A Treatise of Human Nature

by David Hume (1739)
Reprinted from the Original Edition in three volumes and edited, with an analytical index, by L.A. SelbyBigge, M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896). Editor’s Preface. Book I: Of the Understanding Introduction. Part I.: Of Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction, &c. Section I.: Of the Origin of Our Ideas. Section II.: Division of the Subject. Section III.: Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination. Section IV.: Of the Connexion Or Association of Ideas. Section V.: Of Relations. Section VI.: Of Modes and Substances. Section VII.: Of Abstract Ideas. Part II.: Of the Ideas of Space and Time. Section I.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Our Ideas of Space and Time. Section II.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time. Section III.: Of the Other Qualities of Our Ideas of Space and Time. Section IV.: Objections Answer’d. Section V.: The Same Subject Continu’d. Section VI.: Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence. Part III.: Of Knowledge and Probability. Section I.: Of Knowledge. Section II.: Of Probability; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect. Section III.: Why a Cause Is Always Necessary. Section IV.: Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect. Section. V.: Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory. Section VI.: Of the Inference From the Impression to the Idea. Section VII.: Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief. Section VIII.: Of the Causes of Belief. Section IX.: Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits. Section X.: Of the Influence of Belief. Section XI.: Of the Probability of Chances. Section XII.: Of the Probability of Causes. Section XIII.: Of Unphilosophical Probability.

Section XIV.: Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. Section XV.: Rules By Which to Judge of Causes and Effects. Section XVI.: Of the Reason of Animals. Part IV.: Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy. Section I.: Of Scepticism With Regard to Reason. Section II.: Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses. Section III.: Of the Antient Philosophy. Section IV.: Of the Modern Philosophy. Section V.: Of the Immateriality of the Soul. Section VI.: Of Personal Identity. Section VII.: Conclusion of This Book.

Book II: Of the Passions Part I.: Of Pride and Humility. Section I.: Division of the Subject. Section II.: Of Pride and Humility; Their Objects and Causes. Section III.: Whence These Objects and Causes Are Deriv’d. Section IV.: Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas. Section V.: Of the Influence of These Relations On Pride and Humility. Section VI.: Limitations of This System. Section VII.: Of Vice and Virtue. Section VIII.: Of Beauty and Deformity. Section IX.: Of External Advantages and Disadvantages. Section X.: Of Property and Riches. Section XI.: Of the Love of Fame. Section XII.: Of the Pride and Humility of Animals. Part II.: Of Love and Hatred. Section I.: Of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred. Section II.: Experiments to Confirm This System. Section III.: Difficulties Solv’d. Section IV.: Of the Love of Relations. Section V.: Of Our Esteem For the Rich and Powerful. Section VI.: Of Benevolence and Anger. Section VII.: Of Compassion. Section VIII.: Of Malice and Envy. Section IX.: Of the Mixture of Benevolence and Anger With Compassion and Malice. Section X.: Of Respect and Contempt. Section XI.: Of the Amorous Passion, Or Love Betwixt the Sexes. Section XII.: Of the Love and Hatred of Animals. Part III.: Of the Will and Direct Passions. Section I.: Of Liberty and Necessity. Section II.: The Same Subject Continu’d. Section III.: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will. 2

Section IV.: Of the Causes of the Violent Passions. Section V.: Of the Effects of Custom. Section VI.: Of the Influence of the Imagination On the Passions. Section VII.: Of Contiguity, and Distance In Space and Time. Section VIII.: The Same Subject Continu’d. Section IX.: Of the Direct Passions. Section X.: Of Curiosity, Or the Love of Truth.

Book III: Of Morals Part I.: Of Virtue and Vice In General. Section I.: Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason. Section II.: Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From a Moral Sense. Part II.: Of Justice and Injustice. Section I.: Justice, Whether a Natural Or Artificial Virtue? Section II.: Of the Origin of Justice and Property. Section III.: Of the Rules, Which Determine Property. Section IV.: Of the Transference of Property By Consent. Section V.: Of the Obligation of Promises. Section VI.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning Justice and Injustice. Section VII.: Of the Origin of Government. Section VIII.: Of the Source of Allegiance. Section IX.: Of the Measures of Allegiance. Section X.: Of the Objects of Allegiance. Section XI.: Of the Laws of Nations. Section XII.: Of Chastity and Modesty. Part III.: Of the Other Virtues and Vices. Section I.: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices. Section II.: Of Greatness of Mind. Section III.: Of Goodness and Benevolence. Section IV.: Of Natural Abilities. Section V.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning the Natural Virtues. Section VI.: Conclusion of This Book. Appendix.


EDITOR’S PREFACE. The length of the Index demands apology or at least justification. An index may serve several purposes. It enables a reader or student to find some definite passage, or to see whether a certain point is discussed or not in the work. For this purpose a long is evidently better than a short index, an index which quotes than one which consists of the compiler’s abbreviations, and its alphabetical arrangement gives it an advantage over a table of contents which is hardly secured by placing the table at the end instead of the beginning. But besides this, in the case of a well known and much criticised author, an index may very well serve the purpose of a critical introduction. If well devised it should point, not loudly but unmistakeably, to any contradictions or inconsequences, and, if the work be systematic, to any omissions which are of importance. This is the aim of the index now offered: it undoubtedly is not what it should be, but Hume’s Treatise seems to offer an excellent field for an attempt. Hume loses nothing by close and critical reading, and, though his language is often perversely loose, yet it is not always the expression of loose thinking: this index aims at helping the student to see the difference and to fix his attention on the real merits and real deficiencies of the system: it does not aim at saving him the trouble of studying it for himself.

Book I: Of The Understanding A TREATISE OF Human Nature: BEING An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into MORAL SUBJECTS. Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis; & quæ sentias, dicere licet. Tacit. Book I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING. LONDON: Printed for John Noon, at the White-Hart, near Mercer’s-Chapel in Cheapside. MDCCXXXIX. ADVERTISEMENT TO BOOKS I and II. My design in the present work is sufficiently explain’d in the introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann’d out to my self, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the understanding and passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of morals, politics, and criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of human nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determin’d to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction. INTRODUCTION. Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decry4

ing all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. ’Tis easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there requir’d such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle ’tis not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, ’tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious. ’Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. ’Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou’d explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind. Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingring method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. ’Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt my Lord Bacon1 and some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty. Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man.

I will venture to affirm. SECTION I. passions and emotions. so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance. Of the Origin of our Ideas. whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers. We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life. and under this name I comprehend all our sensations. and in their pleasures. and make their way into our thought or consciousness. we may hope to establish on them a science. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment. None of them can go beyond experience. PART I. those which arise from the sight and touch. in affairs. are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse. such as. or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared. But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man. and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension. &c. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. which enter with most force and violence. as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phænomenon. and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phænomenon. and from his prudence in avoiding that error. into which so many have fallen. All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds. which I shall call Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind. and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. we sit down contented. indeed. this peculiar disadvantage. connexion. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar. ’tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles. tho’ we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance. as they make their first appearance in the soul. that in collecting its experiments. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation. and all the arts. with premeditation. than the desire itself vanishes. that ’tis a defect common to it with all the sciences. it cannot make them purposely. composition. abstraction. But should I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy. Those perceptions. which is not found in natural. by men’s behaviour in company. Moral philosophy has. of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles. which will not be inferior in certainty. that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason. and take them as they appear in the common course of the world. which is the reason of the mere vulgar. and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I need only put them in that situation. Every one of him7 . or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. for instance. by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader. beside our experience of their reality. of ideas. When we see. and observe what results from it. and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire. excepting only.For nothing is more certain. we may name impressions. their origin. in which we can employ ourselves. I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.

that strikes my eye. and every simple impression a correspondent idea. therefore. This division is into Simple and Complex. tho’ it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. The complex are the contrary to these. I find still the same resemblance and representation. We may next consider how the case stands with our simple perceptions. The first circumstance. and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference2 . In running over my other perceptions. we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. that tho’ there is in general a great resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas. tho’ I never saw any such. but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city. and appear both as impressions and ideas. that they are exact copies of each other. that the rule here holds without any exception. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber. that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads. The common degrees of these are easily distinguished. they are in general so very different. ’tis easy to perceive they are not the same. whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies. yet the rule is not universally true. and that every simple idea has a simple impression. except their degree of force and vivacity. in madness. Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects. that corresponded to them. so that all the perceptions of the mind are double. ’tis impossible to prove by a particular enumeration of them. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem. in a fever. which we form in the dark. that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. Every one may satisfy himself in this point by running over as many as he pleases. that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. But if any one should deny this universal resemblance. and that I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into simple and complex. as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions? I perceive. There is another division of our perceptions. that has not a correspondent idea. is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular. which strikes our eyes in sun-shine. that many of our complex ideas never had impressions. of which I am capable. or a simple idea. not in nature. which it will be convenient to observe. and smell are qualities all united together in this apple. Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the first appearance. After the most accurate examination. which resembles it. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. I venture to affirm. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. differ only in degree. taste. I know no way of convincing him. That idea of red. Thus in sleep. nor is there any circumstance of the one. I observe. and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens.self will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. to limit this general decision. and that impression. that our impressions are so faint and low. and engages my attention for a moment. but by desiring him to shew a simple impression. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances. That the case is the same with all our simple impressions and ideas. Tho’ a particular colour. which is not to be found in the other. This circumstance seems to me remarkable. the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt. and may be distinguished into parts. The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other. and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. but are at least distinguishable from each other. I have seen Paris. or in any very violent emotions of soul. that has not a correspondent 8 .

If he does not answer this challenge. we may from his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion. I consider the order of their first appearance. or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. Now if 9 . not only the impressions are lost. as when one is born blind or deaf. Such a constant conjunction. I am curious to find some other of their qualities. numerous. and which they exactly represent. convey to him these impressions. of sweet or bitter. which give rise to any impressions. is a convincing proof. I first make myself certain. and find by constant experience. in such an infinite number of instances. but never appear in the contrary order. that the one are the causes of the other. which is. The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions. To confirm this I consider another plain and convincing phænomenon. as ’tis certain he cannot.impression. which resembles it. as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas. that the several distinct ideas of colours. tho’ at the same time resembling. Our ideas upon their appearance produce not their correspondent impressions. but proceed not so absurdly. and as the complex are formed from them. nor do we perceive any colour. That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions. and that the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon that of the other. which are convey’d by the hearing. that our impressions are the causes of our ideas. and every simple idea with a correspondent impression. of what I have already asserted. and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof. without having actually tasted it. but likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression. I believe it will readily be allow’d. which are correspondent to them. by a new review. that every simple impression is attended with a correspondent idea. In seeking for phænomena to prove this proposition. That I may know on which side this dependence lies. can never arise from chance. so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them. and which effects. are really different from each other. which requires no farther examination. that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other. Having discover’d this relation. we may affirm in general. or of the ideas on the impressions. that there is a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas. not our ideas of our impressions. or those of sounds. Nor is this only true. that ’tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions. The full examination of this question is the subject of the present treatise. where the organs of sensation are entirely destroy’d. and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition. are obstructed in their operations. that any impressions either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an idea. but in each kind the phænomena are obvious. We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pineapple. and conclusive. or in other words. but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange. which may prove. and which of the impressions and ideas are causes. Thus we find. that where-ever by any accident the faculties. On the other hand we find. that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I immediately conclude. and is only different in the degrees of force and liveliness. Let us consider how they stand with regard to their existence. There is however one contradictory phænomenon. I find only those of two kinds. I present the objects. which enter by the eyes. that the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas. but also their correspondent ideas.

those of Sensation and those of Reflexion. an exception to the rule so much as an explanation of it. and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim. that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions. that as our ideas are images of our impressions. that ’tis scarce worth our observing. which it never has been his fortune to meet with. for instance. as appears from this very reasoning concerning them. and will render this principle of more use in our reasonings. that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the continguous colours. I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all disputes concerning it. and if you will not allow any of the means to be different. tho’ it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can. This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature. you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. is the same with what has made so much noise in other terms. method seems to require we should examine our impressions. except that single one. to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it. For ’tis remarkable. which are images of the primary. and that the exceptions are very rare. descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest. that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas. viz. whether ’tis possible for him. from which they are derived. Suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years. tho’ the instance is so particular and singular. and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds. Since it appears. nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its appearance. from unknown causes. But besides this exception.this be true of different colours. excepting one particular shade of blue. Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas. For if this shou’d be deny’d. and which they represent. than in any other. we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions. but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions. Now if we carefully examine these arguments. when it has been disputed whether there be any innate ideas. that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately from their correspondent impressions. and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate. be plac’d before him. Impressions may be divided into two kinds. and that in the following order. philosophers do nothing but shew. they observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. SECTION II. it may not be amiss to remark on this head. that he will perceive a blank. that each of them produces a distinct idea. properly speaking. and this may serve as a proof. and will be sensible. ’tis plain. that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas. ’tis possible. from his own imagination. that they are conveyed by our senses. Division of the subject. or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion. so we can form secondary ideas. The first kind arises in the soul originally. it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour. This is not. that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with another limitation. by the continual gradation of shades. it still remains true. An impression first strikes upon the 10 . We may observe. than it seems hitherto to have been. Let all the different shades of that colour. independent of the rest. Now I ask. that the present question concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas. where that shade is wanting. to supply this deficiency. before we consider our ideas.

which may properly be called impressions of reflexion. because derived from it. and by that means replaces the idea in its due position. ’Tis the same case in our recollection of those places and persons. which at first sight seems most natural. which is no less evident. These again are copied by the memory and imagination. to which it was in fact posterior. without any power of variation. whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid. which principally deserve our attention. unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them. But of this more fully hereafter3. Of the ideas of the memory and imagination. this 11 . There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas. We find by experience. And as the impressions of reflexion. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral. if he be exact. ’Tis evident at first sight. pleasure or pain of some kind or other. In short. but posterior to those of sensation. when it returns upon the soul. by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner. and cannot without difficulty be preserv’d by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. viz. give a particular account of ideas. and become ideas. desires. arise mostly from ideas. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind. but then he takes notice of this disorder. is called the Memory. and emotions. When we remember any past event. and deriv’d from them. yet the imagination is not restrain’d to the same order and form with the original impressions. and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea. hope and fear. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. An historian may. neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind. SECTION III. it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty. that the memory preserves the original form. and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity. that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination. it again makes its appearance there as an idea. the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner. perhaps. produces the new impressions of desire and aversion.senses. ’Tis evident. and makes us perceive heat or cold. while the memory is in a manner ty’d down in that respect. and this we call an idea. For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas. relate an event before another. before we proceed to impressions. thirst or hunger. that when any impression has been present with the mind. and the other the Imagination. or when it entirely loses that vivacity. This idea of pleasure or pain. and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind. for the more convenient carrying on of his narration. The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas. The faculty. and is a perfect idea. in which its objects were presented. than any which are employ’d by the latter. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas. passions. and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing. namely that tho’ neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination. which remains after the impression ceases. and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours. ’twill be necessary to reverse that method. which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. but their order and position. and therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon. with which we were formerly acquainted.

