the administration’s wishes. Senator Guy M. telephoned Hull. Gillette of Iowa and Congressman Martin Dies of Texas planned to investigate Japanese subversion. Dies return to his office. Democrat-Iowa) introduced a Senate resolution calling for an investigation into Japanese espionage activities in Hawaii on October 2. Gillette’s proposed investigation swiftly ran afoul of the State Department.’” And he insisted. and the attorney general all felt “quite strongly that hearings such as you contemplate would be inadvisable. “I appeal to you – don’t rock the boat!” Like Dies. “It would be a tremendous force to reckon with in the event of war. .

248-249 . “to foresee exactly.S.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. with the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond it.) In effect this message placed over Pearl Harbor an invisible grid whereon Yoshikawa and his assistants could plot the position of each individual ship in its specific anchorage. tied up at wharves. 2. (Designate types and classes briefly. Fleet movements. 83 clearly reflected a new orientation: Henceforth. (Official U.S. 1941) Aerial view of the Naval Operating Base.mil/photos/images/g100000/g182874c. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.) Area C. East Loch. Prange.history. Heretofore Tokyo had been principally interested in U.navy. Area B. we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important). whether or not the U. Navy Photograph. Area E. p. we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible: 1. at least two weeks before hand. now in the collections of the National Archives) http://www.) Area A. 1941. at the behest of Naval Intelligence. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers. warships. looking southwest on October 30. Fleet would be in harbor on the designated day of attack. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.S. The airfield in the upper left-center is the Army’s Hickam Field. “It became essential. Waters adjacent to the Island south and wet of Ford Island. Area D. Middle Loch.htm “But for a successful attack on Kimmel’s warships.S. to have the Hawaiian attack air force crews familiar with the topography of the Hawaiian district and U. This dispatch became famous as the “bomb plot” message…For a number of reasons the U. “Strict secret” Message No. the Japanese needed exact information about the ships when they were in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.S. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf. to figure out the status of patrols around Pearl Harbor.The “Bomb Plot” Message (September 24. the Foreign Ministry dispatched the most significant set of instructions thus far sent to the Honolulu consulate.” So on September 24.” Tachibana recalled. Army did not translate this dispatch until October 9. buoys and in docks. Now the Navy wanted precise information on the exact location of vessels in harbor as well. (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like. Ford Island Naval Air Station is in the center. and promptly establish firm and reserve intelligence channels through which timely information could be obtained. West Loch and the communicating water routes. across the channel.

1941 (Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.The “Bomb Plot” Message No. 83 issued on September 24. Layton) .

(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton) .

handled the traffic for November [1941]. p.” What more evidence could one ask of a fox in the chicken coop? Yet we have no record that this message caused the smallest stir in Washington. David Sarnoff.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.” (2) Japan-U. relations: KITANOKAZE [sic] KUMORI [“North wind cloudy”]. visited Honolulu in mid-November. But the Japanese messages which really raised a fuss in ONI and G-2 were two which the Foreign Ministry dispatched to Nomura on November 29: …In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations).” Just how difficult a tussle.I. Their consulate.): “NISHI. When this is heard please destroy all code papers. It was detailed. Relay to Rio de Janeiro. Tokyo’s asking for information on a twice-a-week basis indicated current.S.” McCollum testified. Washington directed Rochefort to establish “a listening watch on the most likely frequencies. please take extra care to maintain secrecy. if any. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. “KITA. relations. Sarnoff had with his conscience we cannot say. Results were nil. Here for the first and only time Tokyo in so many words equated the consular reports with the relations between Japan and the United States.E. so presumably his patriotism overcame his legalistic scruples. He “felt that the situation between us and Japan was extremely explosive and would erupt at any time…” He believed that if Japan went to war with the United States. Prange. That in itself distinguished this particular dispatch and the Honolulu consulate from the stream of intercepts inundating Army and Naval Intelligence. San Francisco. etc. but at a rate of twice a week.] Rochefort was. p. 356-357 “Kita promptly answered Tokyo with one of Yoshikawa’s meticulous reports on November 18. make your ‘ships in harbor report’ irregular. and suggestive. he and his unit would have had little difficulty in decoding and translating the messages between Tokyo and Honolulu. This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. On November 15 Tokyo enjoined its Honolulu consulate: “As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical. “the only officer in our Navy who is a top-flight cryptographer and radio man. (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE [“West wind clear”]. 355-356 “Sometime after December 7. Malaya and N.S. not the Purple. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME [sic] [“East wind rain”]. one of the most significant tip-offs of the year slipped by unnoticed. (1) In case of a Japan-U. Forward as urgent intelligence. in McCollum’s words.“While those in on Magic paid fascinated attention to the diplomatic messages. Tokyo promptly followed this up with an amplification: When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous.” (3) Japan-British relations. we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: (1) If it is Japan-U. Although you are no doubt aware. precise. “where they covered on a twenty-four hour basis one or more frequencies in addition to all the known broadcasts from Tokyo.” So he sent four language officers to Aiea. Tokyo charged the consulate to “take extra care to maintain secrecy.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. (including Thai. Mayfield. Tokyo’s “winds” dispatches went through the mill on November 28 and 26 respectively. And the request to report at irregular intervals was an obvious precaution against establishing a habit pattern. at last American counterintelligence had access to the files at which it had gazed so hungrily for so long. Shivers told Fielder that he knew “the entire espionage ring centered around [sic] the Japanese Consulate.” Yet at this very time [Captain Irving] Mayfield of the DIO [Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence Office] initiated an action which could have blown Yoshikawa’s mission and indeed the success of Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor project sky-high. with fine impartiality. But he held a reserve commission as an Army colonel. continuing interest. “We were all looking for it…” And so far as he knew. arranged through Sarnoff “to obtain in a roundabout way certain information from the files of his company. But Washington was far from asleep at the switch. Mexico City. 360-361 . spread its business by month among the Honolulu radio companies. and that anything he did might start the overt act which would create war. The Japanese consulate used the J-19. let alone inspired anyone to tip off either Kimmel or Short. Buenos Aires. Prange. Thus. “HIGASHI.S.” Unfortunately the Navy did not translate this highly important message until December 3. the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. and who also has a thorough knowledge of the Japanese language. “we were continuing to look for that after the bombs had started falling on the fleet…” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. McCollum put his office on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis early in November.” Since he received the J-19 keys within twelve hours of their solution in Washington. but diplomatic immunity prevented his investigation. Finally.and the cutting off of international communications. who had been trying unsuccessfully to procure copies of the Japanese consulate’s messages.S. Seldom has so much significance been crammed into so few phrases.R. But luck still favored the Japanese. and it so happened that MacKay Radio. not RCA.” (2) Japan-Russia relations. as it had in Mayfield’s case long since. president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). From then on both services knocked themselves out to intercept the implementing messages. Yet time still afforded Washington the opportunity to alert Hawaii’s defenders. it would begin with an attack on the Fleet. Prange. [Commander Joseph J. p.” The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end. diplomatic code.

but Yoshikawa saw the anchorage and Hickam Field clearly.000 bonus at the end of each year. he estimated the number of planes by counting the hangars. conveniently near Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field. so he no longer had to waste time gathering statistical data. Friedel. at which time Kuehn discussed intelligence plans with other officers of the Naval General Staff. The news from Hawaii was good: no barrage balloons over Pearl Harbor. Kuehn also remained discreetly silent about an interview with Kanji Ogawa in Japan that same year.”” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Naturally all these goings-on did not pass unnoted. He worried about Kuehn’s ability to do the job. “As we sent these final.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin. 310 “About 1500 [Hawaii Time. Ogawa also gave Kuehn instructions to lie low. Once more Kita looked over his draft and pronounced it good. The Kuehns had incurred the suspicions of the District Intelligence Office. Since April 1936 he and his wife. In his bird’s eye view of both Wheeler and Hickam. Duly approved. The entire transmitter fitted into a suitcase and had a range of 100 miles. although he had earned the reputation at headquarters in Tokyo of being a “money eater. and an aerial view. December 6] Yoshikawa set out for his last check on the Fleet. then swung off the highway to the Pearl City pier. He and his associates studied them briefly but carefully. The little aircraft then flew east of Aiea and back to Honolulu. although this came out later. If war came between Japan and the United States. firsthand experience of air conditions. 479 . and his past studies plus on-the-spot experience made him sensitive to any change in the military situation. In his original statement to the FBI of January 1942. The general picture which Kuehn’s career presents is that of a well-bred. and the ships snuggled against their docks were old friends. and their family had been established in Honolulu. no long-range air patrol. and signed an initial contract for two years at a salary of $2. Mikami remembered taking him to windward Oahu five or six times. but one could not expect to have everything one’s own way. During this trip he could see Wheeler Field and noted the number and direction of runways. which had proved a hard nut to crack. he was to use the equipment to send messages to Japanese submarines waiting off Oahu. 254-255 “On October 25 Yoshikawa’s path crossed that of a man whose case is tailor-made to prove the validity of the consular spy’s strictures on “other kind of people. with the contract renewable at the close of each period if all went well.” In early autumn Yoshikawa expanded his “sightseeing” from buses and cars into the air. they were passed to the Naval General Staff. Then he returned to his office to prepare his report. Of course. It showed him where any destroyers or other craft might be cruising around or near Oahu. his last message. the entire flight having taken no more than twenty or thirty minutes. Prange.” As each of Kita’s last messages reached the Foreign Office in Tokyo. and by 1938 or early 1939 the DIO had spotted Kuehn as a probable agent for either Germany or Japan. His taxi took him to Aiea. which lies almost in the center of Oahu. p. Kuehn made no mention of the interesting fact that during the period 1928 and 1930 he belonged to the German Navy’s secret police. Perhaps most valuable of all. The Japanese renewed Kuehn’s contract in 1938. On one of these jaunts Yoshikawa tried to enter Schofield Barracks. p. He donned his brightest aloha shirt and took one of his geisha friends for a tourist flight over Oahu. He spent some time in Japan in 1935 and again in 1936. or both. This trip gave Yoshikawa an overall picture of Oahu. a glance at Hickam. although with some misgivings. of Pearl Harbor.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.” Tomioka recalled. Near the southwest coast of the island the plane swung eastward across Ewa and north of Pearl Harbor.” In March 1939 Ogawa stopped off in Honolulu enroute to Washington to give Kuehn a portable radio transmitter of special design with a “quickly devised” aerial. The Nazi party could have decided quit4e early that this man had the temperament for espionage. both alone and with Kotoshirodo. Prange.000 a month plus $6. Nor did he confide the still more interesting detail that he had been under contract to the Japanese Navy since 1935. the Kuehns settled in Honolulu and made themselves agreeable. albeit restricted. Prange. followed by the second an hour later. he had no difficulty in trying to fit his information into the modified “bomb plot” categories. at 1801.” This individual was Herr Doktor Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn. crucial messages. “I prayed fervently to our ancestral gods that all would go well. Suffice it to say of Kuehn’s background that he had joined the Nazi party in 1930. the carriers and a number of heavy cruisers had slipped through Japan’s fingers and might spell trouble. These submarines would relay the messages to Japan. Therefore. In that year he contacted Captain Tadao Yokoi. He also attempted a career in real estate and in the furniture business. Tomioka set his encoders to work on each dispatch and sent off the first one at 1700 Japanese time. “but the sentry at the gate refused them permission…because Mikami’s taxi did not have proper identification plates. where they wound up a few hours apart in Tomioka’s Operations Section. fairly well-educated drifter. the bulk of the Fleet snugly in the great base. Ogawa accepted Kuehn. Yoshikawa went to the commercial telegraph office to dispatch this. p. Its final sentence read: “It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm. it confirmed the accuracy of his observations from ground level. Twice the agent and his faithful driver visited Wahiawa. with its excellent view of Kaneohe Naval Air Station. After processing it. He scouted numerous areas besides Pearl Harbor in trips scattered over many weeks. not so much because he mistrusted his recruit as because the man appeared too nervous and jumpy for such an assignment.“By September Yoshikawa had gleaned all he could about the installations at Pearl Harbor. On these trips Yoshikawa directed Mikami to follow along the Kokokahi Road. without success. ostensibly to enable him to study Japanese at the University of Hawaii. Military security restrictions forbade sightseeing planes to fly over Pearl Harbor. no torpedo nets around the ships.

Yoshikawa was contemplating suicide when the navy offered him a job with its general staff’s intelligence division.S. When Consul General Kita introduced Yoshikawa to a Japanese-style teahouse in the mountainside Alewa Heights section. just north of downtown Honolulu.S. He was given the title of chancellor. was introduced to his co-workers and settled into a cottage in the consular compound. was not an important part of the [Japanese spy] net. There. which were concentrated on Oahu. . Telephone taps had provided little of value. From other nearby slopes.S. the newcomer was Takeo Yoshikawa. the young man studied English and pored over everything available on the U. From the front windows. he and his helpers got virtually all the information they needed by legal. lay the army’s Hickam Field. U. adjacent to the naval installation.S. he took a minibus to the cane fields at Aiea to the north of the two bases. that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence organizations followed leads that led elsewhere. Yoshikawa wisely did not overuse any one observation post or method as he spied on activities in Pearl Harbor and Hickam airfield. although they surely knew. a nisei consular clerk. the nearly landlocked U. It did not take long for Yoshikawa to scout out the various U. his longish. relying instead on memory. since the consular staff assumed that the Americans were eavesdropping. Sometimes. Its intelligence value lay in the view from the second floor. the affable intelligence officer knew it would be his favorite operational site. which only Kita and Okuda knew would not be his real job. the focus of his attention was Pearl Harbor. Retired after only two years. The plan called for an aerial assault on Hawaii as the opening move of a war that seemed inevitable as tensions rose between the United States and Japan. he briefly served aboard a battleship. a naval reserve ensign. Army and Navy bases on central. black hair combed back–received a lei greeting from an official of the Japanese Consulate. He supplemented his observations with items of interest gleaned from daily newspapers. he used one or more of the consulate’s personnel to complement his intelligence gathering. then underwent submarine and pilot training. Navy and its Pacific Ocean bases. In reality. For the next four years. chief of the naval district intelligence offices. Other times. which might be guarded by anti-submarine nets. Yoshikawa avoided illegally entering military bases or stealing classified documents.S. 1941. Not only was the teahouse strategically situated but it also fit his penchant for hard drinking and pursuing women. Yoshikawa began by familiarizing himself with the principal Hawaiian islands and their military installations. reporting his observations to Tokyo by coded telegraph messages. Without telling them what he was doing with their input. despite its presumed involvement in espionage. the Japanese liner Nitta Maru nuzzled against Pier 8 near Honolulu’s famous Aloha Tower on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. fleet and its anchorages. whose papers identified him as Tadashi Morimura. Just to the left. counterintelligence agencies were hampered by laws that prohibited them from probing deeply into the consulate’s communications. The teahouse conveniently had a telescope or two that enhanced the view. posing as junior diplomat Morimura. a Japanese-Hawaiian who often performed chores for the consulate. southern and eastern Oahu. Predictably. the spy used a 1937 Ford chauffeured by Richard Kotoshirodo. Vice Consul Otojiro Okuda guided the young man. A close look at the harbor entrance. It was not surprising. Pacific Fleet anchorage on the south coast of the island. he was to keep current on the status of the U. eluded him because both sides of the entrance were restricted areas. he frequently relied on a hired cab driven by John Mikami. a native of his own Shikoku Island. therefore. only six miles to the west. believed that the consulate. A pier at Pearl City to the northwest enabled the Japanese operative to view the far side of Ford Island and its airstrip. In keeping with his cover. He shunned cameras and notepads. Morimura chatted with Consul General Nagao Kita. Yoshikawa could see Ford Island in the center of Pearl Harbor. To explore the latter. Son of a policeman and a 1933 honor graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval College. and was staffed by genial geishas. Other factors that hamstrung counterintelligence operations were an American fear of alarming the population and ongoing efforts to secure the loyalty of local ethnic Japanese. The Shuncho ro (Spring Tide Restaurant) on Makanani Drive was run by a cooperative woman. There. 27-year-old man of medium height. dressed as a laborer. Given American openness. One of the disembarking passengers–a slim. though stealthy. through customs and drove him to the two-story consulate on Nuuana Avenue. he could look down at the submarine facilities in the harbor’s Southeast Loch. The assignment fit into a plan outlined in January 1941 by Combined Fleet Commander Isoroku Yamamoto. He was told late in 1940 that he was being posted to the American territory of Hawaii. Yoshikawa was to become his country’s only military spy in the islands and Yamamoto’s most valuable source of current information on Oahu.Takeo Yoshikawa: World War II Japanese Pearl Harbor Spy On March 27. His promising career was truncated by a major stomach ailment. Furthermore. For example. means. Captain Irving Mayfield.

Tokyo’s strictly secret message No. powers-that-be. and obtain new data. and was therefore not relayed to military commanders in Hawaii. the consulate was ordered to destroy its high-level codes and all accumulated secret papers. Your concern over the old whaling port of Lahaina as a possible U. Aboard were three Japanese naval officers ordered to make observations along the route laid out for the attack force. there was concern that Japanese consulates might be next. encoded and transmitted to Tokyo using. which included maps covering various aspects of Oahu’s military dispositions. It requested ship locations keyed to the five geographical zones into which Japanese naval intelligence had divided the waters of Pearl Harbor. Late in the month. He used numerous cover ploys to scout places that soon would gain international attention–Pearl Harbor.S. he described Kaneohe Bay on the windward side of Oahu’s Koolau Mountains as too shallow for major fleet units. Kaneohe and Ewa airfields. Soon. a long-term agent to be activated when needed. Nevertheless. Japan’s intelligence gatherers had a largely complete general picture of their Oahu targets. Kuehn’s vacation at Axis expense was over in more ways than one. all the cable companies in Honolulu. too. By September. Most vessels were in port every weekend. Air patrols neglected the northern side of Oahu. Yoshikawa pursued his mission with unrelenting vigor. torpedoes could be used only against the outboard ones. the brunt of the new information requirements fell on his shoulders. the FBI also was intensifying its own look at the consulate’s 234 employees. He also eliminated other sites as potential targets. to the southeast. on the other hand. Since the battleships were moored in double rows along Ford Island’s southeast side. The message was deemed noncritical by the U. respectively. Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. When German and Italian consulates were closed. While Yoshikawa and his helpers raced around Oahu. Hickam. although his information was not always accurate.000 in working funds. The next day. Washington codebreakers had this revealing request. Less constrained than its military counterparts. Wheeler. Yoshikawa had given the Japanese navy invaluable information for its upcoming surprise attack. Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn was a Nazi who had moved with his family to Hawaii in 1936 under contract to the Japanese. now could have little doubt that their work was feeding plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Yoshikawa gradually recorded the island’s patterns of military activity. On September 24. What they now needed were constantly updated data pinpointing warship locations. In October. translated within 15 days of its interception. In late October. Tokyo flashed a green light to the Kido Butai to proceed with the attack.Following a time-consuming process. he met the man Tokyo had selected to be his successor once the outbreak of war shuttered the consulate.S. Yoshikawa kept away for security reasons. By this time. 83 was received at the Honolulu consulate. Oahu time. the Kido Butai. aircraft strength and the like. Kuehn was anything but an effective agent–in fact. with Emperor Hirohito present.S.S.S. Local papers announced that the Honolulu police had established an espionage bureau at the request of the FBI. requests for updated information and replies flashed between Japan and Hawaii. assembled and steamed eastward into the North Pacific. American reaction to the growing Axis threat began to give the Honolulu consulate anxious moments. These and other observations were written up. This message. in turn. surveillance measures that kept them aboard ship. He was a sleeper. the liner Taiyo Maru left Yokohama for Honolulu in a limited relaxation of the shipping freeze. closed American ports to Japanese ships and embargoed the sale of petroleum products to Japan. known as the bomb plot message. The intelligence-collecting pace paralleled the increased tension that came with a November 5 Tokyo imperial conference decision to prepare a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor for Sunday. the Japanese Privy Council officially authorized the Pearl Harbor action. After a glass-bottomed tourist-boat outing with two women co-workers. Bellows. Although other personnel maintained a brisk traffic between the consulate and the trio on the docked liner during a five-day period. verify the consulate’s information. The letter and package Yoshikawa gave Kuehn contained. On December 1. Throughout the month. . Japan’s attack force. He knew the individual American warships by name and whether or not they were in port on a specific day. authorities clamped down on spies both on the mainland and in Hawaii. he was arrested shortly after the Japanese attack. He worked nearly around the clock to prepare responses. as U. December 7. was intercepted by the Americans–and shrugged off. Despite close U. Washington was downplaying Japanese subversion in the interests of ongoing diplomatic talks with Tokyo. enabling Yamamoto’s planners to focus on Pearl Harbor. Yoshikawa and his colleagues. counterintelligence already had him on its suspect list–but he was the only one available to fill in at a time when Asian faces might be unwelcome in Hawaii. an operational message and $14. U. however. That would have dealt a major blow to Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor planning. The consulate’s response to the bomb plot message offered suggestions that would refine Tokyo’s request and more precisely locate individual targets. anchorage is groundless. the visiting officers returned home satisfied that they had successfully completed their mission. the spy reported after a trip to Maui Island. Yoshikawa was sending biweekly ships in harbor reports to Japan for relay to the approaching task force. By mid-1941. President Franklin Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the United States.

the latest target information was in the hands of the Kido Butai.On December 5. In March 1942. Yoshikawa had been in his cottage. now churning due south toward Oahu. but not translated until the day after the air raid. Driven to a Coast Guard vessel. According to Yoshikawa’s reporting. I couldn’t trust them [Japanese-Americans] in Hawaii to help us. His government gave him neither honors nor pension. He returned to his wife and two children after the occupation. troops occupied Japan in 1945. Hawaii is photographed few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Mikami was told that his fares would not be coming out to play that day. Back at the consulate. then saw that the encoded message went to the RCA communications office for transmittal to Tokyo. At midafternoon on December 6. You see. he coordinated his report with Kita. Yoshikawa and his colleagues remained inside their workplace for more than a week. not having been forewarned by Tokyo. Fearful of arrest when U.S. From there. During his internment. he fled into the countryside and posed as a Buddhist monk. The Japanese foreign ministry received it shortly afterward and passed it to the navy general staff for forwarding to the attack force. Source: http://www. not telling his story to an American audience until 1960. While the departure of USS Lexington came too late to affect Japan’s war plans. Mikami pulled up in his taxi and asked a policeman to inform the consul general and vice consul that he had arrived to drive them to the golf course. The spy and his companions ultimately were exchanged for American diplomats being held in Japan. The aging Pearl Harbor spy was left to ask.com/takeo-yoshikawa-world-war-ii-japanese-pearl-harbor-spy. Yoshikawa later described this experience as a cruel joke. a slip that was caught by American codebreakers.editinternational. ships were protected by anti-aircraft balloons and anti-torpedo nets.php?id=47a8838303593) . He was a bitter man. Why has history cheated me? This article was written by Wil Deac and originally appeared in the May 1997 issue of World War II magazine. Back in his homeland. (Photo: Edit International/http://www. The Japanese consular personnel. December 7. local policemen drove past posted guards into the driveway at the rear of the consulate and took over the building. Yoshikawa married and continued working for naval intelligence until the end of the war. they were placed in an Arizona camp holding numerous interned nisei. Yoshikawa asked cabbie Mikami to drive him west along a road that has since been replaced by the Moanalua Freeway to a point north of Pearl Harbor. no outsider learned Yoshikawa’s true identity. everything seemed favorable for Sunday’s mission.com/photos. They were loyal to the United States. Shortly afterward. unable to earn a living and forced to rely on his wife’s insurance sales for subsistence. At midday.S. they were then transported to San Diego.historynet. Late that Saturday. he watched the last of the Pacific Fleet’s three aircraft carriers put to sea with her escort of cruisers and destroyers.htm The Imperial Japanese Consulate staff at Honolulu. the absence of the carriers on December 7 was to have a decisive effect on America’s ability to eventually wrest the offensive from Japan. nervously gathered together as the noise of the surprise raid reached them that fateful Sunday. Yoshikawa climbed into Mikami’s taxi for what turned out to be his final reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor from the Pearl City pier. Yoshikawa was asked if the moored U. supplemented by coded transpacific telephone conversations with at least one other operative. Takeo Yoshikawa is at center of front row. His negative report on these contained a direct reference to a surprise attack. Oahu time. They interrupted a last-minute burning of documents. An enterprising Honolulu journalist visiting the consulate for comments provided the first confirmation of what was happening. Kita and Okuda were dressed for a golfing date.

maps of military bases (including Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field). 1914-February 20. 1993) was a Japanese spy who worked at the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu. Yoshikawa also spied on Pearl Harbor by airplane and acquired a bird’s eye view of Wheeler Field and Hickam Field while flying an airplane. 1941. Yoshikawa collected detailed information related to the planned attack on Pearl Harbor from March 27. 1941. and the number of airplanes and ships. including troop movements. 1941 to December 7. Hawaii as a “Chancellor” prior to the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7. .Takeo Yoshikawa (March 7.

obtained by the United States at the end of World War II. The man standing in the middle was Joachim von Ribbentrop. was involved in spying on Pearl Harbor while living in Hawaii in 1941. appears on a TV program in Tokyo. Shivers.gov/history. a Nazi German spy and a Nazi Party member who worked for the Imperial Japanese government. Japan on December 5.jpg) Right photo: Takeo Yoshikawa. 1941. FBI Special Agent in Charge of Hawaii (Honolulu) in 1941. The interception of critical PURPLE code messages enabled the Roosevelt Administration to “prepare” for the attack by ordering aircraft carriers to evacuate Pearl Harbor before the bombing raid on December 7.org/wiki/File:PURPLE. (Both photos: http://honolulu. (Photo: http://en. The Roosevelt Administration successfully intercepted Japanese PURPLE code messages involving Japan’s plan to attack Pearl Harbor before the bombing of Pearl Harbor before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. (AP Photo) Left: Robert L.htm) . The photograph in the display is that of Hiroshi Oshima shaking hands with Adolf Hitler. a former Japanese spy attached to the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu in 1941. Shivers was instrumental in persuading the Roosevelt administration to refrain from incarcerating 150.fbi.000 people of Japanese ancestry living in Hawaii. Right: Bernard Julius “Otto” Kuehn.Left photo: Fragment of an actual PURPLE machine from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. 1964.wikipedia. FBI agent Robert L.

Police later stopped the fire after most of the papers had been destroyed. (AP Photo/Horace Cort) This unidentified Japanese man turns to face a visitor at the Japanese Consulate in Chicago on December 9. ledgers.Unidentified attaches of the Japanese Consulate began burning papers. he was startled while in the act of taking papers and files from a cabinet. shortly after Japan went to war against the United States. (AP Photo) . 1941. 1941. Confidential papers at the consulate had been burned. Clad only in underwear. and other records at the Japanese Consulate in New Orleans on December 7.

and J.Pearl Harbor & Southern Operation (“Nanshinron”) (Source: The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor. Goldstein. Dillon. The Original Photographs by Donald M. Katherine V. Michael Wenger) .

although many present had been privy to the plot for months. Having made these remarks. If negotiations between the United States and Japan proved successful.Imperial Japanese Navy sailors of aircraft carrier Zuikaku are seen winching up the anchor on the quarter-deck after leaving Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu Island on the morning of November 26.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. the task force would change course as conditions directed and proceed.com/image. the route across the Pacific. If the enemy sighted the entire task force any time before X – 1 Day. and the commanding officer of Kyokuto Maru. [Rear Admiral Ryunosuke] Kusaka outlined the action they would take in case the enemy spotted the task force en route. [Commander Tomatsu] Oishi discussed the task force organization. precautions to be observed. otherwise. and destroyers.php?image_id=8971) “Akagi hummed with activity as key personnel from every ship crowded her wardroom at Nagumo’s call to attend a special conference on the morning of November 23. This was the first time Nagumo had openly revealed the objective to all his commanding officers and staffs. Nagumo explained that the attack was not yet an absolute certainty.” A wave of excitement ran through the assembly. (Photo: http://ww2db. there would be no alternative but to carry out the strike. But if he and his staff believed the Americans had discovered only a portion of the Japanese ships. 1941. p. Kusaka introduced each succeeding speaker. flagship of the tankers. and the duty of each unit during the dangerous voyage. Next. the task force would e ordered back. [Admiral Chuichi] Nagumo opened the meeting with an electrifying announcement: “Our mission is to attack Pearl Harbor. He appealed to each individual to do everything in his power to ensure the mission’s success. 373-374 . if the enemy found them on X-Day or fired on them prior to that date. enroute to attack Pearl Harbor. Prange. However. cruisers. Nagumo would turn his ships back to Japan. battleships. the Japanese must perforce fight it out. [Captain Kijiro] Imaizumi and the skippers of his three submarines. Here assembled the captains and staffs of the carriers.

org/wiki/File:Zuikaku_November_1941.org/wiki/File:Zuikaku_Hitokappu_Bay_November_1941. p. The Imperial Japanese Navy utilized six aircraft carriers (Akagi. Four Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carriers (Akagi. Japanese Naval Warship Photo Album: Aircraft carrier and Seaplane carrier.Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier Zuikaku anchors at Hitokappu Bay. Soryu. Atglen. Kaga. Ron. Zuikaku.) Source: http://commons. Hiryu. PA. Beyond Pearl Harbor: The Untold Stories of Japan's Naval Airmen. 2008. Etorofu Island.wikimedia. Shokaku) during its attack on Pearl Harbor.wikimedia. Schiffer Military History. 68) http://commons. (Source: Werneth. p. Kaga. 66. and Soryu) were sunk during the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Supervisory editor: Kazushige Todaka. Japan in November 1941. (Source: Kure Maritime Museum. prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.jpg . Book states that the photo is from Maru magazine.jpg Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carriers Zuikaku (foreground) and Kaga (background) sail in the Pacific Ocean in late November 1941 enroute to Hawaii to attack Pearl Harbor. Hiryu.

and J. Goldstein.(Source: The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor. Katherine V. Michael Wenger . The Original Photographs by Donald M. Dillon. Michael Wenger (published in 1991)) (Source: The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor. Dillon. Goldstein. and J. The Original Photographs by Donald M. Katherine V.

p. two heavy cruisers. Admiral Kimmel’s intelligence chief. commander of the Netherlands army forces in the DEI [Dutch East Indies]. classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD. Other warships went on the Japanese naval air waves and confirmed that Hitokappu Bay was the standby location for the Hawaii force. the Navy intercept records of Station H remained in locked vaults. undertake the task (for carrying out assigned operations). Guam. renounce their Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. denies that such a message was sent. December 8. on December 2. According to American sources and most Japanese accounts the phrase was broadcast in plain Japanese in the katakana naval syllabary. intercepted the transmissions. and Hawaii – and was available by December 3 Hawaii Time for delivery to Admiral Hart and General MacArthur in Manila. Layton certainly had reason to believe that the intercepts would never be declassified and would never be used to contradict the assertions he made about the NIITAKA messages… In truth. the President said he regarded the proposal as fair but did not believe that Japan would agree. “I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble. an inlet on Etorofu Island in the Kurile Islands group. It would have turned the nation’s back on hundreds of thousands of Japanese military personnel who had been killed or wounded in the four years of fighting there. Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented the proposal to Ambassador Nomura late in the after of November 26. Navy radio monitoring stations at Corregidor. The radio intercept reports were available. Joseph Christie Howard. He developed four different stories that implied that the message was never intercepted or received in Hawaii. According to Edwin Layton. Congress was told that American radio intelligence had “lost” the warships because each Japanese naval vessel maintained radio silence. or BAKER on Guam…When the English version of the message was prepared (but never introduced into evidence) for Congress in 1945. he said neither the Japanese carriers nor the carrier commanders were ever addressed or heard on Nippon radio frequencies in the twenty-five days preceding Pearl Harbor.M. Hawaii. Joining the carriers in the anchorage were its support force of two battleships. Several warships committed a serious radio security breach during their sortie to the Hitokappu Bay anchorage: each transmitted coded movement reports – reports that could be read by American naval cryptographers in Washington. Stinnett. To abandon either the Tripartite Pact or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would have been equally difficult for Japan. entered it in the log book. deceit took over. None of the movement reports were shown to the 1945-46 congressional investigation or to the one in 1995. However. one light cruiser.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. General Hein ter Poorten. The Roman letters were not even encoded – they were spelled out in clear. the Liaison Conference.“Hitokappu Bay. Edwin Layton. possibly soon. In fact. For 58 years Howard’s account of intercepting Yamamoto’s war start message never became public. RK wrote: “This was undoubtedly the prearranged signal for specifying the date for opening hostilities. And her only governmental friends in the world were Germany and Italy. 217-218 “Emperor Hirohito and his council of advisors. p. the message was intercepted by three Navy listening posts – on Corregidor. It read: NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE. Howard never testified before any Pearl Harbor investigation.”” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. 1208 signifies the 12 month. Instead. Alaska. and renounce the economic plan for Southeast Asia called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. and three “I” type submarines. It contained ten points that Hull called a modus vivendi (temporary agreement)…In a handwritten note to Hull. p. a cryptographer whose Navy initials are RK interpreted the meaning of NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE. renouncing the war in China was impossible. the radio traffic analyst at CAST. unavailable to the public. 46-48 “Over the weekend of November 28-30 diplomatic negotiations between America and Japan collapsed when the United States presented a calculated ten-point proposal that called for settling relations…The American proposal insisted that Japan renounce the war with China. according to Albert Pelletier one of the Navy’s top cryppies at Station US. 8th day. During most of Layton’s postwar lifetime.” One intercepted message on November 18 defied all security precautions and spelled out H-I-T-O-K-A-P-P-U-B-A-Y. was the assembly location for the six [aircraft] carriers of the First Air Fleet – the offensive power of the Pearl Harbor raid. To climb Niitaka Yama is to accomplish one of the greatest feats – in other words. But Layton was covering up. 1208. Guam. HYPO. In English: CLIMB MOUNT NIITAKA. During his Capitol Hill testimony in 1946. responded to the ultimatum by giving the go-ahead to Admiral Yamamoto: start the war on Monday. plus the crucial supply train of seven tankers. But there is no record indicating that any of the officials saw the intercept. 218-222 . One of Kisner’s operators at Station H. and put it in the intelligence pipeline. but Captain Duane Whitlock. 1208. eleven destroyers. At 1:30 A. the significance of the phrase is interesting in that it is so appropriately used in this connection. the message reached Hawaii. Niitaka Yama is the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire. said his cryptologists at Kamer 14 had evidence that “showed Japanese naval concentration near the Kuriles. Admiral Kimmel and General Short in Hawaii. Yamamoto then sent a message using a prearranged phrase to the Combined Fleet. and President Roosevelt’s military staff in Washington. None of the Pearl Harbor investigations followed the paper trail of the NIITAKA dispatch that led from Stations CAST. Confirmation of this is available from the station H records. But the stories were flawed. But in the next step of the pipeline. intercepted the order…He transcribed the message on his code typewriters. These Japanese warship movement reports are substantiated by intercept records of Station H. Japanese officials felt that their nation’s survival depended upon access to the natural resources of Southeast Asia. including the Thurmond-Spence inquiry of 1995. British naval monitors at Singapore and their Dutch counterparts in Java heard the same broadcasts. but Layton failed to inform Admiral Kimmel of the Japanese movement to Hitokappu Bay. Item time. Japanese warships and the commanding admirals of the thirty-one-ship Hawaii force broke radio silence and were addressed by Tokyo radio during the twenty-five days from about November 12 through the December 7 “surprise attack. Hawaii never received the NIITAKA transmission.” From Japan’s point of view. Stinnett. and Dutch Harbor. 1208 REPEAT 1208. for the message was intercepted by Joseph Howard at Station H.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. 1941 – Tokyo Time. Stinnett. substantiated this claim.

htm) . December 1941-May 1942 (Source: http://www.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch4.army.history.htm) Southern Operations.Japan’s Basic Strategy in December 1941 (Source: http://www.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch5.history.

11 destroyers. Hiryu. 6 aircraft carriers. Sazanami. Tanikaze. 1 submarine tender. 27 submarines. Shiriya Source: At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Main Body: Under direct command Commander-in-Chef. Shinkoku-Maru. Zuikaku. Timor. Kasumi. 2 heavy cruisers. 2 aircraft carriers. 2 battleships. Toho-Maru. 1 coastal defense ship. Source: http://www. Mission: To attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area and subsequently support operations of the South Seas and Southern Forces. Shiranuhi. Shokaku. Kokuyo-Maru. 2nd Fleet. Malaya. prepare for invasion operations in the Dutch East Indies. 23 Igo 23 Supply ships: Kenyo-Maru.army. and Dutch East Indies areas. South Seas Force: Under Commander-in-Chef. Kagero. 1 light cruiser. Kaga. Mission: To reconnoiter Hawaiian waters in advance of Pearl Harbor attack. Shokaku] Advance (Submarine) Force: Under Commander-in-Chef. cooperate with the Army in the successive occupation of Guam and Rabaul. Akigumo. Southern Expeditionary Fleet. Missions: To occupy Wake. 2 battleships. 4 torpedo boats. Combined Fleet. Soryu. 1st Air Fleet. Nihon-Maru. 2nd Fleet. 4th Fleet. Hiryu. 5 heavy cruisers. 5 light cruisers. 29 destroyers. Task Force: Under Commander-in-Chef. Borneo. Akagi. Isokaze. Zuikaku. cooperate with Task Force in execution of attack. Malaya. Prange . [Names of the 6 aircraft carriers: Akagi.Composition of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy (December 1941) Main Body: Under direct command Commander-in-Chef. Soryu Battleships: Kirishima. Malaya Force: Under Commander-in-Chef. act as surface escort and support landings of Army forces in Philippines. 3 submarines. and attack enemy naval forces along west coast of the United States.history. 1 aircraft carrier. 6 battleships. 10 destroyers. Arare. Southern Forces: Under over-all command of Cin-C. Hiei Heavy Crusiers: Tone. and Thailand. 21 Igo 21.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch5. Mission: To support overall operations. 1 destroyer. defend and patrol inner South Seas area and protect surface traffic. 6th Fleet.htm Pearl Harbor Task Force of the Imperial Japanese Navy in December 1941: Aircraft carriers: Kaga.Chikuma Light Cruiser: Abukuma Destroyers: Urakaze. Toei-Maru. 2 light cruisers. 3 base forces. 2 heavy cruisers. Philippines Force: Under Commander-in-Chef. Missions: To destroy enemy fleet and air strength in the Philippines. Kyokuto-Maru. 4 minesweepers. 3rd Fleet. Hamakaze. Ushio Submarines: 19 Igo 19. and Burma.

a unit of the Imperial Japanese Navy.M. Layton) . located next to Etorofu Island. 1941 [Japan local time] (and at 1600 [4:00 P. 1941 Washington .] on November 26.] on November 25.C. at 0600 [6:00 A. local time). D. A photo of the Kido Butai docked at Hitokappu Bay next to Etorofu Island (Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T. departed Hitokappu Bay.Six aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet (一航空艦隊).M.

1941.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.navy. (Official U. Plane in the foreground is a "Zero" Fighter.history.S.) http://www.htm (Source: Day of Deceit by Robert B. possibly during the launch of the second attack wave. to attack Pearl Harbor during the morning of December 7. Navy Photograph. The original photograph was captured on Attu in 1943. National Archives Collection. Stinnett) .Japanese naval aircraft prepare to take off from an aircraft carrier (reportedly Shokaku).

in this scene from a Japanese newsreel. War Department and released to U.S. It was obtained by the U. 1941.S. (National Archives) Japanese pilots get instructions aboard an aircraft carrier before the attack on Pearl Harbor. (AP Photo) . newsreels.Imperial Japanese Navy sailors prepare to launch the airplanes from the Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier Akagi during the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.

S.time.29307. Navy Photograph. (Official U.htm Japanese bomber pilots receive their orders onboard an aircraft carrier prior to commencing their mission of bombing Pearl Harbor.com/time/photogallery/0. (Keystone/Getty) http://www.Japanese Navy Type 99 Carrier Bombers ("Val") prepare to take off from an aircraft carrier during the morning of December 7.navy. fleet would make the Americans petition for peace.S. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto hoped that a quick surprise attack on the U. leaving the Pacific open for the Japanese expansion. National Archives Collection) http://www.1691753_1498751.history. Ship in the background is the carrier Soryu.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.00. 1941.html .

This ship is either Zuikaku or Shokaku.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1. Ship's crewmen are cheering "Banzai".A Japanese Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") takes off from a carrier as the second wave attack is launched during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.navy.htm .history.S. during the morning of 7 December 1941. National Archives Collection) http://www.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1. (Official U. Navy Photograph.navy.history. (NHHC Photograph) http://www. 1941. en route to attack Pearl Harbor.htm A Japanese Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") takes off from the aircraft carrier Shokaku.

.

to the left.M. and California. Raleigh and Utah have been torpedoed. Tennessee (inboard of West Virginia). Hawaii.M. (NHHC Photograph) http://www.htm . target and training ship Utah and seaplane tender Tangier. that occurred at 7:55 A.history. and Utah is listing sharply to port. are light cruisers Detroit and Raleigh.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-oa. An Imperial Japanese Navy airman took a photograph of Battleship Row while riding in one of the airplanes. (Hawaii Time). 1941.navy. On the near side of Ford Island. A torpedo has just hit USS West Virginia on the far side of Ford Island (center).A. U. The explosion in the center is a torpedo strike on the USS West Virginia. Oklahoma (torpedoed and listing) alongside Maryland.S. The attack on Pearl Harbor ended before 10:00 A.A photograph of Battleship Row at the beginning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Other battleships moored nearby are (from left): Nevada. submarine base and fuel tank farm in the right center distance. Arizona. Japanese writing in the lower right states that the photograph was reproduced by authorization of the Navy Ministry. Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island. Japanese planes are visible in the right center (over Ford Island) and over the Navy Yard at right. View looks about east. (Hawaii Time) on December 7. with the supply depot.

history.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-a/bb39.htm USS Shaw (DD-373) burning in floating drydock YFD-2 after she was set afire by Japanese dive bombing attacks on December 7. The burning bow of USS Nevada (BB-36) is on the right. Her forward magazines had exploded when she was hit by a Japanese bomb. men on the stern of USS Tennessee (BB-43) are playing fire hoses on the water to force burning oil away from their ship. 1941. National Archives Collection) http://www. At left.htm .history.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-shw.USS Arizona (BB-39) sunk and burning furiously on December 7. At left is a motor launch from USS San Francisco (CA-38). 1941. (Official U. Navy Photograph.navy. (Official U.S.S. National Archives Collection) http://www. Navy Photograph.navy.

Visible in the center distance is the capsized USS Oklahoma (BB-37). Cassin has capsized against Downes.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.The wrecked destroyers USS Downes (DD-375) and USS Cassin (DD-372) in Drydock One at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. National Archives collection. soon after the end of the Japanese air attack.history. Official U. Smoke is from the sunken and burning USS Arizona (BB-39).S. beyond the crane. The torpedo-damaged cruiser USS Helena (CL-50) is in the right distance. (This image has been attributed to Navy Photographer's Mate Harold Fawcett. Navy Photograph. with USS Maryland (BB-46) alongside.) http://www. out of view behind Pennsylvania.navy.htm . USS California (BB-44) is partially visible at the extreme left. USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) is astern. occupying the rest of the drydock.

The ship sank with more than 80 percent of its 1. which left 2. Hawaii on December 7. 1941.The battleship USS Arizona belches smoke as it topples over into the sea during a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. (AP Photo) .500-man crew.402 Americans dead and 916 missing. The attack. and 5 torpedo bombers during the attack. Pacific Fleet and forced America out of a policy of isolationism. 15 dive bombers. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost 9 fighter planes.S. broke the backbone of the U.

(Official U.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm . National Archives collection) http://www.history. Navy Photograph.S.navy. Most of the smoke comes from planes burning on the Wheeler Field apron in the center. 1941. as seen from a Japanese Navy plane.Imperial Japanese Navy pilots attack Wheeler Air Field and Schofield Barracks on December 7.

history.navy.htm . Pearl Harbor is in the background.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air. 1941. Navy Photograph.S.Japanese Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") flies high over Hickam Army Air Field during the attack on December 7. Photographed from a Japanese plane. http://www. Official U. National Archives collection. with smoke rising from burning ships off Ford Island and at the Navy Yard.

mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air. following the end of the Japanese raid on December 7. National Archives collection) http://www.S.navy. (Note long blast tubes for the plane's nose machine guns. near Hangar 4 at Wheeler Air Field. 1941.history.Men examine the burned-out wreckage of a P-40 pursuit aircraft.htm .) (Official U. Navy Photograph.

navy.htm .history. following the end of the attacks. Army aircraft destroyed by Japanese raiders at Wheeler Air Field was photographed later in the day on December 7. National Archives collection) http://www.S. 1941. (Official U.A U.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air. Wreckage includes at least one P-40 and a twin-engine amphibian as well as a wrecked hangar in the background. Navy Photograph.S.

S.S.S. 1941.S.flickr. severely damaged.S. West Virginia. Tennessee. and U.U. U. Arizona.S.com/photos/32912172@N00/2950636384/ . (Library of Congress Collection) http://www. damaged. sunk during the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.

A photo of the rear view of hanger No. 1941. (Library of Congress Collection) http://www.com/photos/32912172@N00/2950636182/in/photostream/ . 11 at Hickam Field in Hawaii on December 7.flickr.

C.S. 1941.wikimedia.View of the burning barracks at Hickam Field and the shredded American flag on the flagpole after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor near Honolulu.jpg . Source: U.org/wiki/File:Hickam_Field_flag_with_burning_barracks_1941. Hawaii on December 7. National Park Service Pearl Harbor gallery photo/USAAF photo 61126 A. http://commons.

at about 0800 on 7 December 1941.history. NHHC Photograph) http://www.navy. 1975. The orientation of the compass direction arrow in the chart's center is turned approximately 45 degrees too far in a counterclockwise direction. USN (Retired).htm . (Collection of Vice Admiral Homer N. Some of the ships moored in "nests" in the northern part of the harbor are listed in incorrect order.Chart showing the positions of ships inside Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese Attack. Wallin.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-oa.

Nagumo and Kusaka fulfilled their mission.” The fault as he saw it lay not in the execution. and by failing to seek out and sink America’s carriers.S. restore his morale. “Whoever controls Pearl Harbor holds the central Pacific firmly in his grasp.” Despite his decision. they had not completed the job. Admiral Raymond A. Nimitz remarked.” He. Unless Japan could take it and hold it.” So long as anything was left. “The Japanese attacked only military objectives.” he declared. Fleet Admiral Chester W.” said Furlong. which placed a high premium on cramming facts into students’ minds rather than on individual thinking…Yet from the Japanese point of view. but he added. the failure to follow through at Pearl Harbor haunted Genda. [Rear Admiral Sadatoshi] Tomioka further believed that the root of the problem lay in the Japanese educational system. Spruance. Edited by Paul Stillwell) “In contrast. Yamamoto thought that he should have made a second major attack even though not so ordered. bewilderment.(Source: Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy. by failing to destroy Oahu’s vast fuel stores. Its officers lacked a sufficiently flexible outlook to adapt themselves to new situations which might permit them to go beyond their instructions. “but they stuck with it. and the like.” he said. believed the Japanese could have done much more damage had they struck the submarine base. a number of American admirals agree that the Japanese made the wrong decision. “The fact that the Japanese did not return to Pearl Harbor and complete the job was the greatest help to us.” Both Genda and Fuchida had been so personally involved in the attack that they rather lost sight of Yamamoto’s original objective – to knock the Pacific Fleet hors de combat for about six months so that Japan could carry out its seizure of Southeast Asia without the U. by failing to pulverize the Pearl Harbor base. Nevertheless. Navy. “Hawaii provided the key to all future operations in the Pacific. 549-550 . Tomioka believed that Nagumo was not entirely at fault because carrying out orders according to the book was a general weakness in the Japanese Navy. Japan committed its first and probably its greatest strategical error of the entire Pacific conflict. and they stuck to it.” On the other hand. Navy’s striking its flank.” Kimmel considered the base at Pearl Harbor would have been an even more lucrative target than the warships: “…if they had destroyed the oil which was all above ground at that time…it would have forced the withdrawal of the fleet to the coast because there wasn’t any oil anywhere else out there to keep the fleet operating. by failing to take full advantage of its savage attack against Kimmel’s ships. but in the original assignment of targets.” – At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. Seen in this light. for they left their principal enemy with the time to catch his breath. and rebuild his forces. the tank farm. “Their mission may have been wrong. Furlong pointed out that Nagumo followed classic naval doctrine in staying within the established boundaries of his task and refusing to be tempted into alluring side paths. p. hero of Midway. Yamamoto “was still not satisfied with Nagumo” according to Tomioka. He thought that they worked over the ships effectively. had somewhat the same idea. He never forgot Nagumo’s original opposition to his plan. she could not defeat the U.S. And at Pearl Harbor Nagumo carried out his orders but did not go one bit beyond them to exploit the situation fully. Prange.” By failing to exploit the shock. one is inclined to agree with Yamamoto’s observation to Ozawa at Truk in late 1942: “Events have shown that it was a great mistake not to have launched a second attack against Pearl Harbor. “This was their mission. and confusion on Oahu. too.

was the leader of the second wave of the air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7. 1908-January 9. who graduated from Eta Jima in 1929. 1945). was a career officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service during World War II. Shimazaki. 1941. .Shigekazu Shimazaki (September 9.

1941.wikimedia. Schiffer Military History.org/wiki/File:Zuikaku_dive_bomber_pilots_Pearl_Harbor. Right: Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier Zuikaku dive bomber pilots pose for a group photo before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 1941. (Photo: http://commons. Front row. Source: Werneth. Beyond Pearl Harbor: The Untold Stories of Japan's Naval Airmen. p. The photo was likely taken aboard ship the day before the attack. Second row. Masataka Fukunaga. on December 6. fifth person. Reijiro Otsuka. Atglen.S. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Commander Shizuo Fukui. Hawaii in December 1941. 2008. The supply ship Mamiya is in the center distance.jpg) A photo of Japanese battleship Yamato (大和) under construction at the Kure Naval Base (呉海軍基地). The aircraft carrier HIJMS Hosho is at the extreme right. 1941. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph) . Japan on September 20. Fuchida converted to Christianity after World War II and became a preacher. “Tora! Tora! Tora!” on his radio on the morning of December 7. 1941. fourth person from the left is Kenji Hori. Fuchida became a naturalized American citizen in the 1960s. 1902-May 30. Tohichi Azuma. fourth person. Ron. U. PA. from the left: second person. Tamotsu Ema. 66. Book states that the photo is from the Arizona Memorial. 1976). third person.Left: Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (December 3. lead the first air wave attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7. who announced.

1941. Goldstein and Katherine V. on November 25. (Source: God’s Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.Mitsuo Fuchida and his fellow Imperial Japanese Navy pilots appear at a farewell meeting in the wardroom of the aircraft carrier Agaki. Dillon)) . Prange (with Donald M. a day before setting off for Hawaii. docked at Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu Island.

Photographs of Mitsuo Fuchida aboard the aircraft carrier Akagi in December 1941 before the air raid on Pearl Harbor. Prange (with Donald M. Dillon) . Source: God’s Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Goldstein and Katherine V.

1941.Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki's HA-19 midget submarine ran aground on the beaches of Oahu on December 7-8. 1999) was a Japanese naval officer who became the first Japanese prisoner-of-war of World War II captured by American forces. Sakamaki served as a president of a Brazilian subsidiary of Toyota. Kazuo Sakamaki remained a prisoner-of-war until the end of World War II. Sakamaki was captured by U.S. 1941. however. Army Sergeant David Akui on the beaches of Oahu on the morning of December 8. . Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki (November 8. the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Sakamaki attempted to destroy his submarine after his submarine malfunctioned. 1918-November 29. After World War II. the explosives used to destroy the submarine failed to explode.

1937. 1941 to July 22. 1937 to December 1. 1940. 1944. Right: Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama (January 1. 1883-June 7. 1944 and Minister of War [Army] from 1940 to 1944. Admiral Nagano was Minister of the Navy from March 1936 to February 1937 and the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy from February 2. 1941 to July 17. 1880-September 12. 1948) was the Prime Minister of Japan from October 18. Right: General Hideki Tojo (December 30. 1880-January 5. Left: Admiral Osami Nagano (June 15. Hideki Tojo was tried as a “Class A” war criminal in Tokyo.Imperial Japanese Military Leaders Behind the Attack on Pearl Harbor Left: Admiral Shigetarō Shimada (September 24. 1947) was the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff from April 1941 to February 1944. . 1884-December 23. 1976) was Minister of the Navy from October 18. Admiral Shimada was also the Commander of Kure Naval Station from November 15. Admiral Shimada was the Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Station for several weeks in 1941 before he was appointed Minister of the Navy. Japan after World War II. 1938 to April 15. 1945) was Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff from October 1940 to February 1944.

S. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto proposed a Japanese naval attack on Pearl Harbor as early as January 7. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in an attempt to sabotage the U.S. British Malaya (Singapore). Navy and prevent the U. Hong Kong. visited oil fields in Texas.Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (April 4.C. Admiral Yamamoto was killed on Bougainville Island when his transport bomber airplane was shot down by U. Army Air Forces fighter pilots operating from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. Navy from interfering with Imperial Japan’s conquest of French Indochina and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies as well as the British colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore. during the 1920s. 1941. “Nanshinron” (南進論). was a Japanese military strategy for a Japanese invasion of French Indochina (Saigon). (U.S. Burma. Naval Historical Center Photograph) . a Japanese military term for “South Strike strategy”. USNR. 1884-April 18. D. Dutch East Indies (Jakarta). when he was killed in action. 1943. Original photograph was in the files of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison. The Imperial Japanese government conquered southeast Asia in an attempt to acquire raw materials for the Japanese family-owned corporations (zaibatsu) and to sustain their military-industrial complex and growing population. 1939 to April 18. 1943) was the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy from August 30. Admiral Yamamoto served as a naval attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Washington.S. and attended classes at Harvard University. and the Philippines.

the Imperial Japanese Navy's main Carrier battle group. 1887-July 6. on April 10. Nagumo was appointed Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet. 1944) was the commander of the Kido Butai (the carrier battle group). 1941. Nagumo committed suicide while defending Saipan in July 1944.Admiral Chūichi Nagumo (March 25. .