Nature there is totally confounded. nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas. that without it the mind cannot join two ideas. which commonly prevails. Contiguity in time or place. ’Tis plain. That we may understand the full extent of these relations. which are most proper to be united into a complex one. which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy. and that there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable. we must consider. we shall have occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom. when we consider. and Cause and Effect. but also when there is interposed betwixt them a third object.principle is supported by such a number of common and vulgar phænomena. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider’d as an inseparable connexion. that in the course of our thinking. the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking. ’Tis likewise evident. that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions. As to the connexion. for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force. and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. and take them as they lie contiguous to each other. that there is no relation. and in the constant revolution of our ideas. are three. that this is an evident consequence of the division of ideas into simple and complex. that is made by the relation of cause and effect. for that has been already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude. and therefore shall not at present insist upon it. that two objects are connected together in the imagination. were it not guided by some universal principles. by which one idea naturally introduces another. chance alone wou’d join them. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected. The qualities. ’Tis sufficient to observe.Resemblance. Of the connexion or association of ideas. some associating quality. and is the cause why. and by which the mind is after this manner convey’d from one idea to another. nothing wou’d be more unaccountable than the operations of that faculty. I believe it will not be very necessary to prove. that these qualities produce an association among ideas. are necessitated to change them regularly. viz. among other things. our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it. Not to mention. and monstrous giants. and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. The same evidence follows us in our second principle. and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another. not only when the one is immediately resembling. that as the senses. or the cause of the other. and may be united again in what form it pleases. SECTION IV. and makes one idea more readily recall another. Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas. and nothing mentioned but winged horses. in changing their objects. As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination. Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange. uniform with itself in all times and places. The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of question. languages so nearly correspond to each other. that we may spare ourselves the trouble of insisting on it any farther. in some measure. fiery dragons. contiguous to. and ’tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them. which render it. it can easily produce a separation. than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects. from which this association arises. which 12 . of the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas.

but also when it has a power of producing it. if I may be allowed to use that term. ’tis easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another may connect them in the imagination. Modes. and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. These complex ideas may be divided into Relations. whom we call servant. that all the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect. We shall briefly examine each of these in order. When a person is possess’d of any power. and in many as probable. but as to its causes. they are mostly unknown. when he sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations. especially in the case of authority. tho’ at the same time we may observe. which may be consider’d as the elements of this philosophy.bears to both of them any of these relations. A judge is one. who in all disputed cases can fix by his opinion the possession or property of any thing betwixt any members of the society. and remark. These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas. Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas. by which they are united in our memory. Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher. than those complex ideas. And this we may observe to be the source of all the relations of interest and duty. by which men influence each other in society. Two objects may be consider’d as plac’d in this relation. and are esteemed near or remote. and must be resolv’d into original qualities of human nature. than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes. We may carry this farther. Cousins in the fourth degree are connected by causation. but the exertion of the will. and shall subjoin some considerations concerning our general and particular ideas. much less as child and parent. which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning. not only that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect. Of the three relations above-mention’d this of causation is the most extensive. where the obedience of the subject is a pleasure and advantage to the superior. A master is such-a-one as by his situation. as well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the other. This may be carried on to a great length. and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas. and are plac’d in the ties of government and subordination. 13 . In general we may observe. In that case his enquiry wou’d be much better employ’d in examining the effects than the causes of his principle. which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural. there is no more required to convert it into action. as when the former is the cause of the existence of the latter. For as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself. and Substances. and as the object continues the same in all its different situations. there are none more remarkable. has a power of directing in certain particulars the actions of another. when the one produces a motion or any action in the other. Here is a kind of Attraction. but not so closely as brothers. and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion. that each remove considerably weakens the relation. consider’d in a certain light. arising either from force or agreement. and having establish’d any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments. before we leave the present subject. which I pretend not to explain. rest contented with that. and that in every case is consider’d as possible. Its effects are every where conspicuous. according to the number of connecting causes interpos’d betwixt the persons.

that nothing can be more distant than such or such things from each other. does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any single object. Two colours. Of relations. that are of the same kind. &c. Identity may be esteem’d a second species of relation. which is another very fertile source of relation. but by presenting at once too great a choice. But let us consider. Thus of two objects. as if distance and relation were incompatible. or number. which are plainly 14 . that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance. nothing can have less relation. 5. But if we diligently consider them. by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination. in which they possess it. whose existence has any duration. the one may be either of greater. without which no philosophical relation can exist. above.SECTION V. and the one naturally introduces the other. 4. in which. and is common to a great many individuals. Either for that quality. After identity the most universal and comprehensive relations are those of Space and Time. which are both heavy. Of all relations the most universal is that of identity. and ’tis only in philosophy. When a quality becomes very general. after the manner above-explained. because we acquire an idea of it by the comparing of objects: But in a common way we say. without examining the nature and foundation of personal identity. except those of existence and non-existence. Thus distance will be allowed by philosophers to be a true relation. that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas. which make objects admit of comparison. In common language the former is always the sense. 2. such as distant. without a connecting principle. When any two objects possess the same quality in common. All those objects. that we extend it to mean any particular subject of comparison. which are the sources of an infinite number of comparisons. and in that respect admit of comparison. The first is resemblance: And this is a relation. relation. in which we use the word. which may be considered as the sources of all philosophical relation. 3. it does not follow. 1. or for that particular circumstance. which admit of quantity. the degrees. below. 6. but what have some degree of resemblance. it leads not the mind directly to any one of them. or less weight than with the other. form a fifth species of relation. and by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced. even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy. This relation I here consider as apply’d in its strictest sense to constant and unchangeable objects. which shall find its place afterwards. that no two ideas are in themselves contrary. It may perhaps be esteemed an endless task to enumerate all those qualities. since no objects will admit of comparison. before. But tho’ resemblance be necessary to all philosophical relation. may be compar’d in that particular. being common to every being. contiguous. The word Relation is commonly used in two senses considerably different from each other. we shall find that without difficulty they may be compriz’d under seven general heads. we may think proper to compare them. after. may yet be of different shades. The relation of contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule.

it must be a colour. But that I consider rather as a negation of relation. But the impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions. The simple ideas of which modes are formed. All other objects. shall be explain’d afterwards. But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this. It might naturally be expected. Thus our idea of gold may at first be a yellow colour. tho’ the latter excludes the object from all times and places. the other of kind. The first is called a difference of number. whether the idea of substance be deriv’d from the impressions of sensation or reflexion? If it be convey’d to us by our senses. and imagine we have clear ideas of each. fusibility. But I believe none will assert. that collection. The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode. distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities. by which we are able to recall. we join that to the other qualities. Of modes and substances. which of them. in which they are supposed to inhere. that substance is either a colour. malleableness. gives entrance to whatever quality afterwards occurs. and from the contrariety of their causes or effects. as well as a natural one. nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. SECTION VI. if it really exist. which first presented themselves. that I should join difference to the other relations. in which it is supposed not to exist.resembling. the uniting principle is not regarded as the foundation of the complex idea. and so of the other senses. a taste. which relation of cause and effect is a seventh philosophical relation. is evident from considering their nature. even tho’ it did not enter into the first conception of the substance. that whatever new simple quality we discover to have the same connexion with the rest. We have therefore no idea of substance. or if they be all united together. than as any thing real or positive. or granting this fiction should not take place. 7. and suppose it to belong to the substance as much as if its idea had from the beginning made a part of the compound one. I ask. but are dispers’d in different subjects. that are united by the imagination. I wou’d fain ask those philosophers. a sound. and have a particular name assigned them. That this cannot take place in modes. as are the others. Difference is of two kinds as oppos’d either to identity or resemblance. who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident. if by the ears. are only found to be contrary from experience. if by the palate. either represent qualities. are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation. The resemblance implied in this relation. which form a substance. or a taste. which are not united by contiguity and causation. as implying both of them an idea of the object. The idea of a dance is an instance of the first 15 . or sound. The effect of this is. but upon the discovery of its dissolubility in aqua regia. and is equally comprehended by it. The idea of substance must therefore be deriv’d from an impression or reflexion. weight. is nothing but a collection of simple ideas. are commonly refer’d to an unknown something. such as fire and water. we immediately comprehend it among them. that the particular qualities. and after what manner? If it be perceiv’d by the eyes. heat. and cold. either to ourselves or others. none of which can possibly represent a substance. The principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex idea.

and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals. which distinguishes the mode. For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable. and that whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable. To begin with the first proposition. as. notwithstanding all our abstractions and 16 . that the precise length of a line is not different nor distinguishable from the line itself. however imperfect. and our abstract ideas have been suppos’d to represent no particular degree either of quantity or quality. we may prove this by the three following arguments. First. first. whether abstraction implies a separation. it has been commonly infer’d in favour of the latter. and has asserted. we need only consider it in this view. or by representing no particular one at all. and that an object ceases not to be of any particular species on account of every small alteration in its extension. which we abstract from in our general ideas. that these propositions are equally true in the inverse. as implying an infinite capacity in the mind. We have observ’d. They are consequently conjoined with each other in the conception. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition. annexed to a certain term. SECTION VII. if not all of them. and examine. whether they be general or particular in the mind’s conception of them. without changing the name. nor the precise degree of any quality from the quality. that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of degrees of each. The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities. or distinguish what is not different? In order therefore to know. by proving. may serve all the purposes of reflexion and conversation. that of beauty of the second. we abstract from every particular degree of quantity and quality. in such a manner at least. and that whatever objects are distinguishable are also different. But that this inference is erroneous. therefore. which have afforded so much speculation to philosophers. A very material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas. that here is a plain dilemma. that in forming most of our general ideas. why such complex ideas cannot receive any new idea. yet we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality. whether all the circumstances. admit no more of separation than they do of distinction and difference. that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones. and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. It may therefore be thought. ’Tis evident. which gives them a more extensive signification. which ’tis concluded it cannot do. I shall endeavour to make appear. duration and other properties. that decides concerning the nature of those abstract ideas. These ideas.kind of modes. be such as are distinguishable and different from those. that whatever objects are different are distinguishable. I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments. which are similar to them. without forming a precise notion of its degrees: And secondly by showing. which we retain as essential parts of them. and the general idea of a line. that tho’ the capacity of the mind be not infinite. which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy. A4 great philosopher has disputed the receiv’d opinion in this particular. that ’tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters. The reason is obvious. but either by representing at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities. Of abstract ideas. But ’tis evident at first sight. And we may here add.