Emperor Hirohito. was the Emperor of Japan from December 25. Emperor Hirohito gave his approval to the Imperial Japanese Navy’s proposed military operation to attack Hawaii during a meeting with his military subordinates in November 1941. . 1901-January 7. Hirohito capitulated to Japanese Army’s demands for an attack on Pearl Harbor by November 1941. 1989). however. also known as Emperor Shōwa (April 29. 1989. 1926 until his death on January 7. Emperor Hirohito preferred to solve Japan’s dipute with America through diplomacy in early 1941.

Prange) .(Source: At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. Prange) Pearl Harbor planners Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi (left) and Commander Minoru Genda (right) (Source: At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W.

Imperial Japanese Navy intelligence officers in 1941 (Source: At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. Prange) .

craggy-faced general said that if Japan had possessed atomic bombs..” He became a fighter pilot while bombing and strafing cities in China and was increasingly regarded by Japanese leaders as one of the nation's brightest young officers.GENERAL MINORU GENDA.html . I get along fine with them. but illness kept him from piloting a bomber. 84. sank or severely damaged 19 ships. Japan must rely on American might for its defense. DIES: PLANNED ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR By PETER B. The American pilots especially are a wonderful. died of heart disease in a Tokyo hospital Tuesday on the 44th anniversary of the end of the World War II. General Genda.450 Americans. Asked about his ties with Americans.M. destroyed 177 planes and gave Japan control of the central Pacific. he said that. The assault killed nearly 2.” The general abstained from cigarettes and alcohol and helped keep his trim. Even with the augmented Japanese air force. His 1969 tour of the United States drew protests from some veterans' groups. was a native of Hiroshima and a 1924 graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy.M. who planned the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. briskly walking his many dogs and getting to bed by 8 P. muscular body in shape by rising at 4 A. FLINT The New York Times Published: August 17. congenial bunch of men. 1989 General Minoru Genda.000 of them in jets in which he was instructed by Americans. He was aboard one of the carriers that staged the strike on Dec. except for limited actions. He also expressed the view that Japan should allow the United States to station nuclear arms on Japanese soil.” Questioned about the scars of combat. which crippled the American Pacific fleet and plunged the United States into World War II. “Wars are fought and then they end. Low-Flying Torpedo Bombers He is considered responsible for originating attacks by low-flying torpedo bombers. which were used with devastating effect. a statement that prompted a rebuke by party leaders. where he introduced aerobatics teams that were popularly known as “Genda’s circuses. and our national leadership was not up to the task. General Genda made these remarks during a three-week speaking tour of the United States sponsored by the Naval Institute. an early advocate of naval air power over surface vessels. the Legion of Merit. and when they end we don't look back . A Top Fighter Pilot General Genda was instrumental in arming Japan’s air force with the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and was considered to be one of the best Japanese pilots of the F-104. “I thought we would win. In 1969. exercising. he was assigned to the general staff and directed to draft the air tactics for the Pearl Harbor assault. but we misjudged America's real strength. We lacked war materiel.” After World War II. He was a strong advocate of animals' rights. As a commander in the navy. He would have been 85 years old yesterday. he said the idea for the concentrated strike from a task force of aircraft carriers came to him in 1940 while he was watching an American newsreel. he received the highest United States honor given to foreigners. retiring in 1986. Source: http://www. a private historical and professional association. he replied: “Of course. 7. Would Have Used A-Bombs The outspoken. Addressing American officers and midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy. General Genda said that if he had been commander-in-chief of the Japanese armed forces in 1941. For years he was chairman of the National Defense Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party and served many terms in Parliament. he recalled. he was commissioned a general in the air force [Japan Air Self-Defense Force] and served as chief of staff from 1959 to 1962. he said. When the Japanese entered the Pacific war.only forward. for his role in rebuilding the Japanese air force and cooperating closely with the United States.nytimes. when he was elected to the upper house of Parliament. 1.000 hours of flying time. Survivors include his wife and three children. he would have ordered repeated air attacks on Pearl Harbor and the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands by Japanese forces as a base for an attack on the West Coast of the United States. Seven years earlier. it might have used them against the United States. but his appearances were generally politely received. 1941.com/1989/08/17/obituaries/general-minoru-genda-84-dies-planned-attack-on-pearl-harbor. By 1960 he had logged 5.

the better chance the Japanese would have of a successful attack and the better they would be prepared to face unexpected developments at the scene of action. and high-level. they would sweep the skies clear of enemy planes. Instead of Yamamoto’s tentative suggestion of one or at the most two carrier divisions. Inasmuch as refueling would constitute one of the most knotty problems of the entire operation. “The attack against Pearl Harbor was the summit of my career as a Navy officer. Genda wished to sink battleships. warships. 9. but carriers held first priority. Prange. naval air power badly shattered and its own still capable of powerful offensive action. casualties among the attacking planes and crews exorbitantly high. During the attack other fighters should hover over the carrier fleet to ward off enemy counterstrokes.“In one nostalgic postwar discussion [Minoru] Genda said. like Onishi. The basic elements of Genda’s draft were: 1. Fleet. For about two weeks he labored in secret aboard Kaga. Neither the Imperial Navy nor the Army had precise instruments to assist in air strikes under cover of darkness. as Genda stressed. in time Japan could destroy other major units of the enemy fleet.” Indeed. The attack must catch the enemy completely by surprise. This point followed the traditions of Japanese military history. The stronger the carrier force. carriers. it must be studied thoroughly. 6. In contrast with Yamamoto’s original idea. too. 2. At best bombing would be ineffective. The attack should be made in daylight. wanted the greatest application of power – the military principle of mass. 4. Genda. Should hard training and enemy countermeasures prove that torpedo bombing was not feasible. 5.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. dive. Then in late February he returned to Kanoya for a second conference with Onishi. Therefore. 3.” Genda’s draft also reminded Onishi that there might be “antitorpedo obstructions” around U. Genda placed priority on torpedo bombing. He wished to inflict maximum damage to the U. it would have a double advantage. . his work on the Hawaiian venture alone will seal his name in the history of the Imperial Navy. With U. p.S. the Japanese should rely on dive bombing. So Genda suggested that the air armada should take off from the carriers long before sunrise. Tight security was imperative to prevent the enemy from even guessing that the Japanese were preparing such a dangerous enterprise. he considered the aerial torpedo their highest-yield weapon.S. 25-26 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and his Navy officers study a map. But he doubted that a successful torpedo attack could be launched in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. All planning must be done in strict secrecy. preferably in the early morning. Eventually the Imperial Navy could roam the Pacific with impunity. 8. he considered it “practically out of the question. It would also preclude the enemy’s following the Japanese aircraft back to the carriers and bombing the task force. Refueling at sea would be necessary.” All the more reason why the operation must be a complete surprise. For if the Americans expected the attack. Genda visualized the primary target as the long-range striking arm of the U. The main objective of the attack should be U. Destruction of as many enemy aircraft as possible – preferably on the ground at the outset of the strike – would secure control of the air over the target.S. land-based planes on Oahu. In fact. This was his second preference because high-level bombing had not proved entirely satisfactory in China.S. timed to reach Pearl Harbor at dawn. Every available carrier should participate in the operation. and the danger of fatal damage to the carrier fleet prohibitive. If Japan could sink America’s carriers and escape with the majority of its flattops undamaged. “The success of this attack depends on the outcome of the initial strike. A strong fighter escort should protect the bombers en route to and from Pearl Harbor. Fighter planes should play an active part in the attack. Once over the target. Pacific Fleet.S. 7. Another priority target should be U. Genda thought they might as well drop the whole idea. If surprise could not be achieved. the task force could sail into a well-laid trap.S. like most Japanese airmen. Then. Of course. too. The attack should utilize all types of bombing – torpedo. Most Japanese warships had a limited radius of action. tankers had to accompany the task force.

Before 1941 the Japanese Navy had never sent a fighter unit more than 100 miles from its home base or carrier. and training for the proposed attack exclusively on his own initiative. and Genda visited the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff. Yamamoto knew even better than Genda that if Japan went to war. Aboard ship. In mid-June 1941 Onishi.“Fighters also trained hard in this early period. Genda and Kami were just as forceful that carriers and land-based aircraft must receive top priority. after hearing the explanation. At his signal the dive bombers soared to attack level and the torpedo planes sought lower altitude. and at this space they had to use Morse code. he stood on much firmer ground and no longer carried the entire load of responsibility on his own shoulders. Later he would collect reports from the other staff officers to pass to Fuchida. Hitherto he had authorized the planning. Tomioka conferred with Admiral Yamamoto and various members of his staff for several hours. The first wave took off at 0700. Then Nagano presented this “modified national defense plan of the Japanese Fleet” to the Emperor for approval. then Genda presented the air attack plan. Nagumo had decided that the time had come to inform them of the purpose of their long training. and Nagumo held a critique aboard Akagi next morning. Fuchida.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Below the attacking force the battlewagons of the Japanese Fleet lay in majestic array. This time the high-level planes tore into Saeki Field while the dive bombers concentrated on the ships.” Oishi explained the overall outline. just as the planners hope their counterparts would rest in Pearl Harbor. Much remained to be done. Prange. p. helping with the details. 324 “At 1330 on November 3. If. but the preparations had reached the point of dress rehearsal. sharp and shrewd. The task force arrived back at Ariake Bay at dark. Prange. had served in the United States as assistant naval attaché and had traveled in England. France. feel free to ask them. So the task force sailed with most of the aircraft aboard their home carriers to a spot about 200 miles from Saeki. directives. 1941] – a dress rehearsal for Operation Hawaii.” the second group of level and dive bombers swooped in. Sasaki from the Combined Fleet staff. esprit de corps would be a strength no less sturdy for being intangible. Nagumo said something like this: “Judging from the diplomatic situation. and Italy to study aviation. for the first time. Once the Naval General Staff accepted [Admiral Isoroku] Yamamoto’s scheme. Yamamoto was very pleased to see his bold design incorporated into the blueprint of the Naval General Staff. Although final details have not been firmed up. the second at 0830 followed the general pattern of a defending force. Some of the airmen almost fell out of their seats in their astonishment…A change of pace ensued the next day [November 4. all the ships scheduled to be a part of the task force had congregated in Ariake Bay. Germany. by the end of October the Japanese had tied up many a loose operation end of the Pearl Harbor plan. So throughout the summer the Navy communications people had to train fighter pilots in this skill. After the first wave hit the “enemy. On October 29 [Rear Admiral Sadatoshi] Tomioka and Commander Yugi Yamamoto came to Nagato to inform the Combined Fleet of the Naval General Staff’s “operational principles. war with the United States seems unavoidable. in the latter part of July he dispatched Kuroshima to Tokyo in an effort to prevent the kind of impending personnel shuffle that periodically upset the Combined Fleet. originating from land bases instead of carriers to save precious fuel. No torpedo planes would participate in the second wave because by that time the element of surprise would be lost.” Commander Yamamoto was one of the promising young men with whom Tomioka’s organization abounded. To this end. preparation. [Commander Mitsuo] Fuchida had scheduled many dry runs during October. Prange.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. He could assemble them rapidly because the previous day. you have any questions. Genda hoped that at Kagoshima they would work up an intense competitive spirit and that intergroup rivalry would improve their marksmanship. After the meeting Tomioka gave Genda Onishi’s report which he had worked out for Yamamoto. By 0930 the maneuver was over. But this time conditions would be as much like the actual attack as Fuchida could make them. it moved full speed ahead and cooperated with the Combined Fleet in every possible way. p.” Sanagi. the Naval General Staff revised its war plan to include the outline of that operation. He also wanted his personnel thoroughly indoctrinated in their jobs and able to work together with the ease of long practice. orders. There they conferred among others with Miyo. but the Fifth Carrier Division did not participate. The delegation made a vigorous pitch for the adoption of the Pearl Harbor project as a part of Japan’s overall strategy…But the conferees indulged in some tactical discussions about the proposed Pearl Harbor attack. Commanders Genda and Fuchida have mapped out a general plan. and the radiotelephone connection worked only for that distance. About twenty miles from Saeki. Accordingly the sixteen horizontal-bombing leaders of the First Air Fleet set out for intensive training under Furukawa’s direction. The son-in-law of ex-Foreign Minister Toyoda.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. particularly Akagi and Soryu. Early in June Genda recommended to Nagumo that all high-level bombing leaders go to Kagoshima Naval Airfield to train as Watanabe and Aso had done. 327-328 . and Commander Shigenori Kami. Kami had general charge of “war-preparation and operational plans. officers of the Combined Fleet watched with keen interest. he had charge of liaison with the Army and overall operations. who had conscientiously and stubbornly opposed the Pearl Harbor project. 163 “Thus. p. Tomioka. After [Admiral Osami] Nagano approved the Pearl Harbor project. Commander Sadamu Sanagi. Genda among them. To the best of his hearers’ recollection. Nagumo summoned to Akagi his commanders at each level together with their staffs. Now that he had the sanction not only of the top brass in Tokyo but of the Emperor himself. Now they planned to dispatch Zeros against a target 250 to 300 miles from the carriers. The individual actors from [Vice Admiral Chuichi] Nagumo to the rawest recruit on Zuikaku knew their parts. In that event we plan to attack the American Fleet in Hawaii. specifically those concerning China. Fuchida ordered deployment. was now in the very thick of it. Genda took it back to Akagi and never showed it to anyone else. Communications in particular posed a problem. Sasaki and Uchida insisted that battleships should be the prime targets. A very bright and practicalminded officer. They will explain it to you. and the central agreement between the Army and Navy.

25. Celebes Island. Kirishima. p. (Source: Kure Maritime Museum.) Commemorative postcard showing Sasebo Naval Dockyard in the early 1930s. Navy since 1945.S. Hiei. and Shokaku. Carriers and battleships (in the background) from left to right: Soryu. . shortly after leaving Port Stirling. (edited by Kazushige Todaka).S. has been administered by the U. Haruna.Aircraft carrier Akagi (赤城) sail for the Indian Ocean on March 26. renamed U. 1942. Fleet Activities Sasebo in 1945. Several B5N Kate torpedo bombers appear on the forward flight deck of Akagi. Zuikaku. Kongō. Sasebo Naval Station. Japanese Naval Warship Photo Album: Aircraft carrier and Seaplane carrier". Hiryu. Sasebo Naval Dockyard is located approximately 29 miles north of Nagasaki.

The Bureaucracy of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy Prime Minister of Japan Gen. 1940 to mark the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire. following the military parade held on the Yoyogi Parade Grounds in Tokyo. Chief Aide-de-Camp General Ban Hasunuma stands behind the emperor. Japan on October 21. (Bettmann/CORBIS) . 1941. Hideki Tojo and his Cabinet pose for a group portrait in Tokyo on October 18. (Photo: Mainichi Shinbun) Emperor Hirohito of Japan delivers his message to War Minister Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo.

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The Army Ministry of Japan.The former Imperial General Headquarters and War Ministry building in Tokyo.htm) .army. 2” published by Shinkosha) (Source for chain of command charts: http://www. Imperial Japanese Navy Ministry headquarters in Tokyo circa 1930. was established in April 1872. (Source: Japanese book “Series of Japanese geography and folk culture: Vol.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch4. The Imperial Japanese Navy Ministry was also established in April 1872.history. also known as the Ministry of War of Japan.

(Source: A Book: The Century Album of Tokyo Views. Japan in 1907. Imperial Japanese Army Academy in Tokyo. a small island located south of the city of Hiroshima and west of the former Kure Naval Arsenal.The building of the former Imperial Japanese Naval Academy is located at Eta Jima. published March 1909) .

The Kenpeitai was the equivalent of the Gestapo and the Abwehr. 1945 editon (right) of Time magazine.org/wiki/File:Kenpei. pose for a group photo in in 1935. 1932 edition (left) and May 21. The Kenpeitai was Imperial Japan’s notorious secret police.JPG Emperor Hirohito of Japan appears on the front cover of the June 6.) http://en. better known as Kenpeitai (憲兵隊).wikipedia. .The Military Policemen of the Imperial Japanese Army.7: February 26 Incident" published by Mainichi Newspapers Company. (Source: Japanese book "Showa History Vol.

1944) during Japan’s invasion of Shanghai (August-November 1937). 1942). Mitsubishi (三菱. 1937-March 18. Rape of Nanking (December 1937). The Bank of Japan (日本銀行. 1941). produced Zero fighter airplanes for the Imperial Japanese Navy.Corporate Sponsors of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Toyotaro Yuki (center) was the Governor of the Bank of Japan (July 27. Bataan Death March (May 1942). 1941. A wreckage. was salvaged from the bottom of Pearl Harbor following the surprise attack on December 7. right). left) is Japan’s central bank. and Battle of Midway (June 4-7. one of the largest family-owned Japanese corporations (also known as zaibatsu (財閥)) during World War II. identified by the U. Navy as a Japanese torpedo plane. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7. (AP Photo) .S.

1945. B. 1905. Japan. Governor of the Pennsylvania Bank of Japan (November 11. Note: Spanish-American War occurred from April 25. 1904 to September 5. 1898) Note: First Sino-Japanese War occurred from August 1. Mitsui (三井). also known as zaibatsu (財閥). Mitsubishi corporation in Imperial Japan is the equivalent of I. Note: Russo-Japanese War occurred from February 8. Mitsubishi (三菱). Note: Second Sino-Japanese War occurred from July 7. 1894 to April 17. 1895.S.G.A. and Yasuda (安田) [banking and insurance firm] were four of the primary zaibatsu in Imperial Japan during World War II and an integral part of the Imperial Japanese military-industrial complex. 1898 to August 12. 1937 to September 2. 1898. Farben corporation in Nazi Germany and Halliburton corporation in the United States of America. of (1885-1893). . Sumitomo (住友).Prominent Businessmen of the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu Hisaya Iwasaki Yanosuke Iwasaki (1865-1955) (1851-1908) President of Mitsubishi President of Mitsubishi (1893-1916). Yataro Iwasaki (1835-1885) President of Mitsubishi (1873-1885) Koyata Iwasaki (1879-1945) President of Mitsubishi (19161945). U. Mitsubishi was one of the largest family-owned Japanese corporations. in Imperial Japan. University of Cambridge (Pembroke College) 1905 Pre-1923 postcard with a view of the Mitsubishi headquarters in the Marunouchi district of Tokyo. looking towards the Imperial Palace. 1896-October 20. B.

1941 Emperor Hirohito salutes as he rides past and inspects his troops.A map of the Japanese Empire on December 7. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) .

Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama of the Imperial Japanese Army salutes to his soldiers in June 1943. . 1943. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of the Imperial Japanese Navy salutes to his naval pilots in one of the last known photographs of Admiral Yamamoto that was taken shortly before his plane was shot down on April 18.

Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www.Visitors at the Orange Oil Field.S.navy.net/Family_Stories/Takahashi. 1941. and Kenji Ide (Admiral. the Naval Attaché to the United States. At the right end of the Japanese delegation is Captain Isoroku Yamamoto. The U. U. photo taken by Shunkichi Nomura. circa 1923.A.htm .. Kichimatsu Kishi. Imperial Japanese Navy).S. Navy officer standing hatless just behind them is Lieutenant Commander Paulus P. Aide to Vice Admiral Osami Nagano during this visit. in circa 1927.S.S. Virginia.history. (Collection of Rear Admiral Paulus P. Imperial Japanese Navy) (Photo: http://hirasaki. later changed to Takahashi). From left to right: Katsunori Wakasa (Engineer. Osami Nagano and Isoroku Yamamoto commanded the Imperial Japanese Navy fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7.A. Isoroku Yamamoto (Commander. Powell. Texas. Imperial Japanese Navy).htm) Imperial Japanese Navy Vice Admiral Osami Nagano lays a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington.mil/photos/prs-for/japan/japrs-xz/i-yamto. near Orange. U. unknown (possibly Commander Kaku. Powell/U.

Buti. Stahmer. Mackensen. (Photo: Courtesy of Australian War Memorial) http://john. Weiszäcker. a defense agreement between Imperial Japan. Italy’s Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano. Adolf Hitler.au/envoy/expansion. Schmidt.com/search/label/As%20a%20Diplomat) . (Photo: http://adolfhitlerbestpictures.edu.html Left to right: Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu. and Woermann appear at the Tripartite Pact conference in Berlin on September 27. Alfieri. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Japan in September 1940. Meissner.Imperial Japanese Government: From Tripartite Pact to Pearl Harbor Minister of the Army General Hideki Tojo (center) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (right) propose a toast with the German and Italian Ambassadors to Japan and officers from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. The occasion was the signing of the Tripartite Pact.blogspot. 1940.curtin.

the German foreign minister. Joachim von Ribbentrop. looks on (extreme left). 1941. Schmidt (in uniform) acting as interpreter. 1940. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. Minister of the Navy Admiral Zengo Yoshida. and Minister of War General Hideki Tojo meet privately in Tokyo. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) Adolf Hitler talks to Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka during the latter's recent visit to the German capital in Berlin on April 21. with Dr. (CORBIS) . Japan on August 6.Left to right: Prime Minister of Japan Prince Fumimaro Konoe.

Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka visits Berlin.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www. Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on September 27.jacar. 1940.html Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka appears with Fascist Italy’s Prime Minister Benito Mussolini in Venice.go. Italy on April 27. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www. Germany on April 19.jacar. 1941. 1941.html .go.

go. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jacar.Soviet dictator Josef Stalin (second from right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (third from right) watch Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka signs the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact in Moscow on April 13. 1941. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html .html Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka (center) celebrates with Prime Minister of Japan Fumimaro Konoe (third from left) on April 24.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.jacar. 1941.

which he himself had negotiated. and the eagle simultaneously. 1946). (Both photos: Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time Life) . a major milestone on the tragic road to war.S. But the Foreign Office paid little attention to Nomura’s wise. First of all. while still entwined in the dragon’s tail. Prange. and finally our clash with Britain and the U. for several years and graduated from University of Oregon Law School in 1900.A. the lion. was Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan from 1940 to 1941 and President of South Manchuria Railroad from 1935 to 1939.S. December 10. who lived in Portland. she is hastily making provision for the time when this may be impossible…” He warned that if the United States stopped the talks. well-reasoned warnings. expand there. we will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America. There in the Imperial Palace he proffered his advice: “…now that the German-Soviet War has started Japan. In carrying out the plans outlined in the foregoing article. p. to suit the needs of the moment.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. U. our advance to the south. 1941 to September 1. As Japan hesitated at the crossroads. The prospect of tackling the bear. 143-144 Shigenori Togo (left.“The outbreak of the Russo-German war put Japan on the spot. it would be better for the time being to refrain from action in the south. curiously enough Konoye’s Cabinet made no advance decision concerning a possible German attack on the Soviet Union. could not have appealed to a sensible man. It was pledged to the Axis and had signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. Both men were tried for war crimes at the Tokyo Trials in 1946. To do this. this would start a chain reaction: “severance of economic relations.” Konoye [sic] tells us.S. Irrespective of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact. take over Southeast Asia. 1880-June 26. as you know. The document which issued from this conference did not rule out the possibility of eventual war with the Soviet Union. One Japanese who had no doubt of his position was Matsuoka. 1950) was the Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan from October 18. Here was an elastic program designed to fit all contingencies. There it was. in black and white. 1942 and from April 1945 to August 1945. but. and. the plans which have been laid with reference to French IndoChina and Thai [sic] will be prosecuted. on June 29 Nomura gave the Foreign Ministry an excellent summary of American attitudes as he saw them: “The U. then. 1882-July 23. does not wish to make double-front operations. he gained an immediate audience with the Emperor. In case the diplomatic negotiations break down. but it concentrated heavily on the strategy of “Southward Ho!” Its essence was this: The government had resolved to dominate East Asia and to that end pledged to win the war in China. Oregon. The fatal decision was already in the making. Japan wanted the treasures of Southeast Asia so badly that it would fight any power or combination of powers to secure them. It would give here. “The Emperor was greatly astonished. For instance: 2… The Imperial Government will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the Southern Regions and also carry out various other plans as may be necessary. too. must cooperate with Germany and attack Russia. What path should it follow? The Japanese government did not know. Sooner or later Japan would have to fight there. Some of the explanatory notes attached to the formal decision were far more explicit than the basic document itself. with side excursions into Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies. March 3. It also demonstrated one of the major weaknesses which eventually led to the downfall of the Axis: an ambition so all-encompassing that Germany and Japan scattered their shots over an impossibly large area.A. preparations for a war with England and America will also be carried forward. Although the prospect of such a war came up for discussion regularly at liaison conferences. if the Germans crushed the Russians – which at the moment seemed likely – strike the Soviet Union. Consequently it goes without saying that she desires peace in the Pacific.A. The Emperor himself presided on July 2 over one of the most important conferences ever held in Tokyo. with a view to consolidating our position in the southern territories. Ultimately Japan would be fighting the Soviets. Yosuke “Frank” Matsuoka (right. and without pausing to consult the Cabinet. America and England simultaneously. [Nomura’s italics]. Shigenori Togo was the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1940.” and well he might be.” He urged that Tokyo think up some way to realize a Japanese-American understanding.

000 Peoples' representatives gathered in Tokyo for the celebration. More than 30. Japan on June 12.Emperor Hirohito of Japan delivers his message to War Minister Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo. The inspection featured the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of the Young Peoples' Schools in Japan. 1940 to mark the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire. following the military parade held on the Yoyogi Parade Grounds in Tokyo. Japan on October 21. Chief Aide-de-Camp General Ban Hasunuma stands behind the emperor. (Bettmann/CORBIS) Emperor Hirohito of Japan reviews his troops during the imperial inspection in Tokyo. (Bettmann/CORBIS) . 1941.

" (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) . (Photo: © CORBIS) The famous Mori Unit of the Imperial Japanese Army pushes its way forward around the Honan Battlefront in China in an area north of the Yangtze River on November 27. of "the fast dwindling remnants of Chiang's once mighty army. 1941. says the Japanese caption. 1941. in pursuit.Three German generals and a Japanese general (right) examine a globe during a meeting in Germany on March 29.

Captured Japanese image shows Imperial Japan’s Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo (center. in uniform) visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. (Photo: Time Life) . Japan in October 1941.

Imperial Japanese Army General Hideki Tojo (front row.html General Hideki Tojo. shortly after the first cabinet meeting under his leadership was held. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) .go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5. the new Prime Minister of Japan. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www. gives a statement to newspapermen at a press conference held at his official residence in Tokyo on November 7. Japan on October 21. 1941. center) appears with his Cabinet in Tokyo. 1941.jacar.

S. (Provided by Mainichi Newspaper) http://www. (Photo: © CORBIS) Japanese navy officers announce the outbreak of war between Japan and the U. 1941.Pearl Harbor is filled with burning and damaged ships following the Japanese attack on December 7.jacar.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5. at the Ministry of the Navy in Tokyo. 1941. Battleship Row (center) is obscured by heavy smoke.html .go. Japan on December 8.

Lamont.American Provocation and Prior Knowledge Thomas W. P. (second from right). a partner of J. Thomas W. were members of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1927. banking firm in New York City. Lamont and Jeremiah Smith Jr. Smith.P. Donald & Farley law firm in Boston. visit the Meiji (Shinto) Shrine in Tokyo. Morgan’s Chief Executive by Edward M. earned a Bachelor of Arts degree at Harvard University in 1892. Lamont) . J. Both Thomas W. Lamont and Jeremiah Smith Jr. and Jeremiah Smith Jr. Morgan & Co. a member of Herrick. (Source: The Ambassador from Wall Street: The Story of Thomas W. Japan in October 1927. Lamont (TWL) (third from right).

Economic adviser. and Katsuji Debuchi. 1933. (CORBIS) Members of the Japanese delegation to the World Economic Conference in London bid goodbye to U. 1929 while U. Juukuio Kabono. Secretary of State Henry Stimson looks on.C. Japanese banker Eigo Fukai (Governor of the Bank of Japan from 1935 to 1937).S. Japanese Ambassador to the U. on May 27. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White House in Washington. President Roosevelt. U.A. (Image: © Bettmann/CORBIS) .S.S.. D.S. Left to right: Viscount Kikujiro Ishii.Japanese Ambassador Katsuji Debuchi (left) signs the Kellogg-Briand Pact an hour prior to the ratification ceremony on July 24.S. (1918-1919). head delegate and former Japanese Ambassador to the U.

1936 to February 2. Grew) . Minister of the Navy. (Source: Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945. Koki Hirota was convicted of war crimes at the Tokyo Trials in 1948 and executed by hanging at Sugamo Prison in Tokyo on December 23. The Japanese naval officer at the extreme right is Admiral Mineo Osumi. Grew (standing). 1948. Admiral Mineo Osumi. Volume 2 by Joseph C. Edited by Paul Stillwell) Joseph C. 1941.(Source: Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy. Prime Minister of Japan Koki Hirota. who served as the Minister of the Navy from 1931 to 1932 and from 1933 to 1936. is seated three persons from Grew’s right. 1937. delivers a speech at an America-Japan Society dinner in March 1936. the American Ambassador to Imperial Japan. was killed in action in China during the Second SinoJapanese War on February 5. who served as the Prime Minister from March 9.

Japan in January 1941 as Nomura leaves for America. 1941 to October 18.jacar. 1941 when Minister Toyoda made the customary call upon the dean of the Tokyo diplomatic Corps after he assumed office.S.jp/english/nichibei/popup/pop_03. 1941. served as Foreign Minister of Japan from July 18. 1941. at the Tokyo train station in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura arrived in Washington.C. Admiral Teijiro Toyoda. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C.C. (Bettmann/CORBIS) .html) United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph Clark Grew (left) and Foreign Minister of Japan Admiral Teijiro Toyoda smile for camera on October 2. 1941. the designated Japanese Ambassador to the United States of America. Grew chats with Kichisaburo Nomura. on February 11. (Provided by Mainichi Newspaper) Right: Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura carries the Emperor’s letter of credentials to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White house in Washington. who opposed the Tripartite Pact and war with Soviet Union. D.Left: U. on February 14. D.go. (Photo: http://www.

A. D.S. in Washington. Stimson. Roosevelt shakes hands with Henry L.. U. a longtime Counsel of Winthrop. President Roosevelt called this "a frank and . on May 1. government's Defense Savings Bonds from his Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr.S. at the White House on July 10.S. (Bettmann/CORBIS) U. 1940 after the Senate confirmed his nomination as Secretary of War. 1941.President Franklin D. Putnam & Roberts [a law firm in New York City] and a member of the Republican Party. Stimson. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt buys the first of the U.C.

on September 16. 1940. D. (Bettmann/CORBIS) .clear appeal for financial support to pay for our arming and to pay for the American Existence of later generations. George C. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) Secretary of War Henry Stimson (far left) and Army Gen. Marshall (second from right) watch as President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Draft Bill in the Oval Office in Washington.C.

Army Chief of Staff.history. Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington.navy. Virginia. Naval Aide to the President. Secretary of War Henry L. United States of America on November 11. Chief of Naval Operations. Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Roosevelt (left) watches U.S. In the front row are. Carroll. U. 1940.S. Spaman are in the second row. USN (Retired). and Colonel Edwin M. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt attends Armistice Day ceremonies at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Omar Bradley. Watson. Qualters and Guy H. Army. Callaghan. U. In the third row are. U.htm . Admiral Harold Stark.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www. 1940. Military Aide to the President. Marshall. The Roosevelt administration initiated America’s first peacetime draft via the Selective Service Act. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.U.S.S.mil/photos/images/h74000/h74175kc. and General George C. left to right: Captain Daniel J. (Donation of Lieutenant Commander George A. immediately behind the President. Secret Service Agents Thomas J. President Franklin D. Stimson (wearing a blindfold) pick a draft number from a container on October 29.

1937 from the White House by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Japanese Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. 1941. from December 1914 to June 1918. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order on the night of July 25. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from March 17.Letter written April 6. (Photo: Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time Life) . 1920. 1941 to freeze Japanese assets after the Imperial Japanese Army marched into French Indochina. when America declared war on Japan. who would serve as the Japanese Ambassador to America from February 14.C. Kichisaburo Nomura was a Japanese naval attaché to the United States at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. 1913 to August 26. 1941 until December 8. D.

Roosevelt to Japanese Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura.A November 6. (Photo: Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time Life) Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura appears on the front cover of the September 22. . 1941 edition of Time magazine. 1929 letter written by New York Governor Franklin D.

S.C. Fleet at Pearl Harbor.navy. Yarnell. to protest the continued basing of the U.history.S. USN (Retired) (left) and Admiral Harold R. 1940. Stark. Chief of Naval Operations. D. Also present are Admiral Harry E. on October 10. D. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www.Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (right center) confers with Admiral James O. Commander in Chief of United States Fleet. Richardson (right). Admiral Richardson was in Washington. Yarnell was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. U. Admiral Harry E.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-r/j-richdn.htm . in the Navy Secretary’s Office in Washington. Stark. (Collection of Admiral Harold R.C.

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(Source: http://pearlharboronline.com/warnings.htm)

Naval Intelligence & Lt. Com. Arthur H. McCollum’s Eight-Action Memorandum

Left: Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Richmond Kelly Turner, Navy War Plans Officer at the Department of the Navy in 1941 Center: Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in December 1941 Right: Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at Pearl Harbor (1940-1942)

Left: Captain (later Rear Admiral) Walter S. Anderson was the Director of Naval Intelligence from June 1939 to January 1941. Center: Captain (later Admiral) Alan Goodrich Kirk was the Director of Naval Intelligence from March 1941 to October 1941. Admiral Kirk was the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from July 4, 1949 to Oct. 6, 1951; Admiral Kirk was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Right: Captian (later Rear Admiral) Theodore S. Wilkinson was the Director of Naval Intelligence from October 1941 to July 1942. Note: Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) Arthur H. McCollum (left), who was born in Nagasaki, Japan in 1898 to Baptist missionaries parents, was the author of an “eight-action memorandum” he produced on October 7, 1940 that encouraged the Roosevelt Administration to take a more aggressive approach toward Japan and incite Japan into attacking America. Both Edwin T. Layton and Joseph J. Rochefort studied the Japanese language in Japan from August 1929 to August 1932.

Left to right: Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Lt. Com. (later Rear Adm.) Arthur H. McCollum, Captain Laurance F. Safford

Left to right: Lt. Com. (later Rear Admiral) Edwin T. Layton, Commander Joseph John Rochefort, Lt. Com. Alwin D. Kramer

Army Intelligence Officers:

Left to right: Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow

Scene on the carrier USS Wasp (CV-7) during operations off Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. Among those present are (from left to right, in the right center) Commander D.F. Smith (hatless); Captain Forrest P. Sherman, Commanding Officer (wearing helmet); Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Commander Task Group 61.1 (facing camera); and Lieutenant Commander Wallace M. Beakley, Commander Wasp Air Group, who is making his report to Rear Admiral Noyes. Captain (later Rear Admiral) Leigh Noyes, was the Director of Naval Communications in 1941. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-w/cv7.htm
Pre-Pearl Harbor Army and Navy Intelligence Officers & Headquarters Officers: Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations [Washington, D.C.] Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Navy War Plans Officer in Washington, D.C. Captain Walter S. Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C. Captain Jules James, second Director of Naval Intelligence (January 15, 1941-March 1941) Captain Alan G. Kirk, third Director of Naval Intelligence (March 1941-October 1941) Captain Theodore S. Wilkinson, fourth Director of Naval Intelligence (October 1, 1941-December 7, 1941) Captain Laurance F. Safford, Commanding Officer, Station US in Washington, D.C. Captain Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Comunications in Washington, D.C. Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of Far East Section at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C. Captain William A. Heard, Far East Division, Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C. Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intellignence officer at Pearl Harbor Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, Commander of Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor Naval Yard (July 1941-December 1941); Commander of the Navy’s Communications Intelligence Unit on Oahu beginning in May 1941 Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer, Officer in Charge of the Translation Section (OP-20-GZ) (February 1939-May 1942); U.S. Navy courier in Washington, D.C. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, U.S. Army courier in Washington, D.C. Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of the Military Intelligence (G-2) Division of the War Department Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department

“Lieutenant Commander McCollum’s five-page memorandum of October 1940 put forward a startling plan – a plan intended to engineer a situation that would mobilize a reluctant American into joining Britain’s struggle against the German armed forces then overrunning Europe. Its eight actions called for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Dutch colonial outposts in the Pacific region. Opinion polls in the summer of 1940 indicated that a majority of Americans did not want the country involved in Europe’s wars. Yet FDR’s military and State Department leaders agreed that a victorious Nazi Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. They felt that Americans needed a call to action. McCollum would be an essential part of this plan. His code name was F-2. He oversaw the routing of communications intelligence to FDR from early 1940 to December 7, 1941, and provided the President with intelligence reports on Japanese military and diplomatic strategy. Every intercepted and decoded Japanese military and diplomatic report destined for the White House went through the Far East Asia section of ONI, which he oversaw. The section served as a clearinghouse for all categories of intelligence reports, not only on Japan but on all the other nations of eastern Asia. Each report prepared by McCollum for the President was based on radio intercepts gathered and decoded by a worldwide network of American military cryptographers and radio intercept operators. McCollum’s office was an element of Station US, a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters at 18th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., about four blocks from the White House. Few people in America’s government or military knew as much about Japan’s activities and intentions as Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum. He felt that war with Japan was inevitable and that the United States should provoke it at a time which suited U.S. interests. In his October 1940 memorandum McCollum advocated eight actions that he predicted would lead to a Japanese attack on the United States: A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore. B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies. C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek. D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore. E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient. F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil. H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire. McCollum’s eight-action memo was dated October 7, 1940, and was addressed and forwarded to two of Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors: Navy captains Walter S. Anderson and Dudley W. Knox. Anderson was the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence and had direct White House access to FDR. Knox was a naval strategist and chief of the ONI library.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 7-8 “Two major decisions involving Japan and the Far East took place on October 8, 1940 – the day after McCollum wrote his memo. First, the State Department told Americans to evacuate Far East countries as quickly as possible. Then President Roosevelt brought about Action F – keep the United States Fleet based in Hawaiian waters – during an extended Oval Office luncheon with the fleet’s commander, Admiral James O. Richardson, and former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy, a favored presidential confidant. When Richardson heard the proposal, he exploded: “Mr. President, senior officers of the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific.” Richardson did not approve of Roosevelt’s plan to place the fleet in harm’s way. He strongly disagreed with two of FDR’s lunchtime points: 1. FDR’s willingness to sacrifice a ship of the Navy in order to provoke what he called a Japanese “mistake,” and 2. Richardson quoted the President as saying: “Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war.”…For Richardson, the safety of his men and warships was paramount and the policy was no laughing matter. Richardson stood up to Roosevelt. Doing so ended his naval career. On October 26, 1940, a White House leak to the Washington-based Kiplinger Newsletter predicted that Richardson would be removed as commander-in-chief. The admiral was relieved of his command on February 1, 1941, during a major restructuring of the Navy. The sea command held by Richardson – Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS) – was modified. In his restructuring, Roosevelt approved a two-ocean Navy and created the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. Skipping over more senior naval officers the President picked Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel to head the Pacific Fleet and promoted him to four-star rank. The job had been offered to Rear Admiral Chester Nimitz in the fall of 1940, but Nimitz “begged off” because he lacked seniority. Roosevelt had carefully selected and placed naval officers in key fleetcommand positions who would not obstruct is provocation policies. One of them was Admiral Harold Stark, his chief of naval operations since August 1939, an all too faithful servant of the President.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 10-12

“Throughout 1941, it seems, provoking Japan into an overt act of war was the principal policy that guided FDR’s actions toward Japan. Army and Navy directives containing the “overt act” phrase were sent to Pacific commanders. Roosevelt’s cabinet members, most notably Secretary of War Henry Stimson, are on record favoring the policy, according to Stimson’s diary. Stimson’s diary entries of 1941 place him with nine other Americans who knew or were associated with this policy of provocation during 1941. Roosevelt’s “fingerprints” can be found on each of McCollum’s proposals. One of the most shocking was Action D, the deliberate deployment of American warships within or adjacent to the territorial waters of Japan. During secret White House meetings, Roosevelt personally took charge of Action D. He called the provocations “pop-up” cruises: “I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six.” Admiral Husband Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet commander, objected to the pop-up cruises, saying: “It is ill-advised and will result in war if we make this move.”…From March through July 1941, White House records show that FDR ignored international law and dispatched naval task groups into Japanese waters on three such pop-up cruises. One of the most provocative was a sortie into the Bungo Strait southeast of Honshu, the principal access to Japan’s Inland Sea. The strait separates the home islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, and was a favored operational area for the warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1941. Japan’s naval ministry registered a protest with Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo: “On the night of July 31, 1941, Japanese fleet units at anchor in Sukumo Bay (in the Bungo Strait, off the island of Shikoku) picked up the sound of propellers approaching Bungo Channel from the eastward. Duty destroyers of the Japanese navy investigated and sighted two darkened cruisers that disappeared in a southerly direction behind a smoke screen when they were challenged.” The protest concluded: “Japanese naval officers believe the vessels were United States cruisers.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 9-10

Left: Dr. Gordon W. Prange’s book At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor was published in 1981. Right: Robert B. Stinnett’s book Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor was published in 2000.

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(Source: Day of Deceit by Robert B. Stinnett) .

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

There is no record that the Japanese ever stole or photographed classified information. p. the Japanese Navy prudently changed some of its codes several times during 1941. and as 1941 opened. and the local companies very properly refused to give the FBI. And Kita and Okuda were very careful to have their people carry on “legal espionage.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. So Magic could not answer all the questions the United States wanted to ask. It never credited the Americans with the ability to crack the Purple system. Navy. when it was too little and too late. As host nation usually bends over backward to let accredited diplomatic and consular personnel go their ways so long as they operate within the letter of the law. By July of that year Pearl Harbor could have had one. including Honolulu. and State departments acknowledged the enormous worth of the Magic data and leaned heavily upon them for command decisions.S. the most secret of which was an exceedingly complicated cipher system known as Purple. the Army the even.S. possessed a drive and tenacity that refused to recognize the word “impossible.” These cryptologists also maintained liaison with their British opposites at Singapore and furnished Washington with anything of interest from that source. They violated no law in pausing to look at the imposing spectacle of men-of-war moored in Pearl Harbor. Hence Washington did not know of the orders Yamamoto sent to the ships of the Combined Fleet or the messages which the Naval General Staff radioed to the Pearl Harbor task force as it sailed across the northern Pacific to Hawaii. the base was an open book by its very nature. and in too open a position.” Friedman. “The Army provided the solution and wiring diagram. it was transferred in August to Corregidor [Philippines].S. The Navy assisted throughout 1939 and 1940 by furnishing the intercepts and taking over all other Japanese diplomatic systems so that the Army could concentrate on Purple. Generally speaking. Government had full knowledge of virtually all the traffic which passed between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and its most important embassies and consulates abroad. These were mainly in use between the Foreign Ministry and many consulates. Rated “the world’s greatest cryptologist. Its messages revealed only what the Foreign Office gave its own diplomats.” A copy of all of this unit’s diplomatic translations went daily to the Army locally.” To avoid duplication of effort.” From the summer of 1940 on.” Then the question arose of a third for the British. The Army and Navy dictated Japanese foreign policy. and a requisition for stepping switches for four more machines was “bogged down in the War Production Board…” Thus. London received two Purple machines in January 1941. The very law the Americans swore to uphold and protect tripped them up. Pacific Fleet. “but only at the expense of Washington. Red. p.” triggered the breakthrough. For instance. to be hidden or camouflaged from either sea or land view. military codes are more difficult to break than diplomatic. Seki. U. all Purple and some Red and J-19 “were immediately enciphered and sent to Washington.” The decrypting of Purple and its brother systems earned the name Magic.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. The switches and “intricate rat’s-nest of wiring” seldom cooled off.S. In fact. And the individual services could do nothing about this. notably the so-called J codes. in 1941 U. This law guaranteed the privacy of the airways. the Navy taking the odd days. Washington was scooping up these and other Japanese diplomatic messages by the bucketful. Friedman paid a high price for his magnificent gift to his country. In April 1941a machine went to Cavite. and they did not always clue in the foreign minister and his associates until matters had proceeded well along – sometimes too far. Intelligence had not yet broken through the chain of Japanese naval codes.“Both the FBI and DIO kept a partial watch on activities at the Japanese consulate and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) steamship line. But irony of ironies. Stark approved sending this machine because Philippines were “the best place to intercept Japanese traffic and receive the information during that time…” Any benefit to Admiral Hart “was a secondary consideration. And the Foreign Ministry itself was not omniscient. The only way to cut off observation would have been to make the entire island of Oahu a restricted military reservation – something no American government could tolerate. Friedman. So Washington knew Tokyo’s instructions to Nomura and his reports from the embassy. Pearl Harbor was too big. he was under treatment in Walter Reed General Hospital in Washington. In November 1941 “the diplomatic traffic…averaged about 26 messages a day. But Magic was not a cure-all or an enchanted key to the mazes of all Japanese thinking.” So around “September or early October” London had its third apparatus. The United States Army. or Navy Intelligence copies of the consulate’s messages – until early December 1941. The “best compromise” was to send the machine to London “and at the same time order parts of more machines. after eighteen to twenty months of the most intense labor. 81-82 . for Tokyo was by no means candid with its ambassador. and in addition. cryptanalysts were also reading lower-grade Japanese diplomatic ciphers. By the fall of 1941 American policy makers actually knew more than Nomura about his country’s intentions. This meant that the U. the United States also picked up the traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu about the U. the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) under the tireless direction of Lieutenant Colonel William F. succeeded in doing so as early as August 1940. Intelligence had been reading Japan’s diplomatic messages. 80-81 “Eight Purple decrypting machines existed in 1941. though quiet and unassuming. the Navy provided the funds and manufacturing facilities. or Kotoshirodo. U. The “individual genius…of Harry Larry Clark.” To the best of our knowledge. The basic story is as follows: The Japanese used several diplomatic codes. Army Intelligence. Tokyo had a childlike faith in the complete infallibility of its diplomatic codes. Prange. and J codes.S. Hawaii did not receive a Purple machine. Thus. But either of them could have done little to cut off Yoshikawa. Washington had four – two each for the Army and Navy. where the Communications Intelligence Unit had been assigned the Purple. one of the younger civilian cryptanalysts. In addition. Prange. In fact. therefore. no one from the consulate ever entered a restricted military area unless at the invitation of the American authorities. In December 1940 he suffered a nervous collapse from overwork. the services divided the messages by date of origin in Tokyo. the current one being J-19.

L. These experienced exponents of aerial warfare were thinking along the same lines as Genda. a patrol extensive enough to insure than an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise…” Here in a nutshell was the dilemma of Oahu’s defenders – the need for a 360-degree arc of patrol without the planes necessary to accomplish such a mission. “In its final form this historic work became famous to all students of the Pacific war as the Martin-Bellinger Report. who was the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force at Hickam Field on December 7. for any extended period. also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force… Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack…’ The possibility of such undersea craft prowling into the Hawaiian area was a nasty one. Bloch. The report continued: “The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain.S. (c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. Martin and Bellinger.” the authors virtually foretold the future: (a) A declaration of war might be preceded by: 1. 3. into two short sentences Martin and Bellinger unknowingly compressed an awesome American tragedy…Martin and Bellinger could not have done a much better job of mind reading had they actually looked over the shoulders of Yamamoto.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor. and U. be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.. The two airmen. p. Its “Summary of the Situation” observed. (d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.” One notes a striking difference from Kimmel’s Pacific Fleet letter of February 15. 2. among other things: (c) A successful. (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. Prange. What then could Kimmel. from bases on Oahu. 1941. In the area of “Possible Enemy Action. Bellinger (right) co-authored the Martin-Bellinger Report. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. 93-95 . The final document [Martin-Bellinger Report] bore the date of March 31. A combination of these two.S. 1941. estimated that enemy carriers would be “supported by fast cruisers. Navy Admiral Patrick N. Actually [Major General Frederick L. Army Air Forces Major General Frederick L. 1941. a military report that described various scenarios of a possible Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor. .] Martin and [Rear Admiral Patrick N. Thus. Martin was relieved of his command at Hickam Field shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Martin (left).(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. The document then considered the capability of Japan in terms of actual strength: “(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For in Japan the Pearl Harbor circle was widening even as Oahu’s planners labored over their report. approximately the same time that Yamamoto put his Combined Fleet staff to work on his design. Onishi. on March 31.” instead of vice versa.] Bellinger went somewhat ahead of Onishi and Genda’s original plan for a Pearl Harbor attack. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot. sudden raid against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period… (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.Martin-Bellinger Report U. Major General Frederick L.L. Genda – and others.. therefore. It speaks for itself clearly and crisply. which did not envisage the use of submarines. and Short do about a potential Japanese attack? Martin and Bellinger had this answer: (a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise.

Edited by Paul Stillwell) .Change of command ceremony on February 1. 1941 (Source: Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy.

Harry L Twaddle. Gen. “Hap” Arnold (Aviation officer). (Photo: U. The only member of the General Staff not present during the meeting is Major General R. Army/Naval Institute Collection/Corbis) Army Chief of Staff General George C. Gen. Maj.General George C. from left to right: Brig. Loomis. Marshall (seated). Sherman Miles (Intelligence officer). W. William Bryden. Gen. Maj. Admiral Harold R. Leonard T. 1941. William Bryden. Gen. Harold F. Gen. John H. Wheeler. Richmond K. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) . R. Moore. 1942 (right) editions of Time magazine. General George C. 1940 (left) and October 19. and Rear Adm.A. Brig. Joint Board Meeting takes place on November 26. Henry H. Gerow (War Plans officer). D.C.H. Brig. Rear Adm. Henry H. Arnold. Maj. Towers. Turner. Gen. Marshall appears with members of his General Staff in his office at the War Department in Washington. Ingersoll. Rear Adm. Brig. Left to right: Brig. 1941. Gen.C. Seated around the table. Gen. Royal E. Haislip. Marshall appears on the front cover of the July 29. Brig. Marshall.S. Gen. on November 26. and Maj. Gen. Stark. Gen.