17 . But to form the idea of an object. we abridge that work by a more partial consideration. as we may be prompted by a present design or necessity. or in other words. it must also be absurd in idea. and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality. and makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances and proportions. But as the production of all the ideas. that are different in many respects from that idea. has in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity and quality. and find but few inconveniences to arise in our reasoning from that abridgment. which is immediately present to the mind. Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual. however they may become general in their representation. and that ’tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent. Impressions and ideas differ only in their strength and vivacity. and even implies the flattest of all contradictions. but keep ourselves in a readiness to survey any of them. The foregoing conclusion is not founded on any particular degree of vivacity.refinements. nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the imagination. and yet is possest of no precise degree of either. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object. we apply the same name to all of them. ’tis confest. the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination. it follows. The confusion. for which we may have occasion. but only in power. proceeds only from their faintness and unsteadiness. But as the same word is suppos’d to have been frequently applied to other individuals. however it may be made to represent others. that often occur to us. that every thing in nature is individual. and are nothing but copies and representations of them. and to form an idea simply is the same thing. and that custom produces any other individual one. that no object can appear to the senses. in which impressions are sometimes involv’d. the word not being able to revive the idea of all these individuals. It cannot therefore be affected by any variation in that particular. only touches the soul. that ’tis possible for the same thing both to be and not to be. the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects. This application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life. The word raises up an individual idea. of which in itself it bears no mark or character. is in most cases impossible. They are not really and in fact present to the mind. that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea. without being determin’d in its degrees both of quantity and quality. which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. After we have acquired a custom of this kind. whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality. that is not limited and confin’d in both these particulars. if I may be allow’d so to speak. Secondly. Thirdly. along with a certain custom. and whatever other differences may appear among them. not from any capacity in the mind to receive any impression. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality. to which the name may be apply’d. the case must be the same with its copy or representative. and revives that custom. which we have acquir’d by surveying them. An idea is a weaker impression. Now as ’tis impossible to form an idea of an object. Now since all ideas are deriv’d from impressions. whatever is true of the one must be acknowledg’d concerning the other. that no impression can become present to the mind. viz. That is a contradiction in terms. tho’ the application of it in our reasoning be the same. When we have found a resemblance among several objects. which is the second proposition I propos’d to explain. as if it were universal. ’tis a principle generally receiv’d in philosophy. which in its real existence has no particular degree nor proportion. that is possest of quantity and quality. which have different degrees of both. since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible.

that after the mind has produc’d an individual idea. that when we mention any great number. and shou’d we afterwards assert. under which the number is comprehended. of a rectilineal figure. If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon occasion. in order to make itself comprehend its own meaning. To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossible. figure. that no conclusion be form’d contrary to any ideas. which it intends to express by the general term. but general in their representation. First then I observe. On other occasions the custom is more entire. reviv’d by the general or abstract term. however in our ideas. which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas. All these terms. the other individuals of a scalenum and isoceles. whenever any present occasion requires it. but only a power of producing such an idea. and form the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it. Thus the idea of an equilateral triangle of an inch perpendicular may serve us in talking of a figure. and thereby keep the mind in a readiness to observe. which are usually compriz’d under them. and that those. tho’ it be true with relation to that idea. and readily recalls them in the imagination. by which we recall them. for which we may have occasion. such as a thousand. the mind has generally no adequate idea of it. if we can give any satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy. which remain. and ’tis after this manner we account for the foregoing paradox. of giving a satisfactory explication of this act of the mind. to a term. which we overlook’d at first.For this is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the present affair. that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other. that agrees not with it. and is excited by any word or sound. immediately crowd in upon us. ’tis certain that we form the idea of individuals. but may run over several. upon which we reason. it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties. This imperfection. triangles of different sizes and proportions. which so readily recalls every particular idea. is 18 . is by producing other instances. The most proper method. to which we commonly annex it. must be with regard to that custom. readily suggests any other individual. ’Tis sufficient. the attendant custom. Nay so entire is the custom. That we may fix the meaning of the word. But this is principally the case with those ideas which are abstruse and compounded. squares. are only represented by means of that habit. Before those habits have become entirely perfect. perhaps the mind may not be content with forming the idea of only one individual. of a regular figure. that is. without any danger of mistake. The only difficulty. which we had form’d. are in this case attended with the same idea. and such a one as is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry. parallelograms. which are analogous to it. by its adequate idea of the decimals. they excite their particular habits. and may be employ’d in different reasonings. that some ideas are particular in their nature. This then is the nature of our abstract ideas and general terms. and the compass of that collection. A particular idea becomes general by being annex’d to a general term. we may revolve in our mind the ideas of circles. Thus shou’d we mention the word. which facilitate its operation. and other principles. and make us perceive the falshood of this proposition. but as they are wont to be apply’d in a greater or lesser compass. and of an equilateral triangle. and may not rest on one image or idea. therefore. in my opinion. of a triangle. However this may be. and ’tis seldom we run into such errors. if by chance we form any reasoning. triangle. that can remain on this subject. that we seldom or never can exhaust these individuals. whenever we use any general term. that the very same idea may be annext to several different words.

But to tell the truth I place my chief confidence in what I have already prov’d concerning the impossibility of general ideas. and presents them at the very instant. Perhaps these four reflexions may help to remove all difficulties to the hypothesis I have propos’d concerning abstract ideas. There may not. who has by rote any periods of a discourse. and at the same time finite in their number. Nothing is more admirable. which he is at a loss to recollect. Of this kind is the distinction betwixt figure and the body figur’d. be any present. which they bear to each other. I believe every one. which are different. beside those very ideas. As the individuals are collected together.never felt in our reasonings. and there plainly is none beside what I have propos’d. or any number of verses. by that single word or expression. Fourthly. ’Tis however observable. than the readiness. and may perceive any repugnance among the ideas. we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas. if they be not different. and make them be suggested more readily upon occasion. will be put in remembrance of the whole. according to the common method of explaining them. as when a person. will agree with me. that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation. and plac’d under a general term with a view to that resemblance. with which the imagination suggests its ideas. we have several instances of habits. Secondly. still follows the words. tho’ it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses. as well as if we had a full comprehension of them. either in reflexion or conversation. that are thus collected by a kind of magical faculty in the soul. we shou’d say. in the schools. which belong to any subject. is however inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding. and that in talking of government. which may be reviv’d by one single word. Thus if instead of saying. are separable. which has hitherto prevail’d in philosophy. and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition. so contrary to that. this relation must facilitate their entrance in the imagination. their ideas can neither be separable nor 19 . ’tis only by custom they can become general in their representation. motion and the body mov’d. that notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects. that if the figure be different from the body. we shall find great reason to be satisfy’d in this particular. that we do not annex distinct and compleat ideas to every term we make use of. conquest. their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas. Before I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain that distinction of reason. church. who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning. negotiation. and is so little understood. the custom. One would think the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view. which we have acquir’d of attributing certain relations to ideas. For it follows from thence. in the same manner as one particular idea may serve us in reasoning concerning other ideas. and contain an infinite number of other ideas under them. which. Thirdly. The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle above explain’d. in which they become necessary or useful. with which they begin. which is so much talk’d of. however. that all ideas. If ideas be particular in their nature. And indeed if we consider the common progress of the thought. of which these complex ones are compos’d. however different from it in several circumstances. and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper for our purpose. that they have always recourse to conquest. and is properly what we call a genius. We must certainly seek some new system on this head. which seems to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas.

But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white. and the latter so readily believe them. of which they are susceptible. and comparing them with our former object. that we shou’d consider the colour and figure together. ’Tis certain that the mind wou’d never have dream’d of distinguishing a figure from the body figur’d. and will never be perswaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation. nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. ’twou’d be sufficiently evident from the plainest observation and experience. we turn our view to its resemblance with the cube of white marble. we consider the figure and colour together. nor different. gives such a satisfaction to the mind. any thing propos’d to us. but still view them in different aspects. did it not observe. as shewing the superiority of their science. while the former furnish such plenty of strange and unaccountable opinions. or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance. On the other hand. of which custom renders us. that even in this simplicity there might be contain’d many different resemblances and relations. When we wou’d consider only the figure of the globe of white marble. ’Tis universally allow’d. that whatever is capable of being divided in infinitum. but his meaning is. we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason. which cou’d discover opinions so remote from vulgar conception. insensible. ’Tis also obvious. and that ’tis impossible to set any bounds to the number of parts. that it indulges itself in those agreeable emotions. perfectly inseparable. as being in reality neither distinguishable. By this means we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflexion. with the examination of which I shall begin this subject of the ideas of space and time. that the capacity of the mind is limited. we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos’d in a certain form. SECTION I. that is. After a little more practice of this kind. Thus when a globe of white marble is presented. and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity: And tho’ it were not allow’d. nor separable. since it implies neither a difference nor separation? To remove this difficulty we must have recourse to the foregoing explication of abstract ideas. Of this mutual complaisance I cannot give a more evident instance than in the doctrine of infinite divisibility. when we wou’d consider its colour only. PART II. and really is. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME. What then is meant by a distinction of reason. and is contrary to the first and most unprejudic’d notions of mankind is often greedily embrac’d by philosophers. From these dispositions in philosophers and their disciples arises that mutual complaisance betwixt them. we find two separate resemblances. which causes surprize and admiration. Whatever has the air of a paradox. Of the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time. but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble: And in the same manner. according to the resemblances. A person. we form in reality an idea both of the figure and colour. who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour. must consist of an infinite number of parts. but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble. in a great measure. in what formerly seem’d. desires an impossibility.distinguishable. It requires scarce 20 . without setting bounds at the same time to the division. since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable.

what was formerly imperceptible. This mistake we are not sensible of. Put a spot of ink upon paper. that the moment before it vanish’d the image or impression was perfectly indivisible. which. and advances to a minimum. and may raise up to itself an idea. and that ’tis impossible for the imagination to form an adequate idea. and according to that of indivisible parts or atoms. fix your eye upon that spot. that we can form ideas. and images. that there are other objects vastly more minute. is utterly impossible. that the minute parts of distant bodies convey not any sensible impression. by which I represent the grain of sand itself. by reason of the vast number and multiplicity of these parts. that the capacity of the mind is limited on both sides. which shall be no greater than the smallest atom of the animal spirits of an insect a thousand times less than a mite: And we ought rather to conclude. ’tis plain. are nothing different from each other. 21 . at which their impressions were reduc’d to a minimum. but that by proper distinctions and separations we may run up this idea to inferior ones. But whatever we may imagine of the thing. and by that means both gives parts to impressions. of which it cannot conceive any sub-division. the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable. and represent as minute and uncompounded what is really great and compos’d of a vast number of parts. but because they are remov’d beyond that distance. I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions. The only defect of our senses is. and retire to such a distance. which we form of any finite quality.any induction to conclude from hence. ’Tis the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas of the imagination. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand. which will be perfectly simple and indivisible. which always flow’d from them. or an infinite number of different ideas. nor separable into twenty. we must have a distinct idea representing every part of them. A microscope or telescope. much less into a thousand. which appear to the senses. and what is distinguishable is separable. ’Tis not for want of rays of light striking on our eyes. This however is certain. according to the system of infinite divisibility. that these are inferior to any idea of our imagination or impression of our senses. We may hence discover the error of the common opinion. ten thousand. since there are ideas and images perfectly simple and indivisible. and were incapable of any farther diminution. which renders them visible. which is suppos’d so vastly to exceed them. which appear to the senses. is extremely difficult. that the difficulty lies in enlarging our conceptions so much as to form a just notion of a mite. In rejecting the infinite capacity of the mind. nor inferior to that image. we suppose it may arrive at an end in the division of its ideas. that the imagination reaches a minimum. that the idea. What consists of parts is distinguishable into them. and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation. nor are there any possible means of evading the evidence of this conclusion. and finding by reason. but the images. Nothing can be more minute. that at last you lose sight of it. is not infinitely divisible. that they give us disproportion’d images of things. which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves. produces not any new rays of light. but only spreads those. to be equal or nearly equal to the objects. of what goes beyond a certain degree of minuteness as well as of greatness. ’Tis therefore certain. than some ideas. which we form in the fancy. we too hastily conclude. but taking the impressions of those minute objects. or even of an insect a thousand times less than a mite. For in order to form a just notion of these animals. which to the naked eye appear simple and uncompounded.

that the idea of extension must also become infinite. Of the infinite divisibility of space and time. and is never applicable to number. nay the whole universe may be consider’d as an unite. which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together. and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity. that whatever I discover by its means must be a real quality of extension. and if you deny the existence of the latter. nor can such an unity any more exist alone than number can. thrice. contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects. and is inexhaustible in its sub-divisions. and were I to carry on the addition in infinitum. which we should immediately arrive at. but on account of the unites. is of another kind. the idea of extension ceases to augment. The whole globe of the earth. For by the same rule these twenty men may be consider’d as an unite. The plain consequence is. in proportion as I repeat more or less the same idea. twice. When I stop in the addition of parts. ’Tis in vain to reply. and being certain that there is nothing more minute than this idea. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension. I first take the least idea I can form of a part of extension. and find the compound idea of extension. &c. and consequently that no finite extension is infinitely divisible5 .SECTION II. Twenty men may be said to exist. which can exist alone. &c. That term of unity is merely a fictitious denomination. that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts: And vice versa. otherwise the division would be stopt short by the indivisible parts. but ’tis only because one. if it be a contradiction to suppose. must be really impossible and contradictory. But that this latter supposition is absurd. of which the number is compos’d. that any determinate quantity of extension is an unite. I clearly perceive. Upon the whole. till at last it swells up to a considerable bulk. ’Tis therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to exist. always to augment. two. &c. and as extension is always a number. that extension can never at all exist. arising from its repetition. ’Tis evident. they can never become inferior to some ideas. and yet deny the existence of unites. as being in reality a true number. which seems to me very strong and beautiful. I conclude. I then repeat this idea once. and become double. and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human knowledge. Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects. 22 . according to the common sentiment of metaphysicians. quadruple. it follows. three. that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts. that existence in itself belongs only to unity. that of the former falls of course. I easily convince myself by the consideration of my clear ideas. If therefore any finite extension be infinitely divisible. no finite extension can be infinitely divisible. and never resolves itself into any unite or indivisible quantity. without any farther excuse or evasion. greater or smaller. and thro’ whatever divisions and subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arriv’d at. it can be no contradiction to suppose. the relations. but such-a-one as admits of an infinite number of fractions. which we form. I conclude. that whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas. that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts. and must be perfectly indivisible. are existent. triple. four. I may subjoin another argument propos’d by a noted author6 . But the unity. Every thing capable of being infinitely divided contains an infinite number of parts. that the idea of an infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension. and whose existence is necessary to that of all number.