Pogue. Knox agreed.(Source: At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. He lingered for a moment on the importance of Dakar. “that with our heavy bombers and our new fine pursuit planes. Deeply involved in negotiations with Japan. 1939-1942 by Forrest C. He also asked them to reanalyze the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. was sufficient to keep off the Japanese. to include the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutians. the possible relocation of British ground forces if they were withdrawn from that area. Prange) “At his meeting with the President on the afternoon of April 16 [. the Chief of Staff strongly dissented. For more than two months. the Navy outlined for its forces in the Atlantic a Western Hemisphere Defense Plan that put into effect the President’s mid-April decision on patrolling. He directed Marshall and Stark to examine cargoes ready for shipment to Greece and Yugoslavia to see if any could be diverted to General Wavell. 1941] General Marshall had no opportunity to discuss the broad issues that he had raised with his War Department advisers that morning. westward to the International Date Line in the Pacific. In the week that followed.” recorded Stimson. Marshall said. setting off a discussion of the importance of West Africa to future American strategy. who believed that the Pacific Fleet had to stay at Pearl Harbor to exercise a calming effect on the Japanese.” On the following day the Secretary took the Chief of Staff with him to the White House to assure the President that Hawaii was impregnable. particularly such a long distance from home. When Stimson told General Marshall on April 23 that the President now was convinced that the Pacific Fleet had to remain at Pearl Harbor. Admiral King indicated that the Western Hemisphere extended from approximately 26 degrees West (a boundary that ran just west of Iceland and included most of the Azores). during which the Secretary of State urged postponement of the transfer and Admiral Stark. Hull was certain that the removal of part of the Navy from the Pacific would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. and the air defense could be reinforced from the mainland if necessary.” Secretary Stimson was disappointed that Roosevelt had not gone further. He wanted not only escorts for ships but early shifting of a large part of the Pacific Fleet to Atlantic waters. blew hot and cold on the proposition. the Secretary of War worked doggedly to encourage the President to make the shift. His wishes were contrary to the firm convictions of the Secretary of State. the land force could put up such a defense that the Japs wouldn’t dare attack Hawaii. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope.” – George C. The land defense. The President seemed interested instead in exploring a number of immediate steps to aid the British. 134-135 (published in 1966) . The territorial extension was not so important as the reminder that “Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval ships or aircraft of belligerents other than those powers having sovereignty over territory in the Western Hemisphere is to be viewed as possibly actuated by an unfriendly interest toward shipping or territory in the Western Hemisphere. and the potential field of action for the Eastern Mediterranean fleet after its withdrawal. “Marshall felt. In this effort he relied heavily on Marshall’s current high standing with the White House and the State Department to win his point. to Stimson’s dismay. p.

the Hawaiian Air Force stood ready to help smash any attack. He also asked for an interview with the President. Nomura relayed his government’s expressed wish to resume the conversations and handed Hull a document embodying Proposal A. and manpower. the meeting was personally cordial. This awareness that Japan might break out anywhere at any time did not help [Admiral Husband] Kimmel. fuel.” That afternoon Roosevelt summoned his Cabinet. No one in authority in Washington was spoiling for a fight with Japan. That very day. submarines. 96-97 “The Navy noted on the same day – November 4 – a significant phenomenon which it reported to Kimmel. Armed with all the tools of modern warfare. or the Netherlands East Indies…” Little more than a month of peace remained when [Kichisaburo] Nomura and Wakasugi called on Hull and his assistant Joseph W. considering that the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet had just issued their operational orders. On the contrary. 1941.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. minesweepers. bent every effort to make good the boast that Pearl Harbor was “the best defended naval base in the world. The undeniable argument that Japan had a vast ocean in which to approach Oahu could be countered by the simple fact that Hawaii commanded all seaways in the central Pacific. and the latest fighter planes organized in effective squadrons at Wheeler Field assured mastery of the skies over Oahu. Still other American and British possessions stretched beyond this defensive rim. the defenders could expect it to be on a Saturday. until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.] Stark wrote once more. Up in the Aleutians a new naval and air base at Dutch Harbor guarded the northern Pacific and flanked Japan’s shortest line of approach to the West Cost. Moreover. Prange. Some military experts considered the great area of “vacant sea” to the north the best and most likely avenue of approach for the enemy. The President started the session by asking [Secretary of State Cordell] Hull if he had anything in mind. November 7. He ended on a worried note: “Things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific…A month may see. a white spear of land.] Short say on April 7: “Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified island. “If there were ever men and a fleet ready for any emergency. dozens of destroyers. Midway lay 1.” Naval Intelligence “had long realized that…” More and more Togo bore down on the harassed Nomura. barely crested the waves 700 miles to the southwest. I realized that this is a difficult order. Harold R. [Adm. Wake about another 1. including Bloch: Japan appeared to be withdrawing all its merchant vessels from the Western Hemisphere. Intelligence expert Captain Ellis M. fuel. While military leaders on Oahu were busy developing plans to meet a possible Japanese attack. but Hull could not see that Proposal A contained anything “fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government.” Another link in the chain of prediction! If Japan took the plunge. Marshall and Stark sent Roosevelt on November 5 a joint estimate in which they affirmed bluntly: “At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. A vast protective belt of water shielded Oahu on all sides. To reach an agreement before the First Air Fleet got under way would save the Japanese a considerable investment in time. workshops. too. and auxiliary craft. in the “Navy behind the Navy. On November 5 he sent the ambassador an actual deadline: “Because of various circumstances.“On April 1.” [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. these soldiers were expertly trained in the defense of the island. Hull had plenty and spoke for some fifteen minutes on “the dangers of the international situation. one could see fighting craft of all descriptions – six to eight battleships. but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one…” Why the twenty-fifth? On that date (November 26.300 miles to the northwest. Naval Intelligence in Washington alerted the commandants of all naval districts – including the Fourteenth at Hawaii – as follows: “Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows [sic] the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect. Sunday. dry docks. Walter C. supply. “it’s Uncle Sam’s fighting ships.] Marshall pointed out: “If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated decision will still have not been reached…” Therefore. kept rugged and alert by constant field exercises. numerous heavy and light cruisers.” the entire Fleet could dock. a screen of outlying bases into which the United Sates was pouring millions of defense dollars flanked Oahu.” In 1941 Oahu had a strong garrison of about 25. And if the Japanese sideslipped the American outer defense posts or succeeded in fighting through the Pacific Fleet. Zacharias considered the removal of commercial shipping back to Japan one of the “earliest indications of hostilities. field guns stood ready. Well could [Gen. From this great mid-Pacific pivotal point it could swing into action at a moment’s notice and strike hard at the enemy in any direction. regretfully turning down Kimmel’s request for more destroyers and the two new battleships North Carolina and Washington. most anything…” .” They recommended “military action against Japan” only in certain contingencies. Here. Here. Japanese time) the task force would sortie from Hitokappu Bay. with Palmyra 1. Johnston Island. many Americans conceived of Hawaii as an impregnable fortress. naval strength was concentrated heavily at Pearl Harbor. the British Commonwealth. “War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East.” This was an uncanny prognostication. exactly one day after the dating of the Martin-Bellinger Report. Bombers stationed at Hickam Field gave the Air force potent scoring punch. two or three aircraft carriers.” He [Hull] went over the conversations with Japan. literally. and certain naval district commandants. emphasizing that in his opinion “relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. or national holiday.” The Army. which was later arranged for the tenth. but by the same token it provided an open highway of exposure and detection. at any time the Fleet moved out in stately maneuver. p. and many other shore installations made Pearl Harbor virtually an independent maintenance base. George C. U. and undergo repairs. Hawaii was proud of its guardian of the seas. the first being “A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States. it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. Harold R.] Stark and [Army Chief of Staff Gen.” bragged the Honolulu Advertiser on February 1. Oil storage tanks.000 miles due south. As always. Ballantine at 0900 on November 7.S. In case the enemy got too close or tried to land there. Hart.000 troops.000 miles west and somewhat southward.

but correcting a mistake in the key took some time. Then he passed the material to Hopkins. they faced the difficulty of working out a Japanese-American rapprochement while Japan was still tied to Germany. Nomura took a certain comfort from Roosevelt’s quoting William Jennings Bryan: “There is no last word between friends. Prange. be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. with help from their Army opposites. Hull complimented Kurusu on the way he had “handled his relations with the public since coming to this country. Schulz carried the locked pouch to the main White House. The dispatch arrived at an opportune moment. once more Tokyo insisted upon November 25 as the cutoff date. with Harry Hopkins “pacing back and forth slowly. “This means war. 474-475 . repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Bloch’s liaison officer with Short’s headquarters. p. Inform district and army authorities. as well as several other Japanese diplomatic missions. Prange. At around 1630 Safford said. “There is nothing I can do but get in your way and make you nervous. Short went over the message with Phillips almost word for word. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not. and Kurusu met on the eighteenth. Kramer telephoned his wife. “Someone from the usher’s office” accompanied him to the President’s study and announced him. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates [sic] an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Colonel Tige Phillips. 405-406 “Thus. Kramer telephoned Wilkinson at about 2100 and received authority to make the necessary rounds.” It therefore behooved him to be circumspect because the Japanese “were apparently looking for excuses. not more than 10 feet away. 335-337 “Now it so happened that at 1430 on November 27. and he read carefully for about ten minutes. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. 1941] Lieutenant Harold S. Although they talked together for an hour and a quarter. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 [the Navy’s basic war plan]. signed “Marshall. Nevertheless. his wife sensed “an air of tenseness about him.”” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.” Roosevelt’s big hand grasped the sheaf of about fifteen typewritten pages. 358 “As the cold dusk of December 6 closed over Washington. the men of Safford’s shop were duly thankful that Togo’s long opus arrived in English. He received the impression “that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and be regarded by Japan as an overt act. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. A similar warning is being sent by War Department…” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. repeat not. Nomura. whereupon the President turned to him and said. p. Prange. who had gone to the National Theater to see The Student Prince. repeat not. Earle. Then they spent some two hours making the requisite copies. so they did not have to translate it or worry about phraseology. He also spoke highly of the respect and confidence in which the Secretary and his associates hold the Japanese Ambassador. where Kramer left Roosevelt’s copy in the customary locked pouch with Lieutenant Schulz in the latter’s cubbyhole in the mailroom. at 1030. p. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. nothing new developed. to commandeer her as chauffeur. He had no luck in raising Stark. Kimmel had just received a similar. his chief of staff. Prange. Nomura presented Kurusu to Hull. He saw Roosevelt seated at his desk. If hostilities cannot. even stronger message from the Navy Department: This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. The secretary of state took an immediate dislike to the new envoy.” By about 1900 they had finished decoding the thirteen parts so far received. On the seventeenth. Bloch’s chief of staff. p. who also read it and handed it back. to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Burr. Report measures taken. after Short had left Kimmel’s conference.” When Hull.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.” They first stopped at the White House office building. He also called the usual recipients to see if they would be in. This policy should not. 472.– At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. p. Prange. Earle promptly escorted Burr to Kimmel’s office. 402 “That afternoon or early evening [on November 27. After finishing his calls. And on the fifteenth the Foreign Ministry had sent instructions to Washington.” which read: Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. whatever his personal bias. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [the Army’s basic war plan] so far as they pertain to Japan. I am going home.” The three diplomats adjourned to the White House for an appointment with the President at 1100. for destroying code machines in the event of emergency. took the message to Captain John B. Mary. When he scrambled into the car. brought him War Department Message No.

Clausen and Bruce Lee) .(Source: Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement by Henry C.

(Source: Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee) .

The draft began by saying simply that negotiations with Japan had terminated. or how little. 1941.” The rest of the message he examined carefully and approved without change.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. Stimson added to the second sentence these words: “hostile action possible at any moment. Current. General Gerow and Colonel Bundy composed a draft of the message.” To General Short. Knox.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. Short. writing to the Secretary of War about the Hawaiian situation. This socalled “war warning” was dispatched from Washington on November 27. and thereafter American war planners repeatedly calculated on the probability of the enemy’s beginning hostilities in that way. 1941. His Philippine preoccupation shines through his handling of what he considered the War Department’s final alert to the Army outpost commanders. an “air bombing attack”.” Stimson wrote back: “In replying to your letter of January 24. Current. this message was not very informative. “I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert”). and yet he was not to carry them out in such a way as to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. The Army commander at Pearl Harbor was General Walter C. an “air torpedo plane attack” and third. p. Current. After calling up Hull. Various investigations by war planners showed that only a continuous. he was told. not defense – he focused the greater part of his attention. as Stimson recorded. Three facts about it should be noted. 164-165 “Instead. and cooperating with the Dutch and the British in the southwestern Pacific. as the crisis with Japan developed. that hostile action was possible and. was actually ready and in use. wide-arc reconnaissance by air could give adequate warning of an enemy approach. reported that the “dangers envisaged in the order of importance and probability” were these: first. but not to let this consideration jeopardize his defense. the War Secretary corrected the first sentence to read: “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. He was left with the inference that. Third. and at first exclusively.“For months before December 7. if the pieces of the puzzle had been properly put together. Instead. barrage balloons. long-range. his job would not be to drive attackers off from his own base. The fact is that Stimson did see the danger early in the year. To the message intended for him was added a caution against alarming the civilian population of Oahu. on the one hand. second. 167-168 . I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. when they launched the Russo-Japanese war with a surprise blow at Port Arthur. Stimson had expected eventual war with Japan. He was to take such reconnaissance measures as he deemed necessary. Here is the complete dispatch as sent to General Short: “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. he was thinking primarily. that negotiations might be resumed. 166 “All along he had been thinking of MacArthur in the Philippines. It told him. and Stark (Marshall being absent from Washington that day). First. “sabotage. It seems – in retrospect – that he should have foreseen the Pearl Harbor attack. At Stimson’s instance. but he finally decided to send warnings to the rest of the outpost commanders also. Second. and “aircraft warning service. On January 24 the Secretary of the navy. he concentrated more and more upon sending bombers to the Philippines. It told him to let the Japanese commit the first overt act.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. raiding Japanese installations and communications. After all. In January. The Navy in its Hawaiian maneuvers of 1932 staged a successful raid on Pearl Harbor with carrier-borne aircraft. was complex. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo warned Washington of rumors that Japan might begin war without declaring it. “you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five. a reputation dating at least from 1904. not Hawaii – on offense. Stimson and not Roosevelt or Marshall took the initiative in making the decision to send the message (in a telephone conversation with the President that morning. though he failed to check up to see how much of it. then presented it to a conference of Stimson. p. would have spelled out the very time as well as the place of the attack. of the Philippines (“The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur”). the wording of the alert.” As if to offset the ambiguities he thus introduced. and begin it with an assault upon Hawaii from the air.” To overcome this last deficiency. anti-aircraft guns. Yet Stimson did little or nothing to make additional patrol planes available for Hawaii. on the other hand. On the Philippines. if and when hostilities came. he worked hard to provide radar equipment.” Stimson considered Hawaii “the best equipped of all our overseas departments. this war plan called for defending the Philippines. p.” So far as it applied to Japan. regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. the Japanese had a reputation for striking without warning. The “Magic” intercepts of Japanese communications in the fall of 1941.” though he conceded that it was lacking in pursuit and patrol planes. in the form or forms it ultimately took.

” he immediately replied to the War Department: “Report [Hawaiian] department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy re URAD [your radio message] four seven two twenty seventh. Stimson paid close attention to the one on top. the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.” Stimson replied that he too would like more time but not at the cost of the humiliation of the United States or at the cost of “reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. Short. This reply.” This reply General Marshall brought to Stimson’s desk for the Secretary’s eye. Knox.” taken by itself. as usual. So little hope for anything was held out that on the 24th a “quasi alert” was sent to the Pacific commands. This policy should not. With this statement in mind he introduced some qualifying phrases in the text which h then served as the basis for the “final alert” prepared in the War Plans Division and sent under General Marshall’s signature to the Pacific commands. was passed through the Secretary’s office where Stimson put his initials on it. But he did not and could not take that message by itself. Report measures taken. Short’s underneath. In this communication the Japanese government asked its consul general in Hawaii for detailed information about the precise berthing of the ships in Pearl Harbor. the Secretary of State confided to Stimson and Knox on the 27th that the matter “is now in the hands of you and Knox – the Army and the Navy. and General Leonard T. The two military men revealed in discussion a “not unnatural” tendency “to seek for more time. Liaison with Navy [as prescribed in your radio message] four seven two twenty seventh. for his initials. and the others confounded his confusion. With the message from Short was one from MacArthur. Stimson by Elting E. repeat not. because Stimson was concerned with only his own “war warning. General Marshall was away for the day at troop maneuvers. p.” On that same day the Secretary of War took some part of the matter into his own hands. Chief of Naval Operations.“To General Short. His mind. that is. Afterwards he could not remember ever having seen it. the wording of this “war warning. Stimson and Short misunderstood each other completely. that several divisions of Japanese troops were boarding ship at Shanghai. like the others received in answer to the final alert. While Nomura and his fellow negotiator Saburo Kurusu took Hull’s recommendations off for study. be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. From G-2 and from General Arnold he got instructions to be on the lookout for sabotage. through the broken Japanese code. Morison. it was a response to what was actually Stimson’s own “war warning. To the alert. Stimson never inquired into the sabotage warnings that the War Department had sent. After all. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. repeat not. was not intended for saboteurs. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not. as they would get their data by local observations of their own. He never ordered any answer to it. Current. read: Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. If hostilities cannot. who like Hull believed the “talks had been called off. There was a consideration of a six-month and then of a three-month truce. The first sentence and the last seven words of the second sentence in the alert were written by Stimson himself. then. replied as follows: Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. in his own hand. though he must have. Next day word came in.” that a “final alert” should be sent to the Pacific to put the forces on the “qui vive for any attack. and he was stopped by a recent Supreme Court decision from tapping Japanese communications.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. one might have reasoned.” He then called Cordell Hull to obtain an exact statement of the existing situation. and apparently the two were clipped together. His superiors might have expected something other than sabotage if they had interpreted aright the Japanese “bomb plot” message of September 24 which had been intercepted and decoded. This information. Lieutenant General Walter C.” while Short was responding to a whole group of warnings he had received. And so that afternoon Stimson. himself. Admiral Stark. he never gave it a second thought. Gerow of the War Plans Division sat down to work out a text for the final warning.” He gave some proposals to the Japanese but his pessimism continued. was ambiguous and misleading enough. On the 26th Hull believed that Japan was “poised for attack” but he made one further “honest effort to keep our conversations going. was on the Philippines. This message was sent on November 27. 526-528 . Number 472. The message. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.” – Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. He suggested to the President. repeat cannot. He never questioned (till after December 7) the sufficiency of Short’s reply. He left the Hawaiian commander to take it for granted that the War Department was satisfied with his antisabotage measures – which included bunching his planes on the ground in such a way as to make them useless for defense and vulnerable as targets in case of an air attack. but they were going on badly. were on it. to alarm civil population or disclose intent. General Short did not have access to this or other “Magic” intercepts. He approved the rest.” The President agreed. MacArthur’s. Having been asked to “report measures taken. 168-169 “In the last week of November the negotiations with Japan were still going on. It was only one of several that he received. If he as much as looked at Short’s.” sent out over Marshall’s name during Marshall’s absence. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

1969. Marshall. Newfoundland.S. General George C. U.mil/photos/images/h67000/h67209c. Navy. Conference leaders during Church services on the after deck of HMS Prince of Wales.S. (Donation of Vice Admiral Harry Sanders. USN (Retired).S. American President Franklin D. British Army.navy. U. U. Stark. Royal Navy.htm .S.Atlantic Charter Conference & Negotiations with the Japanese Ambassador Atlantic Charter Conference. U. King. General Sir John Dill. 10-12 August 1941. Army. in Placentia Bay. Admiral Harold R. Standing directly behind them are Admiral Ernest J. and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound. Roosevelt (left) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill are seated in the foreground.history. American envoy Harry Hopkins (far left) is seen talking with Union Pacific Railroad chairman and special envoy William Averell Harriman in the background. Naval Historical Center Photograph) Source: http://www. Navy.

D. 1941.M. Prince of Wales to relax. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill are shown as they sat on the big forward deck of H. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) U.C. 1941. on March 11. chat and breathe a bit of salt air during their Atlantic meeting on August 15. Behind the two at right are: Admiral . 1941 and ordered an oil embargo on Imperial Japan on August 1. President Roosevelt ordered an economic embargo on Imperial Japan on July 24. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Bill in Washington.S. 1941.President Franklin D.S.

In the more distant background (center) stands Sumner Welles. U. U. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) (Source: Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by John Toland) . Under Secretary of State and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. King.J.S. Marshall (extreme right).E. George C.S. and Gen. Atlantic Fleet Commander.

(Photo: Thomas D. Nomura was not informed about the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor until after the incident. McAvoy/Time Life) . General Hideki Tojo and his Cabinet withheld vital information concerning the proposed attack on Pearl Harbor from Kichisaburo Nomura. in November 1941 for diplomatic talks a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor.C. D. (Source: Day of Deceit by Robert B. Stinnett) Secretary of State Cordell Hull (center) walks with Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura (left) Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu (right) upon their arrival in Washington.Note: McCollum’s memorandum was issued in October 1940.

” He was not quite so much concerned about the need for gaining time. he told the President. Stimson favored “stringing out negotiations” but opposed an actual conference or even a preliminary discussion of concrete terms. His idea was to make the Philippines a base for B-17 bombers which could attack any Japanese expedition daring to move southward past the islands.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N.” (Here Stimson was a bit forgetful. had already used it against the Chinese. That is precisely the reason why the question “how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot” was. Stimson went to the “War Cabinet” meeting in the White House at which the President “brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday. the President turned from talk of truce to talk of war. he himself had insisted on leaving the Chinese and the Japanese alone together. he was willing to see Roosevelt and Hull keep up their month-old conversations with Ambassador Nomura. His colleagues seemed to be coming around to his idea of an offensive-defensive move from the Philippines. who. if Japan should “move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees or south of 10 degrees North” or into Portuguese Timor. in spite of strong objections from China and the League [of Nations]. November 25. as Stimson put it. was preparing a “strategy of national defense” with which to forestall the Japanese. On October 21.D. such a “difficult proposition. for ultimate use against the Japanese. the “troubleshooter” Saburo Kurusu headed for Washington to join Nomura.” For Stimson. the Japanese would not actually fire the “first shot” as against the United States. if not promptly called by the Japanese.” Since. already entrenched in Indo-China. They were confident that the Japanese would not dare to start hostilities against the United States. Current.” Should we strike first? What should the tactics be? Would the people back us up? One by one the Secretaries – Hull. in the language of the administration. Stimson commented to himself: “Japan is sending somebody to us who. Just ten years before. He was thinking now in terms of air rather than sea power. because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese knew it. as he told Roosevelt. was broad and inclusive. he rejoiced in his diary. the British and the Dutch in the Pacific were. in the fall of 1931 [i. It included the British and the Dutch. p. Secretary Hull at first proposed putting the matter to the American people this way: the Japanese have fired the first shot at us by infringing our freedom of the seas and by allying themselves with the Germans in a program of aggression against the world. Stimson was pleased. but they did appear ready to strike out against the colonies of Great Britain or the Netherlands. Stimson. When. agreement.” “We were likely to be attacked”! The pronoun. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. in September. Not that they seemed to menace directly the United States or its territories. To this problem the men in the White House proceeded to seek solutions. or the Loyalty Islands. It would check his own scheme of building up an overpowering air force in the Philippines. I think. as he and his associates supposed. On the following day (November 7) he polled his Cabinet on the question of the southwestern Pacific – “whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. put it this way: the Japanese have fired the first shot at us by disregarding that near-ultimatum. was much the best Cabinet meeting yet. He wanted to put in the Philippines at least a hundred of the Flying Fortresses. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that. “I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together.) After listening to Stimson. American.e. preoccupied with his old proconsular domain. “It was a difficult proposition. Others added these arguments: the Japanese have fired the first shot at us by threatening an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and by threatening to cut off our rubber supply from Malaya. who in his own and his colleagues’ thinking were already our Pacific allies in effect. for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning.” That is to say. identified with us. Earlier in the year. stood poised for new and wider adventures in the southwestern Pacific. and Roosevelt had refused to commit himself. British. as were General Marshall and Admiral Stark. early in November. Stimson repeatedly had tried to get Roosevelt to approve war plans based on this A. for that matter. the Philippines. recalling Roosevelt’s secret warning to Japan of August 17. the problem was how to maneuver them into the position of seeming to do so when they moved upon Dutch or British possessions in the Pacific.” To gain time for assembling his air armada in the Philippines. as Stimson here used it. 155-157 “That October the Japanese. Mukden Incident].” Apparently impressed by this memorandum. And when. On November 5 they sent the President a joint Army-Navy memorandum advising that “no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. the next step was to send poison gas to the Philippines. he reported to the President: “even this imperfect threat.” . On that November 25 the White House conferees were expecting Japan to strike soon at British or Dutch but not American soil. Roosevelt the next day told Stimson he thought he might propose to Kurusu a six months’ truce during which neither Japan nor the United States would make any military advance or increase of armaments in the Far East. and the Chinese would object to it. and the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. of which we are a part. bids fair to stop Japan’s march to the South and secure the safety of Singapore.” As Stimson said. and Roosevelt agreed. Stimson. New Caledonia. when only a few had arrived. but he did not want them to concede anything but talk. will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. Then Stimson. and Dutch staff officers in the Far East had agreed that “joint military counteraction” should be undertaken if Japan attacked or directly threatened the territory of either the United States or Great Britain or the Netherlands – or.“At noon that same. This. As Stimson recorded: “Hull laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing should be rested – the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression.B. and he calculated on October 6 that he could provide that many in about three months. Nevertheless. Premier Konoye proposed to meet Roosevelt in the Pacific. “The thing would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known – and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President – what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in. Stimson did not like this truce plan. however. and the rest – expressed their opinion that the public would support the government.

U.S.– Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. where they discussed foreign relations between Japan and America. 152-154 Japanese Ambassadorto America Kichisaburo Nomura (left). and Japanese special envoy Saburo Kurusu are seen departing after meeting with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White House in November 1941. Secretary of State Cordell Hull (center). p. Current. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) .

and special envoy Saburo Kuruso smile as they leave a brief meeting with U. D. just after the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii Territory.A. the Japanese Ambassador to the United States.Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura (left). U. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington. (© CORBIS) . on December 7.S. 1941..C.S.

Convinced that “the Japanese were going to attack some American installation in the Pacific area.” He believed that a warning should go to the field commanders in all Pacific areas. he reached Hull’s office at 0950. but he had no authority to send one. The colonel explained that he had “a most important message” that Marshall “must see at once…” He offered to bring it out.” One can readily see why.” Bratton clearly recalled having spoken with Marshall. Stone. Bratton decided at about 0900 to telephone Marshall’s quarters.S. “and then to dash out with it again.” Kramer delivered the President’s copies of the morning’s harvest to the White House around 0940. Clyde Dusenbury. While Kramer prepared packets of the entire message for delivery. Kramer walked over to State. And no other directive from Tokyo to its embassy in Washington had ever specified a precise hour for a meeting. They immediately returned to Stark’s office and “pointed out to him the virulence and tenor of the language. on the 7th. who arrived five minutes later.] Kramer reached his office in Washington at about 0730 the document was awaiting him.] McCollum was “trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing” when Wilkinson sent for him. As he later explained. Kramer delivered the fourteenth part to McCollum. Tokyo had sent off Part 14 of its reply to the American proposals. In any cases. and said “that it looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations. made on a Sunday in a time of crisis and in such terms as Bratton used.” This fourteenth part was not a formal declaration of war. At about the same moment. Schindel hand-carried it shortly thereafter. and Miles were not in their offices. don’t bother to do that. that it was “vitally important” that Bratton “communicate with him at the earliest practicable moment.“At 0238 Eastern Standard Time. at 0730. Lieutenant John Schindel prepared to deliver the State Department’s copies. “Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering when the blow will strike…” This was just about the time Nagumo’s pilots began preparing for their devastating blow. Miles “could not issue a command message. Navy Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. your time. 485-487 . It merely broke off the discussions.M. Gerow. By the time [Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Roosevelt read the fourteenth part.] Bratton received the fourteenth part at his office between 0830 and 0900. nobody in G-2. You can give it to me then. clearly indicated that an emergency had arisen. to the White House and State. break off negotiations. Some discussion ensued. The two men went to Stark’s office and talked briefly with him. so the President’s reaction was milder than on the previous day. Kramer returned to his office.” While he was thus occupied.” Bratton “just wiped everything else” out of his mind and turned his office over to his assistant. asking him to get the secretary out of bed to receive the famous message. but Marshall answered.” put it through the mill. it did not even rupture diplomatic relations. We all thought they had gone to sea…because that was part of the war plan. Clocks in the War Department showed nearly 1030 when the general returned Bratton’s call. who took it up with Wilkinson. but “nothing was done at that time. trying to find someone who could take action. …” Someone made the remark that “it looked right there that that was enough to indicate that we could expect war. it activated the fourteen-part message.” On the War Department side. a Foreign Service officer serving as Hull’s assistant.” This “immediately stunned” Bratton “into frenzied activity…” The document “was peculiarly worded and the implication was inescapable that it was of vital importance. Prange. He delivered his folder personally to Knox. but evidently no one delivered the message. No wonder his “most vivid impressions of that morning” were of “urgency and perspiration” from chasing about the Navy Department. Yet Bratton never imagined that the United States installation in danger might be Pearl Harbor. An orderly informed him that the general had gone horseback riding. As Stimson recorded in his diary. p. He assembled the entire message and read it through “to see just exactly what it meant. [U. and they had been given a war warning. Unfortunately no one was on duty in the War Department at that hour who could or would act promptly in Marshall’s absence. “Nobody in ONI. At about 1000 Beardall gave Roosevelt the material. For another.”” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. [Colonel Rufus S.” With time slipping by. I am coming down to my office. So he hurried off. Lieutenant Colonel C. Stimson and Knox began their meeting with the secretary of state. back to his office “as quickly as possible to see if anything new had come in. But Marshall. As he remembered. which he reached at 1020. He telephoned John F. Shortly after they left the CNO. knew that any major element of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning the 7th of December.” Wilkinson suggested that an additional warning be sent to Pearl Harbor. but the Chief of Staff did not recollect talking directly with him. Sunday was not a normal working day for the diplomatic corps. Next. For one thing. From State. It ended: “The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. shook his head. “No. an intercept of a much shorter message from [Foreign Minister Shigenori] Togo to [Ambassador Kichisaburo] Nomura crossed his desk: “Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 P.” This request.” Just as the fourteenth part seemed to back away from the final break. Bratton requested that he find the general and give him an urgent message to phone.

Miles arrived shortly after Bratton’s call. After some discussion everyone concurred “in urging that our outlying possessions be given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible means. transfer it there to RCA.” Stark then asked him to include in the dispatch “instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites. The first message went to the Caribbean Defense Command promptly at 1200. Gerow called after him. Yet no one seems to have seriously considered telephoning.” About this time [Brigadier General Leonard T. will you help me get this into readable script? Neither I nor my clerk here can read General Marshall’s handwriting. After a seeming eternity Marshall finished and accepted the trigger dispatch. Gen. Both the fourteenth section and the 1300 message struck [Brigadier General Sherman] Miles forcibly. probably at 1140. So Bratton hurried back to French and asked Marshall’s question. The Navy seldom used the scrambler for secret information because [Captain Leigh] Noyes had warned not to depend on it for security.” As Bratton went out the door. 493-495 . After “a little figuring mentally. But exactly what American installation? Miles urged an immediate warning to the Philippines. which could handle the message straight to San Francisco. There was “an awful urgency” about the deadline. They might as well have tried to deflect a glacier. Panama. French considered going to the Navy but decided that commercial service would provide quicker and safer transmission. Miles and Bratton promptly descended upon him.” Bratton handed French the draft. and (2) something is going to happen coincident with 1 o’clock Washington time. Fuchida’s first wave was circling the carriers preparatory to its flight of destruction. Marshall was reading the entire Japanese reply while Bratton inwardly squirmed with impatience. decoded. Both he and Miles tried to interrupt Marshall and persuade him to read the other message which Bratton clutched in his hand. in charge of Pacific Affairs in War Plans.” Bratton glanced at his watch. Very shortly Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. He found Bratton. French looked over Marshall’s hasty scrawl and replied. “very much exercised. “Go back and find out how long it is going to take for this message to be delivered to the addressees. “The Chief of Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means. and delivered. The message now read: “Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Prange. He had learned the previous day that RCA was installing a teletype circuit to Hawaiian Department Headquarters. He had a direct teletype to Western Union in Washington. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. he had been discussing this identical Japanese message with Schuirmann. The time was about 1158. give the Philippines first priority.” he emphasized.] Bundy. French. local time. which “were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it.” So Marshall pulled up “a piece of scratch paper” and wrote out a longhand message.“In Washington Bratton grew more restive with each passing moment. When Stark answered this call. They concurred in this judgment. Bratton returned to Marshall’s office. So he sent the dispatch to Western Union at 1217.” This did not mean that [Lt. the West Coast. and Hawaii.] Gerow came in with [Colonel Charles W. “If there is any question of priority. When French checked with his Signal Center.” It lacked but a few minutes of noon in Washington. Miles and Bratton continued to urge Marshall to send the warnings. But the warning for Hawaii hit a snag. It would have to be deciphered.” Not until about 1125. officer in charge of the War Department Signal Center. Nevertheless. Leaving French to process his precious message. message in hand.” the Chief of Staff directed him. p. Within a minute or so Stark called Marshall back. Stark told Marshall that “we had sent them so much already” that he “hesitated to send more. Six minutes later the word went out to [Gen. who typed it out from Bratton’s reading. Bratton assumed that the Army had direct communication with Hawaii and did not find out to the contrary until several days after the attack. that for the Presidio [San Francisco] following at 1211. To him they meant two things: “(1) That war is very likely because of the language used by the Japanese. Douglas] MacArthur [in the Philippines]. Inform naval authorities of this communication. Marshall later testified that even if he had used the phone. he discovered that atmospheric conditions had blocked of the channel to Honolulu since about 1030.” Marshall replied that he believed “he could get it through very quickly. When they walked in. Yet no one mentioned the timing of the 1300 message as it related to Hawaii.” French had “never seen him more excited. Marshall. On Nagumo’s task force the clocks read 0158 Tokyo time December 8 – 0628 December 7. he would have called first MacArthur. “It will take about 30 or 40 minutes for it to be delivered to the person to whom it is addressed.” That ended the conversation for the moment. Time ticked away. Walter C. This took a few minutes.” So Bratton read it to one of French’s clerks. He “would go along with” him and offered the use of his naval communications. He had no doubt that the time designated therein “had some very definite significance…” He asked Miles and Bratton what they thought this portended. then Panama.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W.” Marshall did so and instructed Bratton to take the draft to the message center for dispatch “at once by the fastest safe means.” French informed him.just as Nagumo’s carriers were turning into the wind preparing for takeoff – did Marshall appear. and still the Chief of Staff did not show up at the War Department. Then he picked up the White House phone and called Stark. The heavy static interfered even with San Francisco. “Well. Both replied that they “were convinced it meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o’clock that afternoon. “heard some commotion over in the code room” and left his office to investigate. and thence to Honolulu.] Short would have it in his hands in that time. He informed the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] “in a guarded way” what he proposed to do.

by ship on November 15. 1941. D. Saburo Kurusu’s wife Alice Jay [Kurusu] was an American of European descent. Saburo Kurusu and his wife lived in Japan throughout the remainder of World War II. (Photo: Thomas D.C. in 1941. Roosevelt at the White House on November 17. 1941 and again on November 27. Saburo Kurusu arrived in Washington.Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu (left) and Imperial Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura laugh while waiting for talks with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull about reducing tensions between America and Japan at the State Department in Washington. D.C. Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu met with President Franklin D. Saburo Kurusu was the Imperial Japanese Ambassador to Nazi Germany from 1939 to November 1941. McAvoy/Time Life) . 1941 from Japan via Honolulu.

there were no official minutes of the meeting. 1941. hours after the Imperial Japanese Navy bombed Pearl Harbor. just hours after the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii Territory. He prepared a rough draft of what later became his “Day of Infamy” speech. “Throughout the evening of December 7. 1941. He sensed that this was FDR’s overriding concern. who served as a Director of OSS during World War II. Only Donovan has hinted at what went on: the conversation was mostly about public reaction to the attack. Then he invited [Edward R. Edward R. He decided his first wartime move would come the next morning.] Murrow and [William J. 3 . Murrow was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1934 to 1964. Chief Usher Crim noted that the three men spent twenty-five minutes together in the study before Roosevelt retired to his adjoining bedroom. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1932 to 1957. William J. when he would ask Congress to declare that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States. p. and CBS war correspondent Edward R. Crim’s arrival and departure notations in the Usher Book comprise the only official record.The White House as seen from Pennsylvania Avenue was ablaze with light late on the night of December 7.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. “Wild Bill” Donovan (center). “Wild Bill”] Donovan into the study for a midnight snack of sandwiches and cold beer. December 8. Murrow (right) met with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White House on the night of December 7. Roosevelt conferred with congressional and military leaders. Stinnett.

Office of War Information files in the National Archives.) http://www. Washington. (Photographed by Harris & Ewing. it may represent the 1941 or 1942 State of the Union Address.C.navy. a note with the original photograph states that the Franklin D. If that is the case. as the presiding officers (seated behind the President) are Vice President Henry A. New York) has said that the view is not of that event. This photograph.S. from U. 1941.Addressing the United States Congress. D.S. has long been identified as the President delivering his war message on December 8. National Archives. Photograph from Office of War Information collection. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park. the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. in a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives.history. Wallace and House Speaker Sam Rayburn. U. However.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-aftr.htm .

U. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the declaration of war on Imperial Japan at the White House in Washington. 1941. James Roosevelt. Roosevelt is pictured during the dramatic moments before the joint session of Congress in Washington. around 12:30 P. In the background are Vice President Henry A. on December 8. D. (AP Photo) . President Franklin D.. Both the Senate and the House complied with his request almost immediately. D.S." On the right is his son. on December 8. as he asked Congress to declare a state of war against Japan for its "unprovoked and dastardly attack. Wallace (left) and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn. 1941.C.M.C.

D. Hawaii on December 7. opium syndicate. Imperial Japanese Navy planes bombed Pearl Harbor. relaxes in his chair after signing a declaration of war statement against Japan at the White House in Washington. D. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) Left photo: U. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) Right photo: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson observes a globe. on December 8. wearing a black armband. . Roosevelt. 1941 in a surprise attack that destroyed a large portion of the fleet there. 1941. prompting the war declaration. 1941.Cabinet members watch with mixed emotions as President Franklin D. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. whose grandfather Warren Delano was a partner of Russell & Co.m.C. time on December 8.S. signs the declaration of war against Japan at 4:10 p.C. Washington.

S. Navy Admiral Harold R.history.President Franklin Delano Roosevelt congratulates U. in ceremonies at the White House in April 1942.mil/photos/images/h93000/h93290c. (Collection of Admiral Harold R. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www.htm . Stark after Admiral Stark received a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal.S.navy. U. Stark.

1941. Charles Evans Hughes was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.” – President Franklin D. 1941.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the east portico of the U.C.S.S. on January 20. Capitol in Washington. from 1930 to 1946. D. but I shall say it again and again and again. your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.1941: Year of the Snake and Year of Infamy U. 1940 . a private organization in New York City. Charles Evans Hughes retired as the Chief Justice of the U. (Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library Photo) “I have said this before. Roosevelt. Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes administers the oath of office to U.S. Supreme Court on June 30.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appears with his “War Cabinet” in the modern Cabinet Room in 1941. (Library of Congress) .

S. killing more than 100 U. Gen. military surrenders Guam to Imperial Japan. April 27 – Nazi German troops enter Athens. 1941.S. thus joining the Axis powers.S. America reciprocates by declaring war on both nations. Richardson as Commander-in-Chief of U. July 26 – In response to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. 1944) September 16 – Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran is forced to resign in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran (“The Shah” who went into exile in America in 1979). Ambassador to Japan Joseph C.S. 8 Japan time) – The Imperial Japanese Navy launches a surprise attack on the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor December 8 – The United States officially declares war on Empire of Japan. Grew delivers a message to the State Department warning the U. April 23 – The America First Committee holds its first mass rally in New York City. government about a possible Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor. military surrenders Wake Island to Imperial Japan. Takashi Sakai at the The Peninsula Hotel [Hong Kong] in Hong Kong. July 31 – New York Herald Tribune publishes an article about Nazi German financier Fritz Thyssen’s bank account with Union Banking Corporation and Prescott S. representative Averill Harriman and British representative Lord Beaverbrook meet with Josef Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to arrange urgent assistance for Russia. December 10 – U.S. March 11 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Act into law. Roosevelt and begins his duties as Japanese Ambassador to the U. Navy Admiral Patrick N. 1942 – Nazi German military fights the Soviet Red Army at the Battle of Moscow. April 9 – The U. Ethiopia which had been liberated from Italian forces. acquires full military defense rights in Greenland. October 30 – Franklin Delano Roosevelt approves US$1 billion in Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. August 25 –September 17. in Placentia Bay.S. the Governor of Hong Kong. . Republic of China are asphyxiated in a bomb shelter during the Bombing of Chungking.L. 1941-Jan. and the Philippines. with Charles Lindbergh as keynote speaker. Singapore.1941 Timeline – Events Leading to Pearl Harbor: January 20 – Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes swears in U. December 7 (Dec. June 21 – All Fascist Italian consulates in the United States are ordered closed. Manila.S. Newfoundland and establish the Atlantic Charter. Bush’s ties to Union Banking Corporation. 27. April 18 – Prime Minister of Greece Alexandros Koryzis commits suicide as German troops approach Athens. December 11 – Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declare war on America. November 26 (Japan time) – Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet departs Japan enroute to Pearl Harbor. March 31 – Major General Frederick L.S. 1941-January 7. July 7 – American forces take over the defense of Iceland from the British. Malaya. Nazi Germany begins a siege against Leningrad [St. June 22 – Nazi Germany invades the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa).S.S. March 27 – Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa arrives in Honolulu. Petersburg] (Sept. Martin and U. May 10 – The British House of Commons is damaged by the Luftwaffe in an air raid." June 16 – All Nazi German consulates in the United States are ordered closed and their staffs to leave the country by July 10. to help fund the greatly increased production of military equipment. December 18 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs Executive Order 8983 establishing a commission to investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack (Roberts Commission) December 22 – U. Bellinger co-authored the Martin-Bellinger Report. killing 11 American sailors. June 25 – Finland attacks the Soviet Union to seek the opportunity of revenge in the Continuation War. February 14 – Kichisaburo Nomura presents his credentials to Pres. June 23 – Hungary and Slovakia declare war on the Soviet Union. 7 American time) – Imperial Japan launches invasions in Hong Kong. President Franklin D. January 27 – U. House of Representatives passes the Lend-Lease Act (260–165). Rudolf Hess parachutes into Scotland. February 1 – Admiral Husband Kimmel replaces Admiral James O. Pacific Fleet.S. December 25 – Sir Mark Aitchison Young. May 2-31 – Great Britain invades Iraq in the Anglo-Iraqi War and overthrows the pro-Nazi Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gailani May 5 – Emperor Haile Selassie enters Addis Ababa. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill meet aboard HMS Prince of Wales. Roosevelt orders the seizure of all Japanese assets in the United States and imposed an oil and gasoline trade embargo on Japan on August 1.S. December 8 (Dec. February 8 – The U. U.S. Roosevelt for his third term. forces in the Philippines. November 26 – Secretary of State Cordell Hull issues the Ten Points. November 17 – Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura and envoy Saburo Kurusu meet with President Roosevelt at the White House. also known as the Hull Notes. October 31 – The destroyer USS Reuben James is torpedoed by a German U-boat near Iceland. surrenders to Imperial Japanese Army Lt. Hawaii and begins to study the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. July 4 – The mass murder of Polish scientists and writers is committed by Nazi German troops in Lwów (Lviv. October 18 – General Hideki Tojo becomes the Prime Minister of Japan. Ukraine). claiming to be on a peace mission. U. June 8 – British and Free French forces invade Syria.S. May 27 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaims an "unlimited national emergency. Navy sailors. September 24 – Imperial Japanese Foreign Ministry issues the “bomb plot” message to the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu. the Philippines Army is ordered nationalized by President Roosevelt. July 26 – General Douglas MacArthur is named commander of all U. under pressure from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. 8. 1941 Timeline – Overseas: March 1 – Bulgaria signs the Tripartite Pact. President Franklin D. April 13 – The Soviet Union and Japan sign a neutrality pact. October 17 – Destroyer USS Kearny is torpedoed and damaged near Iceland. a military report that described various scenarios of a possible Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor. May 1 – The first Defense Bonds and Defense Savings Stamps go on sale in the United States. August 10-12 – President Franklin D. Senate passes the Lend-Lease Act (60–31). October 2. 1941: United Kingdom and Soviet forces invades Iran (later known as Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran). March 8 – The U. September 29-October 1 – The First Moscow Conference begins.S. April 6 – Nazi Germany invades Yugoslavia and Greece. September 8 – The Siege of Leningrad begins. June 5 – Four thousand residents of Chungking.

D. 1323 (0753 Hawaii Time) – Commander Mitsuo Fuchida announces “Tora! Tora! Tora!” 1325 (0755 Hawaii Time) – The Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor begins. 0955 – Lt. 0900 – Colonel Bratton calls Gen. Gen. 1340 – Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox informs President Franklin D. Com. D.S. 1405 – President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the joint congressional resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and Japan in the executive office of the White House at 4:10 p. Note: Eastern Standard Time (Washington. 1941 (Eastern Standard Time) Leading Up to the Attack 0238 – Japanese government issues Part 14 of its reply (“Part 14 Message”) to the American proposals. Bratton received the Part 14 Message at his office in Washington. 1030 (0030 Tokyo Time.Timeline of Events on December 7. George C. Com. Gen. Walter C. on December 8. D. 1140 (0610 Hawaii Time) – Imperial Japanese Navy pilots begin taking off for Pearl Harbor.S. 1206 – Gen. Kramer delivers Part 14 Message to the White House.C. 1230 (0700 Hawaii Time) – Admiral Husband Kimmel wakes up at his quarters in Hawaii. George C. 0730 – U. Georce C. December 8) – Ambassador Joseph C. 1941. 30 minutes ahead of Hawaii Time (Honolulu Time) on December 7. THIS IS NO DRILL”. 1217 (0647 Hawaii Time) – Gen. Marshall was riding on horseback. Short in Hawaii is sent via Western Union. Roosevelt by phone that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Com. Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines. PEARL HARBOR. Kramer receives Part 14 Message and “1:00 P. 1941. Marshall’s warning dispatch to Lt. George C.C. Roosevelt’s message to the Emperor in Tokyo 1030 – Gen. (1300 Eastern Standard Time) Reply” Message at his office in Washington. 0950 – Lt. 1125 (0555 Hawaii Time) – Gen. 1420 – Secretary of State Cordell Hull receives Japanese diplomats Nomura and Kurusu at the State Department. Kramer delivers Part 14 Message to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the State Department. 0940 – Lt. Time) was 5 hours. Marshall’s warning dispatch is issued to Gen. D.m. Marshall’s quarters. December 8) – Imperial Japanese Navy attacks Clark Field in the Philippines. Marshall reads the Part 14 Message at his office in Washington. 1210-1223 (0640-0653 Hawaii Time) – A Japanese submarine is sunk outside Pearl Harbor. Grew delivers Pres. 1328 (0758 Hawaii Time) – U. Navy in Hawaii issues the message: “AIR RAID. 1405 – Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura and Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu arrive at the State Department. Marshall returns Colonel Bratton’s telephone call. 1150 (0620 Hawaii Time) – The first attack wave (183 Japanese planes) begin flying in formation en route to Pearl Harbor. President Franklin D. Kramer delivers Part 14 Message to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox at the State Department.C. 1000 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reads the Part 14 Message at the White House. 2230 (1130 Philippine Time. Roosevelt informs Secretary of State Cordell Hull by phone that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. 1245 (0715 Hawaii Time) – The second attack wave take off for Pearl Harbor. 0830-0900 – Colonel Rufus S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Alwin D.C. All hours listed are Eastern Standard Time unless otherwise noted.M. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) .

1941 (Manila time) when the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor. right) on board USS Baltimore (CA-68) at Pearl Harbor.navy. demotion) for his actions in the Philippines. Gen. Richardson Jr.e. unlike Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lt. Walter C. left) and Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Roosevelt (seated. court-martial. Conversing in the left background are U.S. forces in the Philippines on December 8. was the Military Governor of Hawaii Territory (1943-1944) and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. General Douglas MacArthur was never relieved of his duties or reprimanded (i. Hawaii on July 26.history. Richardson Jr. Stainback (seated. Nimitz.President Franklin D. (Collection of Fleet Admiral Chester W.htm General Douglas MacArthur was the Commander of the U. (seated. Standing directly behind them are Vice Admiral Robert L. Army General Douglas MacArthur (far left) and Admiral William D. Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Although Imperial Japanese military attacked and later conquered the Philippines. U. Ghormley (left) and Rear Admiral William R. The Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Clark Field in the Philippines nine hours after the Pearl Harbor raid.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-g/r-ghorml. . Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www.S. Leahy. Short. 1944. center) poses with Hawaii Territorial Governor Ingram M. Furlong (right).S.

S.com/roosevelt-obit. Hawaii.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur.mishalov. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and U.A.html) .Left to right: U. on July 26. 1944. U. Nimitz on board the USS Baltimore in Pearl Harbor. Navy Admiral Chester W. (Photo: http://www.S.

25. Nov. . second." With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East— whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. and myself. saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us—first. stating a point beyond which we would fight. General Marshall and I went to the White House. Stark. . Stimson. forty or fifty ships—and have been sighted south of Formosa. The President outlined what he thought he might say. . deep vein of comment and discussion of the 1941 tragedy by ex-War Secretary Henry L. Monday. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. On talking with the President this morning over the telephone. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling NO and then he said. Matters are crystallizing . . 6. 28. . G-2 had sent me a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. and. it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers. . Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships—thirty. . I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation. . I told him I frankly saw two great objections: first. for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning. perhaps (as soon as) next Monday. and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. The President brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked. . studded with pure history in the form of notes from his diary. (2 of 3) He branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed. I think. Nov. . where we were until nearly half past one. to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again. 5. 7. . . third. . . . that he should be on the qui vive for any attack. that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines. Apr. Britain at Singapore. . I left for the White House and had about an hour's talk with the President—on the whole a good talk. . . and the question was what we should do. He said that this time the vote IS unanimous. the Pearl Harbor Committee at last unearthed a rich find—a broad. [At a War Cabinet meeting at noon] it was now the opinion of everyone that if this [Japanese] expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam . and he agreed with me. . he feeling the same way. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one. that the Chinese would feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. At the meeting were Hull.National Affairs: PEARL HARBOR: HENRY STIMSON'S VIEW Time magazine. second. Knox. Cabinet meeting this afternoon. He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He went around the table—first Hull and then myself. . . Nov. namely. The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. I told him . . We talked about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from Japan. will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. . Japan is sending to us someone who. Nov. . 01. I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six months. When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started. . . "The Ayes have it. . 1946 In its fifth month of prospecting. . to fight at once. . . I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President. . . Nov. 27. Marshall. . . . The Netherlands. to do nothing. Significant excerpts: Nov. and ourselves in the Philippines.

I pointed out that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing.html . . . ." My first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. British or Dutch territory. "Have you heard the news? . 27. .00. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us. both of which were stated without equivocation in the message of Nov. . I have tried to review these various responsibilities with fairness to both the outpost commander and the Staff officers at home. . . . . that he will make a message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country.. we should have to fight. this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot. must fight if Japan 1) attacked U.* The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor . They have attacked Hawaii. . . . Source: http://www. Given these two facts. the outpost commander should be on the alert to make his fight. Henry Stimson summarized: With the aid of "hindsight. reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. Dec. Re-reading his diary. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra. by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor. while I was sitting at lunch.time. . . .It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. I think. although all the rest of us are rather against it. To cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours. I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States . only for a very small fraction of the day and night. They are now bombing Hawaii. . 7. or a certain point. on the other. . Our General Staff officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of global war which they felt was probably imminent." I [have] reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the General Staff would have placed itself and the safety of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General Short more information than it did. It was also agreed that if the British fought. I am particularly led to do so because of the difficulty of reproducing now the background and atmosphere under which the entire Army was then working. . . . . 2. or 2) moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100° longitude or south of 10° latitude. Just about 2 o'clock. and to use his best reconnaissance system. or sitting still and allowing it to go on. The President asked Hull and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers. If this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China. . . the British would fight. . .S. the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me. the radar.S. or a certain line. Yet they were surrounded. in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief. .792673. . 2) hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. which we didn't think we could do—that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place. outside their offices and almost throughout the country. which we didn't think we could do. and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available. we would have to fight. (3 of 3) [Yet] General Short had been told the two essential facts: 1) a war with Japan is threatening.9171.com/time/magazine/article/0. and then make his speech to Congress as a separate and more understandable thing to the people of the United States. Then we discussed how to prevent it. . but in addition to that he is quite settled. * The War Cabinet agreed that the U. . . . . Dec. . It became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand.

and our interests are in grave danger.milestonedocuments. Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam. And while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations. Japan has. 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. at the solicitation of Japan. Indeed. Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.com/documents/full-text/franklin-d-roosevelts-pearl-harbor-speech/ . December 7. Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation. December 7. was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday. therefore. There is no blinking at the fact that our people.Franklin D. And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island. Roosevelt’s “Pearl Harbor” Speech Mr. Vice President. one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American Island of Oahu. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu. As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. Speaker. and Mr. Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us. It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. our territory. Hostilities exist. a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire. Source: http://www. The United States was at peace with that Nation and. 1941. the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph— so help us God. and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives: Yesterday.

mil/photos/images/g450000/g451125c.S. was in the upper left corner of the building's top floor. Fleet Headquarters at the time of the Japanese attack on December 7. shaped like an upsidedown "U") housed the U. National Archives Collection) http://www. painted to resemble a building.history. Navy Photograph. Pacific Fleet. 1941. looking north on October 13. with part of the supply depot beyond and the fuel farm at right.S. (Official U.S.htm . Note the fuel tank across the road from the submarine base. Kimmel. the Commander in Chief of the U. Hawaii. The building beside the submarine ascent tower (in left center. Office of Admiral Husband E. 1941.Aerial view of the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor in Oahu.navy.

and his Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-k/h-kimml. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www.navy.history. U. Delany (left). Captain Walter S. confers with his Chief of Staff. at Pearl Harbor.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet.S. USN (center).Admiral Husband E. (U. Hawaii in 1941. Kimmel. Smith (right). Commander in Chief.htm . Captain William W.

(Source: Day of Deceit by Robert B. Stinnett) .

Japan had invited American sanctions by its move south. for it could not possibly meet its extensive oil needs by producing synthetics. 476-477 “In essence China was the touchstone of Japanese-American relations.” After some quibbling Togo agreed to present Grew’s request to Hirohito. The United States had no desire to strangle Japan. Now. 4-5 . The very presence in Asia of the United States. Prince Fumimaro Konoye. 169 “Grew received Roosevelt’s message for the Emperor at 2230 December 7. Roosevelt slammed an embargo on high-octane gasoline as well as crude oil.” declared Japan’s premier. ten the next. the United States had no intention of subsidizing Japanese expansion in Asia while at the same time opposing German expansion in Europe. the holdup schedule was changed to five hours one day. Above all. these estimates did not include any margin for loss through tanker sinkings or storage fires. the foremost being the recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. on December 6. could be a strength and a blessing to all Asia. The press lost no occasion to assure such intruders that Japan would slam the Open Door in their faces. flowing in productive channels. and important industries paralyzed in less than half that time. p. Japan considered America’s huge naval expansion program aimed directly at it. The termination on January 26. so what helped the British hindered the Axis. As far back as 1938 the United States had placed Japan under the so-called moral embargo. This put Japan in a tight spot. peacetime consumption of the Japanese Navy ran to 300. was a constant irritation to Japanese pride. It was then about 0030 on December 8. serious discussions. Then. It so happened that on November 29 Lieutenant Colonel Morio Tomura of the Communications Section of the Army General Staff had asked Tateki Shirao. along with the European powers. To the Japanese the fulfillment of this dream was imperative. Since the stationing of a large segment of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940. Presumably it would expand as Japan moved outward to include all that the traffic would bear. Britain was at war with Japan’s allies. on August 1. thus extending the European war to Asia and making the defeat of Hitler that more difficult.” asserted the influential Yomiuri. Inasmuch as the dispatch had left Washington around 2100 (Eastern Standard Time) on the sixth and it showed that the Japanese post office had received it at noon Tokyo time on the seventh. 1940. In addition. yet China was only part of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Tokyo also had an old bone to pick with Washington – the immigration policy which excluded Japanese from American shores and refused United States citizenship to those Japanese residents not actually born there. or purchasing it from Iran or Peru.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. p.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. And it was typical of the Japanese in the context of the day that they did not consider pulling in their horns or seeking to obtain oil by peaceful means. Prange. Germany and Italy. Thus. Prange. Japan time.“The area in which Japan was most vulnerable to American sanctions was oil. p.000 tons every month. What is more. France and the Netherlands must be forced out of the Far East. Against these grim figures. The President had consistently resisted the pressure to stop the flow. the United States. this meant that the Japanese had held it up ten and a half hours – another incident revealing that Japanese officialdom was not exactly eager for prompt communication with Washington on this particular day. a concept the very fluidity of which made the democracies uneasy. the fleet had always estimated that it would need 500. With that Grew left the Foreign Ministry. lest total cutoff trigger a Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. Tomioka calculated that the stock on hand in July could fill only 75 percent of the requirements for two years of combat. Washington placed all exports of aviation fuel and high-grade scrap iron and steel under federal license and control. On the other hand. of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 removed the legal obstacle to actual restrictions. to delay by five hours the delivery of all incoming and outgoing cables except those of the Japanese government. Japan considered that Washington’s bolstering of London perpetuated the remnants of British colonialism and hence the obnoxious presence of European flags on Asian soil. The Japanese never tired of expounding the principle in the loftiest phrases but fought shy of actually stating in geographical terms just what “Greater East Asia” covered. Japan had a long list of grievances against the United States. which is why the Japanese sat on the President’s message to the Emperor such a long time…Grew took the decoded message to Togo at about a quarter past midnight and asked for an audience with the Emperor so that he might present it in person since he “did not want any doubt as to getting it in his hands. By the end of 1940 Washington had cut it off from all vital war materials except petroleum. by the end of that year Japan had begun to experience a real pinch and a shadow of genuine fear mingled with its resentment of these discriminatory measures. Asia is the territory of the Asiatics…On a number of scores the Japanese objected vociferously to American aid to Great Britain and to Anglo-American cooperation. “Japan must remove all elements in East Asia which will interfere with its plans. 0500 in Hawaii) – less than three hours before Fuchida’s first wave would strike. the United States Navy had stood athwart Japan’s path – a navy which Japanese admirals thought capable of menacing their nation’s very existence. after long. Japan time (1030 December 7 in Washington.000 tons in reserve for the Great All-Out Battle. Roosevelt finally announced an embargo on scrap iron and steel to Japan. on January 24. In the first place. “I am convinced that the firm establishment of a Mutual Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia is absolutely necessary to the continued existence of this country. December 7 was a ten-hour day. Thus. exploiting oil in northern Sakhalin. after Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina. “Britain. Beginning in July 1940. Japan estimated that its Navy would be disabled in two years. Prange. In September 1940.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Japanese anger also focused on the embargoes which the United States had slapped on American exports to Japan. Thinking Americans realized that the many fine qualities of the Japanese people. In the second. chief of the Censorship Office of the Ministry of Communications.

D. only ten days before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and America’s into World War II. and eastern China from December 1937 to September 9.fourthmarinesband. (Photo: http://www. time).Members of the United States Marine Corps Fourth Marine Regiment Band march in the International Settlement area of Shanghai. The Imperial Japanese Army occupied the International Settlement area of Shanghai beginning on December 8. Fourth Marines of the United States Marine Corps march down Nanking Road in Shanghai.S.com/) . 1941 (November 27 Washington. The Marines share the crowded streets with examples of every mode of transportation available. Nanking. on their way to the quays of the Whangpoo River preparatory to embarking on U.com/) Troops of the First Battalion. 1941 (Japan time). China on November 28. (Photo: http://www. The Imperial Japanese Army occupied Shanghai.fourthmarinesband.C. President Line ships for the Philippine Islands. China on November 28. 1945. 1941.

Investigation of Pearl Harbor Roberts Commission. Brig. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Gen.edu/digicoll/hwrd/HWRD_html/HWRD41. and Maj. Gen. Admiral Reeves and General McCoy were retired. McNarney. 1941. & Congressional Hearings Members of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s committee to investigate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the island of Oahu (also known as the Roberts Commission) on December 7. Left to right are Admiral William H. (Photo: http://libweb. Admiral Standley and General McCoy were members of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1941. 1941. Standley. Frank R. Army Pearl Harbor Board. Admiral Joseph N.S. Admiral Standley.html) . The group photo was first published on December 29. Associate U. Navy Court of Inquiry. Reeves. 1941 are photographed as they returned to the Royal Hawaiian Hotel where they have been staying since December 22. McCoy.hawaii. Roberts. Joseph T.

Macintyre.” The Roberts Commission report was written with the intention of keeping Magic. McCoy. found Justice Roberts putting the finishing touches to the report.edu/ws/?pid=16065. The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned. He summoned Marvin O. Standley. Layton (USN. and if so. The final draft was not agreed to without some bitter debate between the two admirals on the commission. I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7. and any other places it may deem necessary to visit for the completion of its inquiry. 1941. he took advantage of the Pullman car that carried the commission members across country from San Francisco to begin writing up his report. 23 January 1942. Friday. or assigned shall receive payment of his actual and necessary expenses for transportation. Navy. and in addition and in lieu of all other allowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence or station in connection with the business of the Commission. a vital intelligence source.. Source: http://www. the following: Associate Justice Owen J. “Mac. will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu. It carefully omitted any mention of Magic. All executive officers and agencies of the United States are directed to furnish the Commission such facilities. “The findings as to sins of commission presented true enough statements.ucsb. D. United States Supreme Court.presidency. p. after some late-night discussion of his findings three days earlier with Secretary Stimson and Supreme Court Chief Justice [sic] Felix Frankfurter. The American Presidency Project [online]. Edwin T.C.ucsb. Retired. Citation: John T. “but the many sins of omission in the picture were omitted from our findings because the President in his executive order setting up the Commission had specifically limited its jurisdiction. 1941 Pursuant to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States. including civilian advisers and any Army. Standley believed that this view did not show the whole picture. services. secret. he was no doubt reassured to find that by shifting the burden of responsibility from the war and navy departments. Retired.Executive Order 8983 Establishing a Commission to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack.. a per diem allowance of twenty-five dollars. nonetheless. he said.edu/ws/index.”” – And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway. D. Brigadier General Joseph T.” he wrote.presidency. United States Army. Standley admitted years later that he had only agreed not to submit a minority report after being persuaded that such a divisive opinion would threaten the war effort. and to direct such travel of members and employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment of its mission. This may have been because after Roberts left Honolulu on 10 January. the White House secretary.). 350 . to incur all necessary expenses for services and supplies. to fix the compensation and allowances of such assistants. United States Navy.C. United States Navy. McNarney. Roberts. and who were responsible therefor. Territory of Hawaii. So when Roosevelt read through the long report on that Saturday. Retired. and submit its report direct to the President of the United States. It will then return to Washington.php?pid=16065 “The presidential commission of inquiry chose. United States Army. CA. Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves was convinced that Kimmel was wholly to blame. to employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary. and Marine Corps officers so employed. to overlook or ignore the possibility that the navy department might have broken into the consular traffic. December 18. Chairman. what these derelictions or errors were. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its professional assistants. give that to the Sunday papers in full. Ret. Available from World Wide Web: http://www. the commission’s findings had not damaged the credibility of key members of his administration. Tossing the report onto his desk. Major General Frank R. in the two days of questioning that the commission contented itself with after returning to Washington. No attempt was made to look at the records. Breaking the Secrets by Rear Adm. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President. Admiral William H. Reeves. or to reexamine Wilkinson under oath. detailed. While concealing Washington’s sins of omission it exaggerated the errors of commission of the local commanders. The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington. The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedure. and cooperation as it may request of them from time to time. Santa Barbara.

who accepted Justice Roberts instead of his own nominee.” Stimson preferred Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen J. “His presence and position on the Board alone would be sufficient to assure the Nation of a thorough. He was a good choice to direct the investigation. those selected appeared highly qualified. USN (Retired). McNarney “the best man. Standley. What is more.” So Stimson relayed his suggestions for the Army members to Knox. informing him that he had decided upon Major General Frank B. At Stimson’s suggestion and with Knox’s concurrence.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Prange. Roberts described him as “one of the keenest and ablest men I have ever known and one of the fairest. in the closely knit armed services of 1941 almost any officer was bound to have dozens of friends stationed in Hawaii and so could not fail to be emotionally involved. and few indeed could hear testimony concerning the case with complete objectivity. First in seniority stood sixty-nine-year-old Admiral William H. To be just. On December 17 the Roberts Commission met informally with Stimson and Knox in the former’s office at his request. USN (Retired). met with and instructed a commission to investigate a case in which he was involved and that he permitted them to hear from Knox. so much the lawyer. Before 0900 the next morning Stimson phoned Marshall. He asked Marshall to pick an air officer because he believed that the commission “should have an airman in view of the fact that the problem was really one of air and the problem of delinquency connected with it was also connected with air. Edited by Paul Stillwell) “Soon after Knox returned to Washington. Congressman Roy O. what amounted to unsworn testimony which might be highly prejudicial. was the Recorder of the Roberts Commission. One literally could not find qualified commission members genuinely without prejudice. Deciding that this man was not “an outstanding judge. It is indicative of the psychological frenzy and fuzzy thinking of those December days that Stimson. He also asked Stimson’s opinion of a certain “Federal judge in Chicago” as the civilian member. later reporting that he considered Brigadier General Joseph T. He had been “a very outstanding chief of Naval Operations” from 1933 to 1937. 592-593 . and honest investigation of conditions and causes of the disaster of December 7. Roosevelt selected Roberts. also involved. Only little green men from Mars could have reviewed this problem with coldly impersonal.” Late in the afternoon of December 15 Knox phoned Stimson accordingly. Every thinking man and woman in the country had read about the Pearl Harbor attack. Roberts. searching.” Stimson informed the commission that “the Army and Navy wanted to cooperate fully” and offered Roberts every possible assistance. (Source: Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy. Reeves. Woodruff of Michigan placed great faith in Roberts.” This assessment speaks well for Roberts’s own fairness because Standley gave the chairman some difficult moments. a member of Scroll & Key at Yale University. p. judicial eyes.” The Chief of Staff agreed. the situation was enough to make a lawyer tear his hair. Howe. Next came Rear Admiral Joseph M. McCoy] as one Army member of the projected board. No wonder Stimson and Knox paid particular attention to their recommendations for membership on the commission.Walter B. On the basis of their previous records. the President informed him that he wanted “to appoint a commission consisting of two Army and two Navy officers and a third civilian to investigate the responsibility for the losses at Hawaii and to make recommendations. McCoy [Frank R. Knox “told them in considerable detail and with great effect what he saw on his recent visit to Hawaii.” Roberts had come to national attention when President Calvin Coolidge appointed him the special government prosecutor in the Teapot Dome and Elk Hill trial.

Cupps.navy.W. AMM1c W.H. Pacific Fleet on December 31. Watson. Others receiving awards. They were the crew of a Navy bomber. Warlick and AMM2c C. Nimitz. R3c H. The former fleet commander. Gimber. USNR. are: Ensign C.C. Wagoner (also awarded the Navy Cross).F.C. Fisler. at the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base. (Admiral Nimitz has just presented the Navy Cross to Ensign F. following ceremonies in which he took command of the U. in a white uniform with two-star insignia. R2c W. AMM1c L. USNR. USN (center) presents awards on board USS Grayling (SS-209). Kimmel is standing to the right.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/cmd/cincpc1a.S.M. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www.) (U.S. USS Pelias (AS-14) is in the background. 1941. Forbes. standing left-to-right in line behind Nimitz and Fisler. Rear Admiral Husband E.Admiral Chester W.B.history.htm .

Nimitz. Nimitz. Rear Admiral John H. Bloch). 1941. Bloch. Standing in line at left are (right to left): Vice Admiral William S. addresses senior officers at Pearl Harbor in front of the Torpedo Building at Quarry Point on December 31. Pye.htm . Newton.history. Pacific Fleet. U.Admiral Chester W. Furlong (almost completely hidden behind Rear Adm.navy. Train and Rear Admiral William L. Naval Historical Center Photograph) http://www. Calhoun. (probably). Rear Admiral Claude C. USN (right center). U. 1941.S. Standing at right is Rear Admiral Husband E.mil/photos/images/h62000/h62021c. Kimmel. Last two officers on left (not listed in order. (Collection of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Lieutenant General Delos C. the Commander in Chief of U. Rear Admiral Thomas Withers. Emmons. the day he assumed command. and one nearly hidden) are possibly Captain Harold C. USN. Draemel. Rear Admiral Milo F. Rear Admiral William R.S. Army. who had held the command until December 17.S.

” But because of the need to maintain military secrecy the Roberts Commission was understandably unable to conduct a full examination or a public discussion of the Japanese naval intercepts.” The United Press story. The Roosevelt administration deliberately withheld vital information from the two officers prior to the military attack on Pearl Harbor. Myler. and Admiral Husband Kimmel (right) pose for a group photo in Hawaii in September 1941. an independent commission that investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. None of the U. front). Full disclosure of the pre-Pearl Harbor information – including McCollum’s eight actions – would have compromised American codebreaking and disclosed the U. Martin (left. Short (left. that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. Michael Wenger) “Alarmed by the criticism leveled at the Administration and fearing that a congressional investigation would harm the war effort and provide political fodder for the 1942 elections. arbitrary conclusions reached by Kimmel and Short in conflict with the advice from Washington. 254-255 . unjust. and in the public press. The Roberts Commission. Rear Admiral Patrick N. Gen. Roberts of the United States Supreme Court. Nothing was revealed about them.Maj. Therefore the President headed off a proposed congressional inquiry by appointing a five-man board of inquiry. 1942. and J. At the same tie the commission cleared General George Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark of any wrongdoing. The Original Photographs by Donald M.S. success in solving the various Japanese cryptographic systems. front). Navy’s intercept operators testified or produced their radio logs and documents. it told an amazing story of lack of preparation. (Source: The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor. Lt. Walter C. January 24.”” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. accused General Short and Admiral Kimmel of “dereliction of duty” for failing to prevent the Imperial Japanese Navy from attacking Pearl Harbor. p. Myler wrote of the report: “After thorough investigations in Washington and Hawaii. written by Joseph L. headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Goldstein. rear). and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office. Gen. Katherine V.L. Stinnett. They were charged with dereliction of duty. rear).” Admiral James Richardson condemned the findings. “It is the most unfair. military and naval circles. Bellinger (center. Frederick L.000-page report said that Japan’s success “resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic. The 13. President Roosevelt approved the Roberts Commission’s report on Saturday. Dillon. Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten (center. Frankfurter endorsed Roberts as the most “forthright of men. It concluded that the attack was successful due to failures and errors of judgment by Admiral Kimmel and George Short. I cannot conceive of honorable men serving on the commission without greatest regret and deepest feeling of shame.S. received front-page play throughout the nation. saying they had fulfilled their command obligations. President Roosevelt sought a way to defuse the critics and called upon Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter for advice.

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Commander of U. (Photo: U. (Photo: Thomas D.S. 1942. 1940 until his death on April 28. 1944. and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (right) read in their railway car in Great Britain while coming back from a visit to Scapa Flow in September 1943. 1940 until his resignation on September 21.S. Navy) U. Admiral Harold R.U. Naval Forces in Europe.S.S. Stark (left). Marshall was the U. General George C. Henry L. Stimson in 1942. Army Chief of Staff from September 1.S. 1945. Navy Admiral Harold R. William Franklin “Frank” Knox was the Secretary of the Navy from July 11. Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations from August 1. Marshall (L) reviews a map with Secretary of War Henry L. McAvoy/Time Life) . Stimson served as Secretary of War from July 10. 1945. 1939 to November 18. 1939 to March 26.

Henry C. West.S. unknown. Gen. Stimson’s memorandum concerning U.Members and staff of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944. Clausen and Bruce Lee) Secretary of War Henry L. Gen. Harry A. Clausen’s investigation into Pearl Harbor. Russell. Frank. Lieutenant General George Grunert was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1944 and 1945. (Source: Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement by Henry C. Gen. Army Major Henry C. Toulmin Jr. From left to right: Maj. George Grunert. The identites of the other three “judges” were Maj. Henry D. and unknown. Charles W. Col. Clausen. Walter H. and Col. (Source: Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee) . unknown. Maj. Lt.

” But Attorney-General Biddle in a memo to Stimson objected to mention a court-martial at all. which they did. “the defense would certainly attempt to pass part of the blame to the War Department. he had been relieved from command of the Hawaiian Department.” Stimson and Knox were never to find conditions suitable for holding the court-martial. January 26. could draw their own conclusions. for the Secretaries had required them to waive their rights to a prompt trial. on the other hand. The main points of their report. or added to it. Myron C. He was not satisfied with the way their inquiry was going. but there remained the complication of devising a verbal formula by which Short’s retirement could be accepted without embarrassing the administration. The Judge Advocate General. demand an early trial. And the Judge Advocate General in a memo to Marshall warned that at their trial. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry C. in the fall of 1944. part of which was finally used: “without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any action on behalf of the Government. If. p. The extent of the disaster was due to failures both on the scene and in Washington. he ordered a court-martial first. but he had been directed to proceed to Oklahoma City “on temporary duty” and then. and to the War Department. but that no trial would be held until “such time as the public interest and safety would permit. Current. Stimson] a rather rough time. Current. “on further notice. briefly summarized.” Two weeks later the administration published a statement incorporating the Stimson formula. Clausen was supposed to complete the evidence by gathering information on it from some of the earlier witnesses. the Secretaries requested them also to waive the statue of limitations. The statement said that the retirement applications of the two commanders had been accepted “without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action.” He was expecting nothing more than some new assignment. There was a reason for Stimson’s delay. was cautioning Stimson that it would be very hard to make the charges against Short stick. to the Hawaiian command. failed to direct him to take a more suitable one and also failed to keep him fully enough informed about American-Japanese relations that he might have corrected his own error. were these: The Pearl Harbor attack was a surprise to all concerned – to the public at large. or professed to have forgotten certain things. many of the witnesses changed the testimony they earlier had sworn to.” Stimson himself. 178-179 . Short and Kimmel themselves could not demand a hearing. 172-174 “All in all. he telephoned General Marshall and asked whether he should retire. in a letter to Knox. along with Kimmel.” He added: “Any reasons we want to give for our action can be said to the press. the Roberts Report was published. the generals had given the Secretary [of War Henry L. proposed the essence of the “saving clause. Except for the last week of the Board’s hearings. was receiving all the obloquy for Pearl Harbor. nor did he look into the Stimson diary. The next day. When confronted by Clausen.” as he termed it. Clausen.” The supplementary announcement informed the people that courtmartial preparations had been ordered on the basis of the Roberts Report “alleging” derelictions of duty. Marshall recommended to Stimson that Short’s application for retirement be accepted “today” and “quietly without any publicity at the moment. Marshall advised him to “stand pat” but told him he would consider this conversation as “authority” for his retirement if it should become necessary. 1942. The War Department. he was still less satisfied. Clausen did not give General Short another chance to speak. The later witnesses having referred to phases of that subject. about the precise warlike intentions of the Japanese in 1941. to a oneman mission of re-investigation. now that they had what were represented as the facts. p. since scattered all over the world. he would invite public c criticism for allowing a guilty man – vide the Roberts Report – to escape. he would leave himself open to evidence and argument which might tar him along with Short as guilty of at least contributory negligence. And when they finally drew up their conclusions. after their retirement. The tendency of Clausen’s re-examination was to strengthen the case against General Short by showing that the general knew more than had previously appeared.” to report in Washington for “further temporary duty. And when the two-year statutory period for instituting court-martial proceedings was about to expire.“On January 25. January 14. President Roosevelt himself suggested that Short and Kimmel be required to agree that their retirement would be “no bar” to “subsequent court-martial proceedings. Day after day the administration leaders fretted over this problem of wording. and the Secretary of War less.” But Stimson did not accept Short’s application that day.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. And now – in the newspapers – General Short himself had a chance to learn the findings of the board. Stimson refused to let the Army Board’s findings stand unchallenged. and in a supplementary announcement he and Knox gave the reasons they wanted to give. He waited a whole month. He assigned the assistant recorder of the Board. if they were granted one. He was facing another dilemma.” – Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft by Richard N. True. Nor did Clausen call upon Stimson to appear again as a witness. Cramer suggested a way out of the dilemma: retire Short now – but leave the threat of a future court-martial hanging over his head! That was simple enough. General Short failed adequately to alert his command for war. When he discovered that he. 1942. knowing the type of alert he had taken. He was unprepared for what he read. Newspaper readers. Cramer. lest Kimmel and Short. testimony regarding the “Magic” intercepts had been excluded. If he let Short go without court-martialing him.

and into the record went a large bloc of Magic and a few consular messages. Nevertheless. The photograph was released on 24 July 1944. This represented a tribute to Kimmel’s iron will and tenacity of purpose and to his legal team.S.) http://www. the fact that this key dispatch did not appear in the exhibits may help explain why a number of witnesses discounted the importance of the few “bomb plot” series messages under consideration. Now the court faced what amounted to another investigation. USN (Retired) is at right. Whatever the reason for its omission. Kimmel had won his point. during a session of their examination of the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1944. the Navy Department had given the court all the documents for which Kimmel through Lavender had asked. Yet we have a peculiar twist at this point in the Pearl Harbor story. USN (Retired) is at left. Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1942 to 1948. the dispatches which triggered the most response were some of the “bomb plot” series. At considerable risk to the security of Magic. Murfin.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-aftr. and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews.Members of the Navy Court of Inquiry appear at the Navy Department in Washington. Prange. The original “bomb plot” message of September 24.htm “Monday. President of the Court. especially Rugg. was a memorable day for Kimmel. August 28 [. “but because their use here may compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most important to the Nation’s future interest. does not appear in the Navy court’s exhibits.history. This was the dispatch which divided Pearl Harbor into areas for use in espionage reporting and which set forth specifics Tokyo wanted from the Honolulu consulate. excepting the ever-elusive “winds execute. The principal questions had become these: Was information available in Washington which one could reasonably argue had tipped off Japanese intentions? And if so. Kalbfus.navy. had someone in Washington deliberately withheld information from Kimmel?” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. The court received the documents Kimmel had fought to obtain. USN (Retired). D.C.” Revelation of the Magic and consular documents clarified a number of ambiguities in the preceding testimony. p. National Archives collection. 628 .” The court. 1941. Stark objected not to the contents. Navy Photograph. In the center is Admiral Orin G. however. (Official U. 1944]. According to Lavender. Admiral Edward C. who directed the effort. did not sustain his objections.

C. on December 8. but remained on active duty during the rest of World War II.Admiral James O. 1942. (NHHC Photograph. Navy takes the oath prior to giving testimony during a Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack during World War II.history.htm Admiral James O. Richardson was the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet from January 1940 until February 1941. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) . member of Kimmel's counsel. Richardson (left) talks to Admiral Husband Kimmel during a recess at Pearl Harbor Hearings in Washington.navy.S. is seen standing between the two officers.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-aftr. Admiral James O.) http://www. Richardson of the U. Lieutenant Edward B. He retired on October 1. D. Hanify. 1945.

S. Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky. George.C.A. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel. seated at right are Senator Owen Brewster of Maine. D.View of the opening of hearings by the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee in Washington. First witnesses. Jere Cooper of Tennessee. on November 15. and Representative Jere Cooper.C. U. and Rep. Rear Admiral T. Senator Walter F. are shown in the center background. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) .B. Seated at right center are senator Alben Barkley.. 1945. tells his own side of the story before the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee in Washington. on January 15. chairman of the House group. Georgia. 1946. giving their testimony about the attack. Inglis and Colonel Bernard Thielen. who was commander of the Pacific fleet at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and who was removed from his command shortly after. D. Admiral Kimmel is seated at left. chairman of the Senate group of the joint bi-partisan committee. chairman.

(Source: Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by John Toland) (Source: Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by John Toland) .

Republicans suspected a stranglehold but could not pierce [Admiral Ernest] King’s gag order. and I didn’t see a record or look at a thing until. Though head of the Navy’s cryptographic efforts. Stinnett. trying to get something for this board – so I haven’t probed into the matter. the last day or two. and Marshall certainly filled the bill. I was busy with something else. the Navy’s Director of Communications. was discovered by the author [Robert B. he never got testimony or records of the military intercepts.” Noyes was on shaky legal ground. for defense.. and evidently considered the point of little interest. Stinnett. Personal memoranda prepared in Navy offices by Navy personnel belong to the people of the United States if the files concern naval matters. or dissemination of the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval messages saw the light of day. Safford implied that some destruction of records was carried out and added that he felt no shame or embarrassment in ordering his staff to destroy all unofficial notes. but later he admitted: “I may have instructed my subordinates to destroy personal memoranda. since it controlled all categories of service-involving communications. only four days after the attack. “I don’t know where I was.” Noyes told a group of his subordinates on December 11.”” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. “Destroy all notes or anything in writing. He prophesied that “writings of irresponsible people” would test the loyalty of all concerned. Americans believed they would be given full details on breaking the Japanese code prior to the attack. Such replies can be frustrating to a court or board trying to pin down specifics. The Army could use a witness of stature before the Navy court.” He considered Hawaii “far and away the most heavily provided installation of ours in or out of the country. General Marshall. Stinnett] in January 1995 in the personal classified file of Arthur McCollum. December 6. He threatened imprisonment and loss of Navy and veteran’s benefits to any naval personnel who disclosed the success of the code-breaking. At the same time. “The Navy Department does not intend to dignify any stories concerning successes in Ultra [code breaking] by official denials or confirmations. Maine) set off political fireworks when he was blocked from obtaining monitor records from the Navy’s intercept stations. Fleet Admiral Ernest King oversaw the censorship. Among the group was Commander Laurance Safford. Every naval officer involved in the intercept and cryptographic operations (including those at outlying facilities) maintained a personal file at Station US for classified documents. Senator Owen Brewster (R. The Navy’s order was sweeping: it gagged the cryptographers and radio intercept operators who had obtained the Japanese fleet’s radio messages during the fall of 1941.” “I don’t know about that. 1945. 1941]. Witnesses introduced intercepts into evidence and read decrypted messages to the senators and representatives of the Joint Committee. September 1 [. p. even those discharged: “The oath which you have taken must not be violated. The oath applied to all naval personnel.“The key evidence of what really happened began to be concealed as early as December 11.” King then reminded the code-breakers of the legal obligations embedded in their secrecy oath. as he explained to the court on September 2. The McCollum memorandum.” Asked how he rated Short. But all Brewster achieved was rhetoric. some files escaped destruction. 629 . At first Noyes denied ever issuing the destruction order. They cannot be destroyed except by authority of Congress. after Pearl Harbor his “whole attention was turned to other things from that instant. for example. Marshall replied laconically.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. 255-256 “Two weeks after Japan surrendered in August 1945. decoding. Nothing was said to destroy official records. the Navy blocked public access to the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts by classifying the documents TOP SECRET. Even Congress was cut out of the intercept loop.” – Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. His dictate set a policy that effectively excluded Japanese military intercepts from all Pearl Harbor investigations. It had had first priority in the Army for years…” Marshall did not claim perfect memory. as a matter of fact. head of Station US (appointed captain in January 1942). He instituted the fifty-four-year censorship policy that consigned the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese military and diplomatic intercepts and the relevant directives to Navy vaults. Prange. The first step in the clean-up came from Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes. I never thought of it until this instant. p.” He did not remember his whereabouts on the night of Saturday.” He had no memory one way or the other about seeing Short’s answer to the warning message of November 27 [. probably to accommodate the schedule of the next witness. p. However. 1941. None of the details involving the interception. I repeat that it is most important that leaks and partial disclosures be not fortified or reinforced nor further discussion stimulated by additional statements of those who know the facts from the inside. That was water over the dam. It was a total sham. p. 257 “The court held no session on Friday.” “I have no recollection.” – At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Only diplomatic messages were released. Noyes’ destruction directive was issued just a few days before the formation of the presidential board of inquiries headed by Justice Roberts. Stinnett. 1944]. “Very superior officer. Noyes said it was common practice to destroy “intercept stuff” after three or four months. Safford reported to Noyes through Naval Communications. 256 “When the congressional investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack began on November 15. His testimony is laced with such replies as “I do not recall.

mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-k/ej-kng. U. Navy Photograph. photographed at the Navy Department.S.navy.Admiral Ernest J. USN. King oversaw the censorship of pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts shortly after the end of World War II and “threatened imprisonment and loss of Navy and veteran’s benefits to any naval personnel who disclosed the success of the code-breaking. Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief. circa 1942-1944. Fleet.htm . now in the collections of the National Archives) http://www.S.history. King.” (Official U. Admiral Ernest J.

D. in December 1945. Marshall is sworn in to testify at the Joint Congressional Committee Pearl Harbor Investigations hearings in Washington.C. (Photo: Sam Shere/Time Life) . (Photo: Sam Shere/Time Life) U. Washington.S. Army General George C. Marshall testifies at the Joint Congressional Committee Pearl Harbor Investigations hearings. Army General George C.C. D.U. in December 1945.S.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel retired from the Navy on March 1. 1880-March 9. Major General Walter C. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were allowed to retire despite a demotion in rank. 1942. Army Major General Walter C. Short retired from the Army on February 28. Congress exonerated Admiral Kimmel and General Short in a resolution in May 1999. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were never subjected to a formal court-martial. 1882-May 14. (Photo: Marie Hansen/Time Life) .S.S. Short (March 30. Kimmel (February 26. (Photo: George Skadding/Time Life) Retired U.Retired Rear Admiral Husband E. The U. 1942. 1949) appears at the Pearl Harbor Hearing in 1946. 1968) testifies at the Pearl Harbor Hearing in 1946.

a private organization where prominent “gentlemen” discuss foreign affairs behind closed doors. Secretary of CFR (1933-1944) Partner of J. Polk. Chairman of American Red Cross (1938-1944) Director of Institute of International Education (1919-1946) Professor of Economic History at Harvard University (1924-1936) Member of Davis. Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1914-1943) Treasurer of the Council on Foreign Relations (1933-1941) Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm]. Dodds Leon Fraser John H. Shepardson Allen W. Davis Norman H. May Hamilton Fish Armstrong Frank Altschul Philip C. [banking firm] (1916-1945) Professor of International Law at Columbia University (1934-1946) President of Princeton University (1933-1957) Chairman and President of Bank for International Settlements (1933-1935) Vice President of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1936-1947) President of Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (1940-1947) Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board (1939-1945) . Duggan Edwin F. [banking firm] (1923-1950) Senior Partner of Price.Pearl Harbor & Special Interest: Council on Foreign Relations in 1941 Council on Foreign Relations. Polk. Polk Whitney H. Davis Stephen P. Douglas Edward Warner 1921-1950 1921-1955 1921-1944 1921-1950 1921-1945 1921-1943 1921-1966 1927-1969 1927-1960 1927-1953 1928-1972 1934-1972 1934-1942 1935-1943 1936-1945 1937-1964 1940-1964 1940-1949 President of Johns Hopkins University (1935-1948) Member of Davis. Williams Lewis W. Morgan & Co. Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations (1940-1942) Name Year Occupation in 1941 Isaiah Bowman John W. Waterhouse & Co. one block west of the 68th Street and Hunter College subway station. Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1921-1955) President of the Council on Foreign Relations (1936-1944). Jessup Harold W. Leffingwell George O. public accountants (1911-1961) Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine (1928-1972) Partner of Lazard Freres & Co.P. Dulles Russell C. Wardwell. is located on the southwest corner of Park Avenue and 68th Street in midtown Manhattan in New York City. Gay Frank L. Wardwell.

S. Lehman Governor of New York (1933-1942) Lt. Ambassador to Colombia (1939-1942) Norman Armour U. Woodward Commandant of Brooklyn Navy Yard (1937-1941) Adm. Grew U. Drum Commanding General. Arthur J. Gen.S.S. Stimson Secretary of War (1911-1913. McCloy Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945) Felix Frankfurter Justice of the U.S.S. “Wild Bill” Donovan Director. Frank McCoy Member of the Roberts Commission [Pearl Harbor] (1941-1942) Adm. Eastern Defense Command (1940-1943) Adm. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1932-1941) William Phillips U. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (1942-1945) Rear Admiral Clark H. Yarnell Commandant of Pearl Harbor Naval Station (1933-1936) . Messersmith U. Gen.S.S. Harry E. Weddell U. Standley Member of the Roberts Commission [Pearl Harbor] (1941-1942) Leland Harrison U. Hornbeck State Department Adviser on Political Relations (1937-1943) John J. Minister to Switzerland (1937-1947) Alexander W.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1940-1942) Sumner Welles Under Secretary of State (1937-1943) Stanley K. William H.Prominent Members of the Council on Foreign Relations (1940-1942) Government Officials: Joseph C. Ambassador to Fascist Spain (1939-1942) Spruille Braden U. Hugh A. Supreme Court (1939-1962) Herbert H. Ambassador to Argentina (1939-1944) George S. Hepburn Commandant of 12th Naval District [San Francisco] (1938-1941) Maj. William J. Ambassador to Fascist Italy (1936-1941) Henry L. 1940-1945) Maj. Gen.

Morgan & Co. Sloan Jr. (1923-1950) Harold Stanley Partner of Morgan Stanley & Co. [bank] (1941-1955) Winthrop W. Gifford President of American Telephone and Telegraph Co. Morgan & Co. Paley President of Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] (1928-1946) Arthur Hays Sulzberger Publisher of The New York Times (1935-1961) Eugene Meyer Publisher of The Washington Post (1933-1946) Juan Terry Trippe President of Pan American World Airways. Aldrich Chairman of the board of Chase National Bank (1934-1953) Gordon S. (1938-1952) Alfred P. Grace President of Bethlehem Steel Corp. Chairman (1949-1956) and President (19141949) of International Business Machines Corp. (1922-1940. Leffingwell Partner of J. Watson Sr. (1941-1948) Lewis W. Lamont Partner of J. Harrison President of New York Life Insurance Co.P. Fairless President of United States Steel Corp. Averell Harriman Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.Bankers and Businessmen: Thomas W. Inc.P. [AT&T] (1925-1948) William S. (1937-1956) Gerard Swope President of General Electric Co. [bank] (1931-1946) Thomas J. (1916-1945) Benjamin F. Chairman of the board of General Motors Corp. Rentschler Chairman of the board of National City Bank of New York (1940-1948) George L. (1911-1948) Russell C. (1927-1964) . Douglas President of Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (1940-1947) Allan Sproul President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1941-1956) Frank Altschul Partner of Lazard Freres & Co. 1942-1945) Walter S. (1916-1945) W. Eugene G.

Davis Member of Davis. Wardwell [law firm] (1914-1943) Allen Wardwell Member of Davis.S. Lawrence Lowell Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1910-1942). Greene Trustee of the Brookings Institution (1928-1945) James R. Dean Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1929-1976) Allen T. Polk & Wardwell [law firm] (1921-1955) Frank L. Stimson. 1962-1969) Arthur H. MalletPrevost & Colt (1897-1948) Thomas D. Polk Member of Davis. Putnam & Roberts (1921-1965) Severo Mallet-Prevost Member of Curtis. Bundy Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (19411945). Garfield Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1930-1942) Frank Aydelotte Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1927-1956) A. Duggan Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1920-1947) Harry A. [banking firm in New York City] (1892-1944) Cass Canfield President of Harper & Brothers [later Harper & Row] (1931-1945) Jerome D. (1939-1946) Raymond B.S. President of Harvard University (1909-1933) . Dulles Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1926-1951. Polk & Wardwell [law firm] (1909-1953) John Foster Dulles Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1911-1949) Allen W. Angell President of the EnglishSpeaking Union of the U. Bache & Co. Trustee of World Peace Foundation (19341963) Stephen P.Lawyers and Organization Executives: John W. Fosdick President of The Rockefeller Foundation (1936-1948) Norman H. Polk. Bache Head of J. Thacher Partner of Simpson. Thacher & Bartlett [law firm in New York City] (1933-1943) Jules S. Davis Chairman of American Red Cross (1938-1944) Harvey H. Klots Member of Winthrop.

Schmitt Professor of History at the University of Chicago (1925-1946) . Borchard Professor of Law at Yale Law School (1917-1951) Bernadotte E. Murrow CBS war correspondent (1939-1945) Wesley C. Hopkins President of Dartmouth College (1916-1945) James P. Schuyler Professor of History at Columbia University (1924-1951) Manley O. Luce Editor-in-Chief of Time magazine (1923-1964) Edward R. Mitchell Professor of Economics at Columbia University (1914-1919. Sills President of Bowdoin College (1918-1952) Harry Woodburn Chase President of New York University (1933-1951) Wallace Brett Donham Dean of Harvard Business School (1919-1942) Henry R. College Professors.College Presidents. Conant President of Harvard University (1933-1953) Harold W. 1922-1944) Robert L. and Journalists: Isaiah Bowman President of Johns Hopkins University (1935-1948) Charles Seymour President of Yale University (1937-1950) James B. Dodds President of Princeton University (1933-1957) Henry M. Wriston President of Brown University (1937-1955) Ray Lyman Wilbur President of Stanford University (1916-1943) Edmund E. Compton President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1930-1948) Ernest M. Baxter III President of Williams College (1937-1961) Kenneth C.M. Hudson Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School (1923-1960) Edwin M. Day President of Cornell University (1937-1949) Karl T.

U.S. Cameron Forbes 1930-1959 U. Supreme Court (Feb. Walcott 1938-1948 U. 13. (1917-1922) . (1917-1922) Prominent Members of the Council on Foreign Relations (1940-1942) – Elder Statesmen Name CFR Membership (Year) Primary Occupation in 1941 (including December 7. Governor-General of the Philippines (1932-1933) Frederic C. U. Bullitt U.S. Dawes 1928-1950 Vice-President of the United States (1925-1929). [Chicago] (1932-1951) Herbert Hoover President of the United States (1929-1933) Charles Evans Hughes Chief Justice of the U. 1929-1935) William C.S. Davis 1933-1945 Secretary of War (1925-1929) Theodore Roosevelt Jr. 1930-June 30. Cameron Forbes U. 1930-June 30. (1925-1929).S. Bullitt 1936-1954 U. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1933-1936). Supreme Court (Feb. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1930-1932) Henry P. Pratt 1934-1957 Chief of Naval Operations (1930-1933) Garrard B.S. 1941) Charles Evans Hughes 1930-1946 Chief Justice of the U.S.S.S. Governor of Puerto Rico (1929-1932) Frederic C.S. City National Bank & Trust Co. Winston Under Secretary of the Treasury (1923-1927) Boris Bakhmeteff Russian Ambassador to the U. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1917-1920) W.S. Senator (R-Conn.S. Morris U. Winston 1928-1954 Under Secretary of the Treasury (1923-1927) Boris Bakhmeteff 1940-1950 Russian Ambassador to the U. Ambassador to Great Britain (1929-1931) Roland S.S. Ambassador to France (1936-1940) Adm.S. Ambassador to Fascist Italy (1924-1929) James W.S.S. Ambassador to Imperial Germany (1913-1917) Abram I. Pratt Chief of Naval Operations (1930-1933) Garrard B. Ambassador to Fascist Italy (1924-1929) James W.S.S. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1930-1932) Henry P. Davis Secretary of War (1925-1929) Theodore Roosevelt Jr. U.. 1938-1945 U. Ambassador to Imperial Germany (1913-1917) Abram I. Fletcher 1930-1953 U. 1941) Roland S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1916-1917) Dwight F. 1929-1935) William C. 1941). Gerard U. Secretary of State (1921-1925) Herbert Hoover 1938-1962 President of the United States (1929-1933) Charles G.S. William V. Gerard 1924-1951 U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1933-1936) Adm.S. Dawes Vice President of the U. 13. Elkus 1921-1947 U. William V.Elder Statesmen: Charles G. Elkus U.S. Chairman of the board. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1916-1917) Dwight F.S. Morris 1921-1932. 1935-1944 Governor-General of the Philippines (1932-1933). Fletcher U. Senator (R-Connecticut. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1917-1920) W. Walcott U.

Ambassador to Fascist Italy (1936-1941) U. Frank R. [bank] (1931-1973) Partner of Kuhn. Loeb & Co. Gifford Thomas J. 1934-1957 1932-1964 1925-1944 1921-1963 1935-1955 1921-1959 1921-1947 1927-1973 1936-1968 1930-1947 1925-1959 1933-1970 1938-1986 1921-1973 1940-1968 1929-1953 1923-1986 1933-1969 1927-1972 1921-1932.S. (1927-1964) Vice Chairman of the board of General Motors Corp. Woodward Rear Adm. Fairless George H. Eastern Defense Command (1940-1943) State Department Adviser on International Economic Affairs (1937-1943) State Department Adviser on Political Relations (1937-1943) Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board (1939-1945) Justice of the U. [bank] (1941-1955) Partner of Kuhn. (1925-1951) Head of J. Ambassador to Argentina (1939-1944) U. Hawaiian Department (Honolulu) (1935-1937).S. 1942-1945) President of Bethlehem Steel Corp. Bache Charles Gates Dawes Businessmen: Alfred P. Inc. Yarnell Lt. 1934-1950 1940-1989 1934-1959 1938-1965 1932-1957 1938-1947 1938-1953 1931-1967 1935-1944 1935-1966 1938-1977 1938-1959 1935-1950 1935-1971 1934-1957 1938-1958 1940-1953 1939-1951 1930-1971 1932-1966 1932.S.S. Gen. [Macy’s department store] (1934-1945) Member of the board of directors of National City Bank of New York (1925-1956) Member of the board of directors of National City Bank of New York (1926-1960) . Standley Maj.P. Lamont Winthrop W. Henry Schroeder Banking Corp. Ambassador to Colombia (1939-1942) U. William H. Commanding General. Weddell Spruille Braden Norman Armour George S.S. Secretary of War (1940-1945) Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945) Under Secretary of State (1937-1943) Assistant Secretary of State (1941-1944) Director of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (1942-1945) Member of the Roberts Commission (1941-1942) Member of the Roberts Commission (1941-1942) U. City National Bank & Trust Co. McCoy William Phillips Alexander W. [Chicago] (1932-1951) Chairman of the board of General Motors Corp.S. (1923-1950) Partner of J.S.P. Gerard Swope Eugene G.Council on Foreign Relations Members and Their Occupation during the Imperial Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7.S. Hepburn Rear Adm. Averell Harriman E. [bank] (1931-1977) Partner of Lazard Freres & Co. (1940-1952) President of American Telephone and Telegraph Co. McCloy Sumner Welles G. Olds Walter S. (1937-1946) Vice President of Chrysler Corp. Watson Sr. [bank] (1931-1946) Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Grew Henry L. Ambassador to Cuba (1940-1942) U. Simpson Jules S. Roland Harriman John L. Grace Benjamin F. Gen. (1941-1948) Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Irving S. Bucher Juan Terry Trippe Donaldson Brown B. Clark H. Hornbeck Edward Warner Felix Frankfurter Learned Hand Herbert H. Warburg John M. Harrison W. Bache & Co. Rentschler Harold Stanley Frederick M. (1938-1952) President of Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. Sloan Jr. (1927-1947) Treasurer of R. 1941) Name Government Officials: Joseph C. Hugh A.S. Donald Campbell Gordon S. (1911-1948) Chairman of Chase National Bank (1934-1953) President of Chase National Bank (1934-1946) Chairman of National City Bank of New York [Citibank] (1940-1948) Partner of Morgan Stanley & Co. Edwin Hutchinson Arthur W. (1937-1956) Chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp. Commandant of Third Naval District (1937-1941) Commandant of Pearl Harbor Naval Station (1933-1936). Ambassador to Greece (1933-1941. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit [New York City] (1924-1951) Governor of New York (1933-1942) President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1941-1956) Partner of J. (1916-1945) President of United States Steel Corp. Harry E. [banking firm in New York City] (1892-1944) Chairman of the board. Morgan & Co. Loeb & Co. [AT&T] (1925-1948) President of International Business Machines Corp. (1938-1946) President of Pan American World Airways.S. Howland Shaw William J. Minister to Switzerland (1937-1947) U. Ambassador to Fascist Spain (1939-1942) U.S. Lehman Bankers: Allan Sproul Russell C. Dodge Media: CFR Membership (Year) 1928-1959 1924-1929. 1943-1947) Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet (1936-1938). Schiff Frank Altschul Robert Lehman George L. Macy & Co. Morgan & Co. Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet (1936-1939) Commander. Drum Herbert Feis Stanley K. [bank] (1916-1945) Partner of Lehman Brothers (1925-1969) President of New York Life Insurance Co. Leffingwell Thomas W. (1922-1940. [bank] (1931-1978) Executive Vice President of J.H. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1932-1941) U. Stimson John J. Aldrich H. Supreme Court (1939-1962) U. Messersmith Leland Harrison Lincoln MacVeagh Adm. [IBM] (1914-1949) President of General Electric Co. “Wild Bill” Donovan Adm. Page Beardsley Ruml Sosthenes Behn Cleveland E.S. Commandant of 12th Naval District [San Francisco] (1938-1941) Commandant of Brooklyn Navy Yard (1937-1941). (1925-1953) Vice President of American Telephone and Telegraph Co. 1934-1944 1928-1950 1933-1965 1935-1962 1928-1965 1924-1955 1924-1950 1925-1958 1939-1954 1939-1947 1933-1976 1933-1946 1927-1960 1932-1959 1927-1959 1930-1953 1931-1982 Primary Occupation U. Arthur J.

(1925-1945) Burgess Professor of Public Law at Columbia University (1929-1959) Professor of History at Columbia University (1924-1951) Professor of International Law at Columbia University (1934-1946) Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School (1924-1949) Professor of Economics at Columbia University (1914-1919. 1965-1983) Member of Lord.M. Paley Edward R.Arthur Hays Sulzberger Eugene Meyer Henry R. Wriston Edmund E. Dodds Henry M. (1939-1946) Secretary General of the Institute of Pacific Relations (1933-1946) Trustee of the Brookings Institution (1928-1945) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1910-1942) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1920-1947) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1930-1942) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1927-1956) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1934-1963) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1937-1969) Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1927-1959) President of International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (1932-1966) President of Yale University (1937-1950) President of Harvard University (1933-1953) President of Princeton University (1933-1957) President of Brown University (1937-1955) President of Cornell University (1937-1949) President of Johns Hopkins University (1935-1948) President of Stanford University (1916-1943) President of Dartmouth College (1916-1945) President of Amherst College (1932-1946) President of Williams College (1937-1961) President of Bowdoin College (1918-1952) President of Haverford College (1940-1945) President of New York University (1933-1951) President of University of Maine (1934-1958) President of Temple University (1941-1959) President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1930-1948) Dean of Harvard Business School (1919-1942) Dean of Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University (1931-1956) Dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Univ. Day & Lord [law firm] (1900-1947) Member of Winthrop. Dean John W. Dulles Eustace Seligman Arthur H. Thacher & Bartlett [law firm] (1914-1925. Grad. Carter Jerome D. 1922-1944) Professor of Economics at Columbia University (1931-1958) Professor of Law at Harvard University (1919-1956) . (1919-1944) Trustee of Princeton University (1937-1967) Hamilton Fish Prof. Duggan Harry A. Wardwell. Rockefeller III Charles Cheney Hyde Lindsay Rogers Robert L. (1933-1944) Dean of Grad. Greene A. Polk. Day Isaiah Bowman Ray Lyman Wilbur Ernest M. Blakeslee James R. (1937-1947) Dean. Plimpton Henry de Forest Baldwin Allen T. Columbia Univ. Hopkins Stanley King James P. 1933-1943) Member of Curtis.S. Baxter III Kenneth C. Huger W. Jessup Sr. Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1909-1953) Member of Davis. Mallet-Prevost & Colt [law firm] (1897-1948) President of The Rockefeller Foundation (1936-1948) Chairman of the American Red Cross (1938-1944) President of World Peace Foundation (1930-1946) President of the English-Speaking Union of the U. School of Public Administration at Harvard Univ. Polk Allen Wardwell Ralph M. Morley Harry Woodburn Chase Arthur A. Compton Wallace Brett Donham Carl W. Polk. Davis George H. Hauck Robert L. Johnson Karl T. Wardwell. Wardwell. Ackerman Halford L. Thacher Severo Mallet-Prevost Organizations: Raymond B. Mitchell Leo Wolman Zechariah Chafee Jr. Garfield Frank Aydelotte Harvey Bundy Bruce C. Putnam & Roberts [law firm] (1921-1965) Partner of Simpson. Lawrence Lowell Stephen P. Hoskins John H. Polk. Williams Archibald Wellington Taylor John D. Luce William S. Wardwell. School of Business Administration. Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1935-1977) Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton [law firm] (1931-1990) Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton [law firm] (1933-1961. Polk. Mallory David Dubinsky College Administrators: Charles Seymour James B. Carson Eli Whitney Debevoise Francis T.P. Schuyler Philip C. Hopper Walter H. Stimson. Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1921-1955) Member of Davis. Murrow Hamilton Fish Armstrong Cass Canfield Lawyers (New York City): John Foster Dulles Allen W. New York Univ. Davis Frank L. Angell Edward C. Jervey Wesley C. Conant Harold W. Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1914-1943) Member of Davis. 1927-1968 1930-1958 1934-1966 1936-1989 1934-1964 1921-1972 1923-1985 1921-1959 1927-1969 1926-1976 1938-1987 1921-1955 1921-1943 1921-1953 1938-1969 1935-1989 1933-1983 1928-1947 1934-1964 1935-1950 1921-1948 1921-1971 1921-1944 1924-1953 1928-1948 1927-1954 1921-1950 1925-1942 1921-1950 1921-1942 1938-1954 1934-1962 1930-1972 1928-1979 1939-1976 1921-1961 1934-1976 1934-1968 1926-1978 1932-1944 1921-1950 1929-1948 1930-1953 1934-1950 1938-1971 1938-1953 1938-1947 1938-1950 1939-1970 1940-1961 1936-1953 1933-1954 1940-1953 1938-1966 1934-1972 1921-1953 1931-1978 1926-1951 1927-1970 1928-1949 1928-1981 1938-1948 1924-1948 1934-1958 1928-1956 Publisher of The New York Times (1935-1961) Publisher of The Washington Post (1933-1946) Editor-in-Chief of Time Magazine (1923-1964) President of Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] (1928-1946) CBS war correspondent (1939-1945) Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine (1928-1972) President of Harper & Brothers [later Harper & Row] (1931-1945) Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1911-1949) Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1926-1951) Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1923-1976) Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1929-1976) Member of Davis. Sills Felix M. Klots Thomas D. Fosdick Norman H. of Int’l Law & Diplomacy.

Latin American History & Economics. Hudson Clarence H. Harvard Univ. Hansen William L.Manley O. Morris 1921-1956 1931-1954 1939-1953 1927-1977 1927-1953 1927-1945 1926-1950 1926-1954 1921-1932. (1937-1958) Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard University (1936-1964) Professor of History at the University of Chicago (1925-1946) Walker Professor of International Finance at Princeton Univ. Schmitt Edwin W. Morris & Heckscher [law firm in Philadelphia] (1904-1945) Professor of International Law at University of Pennsylvania (1924-1945) . 1938-1945 Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School (1923-1960) Professor. McLaren Roland S. (1923-1953) Lucius N. Langer Bernadotte E. Harvard Univ. Borchard Walter W. Kemmerer Edwin M. (1928-1943) Professor of Law at Yale Law School (1917-1951) Professor of Economics at Williams College (1914-1945) Member of Duane. Littauer Professor of Political Economy. Haring Alvin H.

Connecticut. is located at Yale University on High Street in New Haven. a secret society founded in 1832 by William Huntington Russell. and the Hidden Paths of Power by Alexandra Robbins) . the Ivy League. (Source: Secrets of the Tomb: Skull and Bones.Pearl Harbor & Special Interest: Skull & Bones in 1941 The Order of Skull & Bones.

Stimson B. Yale 1913 Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Taft B. 1952-1973) . Senator (R-Ohio. 1940-1945) Harold Stanley B.A. 1939-1959) W.Prominent Members of Skull & Bones in 1941 Charles Seymour B. Yale 1920 Editor-in-Chief of Time magazine (1923-1964) Allen T.A. Thacher B.A. Yale 1904 Partner of Simpson.A.A. Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1939-1945) Harvey H. Yale 1910 U. Gates B. Yale 1918 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air (1941-1945) Robert A. Bush B. (1941-1948) Robert A.A. Yale 1888 Secretary of War (1911-1913. Yale 1898 U. (1931-1982) Pierre Jay B. Harrison B. Yale 1917 Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.A. Yale 1892 Chairman of the board of Fiduciary Trust Co.A. Bundy B.A. Yale 1918 U. Thacher & Bartlett [law firm in New York City] (1933-1943) Charles M. Yale 1917 Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Lovett B. (1930-1945) Henry R. Spofford B.A. (1931-1978) Prescott S. Stimson. (1937-1950).S. Yale 1880 Partner of Cadwalader. Wickersham & Taft [law firm in New York City] (1899-1945) Thomas D.S.A. Roland Harriman B. Yale 1918 Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1941-1945) Artemus L. Congressman (R-Ohio.A.A.A. Yale 1908 Partner of Morgan.A. Yale 1917 Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Yale 1910 President of New York Life Insurance Co. (1931-1972) Knight Woolley B. Wadsworth Jr.A. B. 1939-1953) James W. Congressman (R-New York.S.A. Putnam & Roberts [law firm in New York City] (1921-1965) Henry Waters Taft B. Averell Harriman B. Yale 1924 Member of Davis. Polk & Wardwell [law firm in New York City] (1940-1950. Yale 1908 President of Yale Univ. (1941-1955) George L. Luce B.A. (1931-1946) E. 1933-1951) John Martin Vorys B.A. Stanley & Co. Klots B. Yale 1909 Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (19411945). Yale 1909 Member of Winthrop.A. Trustee of World Peace Foundation (19341963) Henry L.

John J. (Photo: John Phillips/Time Life) . Stimson and John J. on April 22. 1941. Stimson and Robert A. Stimson (left) entertains his assistants John J. Henry L. Henry L. before and after World War II. McCloy served as a member of the Warren Commission in 1963 and 1964. Archibald MacLeish was a member of Skull & Bones. “Wild Bill” Donovan (left) sits beside Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish in 1941. Robert A.. (Photo: Time Magazine/The Wise Men by Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas) Colonel William J. the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1941-1945).Secretary of War Henry L. McCloy were members of the Council on Foreign Relations during World War II. Lovett were members of Skull & Bones. a banking firm in New York City. the Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945) and Robert A. Lovett (right). McCloy (center). John J. Lovett served as Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. McCloy served as Chairman and CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City after World War II.