that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738. or that the person himself. that ’tis utterly impossible they can have any just foundation. and that the doctrine of indivisible points is also liable to unanswerable objections. and if each moment. and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. I doubt not but it will readily be allow’d by the most obstinate defender of the doctrine of infinite divisibility. ’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics. that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. every moment must be distinct from. the former must be equally so. is not infinitely divisible. ’Tis either irresistible. that these arguments are difficulties. either that human reason is nothing but a play of words. there would be an infinite number of co-existent moments. If the latter. for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? ’Tis likewise certain. which consists of parts or inferior ideas.All this reasoning takes place with regard to time. and ballancing of arguments in such a question as this. as is evident from the nature of motion. and endeavouring by that means to elude its force and evidence. Before I examine these arguments and objections in detail. therefore. A demonstration. that are perfectly indivisible: consequently this idea implies no contradiction: consequently ’tis possible for extension really to exist conformable to it: and consequently all the arguments employ’d against the possibility of mathematical points are mere scholastick quibbles. tho’ divisible into parts or inferior ideas. We can form the idea of a golden mountain. must be compos’d of indivisible moments. if just. ’Tis not in demonstrations as in probabilities. nor consists of an infinite number of parts: For that exceeds the comprehension of our limited capacities. or in other words. For the same reason. ’Tis true. than this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration. that there are here equally strong arguments on the other side of the question. 23 . that time. when once they are comprehended. which it may be proper to take notice of. who talks so. or parts of time. ’Tis certain then. because of the abstractedness of the subject. and consequently can never be a difficulty. and if not just. that this idea. that difficulties can take place. ’tis a mere sophism. The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time. and which in a manner constitutes its essence. has not a capacity equal to such subjects. Demonstrations may be difficult to be comprehended. that each of its parts succeeds another. along with an additional argument. admits of no opposite difficulty. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley. as it exists. can ever be co-existent. That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence. and one argument counter-ballance another. and posterior or antecedent to another. For if in time we could never arrive at an end of division. Now ’tis certain we have an idea of extension. Here then is an idea of extension. and endeavour by a short and decisive reason to prove at once. ’Tis a property inseparable from time. as it succeeds another. and unworthy of our attention. be impossible. but can never have any such difficulties as will weaken their authority. however contiguous. But here we may observe. and that none of them. is to confess. To talk therefore of objections and replies. and therefore regard it as impossible. mathematicians are wont to say. that nothing can be more absurd. and diminish its authority. were not perfectly single and indivisible. which I believe will be allow’d to be an arrant contradiction. or has no manner of force. I will here take them in a body. and that ’tis impossible to give any answer to them which will be perfectly clear and satisfactory. as conceiv’d by the imagination.

of which they are compos’d. and that every idea. and finding a resemblance in the disposition of colour’d points. and of all the different compositions of these. in order to discover farther the nature of our ideas of space and time. white. and of the manner of their appearance. or manner of appearance. that impressions always take the precedency of them. to tell exactly their nature and composition. and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical. Of the other qualities of our ideas of space and time. and decides without appeal concerning the nature of the idea. since ’tis certain these demonstrations cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points. is borrow’d from. This idea. or some internal impressions arising from these sensations. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther. These latter perceptions are all so clear and evident. tho’ many of our ideas are so obscure. I desire it may be pointed out to me. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points. which can convey to us this original impression. I perceive many visible bodies. we may conclude with certainty. as far as possible. Nay even when the resemblance is carry’d beyond the objects of one sense. Let us apply this principle. with which the imagination is furnish’d. emotions. must either be some sensations deriv’d from the sight. from which the idea of space is deriv’d. the impressions similar to this idea of extension.These consequences we may carry one step farther. The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. first makes its appearance in a correspondent impression. SECTION III. which is exactly similar to it. the points were of a purple colour. I acquire the idea of extension. and considering the distance betwixt these bodies. But afterwards having experience of the other colours of violet. dispos’d in a certain manner. There remains therefore nothing but the senses. green. which ’tis an evident absurdity to pretend to. will ever be asserted to be the model. But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther. Upon opening my eyes. As every idea is deriv’d from some impression. black. and turning them to the surrounding objects. this does not hinder the abstract idea from 24 . and upon shutting them again. in which they agree. none of which. and represents some impression. I believe. and found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points. red. with which alone we are acquainted. which this moment appears to the senses. and the impressions of touch are found to be similar to those of sight in the disposition of their parts. then. which forms them. Our internal impressions are our passions. we omit the peculiarities of colour. that they admit of no controversy. that ’tis almost impossible even for the mind. or composition of colour’d points. Now what impression do our senses here convey to us? This is the principal question. but also bestow on them that precise colour. that in every repetition of that idea we wou’d not only place the points in the same order with respect to each other. than that abovemention’d. it follows. from which we first receiv’d the idea of extension. Suppose that in the extended object. No discovery cou’d have been made more happily for deciding all controversies concerning ideas. that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour’d points. desires and aversions.

consider’d in a certain light. that time or duration consists of different parts: For otherwise we cou’d not conceive a longer or shorter duration. which comprehends a still greater variety than that of space. But this is precisely the case with respect to time. that time in its first appearance to the mind is always conjoin’d with a succession of changeable objects. ’Tis evident. and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation. are in others vastly wide of each other. compar’d with our successive perceptions. and is what distinguishes it from duration. ’Tis also evident. the same duration appears longer or shorter to his imagination. Having therefore found. produces none that can give us the idea of time. All abstract ideas are really nothing but particular ones. that is distinguishable. will afford us an instance of an abstract idea. is insensible of time. The idea of time. or attended with a steady unchangeable object. but is always discover’d by some perceivable succession of changeable objects. and that otherwise it can never fall under our notice. that our perceptions have certain bounds in this particular. according to the maxims above-explain’d. or strongly occupy’d with one thought. and consequently that idea must be deriv’d from a succession of changeable objects. that are not co-existent. which. so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time. it will present to the senses an image of a circle of fire.representing both. and if they be not distinguishable. we may conclude. and yet is represented in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and quality. and beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought. and time in its first appearance can never be sever’d from such a succession. nor is it possible for time alone ever to make its appearance. It has been remark’d by a7 great philosopher. be separable in idea. that these parts are not co-existent: For that quality of the co-existence of parts belongs to extension. Every thing. meerly because ’tis impossible for our perceptions to succeed each other with the same rapidity. we must now examine whether it can be conceiv’d without our conceiving any succession of objects. As ’tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space. and whether it can alone form a distinct idea in the imagination. To confirm this we may add the following argument. that is different. as well as from many others. but being annexed to general terms. or be taken notice of by the mind. upon account of their resemblance. being deriv’d from the succession of our perceptions of every kind. ideas as well as impressions. From these phænomena. either alone. since it produces none but co-existent impressions. which to me seems perfectly decisive and convincing. if they be different from each other. we need only consider. ’tis plain they may be conceiv’d apart. is distinguishable. that motion may be communicated to external objects. they are not distinguishable. which are join’d in impression. even tho’ there be a real succession in the objects. and according as his perceptions succeed each other with greater or less rapidity. The idea of time is 25 . they cannot be separated. which are fix’d by the original nature and constitution of the mind. and to comprehend objects. they are able to represent a vast variety. may be separated. Now as time is compos’d of parts. In order to know whether any objects. as they are alike in some particulars. nor will there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its revolutions. Wherever we have no successive perceptions. If on the contrary they be not different. If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity. we have no notion of time. in which case. A man in a sound sleep. and every thing. that time cannot make its appearance to the mind. an unchangeable object.

and can never without a fiction represent or be apply’d to any other. in which the different sounds make their appearance. and is founded only on that simple principle. without making one of the number. since the question itself has scarce ever yet been thought of. we shall consider8 afterwards. or objects dispos’d in a certain manner. 26 . which is absurd. Ideas always represent the objects or impressions. which are indivisible. Is it therefore nothing? That is absolutely impossible. The ideas of some objects it certainly must have. and plainly distinguishable from them.not deriv’d from a particular impression mix’d up with others. But here it only takes notice of the manner. These five sounds making their appearance in this particular manner. let us take one of those simple indivisible ideas. By what fiction we apply the idea of time. and suppose. For the idea of extension consists of parts. and considering it apart. and this idea. that the idea of duration is always deriv’d from a succession of changeable objects. ’Tis plain it is not the idea of extension. but arises altogether from the manner. ever extract from them any new original idea. and separating it from all others. nor is it possible for it without these ideas ever to arrive at any conception of time. nor produce an affection of any kind. it can never in any propriety or exactness be apply’d to it. which establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time. which since it appears not as any primary distinct impression. that it feels some new original impression arise from such a contemplation. is compos’d of such ideas. which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses. excite no emotion in the mind. that is distinguishable. even to what is unchangeable. Here therefore I must ask. but seldom concerning the nature of their ideas. that the idea of duration is applicable in a proper sense to objects. nor can the mind. For as the compound idea of extension. as is common. But to be convinc’d of its falsehood we need but reflect on the foregoing conclusion. were these so many non-entities. can plainly be nothing but different ideas. which is real. Nor is it a sixth impression. that our ideas of them are compounded of parts. This argument may be worth the examining. is perfectly simple and indivisible. being also separable. Every idea. there wou’d be a real existence compos’d of non-entities. which are perfectly unchangeable. nor can any thing unchangeable be ever said to have duration. tho’ time be not a sixth impression. in which impressions appear to the mind. For that is necessary to produce a new idea of reflection. that duration is a measure of rest as well as of motion. Five notes play’d on a flute give us the impression and idea of time. We are wont to dispute concerning the nature of mathematical points. according to the supposition. succeeding each other. which being observ’d by it can give rise to a new idea. and that it may afterwards consider without considering these particular sounds. and can never be convey’d to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable. but may conjoin it with any other objects. or impressions. that is. from which they are deriv’d. let us form a judgment of its nature and qualities. that since the idea of duration cannot be deriv’d from such an object. unless nature has so fram’d its faculties. of which the compound one of extension is form’d. There is another very decisive argument. and this I take to be the common opinion of philosophers as well as of the vulgar. I know there are some who pretend. which the mind by reflection finds in itself. For it inevitably follows from thence. What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point? No wonder if my answer appear somewhat new. by revolving over a thousand times all its ideas of sensation.

Now such as the parts are. We have therefore no idea of space or extension. which represents extension. beginning with those against the finite divisibility of extension. SECTION IV. they are utterly annihilated to the thought or imagination. is more proper to prove this connexion and dependance of the one part upon the other. and the non-entity 27 . which I shall take notice of. such is the whole. or a time. It has often been maintain’d in the schools. which have been urg’d against both of them. Our system concerning space and time consists of two parts. become at last indivisible. in infinitum. The other part of our system is a consequence of this. since their infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory. But if the idea of extension really can exist. Objections answer’d. in other words. There is nothing but the idea of their colour or tangibility. but of a finite number. consequently no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas. the sight and touch. than to destroy either of them. into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves. and these simple and indivisible: ’Tis therefore possible for space and time to exist conformable to this idea: And if it be possible. and these indivisible parts. If a point be not consider’d as colour’d or tangible. The first depends on this chain of reasoning. and makes it be conceivable by the mind. are inconceivable when not fill’d with something real and existent. its parts must also exist. ’Tis not only requisite. But this is not all. The capacity of the mind is not infinite. that the indivisible moments of time must be fill’d with some real object or existence. nor does any thing ever appear extended. being nothing in themselves. that these atoms shou’d be colour’d or tangible. that is not either visible or tangible. it can convey to us no idea. but when we regard it as an object either of our sight or feeling. which is compos’d of the ideas of these points. I. which can render them conceivable by the mind. and consequently can never by its conjunction with others form a real existence. The ideas of space and time are therefore no separate or distinct ideas. That compound impression. because a mathematical point is a non-entity. The intimate connexion betwixt these parts of our system is the reason why we shall examine together the objections. ’tis impossible to conceive either a vacuum and extension without matter. and consequently the idea of extension. because the system of mathematical points is absurd. which are intimately connected together. as we are conscious it does. that are indivisible to the eye or feeling. ’tis also necessary we shou’d preserve the idea of their colour or tangibility in order to comprehend them by our imagination. This wou’d be perfectly decisive. The same reasoning will prove. ’tis certain they actually do exist conformable to it. consists of several lesser impressions. were there no medium betwixt the infinite divisibility of matter. The parts. can never possibly exist. must be consider’d as colour’d or tangible. and that system is absurd. in which objects exist: Or. whose succession forms the duration. that extension must be divisible. but merely those of the manner or order. The first of these objections. and in order to that. in order to discover themselves to our senses. Upon the removal of the ideas of these sensible qualities. when there was no succession or change in any real existence. and may be call’d impressions of atoms or corpuscles endow’d with colour and solidity.The idea of space is convey’d to the mind by two senses.