1947-1958) George Herbert Walker Jr. Gates (S&B 1918) – Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air (1941-1945) Harvey H. Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1934-1963) Robert A. Texas] (1930-1977) Richard Marden Davis (S&B 1933) – Partner of Davis. 1941) Government Officials: Henry L. Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1941-1955) Pierre Jay (S&B 1892) – Chairman of the board of Fiduciary Trust Company [New York City] (1930-1945) Mortimer Norton Buckner (S&B 1895) – Chairman of the board of New York Trust Company (1921-1942) Frank P. Klots (S&B 1909) – Member of Winthrop. (S&B 1898) – U. (1929-1974) Chauncey Jerome Hamlin (S&B 1903) – Member of the New York Stock Exchange (1941-1963) Lawyers: Henry Waters Taft (S&B 1880) – Partner of Cadwalader. Weyerhaeuser (S&B 1896) – President of Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. (1939-1954) Frederick E. Walter Seth Logan (S&B 1910) – Vice President and General Counsel of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1928-1953) Roger B. Shepard (S&B 1908) – Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1940-1953) Businessmen: W. Polk.J. Roland Harriman (S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Stanley & Co. Hall & Stewart [law firm in Boston] (1927-1971) George Frederick Baer Appel (S&B 1924) – Partner of Townsend. (1934-1960) Charles Jacob Stewart (S&B 1918) – Vice President of New York Trust Co. 1933-1951) Archibald MacLeish (S&B 1915) – Librarian of Congress (1939-1944) Bankers: Prescott S. Hadley & McCloy [law firm in New York City] (1924-1979) Dean Sage (S&B 1897) – Member of Sage. Tweed. (1935-1949) Henry P. (1937-1945) Henry John Heinz II (S&B 1931) – President of H. Wickersham & Taft [law firm in New York City] (1914-1945) Henry DeForest Baldwin (S&B 1885) – Member of Lord.H. Harrison (S&B 1910) – President of New York Life Insurance Co. (S&B 1920) – Partner (1929-1940) and Vice President (1940-1942) of J. Inc. Cowles (S&B 1887) – Publisher of Spokane Spokesman-Review (1893-1946) Henry W.1982) William Singer Moorhead (S&B 1906) – Member of Moorhead & Knox [law firm in Pittsburgh] (1917-1952) Others: Charles Seymour (S&B 1908) – President of Yale University (1937-1950). Wardwell. Lovett (S&B 1918) – Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1941-1945) Artemus L. Averell Harriman (S&B 1913) – Chairman of the board of Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1931-1978) Knight Woolley (S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1929-1958) Frank Ford Russell (S&B 1926) – President of National Aviation Corp. Bush (S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.Prominent Members of Skull & Bones (December 7. Burtt (S&B 1915) – Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University (1931-1960) Frederic C. Thacher & Bartlett [law firm in New York City] (1933-1943) Allen T. Shepard (S&B 1917) – Vice President of Bankers Trust Co. Stimson. (1931-1982) Ray Morris (S&B 1901) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1939-1945) Carl A.S. (1931-1956) Harold Stanley (S&B 1908) – Partner of Morgan.P. Inc. Day & Lord [law firm in New York City] (1929-1969) Thomas D. Thacher (S&B 1904) – Partner of Simpson. (1941-1948) H. Luce (S&B 1920) – Editor-in-Chief of Time. Gardiner & Reed [law firm in New York City] (1940-1950. (1941-1943. Lohmann (S&B 1910) – Secretary of Yale University (1927-1953) August Sidney Lovett (S&B 1913) – Chaplain of Yale University (1932-1958) Henry R. Heinz Company (1941-1959) Morehead Patterson (S&B 1920) – President of American Machine & Foundry Co. Bundy (S&B 1909) – Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (1941-1945). French (S&B 1910) – Professor of English at Yale University (1930-1953) F. (1923-1964) William H. Taft (S&B 1910) – U. Walker & Co. Wickersham & Taft [law firm in New York City] (1899-1945) William Lloyd Kitchel (S&B 1892) – Partner of Cadwalader. Gray. Davison Jr. (1932-1946). (1931-1972) E. Putnam & Roberts [law firm in New York City] (1921-1965) Charles M. Trubee Davison (S&B 1918) – President of the American Museum of Natural History (1933-1951) . (S&B 1927) – General Partner of G. Senator (R-Ohio. Neil Mallon (S&B 1917) – President of Dresser Industries. Todd & Sims [law firm in New York City] (1905-1943) Edward Bancroft Twombly (S&B 1912) – Partner of Putney.S. Twombly. Elliott & Munson [law firm in Philadelphia] (1938-1970) Henry Cornick Coke (S&B 1926) – Member of Coke & Coke [law firm in Dallas. Stimson (S&B 1888) – Secretary of War (1911-1913. 1939-1959) James Wolcott Wadsworth Jr. Spofford (S&B 1924) – Member of Davis. Congressman (R-Ohio. Graham & Stubbs [law firm in Denver] (1937-c. Morgan & Co. Congressman (R-New York. (1931-1946) George L. 1940-1945) Robert A.S. 1939-1953) John Martin Vorys (S&B 1918) – U. Hall & Skidmore [law firm in New York City] (1919-1966) Marcien Jenckes (S&B 1921) – Member of Choate. 1952-1973) Morris Hadley (S&B 1916) – Partner of Milbank. Walcott (S&B 1891) – Regent of the Smithsonian Institution (1941-1948) Stanhope Bayne-Jones (S&B 1910) – Professor of Bacteriology at Yale School of Medicine (1932-1947) Robert D. Day & Lord [law firm in New York City] (1900-1947) Sherman Baldwin (S&B 1919) – Member of Lord. Hobson (S&B 1914) – Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Diocese of Southern Ohio (1931-1959) Henry Sloane Coffin (S&B 1897) – President of Union Theological Seminary (1926-1945) Edwin A.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS & MEMORANDUMS RELATED TO PEARL HARBOR Documents published in Robert B. Stinnett’s book Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor: One of the intercepted “HITOKAPPU BAY” messages .

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(Source: Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert B. Stinnett) .

Layton’s book And I Was There: (Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.Documents published in Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton) .

(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton) .

(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton) .

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton) .

Layton) .(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T.

(Source: And I Was There by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton) .

This secret message was transmitted "Priority" to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts for action. USN). Tokyo time and 8:30 a. plain-language Japanese. --1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREPARATIONS FOR INTERCEPTION There are various sources of the so-called "Winds Code. 1941. (Washington time) on November 28. This time corresponded to 10:30 p." which gave me something tangible to work with as well as giving added meaning to the Winds Code. I was shown Tokyo to Washington Serial 843. and was originally written in the Kata-Kana form of written. Maryland. Safford. By the best estimate that can be made from my recollection and the circumstantial evidence now available. thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter. 1 and Tokyo Circular 2354 on page 155 of Exhibit No. 1941. CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence. had it coded in the COPEK system.NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND Statement Regarding Winds Message by Captain L. with the secondary motive that it would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn't. Safford. and released it myself at 6 p. which types the Roman-letter equivalents of the Japanese characters. The most important source was Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet secret dispatch 281430 of November 28.m." two of which have already been introduced as evidence: Tokyo Circular 2353 on page 154 of Exhibit No. It was recorded on a special typewriter.S. It meant War--and we knew it meant War. 79th Cong.. The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded to the Navy Department by TWX (teletypewriter exchange) from the teletype-transmitter in the "Intercept" receiving room at Cheltenham to "WA91.. 1941. addressed for information to the Commander-inChief Pacific Fleet and Commandant 14th Naval District--thus letting them in on the secret.F. December 4. 1. Tokyo Serial 843 implied that such notification would be made. in the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit under my command. dated November 27.F.DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY . 1941. I had taken no action personally on the first tip-off (Tokyo Circular 2354). I saw the Winds Message typed in page form on yellow teletype paper. The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code. 1941. USN PREVIEW There was a Winds Message. which serves the Navy Department. Just about the time I received Admiral Wilkinson's request.m. US Navy [Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes. pursuant to Congressional Resolution 27] Related Resource: Pearl Harbor Frequently Asked Question 25 January 1946 STATEMENT REGARDING WINDS MESSAGE by Captain L. through the Director of Naval Communications. Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham. 1st sess. December 4. After a conference with my subordinates. I hastened to comply." the page-printer located beside the GY Watch Officer's desk. and to the . prescribing a "schedule of (Tokyo News) Broadcasts. It was intercepted by the U. because I was still awaiting the instruction of higher authority. with the translation written below. It was a request from Admiral Wilkinson and an order from Admiral Noyes.m. that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds Codes. for he immediately sent word to me. the "Winds Message" was part of a Japanese Overseas "News" Broadcast from Station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilocycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich Civil Time on Thursday. I drafted a summary of Tokyo Serial 843 --2--------------------------------------------------------------------------------(or had Kramer do it for me). Washington time." Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354 blueprinted what this action would be. The "November 29 deadline" indicated that the Winds Code might be used to notify overseas officials as to things which would "automatically begin to happen. developed by the Navy.

telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments. continued watch for Orange activity. We did not order Guam or Imperial Beach (California) to monitor any of the Tokyo broadcast schedules. I know that they monitored the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts. in fact.Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet for information. and may be identified as OPNAV 282301.November 1941 Receiving conditions throughout the month were very good on all frequencies. According to my memory we decided to play safe and have all East Coast intercept stations monitor the Tokyo Broadcasts. and Bainbridge Island. Lewis and I agreed that 5160 kilocycles would probably come in nicely at Manila and at Pearl Harbor. 1). Our estimates for Bainbridge Island were closely realized: excellent receivability at the wrong time of day and almost a complete "black-out" of reception on the higher frequencies during the period scheduled for the Winds Message broadcast. There did not seem to be a remote possibility of the 11980 kilocycles and 12265 kilocycles being heard by any station in the Pacific Ocean or along either shore at the time of day scheduled. --4--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the intercept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and at Cheltenham (Maryland) to monitor the schedules given in Tokyo Serial 843 as first priority and to forward all plain-language Japanese intercepts on these schedules to the Navy Department by teletype. 1941 (JD-1 #6982: SIS #25571). Orders received from OP-20-GX at 2315 (GCT) November 28. I also know that Corregidor monitored the Tokyo Morse Broadcasts. Three other relevant intercepts not appearing in Exhibit No. Station "M" (Cheltenham) -. Rio to Tokyo Serial 482 of November 30. We agreed that the best chance of intercepting the listed schedules (other than those on 5160 kilocycles) was on the East Coast of the United States. --3--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Welker. We may have sent these instructions to other stations also. We did not want English or coded messages--only written Japanese. We agreed it would be impossible to hear Voice Broadcasts from Tokyo on the East Coast and therefore did not attempt it. Corregidor and Heeia went beyond their instructions and guarded the Tokyo Broadcasts 24 hours a day. 1941 (JD-1 #6981: SIS #25604). as far as the West Coast was concerned.December 1941 Receiving conditions during the month were fair to good on all frequencies. I discussed the situation with Commander Welker. 9430 kilocycles appeared a bit high for a night frequency in winter. We did not order Bainbridge Island to monitor the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts because its two sound recorders were guarding the two ends of the Tokyo-San Francisco radio telephone circuit.Operations -. During the winter months the East Coast had good reception of Tokyo during the few hours included in the schedules. 1941 (JD-1 #6908: SIS #25476). I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge of existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports from Cheltenham. At 2300. and that Tokyo Serial 843 (JD-1 #6899: SIS #25446) is not included in the "Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages" (Exhibit No. These 5 documents should be introduced as evidence for purposes of record. . 1 are also of interest at this point. namely: Washington to Tokyo Serial 1197 of November 27. 37). Captain Rochefort and Commander Leitwiler can verify this. These schedules were covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in both Kana and English. I would like to digress long enough to invite the attention of the Committee to the fact that OPNAV 282301 is not included in the "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches" (Exhibit No. Log sheets were forwarded to OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files. via teletype to give highest priority to various broadcasts at designated Japanese broadcast stations. Station JHL was of too low power to reach the greater distances to the continental United States. Atmospheric disturbances have been at a minimum. extracts from which are quoted below: Station "M" (Cheltenham) -. we decided to have Bainbridge Island monitor the Tokyo Morse Code Broadcasts on the chance that the times given in Tokyo Serial 843 might not be given in Tokyo time or the schedules could be heard because of freak conditions. Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious. We were not encouraged when a day or two later Washington and Rio objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome complained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts.Operations -. and with Chief Radioman Lewis. in charge of the intercept and direction-finder stations. Nevertheless. 7 December 1941. so we had up-tothe-minute data on the receivability of Tokyo. his technical assistant. Winter Harbor. Rome to Tokyo Serial 768 of November 29. which had been guarding the MAM (Tokyo) Broadcasts to Japanese Merchant Vessels. and sent them out immediately after releasing the previously-mentioned OPNAV 282301. This took care of our overseas Communication Intelligence Units: they now had all the available technical information on the subject. We gave the same instructions to both stations. Our best bet was Cheltenham.

STATION JVJ JUD JUD JVJ JVJ JVJ JVJ JVJ JVJ JVJ JVJ JHL JVJ JVJ JVJ FREQUENCY 12275 15880 15880 12275 12275 12275 12275 12275 12275 12275 12275 5160 12275 12275 12275 CORNETTED WITH JUP JVJ/JAU2 JVJ JUP/JUD JUD JUD JUD . Commander Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department. Daily attempts were made to intercept Tokyo and Osaka channels employed to Europe. we asked for a verification. Time used is GCT. but were told that time zone was uncertain and verification was not possible. I do not know why the Army failed to monitor for the Winds Message on the East Coast of the United States: Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Schukraft may remember. GCT 0000 0030 0100 0130 0200 0230 0300 0330 0400 0430 0500 1300 2200 2300 2330 --6--------------------------------------------------------------------------------At my instructions. Where before we seldom averaged more than one or two such messages monthly. Because the use of PST time designation is unusual. and ascertained that the Army was monitoring for the Winds Message at San Francisco.December 1941 Receiving Conditions in General. a directive was received by TWX from Op-20-GX which called for coverage of the following stations at times specified. On 28 November.Station "W" (Winter Harbor) -. and that although we could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel carrying the same broadcast. PST 0100 0130 0200 0300 0400 0500 0530 (GCT) (0900) (0930) (1000) (1100) (1200) (1300) (1330) STATION JVJ JUO JVJ JHL JHL JHL JHP FREQUENCY 12275 9430 12275 5160 5160 5160 11980 Since the time zone indicated was not certain we were faced with the possibility that the time could be either GCT. but was not monitoring for the Winds Messages anywhere on the East Coast of the United States. As soon as the directive was received we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were readable at "S". These messages are sent in both number code and Kana.Operations -.Operations -. zone -9. but only on a few occasions was any intercept possible. Times listed were given as PST. PST. I do not know what sort of instructions the Army gave its intercept stations. Captain Schukraft. We found that in some cases other stations were tied in with the Stations listed in the original directive.November 1941 During the month of November a sharp increase has been noticed in the amount of message traffic sent on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. with priority transmission of intercepted material by TWX. it is now not unusual for two or three such messages to appear daily. and possibly elsewhere. or at least with my concurrence. The stations and time that we can copy are listed below. --5--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Station "S" (Bainbridge Island) -. or even a combination of these. I believe that the above-mentioned conference was held before we issued instruction to our own intercept stations.

on December 6.C.C. These messages were transmitted by Station JAH (Tokyo) to San Francisco on 7630 kilocycles. the Winds Message was monitored for at the following localities. 1941.The F. was not furnished the Tokyo Broadcast Schedules nor any mention of the fact that the Winds Message could come by Morse code. I drove out to Station "M" at Cheltenham. 6618. Oregon. I was shown the translation of Tokyo Circular 2444 (Exhibit No. of course. and that the other Services did all that they considered reasonable.page 209). advising that London. and 6619. 1941. T. The F. which was scheduled to be placed in service on December 1.C. 1941. I may summarize the preparations for interception by stating that the United States Navy listened for the Winds Message at Cheltenham.C. plus two other messages.C. as I recall.S. doubted if voice broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard on the East Coast of the United States. --8--------------------------------------------------------------------------------One evening.S.C.C. Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines. and instructing Washington to retain its machine regardless of other instruction. exclusively. but which had been delayed by installation difficulties at some of the outlying stations. This . Corregidor. Navy) (U. could not possibly have intercepted the same Winds Message that Cheltenham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for Morse code.C. Maryland. The latter request was not complied with because the F. monitor station at Portland. monitor station at Honolulu also monitored for the Winds Message. and the F. The Tokyo-San Francisco circuit was not a regular Cheltenham assignment. So did Colonel Sadtler. I have further documentary proof that Cheltenham was monitoring the Tokyo broadcasts in the fact that between 1200 and 1500 GCT.C. Maryland. to my personal knowledge: Heeia. This is entered in the GY log for December 6. Singapore Australia Java (U. England. Navy) (British Intelligence) (Australian Intelligence) (NEI Intelligence) Voice only Voice and Morse -?-?-?- Intercept stations in Canada. The F. P. 6610. On December 1. The primary purpose of my visit was to inspect the new landline telegraph for direction-finder control which had been completed at Cheltenham and the Navy Department. 1 . The only means by which Tokyo could announce its decisions of peace or war to its overseas diplomatic representatives who had destroyed their regular codes was by means of the emergency Winds Code. about December 1.H.C. at the request of the local military authorities. Hongkong. was requested by the War Department to monitor for the Winds Message on the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts and was given the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but without their meaning. This applied to London and the Far East but not to Washington. and remained until about midnight.C. In 1941. I instituted a daily check of the incoming teletype messages to see that our intercept stations were doing as much as could be expected of them. and also at one of its monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United States. Higher authority in the War and Navy Departments likewise took a greatly increased interest in the Winds Message. the Japanese diplomatic and consular stations listened for the Winds Message themselves on their own receiving sets. And. station at Portland was monitoring for voice. --7--------------------------------------------------------------------------------In addition to the stations previously named. the Japanese Government was sending out "General Information Broadcasts" as well as "Domei News" to its Diplomatic and Consular Officials in foreign lands. over in the War Department. 6609. and did everything that it possibly could to intercept it elsewhere. and China probably watched for it too.C.C. --9--------------------------------------------------------------------------------INTERCEPTION There is no basis for assuming that the Winds Message had to be sent on a Voice Broadcast.I.C. and began heckling me as to the possibility of having missed it. I made a personal check of the Winds Message watch and. found that Chief Radioman Wigle was monitoring the Tokyo News Broadcasts 24 hours a day and had assigned qualified Kana operators to this duty. Cheltenham intercepted and forwarded to the Navy Department Tokyo Serials 902-2 and 904. was requested to monitor the Winds Message at its monitor station at Portland. The F. The F. Oregon. exclusively. 1941: Items Nos. The significance of the Winds Message now became very clear to me and I began to take the matter most seriously. 1941.

but the expression meaning "North Wind Cloudy" was in the negative form.'s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. We knew it. When I first saw the Winds Message. or both.S. Therefore it is necessary to reconstruct the situation from circumstantial evidence and by process of elimination." I am not sure of the order. 1941.S. Australia. and Singapore.was partly to give speedier service. Navy of this duty. Collateral information has been plotted or recorded on a single sheet. dot-and-dash) code exclusively: either Japanese Morse. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting. partly to permit use of the Japanese Morse Code and the Kata-Kana form of written Japanese. As I have previously testified. but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. Pearl Harbor. and partly to be independent of foreign communication systems in emergency. This was the feather in our cap. in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit. but it could not be heard in Burma.C.S." It is possible that the words "No war.S. International Morse. The United States Government was doing the same thing itself. We expected that the Winds Message would be sent in Morse Code--and it was. We used to "sample" these broadcasts periodically until the F. partly to my foresight. Each office had its own Japanese radio operator and its own short-wave receiving set. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet.e. distances. Reception or non-reception at other points was irrelevant." rather than "United States." were used to describe Japan's intentions with regards to Russia. and time of day were such that the Winds Message could be heard on the East Coasts of the United States and Canada. whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo Circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. This graph tells the story better than words and shows just what actually happened. The German Government was doing likewise but was a bit ahead of us. on December 4. or in Rio de Janeiro. Manila. This was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to intercept. the frequency. while it was a physical impossibility for it to be heard (except under freak conditions) on the West Coast of the United States and Canada. 1941.C. it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer.m. Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor the way the . and Western Europe. The radio schedules listed in Tokyo Serial 843 were in Morse (i. on that date. That was immaterial--the Winds Message was intended for London. Everything checks perfectly: there is no element of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation. nor Germany was dependent on Voice broadcasts for direct communication from the seat of government to overseas officials. Kramer distinctly recalls that the Winds Message was shown to him by the GY Watch Officer after 8:30 a. with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message.. etc. The Winds Message broadcast was about 200 words long. It was sent on the so-called "European Schedule" of Tokyo's big foreign broadcasting station "J-A-P" and was intended for London. and partly to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving apparatus at Cheltenham. a reduced-size photograph of which is appended. Tokyo knew full well. that I had first seen the Winds Message a little after eight a. unless it came on a schedule receivable at Pearl Harbor or Corregidor. on December 4.m. with machine reception. It was my recollection. as stated in previous testimony. the following free translations: "War with England (including NEI. I think Kramer used "U. All three "code words" were used. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days previously: this was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. This was the tip-off which would prevent the U. with a Navy radio operator serving at each post. Navy would have missed it. --12--------------------------------------------------------------------------------"This is it!" said Kramer as he handed me the Winds Message.S. --10--------------------------------------------------------------------------------The original documents giving details of the interception of the Winds Message are not available. Peace with Russia. The Winds Message could be heard also in the North Atlantic Ocean.m. If the Winds Message had been sent on a Voice broadcast the U. the United States. Our ability to intercept it was due partly to good luck. Java. --11--------------------------------------------------------------------------------The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded by teletype (TWX) from Cheltenham to the Navy Department (Op-20-GY) shortly before 9:00 a.) War with the U. before the Winds Message was sent. I wish to reiterate that neither Japan. It should convince the most skeptical. British Isles. that it probably would not be received in Washington or in Rio." instead of "Peace.

Forrestal for about two hours. if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. and that he discussed those messages with Mr. There is some question as to whether the Admiral was understood. This was the last time I saw the Winds Message. I did not explain the nature or significance of the Winds Message to this officer. Kramer told me in 1944 that he had shown Assistant Secretary Forrestal a special set of Pre-Pearl Harbor messages about December 10. I saw a copy of it in the special folder of messages which were being assembled for Admiral Noyes to present to the Roberts Commission. 1941. In fact it was not until 1944 that any suggestion or criticism was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list -. I replied that I was in full agreement but there were other odds and ends to be taken care of. It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department. Safford. 1941.had not been notified that the Winds Message had been received or that the Winds Message had been translated in any terms other than War and Peace. Army.Navy.S. My final verification of the fact that the Winds Message translation was typed and distributed lies in the fact that about December 15. because this number is missing and unaccounted for. to track him down and not take "no" for an answer. I will refrain from commenting on what this patently untrue interpretation suggests about Capt. but this only shows the unreliability of telephone messages. and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason. The distribution of the Winds Message was the responsibility of Naval Intelligence and not Naval Communications. when Secretary Knox was making his personal investigation at Pearl Harbor. and comes within the range of messages translated on December 3 and 4. to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy Department. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered. and. I believe that the translation of the Winds Message was given the JD-1 Serial number of 7001. and that I would have some messages ready for his approval by noon. I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order. This set of messages was apparently the basis and possibly the identical file that was given Admiral Noyes and shown to the Roberts Commission via Admiral Wilkinson. I checked these over with Kramer for completeness as well as for the elimination of irrelevant material. was almost universally expected to be the Philippines. 1941 in accordance with standard operating procedure. The six or seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible: here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4. [The editor cannot help commenting on this statement: Neither Capt. Any misunderstanding of what Admiral Noyes said was of negligible effect because written translations of the Winds Message were distributed within --14--------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 or 3 hours of his telephone calls. 1941. War with Japan was widely anticipated by this time ("War warning" messages had been sent to the Pacific commands the previous week). but the target of any Japanese attack on the U. --15--------------------------------------------------------------------------------ACTION TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WINDS MESSAGE About an hour after I had sent the original Winds Message up to Admiral Noyes I received a call from him on the inter-phone to the effect that we ought to tell Guam to burn their excess codes and ciphers. or White House -. . I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that Admiral Noyes telephoned to everyone on his list without delay: I cannot bring myself to imagine otherwise. State Department. nor anyone else in the United States could possibly have had this particular reaction to this message. I have no reason for believing that the Army failed to make a prompt distribution of its translations of the Winds Message. Safford's agenda or the veracity of the rest of his statement. --pwc] This was what the Navy Communication Intelligence had been preparing for since its establishment in 1924--War with Japan! --13--------------------------------------------------------------------------------DISTRIBUTION I immediately sent the original of the Winds Message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Read Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person.Russians had been surprised at Port Arthur.

captured a complete allowance of codes and ciphers.Not yet introduced as evidence I took four of these messages up to Admiral Noyes' office.I. from which I quote: "NISHI NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAY AND N. and others.As a direct results of the Winds Message and other contemporaneous information from intercepted Japanese messages. Redman) and made an appointment to see the Admiral with his secretary. OPNAV Priority 042000 for action of CINCPAC. Guam and Samoa. sent an official message via the Navy . as notification that Guam's allowance of codes and ciphers was being reduced. Colonel Thorpe. was seen by me. the Senior Army Intelligence Officer in Java.Not yet introduced as evidence OPNAV 042000 (Priority) -.Not yet introduced as evidence OPNAV 042017 (Deferred) -. CINCAF. because I had directed the destruction of everything except the system in which sent and the current edition of the Direction Finder Code. COM 14 and COM 16 was sent in the new cipher made effective by OPNAV 042000. as per office instruction. Two confirmations of the British translation came from the official Netherlands East Indies Government translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354. COM 16. I released this message myself during the noon hour to save time. OPNAV 042018 and OPNAV 042019 are not important except that they help establish the date the Winds Message was intercepted and the time and date that the unsent warning message. which dispelled any doubt as to whether or not WAR was meant by the literal translation: "Japan -. It directed Guam to destroy excess cryptographic aids and other secret matter. CINCAF 281430 gave much stronger translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354. However.(blank) relations are in danger." This message contained official British translation furnished by Singapore.Page 44 of Exhibit No. Admiral Noyes made no mention of a war warning when he directed me to prepare this message and I feel sure he did not have any such warning in mind when he toned down my original draft. and as a reminder to Guam to notify the addressees what systems would be available for its future communications. This message had to be sent "for Information" to CINCPAC. 37 OPNAV 042018 (Deferred) -. no matter how worded. made a "new Intelligence" cipher effective immediately and directed the immediate destruction of the old cipher by Guam and Samoa. This message was sent DEFERRED to insure that OPNAV 042000 would arrive well in advance and thus avoid confusion and unnecessary messages at this critical time. 1941: in fact our own translation was considered consistent with it. 37). COM 14. I was not trying to use this message as the vehicle for a war warning as I had the day before in OPNAV 031855 (page 41. 37). This message was released by Admiral Noyes himself. 100 miles away.E. prepared by Commander McCollum. No one disputed this British translation in November-December. --17--------------------------------------------------------------------------------EVALUATION OF THE WINDS MESSAGE Evaluation of the Winds Message was not based on JD-1 #6850 and #6875 alone. CINCAF. cleared them through the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Captain Joseph R." That means war. I prepared the following secret messages: OPNAV 041754 (Priority) -. and was sent in response to a Priority service message requesting verification of the last four groups of ONPAV 040343 (page 43 of Exhibit No. a matter for which I was officially responsible. for action of Guam and for information of CINCPAC. My original wording was much stronger than the message actually sent. I was just trying to insure that Guam "stripped ship" before a Japanese Commando-raid from Saipan.m. This message was rewritten by Admiral Noyes and was released by Admiral Ingersoll. OPNAV Deferred 042017. I was called to his office shortly before 3:00 p. and is the most --16--------------------------------------------------------------------------------important of the five which were sent on this occasion because the precedence did give some idea of urgency. OPNAV 041754 was a correction to a previous Priority message.Not yet introduced as evidence OPNAV 042019 (Deferred) -. Exhibit No.

Copies were forwarded to the War and Navy Departments by the State Department Liaison Officer. sent a similar message to the Secretary of State. This message may be identified as Alusna Batavia 031030 dated December 3. 1941. I might add that there was only one J-A-P European broadcast per day. I quote from this message: --18--------------------------------------------------------------------------------"FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. --19--------------------------------------------------------------------------------This message was received in the State Department at 9:19 a. on December 4. Mr. (B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all 3 cases: Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories. 1941 (Java time). Consul General Foote. TWO KITA NORTH RUSSIA. This time was 7 1/2 hours before the Winds Message was broadcast. 1941 (Washington time). which is a matter of record in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. My own evaluation of the foregoing. They were given a wide circulation in the Navy Department. (C) The Winds Message was probably a "Signal of Execute" of some sort The "Signal of Execute" theory received strong confirmation from a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon of December 4.addressed to General Miles. Orme Wilson. 1941. Copies of this message were circulated in the Navy Department. our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies.. I would like to add --20--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . THREE NISHI WEST BRITAIN WITH ADVANCE INTO THAILAND AND ATTACK ON MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES. THREE WEST WIND CLEAR WAR WITH BRITAIN INCLUDING ATTACK ON THAILAND OR MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES. any or all of which might be followed. on December 4. CODE INTERCEPT: JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END. from which I quote: WHEN CRISIS LEADING TO WORST ARISES FOLLOWING WILL BE BROADCAST AT END WEATHER REPORTS: ONE EAST WIND RAIN WAR WITH UNITED STATES. TWO NORTH WIND CLOUDY WAR WITH RUSSIA. 1941 (Washington time). WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES". -------------------------------------------------------------------------------WHEN THREAT OF CRISIS EXISTS FOLLOWING WILL BE USED FIVE TIMES IN TEXTS OF GENERAL REPORTS AND RADIO BROADCASTS: ONE HIGASHI EAST AMERICA. 1941. and Negative for the 2nd. so the times coincided as closely as possible. the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington. NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA.m. which is December 3. namely: War with the United States (1) War with Russia (2) War with England including the invasion of Thailand and the capture of (3) Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. EAST WIND RAIN UNITED STATES. was about as follows: (A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3 categories or provided for 3 contingencies. and the Chief of Naval Operations was indicated as receiving a copy. This message informed us that the Japanese Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations Code" at 0600 GCT that date. on December 4.

However. The unusual hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its "Operations Code. In fact. United States’ authorities would have been just as well informed of Japan’s intentions to go to war. The ‘Winds’ Code. or Sunday. (Washington.FINIS ---22-- Notes: Although Captain Safford is highly regarded as the "father" of US Navy communications intelligence. Colonel Sadtler saw it. was just the reverse. 06 March 2006 . 1978): pp. In the light of all other evidence available concerning Japan’s intentions to go to war. Source: "Collection of Papers Related to the 'Winds Execute' Message. College Park.S. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear a double burden in my testimony. As I have previously testified. and so did Captain Joseph R. after the attack on Pearl Harbor had already begun. 1941. 1945.S. The War Department over-emphasized the imminence of War as forecast by the "November 29.it was just the plain. we expected that if the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this attack would come on a week-end or national holiday. and was addressed to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval District but not to the Commander-in-Chief. common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition.5. The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor.“ Documents referred to by Captain Safford in the above essay should be located in Record Group 457 at the National Archives and Records Administration. In fact. Also the covering Naval forces were not yet deployed and other signs indicated that the U. that Japan would break off relations with England. The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese themselves. Pacific Fleet.S. or the United States. before the Army Board of Investigation. The preliminary ‘Winds’ code messages pointed only to the breaking of relations with Great Britain. this is the first time it has ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. Furthermore. 1941. made this message highly significant as the probable "Signal of Execute" to the Japanese Navy. Russia. The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday December 6. So far as I know. 1941. located in Record Group 457 at the National Archives and Records Administration. see: Dept. DC: US Government Printing Office. a warning message to this effect had been sent out in April.S. The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval District Priority 041502 dated December 4.also that my subordinates on Corregidor spotted and reported this change only nine hours after it was made. -according to Colonel Sadtler's testimony in 1944. it is apparent that even if the ‘Winds’ messages had never existed. U. MD." SRH-210. This was not crystal gazing or "intuition" -. The Navy Department estimated the situation more accurately -. --21--------------------------------------------------------------------------------The next week-end. December 6-7. College Park. his statement is extremely controversial and does not represent the opinion of the Naval Historical Center. and gave no hint as to the possibility of an attack upon Pearl Harbor. there is no document in American Communication Intelligence files which indicates receipt of any ‘Winds’ code message announcing the severance of relations between Japan and the United States." combined with the Winds Message and other collateral information available in the Navy Department. 1941.N. 1941. December 7.” The text accompanying “Part-D” includes the following remarks: “It will be apparent from the foregoing that American intelligence agencies throughout the world were maintaining a constant watch in order to intercept a ‘Winds’ code message which would indicate that Japan was breaking off relations with the United States. MD. “Part D-Special Studies. U. Navy. It was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13-14. this message has not been introduced as evidence before any previous investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. the Federal Communications Commission has no record of intercepting a message other than those mentioned above which indicate. Army estimate was a bit premature. 37). U. vol. of Defense. deadline" and predicted that the Japanese would strike during the week-end of November 29-30.51-54. 1941. The Winds Message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in the middle of the week: 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday.the Japanese armada which had been concentrating for the Southern invasion was too far from any conceivable objective to give serious consideration to this date. Redman. 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. -. For further information on the “Winds” code messages.

navy.mil/library/online/winds.history.Source: http://www.htm .

Samuel Adolphus Adams. Anderson.T.2c Sea. Thomas Benton Allen.M.2c M.1c F.A.3c PVT Sea.2c B. Allen.2c Lt. Garland C.1c F.1c G.1c Sea. Hugh R. Lawrence Donald Anderson.2c S. Jr.2c F. James Dillion Agola.1c F. Robert Franklin Adkins.T. Mathew Joe Aguirre.2c Sea.1c C.M.A. Leo DeVere Anderberg. Jr.T. Elvis Author Alexander. Allen.C. Robert Adair Anderson. Joseph Kanehoa Adams.1c Sea. Delbert Jake Anderson. T.A Casualty List of people who perished as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.M. Galen Winston Aldridge. Willard Henry Alexander. Alberovsky. August Albanese. Howard Lucas Adkins. Hubert Charles Titus Abercrombie.1c PVT S. Irwin Corinthis Anderson.1c age 18 age 50 Sea.3c Sea. James Pickins . Brainerd Wells Rank or Age F.2c Sea.1c Sea. Stanley W.A.1c SSGT Sea.2c Sea. Ernest Mathew Amon. Ralph Alten.1c Sea.3c Ensign G.T. Thomas Elwood Aldridge. Donald William Anderson.Cmdr Lieutenant (jg) M.F. William Robert Anderson. Allison.T.1c S.M. Charles Titus Anderson. 1941 Name Aaron.K.M. Andrew K. Arnold Leo Anderson. Salvatore J. Marvin Birch Adkison.1c Sea. Alois. William Lewis Alley. Harry Anderson. Allen. John Kalauwae Adams. Frederick Purdy Amundson.1c Sea. Hal Jake Allison. Francis Severin Albright.2c Bmkr.1c F. Robert G. J.1c PVT F. William T.3c CPL C.M. Moses Anderson Allen. Eric .M. Richard James Akina. Gregorio San Nicolas Ahern.T. Anderson.1c Ensign PVT G.2c G.2c Sea. Jesse Leroy Adams. Allen. Howard Taisey Anderson.M.P Branch or Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy Station USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Tennessee Honolulu Honolulu USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Helena USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Enterprise USS California Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona .2c E.1c F.M. Jay Edgar Allison. Andrews. William Clayborn Allen. Robert Lee Allen.1c age 37 F.1c M. Manfred Carl Anderson. Reyner Aceves Aguon.

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William Eugene Blankenship. Bilyi. Charles Henry Bickel. Black. Henry Wilbur Blankenship. Theron A. John Arthur Birdsell.3c M.2c Y.1c S. Albert Edward Blake.2c Sea. Bolen. Albert James Bolling. James Theron Black.3c F.1c F. George P.1c M. Burnis Leroy Bonebrake.2c F. Jr. William John Cox S.2c PFC Sea.2c SSGT F.1c Ph.M. Henry C.2c G. George Albert Bishop.1c SGT R. Rudolph Paul Bigham.F.1c Sea.Cmdr Sea. James Robert Bircher.M. Rudolph Block.M. Wesley Horner .M.3c Sea.1c Sea. Albert Richard Blanchard. Herman Blieffert. Bodecker. Kenneth Robert Bicknell. Arthur Anthony Bertie. Leo Blitz. John Andrew .3c F.1c Lt. Virgil Cornelius Bills. Millard Charles Bishop.3c Sea.1c PVT S.3c R.3c CPL F.2c Sea.3c PVT Lieutenant (jg) PVT Y. Buford Earl Bonfiglio. Ivan Lee Blount. Clarence Arvis Bledsoe.1c Sea. Blais.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Utah Hickam Field USS Shaw USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Utah Camp Malakole USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Helena USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona .1c Cox S. Wayman Boney Bock.Berkanski.2c F.M. Gerald Revese Bolling. Richmond Frederick Blitz.1c Sea.3c F.T. Jr. William Thomas Blanchard. Waldean Blackburn. John Edward Black. Frederick Robert Bird. Sam Bolan. Blount. Jr.2c F. John George .2c E. Paul Louis Boggess.1c F.2c F.2c R.C. John Thomas Blackwell. Grover Barron Bishop. Harding Coolidge Blackburn.M.1c F.1c Sea. Frank Peter Berry. Blanton.F. George Allan . Atticus Lee Blaylock. Mathew T. Jr.2c F. Anthony Bingham.1c M.M.M. Rayon Delois Birge. Dale Deen Bielka.M.T. Walter Karr Bond. Gordon Eugene Berry. James Winford Bersch.1c Ph. Roy Eugene Bohlender.2c Sea. Regis James Boemer. James Monroe Blakley.A. Albert Charles Bernard.2c PVT Cox Bmkr. Bibby.F.

Howard Alton Boxrucker.2c Sea. Walter Robert Bowden.1c M. Lawrence Anton Boyd. R.1c PVT F. Boudreaux.1c Sea. Edwin Charles Bosley.2c Sea. Charles Andrew Boydstun.M.2c F. Lyle Lee Brignole.2c Sea.A.2c F. Walter Pershing Bromley.1c M. Kenneth Gay Brandt. Bruce Dean Bradley. Felix Booe.T. Johnnie Cecil Brock.1c CPL C.C.3c Sea.2c C. Oris Vernelle Branham. George Edward Bromley. Charles Edward Britton. Brooks. Kenneth Leroy Boswell. James Bryce Borovich.3c PVT M.1c PVT Sea. Billy O.2c F.M.2c Sea. Harold W. Brakke.M. Brandt. Booton.2c Y. Ralph McHenry Boviall.A F. Evan Benhart Brewer.T.1c S.M.3c Sea. Bowman.T. Allen Ottis SSGT BMSTP Ensign Sea. James Brazier Booth.2c F. William Broome. Jr. Robert Maurice Brier. Charlie Vinton Booze.2c Mus.1c B. Jimmie Brooks.M.M. Edward Daniel Bowers. L.2c E.1c S. J. Borger. Claire Raymond Briggs. Robert Neal Brooks. Eugene Bridges.3c Sea. Carl Merrill Braga. Erminio Joseph Brittan. Boynton. James Leon Bridges.A. B. Arthur F.1c Ensign Sea.1c United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS California USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Maryland USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona .1c PVT Sea.2c Sea.2c Ensign Sea.1c F. Oran Merrill Bradley. Frank G.1c Sea. Joseph John Borusky. George Ohara Breedlove.M. Robert K.3c SSGT Sea. Ennis Edgar Brooks. Fred Hunter Boyle. Boyer.1c F. Randall Walter Brewer.M.1c A.3c Sea. Don Jasper Boydstun.M.M. Paul Hyatt Bridie. Robert Sinclair .M. Richard Boring.2c F. Charles .2c Sea. Jr. Jr.Bonnie.1c CPL E. Asbury Legare Borgelt.2c CPL F. Raymond Devere Brabbzson. . Loy Raymond Brooner. Robert Leroy Brickley.1c Mldr. Thomas Alonzo Broadhead. Jack Asbury Brekken.T.

1c F. James Rufus Buckley.2c G.A. John Edwin . F.1c PVT PVT Sea.2c F.2c PVT Sea.2c F. Buchanan. James William Brunner. Dewey Olney Buss.C. Frank Edmond .1c 2nd.2c PVT Sea.2c F. Joseph Bush.M.1c PFC United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Downes USS West Virginia USS Arizona Camp Malakole USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field Kaneohe NAS USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona Ft Kamehameha USS Arizona Ft Kamehameha USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Arizona Hickam Field USS California USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Wheeler Field . Claude L. Charles Darling Brown. Charles Martin Brown.3c Q.2c W.3c Sea.C. William Frank Bryan.A Sea. Charles Dewitt Byrd. Brummwell. Brown.M.M. Burk. William G. Lloyd Glenn Bubb. Burlison.3c Mus. Robert S.2c F.T. Elwyn Leroy Brown.2c E.M.M.2c O.T. Walter Scott Brown. Robert P.3c Sea.SGT F.1c PVT A. Tilmon David Brownlee.3c CPL F. Burke.3c C. Bryant. Wesley James Brown. Samuel Jackson Busick.3c F.1c Sea. Burns.M.1c PVT M. Frederick Arthur Browne.3c F.3c A.M. Oliver Kenneth Burgess.M. Brune. Eugene R.K. John Edward Bush. Ralph Warren Burger. Frank George Brown.2c 1st. Rennie V. Riley Mirville Brown. .2c CPL E.O. Clarence Edward Burch.1c F. Pallas Franklin Brown.M.1c Sea.M. Brown. Brooks J. Benjamin Lee Brown. Charlie Leroy Burns. Leland Howard Bryant. Millard . Butcher. Jr. James Warren Butler. Jack C. Malcolm J. Bruesewitz.1c Sea.2c PVT M.M. Ralph Leon Burdette. Jr. Buckley. William John Brubaker. John Dabney Butts. Theodore F. Weldon C.1c S.2c Sea.3c Sea. Burnett. Earl George Burden. Clyde C. Jr. Myron Alonzo Brower.Lt R. Feliciano Todias Buhr.M. John Daniel Budd.1c S. Harry Lamont Browning. Richard Corbett Brown.C. Robert Emile Bugarin. Jr. David Adrian Butler. Edward J.1c CPL B.Brophy.2c Sea.1c Bkr. William Howard Browne.3c R.T. Rodger Cornelius Byrd. Brown.2c Sea.M.

Harold Chagnon. Malachy J. Harold Milton Carney.C.2c B. Jr.2c M.T. Guy Wayne Carroll.T.M. Joseph I.T. James Warren Cashen.S. Robert Lewis Carter.1c CPL TSGT O. John Carroll. William John Casey. Charlton.1c M.2c PVT 1st. Callaghan. Robert Wayne Carlson.2c Sea.2c Sea.T. Chandler. Edward Eugene Caskey. Lloyd George Carter. Jr.2c Sea.1c age 51 Q.M. Chace. Clarence Merton Casola.2c F. Joseph J.2c W. . George H. Casto. Jr.3c S.T. Donald William Carey.T.1c Sea.1c Cox Sea. Claude W. Caplinger.A. William Fielden Campa.2c Sea. Donal V. Charles Ray Casto.2c F.1c Sea.Cabay.Lt S. Epifanio Miranda Casinger.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Marine Corps United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma Hickam Field Midway Island NAS USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Curtiss USS California USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Shaw USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Dobbin USS California USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona Wheeler Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field Wheeler Field USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona .1c W.A. Eugene L.2c Cox Sea. Charles .P M.1c F. Harry Ludwig Carlson.2c M.3c PVT F.M.1c F. George Cebert.S. Francis Lloyd Cargile. Carpenter.1c S. Lawrence Robert Carmack.A. Charles Bruce Chadwick. Elmer Lemuel Carpenter.3c Sea.1c Sea. Raymond Edward Camery.1c F.2c F. Edward J. James Thomas Callahan. Cashman. Raymond Vincent Chadwick. Chambers. Paxton Turner Carter. Harold Francis Caro. Ralph Campbell. Chapman. Camden. Burdette Charles Campbell. Casilan.M. Biacio Castleberry.3c F. Donald Ross Chapman. Murry Randolph Carlisle. William Clarence Campbell.O Sea. Howard Frederick Carter. Raymond Ralph Camm.1c Sea. Joseph William Carroll. Richard Eugene Catsos. Francis Edward Cannon.1c Sea. Louis Clarence Cade.K.1c SGT PFC PVT CPL Sea. Richard Esh Caldwell. Burton Lowell Carter. William Vane Campiglia.2c M. Dean W.T. Archie . Robert Nelson Carreira.1c Sea.2c Sea.K.1c PVT C. Charles Nicholas Sea.M.2c Sea.1c Y.1c B. Naaman N.K.

2c G.2c Bkr. Malcolm Clark.3c 2nd. Lloyd Dale Cloues. Collier. Luther Elvin Clapp.M.3c PFC S.1c Sea. Clark.M. Walter Overton Cockrum.C. Marvin John Clark. Clarence Albert Mus. Francis Eugene Colegrove. Marshall Herman Cohn.3c Sea. Ballard Burgher Coburn. Comstock.M. Robert Eugene Clash.Lt Ensign PVT Ph. Elmer Emil Christensen. Austin Collins.Chernucha.3c Sea. George Anderson Cole.2c Cox F.F. Clarke. Collier. Patrick Kahamokupuni Christensen.K.1c Sea. Linald Long .1c PFC Sea.3c Bkr. Hans C. Harold Jensen Church.1c M. Lawrence John Cisco.C.2c C. Lloyd Raymond Christian.M. George Francis Clark. Clark. William Garnett Christiansen.2c S.3c G.1c Sea.C. David Lester Cole. Harold Kenneth Conant. Ray Emerson Clippard.1c Sea. Jr. Donald Clayton.3c Sea.F. John Crawford Todd Clark. Christopher. Jr.1c S. Leroy R. Floyd Francis Clift. Robert Coffman. Jr.1c Sea.M.2c Ensign G.P S. Monroe M. Hubert Paul Clemmens.3c F. Edward Jay Cobb. James Thomas Chess. Mitchell Coke. Cihlar.1c PVT United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Utah Honolulu USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona Bellows Field USS Nevada Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Helena USS Downes USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Enterprise USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Downes USS Pennsylvania Hickam Field .2c F.3c Sea. Patrick Lloyd Chester. Edward Blanchard Clough.3c R. James Earl Collins.1c SGT Ensign M.M. Jr. George V.1c F. Edward Chestnutt. Gerald Lee Clayton.1c F. Billy Murl Collins. David .1c Bkr. Walter Leon Collins.2c S. Claude Albert Clendenning. Robert William . Lee I.F. .Ph.2c Bkr. Kenneth Earl Coffin. Harry Gregory Cheshire.2c F. Edward Lee Christiansen.3c SSGT F. Charles Warren Cole. Robert Roland Clement. Thomas W.2c Cox Sea.M. . Jr. Cullen Benjamin Clark. John Collier.3c Sea.3c F. Clifford. Chong.3c Sea.2c age 30 M.M. Willett S.2c Sea.1c Sea.

Corning. Walter Ralph Conway. Harley Wade Craig. Harold Kendall Costin. Wallace Dewight Creech. Warren Harding Criscuolo.C.c C. Kenneth Erven Cooper. Joseph William Cooper.M. Louis Albert Cotner.K.2c F. Joseph Ucline Connolly.M.Cmdr S.1c PVT F. W. Robert Livingston Cornelius. William . Beoin Hume Coster.3c Y. P.1c C.1c Sea. Bernard Eugene Conlin.2c F. Richard Earl Conner. Keefe Richard Conrad.M.2c Q. Edward Leroy Cook. James Edwin Craig. Cremeens. Wilfred John Croft.2c PVT F. Leon John Corcoran.Q. Ernest Eugene Corn.1c Sea.M.2c Sea. Gerald Clinton Cox.O H.1c PVT Sea. Charles Edwin Couhig. Homer Milton .3c R.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Nevada USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS California USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS West Virginia USS Nevada USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Oklahoma USS Utah USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Ford Island NAS USS West Virginia USS Utah USS Maryland USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma .1c PFC C.2c F.1c Ph. Robert Frank Conrad.O. Coulter. Russell Dale Corzatt.2c C. Cook.M1. William Milford Coyne. Samuel Warwick Crowe.1c Cox Sea.1c F. Gerard John Corey.3c F. William Cowden. Alva J. Jr.Cmdr PFC E. Kenneth James Corbin.1c A.M. Joel Beman Cox. Howard Don Crossett. Jr. Arthur Lee Cowan.M. William C.1c Ensign F.M. Theodore Wheeler Cromwell.3c Lt. Curry.2c Sea. John Gaynor Connolly.3c F. Clarence Eugene Cooper. Louis Edward Crim.1c G. Cecil Thomas Crowley. John H.M.2c Lt. Thomas Ewing Cruthirds. Cremean.M.3c G.1c Sea.1c F.A.M. Richard Lee Costill. David Lloyd Crow.2c Sea. William McKnight Sea. John E. Craft.W. Howard Daniel Crowder.3c F.2c E.1c F.3c F.Conlin. Conrad. Leo Paul Cottier. John Reeves Crawley. Frank Bernard Cooper.M. John William Crain. Jr.C. James Leo Connelly.A F. Grant Clark .C. Michael Criswell.1c Cox PFC PFC Sea.1c G.2c Mus.1c Sea.1c S.

Murle Melvin Davis. Jr. Jr.3c CPL Sea. Richard Norbert Dains.3c PVT E. Ernest Boggio Dickerson.2c G. Eugene B.2c PFC Sea. Ralph R.2c CPL United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Ft Kamehameha USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Downes USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Helena USS Utah USS California USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS California Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Utah Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Helena Hickam Field . Lyle Bernard Deetz. Stanley Czekajski. Milton Henry Davis.K. Frederick Curtis Davis. W.W. John L. Frank J. Francis Daniel Day. Billy Rex Davis.2c Sea.1c Ensign Sea. Dewitt.1c C. Paul Eugene Davenport.T. Francis Anton Cyriack.P Sea.1c R.M. Dickens. Daugherty. Vicente De Polis. Glenn Gerald Czarnecki.K.1c Sea.3c S. Thomas Ray Davis.M. Lyle Carl Cutrer. Frederick Eugene Dennis.3c PFC Sea. William Joseph Curtis.1c S. Walter Mindred Dawson.2c F. Virgil Denton Davis.M.3c F. Lloyd Henry Cybulski.2c G.1c S. Lloyd Maxton Danik.M.M.1c Sea. John Buchanan Dick. Dean.2c PVT C.P SGT Cox Sea.M. Myrle Clarence Davis. Leslie Phillip Delong. Curtis. James Berkley Day.M.1c F. Edward Carlyle Daniel. Allen Arthur Davis. Davis. Russell C.3c PVT F.1c R. John Quitman Davis. Darch. Andrew Joseph Darby. Delles.3c SSGT Cox G. James Watson . John Wesley Defenbaugh.T.S. Edward Hope Davis.2c F. Phillip Zane Dasenbrock. Jr. Daly. Donald Edwin De Castro.3c O.1c Mus. Louis H. Ralph Alva Derthick. . Harold Bernard Cychosz. Francis Edward Dick.M.Curry. Ernest J.2c Sea.2c Sea. Otreste Dahlheimer. James H.2c Ensign Sea. Russell Edwin Derrington. Lloyd B.1c F. John James Dial.2c S.Lt Cox Y.1c PVT F. Theophil Da Torre.M.1c 2nd. Leroy Denson.M.F. Herbert S. Marshall Eugene .2c Sea.1c PVT E. William John De Armoun. Davenport.1c Sea. Curtis. Deritis. Richard A.

Eakes.K.1c PVT F.M.1c Sea. Lonnie William Dullum. Robert Wesley Dupree. Cyril Isaac Duveene.2c S. Norman W.B. .Std.1c Sea. Tommy Dyer. Billie Joe Dukes. John Malcolm Donohue.1c E. Dunnam.2c S.1c F.2c Sea.1c PFC C. Jack A. Herbert Allen Drefahl. John George Dineen.1c M.1c F. Fred John Ducrest.Dieckhoff. Kenneth Leroy Dunham.A Sea. Edward Norman Durning. Bill Lester Drum. John Dvorak.1c Sea. William Hugh Dougherty. Buford Harvey Dyer. John Albert Dompier.C. Wand B.M. Robert Joseph Dobbins. Alvin Albert Dye.2c C.1c Sea. Marshall Leonard Donald.K. Kenneth E.1c Sea. Ned Burton Dority. Jerald Fraser Dunaway.SGT B. Durr.T. George S.3c F. Jr.2c Pmkr. Doernenburg. Jr. Thomas Roy .3c Sea. Clement Edward Dusset.M. Douglas R.2c Sea. Guy Duke. Donat George . William Teasdale Durio.F. Robert C. Arthur Joseph Duquette.1c C. Dreesbach.2c Cox PFC CPL R.2c F. Leaman Robert Dine.1c E. Eugene Victor Downs. Downing. Stanley Daniel Dosser. Daniel A.M. George Walter Doherty.M. Doyle. Stanislaw Frank Duane.M.1c E. Dugger.1c Sea.3c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Kaneohe NAS USS Utah USS Arizona USS California USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Vestal USS Enterprise USS Arizona Hickam Field USS California USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS California USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona Ft Kamehameha USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS California USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Oklahoma .1c TSGT S. Ralph McClearn Douglas.A.2c PVT F.M. .1c Sea.2c Sea. Wallace Eldred S.A Sea.2c PVT Sea. Carl David Dosick. Russell Durkee.2c PVT Sea.3c E.2c Sea. William Ducolon.2c M.3c F.M. Jr.P Cox Sea.2c F. . Elmer Marvin Dunn. Lee Herwin Duke.M. John Monroe Dorr. Durham. Jr.1c Sea. Richard Henry Dobey.C. Louis Felix Duff. Jr.1c 1st. Dill.2c F. Bernard Vincent Doyle.M. Donald Landford Drwall. Doherty. Robert Edward Dukes.T. Jr.M.1c Sea. Milton Paul . Elmer Edwin Driver.