& totaliter. that upon your return and nearer approach the spot first becomes visible by short intervals. the bestowing a colour or solidity on these points. Before the approach we have the idea of two bodies. if extension consisted of mathematical points. many questions which may arise concerning it. and in proper expressions. from the very supposition of its perfect simplicity. is no more extended than either of them. viz. and at the same time renders it so difficult to give a satisfactory answer to them. secundum se. Taking then penetration in this sense. and afterwards. must necessarily penetrate it. The second objection is deriv’d from the necessity there wou’d be of penetration. which excludes all parts. But there is evidently a medium. does he not evidently perceive. because of the uneasiness it finds in the conception of such a minute object as a single point. Put a spot of ink upon paper. and in its whole essence. is too absurd to need a refutation. of which each preserves its existence distinct and separate. After it we have the idea only of one. II. and to unite in such a manner that the body. what possibly can become of them? Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? Or if these colours unite into one. But ’tis evident this penetration is nothing but the annihilation of one of these bodies. that the spot becomes altogether invisible. A real extension. ’tis this we must mean when we talk of penetration. It must therefore touch it intimately. tota. and retire to such a distance. ’tis still difficult for the imagination to break it into its component parts. and afterwards becomes always visible. and wherever objects are different. what new colour will they produce by their union? What chiefly gives rise to these objections. if he sees a necessity. which is the very definition of penetration. which is compounded and divisible. when it has encreas’d to such a degree as to be really extended. is the natural infirmity and unsteadiness both of our imagination and senses. 28 . Suppose two bodies containing no void within their circumference. that touches another. that from the union of these points there results an object. and the preservation of the other. for the annihilation of one body upon its approach to another. can never exist without parts. without our being able to distinguish particularly which is preserv’d and which annihilated. I answer this objection by substituting a juster idea of penetration. A blue and a red point may surely lie contiguous without any penetration or annihilation. such as a physical point is suppos’d to be. For if they cannot. they are distinguishable and separable by the imagination. I ask any one. that a colour’d or tangible point shou’d be annihilated upon the approach of another colour’d or tangible point? On the contrary. when employ’d on such minute objects. for ’tis impossible it can touch it by its external parts. ’Tis impossible for the mind to preserve any notion of difference betwixt two bodies of the same nature existing in the same place at the same time. the better to prevent their coalition and confusion. This infirmity affects most of our reasonings on the present subject.of mathematical points. you will find. and afterwards acquires only a new force in its colouring without augmenting its bulk. The system of physical points. and makes it almost impossible to answer in an intelligible manner. A simple and indivisible atom. and the absurdity of both the extremes is a demonstration of the truth and reality of this medium. different from each other. But penetration is impossible: Mathematical points are of consequence equally impossible. which is another medium. notwithstanding its contiguity to the other? Let him aid his fancy by conceiving these points to be of different colours. and may be distinguish’d into two parts. which results from their union. to approach each other.

and as this terminating idea cannot itself consist of parts or inferior ideas. than the first idea it form’d. that we have no clear idea of it. which terminates the idea of every finite quantity. and if it be contrary in its demonstrations. A surface terminates a solid. ’Tis evident that all this is perfectly unintelligible upon any other supposition than that of the composition of extension by indivisible points or atoms. The first is. yet by an abstraction without a separation. For let these ideas be suppos’d infinitely divisible. There have been many objections drawn from the mathematics against the indivisibility of the parts of extension. for no one will pretend to draw a line or make a surface entirely conformable to the definition: They never can exist. that if it be impossible for the mind to arrive at a minimum in its ideas. lines and points.III. which finish’d the 29 . and upon its seizing the last of these parts. of which its idea of any extension wou’d be compos’d. ’tis impossible it cou’d ever be conceiv’d. after the manner above explain’d. are mere ideas in the mind. we can consider the one without regarding the other. But as in fact there must be something. The length is inseparable from the breadth both in nature and in our minds. In refuting this answer I shall not insist on the argument. in reality asserts. ’Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceiv’d by the mind. have been made to this argument. a line terminates a surface. Did it imply any contradiction. those surfaces. But can any thing be imagin’d more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence. without breadth. whose proportions and positions it examines. and a distinction of reason. The number of fractions bring it no nearer the last division. but never can exist in nature. and ’tis on this latter principle. They never did exist. and denying their idea. line or point. line or surface were not indivisible. My present business then must be to defend the definitions. ’tis perfectly conformable in its definitions. breadth nor depth. Every particle eludes the grasp by a new fraction. and refute the demonstrations. it immediately finds this idea to break into parts. when we endeavour to seize it. but this excludes not a partial consideration. It has been9 pretended. like quicksilver. A surface is defin’d to be length and breadth without depth: A line to be length without breadth or depth: A point to be what has neither length. its capacity must be infinite. and then let the fancy endeavour to fix itself on the idea of the last surface. in order to comprehend the infinite number of parts. ’tis impossible we shou’d ever conceive these terminations. and overlook its breadth. There is therefore no medium betwixt allowing at least the possibility of indivisible points. without any possibility of its arriving at a concluding idea. and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any argument deriv’d from the clear idea. it loses its hold by a new division. How else cou’d any thing exist without length. but I assert. that the objects of geometry. I find. which I have already sufficiently explain’d. neither of which is in my opinion satisfactory. because we have a clear idea. I shall here endeavour to find some new absurdities in this reasoning. otherwise it wou’d be the last of its parts. or without depth? Two different answers. that tho’ it be impossible to conceive a length without any breadth. that if the ideas of a point. tho’ at first sight that science seems rather favourable to the present doctrine. and not only never did. for we may produce demonstrations from these very ideas to prove that they are impossible. a point terminates a line. that the second answer to the foregoing argument is founded. and so on in infinitum. in the same manner as we may think of the length of the way betwixt two towns.

For since. and others eluded the force of this reasoning by a heap of unintelligible cavils and distinctions. for which reason we seldom or never consider this as the standard of equality or inequality. and so on. When geometry decides any thing concerning the proportions of quantity. such a computation will never afford us a standard. It takes the dimensions and proportions of figures justly. and that if we have the idea of indivisible points. But I go farther. yet I may affirm. did it not aspire to such an absolute perfection. when the numbers of points in each are equal. and since infinite numbers. Its errors are never considerable. As to those. whether perceiv’d by the sight or touch. which are divisible in infinitum. that nature has mix’d among those particles of matter. Thus it appears. and that as the proportion of the numbers varies. to whatever sect he belongs. lines and surfaces conformable to the definition. lines and points admit not of any division. a number of mathematical points. ’Tis true. as well as obvious. confesses as evidently the superiority of his enemy. that this standard of equality is entirely useless. that extension is divisible in infinitum. They need only reply. the equality or inequality of any portions of space can never depend on any proportion in the number of their parts. and maxims. the least as well as greatest figures contain an infinite number of parts. by which we may judge of proportions. and whether he maintains the composition of extension by indivisible points. ’tis impossible we can ever conceive the termination of any figure. This question will embarrass both of them. this is a clear proof. that the definitions of mathematics destroy the pretended demonstrations. that the inequality of an ell and a yard 30 . and maintain. who fairly delivers his arms. and that it never is from such a comparison we determine objects to be equal or unequal with respect to each other. without which conception there can be no geometrical demonstration. No one will ever be able to determine by an exact numeration. that the ideas of surfaces. who imagine. The schoolmen were so sensible of the force of this argument. or greater. the proportion of the lines and surfaces is also vary’d. I first ask mathematicians. which are not exact. are so minute and so confounded with each other. according to their hypothesis. that none of these demonstrations can have sufficient weight to establish such a principle. There are few or no mathematicians who defend the hypothesis of indivisible points. but roughly and with some liberty. which are not precisely true. or less than another? Let any of them give an answer. Both these adversaries equally yield the victory. and that because with regard to such minute objects. what they mean when they say one line or surface is equal to. nor wou’d it err at all.idea. A man who hides himself. they are not properly demonstrations. that ’tis utterly impossible for the mind to compute their number. properly speaking. their existence is certainly possible: but if we have no such idea. those of surfaces in depth. or a foot fewer than an ell or any greater measure. as this of infinite divisibility. we ought not to look for the utmost precision and exactness. But tho’ this answer be just. None of its proofs extend so far. can neither be equal nor unequal with respect to each other. that an inch has fewer points than a foot. that lines or surfaces are equal. being built on ideas. which enter into the composition of any line or surface. and of points in any dimension. of lines in breadth and depth. and yet these have the readiest and justest answer to the present question. or by quantities divisible in infinitum. or fix the equality of any line or surface by a numeration of its component parts. For as the points. in order to give a termination to bodies. as another. it may be said. that some of them maintain’d. ’tis impossible they can make use of this answer.

and consequently this standard of equality is the same with that deriv’d from the equality of the number of points. than it can doubt of those principles. without examining or comparing the number of their minute parts. and calls by the names of greater. which we have already determin’d to be a just but an useless standard. in this imaginary application and mutual contact of parts. which being successively apply’d to each. nor are our judgments of this kind more exempt from doubt and error. but in many cases certain and infallible. that there are bodies infinitely more minute. or greater or less than each other. But tho’ its decisions concerning these proportions be sometimes infallible. who pretend. and regard an object as less. If it consists.consists in the different numbers of the feet. There are therefore three proportions. ’Tis evident. which appear to the senses. which can secure us from all error and uncertainty. There are some10. We must therefore look to some other quarter for a solution of the present difficulty. than those on any other subject. We frequently correct our first opinion by a review and reflection. when upon the placing of one upon the other. which can possibly be conceiv’d. which are the most clear and self-evident. We are sen31 . since the contact of large parts wou’d never render the figures equal. we form a mix’d notion of equality deriv’d both from the looser and stricter methods of comparison. In order to judge of this definition let us consider. that at last we must fix some standard of equality different from an enumeration of the parts. informs us of their different proportions. which we call equality. according to the nature of the instrument by which we measure the bodies. and must conceive their contact. and as a false reason wou’d perswade us. and that any two figures are equal. makes them also correspond to each other. tho’ before it appear’d greater than another. And even this correction is susceptible of a new correction. that since equality is a relation. and the care which we employ in the comparison. or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies. that the eye. less and equal. the mind can no more question. and pronounce those objects to be equal. and that of a foot and a yard in the number of the inches. but we often discover our error by a juxta-position of the objects. which these judgments of our senses undergo. and pronounce them equal to. that we are not possess’d of any instrument or art of measuring. which the mind distinguishes in the general appearance of its objects. strictly speaking. therefore. by the use of some common and invariable measure. When the measure of a yard and that of a foot are presented. Now ’tis plain. we clearly perceive. that in this conception we wou’d run up these parts to the greatest minuteness. Such judgments are not only common. which the mind makes betwixt them. it is not. but arises merely from the comparison. they are not always so. But the minutest parts we can conceive are mathematical points. of which they are compos’d. But as that quantity we call an inch in the one is suppos’d equal to what we call an inch in the other. that equality is best defin’d by congruity. or where that is impracticable. all their parts correspond to and touch each other. ’tis evident. and to any common-measure. But we are not content with this. When therefore the mind is accustom’d to these judgments and their corrections. which at first we esteem’d unequal. a property in the figures themselves. and of different degrees of exactness. Nor is this the only correction. that the first is longer than the second. and finds that the same proportion which makes two figures have in the eye that appearance. we must at least have a distinct notion of these parts. For as sound reason convinces us that there are bodies vastly more minute than those. and as ’tis impossible for the mind to find this equality by proceeding in infinitum with these references to inferior quantities. with which they are compar’d.

even when the subject fails him. The case is the same in many other subjects. But tho’ this standard be only imaginary. and nothing is observ’d but the united appearance. even when its reason fails us. have given us an obscure and implicit notion of a perfect and entire equality. that two figures. even after the reason has ceas’d. nor are there any ideas we more easily form than the ideas of these objects. it is the shortest waybetwixt two points. if our idea of a right line was not different from that of the shortest way betwixt two points. which were equal before. Nothing is more apparent to the senses. we can only form a distant notion of some unknown standard to these objects. nor is any thing more usual. I observe. And ’tis from these corrections. Upon that of infinite divisibility we cannot go even this length. that we form the loose idea of a perfect standard to these figures. and entertains a notion of a compleat tierce or octave. but this order is perfectly unknown. we therefore suppose some imaginary standard of equality. ’Tis true. and by carrying on the same action of the mind. and useless as well as incomprehensible. as the rule by which we determine lines to be either curve or right ones. by which the lines run along from one point to another. to the other swift and slow are imagin’d to be capable of an exact comparison and equality beyond the judgments of the senses. mathematicians pretend they give an exact definition of a right line. and by a comparison with some rule. not even so exact as in extension. that they may produce the entire impression of a curve or right line. where tho’ ’tis evident we have no exact method of determining the proportions of parts. which will fix the precise boundaries betwixt them. which we conceive to be more extended. yet the various corrections of our measures. To the one light and shade. which wou’d be as absurd as to say. cannot be equal after this removal or addition. In common life ’tis establish’d as a maxim. nor produce any very exact method of distinguishing the one from the other. For as the very idea of equality is that of such a particular appearance corrected by juxta-position or a common measure. and the figures reduc’d entirely to that proportion. than for the mind to proceed after this manner with any action. A musician finding his ear become every day more delicate. A mechanic with regard to motion. 32 . proceeds with the same act of the mind. but are reduc’d meerly to the general appearance. But tho’ we can give no perfect definition of these lines. is a mere fiction of the mind. yet this hinders us not from correcting the first appearance by a more accurate consideration. is not discernible either in the appearance or measuring. without being able to explain or comprehend it. which first determin’d it to begin. the notion of any correction beyond what we have instruments and art to make. by which the appearances and measuring are exactly corrected. and their different degrees of exactness. and correcting himself by reflection and attention. the shortest way is always the shortest. when they say. But however easily we may form these ideas. When we draw lines upon paper or any continu’d surface. ’tis impossible to produce any definition of them. This appears very conspicuously with regard to time. than the distinction betwixt a curve and a right line.sible. but this definition is unintelligible without a comparison with other lines. We may apply the same reasoning to curve and right lines. of whose rectitude from repeated trials we have a greater assurance. and as we imagine. there is a certain order. that the streightest way is always the shortest. This standard is plainly imaginary. than a just definition of it. if upon mention of a right line he thinks not immediately on such a particular appearance. and if ’tis not by accident only that he considers this property? A right line can be comprehended alone. without being able to tell whence he derives his standard. For I ask any one. Thus even upon the system of indivisible points. that the addition or removal of one of these minute parts. that this is more properly the discovery of one of the properties of a right line. But in the first place. the fiction however is very natural. A painter forms the same fiction with regard to colours.