M.3c E.3c Ensign G. Eugene Keller Eberhart.M. Bruce Roosevelt Edwards. Julius Elwell.3c Sea.1c M.M. Robert Norris Edmonds. Eichelberger. Jr.M.M. Frank . David Bell Edmunds.3c Cox Sea. Edward Wesley Echternkamp. Bill Eugene Emery. Ellis.1c PVT F. Clifton Earle Edmonston.1c age 36 PVT R. Walton Aluard Estep.2c F.1c R. Byron G.1c F. Robert William Erskine. Evan Frederick Evans.1c Sea. Robert Ernest. David Delton Evans.C. Harry Lee Edwards. Lyle O. Bruce Harry Ellsberry. Leslie Edgar Eulberg. Forrest Jesse Etchason.M.1c Sea.1c Sea. Richard Boyd Erbes.1c Sea.2c Ptr.3c S.2c Sea.3c Sea. Jack Marvin Emery.1c Cox E.1c F.T.M. Edwards. John Charles England.2c R.C.T.2c PVT Ensign Sea.M.T.3c G. William Frederick Egbert.1c Sea. Paul Anthony Evans. Leon Egnew. Eidsvig. Embrey. Wesley Vernon Endicott. Robert Charles Erwin.1c Sea. Leland Earl Erickson. Robert Ross Ehlert.2c Sea. Vincent Henry Echols. Richard Henry Evans.3c C.T. Philip Ward Elliott. Jr. Casper Ehrmantraut.1c Sea.2c Y. Mickey Edward Evans. Roland Wayne Eernisse.1c S. Paul R.2c Sea. Jr.3c Ensign M. Ellis.3c M.M. Stanley Joe Erwin.P M. Carl James Estes. Henry Clarence Edling. William Orville F.2c PFC M.1c PVT Sea. Carl Edwen Estes.T.2c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy Civilian United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Helena USS Curtiss USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Nevada Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Utah Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Helena USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona . Emory Lowell Ebel.2c R.1c SSGT F.1c Sea.3c Sea. Wilbur Danner Ellison. Harold C. Francis Arnold .M. Vernon Jerome Eldred. Walter Charles Eberhardt. Ronald Burdette Enger. Stanley Gordon England.A. Echols.K. John Marvin Emery.A. Royal Elyard. Richard Everrett Ellis.1c Sea. Earl Maurice Ellis.Eaton.2c F. Charles Louie .M.M.

3c G. Ferguson.1c Cox ACK SGT PFC Ensign CPL F.1c M.2c Sea.A. Woodrow Wilson Finnegan. Fallis. Malcolm W. Fellman.3c Sea.A.T. Charlton Hanna Ferguson. George Leon Fadon.3c Ensign Sea. Field. James Monroe Flannery.M.3c F. Nicolas San Nicolas Feldman. Ferris.T.3c M. Jack H.1c Sea. Fansler. Ignacio Camacho Farley. Henry Amis Fischer. Patrick L. George Faddis.T.T. James Ewell. Dexter Wilson Finley.1c M. Marvin Lee . John Wilson Farmer.2c Y.T.1c M.3c PFC Mus.3c SSGT W.A.C. Simon Fitzgerald. Arthur Armond Fecho. Bernard Fields.T.2c Cox M. III.K. Felicismo Flory.1c S. Robert Ray Fisk. George Arthur Fincher. Robert Auswell Fife.A. Woodrow Wilson Everett. Willard E.T. Paul V. Reliford Fields.T.1c PVT F. John Junior Fiander. Frank Norman Flores. Firth. Delbert Ray Fisher.2c M.T. Stuart H.T. Jose San Nicolas Florese.T.3c SGT PVT PVT Ph.2c Sea.M. Robert Joseph Fleetwood. Alfred Jack Farmer. Fairchild. Fields. Luther James Faufata.1c Sea. Allen Brady Fincher.K. Alfred Adam Eyed. William Michael Finney. Donald Eugene Floege.1c Sea. Jr. Matilda Kaliko Favreau. James Lowell Flannery. Fairchild.A.T.M.A. Paul J.T. Kent Blake Fitzsimmons.1c age 12 PFC F.2c S.2c Sea. Eugene James Flaherty.1c M.2c PVT SSGT Mus. Walter Charles G.2c M.M. Charles Porter .1c United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Marine Corps United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS West Virginia Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada Schofield Barracks Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Honolulu Ft Shafter USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS California Hickam Field USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma .2c AS TSGT F. James Anderson Fisher. Alvin E. Fess.Evans.T. Max Edward Foley. Arnold E.M. Ralph Elmer Filkins.3c Sea.A.M.2c E. Leslie Henry Fisher. Lawrence Herman Fegurgur. Homer E. Fitch.T. Edgar Arthur Farfan.1c PVT PVT R. Francis Charles Flanagan.

2c Sea. George Perry Ford. Robert Niven Frye.2c M.M. William Thomas French.1c Sea. George Parten Fox.K.T.1c S.T.1c Sea. Gilbert Roy Fox. Rodney Shelton Foster.3c F.T. Frank. Elmer Lee Formoe.M.2c Sea. William Walker Foreman. Paul B. Ganas.M.2c PVT Sea. Clarence Melvin Fortenberry. Ernest Russell Garlington. Lee . Michael Galaszewski. Arthur Joseph Gargaro. Leroy George Frazier. Galajdik.1c B. Martin Anthony Garcia. George K. Orville Wilmer Garrett.M.2c SSGT M.1c E.2c A.3c W. Samuel Merritt Gara. Jack C.2c S. Kay Ivan Fulton. Frizzell. Jack Fowler. Eugene Gartin.M.2c Sea.3c C.A F. Rowena Kamohaulani Foth.C.C.3c S.3c F.1c Cox Ensign age 3 E.3c F. Frank Francis Funk. Walter R. Roy Arthur Gagne.2c Q.Std. Neil Daniel Fugate.1c Sea. Garris.1c SSGT B. Raymond Wesley Garrett. Free.M. Gallagher.2c Lt.M. Stanley C.A.Fones.M.T.1c PFC Ensign Sea.2c PVT F.2c CPL M.M.C.Col F.1c Sea. John Edmund French. Angelo Michael Gager. Robert Stillman Gardner.2c Sea. Charles Donald Free.M. John William Frederick. Gantner. Joy Carol French.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS Pearl City USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Schofield Barracks USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Shaw USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Helena USS West Virginia USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS California Hickam Field USS Curtiss USS Utah Wheeler Field USS Nevada USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS California USS Helena USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona . Jack W. Tedd McKinley Fuzi. Eugene Dash Gabriele.T.T.Cmdr Sea. Lawrence Henry Furr. Nickolas Steve Gandre. Thomas Augusta Free. Leo E. Ford.A.1c C. Gerald Ernest F. Robert R. Melvyn Amour Gannam.C. George Everett Foote. Jr.T. Robert Wilson Funk.2c PVT Sea.1c Cox E.2c M.2c Sea.2c F.K. Russell E.P Sea. Daniel Russell Fox. Jesus Francisco Garcia.F.2c S. Alvie Charles Foss. George Calvin Ford. A. Fox.1c A.A.2c Lt. Claude Ralph Garcia.F.M. Fred Fugate.

A.P F.1c Sea. George H. Bibian Bernard Gonzalez.Lt Ensign Sea.1c age 34 Sea.3c Sea. George Merton Good. Paul Gustavus Gossard. Tom Giles. James Blackburn Giovenazzo.1c M.C. . Henry Hamilton .3c Sea. Angelo Goetsch.C.Smth. Gomez. William Frank Gaudrault.T. James E.2c Y. Myron Eugene Goodwin.M.1c E.1c G.1c E.1c Sea. Arthur Gobbin.2c B.3c 2nd.1c PVT Sea.1c M. George. Gosnell.O R. Jack Reginald Gomez. Peter Charles . Richard Eugene Gillette. Marvin Frederick Geller. George Edward Giesen. Billy Edwin Gibson.M.2c Sea.M.1c Lieutenant (jg) W. Wiley Coy Goggin. Good. Gonsalves. Jr. B. Jr. Manuel Gooch. Edward .M. Samuel Henry .2c Y.1c PFC Ensign United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) USS California USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Utah USS California USS Oklahoma USS California USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Maryland USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Honolulu USS West Virginia USS Enterprise USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Shaw Hickam Field USS Arizona . Gazecki.1c Sea.2c Sea. Gosselin.3c SSGT Sea. Clifford George Goodwin. Jr.2c S.M. James J.Gary. Robert Henry Goodwin. Leonard Richard Gemienhardt. Harold Reuben Gleason.M.2c W. Kenneth Floyd Geise.3c PFC M.2c Y.1c Sea. Benjamin Edward Ginn. Leland Gooding. Emma Gonzales. George Harvey Giesa.2c Ensign F. Herman August Goff. Jr.2c Sea.3c Sea. Gaultney. Charles Clay .M.T. Michael James Givens. Paul Heino Geer. Jr.2c Sea.1c Ensign E. Duff Gordon. Jr.1c E. Kenneth Edward Gebser.1c S.M. Ralph Martin Gaver. Joseph L. Kenneth Mace Gilbert.T. Karl Anthony Gifford. Philip Robert Gebhardt.M.2c Sea.M.2c Sea.3c F. Edward Webb Sea. Joseph E. Roscoe Gibson. Warren Clayton Gilliard.C. Daryl Henry Goldwater.1c Sea. Robert Goodwin. Glenn. George Themistocles Gholston. Gilbert.2c C. George Gilbert. Quentin John Gift.1c Sea. Thomas Robert Gill.M. Thomas Jones Gaudette. William Arthur Gordon.2c R.1c FIc M.M.

Roy Arthur Grow. Harry Lee Gove. Ted Hallmark.M. Clarence James Hamilton.1c Sea. Reese Olin Griffith.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea. Harry John Ham. . Albert James Gray. Jr.M.1c F. Daniel L. Hubert Preston Hall.2c E. Samuel William Haffner.1c Ensign Sea.1c Sea. Thomas Edward Griffiths.3c Y. Arthur M.E. Robert Alfred Grissinger. Elwood R.B. Gurganus. Halloran. Joseph Adjutor Goudy.1c Sea.2c C.1c Sea. Lawrence Moore Gray.1c Sea.1c F. Richard Gunner Guisinger. William Ignatius Halterman. W.C. Granger. Robert Beryle Grosnickle.1c M. Griffin.3c Sea.2c Fld. Guttmann.Gosselin. John Rudolph Hall.M.M.M.3c Sea.1c PFC E.M.K.2c Mus.2c Sea. Claude Oliver Graham.1c PVT R. Gummerson.S.T. Edgar David Gross.P PVT Sea. Curtis Junior Haase.3c F.1c Cox F.3c SSGT PVT Sea.2c W. Allen E.2c F.2c C.Lt Sea.A F.1c Sea.M. Jesse Herbert Gusie. Wesley Ernest Grandpre. Robert Wesley Hall.M.2c A.3c R. Daniel Thornburg Griffin.1c F.3c Sea.1c Sea. William Ike Gurley.M. William Fred Guthrie. Arthur Gould.K. Arthur K.1c Sea. Glen Hubert Greene. Edwin Carrell R.2c SSGT C. Warren Wilbert Gross.2c Sea.1c 1st. Green. Joseph Herman Guy.Mus M. Rupert Clair Gowey. Robert Donald Gregoire. George Hormer Haas.M. Gullachson.1c F. Robert Emile Halvorsen.A S. Vernon Neslie Grundstrom. Harold William Hamel. Jr. Don Edgar Hamilton. Floyd Bates Haines. Milton Henry Gross. Lawrence Everett Gray. Clarence Frederick Haden.2c Sea.3c E. Lawrence J. Raymond Edward Grant. Gould. John Sherman Greenfield. Carroll Gale Greenwald. Johnnie W. William James .M.M.1c United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Helena USS Utah Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Dobbin USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Nevada Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field Hickam Field USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona . James E. Charles Norman Griffin.

Eugene Paul Hanna.M. Edward Joseph Harada. Harold Lloyd G. Carlton H. Keith Homer Harris.2c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army Civilian United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona Honolulu USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah Hickam Field USS Arizona Hickam Field Honolulu Hickam Field USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma . George Ellsworth Harris.M.1c F.1c Sea.M. Herold Aloysius Hasenfuss. Harvey Ralph Hanson.M. Dale Reuben Hammerud.1c M. Carlyle B. .C.1c C. Kisa Haughey. Russell Dean Hayden.1c F. Jack Claudius Head. Walter Lewis Hann. Charles Houston Harris.P M.M.1c Ensign Sea.F.T.3c F.1c Sea. J.2c F. Francis Leon Hansen. Harvey Linfille Hawkins.M. Curtis James Hays. Jr.P B. William E. Jr.M.M.2c W.3c Sea. James Wallace Havins.3c S. James Thomas Hasty. .3c Sea. Ai Hardin.3c PFC F. Frank Bernard Head.3c E. George Winston Hampton. David Darling Hannon.1c E. Charles Ward Harmon.M. Albert Eugene Hayes.T. Hampton. Hawkins. Max June Hartson.1c G.Y. Daniel Fletcher Harris. Alfred Hays. Jr.2c Sea.3c C. Kenneth Merle Haynes.2c S. D.3c M. George Hanson.M.M.1c F.C.1c age 54 Sea.1c Sea. Anthony . Jr. Harris. Hampton.1c B. Kenneth Jay Hartsoe.M. John Doran Hayes. James William Harris.M.E. Haverfield.3c S.2c G.3c C. Robert Joseph Harrington.1c Sea. William Holman Hamlin.A Sea.A. Peter John Harriss.1c M. John Thomas Haven. Hasl. Jr.M. Alvin Hartley. Louis Edward . William Henry Hazdovac.1c PVT G. Hugh Braddock Hartford.1c PVT age 41 PVT Sea.K.1c Mus.3c G.M. Hansen. Helmer Ansel Hanzel. Kenneth William Harker.T.M. Harr. Lonnie Moss Harveson. Hiram Dennis Harris. Charles Eugene Hargraves.2c PVT S.1c Sea. Edward Stanley . William D.Hamilton. Ted W. Noble Burnice Harris.2c Cox Cox H.F.3c Lieutenant (jg) PFC F. Ardrey Vernon Hatate.1c Q.A. Hartley.

Shirley Kinue Hiskett. Floyd Dee Hembree.1c Sea. Frank Weaver Hines.M. Hilt.1c S.1c Sea. Albert Joseph Sea. Paul Henry Heely. Paul Edward Herring.M.M.2c Bkr.3c Sea. Joseph C.3c F. Robert Yoshito Hirasaki.1c M.O Ph.3c Sea. Robert Lee Heckendorn. Elmer Orville Hicks. George Herbert.2c C. William Hitrik.C.M.3c Ptr2c age 21 F.O.M.1c A.1c SSGT PVT S.T.M.M.1c Sea. Leo Shinn Heidt.2c Sea.1c M. Merle Chester . Herber. William Walter Hendricksen. Otis Wellington Henson. Ralph Dueard Higa. Francis Colston Heavin.M.1c B. Robert Asher .1c Lieutenant (jg) S. Gerald Leroy Hellstern. Jr. Gilbert Allen Henderson. Jr. .M. Alfred Grant Heath.M. Jackie Yoneto Hirasaki.2c AS M.2c F. James Junior Herriott.M. Arthur Lee Hickok. John A.2c Sea.2c Sea. Fred Masayoshi Hildebrand.A.2c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS West Virginia USS Enterprise USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Curtiss USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona Honolulu USS California USS Arizona USS Utah USS Nevada USS California USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena Honolulu Honolulu Honolulu Honolulu USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Downes . Jimmie Lee Henry. Arvel Clay Hirasaki. Bartley Talor Hill.Headington.1c Sea.1c Sea.2c E.1c PFC F.M. Hadley Irvin Hebel.M.2c F. Jr.2c Sea. Jr. Warren Guy Hedger. Fred Albert Hilton.2c Sea. William Ed . Thomas Henderson. Robert Arnold Hickman. Jitsuo Hirasaki.W. Wilson Woodrow Hindman.2c age 8 age 48 age 3 age 2 F.3c Sea. Edwin Joseph Hillman. Francis F. Hill.M. Denis Hubert Hislop.2c M. Merritt Cameron Helton.T. Anthony Joseph Hibbard.1c G. Edward Joseph Heidt. William Francis Helm. Hesler.1c G. Harvey Christopher Herbert.2c S. Hebel.3c Sea.M.2c G. Darrel Miller Hessdorfer. Austin Henry Hess.1c PFC F. Wesley John Heim. Frank Henrichsen. Herrick.2c PVT Sea.2c G. Robert Wayne Heater. Verrel Roy Heath. Clifford Dale Hill. Jess Laxton Hedrick. Warren Paul Hicks.1c Sea.

Harvey Howard Horrocks. Edgar E.3c F. Howard David Hoelscher. Harry Randolph Holmes.2c Sea. Clyde Franklin Hughes. George Sanford Holm.P S.Hittorff. Haywood . Kenneth Laurence Holmes.2c Sea.1c PVT F. Holmes. John Emmet Houde.1c PVT CPL S. Charles Eugene Hudson.1c Mgy. Hood. James William Holzworth. Jr.1c F.M. Edwin Chester Hopkins. Leroy Hoyt. Paul Zepp Holley.3c PFC Sea.M. Edward Rhys Ensign R. Lowell D.A.1c B.M. Ralph Hollowell. Harold W.M.1c Lieutenant (jg) Cox F.1c M. Ira Duane Huff.A. Hubbard. Emery Lyle House. James William Horton. Hollenbach.SGT Sea. Joseph Earnest Hookano.1c Bkr.1c Sea. Elmo Howard. Frank A. Hubner. Claude Herbert . Earl A. John J.P F.K.1c C. George F.1c Mus. Horan. Alfred William Hudnall.P Sea.3c PVT F.G. Herbert John Hodges. William David Hosler.3c F. Frank Samuel . Kamiko Hope. Joseph Warren Holland. Darrell Robert Howell. Robert Kimball Holzhauer.1c age 35 PVT F. Clarence E.3c C.1c Sea. Chester George Horn.3c PFC S.1c PFC W.2c F. Jr.K. Hudgell. Henry Vernon Hood. Clem Raymond Housel.T.T.K. Bernard Thomas Hughes.2c C. Hrusecky. Jr. Hoag. Hoard. Hord.3c Sea. Joseph Parker . Hopkins. Charles Lewis Hryniewicz.1c Sea. Vincent M.1c PFC G. John James Howard.W. Homer David Horan.T. James Albert Horrell.M. Paul Elston Hollis. Walter Homer.1c H. Melvin Freeland Horner.3c Sea. Howard. Lester John Hoffman.T. Jr. Rolan George Howe.S.2c PVT United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Navy Civilian United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS West Virginia Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Tennessee USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field . Robert Chilton Hudson.1c Sea. Garris Vada Hodges. Robert Glenn Huffman.3c F.1c Mus.2c Cox PFC PVT Sea.

Victor Lawrence Jedrysik. Lewis Burton . Jr.2c M.A Sea.3c Lieutenant F. Wendell Ray Huval. Edwin Earl Janz. Challis Rudolph James.T.3c Sea. Donald Standly Humphrey. Hultgren. Leslie Creade Huys. Joseph Claude Ibbotson.2c age 25 Ensign Sea. Orville Adalbert Isom. Robert Melvin Hunter.1c PFC Sea.3c S. George Washington Irish. Clifford Thurston Jarding.C. Jr.G.2c S.3c F.3c E. Ingraham.2c Y. James Clynton Huie. Claydon Ignatius C. David Paul . Paul S. Izumi.C.C. Willard Hardy Hurley.M. Robert Woods Jackson.A. Ivey. Hughes. Lorentz Emanuel Hultman.T.2c Sea. Keith Jencuis. Dave Jacobson.2c PVT Ensign Cox PVT Sea.1c Y. Willie Jacobs.F. George William Jastrzemski. Jr. Hunter. Robert Fredrick Huntington.1c Sea. Robert Henry Dawson Sea.1c Cox Y.3c Sea.M. Norman Kenneth Iverson. Ira W.1c H. Richard Fredrick Jacobson. Howard Burt Inamine. William Clarence Jackson. Ivan Joseph Hux. David Archie Ingram. Joseph Herbert Jenkins. Richard Fitch Ingalls. Theodore A.1c PVT Sea.2c C. David William Jackson. Edwin Charles Jayne.2c F. Jackson.1c age 19 S. Earl Henry Iversen. Herbert Barney James.Hughes. Kenneth Lyle Jeans.2c United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Honolulu USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Honolulu USS Utah USS Arizona USS Vestal USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma Wake Island USS California Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS California USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona . William Hughes Iak. Doyne Conley Hull.2c Sea. Arthur Albert Hyde.2c Sea. Charles Andrew .2c PFC SSGT Ensign Sea.3c M.3c O.M. Henry J. John Burditt Jante.1c PVT M. Lowell Bruce Jackson. Ingalls. Joseph Jeffrey.2c Sea.T. Robert Seiko Jackson.3c F. Henry Louis Hurd.A. Marvin Austin Hughey.1c Sea.SGT F.C.1c F.3c W.3c Sea. Richard William Jacobs.1c Sea. Robert L. Robert Clement Isham.1c Sea. Luther James Iversen.2c Mus. Jeffries.3c Sea.

1c Ensign Sea. Theodore Que Jenson. Ernest Jones. Berry Stanley Jones.1c PFC Sea. Johnson. Edward Dale Johnson. Quincy Eugene Jones. Sterling Conrad Johnston.M.2c M. Homer Lloyd Jones.1c R. Jr.2c M.2c Sea. Keith Marlow Jensen. Donald D. Charles Alan Jones.2c Lieutenant Sea. Flavous B. Floyd Baxter Jones.3c CPL G.3c R. Robert Henry Johnson.1c O.Jensen. Hugh Junior Jones.2c F.M.1c Sea. Jim Hal Jolley. Fred M. Thomas Valentine E. Melvin Grant Johnson.M. Jr.1c Sea.1c Sea.2c Sea.2c M. Charles William Jones. Leland Jones.M.3c Sea.1c Sea.C.T. Johnson. Warren Allen Jones. Johnson.A. Rodney Wallace Jones. Daniel Pugh Jones.1c R.1c G.T. James Rodman Johnson.T.A. Woodrow Wilson Jordan.A.M.2c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Nevada USS Helena Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Vestal USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Downes USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Utah USS Oklahoma . Theodore K.2c Sea. Edmund Russell Johnson.M. Judd.1c F.1c PVT Sea.2c M. Calvin Wilbur Joyner.T. William Arthur Jurashen.M.T. Joseph Morris Johnson.1c Sea. Jones.2c M.M.3c PFC PVT Sea.T.M.2c Ensign Y. Willard Worth Jones. Edmon Ethmer Jones.3c Sea. Wesley Vernie Joyce.3c M.2c PVT Cox S.3c Sea.T. Albert John Juedes. Charles Homer Johnson. Carl Andreas Johnson.1c F. Harry Cecil Jones. George Edwin Jones.M.3c G. David Andrew . Julian Bethune Jordan.A. Billy James Johnson. Thomas Raymond Jones. John Russell Johnson. Olaf A. Leroy Henry Jones. Herbert C.T.3c PFC PVT Commander Cox F. Jones.2c Sea.C. Edward Watkin Jones.2c Sea. Jerry Jones. Samuel Earle Johnson.3c G.3c M. Carl Spencer Johnson. Jesse Bennett Jerrison.1c Sea. Jones. George Edward Johnson. Paul Frederick Johannes. Henry . Johann. M. Donald Walter Johnson.

Raymond Joseph Kesler.3c Sea. Jr.1c PVT PFC Ensign Mus. Jr.1c Sea.1c PVT G.2c Sea.M.A R. Warren Joseph Keninger. Charles Ermin Kim.M. Kane. Albert Utley Karabon.3c F.1c Bkr. King. George Richard Keller. Jr. Arlie Glen Keffer.1c M.1c Sea. Kent. James Dennis Kelley. Leander Cleaveland King. John Albert Katt.M. Vernon Paul Kechner.A age 23 F.E.1c PVT PVT PVT S. Henry Kampmeyer. Robert Nicholas .M. William Harrison Kerestes. Kenneth Howard Kennard.M. Billy Mack Keener. Frederick William Kinney.1c Mldr.3c F.M.M.M.2c B.S.F. Gilbert Livingston Y. Vincent John Keen. David Leland Kidd. Robert Lee Kempf. Joseph Nicholas Karli.1c age 66 SSGT age 19 PVT AS Sea. Milton Homer Kent. King. Eugene Louis Kaufman.1c Sea.2c C.1c R. Kenneth Frank Kennedy. Sanford V. King. Donald Garrett Keller.Kaelin.2c F. Howard Verne Keil.1c F.3c R.1c Q. Andrew J. Lewis Meyer King.1c Sea. Andrew King.1c Sea. .1c F. Ronald William Kieselbach. Harold Lee Kahookele.2c PFC G.1c F. Marion E.3c F. Elmer Tom Kerrigan. Ralph Henry Keith.3c Sea. Texas Thomas .M. Charles Cecil Kennington. Leo Thomas Keniston. Harry Keaton. Donald Lee Keniston. Kelley.3c G.K.2c United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Army United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Army Civilian United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Marine Corps United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy USS Utah USS Arizona Honolulu USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Vestal USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Wahiawa Hickam Field Waipahu Hickam Field USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona .2c S.M. Jr. Paul Daniel Kelley. William Henry Kennington. Isaac Campbell Kiehn.3c F. John Louis Kagarice. Joe Marion Kelley. .2c Rear Admiral M.3c Sea. David Kaiser. Robert Doyle Kimura. Orvell Vaniel . Tomaso Kinder. Wilbur Leroy Kelly.M.K. Robert Oscar Kalinowski. Eric T. Kellogg.1c C.3c C. Robert R. Gordon Blane King.1c Sea.1c Sea. Jr. Soon Chip Kimmey. Kinney.M.

Brosig Kondo. Robert Wagner Knipp. Donald Joseph Kuzee.A.2c PFC Sea. Milton Jewel .3c PFC Ensign Sea.3c PVT Cox G.M.C. Knight.1c E. Robert Rudolph Krause.3c Sea.1c S.2c W.M. William Lester Kyser. Koch.1c S. Thomas Larcy Klann.1c Sea.M. .Smth. Richard Warren Kruppa. Hans C.M.C. Lakin. Daniel Lacrosse. Adolph Louis Kubinec.M. Kramb.M.2c B. Edward Klasing. Willard Dale La Verne. John J. John Anthony Kovar.2c Sea. Jr. Robert Paul Lake.2c Sea. Wilbur Albert Kirkpatrick. James Albert Kraker.3c G.2c C.C. La Rue. Harry Wellington Kramer.3c Cox Sea. Donald Lapier Lakin.O Sea. Jr. George Samuel Lamons. Albert Joseph Kosec.1c age 25 S. Robert Kozelek. Joseph Jordan Lamb.1c Sea.Kirchhoff.M.3c PFC Sea.1c F. Stanley Kusie. Max Sam Kruger. Clarence D. John Ervin . Verne Francis Knubel.M.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona Honolulu USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Enterprise USS Arizona Midway Island NAS USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia Schofield Barracks USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona Red Hill USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS California .1c F.C.2c Sea.1c F.M.2c H. Roderick Otto Knight.3c Sea. Herman Oliver Kohl.3c PVT F.M. Henry E.1c M.1c G.3c F. Jr. Kleist. Fred Joseph Krissman. La France.1c Captain S.M.2c Q. James Henry Kramb. Otto C.2c G. Koeppe. William Richard La Mar.1c Sea. Leonard Joseph Krahn. Ernest George Kvalnes.1c age 19 C.1c F.1c C.A B. T. Kolajajck. Conrad Kukuk. George Willard La Salle.1c R.3c R. Robert Edwin Klopp. Ralph B. D.1c E. Jr.M. Francis Lawrence Klubertanz. William August Klein.F. Donald J.3c Sea. John David Kramer. Edward Koichi Konnick.S. Kvidera. Laderach. Walter Ernest Koenekamp. Kenneth Taft Lancaster. Chester Fredrick Kline. Howard Helgi Kula.M.2c Sea. William Paul Kujawa.C.K. John Thomas Sea. William .1c Sea.

1c F. Lionel W.M.1c Ensign SGT B.T. Daniel Edward A.1c F.1c age 21 PVT F.3c F. Jr. Neil Stanley Libolt.1c A.2c PVT Cox R. Clarence William Lipple. Lindsay.2c F.2c Bkr. Gordon Ellsworth Lincoln. Edward Stephen Lawrence. Isaac William Lee.1c CPL C.A. John Goldie Legros.3c Sea. Sherman Lewis. Henry John Larsen.3c M. Malcolm Hedrick Leight.2c F. Bleecker Laurie.2c Sea. John William Lindsay. Donald C. John Earl Lewis.G.1c PFC S. Wayne Alman Lewison.M.1c Sea. John Anthony Lisenby. Thomas Francis Lee. Richard Charles Langenwalter. Frank J.3c Sea. Joseph Sam L. Leopold.1c Sea. Myron Kenneth Leigh.2c Sea.3c Mus. Lewis.2c Sea. Elmer Patterson Lawson.3c CPL G. James Webster Lemire. Lightfoot. Willard Irvin Leary.M.F.T. Mancel Curtis Lange. Gerald George Lehman. Lanouette.2c PVT E.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Kaneohe NAS EWA MCAS USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field USS California Schofield Barracks USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona .3c F. James Mitchell Lindsey. Lango.K.T.K.C.C. George Edward Lipe. Leonard Carl Lattin. Harold William Lindsley. Edward Wallace Lane.1c Sea. Theodore J. Lee.2c Sea. Henry Lloyd Lee.3c R. Jr. Orville J. Lesmeister.M.M. George G.2c S.2c PFC Sea. Carroll Volney . V.M.M. James E.W. Robert Lawrence Lepper.3c F. Leslie.P PFC PFC S. Elliott Deen Larson. Frank Levine.M. Leedy.1c Sea. Jr. Lane.M. James I. Charles Lawrence. Roy Elmer . Lewis. James Joseph .M. John Herbert Linton. Johnnie Cornelius Lawrence.1c S. Steve Louie Levar.Landman. Edmond Brayton Lescault. Larsen.F.1c F. Joseph McNeil Lehman. Lester H. Henry Landry.2c B. Wilbur Thomas Lipke.2c Cox Sea. Worth Ross Linbo.M. David Alonzo Leggett.M.1c F.2c G.3c G.3c C.

Clarence M.M. Tai Chung Lopes.2c S. Octavius Macy. John Grubbs .E.P Sea. Andres Franquez Mafnas. Gerald James Magers.M.2c F.K. Thomas William Loustanau.M.K.2c S.1c F.F.2c Sea. Vernon Thomas Luker. Arthur John Mafnas. Loebach.2c PFC Sea.2c PFC Sea.3c Sea. James Robert .2c PVT C.P Sea.1c M.1c F.K.2c Sea.C. Lounsbury. Lyon. James Edward Long.Y.3c Sea.2c age 19 age 33 PVT Sea. Ernest Burton Lynch. Frank Crook Lovshin. Adolph John Lohman. Jr. Benjamin Franklin Long. Frank Stuart Lomibao.1c Lieutenant (jg) Sea.A.Lish. John Stanley Malson. Neil Jermiah Luke.M. Eugene Victor Little.3c S. Howard Scott Malatak.T. Lockwood. Wayne Nicholas Livingston.M. Charles Bernard Love. Jr. George Jay Mus. Jr.3c age 14 United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian Civilian United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy Civilian USS West Virginia USS Utah USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Vestal Pearl Harbor Honolulu Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Nevada Hickam Field EWA MCAS USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Honolulu . Royle Bradford Luna.2c S.T.T.2c M. William Edward . Lawrence P. James Edward Lunsford.T. William Joseph . Frank Edward Malek.3c PVT Sea. Joseph Malecki. Mabine. Jr. William Joseph Lowe.2c Sea.T. Thomas Samuel Maddox. .3c PVT M. Earl Wynne Lomax. Marciano London. . Lynch.1c G. Alfred Eugene Livingston. Jr. Jack Leon Luntta.M. Harry Lynn Manganelli. Howard N. Algeo Victor Malinowski.1c Sea.3c Sea.1c S. Harry W. John Kallervo Lusk. Lock. Lutschan.A. Raymond Edward Livers. Kenneth Lee Lynch. Emmett Isaac Lynch.Y.3c Sea. Raymond Dudley Madrid.S.1c M.2c Sea. III. Luzier. Lucey.2c F. Livers.1c age 59 C. Francisco Reyes Magee. Donald William Lynch.1c PVT SGT M.T.1c F. Richard E. Robert S. Guy Edward Loo. Michael Malfante. Peter Souza Lord. Douglas A. Arnold Eugene Lyons.1c Mus.A.T.1c Ensign O.1c W. Carl Robert Loveland.1c C.P Sea.2c G.

John Winter Martin. Jesus Manalisay Mathein.M.2c G. Elwood Henry Markley.2c M.1c 2nd. James Albert Martin.O Sea. Howard Ellis Manion. Marsh. Harell K.2c PFC W.3c G. Edward Paul Manley. Marvin William Mayo.C.M.2c Cox Ensign Sea. Henri Clay Massey. Maurice Mata. Rex Haywood McAbee.2c Mus.2c R. Hugh Lee Martin.3c Sea. Benjamin Raymond . William Arthur Marshall. Byron Dalley Mason. Rudolph Machado Marze. Mattox. Martin.M.3c Sea. Jr.2c Sea. McAllen.M.1c W.1c Sea.M.T.1c F. John Scott F. Thomas Donald Marshall.3c 1st.1c S. Charles Willis Mann. Urban Herschel Marsh.2c E.A. Manlove.Lt Sea.SGT E. Carl Mastrototaro. Vernon Merferd Mattox. Robert Francis Marinich.M.M. Steve Matt Maris.2c Sea.2c A. Harold Richard Mathison. George Frederick Mayfield.C. Cleburne E.2c United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS California USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Downes USS Arizona USS Utah USS Nevada Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Utah USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Shaw . Frazier Mayfield. Donald Joseph Matney.2c Sea.3c F. Leroy Manning. Milburn Alex Manning. James Edward Mastel. William E. Luster Lee Martin. Dale Lewis Martin.1c SSGT G. Mann.A.T. .2c Cox Sea. Louis Eugene Maybee.2c PFC Sea.C.1c Bmkr. Andrew Michael Mason. Martinez. Charles Harris Mathison. Arthur Cleon Mann.M.1c M.3c E.1c SGT 1st.T.T. George M. William Earl .3c F. Joseph Henry Marlow.2c F.2c S.1c PFC A.T.C.1c F.SGT Y. Herbert Benjamin Martin.1c F.3c Ph. James Orrwell Martin. John H. Martin.3c Sea. Jr.C. Jr. William Edward Manning. John Andrew Marshall. Lester Ellsworth Mayo.M.Manges.M. William H.1c Y.1c Sea.M. Clyde Harold Masters. Joseph Keith May. Wallace R. Dayton Monroe Masterson. James Durant Maule. Robert Harold Marling.M.3c B. Walter Benjamin Manske.1c Sea.1c AS Sea.

T. John Charles McClelland.1c PFC CPL M. Louis Meares. McCarrens. Samme Willie Genes McGraw.1c Sea.2c Sea. Lawrence Jennings McComas. Donald F.T.A. Sea. Herbert E.1c Y.1c Sea.2c Sea.T.McBee. James Oliver McFaddin. Means. George V.1c M.M. Stanley A. Herbert Hugo Meno. Durward A. John Morgan Medlen.2c Ensign PFC F.2c F.1c Ensign M.3c M.T.1c PVT Sea.C.1c F.1c Sea.2c Sea.T. Merrill.A.1c B. James Francis McCary.A. John Blair McQuade.2c F.1c Sea.1c age 43 CPL Sea. Harvey Manford McCollom.2c B. Lloyd Elden McLeod.M.1c G. Joseph Alford Meglis. John Russell Mendiola. Clarence William McCutcheon. Warren Harrell McDonald.1c S.C. Horace Arthur Meyers.2c M. Dencil Jeoffrey McIntosh. Harry George McKee. Earl Rudolph Melton. Joseph .1c Sea.A Sea. McGuire.2c SGT Sea. Michael Martin McLaughlin.W.K.A. McLaughlin. James Jacob McCloud.1c S. Clyde Clifton McMurtrey. Bert Eugene McKinnie. George Melton.2c CPL F. McPherson. Hale McKosky.2c C. Robert Cameron Meadows.1c Sea. Quentin Guy McKeenan.T. Victor L.1c Sea. Sr.1c M. Donald Robert McClung.T.1c Sea.T. Edwin Bonner McCabe. Edward L. John Anthony Melsen. Meagher. Herbert Franklin Melton.T. McMeans. Lawrence James McGhee. Enrique Castro Menefee. Russell McKissack. John Breckenridge McIntosh.M.T. William Moore McClafferty.A. Francis Raymond McHughes. Howard Deal Messam.2c Sea.2c Cox PFC Ensign PFC PVT United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army United States Army USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma Honolulu USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS West Virginia USS Maryland USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS California USS California USS Arizona USS Shaw Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona Ft Kamehameha USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Enterprise USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field .1c W. Stanley Paul Merithew.M. Joe Otis McGrady. Luther Kirk McCabe.2c Ensign M. Lester Fred McGlasson.2c Sea. William W.T.T. McGuckin. Vicente Gogue Menzenski. Thomas Alfred McClintock. James Austin Menges.M. Aaron L.1c Sea.

Michael, Charles O. Micheletto, Carlo Anthony Middleswart, John Franklin Migita, Torao Milbourne, Jesse Keith Miles, Archie Theodore Miles, Oscar Wright Miller, Chester John Miller, Doyle Allen Miller, Forrest Newton Miller, George Stanley Miller, J. B. Delane Miller, Jessie Zimmer Miller, John David Miller, Marvin Eugene Miller, William Cicero Miller, William Oscar Milligan, Weldon Harvey Milner, James William Mims, Robert Lang Minear, Richard J. , Jr. Minix, Orville Ray Minter, James Dewey Mirello, Bernard Joseph Mister, Joe Eddie Mitchell, Edwin N. Mitchell, John G. Mitchell, Wallace Gregory Mlinar, Joseph Molpus, Richard Preston Monroe, Donald Montgomery, Charles Andrew Montgomery, Robert E. Montgomery, Wallace Alford Montgomery, William A. Moody, Robert Edward Moore, Clyde Carson Moore, Douglas Carlton Moore, Fred Kenneth Moore, James Carlton Moorhead, Lionel Jay Moorhouse, William Starks Moorman, Russell Lee Moran, George A. Morgan, Wayne Morgareidge, James Orries Morincelli, Edo Morley, Eugene Elvis Morrell, Elmer R. Morris, Emmett Edloe Morris, Owen Newton Morris, William Francis Morrison, Earl Leroy Morrissey, Edward Francis Morse, Edward Charles

Lt.Cmdr SGT PFC PVT AS M.M.2c Sea.1c F.2c Cox C.E.M.P Sea.1c Cox Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.2c R.M.1c S.M.3c Sea.1c F.1c Sea.1c PFC Sea.1c Sea.2c Sea.1c M.A.T.T.1c CPL CPL Sea.1c Cox C.M.Smth.P M.A.T.T.2c R.M.3c Sea.2c M.M.2c G.M.3c Sea.1c R.M.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c S.F.3c PFC Mus.2c Sea.2c PVT Sea.1c F.2c M.M.2c F.2c PFC CPL Sea.1c F.1c Sea.1c PFC Sea.2c

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USS Utah EWA MCAS USS Oklahoma Schofield Barracks USS Curtiss USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Tennessee USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Enterprise USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena USS California USS California USS West Virginia Hickam Field Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS California USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona Midway Island NAS Hickam Field USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona

Morse, Francis Jerome Morse, George Robert Morse, Norman Roi Moser, Joseph G. Moslener, Louis Gustav , Jr. Moss, Tommy Lee Mostek, Francis Clayton Moulton, Gordon Eddy Mrace, Albin John Muhofski, Joseph Alexander Mulick, John Mark Muncy, Claude Murdock, Charles Luther Murdock, Melvin Elijah Murphy, James Palmer Murphy, James Joseph Murphy, Jessie Huell Murphy, Thomas J. , Jr. Myers, Clair Clifton Myers, James Gernie Myers, Ray Harrison Naasz, Erwin H. Nadel, Alexander Joseph Naegle, George Eugene Naff, Hugh Kenneth Nagamine, Masayoshi Nail, Elmer Denton Nash, Paul Andrews Nations, James Garland Nations, Morris Edward Naylor, J. D. Neal, Tom Dick Necessary, Charles Raymond Needham, La Verne J. Neher, Don Ocle Neipp, Paul Nelles, Joseph F. Nelson, Harl Coplin Nelson, Henry Clarence Nelson, Lawrence Adolphus Nelson, Marlyn Wayne Nelson, Richard Eugene Nermoe, Earl Tilman Neuendorf, William F. , Jr. Neuenschwander, Arthur C. Nevill, Sam Douglas Newman, Laxton Gail Newton, Paul Eugene Newton, Wayne Edward Newton, Wilbur Francis Nichols, Alfred Rose Nichols, Bethel Allan Nichols, Carl Nichols, Clifford Leroy Nichols, Harry Ernest

B.M.1c Sea.2c W.T.2c PVT 2nd.Lt M.A.T.T.2c PFC F.1c W.T.2c R.M.3c H.A.1c M.M.2c W.T.1c W.T.2c F.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c S.K.1c Sea.1c S.K.1c Sea.2c S.F.2c Mus.2c Sea.1c Sea.2c age 27 F.1c F.C.1c F.C.2c CPL S.M.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c CPL E.M.3c Sea.2c PFC Sea.1c B.M.1c C.T.C.P F.2c F.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c G.M.1c Y.3c A.M.M.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.2c T.C.1c S.K.3c

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USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Pennsylvania USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Helena Honolulu USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Nevada USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma Kaneohe NAS USS West Virginia USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma

Nichols, Louis Duffie Nicholson, Glen Eldon Nicholson, Hancel Grant Nicoles, Frank Edward Nides, Thomas James Nielsen, Arnold Madsen Nielsen, Floyd Theadore Nigg, Laverne Alious Nightingale, Joe Raymond Nix, Charles Edward Noce, Emile Salvatore Nolatubby, Henry Ellis Noonan, Robert Harold Norman, Donald Charles Norman, Orris Nate Northway, William M. Norvelle, Alwyn Berry Nowosacki, Theodore Lucian Nusser, Raymond Alfred Nye, Frank Erskine O'Brien, Joseph Bernard O'Bryan, George David O'Bryan, Joseph Benjamin O'Connor, Maurice Michael O'Grady, Camillus M. O'Neall, Rex Eugene O'Neill, William Thomas , Jr. Ochoski, Henry Francis Oda, Yaeko Lillian Odgaard, Edwin Nelson Off, Virgil Simon Offutt, William H. Ogle, Charles Ralph Ogle, Victor Willard Oglesby, Lonnie Harris Ohashi, Frank Ohta, Hayako Ohta, Janet Yumiko Ohta, Kiyoko Olds, Clifford Nathan Oliver, Raymond Brown Olsen, Edward Kern Olsen, Eli Olson, Glen Martin Ornellas, Barbara June Ornellas, Gertrude Orr, Dwight Jerome Orr, Willard C. Orwick, Dean Baker Orzech, Stanislaus Joseph Osborne, Mervin Eugene Ostrander, Leland Grimstead Ott, Peter Dean Otterstetter, Carl William Outland, Jarvis Godwin

Sea.2c E.M.3c Sea.1c F.1c E.M.1c B.M.1c C.M.3c Sea.2c Sea.1c S.M.3c E.M.2c PFC Sea.1c Sea.2c F.2c PVT C.S.K.A Ensign G.M.3c Sea.1c PFC F.C.3c F.C.3c M.M.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Ensign G.M.2c age 6 E.M.2c Sea.1c CPL F.1c Sea.2c Sea.2c age 29 age 19 age 3 months age 21 F.1c Sea.1c Ensign S.K.3c Sea.2c age 8 age 16 Sea.1c PFC R.M.2c Sea.2c F.1c Ph.M.3c Sea.1c Sea.2c F.1c

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USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Utah Hickam Field USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona EWA USS Utah USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Honolulu Honolulu Honolulu Honolulu USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Honolulu Honolulu USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Oklahoma

Overley, Lawrence Jack Owen, Fredrick Halden Owens, James Patrick Owens, Richard Allen Owsley, Alphard Stanley Owsley, Arnold Jacob Owsley, Thomas Lea Pace, Amos Paul Pace, Joseph Wilson Pace, Millard Clarence Paciga, Walter Joseph Palides, James , Jr. Palmer, Calvin Harry Palmer, Wilferd Dewey Pang, Harry Tuck Lee Paolucci, James Alfred Paradis, George Lawrence Parker, Elmer Anthony Parker, Isaac Parker, June Winton Parkes, Harry Edward Parks, Chester Lloyd Paroli, Peter John Patterson, Clarence Rankin Patterson, Elmer Marvin Patterson, Harold Lemuel Patterson, Richard , Jr. Paulmand, Hilery Pavini, Bruno Pawlowski, Raymond Paul Payne, Kenneth Morris Peak, Robert Hopkins Pearce, Alonzo , Jr. Pearce, Dale Ferrell Pearson, Norman Cecil Pearson, Robert Stanley Peavey, William Howard Peck, Eugene Edward Peckham, Howard William Pedrotti, Francis James Peery, Max Valdyne Peleschak, Michael Peltier, John Arthur Pence, John Wallace Pendarvis, George E. Pennington, Raymond Penny, Russell M. Pensyl, John Campbell Pentico, Walter Ray Penton, Howard Lee Penuel, George Ames , Jr. Pepe, Stephen Perdue, Charles Fred Perkins, George Ernest Perry, Forrest Hurbert

F.C.2c Sea.2c R.M.3c S.K.2c E.M.3c Sea.1c S.C.2c B.M.1c R.M.3c F.1c Sea.2c Mus.2c Sea.2c Sea.2c age 30 Sea.2c Ph.M.3c C.S.K.P M.A.T.T.3c Q.M.3c B.M.1c Sea.1c Bkr.3c PFC C.K.2c Sea.1c S.F.3c O.S.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c PVT Sea.1c Sea.2c Sea.2c F.1c Q.M.2c Sea.2c F.2c PVT Sea.2c Sea.1c E.M.3c R.M.3c F.3c PVT PVT G.M.2c Sea.2c Sea.1c B.M.2c W.T.1c S.F.1c F.1c S.C.3c

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USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS California USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Helena USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Utah

Perry, Hal H. , Jr. Peterson, Albert H. , Jr. Peterson, Elroy Vernon Peterson, Hardy Wilbur Peterson, Roscoe Earl Pettit, Charles Ross Petway, Wiley James Petyak, John Joseph Petz, Robert Albert Phelps, George Edward Philbin, James Richard Philipsky, Thomas F. Phillips, James William Phillips, Milo Elah Phipps, James Norman Piasecki, Alexander Louis Pierce, Sidney Pietzsch, Jay E. Pike, Harvey Lee Pike, Lewis Jackson Pinkham, Albert Wesley Pinko, Andrew Anthony Pirtle, Gerald Homer Piskuran, Rudolph Victor Pitcher, Jack Arthur Pitcher, Walter Giles Pitts, Lewis William , Jr. Plant, Donald D. Platschorre, Daniel P. Poindexter, Herbert J. , Jr. Ponder, Walter Howard Pool, Elmer Leo Poole, Ralph Ernest Porterfield, Robert Kirk Portillo, Damian Maraya Posey, Frank S. E. Post, Darrell Albert Povesko, George Powell, Jack Speed Powell, Raymond E. Powell, Thomas George Powell, William J. Power, Abner Franklin Powers, Joe O`Neil Powers, Roy Wallace Powloski, Daniel J. Presson, Wayne Harold Prewitt, Brady Oliver Pribble, Robert Lamb Price, Arland Earl Price, George Franklin Price, George Price, John A. Pride, Lewis Bailey , Jr. Pritchett, Robert Leo , Jr.

PVT F.C.3c F.C.2c F.C.3c Sea.2c C.R.M.P B.M.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c PFC Sea.1c W.T.1c Sea.2c CPL R.M.3c 2nd.Lt E.M.3c Sea.1c Sea.2c E.M.3c F.1c Sea.2c Sea.1c G.M.1c Sea.2c PVT Sea.2c Sea.1c M.M.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c A.M.M.3c S.C.1c TSGT C.M.M.A Sea.1c PFC TSGT Sea.1c M.A.T.T.2c PVT S.K.3c S.F.2c PVT Sea.1c Sea.2c F.C.3c R.M.2c F.1c PVT SSGT Ensign Sea.1c

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Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Enterprise Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS California Wheeler Field USS Shaw USS Oklahoma USS Utah USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Pennsylvania Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Helena USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona

Przybysz, Alexsander J. Puckett, Edwin Lester Pue, Jasper Langley , Jr. Pugh, John , Jr. Pullen, Roy Alfred Pummill, Nolan Eugene Putnam, Avis Boyd Puzio, Edward Quarto, Mike Joseph Quinata, Jose Sanchez Quirk, Edward Joseph Racisz, Edward Stanley Radford, Neal Jason Rae, Allen G. Raimond, Paul Smith Rainbolt, John Thomas Rall, Richard Redner Rasmussen, Arthur Severin Rasmussen, Warren D. Rasmusson, George Vernon Ratkovich, William Rawhouser, Glen Donald Rawson, Clyde Jackson Ray, Eldon Casper Ray, Harry Joseph Reagan, Dan Edward Reaves, Casbie Rector, Clay Cooper Reece, John Jeffris Reed, Frank Edward Reed, James Buchanan , Jr. Reed, Ray Ellison Reeves, Thomas J. Regan, Leo Basil Register, Paul James Reid, George Beard Reid, William Henry Reinhold, Rudolph Herbert Renner, Albert Restivo, Jack Martin Reuss, Herman C. Reynolds, Earl Arthur Reynolds, Jack Franklyn Rhodes, Birb Richard Rhodes, Mark Alexander Rhodes, William T. Rice, Irvin Franklin Rice, William Hurst Rice, William Albert Rice, Wilson Albert Rich, Claude Edward Rich, Porter Leigh Richar, Raymond Lyle Richardson, Warren John Richey, Joseph L.

Prt.2c S.K.3c F.3c S.F.3c Sea.2c M.M.2c S.C.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c M.A.T.T.2c F.1c Sea.1c Mus.2c PVT Sea.1c F.1c Lieutenant (jg) C.M.1c SGT F.3c W.T.1c F.3c B.M.1c S.K.3c B.M.2c F.1c Sea.1c S.K.3c Sea.2c S.F.3c S.K.1c Sea.2c W.O W.T.1c Lt.Cmdr S.F.1c F.1c PVT F.2c Y.2c TSGT Sea.2c Sea.1c F.2c Sea.1c PFC R.M.3c G.M.3c Sea.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c W.T.2c Sea.1c Cox Ensign

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USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS California USS Downes USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Shaw USS California USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Shaw USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona Camp Malakole USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Vestal USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California

Anson E.2c F.1c Sea. Eugene Joseph Rowell.1c B.1c PVT O.T.1c R.M.C.2c R. Francisco Unpingoo Roach. Walter Boone Rogness.1c S.1c Sea. Raymond Arthur Rodgers. Russell Clyde Robbins.1c Sea. Edgar . Wilburn Carle Roberts. Joseph Carel Rowe.3c Sea.1c PVT F. Jr. Earl Reed Roberts. William Fraser Rouse.2c Sea.1c Sea.T. Leonard Claiver Rico.Richey.M.2c Sea.1c Cox Sea.2c M.M. Jr.1c United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Tennessee USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona . Clyde .M.2c R. William Nicholas 1st.1c Sea.1c Sea. Alfred Aaron Ross. Frank Malcom Royals. Halvor E. Dwight Fisk Roberts.W.M. Edwin Herbert Rivera. McClellan Taylor Roberts.3c S. Eugene Oscar Roehm.F.1c C. Albert Wallace Richter.F.1c B. Fred Louis Richter.3c M.2c Sea.2c M. Donald Roger Romero.2c E.P F. Chester Clay Rose. Romano. David Joseph Ripley. James William Robinson. Guadalupe Augustine Riddell.M.A. Eugene Edward Ridenour.A.1c Sea.3c Sea.1c Ph.M. Simon Rombalski. James Henry Robinson. Fred Riggins.Ph. Melvin Lenord Rose.A.3c M.3c Sea. John Dayton Roe. Robert Warren Robison.2c C.2c Sea.C. William Francis Robertson. Deane Lundy Ross. Ronning. Kenneth Franklin Roberts. Gerald Herald Riley. Thomas Sprugeon Rogers.1c Sea.T. Harry Turner Roesch.1c Sea.3c Cox M.P R.T.M.M. Joe Boyce Ross.2c Sea.Lt G. Robert M.M. Howard Arthur Rosenbery. Joseph Morris Robinson. Orval Albert Rosenthal. Walter Scott . John James Robinson.M.1c M. Riganti. James Milton Robertson.2c G.2c S. Vladimir M.M.T.M. Richison. Harold Thomas Robinson.T.2c Sea.1c Sea. Mark Clifton Roby.2c Sea.T.1c Sea.M. Roberts. Harold William Rogers.3c Sea. Emil Oliver Root.1c Bkr. Ernest Claude Rosenau. Jr.1c Sea. Roberts. Robertson.

1c Ensign Sea.1c Sea.3c R. Orville Lester Rushford. Glenn Dawain Sampson. Kenneth Harlan Sampson.1c Sea. George Albert Schick. Joseph John Russell.2c PFC F.1c Sea. William Jacob Schoonover. James Harvey Sanford. William Rhinehart Schiller. Sherley Rolland Sandall. Lyal Jackson Savage.1c Lieutenant (jg) F.M. Benjamin Schleifer.M.K.3c S.H. Dale Andrew Ryan. Frank Willard Rozar.B.1c Sea.Royer.3c W. Cecil Roy Ruggerio.2c Sea.1c R.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c F.M.1c F.2c Pmkr.1c E.3c F. Roman Walter Saffell. Filomeno Sather.1c Mus. Joseph Scheuerlein. Charles Louis Savage.M.3c C.M. Tom Savinski.M. John Frank Rozmus. Benjamin Nelson Russett. Elmer Pershing Schmersahl.2c R.3c E.C. Nicholas Ruse. Louis Schleiter. Andrew James Schneider. Morris Franklin Sahl.M.1c R.M.3c Y.M.F. Robert L. William Ford Saulsbury. John Edwin Savin. George R.M.M.3c Sea. Herman Schmidt. Ernest Schlect.1c PFC Bkr.M. Paul Edd Schdowski.M. John Peter Ruttan. Joseph Stanley Ruddock.2c Sea. William Runckel. Robert Gleason Runiak.P AS Ph.C.1c C. Jr. Merrill Keith Sanders. USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS California USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam (B-17) USS Arizona USS Curtiss Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Arizona . Theodore Hilliard Saunders. Charles Lee Rush.1c SGT G. Walter Fay Schlund. Aloysius Herman Schmitz.M. Schmidt.3c Bug. Dean Stanley Sanders.1c M.3c 1st. Savidge. Arthur William Rutkowski.2c C. Edmund Thomas Sadlowski. Harold Arthur G.3c O. Thomas Steger Santos. Howard Dale Royse.P Ensign Mus. Schrank. Michael Saylor.1c G. Harvey George Ruskey.1c PFC Ph.Lt Sea. Walter Samuel .1c M.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Shaw NAVAL HOSP P.3c Sea. Eugene Thomas Sanderson.M.2c Sea.M. John Harry Schott. Vernon Joseph Schmitt.1c F.2c F.T. Richard Perry Rusher.2c Sea.