that the idea of a right line is no more precise than that of a plain surface. which is firm and invariable. but we can form no idea of that proportion. and consequently that the one can never afford us a perfect standard for the other. of a right line and a plain surface. and by that means form a figure quite different from a plane. that the line. are far from being exact and determinate. that our idea of a surface is as independent of this method of forming a surface. I repeat what I have already establish’d. which we make from the appearance of the objects. and such a surface a plain one. and employ the supposition of a deity. parallel to each other. in which I have suppos’d them to concur. and repugnant to our clear ideas. and if we join the supposition of any farther correction. for instance. I wou’d answer. and correct by a compass or common measure. I must inform you. to which this line does not agree. that we have no precise idea of equality and inequality. I perceive no absurdity in asserting. that I do not deny. that extension is compos’d of indivisible points (which. But supposing these two lines to approach at the rate of an inch in twenty leagues. that the ideas which are most essential to geometry. Our appeal is still to the weak and fallible judgment.Secondly. when such particular figures are equal. ’Tis in vain. perhaps. that a right line may flow irregularly. nor have we any other means of distinguishing such a surface. that form so small an angle betwixt them? You must surely have some idea of a right line. since the true perfection of any thing consists in its conformity to its standard. ’Twill immediately be objected. shorter and longer. than its general appearance. more than of a right line or a curve. is there any such firmness in our senses or imagination. whose omnipotence may enable him to form a perfect geometrical figure. For. when such a line is a right one. and on the same plane. The idea of a plain surface is as little susceptible of a precise standard as that of a right line. if it were. that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule. by what rule or standard do you judge. as to determine when such an order is violated or preserv’d. Do you therefore mean. then. I beseech you. and returns in a circle. if the case be in any degree doubtful. I wou’d fain ask any mathematician what infallible assurance he has. according to our common method of conceiving them. that neither is this the standard from which we form the idea of a right line. ’tis absurd to talk of any perfection beyond what these faculties can judge of. It appears. Now since these ideas are so loose and uncertain. but ’tis absurd to imagine them to have a common segment. those of equality and inequality. that besides that in judging after this manner you allow. I say. as our idea of an ellipse is of that of a cone. Not only we are incapable of telling. An exact idea can never be built on such as are loose and undeterminate. 33 . that mathematicians represent a plain surface as produc’d by the flowing of a right line. which is a description. that these opinions are obviously absurd. I must inform you. In vain shou’d we have recourse to the common topic. that upon their contact they become one. but of the most vulgar and obvious principles? How can he prove to me. and that therefore we must suppose it to flow along two right lines. not only of the more intricate and obscure propositions of his science. that two right lines cannot have one common segment? Or that ’tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? Shou’d he tell me. As the ultimate standard of these figures is deriv’d from nothing but the senses and imagination. when you assert. nor. is more than you intend) besides this. that explains a thing by itself. vis. ’tis of such-a-one as is either useless or imaginary. cannot make the same right line with those two. and describe a right line without any curve or inflexion. or of these figures. as is peculiar and essential to a right line? If so. where two right lines incline upon each other with a sensible angle.

those of a circle and right line. I know there is no mathematician. and ’tis evident right lines may be made to concur with each other. where there is nothing visible or tangible. But whatever foundation 34 . which is supported by such magnificent pretensions. If he says.The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance. since ’tis certain he has such demonstrations against the concurrence of a circle and a right line. it follows. viz. tho’ corrected by all the means either practicable or imaginable. because the answer I shall give to one is a consequence of that which I shall make use of for the others. or if he must necessarily imagine them to concur for some space. that is. This I am satisfy’d with. the ideas of a circle and a right line. This gives rise to three objections. and yet correspond to this standard. why geometry fails of evidence in this single point. I desire therefore our mathematician to form. without being able to bring the affair to a final decision. that as no idea of quantity is infinitely divisible. and consequently of the thing. The same subject continu’d. these being loose draughts. that the idea of space or extension is nothing but the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order. as accurately as possible. that men have disputed for many ages concerning a vacuum and a plenum. there cannot be imagin’d a more glaring absurdity. that in his conception of the contact of those lines he must make them concur. First. and philosophers. that we can form no idea of a vacuum. in other words. to be incompatible with two other ideas. so there is no argument founded on it. as he will tell us. he runs himself into equal difficulties. If he affirms. than to shew. which is not attended with a new absurdity. and serving only to convey with greater facility certain ideas. if upon the conception of their contact he can conceive them as touching in a mathematical point. when carry’d beyond a certain degree of minuteness. and let us see. even at this day. that we really must make such an exception. And as this absurdity is very glaring in itself. that no geometrical demonstration for the infinite divisibility of extension can have so much force as what we naturally attribute to every argument. that in tracing these figures in his imagination. or space. that of concurrence. and regard all the mathematical arguments for infinite divisibility as utterly sophistical. that quantity itself admits of such a division. For ’tis evident. think themselves at liberty to take party on either side. This may open our eyes a little. I might give as instances those arguments for infinite divisibility. tho’ at the same time he acknowledges these ideas to be inseparable. and I then ask. while all its other reasonings command our fullest assent and approbation. he can prove an idea. And indeed it seems more requisite to give the reason of this exception. At the same time we may learn the reason. which are the true foundation of all our reasoning. he can imagine them to touch only in a point. and am willing to rest the controversy merely upon these ideas. SECTION V. Whichever side he chuses. which are directly opposite in that particular. and involves not an evident contradiction. It may be said. who will not refuse to be judg’d by the diagrams he describes upon paper. and to prove this by means of ideas. he allows the possibility of that idea. he thereby acknowledges the fallacy of geometrical demonstrations. If the second part of my system be true. viz. as their fancy leads them. than to endeavour to prove. which I shall examine together. which are deriv’d from the point of contact.

but also necessary and unavoidable. while they are separated by the four walls. that is distinguishable. Secondly. and ’tis certain such-a-one has no idea either of light or darkness. they touch each other. that run from south to north. that the existence of one particle of matter. ’tis evident. that since matter and extension are the same. But keeping strictly to the two ideas of rest and annihilation. than a square figure in one body implies a square figure in every one. which results from them. who enjoys his sight. without any motion or alteration? There are some metaphysicians. that is separable by the imagination. and as every idea. may be conceiv’d to be separately existent. For as every idea. or more properly speaking. while they touch the opposite ends of two walls. lest we dispute without understanding perfectly the subject of the controversy. the reality or at least possibility of the idea of a vacuum may be prov’d by the following reasoning. For how can the two walls. but merely the negation of light. I shall not enlarge upon this objection. The consequence of this is. we must take the matter pretty deep. The third objection carries the matter still farther. I now demand what results from the concurrence of these two possible ideas of rest and annihilation. the annihilation of one necessarily implies that of the other.there may be for a controversy concerning the things themselves. But tho’ this answer be very common. and this idea will certainly be allow’d possible. that the very dispute is decisive concerning the idea. that run from east to west? And how can the floor and roof ever meet. we may easily conceive it to be depriv’d of motion. because it principally belongs to natural philosophy. that the idea. and that ’tis impossible men cou’d so long reason about a vacuum. while the other parts remain at rest. touch each other. in the same manner as my hand touches the paper. of colour’d and visible objects. is not that of a contact of parts. 35 . that lie in a contrary position? If you change their position. and preserve the same position. no more implies the existence of another. which lies without our present sphere. ’Tis evident the idea of darkness is no positive idea. and not only asserts. Now tho’ we allow the world to be at present a plenum. into which one body must move in order to make way for another. when entirely depriv’d of light. ’tis evident. and that the idea of utter darkness can never be the same with that of vacuum. which is concluded to be the idea of a vacuum. supposing the walls to remain the same. but something else. without having a notion of what they refuted or defended. than what is common to him with one born blind. and consider the nature and origin of several ideas. that ’tis not from the mere removal of visible objects we receive the impression of extension without matter. which. If you conceive any thing betwixt them. and either refute or defend it. receives no other perception from turning his eyes on every side. and there being now no distance betwixt the walls of the chamber. to conceive the annihilation of any part of matter by the omnipotence of the deity. and what must we conceive to follow upon the annihilation of all the air and subtile matter in the chamber. This assertion is founded on the motion we observe in bodies. If this argument shou’d be contested. that the idea of a vacuum is real and possible. you suppose a new creation. with all the opposite sides of the chamber. which is a necessary and infallible consequence of such as are possible. In order to answer these objections. This being granted. is separable by the imagination. ’tis maintain’d. while they continue in rest. which is immediately before me. you suppose a motion. Every idea is possible. it may be pretended. A man. to touch each other. or imagine the floor and roof. wou’d be impossible and inconceivable without a vacuum. who answer. It must also be allow’d possible. I defy these metaphysicians to conceive the matter according to their hypothesis.

and of every colour’d or visible object. and after an interval and motion of the hand or other organ of sensation. ’tis evident he is sensible of nothing. appear as if painted on a plain surface. is in the appearance of these two objects. another. whether they can convey this idea. or what is convey’d to us in the darkest night. they are separated as perfectly by the blue colour of the firmament. the next question is. and that all the rest continues to be as before. with the motion of the bodies. and to be softly convey’d along by some invisible power. invariable and indivisible. that being nothing but darkness. when mix’d with something visible and tangible? ’Tis commonly allow’d by philosophers. as is necessary to convey the idea of space or extension. that darkness and motion. and if this distance varies. the parts of which are successive to each other. which discover themselves to the eye. We may observe. The question is. and spread my fingers. or the negation of light. whose light discovers only these bodies themselves. therefore. we can perceive its increase or diminution. as I said. we must suppose. and upon leaving that. this cannot convey to him that idea. can never give us the idea of extension without matter. as they cou’d be by any visible object. as often as we please. This is not only true of what may be said to be remote from these bodies. it must partake of the same properties: And as blindness and darkness afford us no ideas of extension. but also of the very distance. a perfect negation of light. Since then it appears. ’tis evident. and may give him the idea of time: But certainly are not dispos’d in such a manner. with the utter removal of every thing visible and tangible. without parts. and that their different degrees of remoteness from ourselves are discover’d more by reason than by the senses. We must form a parallel supposition concerning the objects of our feeling. but obvious to the very senses. it may be thought that there is here a vacuum or pure extension. whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body? To begin with the first case. which is interpos’d betwixt them. in the objects themselves. When I hold up my hand before me. the only change. that all bodies. Now since this distance causes no perception different from what a blind man receives from his eyes. He feels in that case a certain sensation or impression. we can perceive. that when only two luminous bodies appear to the eye. The sole difference betwixt an absolute darkness and the appearance of two or more visible luminous objects consists. nor indeed any idea. Even supposing he moves his limbs to and fro. This is our natural and most familiar way of thinking. that when two bodies present themselves. ’tis impossible that the dark and undistinguishable distance betwixt two bodies can ever produce that idea. that is discoverable. which I cou’d place betwixt them. whether they be conjoin’d or separate. that amidst an entire darkness. from this invariable motion. to know whether the sight can convey the impression and idea of a vacuum. without composition. whether they be separated by a great or small distance.Suppose again a man to be supported in the air. there are luminous bodies presented to us. ’Tis not proper to suppose a perfect removal of all tangible objects: we must allow something to be perceiv’d by the feeling. not only intelligible to the mind. or of a vacuum. another object of the touch to be met with. without giving us any impression of the surrounding objects. In order. and in the manner they affect our senses. and never receives the idea of extension. But as the distance is not in this case any thing colour’d or visible. and so on. where there was formerly an entire darkness. but which we shall learn to correct by a little reflexion. 36 .

which are affected by them. affect the senses in the same manner. I suppose two cases. which are so plac’d as to affect the senses in the same manner with two others. when mix’d with the impressions of tangible objects. that of a man supported in the air. and after a motion. and a real extension. diminish in proportion to the distance. when there is nothing tangible interpos’d betwixt two bodies. where there is one object. perceives another tangible object. light. and that of a man. such as heat. that two bodies. and that the sensation. and I then ask. That is. that they have nearly the same effects on every natural phænomenon. in other words. as if the distance betwixt them were fill’d with visible objects. an invisible and intangible distance may be converted into a visible and tangible one. cold. and without any change on that angle. it can no more give us that idea. Secondly. and moving his limbs to and fro. either alone. form with each other.The angles. attending the sensation. when unaccompany’d with some other perception. But as these perceptions are each of them simple and indivisible. For as all qualities. in which the distant objects affect the senses. these produce the only perceptions. which arises from the motion. are capable of receiving the same extent. We may observe. and the perceiving of that sensation we call motion in our hand or organ of sensation. For there is a close relation betwixt that motion and darkness. and meet in the eye. as when we feel a compounded body. there is but little difference observ’d. that ’tis possible the same object may be felt with the same sensation of motion. or attended with tangible and visible objects. wherein consists the difference betwixt these two cases? No one will make any scruple to affirm. that it consists meerly in the perceiving those objects. and the imaginary distance or interval interpos’d betwixt tangible or solid objects. is in both cases the same: And as that sensation is not capable of conveying to us an idea of extension. which we cannot feel after another without an interval. in its passage from one to the other. or be known only by the manner. We find by experience. attraction. experience shews us. Thirdly. since that mixture produces no alteration upon it. which flow from them. under which they appear to the senses. that two visible objects appearing in the midst of utter darkness. along with the interpos’d impression of solid and tangible objects. First. who feeling something tangible. viz. as another relation betwixt these two kinds of distance. without meeting any thing tangible. without any sensible impulse or penetration. But tho’ motion and darkness. In like manner. and the different parts of the organs. convey no idea of a vacuum or extension without matter. and form the same angle by the rays. that give us a true idea of extension. of which he is sensible. that have a certain extent of visible objects interpos’d betwixt them. We may observe. yet they are the causes why we falsly imagine we can form such an idea. the motion that is requir’d in the eye. whose different parts are plac’d beyond each other. 37 . leaves it. We may illustrate this by considering the sense of feeling. or composition of visible and tangible objects. &c. from which we can judge of the distance. whether this distance be mark’d out by compounded and sensible objects. The sensation of motion is likewise the same. without any change on the distant objects. which the rays of light flowing from them. they can never give us the idea of extension.