Jack Leo Seaman. A. Harold Hugh Scott.3c F.M.M.1c M. Robert R. Irland .1c Ensign Sea.Schroeder.M. Shouse.1c G. Robert O. . Donald Robert Shaw. Everett Iven Sevier. William Lawrence Severinson. Gordon Eshom Shive. Sherman.M. Jesse Simensen.M.M. Marvin John Sibley. Chester Ernest Sederstrom. Lewis Purdie Shattuck.M. Crawford Edward Scott. Jr.2c S.1c F.1c Sea. Sheffer.2c F. Shannon.1c Sea. John Schwarting.1c F. Richard Stanton Shields.2c M. William F.C. Jr. Schurr.1c PFC PFC S. Erwin Leroy Seaton.K. William Garfield Silva. Robert Raymond Scruggs. Malcolm Holman Shively.2c Sea.T. George Harrison Scott.M.3c Sea. Paul Eugene Shimer. Ralph Edward Scott.K. Scott. William Kenneth Shanahan. William Howard Silvey. Harry Robert Sharon. Edward Judson Shelly.3c M.2c E.2c Sea.1c PVT Sea.3c PVT R.1c PFC R. Henry Schuman.2c 2nd.2c G.M. Richard Martin .1c E.1c Sea. Verdi Delmore Seeley.1c S. William Alfred Sharbaugh.2c S.1c Sea.1c G. Russell Lewis Sidell.M. Russell Otto Searle. Jr.1c Sea. George William Scott. Melvin Irvin Shive. Delmar Dale Sidders.3c Sea. J.M. Robert K.A. Herman Lincoln Schuon.T.2c Sea. John Henry Silva.1c F.1c Mus.1c G.3c F.2c M.1c Sea.2c SGT Y. Sherrill. Harold Ely Shiley. George Robert Shelden.1c Mus.1c Mus. Shiffman. Benjamin Franklin Shook. Henson Taylor Shugart.1c Sea. Charles Clifton Shafer.1c S. Jr. William Eugene Sellon.F. Russell K. Bernard Oliver Scott.M. Herbert C. Shaum.M.2c Sea. Warren Joseph Sherven. Clyde Donald Shaw.Lt United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Utah USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Downes USS Arizona USS Arizona .1c Sea.F. Carleton Elliott B. William James . Shelby Charles Shores. Scilley.2c PFC Sea.1c Sea.

T.C.1c PFC S.1c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy USS California USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah Hickam Field USS Tennessee USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma Wahiawa USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Shaw USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Nevada . Merle Andrew Smith. James Fredrick Sorensen.Simmons.1c Sea.2c Sea. John Edward Smith. Ralph Stanley Smith.2c Sea. Spear.M. Herman Alder M.1c S.1c Cox Ensign R. Charley Jackson . Jack G. Charles Braxton South.A. Eugene Skiles. Joseph B. Walter Hamilton Simpson.M.3c Sea.2c Sea.T.C. Leonard Ferdnay Smith.1c G. John B. James Cleve Soma. George David Smartt.2c Sea. Robert Daniel Smith.1c Sea.1c M. Martin Rueben Smalley.2c Sea.A. Richard Masaru Sooter. Jack Bertrand Soens. Marvin Ray Smith. Lloyd George Smith.2c Sea. Smart. Harold Mathias Solar.2c CPL S. Eugene Mitchell Skeen.1c Sea. Elmer W.T. Skiles.1c PFC Sea.1c M. Joseph Gillespie Smestad. Walter Henry Solomon.M. Gordon Ellsworth Smith.K.1c G.2c Sea.1c S. Frank Leroy Simmons.1c S. Jr.1c W.F. Smith.2c Sea. Edward Smith. Spaeth. Luther Kent Smith.1c E.3c Ensign PFC Sea.M. Gerald Owen Smith.1c Sea.3c Sea. Johnnie Herbert Spangler.2c Lieutenant (jg) F. Smith. Garold Leroy Slapikas.M.M.M.1c Sea. Harvey Leroy Skiles. Edward Frank Sletto.1c PVT Sea.1c Mus.1c age 22 R.A. Keith Vodden Smith.3c M. Halge Hojem Smith. Earl Clifton Slifer.1c B.3c PVT M.1c Sea. Harry Smith. Adolfo Sollie. George Randolph Smith. Smith. Jr. Roland Hampton Smith.T.K.2c Sea. South. George J.1c Sea.2c PVT Sea. Earl .M. Earl Walter Smith. Holger Earl Sousley. Albert Eugene Skaggs.T. Maurice Verdon Sparks. Walter Tharnel Sniff. John A. Mack Lawrence Smith. Tceollyar Simon.T. Harry E. Albert Joseph Smith. Orville Stanley Smith.2c Sea.T.1c Sea. Smith.

Thomas Lester Stief.1c S. Staton.2c PFC M. Maurice J. Jr. Charles E.1c Sea. Ulis Claude Steffan.1c M. Morris E.2c Cox Sea. Stewart. Stewart.3c C.M. Merle Joe Spencer. Everett R. Robert Lawrence Springer. Otis Delaney Sterns. Stockman. Leo Staples. Harold William Stockton. Kirby Roy Starkovich. Gerald Fay Stockdale. . James Stovall.A PFC F.M.1c Sea.B.3c Y.1c E.3c Sea.2c F. Donald Alfred Stout. Joseph Spotz.2c F. Louis S.3c S.F.A. Sterling. Maurice Edwin Spreeman.3c United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) USS West Virginia USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Curtiss USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field Wheeler Field USS California USS Arizona USS California Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada Hickam Field USS Downes USS Utah .C.A.M. Delbert James Sperling.1c F. Richard Patt Strange.C.2c Ensign F.2c Sea. Charles M. Theodore R.1c Sea.1c PVT Sea.1c Ensign Sea.1c 2nd. Alfred Parker Steely. Woodrow Wilson Stephenson. Strickland.C. Jr.1c PVT Sea. Charles Harold St Germain. Lester Leroy Stein. William Edison Stopyra.T. Carey K.2c PVT F. Merton Iran Stapleton. Jr.T. Jr.3c Sea. Paul L.T. Joseph . James E. . Floyd D.1c Sea. . Stevenson.T.1c E. Stoddard.1c F. Gerald Victor E.M.M.C.2c PVT Sea. Charles Orval Stratton. Stillings.1c R.Speicher.M. Stacey. Joseph Philip Steigleder.2c PVT SGT Sea. Louis Alton Stockwell.M.1c A.1c G. Jr.Lt M.1c Sea.2c Sea. Samuel Cyrus Steinhoff. Walter Claude Steiner. Stevens. Gordon William Stallings.3c F. Gordon H.M. Perry William Strinz. George Joseph Stephens. Strickland.1c F.1c B.1c F.M.1c Sea.M.3c M. Frank Jake Stewart. Ernest Edward Spence. Laun Lee Stott. Stafford.2c PFC S. Robert Thomas Stouten. Julian John Storm. Charles Starkovich. Hugh Donald Sterling.M. Staudt. Lloyd Delroy Stembrosky. John Raymond Strickland. Frank William . Kermit Braxton Stapler. Jack Hazelip Stevens.

Allen Ray Temple. James Takao Talbert.2c age 34 CPL age 20 Sea.C.2c F.1c S.1c Sea.Suggs.3c M. George Woodrow Swanson. Theodore Stephen Szematowicz.1c Fld.1c Sea. Charles Robert Taylor.M.1c S.T.F. William Alfred Sullivan. Antonio S. Henry Szabo.1c Sea.K. Terhune. Charles Benton Taylor.2c M. Terrell.1c 1st. Stanley Horace Thomas.1c PFC F.Lt O. Monroe Temples. .3c M. Harold Edgar Sumner.2c G. Lambert Ray Targ.1c PVT C.1c United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Marine Corps (Reserve) United States Army United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Army Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy USS Arizona Ft Kamehameha USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam (Ft Weaver) USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS California USS West Virginia EWA Hickam Field Honolulu USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Shaw USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona .3c C.1c M.M.M. John Taylor. Robert Denzil Teeling.2c Sea. George Allen Thompson.T.P S. Oren Surratt. Anderson G. Glen Allen Summers.T. Houston Tennell. Victor Charles Tanner. Palmer Lee Taylor. Raymond Clifford Tennison. Irven Edgar Sea. Swiontek.M. Edward Francis Sulser.1c Sea.1c S. Edward Everette Tambolleo.2c Sea.2c G. Harry Theodore Taylor.C. William Grover Symonette.3c Cox F.2c Cox Sea.3c PFC G. Rudolph Thinnes. Charles Madison Teer. Charles William Thompson.A. Charles Elijah Sylvester. Tanner. Rangner F.3c Y.Ck Sea.M.P M.T. Charles E. Russell Allen Tapie.2c Sea.C. Leo H.1c E. Takefuji. Arthur Ray Thomas. Jr. Milton Reece Surrells.M.1c Cox C.P E.K. Charles Harold Sweany. Randall James Thomas. Jerome J. Clyde Westly Sutton.Std. Vincent Duron Thompson. Edward Casamiro Tapp.M.1c Sea. Szurgot.M.1c F. Edward Frank Taber. Stanley Stephen Swisher.3c Sea.1c PVT G. Frederick Franklin Summers.1c E.M. Charles Leroy Thompson.M.2c Sea. Sutton. Benjamin C. George Edward Tacderan. Aaron Gust Taylor.T.Prt.1c PVT PFC S.1c Sea.W.M. Francisco Tafoya. Houston O'Neal Thomas. Clarence Thompson. John Raymond Theiller.A.

Thompson, Irvin A. R. Thompson, Ralph William Thompson, Robert Gary Thompson, William Manley Thomson, Richard Joseph Thorman, John Christopher Thornton, Cecil Howard Thornton, George Hayward Thrombley, Robert Leroy Thuman, John Henry Thunhorst, Lee Vernon Tibbets, Hermann K. , Jr. Tibbs, Ernie Ewart Tidball, David Franklin Timm, Lloyd Rudolph Timmerman, William Frederick Tindall, Lewis Frank Tiner, Robert Reaves Tini, Dante Sylvester Tipsword, Keith Warren Tipton, Henry Glenn Tisdale, William Esley Titterington, Everett Cecil Tobin, Patrick Phillip Todd, Neal Kenneth Tokusato, Yoshio Tomich, Peter Topalian, James N. Torti, Natale Ignatius Tranbarger, Orval Austin Trapp, Harold Frank Trapp, William Herman Treadway, Shelby Treanor, Frank P. Triplett, Thomas Edgar Trovato, Tom Trujillo, Richard Ignacio Tucker, Raymond Edward Tucker, William David Tuckerman, George William Tumlinson, Victor Pat Tuntland, Earl Eugene Turk, Pete Turner, Billy Turner, William George Turnipseed, John Morgan Tushla, Louis James Tussey, Lloyd Harold Tuttle, Ralph E. Tyce, Robert H. Tyson, Robert Ufford, Russell Orville Uhlig, Edward Bruno Uhlmann, Robert W. Uhrenholdt, Andrew Curtis

Ensign F.3c S.C.1c Ensign Sea.2c E.M.2c Sea.2c G.M.3c Sea.2c Ph.M.3c Sea.2c PVT C.M.M.P Sea.1c Sea.2c PVT F.1c F.2c R.M.3c M.M.1c Sea.1c C.W.T.P F.1c PFC F.1c age 19 C.W.T.P CPL Sea.1c Sea.1c F.C.2c E.M.3c G.M.3c R.M.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c PFC Cox F.1c PVT F.C.3c Sea.1c Sea.2c Sea.1c PVT F.3c F.1c E.M.3c F.2c age 38 F.C.3c Sea.2c Sea.2c Ensign Ensign

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USS Oklahoma USS Helena USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma NAV MBL HOSP #2 USS Nevada Hickam Field USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Oklahoma Honolulu USS Utah Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS Oklahoma USS California USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS California USS Oklahoma EWA MCAS USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Midway Island NAS Honolulu USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Helena Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona

Ulrich, Elmer Herbert Ulrich, George Vernon Urban, John Joseph Uyeno, Hisao Valente, Richard Dominic Valley, Lowell Earl Van Atta, Garland Wade Van Horn, James Randolf Van Valkenburgh, Franklin Vander Goore, Albert Peter Vanderelli, Martin Vanderpool, Payton L. , Jr. Varchol, Brinley Vassar, Benjamin Frank Vaughan, William Frank Veeder, Gordon Elliott Velia, Galen Steve Venable, Hoge Cralle , Jr. Vernick, Edward Frank Vidoloff, Russell P. Vieira, Alvaro Everett Villa, Michael William Vincent, Jesse Charles , Jr. Vining, George Eugene Vinson, James Vogelgesang, Joseph , Jr. Vogt, John H. L., Jr. Vojta, Walter Arnold Vosti, Anthony August Wade, Durrell Wade, George Hollive , Jr. Wagner, Mearl James Wagner, Thomas George Wagoner, Lewis Lowell Wainwright, Silas Alonzo Wait, Wayland Lemoyne Walczynski, Andrew A. Walker, Bill Walker, David Walker, Ernest M. , Jr. Walker, Harry Earnest Walker, Lumus E. Walkowiak, Robert N. Wallace, Houston Oliver Wallace, James Frank Wallace, Ralph Leroy Wallen, Earl Delbert Wallenstien, Richard Henry Walpole, Eugene Anderson Walters, Bethel Elbert Walters, Charles Edward Walters, Clarence Arthur Walters, William Spurgeon , Jr. Walther, Edward Alfred Walton, Alva Dowding

F.3c F.1c M.M.2c age 20 G.M.3c F.2c M.M.1c AS Captain F.1c PVT F.2c G.M.2c Sea.2c Ph.M.2c Sea.2c S.M.3c S.K.2c PFC PVT Sea.2c F.3c CPL M.A.T.T.2c F.3c F.2c Ensign Sea.1c G.M.3c A.M.M.2c PFC S.C.2c Sea.1c Sea.2c Ph.M.1c Sea.1c SSGT Sea.1c M.A.T.T.3c PVT S.K.1c PVT F.3c W.T.1c Sea.1c F.3c PFC Sea.1c Sea.2c F.1c Sea.2c Sea.2c F.C.3c F.C.3c Y.3c

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USS Utah USS California USS Helena Honolulu USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS West Virginia Hickam Field USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS Helena USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Helena Hickam Field Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS Utah USS Pennsylvania USS California USS Downes USS West Virginia USS Enterprise USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Pennsylvania USS Arizona USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Wheeler Field USS Arizona USS California Hickam Field USS Oklahoma Wheeler Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS California USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS West Virginia USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona

Walton, Ivan Irwin Ward, Albert Lewis Ward, James Richard Ward, William E. Wardigo, Walter H. Wasielewski, Edward Watkins, Lenvil Leo Watson, Claude Bridger , Jr. Watson, Raphael August Watson, Richard Leon Watson, William Lafayette Watts, Sherman Maurice Watts, Victor Ed Weaver, Luther Dayton Weaver, Richard Walter Webb, Carl Edward Webb, James Cecil Webster, Harold Dwayne Weeden, Carl Alfred Wegrzyn, Felix S. Weidell, William Peter Weier, Bernard Arthur Welch, William Edward Weller, Ludwig Fredrick Wells, Alfred Floyd Wells, Floyd Arthur Wells, Harvey Anthony Wells, Raymond Virgil , Jr. Wells, William Bennett West, Broadus Franklin West, Ernest Ray West, Webster Paul Westbrook, James Ross Westbrook, Robert H. , Jr. Westcott, William Percy , Jr. Westerfield, Ivan Ayers Westin, Donald Vern Westlund, Fred Edwin Wetrich, Vernard Oren Wheeler, John Dennis Whisler, Gilbert Henry Whitaker, John William , Jr. Whitcomb, Cecil Eugene White, Alice White, Charles William White, Claude White, Glen Albert White, Jack Dewey White, James Clifton White, Vernon Russell White, Volmer Dowin Whitehead, Ulmont Irving , Jr. Whiteman, George Allison Whitlock, Paul Morgan Whitson, Alton Walter

Cox Sea.1c Sea.1c Cox PVT Sea.1c F.2c Sea.1c A.M.M.1c Sea.1c F.3c H.A.1c G.M.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c PFC F.1c Sea.2c Ensign PVT Sea.2c PVT Sea.1c C.S.K.P M.M.1c R.M.2c S.F.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c PVT Sea.1c Sea.1c F.3c B.M.2c F.C.1c F.2c PFC Sea.1c E.M.3c age 42 Mus.2c C.W.T.P F.1c Sea.1c F.1c Sea.1c Sea.1c Ensign 2nd.Lt Sea.2c E.M.3c

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USS Nevada USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Pennsylvania Kaneohe NAS USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Kaneohe NAS USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Shaw Hickam Field USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Honolulu USS Arizona USS Oklahoma USS Utah USS Oklahoma USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona USS Arizona Bellows Field USS Arizona USS Oklahoma

Whitson, Ernest Hubert , Jr. Whitt, William Byron Whittemore, Andrew Tiny Wiant, Thomas Solomon Wick, Everett Morris Wicker, Eugene Woodrow Wicklund, John Joseph Wiegand, Lloyd Paul Wilbur, Harold Wilcox, Arnold Alfred Wilcox, George James , Jr. Will, Joseph William Willette, Laddie James Williams, Adrian Delton Williams, Albert Luther Williams, Clyde Richard Williams, Clyde Williams, George Washington Williams, Jack Herman Williams, James Clifford Williams, Laurence A. Williams, Wilbur Slade Williamson, Randolph , Jr. Williamson, William Dean Willis, Robert Kenneth , Jr. Willis, Walter M. Wilson, Bernard Martin Wilson, Clyde Richard Wilson, Comer A. Wilson, Eunice Wilson, Hurschel Woodrow Wilson, John James Wilson, Milton Sloss Wilson, Neil Mataweny Wilson, Ray Milo Wimberly, Paul Edwin Wimmer, Bernard Ramon Windish, Robert James Windle, Everett Gordon Windle, Robert England Winfield, Starring B. Winter, Edward Wise, Clarence Alvin Wise, Rex Elwood Wittenberg, Russell Duane Wodarski, Steven Joseph Wohl, Oswald Carl Wojtkiewicz, Frank Peter Wolf, George Alexanderson , Jr. Wood, Earl A. Wood, Frank Wood, Harold Baker Wood, Horace Van Wood, Roy Eugene Woods, Lawrence Eldon

Mus.2c G.M.3c M.A.T.T.2c AS F.C.3c Sea.1c Sea.1c Mus.2c C.M.3c Q.M.2c Sea.2c Sea.2c Sea.2c Sea.1c Mus.2c Mus.2c Sea.1c Sea.1c R.M.3c Sea.1c Ensign O.S.3c M.A.T.T.2c R.M.2c Sea.1c Ensign R.M.3c Sea.1c C.B.M.P age 7 months F.2c Sea.1c F.3c C.W.O R.M.3c G.M.3c F.C.1c PVT Sea.2c PFC R.M.3c W.O F.3c F.1c PVT Sea.1c Sea.2c C.M.M.P Ensign PVT Sea.2c B.M.2c Sea.1c F.1c F.1c

United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) USN. United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy Civilian United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy

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Woods, Vernon Wesley Woods, William Anthony Woods, Winfred Oral Woodward, Ardenne Allen Woodworth, Lawton Jay Woody, Harlan Fred Woolf, Norman Bragg Workman, Creighton Hale Wortham, John Layman Wright, Edward Henry Wright, Paul Raymond Wright, Thomas Monroe Wyckoff, Robert Leroy Wydila, John Charles Wyman, Eldon P. Yates, Elmer Elias Yeats, Charles , Jr. Yomine, Frank Peter Young, Eric Reed Young, Glendale Rex Young, Jay Wesley Young, Martin Daymond Young, Robert Verdun Young, Virgil Jarrett Young, Vivan Louis Yugovich, Michael Charles Yurko, Joseph John Zacek, Laddie John Zaczkiewicz, Marion Herbert Zappala, Joseph S. Zeiler, John Virgel Ziembicki, Steve Anthony Zimmerman, Fred Zimmerman, Lloyd McDonald Ziskind, Samuel J. Zobeck, Lester Frank Zuckoff, Walter D. Zuschlag, Walter J. Zvansky, Thomas Zwarun, Michael , Jr.

Sea.1c Sea.2c M.M.1c M.M.2c PVT Sea.2c C.W.T.P F.1c G.M.2c Sea.2c C.W.T.P PVT F.1c S.F.3c Ensign S.C.3c Cox F.2c Ensign Sea.1c Sea.1c F.2c Sea.1c PVT W.T.1c E.M.2c W.T.1c Sea.1c PFC PVT Sea.1c Sea.1c Cox Sea.2c PVT Sea.1c PVT SGT C.S.M.P Sea.1c

United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy (Reserve) United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Army United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Navy United States Army United States Navy United States Army (Reserve) United States Army United States Navy United States Navy

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Bill Text of S.J.RES.55.IS 105th Congress (1997-1998)
S.J.RES.55 -- Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during... (Introduced in Senate - IS)

SJ 55 IS 105th CONGRESS 2d Session S. J. RES. 55 Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES September 1 (legislative day, AUGUST 31), 1998 Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. HELMS, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. DURBIN, and Mr. FORD) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services JOINT RESOLUTION Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes. Whereas Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, formerly the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, possessed an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in the United States Navy prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor; Whereas Major General Walter C. Short, formerly the Commander of the United States Army Hawaiian Department, possessed an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in the United States Army prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor; Whereas numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were not provided with the necessary and critical intelligence available that foretold of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that would have alerted them to prepare for the attack, including such essential communiques as the Japanese Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of September 24, 1941, and the message sent from the Imperial Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador in the United States from December 6-7, 1941, known as the Fourteen-Part Message; Whereas on December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were relieved of their commands and returned to their permanent ranks of rear admiral and major general; Whereas Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of the investigating commission known as the Roberts Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short of `dereliction of duty' only six weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report maintaining that `these two officers were martyred' and `if they had been brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the charge'; Whereas on October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the grounds that his military decisions and the disposition of his forces at the time of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor were proper `by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor'; criticized the higher command for not sharing with Admiral Kimmel `during the very critical period of 26 November to 7 December 1941, important information ... regarding the Japanese situation'; and, concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome was attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the naval service; Whereas on June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral Kimmel; Whereas on October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation determined that Lieutenant General Short had not been kept `fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for

the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan. Whereas the joint committee of Congress that was established to investigate the conduct of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short issued. on May 23. though there was ample time to have accomplished this'. and other associations and numerous retired military officers have called for the rehabilitation of the reputations and honor of Admiral . it should be broadly shared'. to appreciate fully and to convey to the commanders in Hawaii the sense of focus and urgency that these intercepts should have engendered'. that `together. and Whereas the Veterans of Foreign Wars. a majority of the members of the Board for the Correction of Military Records of the Department of the Army found that Lieutenant General Short `was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster' and that `it would be equitable and just' to advance him to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list'. Jr. and Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short were denied their requests to defend themselves through trial by courtmartial. 1949. Whereas the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. 1968. Whereas the Dorn Report found that `Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications . Whereas. and the degree to which the commanders of the United States forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short. among other facts.. in establishing a promotion system for the Navy and the Army. Whereas on November 13. Whereas the Dorn Report. which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war'. Whereas the reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation were kept secret. withdrew his 1988 recommendation against the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and recommended that the case of Admiral Kimmel be reopened. Admiral Carlisle Trost. Admiral J. without the honor of having been returned to their wartime ranks as were their fellow veterans of World War II. detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were available in `abundance' but were not shared with the General Short's Hawaii command. 1997. provided a legal basis for the President to honor any officer of the Armed Forces of the United States who served his country as a senior commander during World War II with a placement of that officer. a report on the results of a Department of Defense study that was issued on December 15.. Whereas in October 1994... Vice Admiral David C. 1995. Whereas the then Chief of Naval Personnel. on a retired list with the highest grade held while on the active duty list. with the advice and consent of the Senate. and General Short was not provided `on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th. that the war effort in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive intelligence distribution policy. and lack of clarification and follow-up at higher levels'. Whereas Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short are the only two eligible officers from World War II who were excluded from the list of retired officers presented for advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime ranks under the terms of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. it did set forth as a conclusion of the study that `responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short. the Naval Academy Alumni Association.075-page report which included the conclusions of the committee that the two officers had not been guilty of dereliction of duty. Whereas Major General Walter Short died on September 23. these characteristics resulted in failure . ambiguous language. and Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel died on May 14. some unwarranted assumptions and misestimations. and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee. the Retired Officers Association. L. a 1.. 1946. did not provide support for an advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade. recommended that Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. 1954.better preparation for war'. on July 21. a distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor toward two of the finest officers who have served in the Armed Forces of the United States. Whereas this singular exclusion from advancement on the retired list serves only to perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders in Hawaii were derelict in their duty and responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Richardson (United States Navy. 1991. limited coordination. the Admiral Nimitz Foundation. on April 27. the then Chief of Naval Operations. Holloway. the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association. and. that `the evidence of the handling of these messages in Washington reveals some ineptitude. retired) responded to the Dorn Report with his own study which confirmed findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation and established.

Kimmel to the grade of admiral on the retired list of the Navy. Hawaii. (a) REQUEST. Hawaii. be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.loc. on December 7.Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short through their posthumous advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime grades: Now. SECTION 1. SEC. and other targets on the island of Oahu. competently and professionally. and other targets on the island of Oahu.J. Hawaii. and. the losses incurred by the United States in the attacks on the naval base at Pearl Harbor. therefore. were not a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then Lieutenant General Short. and. Kimmel performed his duties as Commander in Chief.RES. Source: http://thomas. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE OF ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHORT.Any advancement in grade on a retired list requested under subsection (a) shall not increase or change the compensation or benefits from the United States to which any person is now or may in the future be entitled based upon the military service of the officer advanced. Hawaii. (b) ADDITIONAL BENEFITS NOT TO ACCRUE. therefore. the losses incurred by the United States in the attacks on Hickam Army Air Field and Schofield Barracks. and (2) to advance the late Major General Walter C. were not a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then Admiral Kimmel. Short performed his duties as Commanding General. Short to the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list of the Army.IS: . 2. United States Pacific Fleet.The President is requested-(1) to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. 1941.55.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:S. competently and professionally. It is the sense of Congress that-(1) the late Rear Admiral Husband E. 1941. therefore. and (2) the late Major General Walter C. on December 7. Hawaiian Department. ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND MAJOR GENERAL SHORT ON RETIRED LISTS.

1942. and civil officers and citizens who were thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquiry. . 1941. 1941. VOL." The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive order by granting the Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them under oath. December 18. 1941. 7. proceeded to Honolulu. D. and January 5. Pearl Harbor. arrived at Washington January 15 and held further meetings January 16. and 14. 30. and 20. ORDERED. who believed they had knowledge of such facts. January 28 (Legislative Day. and. H. 22. and. what these derelictions or errors were. C. and January 2 and 3. at the submarine base. and who were responsible therefor. on the latter day. if so. Honolulu. and December 27. be printed as a Senate Document. 20. The White House SIR: The undersigned were appointed by Executive order of December 18. 1941. and 9 at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. which defined our duties as a commission thus: "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7. 1942 The PRESIDENT. and 31. 19. "The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned. were summoned and examined under oath. 19.. 13. 1942. and 23.. 24. 6. January 23). The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large number of documents.. 159 ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE FACTS RELATING TO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES UPON PEARL HARBOR IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII ON DECEMBER 7. where the Commission arrived December 22 and held meetings December 22. All persons in the island of Oahu. 23. HAYDEN] IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. held meetings January 12. 77-2. Docs. 8 . 18. 17. 8. were publicly requested to appear. 29. 21. and 26 at the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department. That the report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7. All members of the Military and Naval Establishments. 1941 S. January 10 the commission left Honolulu for Washington. 1 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR JANUARY 23. T. and a number responded to the invitation and gave evidence.Text of the Roberts Commission Report (Summary): 77TH Congress 2d Session SENATE SENATE DOCUMENT No. Fort Shafter.8 [SUBMITTED BY MR. The Commission held three meetings in Washington.

We feel that the national policy in this matter is one that has been settled by those responsible for such decisions and that it is not within our province that of finding the facts respecting the attack of December 7.887 typewritten pages. m. The evidence taken covered a wide scope. Honolulu time (1:25 p. in the view that this might throw some light upon the matters submitted for our consideration. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the mandate appointing this Commission. the Commission heard evidence to show what had been done at Pearl Harbor and on the island of Oahu by naval and military commands subsequent to December 7. in the circumstances. December 7. 1941. the Commission submits the following: JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR FINDING OF FACT I About 7:55 a. Our findings. and the records and documents examined exceed 3. m. as we have found. the Commission heard much testimony as to the population of Hawaii. We have. diverse views of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Commission intentionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief that thereby incidental light might be thrown upon the main issues involved. We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of them. and the responsibility for the resulting damage to the United States to discuss any such topic. we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of failure to take appropriate measures with the means available. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and. The Commission visited the naval base at Pearl Harbor and air fields of the Military and Naval Establishments. 3 . as will appear from our report. however. As an example. refrained from quotation of testimony or documentary proof. as well as the Army posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifications on the island of Oahu. and have been. in the belief that the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investigative. as the result of its deliberations. Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United States at 1 p. its composition. Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the air raid. H. counterespionage.000 printed pages in number. Japanese forces attacked Army and Navy installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu. All testimony received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings was stenographically reported and transcribed. therefore. and anti-sabotage work done antecedent to the attack of December 7. This was but natural. eastern standard time (7:30 a. there was a deficiency in the provision of materiel for the Hawaiian area. and the attitude and disposition of the persons composing it. and was well known to the Government departments and local commanders. We have made no detailed findings on the subject since. The oral evidence received amounts to 1. 1941. Eastern standard time) on Sunday. which as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction. The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. H. that due to the enormous demand on the Nation's capacity to produce munitions and war supplies. Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morning. Appended hereto is a map of the island of Oahu showing the location of the principal naval and military establishments. T. 2 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR It is true. have been made with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony. m. 1941. The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are of record. of that day. Again. T. At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a matter of common knowledge that there are. The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should remain secret.Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to the Commission. The Commission has sought to find and examine witnesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them. and the subject is dealt with in our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsibility for the disaster.

is located in the island of Oahu. to date is Rear Admiral Claude C. This group consists of the larger islands Hawaii. the other islands being garrisoned by minor forces only. The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor. It was realized by the State. Fourteenth Naval District. and War Department and Navy Department plans subsidiary thereto which establish the Hawaiian coastal frontier. and Kauai and a number of smaller islands. or standing orders. the latter acting as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 1941." was prepared by General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch. They extend from Hawaii in the south some 300 miles in a northwesterly direction. Kimmel. respecting defense measures and dispositions. For purposes of certain developments and protection. II The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as the Hawaiian Islands. V The responsibility for the Joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier rested upon the commanding general. was Lt. This joint coastal frontier defense . one of the Hawaiian group. for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel. and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable. Short. The commanding general. Maui. and for the repair and refitting of ships. The commanding general. Hawaiian Department. from April 11. Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory. the main outlying naval base in the Pacific. Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. the latter acting under the direction of Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating procedure. could properly deal. The military preparations for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior to any intimation of the planned severance of relations. Wake. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu.m. Oahu. thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers. and. were being ceaselessly carried out. Walter C. 1941. A local joint defense plan entitled "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. Johnston. and the commandant. IV Plans and preparations against the contingency of war are the joint responsibility of the military and naval authorities. Gen. was assigned the task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions within that frontier. Bloch. the islands of Midway. These included joint Army and Navy war plans. The general function of the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain control of vital sea areas. A main outlying naval base such as Pearl Harbor. The commandant. within the limits of funds and authorizations provided by the Congress. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1 to December 17. was Admiral Husband E. and the further task of covering the operations of the Hawaiian coastal frontier forces. and Canton had been placed under the responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area. to carry out his obligation under the joint agreement. assign tasks and forces to both Army and Navy for its joint defense. is intended for the use of the fleet for taking on fuel and supplies. 4 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against every contingency had been prepared. from February 7 to December 17. with either the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet or the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. including Kauai in the north. The commander in chief of the fleet. Honolulu time) the severance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to attack the island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. and prescribe that the system of coordination between the responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual cooperation. Molokai. Christmas. Hawaiian Department. 1940. III It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other governments. Fourteenth Naval District. in addition. War. Palmyra. Hawaiian Department.

for the fulfillment of its mission. (3) sabotage." It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory. Navy Patrol Wing 21 established the responsibilities for the joint use and operation of the available air forces of the Army and Navy. and an aircraft warning service. described the probable character of an air attack and urgent consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. and funds which they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier under any eventuality. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor. It also urged the conduct of joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids. The responsible commanders made numerous recommendations to the War and JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR 5 Navy Departments for additional forces. VII In a letter of January 24.plan was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments or. The means available to the Army. The joint coastal frontier defense plan and plans subsidiary thereto envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that. (5) mining. (2) air torpedo plane attack. It is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. the Hawaiian air force. The Secretary of War replied February 7. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. The national situation permitted only a partial filling of these requirements. or the occurrence of war. An agreement between the Hawaiian air force and the commander. a threat of hostile action. The writer stated: "If war eventuates with Japan." The writer stated that the "inherent possibilities of a major disaster " warranted further speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *" The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7. presupposing timely dispositions by the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii. as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency. (4) submarine attack. the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. giving the present and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect of airplanes and antiaircraft artillery. However. 1941. It was recognized that. and stating with respect to the other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the commanding general. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies. 1941. and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as were in port. prior to furnishing the full war strength garrison. consist of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery. mobile ground forces. 1941. with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective. The supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces comprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned to the fleet. Hawaiian Department. Hawaiian Department. if made it would most likely occur at dawn. and standing orders of the United States Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District also pre- . the forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air attack or greatly to mitigate its effectiveness. insufficient forces were available to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. were available. (6) bombardment by gunfire. equipment. except that certain aircraft attached to the fleet when present. The standing operating procedure.

particularly of its air arm. November 24. with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in constant touch with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Hawaiian Department. Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. not only in Cabinet meetings. discussed negotiations with Japan and the growing tensity of the relations of the United States with Japan. This message was seen by both the commander in chief of the fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the commanding general. November 27. 1941). the Secretary of State was repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. VIII For months prior to December 7. that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this Nation should not commit the first overt act. that Japanese action was unpredictable. and all three of these officials were cognizant of the growing threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures consequent thereupon. The message directed him. the Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the intelligence officer on the staff of the commanding general. directing him to . that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible. Admiral Kimmel made certain dispositions of units of the fleet. and were awaiting further developments. 1941. that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended. Hawaiian Department. At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important to the training of the fleet personnel. and placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. IX October 16. but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. and they thought the situation was not such as to require this. with little likelihood of their resumption. in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese. On the same day (November 27. and imparted to them the information received from the Secretary of State and the results of their conferences with him. Frequent joint drills and exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to insure such measures would be effective. the statements of the Japanese Government. that the department commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense. The message advised that the Chief of Staff of the Army requested that the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the despatch. and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. of the probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia. including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the field of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. was a possibility. and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. even prior to hostile action. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war. that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations. The JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR 7 communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense existing situation. The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotiations. and on the occasions of those contacts and in conference. and the movements of its army and naval forces. 1941. The purport of this message was communicated by the department commander to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been continued through October and November. but in meetings of the war council. the commanding general. and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese Cabinet.6 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR scribed measures for protection against air attack. supported this opinion. if not its virtual suspension. 1941. to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary. and the Army was also conducting intensive training. Hawaiian Department. The responsible commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment of training. He was directed to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers. the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral Kimmel. At meetings of the war council the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also present. 1941.

the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only). which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning. Hawaiian Department. the first of December 3. and that subversive activity might be expected. At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent recollection of the last-mentioned message. and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents. replied to the last-mentioned message. Samoa. the commanding general. that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended. 1941. outlining at length and in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establishments and property and essential industrial and public-utility installations. The message stated that identical communications were being sent to all air stations and. and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment. Hawaiian Department. Thai. directing the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do certain scouting. No reply was sent by the War Department to this message. 1941. under conditions of greater emergency. and continental districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. November 27. November 28. the commanding general. It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. 1941. which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's despatch of November 27 to the commanding general. The commander in chief of the fleet communicated the purport of this message to the general commanding the Hawaiian Department of the Army. that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication. the second of December 4. The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures. On the same day (November 27. November 29. November 29. or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. 1941. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and Army authorities. Hawaiian Air Force. and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act. against propaganda affecting Army personnel.inform the commanding general and his chief of staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased. within the scope of the Army's responsibility. on November 28. The Navy Department sent three messages to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. and ordered certain action in case hostilities should occur. 1941. informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his 8 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR command against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. General Short testified that he considered this series of messages a tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended by the Department. Hawaiian Department. the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet. 1941. in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report measures taken. but to avoid the appearance of attacking. and warned that protective measures should be confined to those essential to security. directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later. It stated that Guam. in which it was stated the indications were that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. and the third of December 6. that hostilities might ensue. but General Short testified that he considered the Adjutant General's message referred to in the next succeeding paragraph a reply. although he felt that it must have been shown to him. JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR 9 . so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. property. received from The Adjutant General of the Army a message stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken at once against subversive activities. the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the fleet. the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 1941. and against all espionage. Admiral Kimmel testified that he had viewed this message as indicating that the Navy Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii. retaining only such as were necessary. 1941. that all necessary measures be taken to protect military establishments. that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines. November 30. 1941). and equipment against sabotage. was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. the Chief of the Army Air Forces sent such an identical message to the commanding general. and also forwarded the message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for his information. Hawaiian Department. No reply referring to this message was sent by the War Department. the commanding general.

Captain McMorris. their senior subordinates. 1941. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south. Admiral Kimmel. concluded they were in home ports. the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which. At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war-plans officer. considered the possibility of air raids. indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Hawaiian Department. as well as the greatest portion of: the carriers. subsequent to November 27. an additional warning message. Hawaiian Department. and the commandant. XI At about noon. one gradually concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast. At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. 1941. On and after November 27. 10 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR For some time prior to November 27. they did not. of relieving marines stationed there by the substitution of units of the Army. the other in the Mandates. Captain McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack. and. but the organization of an extensive task force. 1941. 2. Although one division battleships also may be assigned. concerning the probability of a surprise air attack on Oahu. according to Captain McMorris. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian defense to be adopted in the light of the messages. the commander in chief of the fleet. hold any conference specifically directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pursuant to those messages. was its dispatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief Naval Operations. 1941. units of the combined air force. but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack." The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii. his reply was that the Japanese would never so attack."' stated: "Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. this proposal was a subject of discussion. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by all individual units. destroyer and submarine squadrons. who was present. Second Fleet. On the contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. Without exception they believed that the chance of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl Harbor were practically nil. and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. will probably take sharper form in the next few days. X December 1. While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures. for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. and 3 concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of view. under the command of the commander in chief. the major capital ship strength remains in home waters. the War Department and the Navy Department had under consideration the possibility of sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing Marine planes then on those islands. Honolulu time). Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time. the commanding general. XII The commanding general. and Rear Admiral Bloch had been in conference concerning this proposal. According to General Short. apparently for French Indochina and Formosan ports. appears to be subdivided into two major task groups. due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea. and their principal staff officers. December 7. General Short. eastern standard time (6:30 a.The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids. respectively. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers. 1941. The attack of Sunday. December 7. To date this task force. General Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel on November 27. The necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack was not considered. independently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the . now definitely indicated. Fourteenth Naval District. under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation.m. December 1. was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.

three states of readiness were prescribed. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central information center. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface. but up December 7 such officers had not been designated. alert No. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4 to 7 a. The commander in chief of the fleet made certain dispositions of units of the fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the Hawaiian Islands. with no threat from without. He reported this fact at 7:20 a. in his capacity as base-defense officer. 2 was thus defined: "This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than alert No. By November 27. on December 7. 1. m. Alert No. in connection with the order for alert No. he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu. Hawaiian Department. In the Hawaiian Department's standing operating procedure governing the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. December 7. Hawaiian Department. the system closed at 7 a. 1941. and as granted leave so to do. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was taking. certain mobile equipment had been installed at temporary locations. 2. 11 . After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following action was taken: The commanding general. m. nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively. It was intended that in the near future the Navy should have officer personnel in the information center. In accordance with the order in effect. An arc of nearly 360 around Oahu could have been covered. On November 27. as installed in its temporary locations. but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what the fact was with respect to its operation. m. surface. 1941. 3. and it was maintained in effect until December 7. 1. ordered that this system be operated each day during the period from 4 until 7 a. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department. At about 7:02 a. and also issued an order that any Japanese submarines found in the operating areas around the island of Oahu should be attacked. m. on and prior to December 7. 1. 3 was thus defined: "This alert requires occupation of alt field positions by all units. 1941. and aircraft. Sunday. and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action had been taken. A noncommissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations. Permanent installations had not. the commanding general.1941. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District." JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR Alert No. at a distance of about 130 miles. and alert No. The recording of the observation made indicated that these airplanes were tracked toward the land and then lost. m. called a conference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol. 1941. assumed that the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army. and took no action with respect to them. in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings is provided. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27. been completed. having information that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity at the time. having been detailed there to familiarize himself with the operation of the system." Alert No. and that they should be on the alert.existing situation. Admiral Kimmel." XIII The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and operation of an aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. 1 was thus defined: "This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands. there was sufficient partially trained personnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout 24 hours of the day. On November 27. prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands. ordered alert No. advised them that something might happen. Throughout the spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in the installation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian Islands. known as alert No. assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes. This inexperienced lieutenant. and was being operated intermittently throughout the day for the purpose of training personnel in its operation.

1941. and the training involved flying around the confines of Oahu from about 8 o'clock in the morning throughout 12 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR the day. to obtain and make available significant information respecting Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii. General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. XV Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan. No action was taken against the agents. carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles. Naval Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil population. prior to December 7. if it could have been learned. Japanese spies on the island of Oahu. except during drills and maneuvers. whether these agents JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEAL HARBOR 13 should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. if any. and that the three services should cooperate with each other. might have . XVI There were. information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the island. when it became effective. restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan. These spies collected and. covering the circumference of the island of Oahu to a distance of about 20 miles. asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart the efforts which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. the commanding general. In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property. T. through various channels transmitted. except during drills and maneuvers. however. The sectors searched.XIV The joint coastal frontier defense plan provided that. Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack. Hawaiian Department objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until then had been given notice and an opportunity to register. It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. In conferences respecting this question. Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. who was stationed in Honolulu. but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance. being conducted by the Navy. no inshore patrol was conducted. In addition. Prior to December 7. H. Then the Bureau's office was established it was agreed by the three governmental agencies that the Bureau should take over and become primarily responsible for investigation of matters connected with the civil population. constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360 . and the local Naval Intelligence Service to matters pertaining to Navy personnel and property. 1941. Pilots were being trained on weekdays. The United States being at peace with Japan. In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under the Japanese consul. and with the intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army. prior to the establishment of an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii. when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. This activity greatly increased toward December 7. The naval district intelligence office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The contents of these messages. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and. 1941. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol conducted. Prior to December 7. Efforts were made by the Bureau to uncover espionage activities in Hawaii. the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol. 1941. in connection with such operations. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. no distant reconnaissances were conducted. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable prior to December 7.

the Army exercises disciplinary control of men on pass through its military police. ordnance. were normal for a period when the forces were not upon a war footing. Their flyers had the most detailed maps. The commanding general. and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet were both guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening. so that each could attack a given vessel or field. were required to be in their quarters at midnight. They knew. the exact location of vital air fields. were 38. of all kinds. and marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. amounting to about 75.8 percent. Intoxicating liquor is sold on the island of Oahu. and men on pass or on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. 49 commanding officers were aboard during the attack and 22 were en route to their ships. quartermaster. with the exception of those authorized to be absent. The evidence shows that as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxication. Following the established procedure.5 percent.. 88. all Navy personnel. On Saturday. Each seems to have been given in a specified mission. and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies. and bearings. or by persons acting for him. from 6 p.9 percent. December 7. and on Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on weekday nights. for intoxication. Hawaiian Department. These organizations take into custody any person showing evidence of intoxication. by men fit for duty. reported by all major echelons and posts. Twenty-fifth Infantry Division. In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from duty by permission on Saturday nights than on other nights.000 soldiers. from maps which they had obtained. 88. and the Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. principally the usual Saturday functions at the various posts and naval establishments. 1941. hangars. the usual percentage of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took advantage of such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Honolulu. 90 per cent. north. for the readiness and alert then in effect. all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight. all places of amusement in Honolulu and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight. but returned to their quarters at an early hour. Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services then on the island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor. Of 75 vessels of the fleet. and arrests of sailors by the Navy shore patrol. m. arrests of soldiers by the military police. 1 was on another ship. they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul. the conditions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of December 6 compare closely with similar conditions for the several preceding months. On the morning of Sunday. 1941. and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. Estimated general percentage. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan. Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking by any officer of either service on that night. December 6. two battalions of infantry were held in reserve for anti-sabotage defense. Reports from large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during the attack show 60 percent of officers on board and 96 percent of the men.furnished valuable information. December 7. miscellaneous. sailors. m. December 6. 92 percent. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any sector. and 1 was on authorized leave. XVIII . to 6 a. 85. courses. including department headquarters. for intoxication. 87. and medical. On the night of December 7. On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended social functions at various points on the island of Oahu. 14 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the island of Oahu at 8 a. were 4. and other structures. antiaircraft gun crews were maintained on ships in harbor for instant defense. XVII The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on Saturday. with the following exceptions: The normal Army guard had been increased by approximately 100 percent. Air Force. By comparison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 39. which leaves 2 for whom we are unable to account. at home and abroad.000 men indicates that no less than 11. Coast Artillery Corps. It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast. were: Twenty-fourth Infantry Division. 1941. Army posts and naval vessels and stations were adequately manned.6 percent. m.

but lost their lives in the attempt. Ford Island. which was not attacked. attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then attacking their airdrome. when it was closed by orders. and Kaneohe. which were in position. Attacks on Wake continued until its capture on December 22.. Honolulu time). took the air. A third small submarine grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was captured. and would have revealed the entrance of a submarine. and antiaircraft weapons ashore. About noon December 8. Honolulu time). Ewa Field. with supporting surface craft and a few small submarines.1941. some 27 land planes made strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. which. At least three fighter pilots. and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in shallow water a weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. opened fire and shelled Midway Island for about 30 minutes. demonstrated excellent training and high morale. 1941 (2:50 p. would detect a submerged or partially submerged submarine. It was kept open during daylight hours. was a combined air-raid and submarine attack on the island of Oahu. for the entrance of two mine sweepers. rammed. m. The torpedoes were of an obsolete type. and planes. m. and that this force had maintained radio silence during its approach. and appeared to be modified armor-piercing shell. at 9:30 p. Wheeler Field. S. m. 1941. These weapons continued in action during and in spite of low-level strafing and dive bombing which have been known to demoralize even seasoned troops. Between 6:33 and 6:45 this object. was from the northward of Oahu. opening it only when necessary for a vessel to pass through. the net vessel. m. and a continuous air attack and bombardment on Wake Island. December 7. on the theory that. This combined antiaircraft and fighter action resulted .. which was a small submarine. Some loss of life and damage to material resulted on each island. which were not already manned. by the U. in defending against the attack. but no alert warnings were issued based upon this report. The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate. was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness. Many of the bombs had extra heavy cases. a bombardment of Midway. and sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 a. m. bombing. S. Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking. The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from planes. m. 1941 (December 21. were promptly manned. altered to increase their explosive load. A report of this action by the Ward reached the naval-base watch officer at 7:12 a. All attacking planes had withdrawn before 11 a. ordered alert No. Officers and enlisted men. depth-charged. The net was not damaged. December 7 the net was opened at 4:58 a. but probably it passed in about 7 a. m. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was caused and serious damage was inflicted on ships in the harbor. who notified his chief of staff. Antiaircraft weapons aboard ship. JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR 15 In the attack on Oahu a suspicions object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a. and other vessels in the vicinity. Midway time (11: 30 p. It was kept open until 8:40 a. The submarine was first sighted in the harbor at 7:45 a. m. Bellows Field. December 7. Pearl Harbor was provided with an anti-torpedo net which would have prevented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor. S. except for the submarines. and torpedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases Oahu at about 7:55 a. approaching from the southward. Honolulu time). Another small submarine was fired upon. the commanding general. to decrease their radius. Ward. An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting.The attack on the morning of December 7. Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu consisted of either three or four Japanese carriers. m. The procedure prior to December 7. The time of its entrance is not known. m. A few fighter planes parked on an outlying gunnery training field. The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. S. and other facilities at Hickam Field. 3. a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two destroyers. Hawaiian Department. Antares. was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U. in total disregard of their own safety. At the same time the commander in chief placed the fleet on a full war basis and 16 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept and destroy the attacking force. 1941. hangars. during daylight the channel entrance destroyer. m. There is no evidence of any damage by torpedoes fired by these submarines. Junior officers and enlisted men on their own initiative procured from storage every possible automatic weapon.. m.

except that 1 Navy airplane was attacked by a Japanese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. which was remanned by about 8:30 a. Two utility planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles. These task forces were engaged in operations connected with strengthening the defenses of the outlying islands. 1941. about 700 miles southwest of Oahu. After the attack following searches were made: The 3 planes in the air south of Oahu. December 7. A report of an actual contact with an enemy carrier. according to their standing orders. m. On the morning of December 7. Adherence to such a plan prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve commanders of their responsibility to apply and adapt the plan to the situation as it develops. the latter acting as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific fleet. These patrol planes were in the air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines south of Oahu. and the element of surprise. XIX The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the attack required them to be ready for flight only after 4 hours' notice. These scouted to the southwestward of Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west of Oahu. On December 7 Naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu. Where. 2 heavy Army bombers and 4 light bombers took off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles off Barber's Point. the first duty of such commanders in the case of .in the destruction of approximately 30 enemy aircraft. Carrier planes of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles southwestward of Oahu. and 9 planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some 200 miles to the northward. searched to the northwest of Oahu a distance of about 375 miles. Thereafter 9 planes searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu. It is the Army's function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile attack. and greater facility in taking the air. This incident was not reported until the next day. Eighteen scouting planes from Task Force 8 had been dispatched to scout in advance of the force which was on its way to JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR 17 Oahu. After failure to make contact the 2 heavy bombers searched first to the southwestward and then in areas to the northwest of Oahu. No contacts were made with enemy aircraft or carriers. which later proved to be erroneous. 1941. Six patrol planes were searching south and southeastwardly from Midway. and the Navy's function to support the Army indirectly by operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such instrumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or permanently. About 11:27 a. 6 Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu. Such information as it afforded indicated enemy forces to the southward and southwestward of Oahu. the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of two commanders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual cooperation. as here. and a number of others were lost at sea because they were unable to rejoin their carriers. the following searches of sea areas were being made. A third. SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base. failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their carriers. The type of alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be concentrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against air attack. m. m. Under the then existing plans the joint defense of the Hawaiian frontier was to be coordinated by mutual cooperation between the commanders concerned. At 11:50 a. Plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier were prepared by the commanding general. The aircraft warning system. The other 4 searched to the southwestward. was in the vicinity of Johnston Island. prior to the attack. Task Force 11. and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. and its security is vital to both offensive and defensive operations. proceeding toward Oahu. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coordinated. Hawaiian Department. This state of readiness. this concentration of airplanes. gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwestward thus causing futile searches in those areas. Nine planes were dispatched by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu. and resulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes that very few fighter airplanes were able to take the air during the course of the action. For the same reasons it was impossible to get airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back to their carriers. all contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack.

and bravery in meeting the raid. the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the Nation. And failed to collaborate and to coordinate defensive measures which should be taken pursuant to the orders received. and equipment were insufficient to place the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for an extended period. A significant warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November 24. 1941. These commanders were acquainted with this 18 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR correspondence. and war only. which persisted up to December 7. Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy. fit for duty. A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were on pass or liberty December 6. The commanding general was ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary. The commander in chief of the fleet was ordered to execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. that Japan had no intention of making any such raid. Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency and exhibited initiative.an emergency is conference and consultation with respect to the measures to be taken under the existing plans and the adaptation of those plans in whole or in part to the situation. 2. The correspondence between the departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the probability of this form of attack. 3. efficiency. The warnings indicated war. materiel. Both of these messages contained orders. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan. second. without exception. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense. the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities were momentarily possible. a conviction. brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. The personnel. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and 19 . Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires: First. These deficiencies did not preclude measures which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated its severity. Other significant messages followed on succeeding days. for the reason that the state of alert or of readiness demanded by the emergency had not been put into effect. Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dispositions taken by the other. during a period of 10 days preceding the Japanese attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information. Based upon its findings of fact. The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a surprise air attack. At about the time that Admiral Kimmel and General Short assumed their respective commands. Dispositions as a result of the messages were independently made by each commander. the Commission reaches the following JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR CONCLUSIONS 1. These emphasized the impending danger and the need for war readiness. This conviction persisted notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders. the War and Navy Departments were in correspondence with respect to adequate defense against air raids on Oahu and the naval base. and. Nevertheless there has been amongst the responsible commanders and their subordinates. In this situation. Consequently this form of attack was a complete surprise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy stationed in the Hawaiian area. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued.

and concurred in. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages. it would still have been too late to be of substantial use. 1941. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages. and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency." 6. There were deficiencies in personnel. 8. The order for alert No. the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense. 7. weapons. and the inshore air patrol of the Army. in the following words: "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. should have been manned and supplied with ammunition: and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. in fulfillment of their obligation so to do. and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only. the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating: the distant reconnaissance of the Navy. and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage.the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof. 15. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27. been complied with. in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. 5 The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities. And Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans. 9. would have been adequate. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27. nor otherwise. But these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed. and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington. neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date. if adapted to and used for the existing emergency. in the following words: This despatch is to be considered a war warning. December 7. prepared plans which. equipment. 11. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the commander in chief. 10. and referring to nothing . had reported the measures taken by him. m. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended. the antiaircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy. intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7 a. 4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other. and each knew of. In view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it. 13. 20 JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR should have been maintained. as well as additional antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. and with their superiors. 1941. and not to take measures which would alarm the civil population. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short. Hawaiian time. Pacific Fleet. 12. The warning message of December 7. was but an added precaution. 14.

resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success of the attack. that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. that he was not required to inform himJAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR 21 self of. and naval circles. OWEN J. Restrictions which prevented effective counter-espionage. military.html . They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed. J.else. 21. [January 23. The existence of such a view. M.ibiblio. and the commander in chief. Hawaiian Department. Each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. 1941. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. 18. and commanding general. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were: Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs. Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the commanding general. MCNARNEY. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders and they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. however prevalent. 20. W. the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. 17. and in the public press. demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief. tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.org/pha/pha/roberts/roberts. The failure of the commanding general. Pacific Fleet. 1941. Non-receipt by the interested parties. and on anti-sabotage measures. the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency. 19. JOSEPH T. it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings. 1941. MCCOY. and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. H. transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7. Hawaiian Department. FRANK R. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action. ROBERTS. 1942] Source: http://www. Except for a negligible number. 16. prior to the attack. and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part. Hawaiian Department. The attitude of each. of the warning message of December 7. the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect. REEVES. did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7. STANDLEY. Respectfully submitted. to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27. Pacific Fleet. Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Ear East. and his lack of interest in.

After the attack. and World War II veteran.000 documents. “Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars. and thus galvanized the country to war. the founder of the Office of Strategic Services.. scores of military messages that America was intercepting. In White House meetings the strong feeling was that America needed a call to action. With George Bush. and so the President relieved him of his command. Murrow. and conducted dozens of interviews. Stinnett by Douglas Cirignano On November 25. The only thing Roosevelt seemed to care about. said. This meticulous research led Stinnett to a firmly held conclusion: FDR knew. “Step by step. Infamy. I was in the navy in World War II. the commander of the Pacific fleet. according to Stinnett. according to Robert Stinnett. Dewey said nothing. Newly released naval records prove that from November 17 to 25 the United States Navy intercepted eighty-three messages that Yamamoto sent to his carriers. the author of America’s Freedom of Information Act. Many who came into contact with Roosevelt during that time hinted that FDR wasn’t being forthright about his intentions in Europe. believe it or not. Later Donovan told an assistant that he believed FDR welcomed the attack and didn’t seem surprised. Day Of Deceit shows that the famous ‘surprise’ attack was no surprise to our war-minded rulers. Part of the strategy was to move America’s Pacific fleet out of California and anchor it in Pearl Harbor. He expressed this to Roosevelt. and Dewey’s speeches could have sacrificed America’s codebreaking advantage. shall advance into Hawaiian waters.. was if the public would now support a declaration of war. It now has to be considered one of the most definitive—if not the definitive—book on the subject. Stinnett’s well-documented book makes a convincing case that the highest officials of the government—including the highest official—fooled and deceived millions of Americans about one of the most important days in the history of the country. let it happen at Pearl Harbor. 2002 Robert B. Cable after cable of decryptions. the famed journalist. author of Simon & Schuster’s Day Of Deceit. including those I admired. and William Donovan. Since World War II many people have suspected that Washington knew the attack was coming. So. the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of the Pearl Harbor book. FDR’s military and State Department leaders were agreeing that a victorious Nazi Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. we have the proof. Eighty to ninety percent of the American people wanted nothing to do with Europe’s war. though. kept the truth from the public until Stinnett’s Freedom of Information Act requests finally persuaded the Navy to release the evidence. keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft.the task force. So. “. Later Richardson quoted Roosevelt as saying: “Sooner or later the Japanese will commit an overt act against the United States and the nation will be willing to enter the war.. According to Day Of Deceit. He poured over more than 200. In the fall of that year.” What led you to write a book about Pearl Harbor? Stinnett: Well.. Admiral James Richardson. He wasn’t being ingenuous. Stinnett goes through the prelude to war. Now. Day Of Deceit could prove to them otherwise.Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? March 11. an author.. spent sixteen years delving into the National Archives. on the Sunday evening of December 7.Robert Stinnett has come up with most of the smoking guns. the answers to the mysteries of Pearl Harbor can be found in the extraordinary number of documents he was able to attain through Freedom of Information Act requests. Roosevelt had a brief meeting in the White House with Edward R.” To those who believe that government conspiracies can’t possibly happen. You wrote a book about that.” And John Toland. though.. Roosevelt provoked Japan to attack us. and in November FDR was elected president for the fourth time. This is not what the public wanted. Stinnett.. Douglas Cirignano An Interview with Robert B. using new documents to reveal the terrible secrets that have never been disclosed to the public.” was Roosevelt’s famous campaign statement of 1940. and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. persuaded Dewey not to make the speeches.” One might wonder if the theory that President Franklin Roosevelt had a foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack would have been alluded to in this summer’s movie. Donovan felt. It is disturbing that eleven presidents. Stinnett’s book is dedicated to Congressman John Moss. Dewey planned a series of speeches charging FDR with foreknowledge of the attack. Pearl Harbor. clearly showed that Japanese ships were preparing for war and heading straight for Hawaii. and thought this knowledge would enable him to defeat the popular FDR. strongly opposed keeping the ships in harm’s way in Hawaii. in October 1940 FDR adopted a specific strategy to incite Japan to commit an overt act of war. then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Part of the November 25 message read: “. 1941 Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto sent a radio message to the group of Japanese warships that would attack Pearl Harbor on December 7. According to Stinnett. journalist. Ultimately. General George Marshall. Stinnett. When Thomas Dewey was running for president against Roosevelt in 1944 he found out about America’s ability to intercept Japan’s radio messages. . Japan’s naval leaders did not realize America had cracked their codes.. Gore Vidal has said. I was on an aircraft carrier. 1941.

And so that started me going. That was the first time I had heard about that. the order came directly from President Roosevelt. this is now. so nobody knew about all this. and they steered me to other sources. And he reveals a lot in there. Was FDR’s cabinet on record for supporting this policy of provoking Japan to commit the first overt act of war? Stinnett: I don’t know that he revealed it to the cabinet. Stinnett: Well. You feel it’s as simple as that? Stinnett: That is right. And they’re very reluctant to give me more information. Well. Another claim at the heart of the Pearl Harbor surprise-attack lore is that Japan’s ships kept radio silence as they approached Hawaii. Life magazine in September 1945. we’re talking about in the 1980’s. My primary purpose was to learn about the intercept procedures.. That’s absolutely untrue. based on his diary. But Frank Knox died before the investigation started. And that was their plan. So. “I won’t send your boys to war unless we are attacked. So.. Is this statement true?—If America was intercepting and decoding Japan’s military messages then Washington and FDR knew that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor. But the Navy did let me. didn’t he and his advisors feel that America was eventually going to have to get into the war? Stinnett: That is right. Stinnett: Yes. were sighted by United States submarines. Who was Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum and what was his connection to the Pearl Harbor attack? Stinnett: He worked for Naval intelligence in Washington.” So then he engineered this attack—to get us into war really against Germany. It was their “overt act of war” plan that I talk about in my book that President Roosevelt adopted on October 7. Until the Freedom of Information Act. And I believed that. It’s a no-no.. He also was the communications routing officer for President Roosevelt. I thought you wrote in your book that they did.. 1940. gave me permission to go to Hawaii and they showed me the station. too. but there’s no evidence that anybody in the cabinet knew about this. because. And this was all withheld from Congress.. He also was the author of this plan to provoke Japan into attacking us at Pearl Harbor. to make a long story short. There’s no question about that. his close confidant.. and I do cite it in my book. in 1982 I read a book by a Professor Prange called At Dawn We Slept. absolutely. Secretary of War Stimson knew. the warships. some did. Okay. Even though Roosevelt made contrary statements to the public.. Stinnett: Oh... He may have revealed it to Harry Hopkins. right after Japan surrendered. I met the cryptographers involved. The crux of your book is that your research proves that is absolutely untrue. and I believed it. his statement was. and also probably Frank Knox. And. suggested that this was the case. Well.So I went over to Hawaii to see the station to confirm it. then. So all we have really is Stimson. Stimson’s diary reveals that nine people in the war cabinet—the military people—knew about the provocation policy. the Secretary of Navy knew. And then I would ask for certain information. Correct? Stinnett: That is correct. We were never told about breaking the Japanese codes. You know.. Yes. .Stinnett: Yes. Historians and government officials who claim that Washington didn’t have a foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack have always contended that America wasn’t intercepting and hadn’t cracked Japan’s important military codes in the months and days preceding the attack.That some of them were on record for. the late 1980’s.. You write that in late November 1941 an order was sent out to all US military commanders that stated: “The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. But that was discarded as an antiRoosevelt tract. But I think that was his only option. we were always told that Japanese targets. I worked at The Oakland Tribune at that time.So that started me on it. documents that would support all of their information.. his diary. They don’t want to discuss it. We were reading most all of Japan’s radio messages. And so I filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the Navy because communications intelligence is very difficult. also. that Roosevelt engineered Pearl Harbor. I’m getting a little bit. I express that in the book.You must mean his war cabinet. And in that book it said that there was a secret US Navy monitoring station at Pearl Harbor intercepting Japanese naval codes prior to December 7. that was a bombshell to me. that’s right.” According to Secretary of War Stimson. So all these intercepts would go to Commander McCollum and then he would route them to the President. And he was born and raised in Japan. also? Stinnett: That is correct.

and he was attached to the Japanese consulate there. He was providing a timetable for the attack. to attack us. The policy of FDR’s government then was to look the other way and let Japan prepare itself for attacking us? Stinnett: That’s right. This was in a diplomatic code now. and that Nazi Germany’s going to become a threat to America’s security. These extended along the west coast of the United States. up to Alaska. These radio monitoring stations allowed us to intercept and read all of Japan’s messages. he understood the Japanese mentality and how the Japanese would react. Dudley Knox. in October 1940. And so the FBI continued to tail him. They put a tail on him. But he also says that public opinion is against that. You claim that the “splendid arrangement” was so adept that ever since the 1920’s Washington always knew what Japan’s government was doing. And Roosevelt even saw those bomb plots. So to assert that we didn’t know the Japanese were going to bomb Pearl Harbor would be illogical? Stinnett: That is correct. and Roosevelt knew this man was spying on the fleet in Pearl Harbor. From March to August he was giving a census of the US Pacific fleet. and you include the document where one of them is agreeing with McCollum’s suggested course of action. no. Then starting in August he started preparing bomb plots of Pearl Harbor. but he adopted all eight of the provocations—including where he signed executive orders. McCollum then suggests eight specific things that America should do to provoke Japan to become more hostile. And then the spy started filing messages to Japan that we were intercepting. and the Dutch. and so did Naval intelligence. so they were suspicious immediately. Your book claims that in 1941 Japan had a spy residing in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu. The memo is addressed to two of Roosevelt’s top advisors. Stinnett: Yes. right? . But when the FBI checked on him they found out he was not listed in the Japanese foreign registry. right? Stinnett: Absolutely. where our ships were anchored and so forth. The spy was even sending bomb plots of Pearl Harbor? Stinnett: Yes. who was his very close associate. Has the existence of this memo from Commander McCollum ever been revealed to the public before your book came out? Stinnett: No. and into the Central Pacific. the FBI.And other information in Navy files offers conclusive evidence that he did see it. then down to Southeast Asia. In the memo McCollum is expressing that it’s inevitable that Japan and America are going to go to war. That is correct. The “splendid arrangement” was a phrase that FDR’s military leaders used to describe America’s situation in the Pacific. Stinnett: Yes. McCollum is saying that America’s going to have to get into the war. Stinnett: Japan secreted this spy—he was a Japanese naval officer—in Honolulu. and that is what Commander McCollum said. Correct? Stinnett: That is correct. I had no idea it existed. and they let the espionage go on.. and crippling Japan’s economy with an embargo—there was no question in their minds that this would cause Japan—whose government was very militant—to attack the United States.McCollum wrote this plan. Britain. Can you explain what the “splendid arrangement” was? Stinnett: The “splendid arrangement” was the system of twenty-two monitoring stations in the Pacific that were operated by the United States. It was addressed to two of Roosevelt’s closest advisors. We had Japan wired for sound. He said. FDR and his military advisors knew that if McCollum’s eight actions were implemented—things like keeping the Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor. And because he was born and raised in Japan. Naval intelligence.” Is there any proof that FDR saw McCollum’s memorandum? Stinnett: There’s no proof that he actually saw the memorandum. “If you adopt these policies then Japan will commit an overt act of war. So. He arrived there in March 1941 under an assumed name. I received that as pursuant to my FOIA request on January 1995 from the National Archives. this memorandum.. Exactly. so that the public would be behind a war effort.

How were they delivered to him? Stinnett: By Commander McCollum routing the information to him. that is correct.it was intercepted.” And on the morning of December 6 the message was: “There are no barrage balloons up and there is an opportunity left for a surprise attack against these places. and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow.it was sent to the President through Commander McCollum who dispatched it through the naval aide to the President. They were prepared in monograph form.— the deadline was the exact hour when Pearl Harbor was attacked..” Did you see the records of those intercepts yourself? Stinnett: Yes. Part of the message read: “The task force. eighty-six percent of which have not been released by the government. And Roosevelt had sent David Sarnoff. anyway. At those times.he didn’t want to warn the Hawaiian commanders in .. December 7.there’s really no proof that it was. keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft. Right? Stinnett: That’s right.. So they realized. According to Day Of Deceit. I have those. And in it he directed.” What’s the proof that the record of that intercept exists? Did you see it yourself? Again. But they acted nonchalantly and didn’t get a warning to Kimmel. These messages were basically a declaration of war—Japan was saying it was breaking off negotiations with America. the message on December 2 was: “No changes observed by afternoon of 2 December.S. but there’s all sorts of cover stories on whether or not that reached the President. Stinnett: Yes. The December 6 message. early in November 1941 Roosevelt ordered that Japanese raw intercepts be delivered directly to him by his naval aide.. On page 203 of the hardcover edition of your book it reads. to Honolulu so that this would facilitate getting these messages even faster. who was head of RCA. “Seven Japanese naval broadcasts intercepted between November 28 and December 6 confirmed that Japan intended to start the war and that it would begin in Pearl Harbor.... And then General Marshall. decoded. FDR and Marshall should have then sent an emergency warning to Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor... They called it monograph. And the December 2 message was intercepted. And all these other messages that the Navy was constantly intercepting showed exactly where the Japanese ships were. According to a Japanese commander. a government book. And on December 2 and on December 6 the spy indicated that Pearl was going to be the target. on November 25 Admiral Yamamoto sent a radio message to the Japanese fleet..There’s no question about it. did Roosevelt know about it? Stinnett: The English version of that message has been released by the United States. Though we were also intercepting them off the airways. sat on the message for about fifteen hours because he didn’t want to send. Captain Beardall. They were sent by RCA communications.. Late on December 6 and in the very early morning hours of December 7 the United States intercepted messages sent to the Japanese ambassador in Washington. anyway.As far as Roosevelt. General Marshall and President Roosevelt were shown the intercepts.” These messages were intercepted by the Navy. That is correct. I have copies of the Station H radio logs—a monitoring station in Hawaii... Our radio direction finders located the Japanese warships. eastern time. right? Did Roosevelt know about these messages? Stinnett: They were intercepted. When FDR read them he said. shall advance into Hawaiian waters.it broke off relations with the United States and set a timetable of 1:00 PM on Sunday. “This means war.. this is it.. that they were preparing for war. though. They prove that the Navy intercepted eight-three messages that Yamamoto sent between November seventeenth and twenty-fifth. but not the raw intercepts.S. I have those records. Which was the exact time that Pearl Harbor was bombed. In that last intercept Japan gave the deadline for when it was breaking off relations with the U.Stinnett: Yes. You claim that twice during the week of December 1 to 6 the spy indicated that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.. and that they were heading straight for Hawaii. with all their information. Sometimes if McCollum felt a message was particularly hot he would deliver it himself to FDR. The Japanese version—the raw message—has not been released by the U. and translated prior to December 5.... You saw the records of those intercepts yourself? Stinnett: Yes. Stinnett: That’s right. But he received other information that it was going to happen the next day. You say Roosevelt regularly received copies of these intercepts.” When the last intercept was shown to Roosevelt it was still hours before the Pearl Harbor attack. This is a message sent from the Japanese foreign office to the Japanese ambassador in Washington DC. So far they do not seem to have been alerted. And also we have new information about other intercepts in the current edition that’s coming out in May 2001.

Right. and knew that Japan was eventually going to attack. Roosevelt saw it too. Isolationists would have charged FDR was precipitating Japanese action by allowing the Pacific fleet in the North Pacific.. and he warned Washington to be on the alert because he couldn’t give them the last minute information. and it’s in my book. Stinnett: Through the radio intercepts. have any indications that Japan was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? Stinnett: The information is that he did.You see. I do quote him in the book. They should have sent an emergency warning to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. Ambassador Joseph Grew. It unified the American people. Kimmel meant business... You claim that Admiral Kimmel and General Short—who headed up the army in Hawaii—were denied by Washington of the information that would have let them know the attack was coming. The White House was handcuffing Kimmel? They wanted him to be completely passive? Stinnett: That is right. FDR did send a war warning to Kimmel on November 28. He was looking for the Japanese. last October of 2000 voted to exonerate him because the information was withheld from them. they were just cut off. Through the radio intercepts.. on November 23. that was a warning. they directed to Kimmel that he was “complicating the situation”. And Congress..That’s where the Japanese found it on December 7. the radio direction finder information. Eventually they did send it but it didn’t arrive until way after the attack. and remain in a defensive position. Your book makes it abundantly clear that FDR and his advisors knew Japan was preparing for war.he didn’t want them to interfere with the overt act. Both military and diplomatic. you know. two weeks before the attack.... it was not.time. minutes after Kimmel got the White House directive he canceled the exercise and returned the fleet to its anchorage in Pearl Harbor. This seems like a classic case of higher-ups doing something questionable.. 1941. right.. and then Grew sent dire warnings to the White House that an attack on Hawaii was a very real possibility. That’s right in the message. made the finding...Absolutely.. Kimmel sent nearly one hundred warships of the Pacific fleet to the exact site where Japan planned to launch the attack. All this information was going to everybody but Kimmel and Short. Well. But it was subject to implementation by President Clinton who did not sign it.stand aside and let Japan commit the first overt act.They were not told that the spy was there.. and then getting the people below them to take the blame for it. At one point Kimmel specifically requested that Washington let him know immediately about any important developments. But you see they wanted the successful overt act by Japan. and they were not given these crucial documents. His actions indicated that he wanted to be thoroughly prepared for action if he encountered a Japanese carrier force. because two weeks before the attack he sent the Pacific fleet north of Hawaii on a reconnaissance exercise to look for Japanese carriers. Admiral Husband Kimmel was in charge of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. When White House officials learned this. the exact wording is in my book... And Admiral Kimmel. the message he received. it was repeated twice. but also in there they directed Admiral Kimmel and all the Pacific commanders to stand aside. And. don’t go on the offensive. Did America’s ambassador in Japan.. Was that enough of a warning? Stinnett: Well. Was that justified? Stinnett: No..So.. When White House military officials learned of this what was their reaction? Stinnett: Admiral Kimmel tried a number of occasions to do something to defend Pearl Harbor. But at least Congress filed it. according to your book Ambassador Grew had a reliable source in the Japanese embassy tell him that Japan was planning the attack. Kimmel was given some information. the White House wanted a clean cut overt act of war by Japan. In what ways were Kimmel and Short denied intelligence? Stinnett: Well. That’s very important. and let Japan commit the first overt act.. right? Stinnett: That’s right. But can it be said that FDR knew that the attack was going to take place specifically on the morning of December 7 at Pearl Harbor? Stinnett: Yes. but they did not do that. That’s very clear. and he was demoted and took the blame for the attack.. ..

the idea that a military has to sometimes provoke the enemy to attack. Stinnett: No. A lot of people wouldn’t agree with it. and other people say. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was based on a provocation aimed at the North Vietnamese gunboats—something like that. that’s what the survivors. of course. then would America ever have ended up dropping nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Stinnett: Well. It could be argued that Rochefort was the closest one to Kimmel who was most responsible for denying Kimmel of the vital intelligence. And he did make that statement. If what you’re saying is true. I want to emphasize that. was a confidant of McCollum’s. this Gulf of Tonkin business. sacrifice its own soldiers. so as to unify a country for war.”—even though it was his plan! He was being disingenuous. that’s a “what if” question. McCollum. Stinnett: Oh. There was a provocation. You know. of course. it’s a military strategy. it was used by President Polk in the Mexican War in 1846. and about half of our carriers were knocked out as of July 1945.. well. It could be a traditional military philosophy. so. but the families—obviously—of the people who get killed when a military uses this strategy wouldn’t agree with it. and. as I say.. Apparently. He worked closely with Kimmel in Pearl Harbor. I don’t have a negative view. you know.Stinnett: Yes. That’s common knowledge in the military. another example is Viet Nam. when I speak about this with the families they just start crying about it.. Stinnett: I think it was more really to bring a close to the war. then Pearl Harbor is a prime example of government treating human beings like guinea pigs. So. They claim that if there hadn’t been Pearl Harbor there would have been no Hiroshima.And also . And then Commander McCollum was asked to evaluate this. you know. there’s nothing to it. yourself. I know. That’s how President Johnson got The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed through the Congress. Stinnett: A lot of people would not. FDR and Washington also knew that Japan had recalled from sea all its merchant ships. That’s right. Stinnett: Yes. in your opinion. frankly. I was very pleased with the atom bombing because that ended the war. What does that mean? Stinnett: It’s known in government and the military that if a nation recalls its merchant ships then those ships are needed to transport soldiers and supplies for war. Oh. personally. One could only speculate on that. And. Stinnett: Yea.. he was the first one to—after President Roosevelt adopted this eight action memo—Ambassador Grew learned about the Pearl Harbor attack in January1941. But. “Oh. Stinnett: I think so. they were attacking our carriers. Commander Joseph Rochefort... I. who said. On December 5 the Navy intercepted a message telling Japanese embassies around the world to burn their code books. I think you could probably trace it back to Caesar’s time.. this was sort of used in the Viet Nam War. you know. if there had been no Pearl Harbor. And I quote the chief cryptographer for the Pacific fleet.. the families of those who were killed at Pearl.. And I don’t know how to answer it. Yet.. They’re terribly upset. How much in your book has never been revealed to the public before? Stinnett: The breaking of radio silence. And the military officials in Washington saw this intercept and the meaning of it wasn’t lost on them. And also by President Lincoln at Fort Sumter And then also. “It was a pretty cheap price to pay for unifying the country. I think it was his only option to do this. It probably saved my life. Exactly. right. and he said. But it seems in a way Hiroshima and Nagasaki were maybe retribution for Pearl Harbor. The fact that the Japanese ships did not keep silent as they approached Hawaii.The breaking of Japanese codes—I mean the full proof of it. don’t disparage and don’t have a negative view of FDR. What does it mean when a government is telling its embassies to burn their code books? Stinnett: That means war is coming within a day or two. but I think under the circumstances this was FDR’s only option.. But do you agree with that? A lot of people would be offended and angered by that statement.we were subject to kamikaze attacks. you.But. Military codes.” That cryptographer. I was out there at the time.

And there were other ships. also.. That would have never happened five years ago. Absolutely. And all the official Congressional Pearl Harbor committees were denied and weren’t privy to all this revealing information? Stinnett: That’s right. I think the American people thought that Roosevelt was trying to provoke us into the German war. The families of the three thousand people who were killed and injured at Pearl Harbor probably wouldn’t think it was brilliant. But no one cared about it.. In your book you use the phrase “Pearl Harbor deceits”. and we were able to stop Hitler. But it seems under our system of government if President Roosevelt felt it was an emergency to go to war with Germany then he should have come before the American people and the Congress and explained it and convinced us that we had to go defeat Hitler. They made the finding. twenty years ago It happened because of the Freedom of Information Act? . It also seems like a classic Washington cover-up. the people who are attacking me. merchant ships. And it’s probably more than that. It really is. Ever since the attack there have been missing documents. You’re talking about new things here. The information you put out in your book. If I didn’t have that it wouldn’t be as important. So. I don’t see what other option he had. Kimmel and Short were cut off from the intelligence loop. and lost a hundred lives about a month before Pearl Harbor. I know. I get about a seventy percent approval rating. or Europe’s war. the Senate and the House. letting them hang out to dry. And Congress. A lot of people would probably be of the opinion that it wasn’t so brilliant. A lot of people probably don’t want to believe that a president would let something like Pearl Harbor happen. Eighty percent of the people wanted nothing to do with Europe’s war. From. Nobody gave a damn. and other ships in the North Atlantic that were sunk or damaged.. That is the smoking gun of Pearl Harbor. last October. You know. but kept quiet about it and covered it up before and after the event? Stinnett: I cite about thirty-five people there in the book that most certainly knew about it. And. you see. Correct? Stinnett: That is right. and they will not release them. or they regard FDR as an icon who brought Social Security. comments. Stinnett: Well. you know. But. Your research seems to prove that government conspiracies can exist. how many people would you say ultimately knew that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor. And you know the Department of Defense has labeled some of my Pearl Harbor requests as B1 National Defense Secrets. I say that in the book.. Janet Reno would not release them to me. They didn’t want anything to do with that. then you agree with what FDR did? Stinnett: I do. you know. I feel they just don’t want to accept it. and people outright perjuring themselves before the Pearl Harbor investigation committees. He fashioned this—it was a real PR job—he got Japan to attack us in a most outrageous manner that really did unite the country. Stinnett: Well. Stinnett: I know. what they are really quoting from is 1950 information. German submarines were sinking our ships in the North Atlantic. altered documents. They were cut out. that’s the argument today. news media. Stinnett: They were cut off. Have you gotten any criticism for contending that FDR had a foreknowledge of the attack? Stinnett: Yes. The USS Ruben James was a destroyer that was sunk. you see that was the problem. Stinnett: That’s right. and everything else that was going on. I disagree with the way he treated Admiral Kimmel and General Short.. you could also say that this was a victory for President Roosevelt.But the nitty-gritty questions are fine to me. and all that. people being disingenuous.McCollum’s eight action memo—that’s the whole heart of my book. And there’s about thirty percent just don’t accept this. and the holocaust. In your view.. And this thirty percent. But he also unified this country. you know. found that they were cut off. They don’t have the 1999 or 2000 information. The strong isolation movement. and all that. Because a lot of the tone in your book seems to be questioning and disagreeing with Roosevelt’s actions. But if this is true. You see. radio. you know. Or ten. That did not rouse the American public. Commander McCollum was brilliant.

San Francisco Chronicle. You know. et al. CNN. He should have been court-martialed for that. So when Congress opened its Pearl Harbor investigation in November 1945 there were no pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval intercepts available. PAX TV. or Fox News have carried a word. Stinnett is a Research Fellow at The Independent Institute in Oakland. Reprinted by permission of the author. He was an attorney in San Francisco. The exceptions have been C-Span. For further information. Did you ever read Clausen’s book? Colonel Henry Clausen was part of a Pearl Harbor investigation of November 1944. Source: http://www.Stinnett: I think so. He had carte blanche with these intercepts. and he never answered my letters. and local television stations.. CBS. Stinnett: I think so. Clausen was obviously a part of the conspiracy that kept the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts from Congress and the American public. Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press). Why do you think the information in your book is important? Stinnett: It’s important because it reveals the lengths that some people in the American government will go to deceive the American public. The Wall Street Journal. progressive think tank in Oakland. a major. He didn’t return my calls. I tried to contact him. and I did write him but he would never answer me. Calif. I wanted to ask him why he didn’t obtain the intercepts.org—The Independent Institute. Mainstream TV has not been forthcoming.asp?id=408 . When was he acting on behalf of the Secretary of War? Stinnett: Well. That includes The New York Times. and to keep this vital information—in our land of the First Amendment—from the people.independent. And I think that was a crime for him to have done that.org/newsroom/article. I read that. you know. But I fault Colonel Clausen because he had access to all of these military intercepts and he did not bring them out. He traveled to the Hawaiian monitoring stations and interviewed cryptographers but failed to obtain any evidence or testimony concerning the intercepts the Navy was making prior to December 7. Clausen was told by Stimson to get the intercepts. He wrote a book that was published in 1992 that claimed FDR didn’t have a foreknowledge of the attack. but he didn’t do it. And that’s against everything I believe in. Did you ever talk with Clausen? Did he criticize you? Stinnett: He died. That was arranged by independent. and the author of the book. You infer in your book that at one point Clausen was probably trying to cover up for General Marshall’s actions of December 6 and 7. Stinnett: Well. NBC. he was acting on the behalf of the Secretary of War. I guess he just didn’t want to be exposed to this. Neither ABC. C-SPAN carried ninety minutes of me discussing the book with a crowd of one hundred-fifty people. California. And the Short and Kimmel families have credited my book with getting that through Congress. Clausen was authorized by Secretary of War Stimson to conduct the Pearl Harbor investigation in November 1944. see the Pearl Harbor Archive. His book doesn’t address that major issue. What kind of attention did your book get from the mainstream media? Did it get as much attention as you thought it would? Stinnett: Most of the mainstream print media has given Day Of Deceit very fine reviews.

(SCAP) Press. the CCD was responsible for reviewing all Japanese publications to identify violations of the Code for the Japanese Press.799 magazine titles 10. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). Pictorial and Broadcast Division.books. posters. When violations were identified by CCD examiners. Prange Collection is the most comprehensive collection in the world of print publications issued in Japan during the immediate post-World War II years. Between 1945 and 1949. General MacArthur arrived in Japan on August 30.000 pages of censorship documents. 1945-1949. telegraph. film. an operating unit overseen by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2). an operating unit of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. General MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued a ten-point Press Code for the Japanese news media. was transferred from the Philippines to Japan at the beginning of the Occupation. The Civil Censorship Detachment On August 15. radio and . Gordon W. The Collection includes: • • • • • • 18. maps and related archival materials. 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces.Dr. pamphlets. Prange Introduction • • • • The Civil Censorship Detachment Gordon W. The Collection comprises virtually everything published on all subjects during this period . The CCD was to establish censorship of civilian communications (mail.047 newspaper titles 71. news agency photographs. 1945. periodicals. newspapers. telephone. The Collection contains approximately 600. censorship action was taken.000 book and pamphlet titles 13. Prange Preservation Access The Gordon W.000 news agency photographs 90 posters 640 maps The contents of the Prange Collection once constituted the files of the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). Within three weeks.

the National Endowment for the Humanities furthered this effort with an award to the Prange Newspaper Project of $531. and the publications from these years are deteriorating rapidly. He is still remembered by alumni as one of the University's truly great teachers. Professor Prange. The economics. Censorship action. Japanese publishers were forced to use poor quality. As a result of severe shortages in the post-war years. Prange Gordon W. receiving his Ph. high-acid content paper. particularly Tora! Tora! Tora! Preservation of the Collection The UM Libraries have invested heavily in organizing. That same year. 1945-1952. When censorship of the Japanese media by Allied Forces was lifted in 1949 and the Civil Censorship Detachment disestablished. Japanese agencies and private individuals were required to submit their publications to the CCD.D. processing. The 63. involved additions to or deletions from texts. the Nippon Foundation and NEH awarded the Prange Collection $477. On September 15.jsp . In 1999. 1910. With the completion of the magazine and newspaper microfilming projects. and considerable progress has been made. Providing Access to the Collection In addition to the microform versions of the Prange magazine and newspaper collections that are freely available at the UM Libraries and the National Diet Library in Japan. 1978. in 1937.000 and $300.095. In 1993. major progress has been made toward achieving the UM Libraries' goal of preserving the entire Collection so that it will be fully accessible to scholars. recognizing the historical significance of the CCD material. 1980. disapprovals.000 respectively to complete the Newspaper Project. arranged for its shipment to the University of Maryland. The project was completed in March 1997. Prange Collection staff is systematically cataloging the 71." Professor Prange continued to teach at the University of Maryland until several months before his death on May 15. but continued in Japan as a civilian from 1946 to 1951 as chief of General Douglas MacArthur's 100-person historical staff. he began his teaching career as a professor of history at the University of Maryland. and preserving the Collection. it is nearly impossible to provide access to these books. and is well known today for major works on the war in the Pacific.000. the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) awarded the UM Libraries a $1. the Prange education book collection was cataloged with support from the Nippon Foundation. which then determined whether they contained violations of the Press Code. He completed his Navy service soon thereafter. the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland passed a motion to name the collection the "Gordon W. publishing delays.000 microfiche and the accompanying finding guide are now available to users at the UM Libraries and NDL. suppressions of materials. Prange was born in Pomeroy. In 1992.umd.799 magazine titles in the Prange Collection. Source: http://www. He was sent to Japan in 1945 as a member of the American Occupation Forces. and changes. In 2001-2002. The materials arrived at the University in 1950.publications). when it occurred. In 1942. Prange Collection: The Allied Presence in Japan. In 1995. political science and sociology books are currently being organized and cataloged. the UM Libraries and the National Diet Library of Japan (NDL) began a joint project to preserve the 13.lib. he was granted a leave of absence from the University to embark on a wartime career as an officer in the United States Navy. Without the bibliographic control that cataloging provides. He studied at the University of Iowa.edu/prange/html/introduction. Gordon W.000 grant to begin preparations for the preservation microfilming of the Prange newspaper and newsletter holdings and related censorship documents. Iowa on July 16.000 books in the Prange Collection by subject.

the famous American aviator who bombed Tokyo. U. California. during a goodwill visit in New York City on March 2.com/Enlargement/U1021277AACME. 1942 during the Doolittle Raid. chats with General James H.A. 1941. the Japanese pilot who led the initial Imperial Japanese Navy air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7. 1959.corbisimages.html Left photo: Former Imperial Japanese Navy pilot Mitsuo Fuchida makes a public profession of his faith in Christ and love for all humanity as he reads the Bible during a meeting at an auditorium in Los Angeles. Japan on April 18. 1953. “Jimmy” Doolittle. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) http://www.S.Mitsuo Fuchida (left). on March 14. . Mitsuo Fuchida converted to Christianity after World War II. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) Right photo: Former Imperial Japanese Navy pilot Mitsuo Fuchida (left) appears with Reverend Billy Graham in November 1952.

English Japanese Empire Japan Okinawa Taiwan Korea Manchuria [Manchukuo] Kwantung Leased Territory Republic of China Kingdom of Thailand Dutch East Indies Philippines United States of America Federal Reserve System Federal Reserve Bank of New York Bank of Japan Bank for International Settlements League of Nations Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Rockefeller Foundation Council on Foreign Relations New York Stock Exchange Yale University Harvard University Arlington National Cemetery Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Meiji Shrine Yasukuni Shrine Imperial Japanese Naval Academy Imperial Japanese Army Academy Kure Naval Arsenal Kure Naval Station Yokosuka Naval Station Sasebo Naval Station Maizuru Naval Station Naval Air Facility Atsugi Pearl Harbor Eta Jima Etorofu Island Hitokappu Bay Pacific Ocean World War II Sino-Japanese War Russo-Japanese War Attack on Pearl Harbor Roberts Commission Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Tripartite Pact Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact Diplomatic relations Executive Order Kenpeitai (Imperial Japanese secret police) English-Japanese Translations Japanese 大日本帝國 日本 沖縄 台湾 韓国(朝鮮) 満州国 関東州 中華民國 タイ王国 オランダ領東インド フィリピン アメリカ合衆国 連邦準備制度 ニューヨーク連邦準備銀行 日本銀行 国際決済銀行 国際連盟 カーネギー国際平和基金 ロックフェラー財団 外交問題評議会 ニューヨーク証券取引所 イェール大学 ハーバード大学 アーリントン国立墓地 無名戦士の墓 明治神宮 靖国神社 海軍兵学校 陸軍士官学校 呉海軍工廠 呉鎮守府 横須賀鎮守府 佐世保鎮守府 舞鶴鎮守府 厚木海軍飛行場 真珠湾. Pāruhābā Etajima Etorofu-jima Hitokappu-wan Taiheiyō Dai-niji Sekai Taisen Nicchusensō Nichi-Ro Sensō Shinjuwan Kogeki Robātsu Iinkai Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken Nichi-doku-i Sangoku Gunji Domei Nisso Chūritsu Jōyaku Gaikō-kankei Daitōryōrei Kenpeitai . パールハーバー 江田島 択捉島 単冠湾 太平洋 第二次世界大戦 日中戦争 日露戦争 真珠湾攻撃 ロバーツ委員会 大東亜共栄圏 日独伊三国軍事同盟 日ソ中立条約 外交関係 大統領令 憲兵隊 Pronunciation Dai-Nippon-Teikoku Nippon Okinawa Taiwan Kankoku (Chōsen) Manshūkoku Kantōshū Chūkaminkoku Tai Ōkoku Oranda Ryōhigashi Indo Fuiripin Amerika Gasshūkoku Renpō Junbi Seido Nyūyōku Renpō Junbi Ginkō Nippon Ginkō Kokusai Kessai Ginkō Kokusai Renmei Kānegii Kokusai Heiwa Kikin Rokkufuerā Zaidan Gaikō Mondai Hyōgikai Nyūyoku Shōken Torihikijo Iēru Daigaku Hābādo Daigaku Arinton Kokuritsu Bochi Mumei-senshi-no-haka Meiji Jingu Yasukuni Jinja Kaigun Heigakkō Rikugun Shikan Gakkō Kure Kaigun Kōshō Kure Chinjufu Yokosuka Chinjufu Sasebo Chinjufu Maizuru Chinjufu Atsugi Kaigun-hikōjō Shinjuwan.

Department of the Treasury アメリカ合衆国財務省 Amerika Gasshūkoku Zaimushō 在日本アメリカ合衆国大使 U. Department of the Navy Amerika Gasshūkoku Kaigunshō U.S. Marine Corps アメリカ海兵隊総司令官 Amerika Kaiheitai Sōshireikan アメリカ太平洋艦隊 United States Pacific Fleet Amerika Taiheiyō Kantai United States Fleet 合衆国艦隊 Gasshūkkoku Kantai アメリカ海軍情報部 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Amerika Kaigun Jōhōbu English-Japanese Translations of Japanese Government and Military Positions Emperor of Japan [His Imperial Majesty] 天皇陛下 Tenno Heika 内閣総理大臣 Prime Minister of Japan Naikaku sōri daijin Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs 外務大臣 Gaimu Daijin Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs 外務省 Gaimushō Japanese Ambassador to America 在米国日本国大使 Zai-Beikoku-Nihon-koku-taishi 在米国日本国大使館 Japanese Embassy in America Zai-Beikoku-Nihon-koku-taishikan Consulate General of Japan at Honolulu 在ホノルル日本国総領事館 Zai-Honoruru-Nihon-koku-Sō-Ryōjikan 在ホノルル日本国総領事 Consul General of Japan at Honolulu Zai-Honoruru-Nihon-koku-Sō-Ryōji Imperial Japanese Navy 大日本帝國海軍 Dai-Nippon-Teikoku-Kaigun 大日本帝國陸軍 Imperial Japanese Army Dai-Nippon-Teikoku-Rikugun Imperial General Headquarters 大本営 Daihon'ei Navy Ministry of Japan 海軍省 Kaigunshō Army Ministry of Japan 陸軍省 Rikugunshō 海軍大臣 Minister of the Navy Kaigun-daijin Minister of War [Army] 陸軍大臣 Rikugun-daijin Chief of Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff 軍令部総長 Gunreibu-sōchō Chief of Imperial Japanese Army General Staff 参謀総長 Sanbo-sōchō 朝鮮総督 Governor-General of Korea Chōsen Sōtoku Governor-General of Taiwan 台湾総督 Taiwan Sōtoku 関東軍 Kwantung Army Kantōgun Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet 連合艦隊司令長官 Rengō Kantai Shireichokan Combined Fleet (Japan) 連合艦隊 Rengō Kantai English-Japanese Translations of Military Terms 海軍元帥 Fleet Admiral Kaigun Gensui General of the Army 陸軍元帥 Rikugun Gensui 海軍大将 Admiral Kaigun Taishō Army General 陸軍大将 Rikugun Taishō . Attorney General アメリカ合衆国司法長官 Amerika Gasshūkoku Shihōchōkan アメリカ合衆国財務長官 U. Army アメリカ陸軍参謀総長 Amerika Rikugun Sanbōsōchō アメリカ海軍作戦部長 Chief of Naval Operations Amerika Kaigun Sakusenbuchō Commandant of the U.S.S.S.S. Senate Amerika Gasshūkoku Jōin U.S.English-Japanese Translations of American Government and Military Positions President of the United States アメリカ合衆国大統領 Amerika Gasshūkoku Daitōryō アメリカ合衆国陸軍長官 U. Secretary of the Treasury Amerika Gasshūkoku Zaimuchōkan U.S. Embassy in Japan 在日本アメリカ合衆国大使館 Zai-Nihon-Amerika-Gasshūkoku-Taishikan アメリカ合衆国上院 U.S.S.S. Department of Justice Amerika Gasshūkoku Shihōshō U.S.S.S. House of Representatives アメリカ合衆国下院 Amerika Gasshūkoku Kain アメリカ合衆国最高裁判所 U. Secretary of War Amerika Gasshūkoku Rikugun Chōkan U.S.S. Department of State アメリカ合衆国国務省 Amerika Gasshūkoku Kokumushō アメリカ合衆国司法省 U. Supreme Court Amerika Gasshūkoku Saikō Saibansho Federal Bureau of Investigation アメリカ連邦捜査局 Amerika Renpō Sōsakyoku アメリカ合衆国内国歳入庁 Internal Revenue Service Amerika Gasshūkoku Naikoku Sai’nyū-chō United States Army アメリカ陸軍 Amerika Rikugun アメリカ海軍 United States Navy Amerika Kaigun United States Marine Corps アメリカ海兵隊 Amerika Kaiheitai アメリカ陸軍航空軍 United States Army Air Forces Amerika Rikugun kōkūgun Chief of Staff of the U. Secretary of State Amerika Gasshūkoku Kokumuchōkan U. Secretary of the Navy アメリカ合衆国海軍長官 Amerika Gasshūkoku Kaigun Chōkan アメリカ合衆国国務長官 U. Department of War アメリカ合衆国陸軍省 Amerika Gasshūkoku Rikugunshō アメリカ合衆国海軍省 U.S.S. Ambassador to Japan Zai-Nihon-Amerika-Gasshūkoku-Taishi U.

New York City San Francisco Los Angeles English-Japanese Translations of Major Cities 東京 Tōkyō 横浜 Yokohama 大阪 Ōsaka 名古屋 Nagoya 神戸 Kōbe 鹿児島 Kagoshima 広島 Hiroshima 長崎 Nagasaki 京都 Kyōtō 札幌 Sapporo 新潟 Niigata ソウル(京城) Souru (Keijō) 台北 Taipei. D.C. Taihoku 哈尓浜 Harubin 北京 Pekin 南京 Nankin 上海 Shanhai 香港 Hon Kon シンガポール (新加坡) Shingapōru バタヴィア (ジャカルタ) Batabia (Jakaruta) サイゴン Saigon バンコク Bankoku マニラ Manira ベルリン Berurin ローマ Rōma モスクワ Mosukuwa ロンドン Rondon ハワイ Hawai ホノルル Honoruru ワシントン Washinton ニューヨーク市 Nyūyoku-shi サンフランシスコ Sanfuranshisuko ロサンゼルス Rosanzerusu .Commander Commander-in-Chief (Military) Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Military Attaché Aircraft carrier Cruiser Destroyer Submarine Fighter aircraft Bomber (airplane) Machine gun Hand grenade Torpedo 司令官 司令長官 下士官 駐在武官 航空母艦 巡洋艦 駆逐艦 潜水艦 戦闘機 爆撃機 機関銃 手榴弾 魚雷 Shireikan Shireichōkan Kashikan Chūzaibukan Kōkūbokan Jun’yōkan Kuchikukan Sensuikan Sentōki Bakugekiki Kikanjū Teryūdan Gyorai Tokyo Yokohama Osaka Nagoya Kobe Kagoshima Hiroshima Nagasaki Kyoto Sapporo Niigata Seoul Taipei Harbin (Manchuria) Beijing [Peking] Nanjing [Nanking] Shanghai Hong Kong Singapore Batavia (Jakarta) Saigon Bangkok Manila Berlin Rome Moscow London Hawaii Honolulu Washington.

M. and Miscellaneous January 一月 Ichi-gatsu 二月 February Ni-gatsu March 三月 San-gatsu 四月 April Shi-gatsu May 五月 Go-gatsu 六月 June Roku-gatsu July 七月 Shichi-gatsu 八月 August Hachi-gatsu September 九月 Ku-gatsu 十月 October Jū-gatsu November 十一月 Jūichi-gatsu 十二月 December Jū’ni-gatsu 1941 (Year) 昭和十六年 Shōwa Jūroku-nen 昭和十六年十一月二十六日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūichi-gatsu Nijū-roku-nichi November 26. Gozen Shichi-ji-han 7:55 A. 1941 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Futsuka December 3.English-Japanese Translations of Time. 1941 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Yōka December 9. 1941 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Hatsuka December 25. 1941 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Muika December 7. 午後一時 Gogo Ichi-ji 午前七時半 7:30 A. 1941 昭和十六年十二月七日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Nanoka 昭和十六年十二月八日 December 8. Gozen Hachi-ji 1 P. 1941 昭和十六年十二月十一日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Jūichi-nichi 昭和十六年十二月二十日 December 20. 午前七時五十五分 Gozen Shichi-ji Gojū-gofun 三菱 Mitsubishi (manufacturing company) Mitsubishi Kawasaki (manufacturing company) 川崎 Kawasaki 住友 Sumitomo (manufacturing company) Sumitomo Asahi Shinbun (daily newspaper) 朝日新聞 Asahi Shinbun 毎日新聞 Mainichi Shinbun (daily newspaper) Mainichi Shinbun Corporation (joint-stock company) 株式会社 Kabushiki-kaisha 財閥 Zaibatsu (cartel) Zaibatsu Skull and Bones (secret society) スカル・アンド・ボーンズ Sukaru Ando Bōnzu 黒龍会 Black Dragon Society (secret society) Kokuryūkai dereliction of duty 職務怠慢 Shokumu taiman . 1941 昭和十六年十二月九日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Kokonoka 昭和十六年十二月十日 December 10.M. 1941 昭和十六年十二月五日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Itsuka 昭和十六年十二月六日 December 6. 1941 December 1. 1941 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu To-oka December 11. 1941 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Yokka December 5. 1941 昭和十六年十二月二十五日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Nijū-go-nichi 日曜日 Sunday Nichiyōbi Monday 月曜日 Getsuyōbi 火曜日 Tuesday Kayōbi Wednesday 水曜日 Suiyōbi 木曜日 Thursday Mokuyōbi Friday 金曜日 Kin’yōbi 土曜日 Saturday Doyōbi Time 時間 Jikan 午前八時 8 A. Date.M. 1941 昭和十六年十二月三日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Mikka 昭和十六年十二月四日 December 4.M. 1941 昭和十六年十二月一日 Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Tsuitachi 昭和十六年十二月二日 December 2.

New York City. Dallas. Columbia University. Rome. Philadelphia. London. Walter C. Luxembourg City. Boston. Short Averell Harriman Prescott S. (My mother is from Japan.English President Franklin D. Reichstag. I have traveled to many cities and places. Baltimore. 昭和天皇 Hirohito. Bush Prime Minister Winston Churchill Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek Josef Stalin Adolf Hitler Hirohito Prince Fumimaro Konoe General Hideki Tojo Yosuke Matsuoka Shigenori Togo Admiral Teijiro Toyoda Koki Hirota Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama General Jiro Minami General Kuniaki Koiso Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto Admiral Osami Nagano Admiral Chuichi Nagumo Admiral Shigetarō Shimada Admiral Zengo Yoshida Admiral Mineo Osumi Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura Ambassador Saburo Kurusu Toyotaro Yuki (banker) Shigekazu Shimazaki (pilot) Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (pilot) Takeo Yoshikawa (spy) Kazuo Sakamaki (prisoner) English-Japanese Translations of Prominent Individuals Japanese Pronunciation フランクリン・ルーズベルト大統領 Furankurin Rūzuberuto Daitōryō ヘンリー・ルイス・スティムソン Henri Ruisu Suteimuson フランク・ノックス Furanku Nokkusu コーデル・ハル Kōderu Haru ヘンリー・モーゲンソウ Henrii Mōgensou ジョセフ・クラーク・グルー 大使 Josefu Kuraku Gurū Taishi ジョージ・マーシャル陸軍元帥 Jōji Māsharu Rikugun Gensui ハロルド・スターク海軍大将 Harorudo Sutāku Kaigun Taishō ハズバンド・キンメル海軍大将 Hazubando Kinmeru Kaigun Taishō ウォルター・ショート海軍中将 Uorutā Shōto Rikugun Chūshō アヴェレル・ハリマン Abuereru Hariman プレスコット・ブッシュ Puresukotto Busshu Uinsuton Chāchiru Shushō ウィンストン・チャーチル首相 蔣介石 大元帥 Shō Kai-Seki (Shan Hai-seki) Daigensui ヨシフ・スターリン Yoshifu Sutārin アドルフ・ヒトラー Adorufu Hitorā 裕仁. New Haven (Connecticut). Venice. British Parliament.) E-mail: wpl314@yahoo. I was deployed to Iraq (near Baghdad) from April 2003 to July 2004. Vienna. Kimmel Lt. Roosevelt Henry Lewis Stimson Frank Knox Cordell Hull Henry Morgenthau Jr. Cologne. including Tokyo. Yale University. and the Rhine River valley. Army from 2001 to 2004 as a soldier in the First Armored Division in Germany (1-1 CAV. Budingen). Litynski ABOUT THE AUTHOR: I served in the U. Frankfurt. Seattle. I reside in Pensacola. Grand Canyon. Harvard University. Marshall Admiral Harold R.S. Paris.. Florida for several years. and my grandfather was drafted twice by the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. Washington D. Princeton University. Munich. Denver. Gen.com . Shōwa Tennō 近衛 文麿 Konoe Fumimaro 東条 英機 大将 Tōjō Hideki Taishō 松岡 洋右 Matsuoka Yōsuke 東郷 茂徳 Shigenori Tōgō 豊田 貞次郎 大将 Toyoda Teijirō Taishō 広田 弘毅 Hirota Kōki 杉山 元 元帥 Sugiyama Hajime Gensui 南 次郎 大将 Minami Jirō Taishō 斎藤 実 大将 Koiso Kuniaki Taishō 山本 五十六 元帥 Yamamoto Isoroku Gensui 永野 修身 大将 Nagano Ōsami Taishō 南雲 忠一 大将 Nagumo Chūichi Taishō 嶋田 繁太郎 大将 Shimada Shigetarō Taishō 吉田 善吾 大将 Yoshida Zengo Taishō 大角 岑生 大将 Ōsumi Mineo Taishō 野村 吉三郎 大将 Nomura Kichisaburō Taishō 来栖 三郎 大使 Kurusu Saburō Taishi 結城 豊太郎 Yuki Toyotarō 嶋崎 重和 Shimazaki Shigekazu 淵田 美津雄 Fuchida Mitsuo 吉川 猛夫 Yoshikawa Takeo 酒巻 和男 Sakamaki Kazuo William P. San Diego.C. San Francisco. Florida and lived in Crestview. Buckingham Palace. Milan. Stark Admiral Husband E. Berlin. Chicago. Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew General George C. Swiss Alps.

(AP Photo) Newspaper vendors sell newspapers at Times Square in New York City on December 7. 1941.A. California. 1941. gather around a reporter's car in the Japanese section of San Francisco. including several Army selectees. (AP Photo/Robert Kradin) .Young Japanese Americans. U.S. announcing that Imperial Japan has attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. on December 8.

Edited by Paul Stillwell) (Source: Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy. Edited by Paul Stillwell) .(Source: Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy.

Texas.htm Cook Third Class Doris Miller.Doris Miller (center).navy. he distinguished himself by courageous conduct and devotion to duty during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-m/d-miller. Hawaii on May 27.history. while serving aboard USS West Virginia (BB-48). (1919-1943) Doris ("Dorie") Miller was born in Waco. Source: http://www. He was then assigned to the escort carrier Liscome Bay (CVE-56). Cook Third Class Miller was lost with that ship when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine on 24 November 1943. on 12 October 1919. He was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions on this occasion. Navy Photograph.history. Mess Attendant Second Class.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-m/d-miller. On 7 December 1941. 1941.S. He enlisted in the Navy in September 1939 as a Mess Attendant Third Class. at an awards ceremony held on the flight deck of USS Enterprise (CV-6) at Pearl Harbor. (Official U. during the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. Doris Miller served aboard USS Indianapolis (CA-35) from December 1941 to May 1943. The medal was awarded for heroism on board USS West Virginia (BB-48) during the Pearl Harbor Attack on December 7. 1942. USN. National Archives collection) http://www.htm . receives the Navy Cross from Admiral Chester W. USN. Nimitz.

Following Hawaiian tradition. Navy) . (Photo: U.S. The casualties had been buried on December 8. 1941. American sailors honor men killed during the Imperial Japanese attack on Naval Air Station Kaneohe (on the island of Oahu). This ceremony was held sometime during the following months.

1941. (Photographed by Lieutenant Commander Tracy D. May they rest in peace. Connors. NHHC Collection) http://www.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-a/bb39-v. Official U.S. Navy Photograph. USN (Retired).The USS Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor. Hawaii was completed in 1962 to honor the sailors and marines who perished aboard USS Arizona on December 7.navy.htm The shrine room of the USS Arizona memorial in Pearl Harbor .history.