than for want of something specious and plausible. contiguity and causation. we are very apt to confound these ideas. and take the one for the other. I shall only premise. When I receiv’d the relations of resemblance. Of this we shall see many instances in the progress of this treatise. which is not fill’d with any colour’d or solid object. I am afraid I must here have recourse to it. which we employ in considering them. which conveys the idea of extension. tho’ at the same time we may observe. that are related to it. and they both equally diminish the force of every quality. without examining into their causes. This last circumstance is of great consequence. and have shewn. and in all its discourses and reasonings to use the one for the other. as principles of union among ideas. Of the three relations above-mention’d that of resemblance is the most fertile source of error. but the actions of the mind. make use of the related idea. ’Twou’d have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain. why the one has so often been taken for the other. which is an evident instance of that very principle. which most readily produces a mistake in ideas. and why we imagine we have an idea of extension without the idea of any object either of the sight or feeling. in metaphysical subjects 38 . that we must distinguish exactly betwixt the phænomenon itself. and rouze up the other ideas. and rummage that cell. present other related ideas in lieu of that. The phænomenon may be real. and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other. which is presented to us. that wherever the actions of the mind in forming any two ideas are the same or resembling. that the former is also uncertain. that as the mind is endow’d with a power of exciting any idea it pleases. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy. as will naturally be imagin’d. whether separated by the one distance or the other. I shall therefore observe. that wherever there is a close relation betwixt two ideas. These relations betwixt the two kinds of distance will afford us an easy reason. and is of such consequence. when they run precisely into the proper traces. why upon our conception of any idea. which I endeavour to explain. which do not borrow largely from that origin. which I shall assign for it. tho’ my explication be chimerical. For we may establish it as a general maxim in this science of human nature. in which the idea is plac’d. these spirits always excite the idea. and indeed there are few mistakes in reasoning. which belongs to the idea. which I might have display’d on that subject.Here then are three relations betwixt that distance. are so little different. were it as usual. as if it were the same with what we demanded. the second species of distance is found capable of receiving the first. We might produce the figures of poets and orators. The falshood of the one is no consequence of that of the other. that we must in the end rest contented with experience. and employ it in our reasoning. But tho’ resemblance be the relation. that I cannot forbear stopping a moment to examine its causes. but continuing still the same train of thought. ’twas more in prosecution of my first maxim. and the causes. and we may in general observe. This change we are not always sensible of. But tho’ I have neglected any advantage. falling into the contiguous traces. which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas. as it is reasonable. whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain. yet the others of causation and contiguity may also concur in the same influence. which the mind desir’d at first to survey. The distant objects affect the senses in the same manner. if there was occasion. This phænomenon occurs on so many occasions. in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. Resembling ideas are not only related together. the mind is very apt to mistake them. But as their motion is seldom direct. and must not imagine from any uncertainty in the latter. that ’tis very natural for us to draw such a consequence. as sufficient proofs of this. that we are not able to distinguish them. for this reason the animal spirits. and that other. the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces. and as it wou’d be easy to shew.

we shall find that these are the only impressions such an object can produce after the suppos’d annihilation. or extension without matter. we cannot be sure it is practicable. In vain shou’d we search any farther. The frequent disputes concerning a vacuum. but will immediately propose new objections and difficulties. ’tis easily conceiv’d. When every thing is annihilated in the chamber. that fictitious distance. why we substitute the idea of a distance. deriv’d from the conjunction of the ideas of rest and annihilation. when the air that fills it. Since a body interpos’d betwixt two others may be suppos’d to be annihilated. ’Twill probably be said. that the mind easily mistakes them. is not an object of the senses. and by the degrees of light and shade. which may be made on most of their own discourses. and the similarity of their manner of affecting the senses. This invisible and intangible distance is also found by experience to 39 . However natural that conversation may seem. which is nothing but a composition of visible or tangible points dispos’d in a certain order. In causing this mistake there concur both the relations of causation and resemblance. And this likewise is the reason. and proves there is no repugnance in such a motion. have really such a capacity of receiving body betwixt them. the chamber must be conceiv’d much in the same manner as at present. or other member of the body. The distant bodies are no more affected in the one case. We may make almost the same answer to the second objection. that ’tis usual for men to use words for ideas. that are affected. that the bodies may be plac’d in the same manner. especially when by means of any close relation. and to the feeling. that my reasoning makes nothing to the matter in hand. with regard to the eye. how it may be created anew.to draw our arguments from that quarter. which is not considered either as visible or tangible. without endeavouring to account for their real nature and operations. This annihilation leaves to the eye. situated in the manner above-describ’d. Thus I seem to have answer’d the three objections abovemention’d. forms the relation of resemblance. than in the other. viz. whether deriv’d from metaphysics or mechanics. without producing any change upon such as lie on each hand of it. there is another idea presented. as if divided by something visible and tangible. yet we find by experience. and that there is no obstacle to the conversion of the invisible and intangible distance into one that is visible and tangible. ’tis in this respect a kind of cause. and yet produce as little alteration. which may be the occasion of their mistake. Now the motion of a body has much the same effect as its creation. Afterwards experience comes in play to persuade us that two bodies. there being nothing more common. On whichever side we turn this subject. upon which the dispute turns. because they are commonly so closely connected. and to talk instead of thinking in their reasonings. Tho’ there be nothing visible or tangible interpos’d betwixt two bodies. But lest metaphysicians shou’d esteem this below their dignity. As the first species of distance is found to be convertible into the second. that which consists in a sensation of motion in the hand. and the walls continue immoveable. prove not the reality of the idea. This suffices to satisfy the imagination. After this chain of reasoning and explication of my principles. and require the same motion of the hand in passing from one to the other. but to such as resemble them. I am now prepared to answer all the objections that have been offer’d. in the room of extension. that impressions can give rise to no ideas. We use words for ideas. tho’ at the same time I am sensible. and it has already been remark’d. that few will be satisfy’d with these answers. before we have had experience of it. which is discover’d by the different parts of the organ. I shall borrow a proof from an observation. and that I explain only the manner in which objects affect the senses. than to see men deceive themselves in this particular. and diminishing every quality.

without any impulse or penetration. as that succession. If it be a sufficient proof. which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions. that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of human understanding. that the object was susceptible of such a number of changes betwixt these appearances. without returning in a circle. you may be certain you are mistaken. and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties. by encreasing or diminishing it. For we may observe. This paradox is. As to those who attempt any thing farther. from which the idea of time without a changeable existence is deriv’d. and in no part of it have I endeavour’d to explain the cause. But tho’ it be impossible to shew the impression. is certain. to the capacity of becoming a visible and tangible distance. that ’tis liable to the same objections as the similar doctrine with regard to extension. yet we can easily point out those appearances. and by confessing that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies. If you will not give it that name. as far as experience informs me of them. being compar’d with the succession of our perceptions. and this also suffices for my philosophy. To which we may add. I cannot approve of their ambition. so that the idea of time being for ever present with us. the name of a vacuum. and yet there is a vacuum. when we consider a stedfast object at five-aclock. which discover themselves to the senses. or explain the secret causes of their operations. till I see. seem equally remov’d as if the object had really chang’d. which is obvious to the senses. in some one instance at least. we must for the same reason have the idea of time without any changeable existence. we may observe. which separates bodies after this manner. that we may know its nature and qualities. we are apt to apply to it that idea in the same manner as if every moment were distinguish’d by a different position. what experience shews us. in which some real objects exist. that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our mind. we must always confess. extension and matter are the same. or of becoming visible and tangible. The first and second appearances of the object. and conceiving its parts as visible or tangible.contain a capacity of receiving body. I am afraid. motion is possible in a plenum. From these three relations we are 40 . that we have no idea of any real extension without filling it with sensible objects. or an alteration of the object. that they have met with success. without any impulse in infinitum. that if you are pleas’d to give to the invisible and intangible distance. which make us fancy we have that idea. which will easily be explain’d from the foregoing reasoning. But that we really have no such idea. or impressions and ideas. But if you cannot point out any such impression. by pleading guilty. and without penetration. or in other words. and regard the same at six. For besides that this belongs not to my present purpose. This suffices for the conduct of life. But at present I content myself with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses. and their connections with each other. as also that the unchangeable or rather fictitious duration has the same effect upon every quality. But however we may express ourselves. I answer this objection. I shall conclude this subject of extension with a paradox. because we dispute and reason concerning it. that we have the idea of a vacuum. that time is nothing but the manner. when you imagine you have any such idea. since there is no subject of dispute more frequent and common. As to the doctrine. For whence shou’d it be deriv’d? Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflexion? Point it out distinctly to us. and gives them a capacity of receiving others betwixt them. Here is the whole of my system.

that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas. The idea of existence. and must prove. the idea of existence is not deriv’d from any particular impression. Our foregoing11 reasoning concerning the distinction of ideas without any real difference will not here serve us in any stead. the idea of existence must either be deriv’d from a distinct impression. and imagine we can form the idea of a time and duration. and is besides pretty obvious of itself. and different from others in the same particular. that is not conceiv’d as existent. as well as the ideas of space and time. which the same simple idea may have to several different ideas. and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form. tho’ every impression and idea we remember be consider’d as existent. which are inseparably conjoin’d. that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions. Tho’ certain sensations may at one time be united. when conjoin’d with the idea of any object.apt to confound our ideas. that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is deriv’d. And thus. SECTION VI. that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent. that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it. This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible. We may observe. since every object. To reflect on any thing simply. that ’tis universally allow’d by philosophers. There is no impression nor idea of any kind. of which we have any consciousness or memory. and ’tis evident. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being. Whoever opposes this. and may be presented apart. and of external existence. before we leave this subject. which have their difficulties. and that external objects become 41 . conjoin’d with every perception or object of our thought. is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle. are nothing different from each other. so our decision betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful. from which the idea of entity is deriv’d. must necessarily point out that distinct impression. attending every impression and every idea. to explain the ideas of existence and of external existence. viz. So far from there being any distinct impression. we quickly find they admit of a separation. Of the idea of existence. But no object can be presented resembling some object with respect to its existence. That idea. that every idea arises from a similar impression. without any change or succession. that is presented. and to reflect on it as existent. the most clear and conclusive that can be imagin’d. A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence. we conceive to be existent. It may not be amiss. That kind of distinction is founded on the different resemblances. By this means we shall be the better prepar’d for the examination of knowledge and probability. Whatever we conceive. From hence we may form a dilemma. makes no addition to it. must necessarily be existent. which may enter into our reasoning. then. when we understand perfectly all those particular ideas. or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object.

identity. Three of these relations are discoverable at first sight. as long as our idea remains the same. connexions and durations. No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence destroy 42 . and proportions in quantity or number. and with the degrees of any quality. therefore. Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different. proportion in quantity or number. PART III. and seldom requires a second examination. degrees in any quality. viz. the resemblance will at first strike the eye. and causation. This is the universe of the imagination. to feel. that ’tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions. contrariety. ’tis evident cause and effect are relations. may be numerically different: And as the power. Two objects. is never discoverable merely from their idea. which we compare together. the relations of continguity and distance betwixt two objects may be chang’d merely by an alteration of their place. and not from any abstract reasoning or reflexion. we never really advance a step beyond ourselves. The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects. and such as may be chang’d without any change in the ideas. which have appear’d in that narrow compass. but only attribute to them different relations. which can be accounted for from the qualities of the objects. that we discover the relation of equality. but those perceptions. ’Tis the same case with identity and causation. It appears. as they appear to us. even the most simple. to love. and the place depends on a hundred different accidents. that of these seven philosophical relations. and since all ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our imagination to the heavens. of which we receive information from experience. On the contrary. nor have we any idea but what is there produc’d. which cannot be foreseen by the mind. These four are resemblance. and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration. The case is the same with contrariety. There is no single phænomenon. nor can conceive any kind of existence. it follows.known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. When any objects resemble each other. without pretending to comprehend the related objects. relations of time and place. is to form a relative idea of them. there remain only four. when suppos’d specifically different from our perceptions. to think. or rather the mind. To hate. degrees in quality. and this relation is invariable. or which we cou’d foresee without the help of our memory and experience. Of knowledge. These relations may be divided into two classes. ’Tis from the idea of a triangle. can be the objects of knowledge and certainty. tho’ perfectly resembling each other. into such as depend entirely on the ideas. SECTION I. or to the utmost limits of the universe. all this is nothing but to perceive. without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas. Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions. resemblance. which its three angles bear to two right ones. of knowledge and probability. which depending solely upon ideas. But of this more fully hereafter12 . to see. and even appearing in the same place at different times. There are13 seven different kinds of philosophical relation. by which one object produces another. contrariety.

In all other cases we must settle the proportions with some liberty. therefore. by reason of their simplicity. that right lines cannot concur. and are perfectly incompatible and contrary. and it may perhaps be imagin’d. they bestow on their consequences a degree of exactness. that geometry can scarce be esteem’d a perfect and infallible science. its mistakes can never be of any consequence. We are possest of a precise standard. when the difference betwixt them is very small. the loose judgments of the senses and imagination. by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers. Our ideas seem to give a perfect assurance. 43 . in fixing the proportions of quantity or number. and that where the angle they form is extremely small. or very limited portions of extension. because its original and fundamental principles are deriv’d merely from appearances. And this decision we always pronounce at first sight. except in very short numbers. that tho’ geometry falls short of that perfect precision and certainty. as to assure us of the truth of this proposition. we can only guess at it from a single consideration. both in universality and exactness. such as colour. we shall find. than what our eye or imagination alone is able to attain. without any enquiry or reasoning. yet ’tis easy to decide. that they always suppose a sensible inclination of the two lines. yet never attains a perfect precision and exactness. yet it excels the imperfect judgments of our senses and imagination. as. when their difference is considerable. which may arise from my asserting. we have no standard of a right line so precise. we pronounce them equal. that this defect must always attend it. We might proceed. And tho’ it be impossible to judge exactly of the degrees of any quality. that we cannot draw more than one right line between two given points. Its first principles are still drawn from the general appearance of the objects. and that appearance can never afford us any security. as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other. tho’ it much excels. There remain. and might at one view observe a superiority or inferiority betwixt any numbers. in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy. as to keep it from ever aspiring to a full certainty: But since these fundamental principles depend on the easiest and least deceitful appearances. or the art. we determine their relations. and keep it from ever reaching a greater exactness in the comparison of objects or ideas. I have already observ’d. of which these consequences are singly incapable. or make any conjecture. but if we consider these ideas. by which we fix the proportions of figures. But here it may not be amiss to obviate a difficulty. cold. which are comprehended in an instant. that any of them is superior or inferior to another. taste. algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences. or proceed in a more artificial manner. As to equality or any exact proportion. cannot lead us into any considerable error. is. and according as they correspond or not to that standard.each other. ’Tis impossible for the eye to determine the angles of a chiliagon to be equal to 1996 right angles. but when it determines. and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty. which are peculiar to arithmetic and algebra. I own that this defect so far attends it. after the same manner. or figures. that approaches this proportion. When two numbers are so combin’d. that geometry. and where we perceive an impossibility of falling into any considerable error. ’Tis the same case with most of the primary decisions of the mathematics. heat. to run us up to such appearances. that no two right lines can have a common segment. and ’tis for want of such a standard of equality in extension. And this is the nature and use of geometry. especially where the difference is very great and remarkable. without any possibility of error. when we examine the prodigious minuteness of which nature is susceptible. The reason why I impute any defect to geometry.

’Tis only causation. When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation. and when from experience and observation we discover. ’tis our business to remedy that defect. tho’ several times absent from and present to the senses. to pretend. which are the foundation of science. except so far as they either affect or are affected by it. which depend not upon the idea. or when only one. and causation. and a discovery of those relations. must be of the same nature. This is all I think necessary to observe concerning those four relations. and the relations of time and place.I shall here take occasion to propose a second observation concerning our demonstrative reasonings. but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view. and may be absent or present even while that remains the same. that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions. cannot imply any very great mystery. This comparison we may make. notwithstanding the interruption of the perception. We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same. of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone capable. and ascribe to it an identity. nor be confin’d to any particular length and proportion of sides. and may refuse to submit to the decisions of clear ideas. why philosophers are so fond of this notion of some spiritual and refin’d perceptions. for instance. we always conclude there is some secret cause. or when neither of them is present. and to shew how we can form an idea of a triangle. There is nothing in any objects to perswade us. that those ideas. An idea is by its very nature weaker and fainter than an impression. we call this perception rather than reasoning. but from our fault. which separates or unites them. If its weakness render it obscure. ’twill be proper to explain them more particularly. But to destroy this artifice. According to this way of thinking. which shall neither be an isosceles nor scalenum. All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison. that ’twas follow’d or preceded by any other existence or action. as much as possible. ’Tis easy to see. which produces such a connexion. are of so refin’d and spiritual a nature. we need but reflect on that principle so oft insisted on. either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects. which are their objects. by appealing to such as are obscure and uncertain. that they fall not under the conception of the fancy. that since all impressions are clear and precise. ’Tis usual with mathematicians. but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro’ the organs of sensation. that if 44 . either when both the objects are present to the senses. These three relations are identity. that they are either always remote or always contiguous. which is suggested by the same subject of the mathematics. but as to the other three. as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object. the ideas. which two or more objects bear to each other. and till we have done so. either constant or inconstant. The same reasoning extends to identity. and can never. ’tis in vain to pretend to reasoning and philosophy. contain any thing so dark and intricate. the situations in time and place. For from thence we may immediately conclude. properly speaking. which are copy’d from them. SECTION II. nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought. or any action. whenever we conclude. The same notion runs thro’ most parts of philosophy. since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses. we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity. since by that means they cover many of their absurdities. but being in every other respect the same. Of probability. by keeping the idea steady and precise. and is principally made use of to explain our abstract ideas. nor can the other two relations be ever made use of in reasoning. and of the idea of cause and effect. that their relation in this particular is invariable.

We may therefore consider the relation of contiguity as essential to that of causation. at least may suppose it such. that can be trac’d beyond our senses. by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction. At first sight I perceive. But this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect. which depend not upon the mere ideas. we shall endeavour to explain fully before we leave the subject of the understanding. that the object is not chang’d upon us. without tracing it up to its origin. which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence. in the very first moment of its existence. according to the general opinion. I find in the first place. which produces an idea of such prodigious consequence. and see from what origin it is deriv’d. Here then it appears. which are contiguous among themselves. is not so universally acknowledg’d. To begin regularly. This relation. and to the distant objects. we consider. ’Tis that of priority of time in the cause before the effect. we form our judgment concerning the identity of the object. however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses. till we can find a more14 proper occasion to clear up this matter. without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we reason. that whatever objects are consider’d as causes or effects. we still presume it to exist. but is liable to some controversy. it wou’d have convey’d an invariable and uninterrupted perception. since. we may establish the relation of priority by a kind of inference or reasoning. whether possibly or probably any cause cou’d operate in producing the change and resemblance. the only one. is not its sole cause. of causation must be deriv’d from some relation among objects. and ’tis impossible perfectly to understand any idea. which universally belongs to all beings. Whenever we discover such a perfect resemblance. Tho’ distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each other. and give rise to another object or action. and that nothing can operate in a time or place. which is not to be consider’d either as a cause or an effect. and when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion. they are commonly found upon examination to be link’d by a chain of causes. that an object. and according as we determine concerning these causes and effects. tho’ ’tis plain there is no one quality. in order to find that impression. which exists for any time in its full perfection without producing another. and examining that primary impression. I find some object. The examination of the impression bestows a clearness on the idea. perfectly co-temporary with itself. but that any object or action. and informs us of existences and objects. and turn them on all sides. Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects. and that relation we must now endeavour to discover. that I must not search for it in any of the particular qualities of the objects. we must consider the idea of causation.we had kept our eye or hand constantly upon it. either externally or internally. which-ever of these qualities I pitch on. that is not possest of it. therefore. and gives them a title to that denomination. are contiguous. and yet falls under the denomination of cause or effect. may exert its productive quality. Some pretend that ’tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou’d precede its effect. from which it arises. that of those three relations. nor can we otherwise have any security. But beside that experience in most instances seems to contradict this opinion. ’Tis an establish’d maxim both in natural and moral philosophy. is causation. but is 45 . ’Tis impossible to reason justly. which we call cause and effect. which we do not see or feel. then. and the examination of the idea bestows a like clearness on all our reasoning. The idea. The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects. whether it be common in that species of objects. And indeed there is nothing existent.

and that relation is of much greater importance. Now if any cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect. For what does he mean by production? Can he give any definition of it. from which its idea may be deriv’d. which pushes it from its state of inactivity. exerts not itself at that very individual time. he here runs in a circle. Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another. of supposing it such. and so on. beat about all the neighbouring fields. without being consider’d as its cause.assisted by some other principle. and this effect with its effect. and gives a synonimous term instead of a definition. therefore. and makes it exert that energy. the utter annihilation of time. which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. and indeed. of which it was secretly possest. and pretend to define a cause. who being in search of any thing that lies conceal’d from them. ’tis plain there wou’d be no such thing as succession. and therefore is no proper cause. I desire it may be produc’d. For he shall find. ’Tis in vain to rack ourselves with farther thought and reflexion upon this subject. but without any sensible interval. which we observe in the world. till we have more fully examin’d the present difficulty. and can proceed no farther in considering any single instance of cause and effect. Having thus discover’d or suppos’d the two relations of contiguity and succession to be essential to causes and effects. as affording a compleat idea of causation? By no means. since any one of them. I beg the reader to allow me the same liberty. in which it might have operated. according to this maxim. and all objects must be co-existent. ’tis certain. I can find none but those of contiguity and succession. If he cannot. and not finding it in the place they expected. at least. An object may be contiguous and prior to another. that the affair is of no great importance. When I cast my eye on the known qualities of objects. and that the motion of it precedes that of the other. proceed like those. I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them. we find only that the one body approaches the other. There is a necessary connexion to be taken into consideration. We must. For if one cause were co-temporary with its effect. Here again I turn the object on all sides. since the contrary principle has been already so firmly establish’d. ’Tis necessary for us to leave the direct survey of this question concerning the nature of that 46 . in hopes their good fortune will at last guide them to what they search for. that will not be the same with that of causation? If he can. ’tis well. ’tis evident he wou’d say nothing. We can go no farther in considering this particular instance. or impressions. If not. than any of the other two above-mention’d. that they must all of them be so. If this argument appear satisfactory. which retards its operation for a single moment. Shall the despair of success make me assert. Shou’d any one leave this instance. which is not preceded by any similar impression? This wou’d be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy. The consequence of this wou’d be no less than the destruction of that succession of causes. that I am here possest of an idea. which I have us’d in the preceding case. in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion. by saying it is something productive of another. Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession. When we consider these objects with the utmost attention. and find the impression. When I consider their relations. I find I am stopt short. as to admit of no farther doubt. without any certain view or design.

must deny these to be the only infallible relations. which I shall proceed to examine. which tho’ they may be deny’d with the lips. that ’tis of a nature quite foreign to that species of conviction. must have a cause of existence. that any thing can ever begin to exist without some productive principle. but on the contrary shall find. All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas. ’Tis suppos’d to be founded on intuition. and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other. without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is. That proposition therefore is not intuitively certain. shou’d also have a cause? Secondly. and contrariety. But here is an argument. that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects. which it will then be time enough to examine. that every thing whose existence has a beginning. tho’ I desire that whatever I say of them may also extend to the former. Why we conclude. proportions in quantity and number. and endeavour to find some other questions. or new modification of existence. and where the latter proposition cannot be prov’d. that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other. The sepa47 . and existent the next. of cause and effect. Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence. But if we examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge above-explain’d. To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a cause: ’Tis a general maxim in philosophy. These relations are resemblance. The same relation. and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable. Why a cause is always necessary. no less than external bodies are connected together. and to be one of those maxims. the examination of which will perhaps afford a hint. Of these questions there occur two. none of which are imply’d in this proposition. For what reason we pronounce it necessary. At least any one. so long as the ideas continue the same. Now that the latter proposition is utterly incapable of a demonstrative proof. that may serve to clear up the present difficulty. that the foregoing proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. then. which enters into our idea of cause and effect. must be common to all of them.necessary connexion. which proves at once. we may satisfy ourselves by considering. without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. Passions are connected with their objects and with one another. we shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty. who wou’d assert it to be intuitively certain. I commonly mention only the latter as the origin of these ideas. First. SECTION III. This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings. viz. ’tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence. degrees of any quality. without any proof given or demanded. and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct. we must despair of ever being able to prove the former. and of the belief we repose in it? I shall only observe before I proceed any farther. ’twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment. yet for brevity’s sake. and must find some other relation of that kind to be imply’d in it. that whatever begins to exist. that tho’ the ideas of cause and effect be deriv’d from the impressions of reflexion as well as from those of sensation. which belongs to one.

than to suppose the existence to be determin’d in that manner? The first question that occurs on this subject is always. without a cause. for want of something to fix its beginning. and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence. If the removal of a cause be intuitively absurd in the one case. that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity. but on the contrary in excluding all external causes. which therefore is taken to be the object itself. and are deriv’d from the same turn of thought. By the same intuition. must have a cause. But this reasoning is plainly unconclusive. and that. I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words in shewing the weakness of this argument. Whatever is produc’d without any cause. But I ask. of the one supposition can never be a proof of that of the other. then. viz. that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles. But nothing can never be a cause. no more than it can be something. excludes a fortiori the thing itself which is created. which is peculiar to one time and to one place.ration. and which by that means determines and fixes the existence. ’Tis exactly the same case with the17 third argument. that exists absolutely without any cause. All the points of time and place. is an evident contradiction. An object. Every thing. and when you assert. which is impossible. that every object has a real cause of its existence. that in our denial of a cause we still grant what we expressly deny. exist before it existed. it will equally require one in the other. no doubt. that it can never be a cause. and the object can never begin to be. that is. is plainly possible for the imagination. we must still have recourse to another. labours under an equal difficulty. If every thing must have a cause. But ’tis the very 48 . is not to affirm. and must stand or fall by the same reasoning. without which ’tis impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. that there must be a cause. which has been employ’d to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. in which we can suppose any object to begin to exist. or not to be something. that ’tis itself its own cause. They are all of them founded on the same fallacy. The second argument. Accordingly we shall find upon examination. since they are both upon the same footing. and consequently must perceive. for if any thing wanted a cause. But to say that any thing is produc’d. are in themselves equal. The absurdity. certainly is not its own cause. or equal to two right angles. is produc’d by nothing. we perceive. you suppose the very point in question. and unless there be some cause. comes into existence. of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence. has nothing for its cause. Is there any more difficulty in supposing the time and place to be fix’d without a cause. and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion. it wou’d produce itself. it must remain in eternal suspence. that the one follows from the other. when and where it shall begin to exist. ’tis said.16 which I find us’d on this head. that upon the exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or of nothing as causes. it must be so in the other: And if that absurdity be not clear without a proof in the one case. that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them. which has been produc’d for the necessity of a cause. or in other words. because it supposes. and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible. after what I have said of the foregoing. and take it for granted. but that upon the exclusion of one productive principle. therefore. or to express myself more properly. ’Tis sufficient only to observe. is fallacious and sophistical.15 say some philosophers. that ’tis utterly impossible any thing can ever begin to exist without a cause. it follows. that every demonstration. whether the object shall exist or not: The next. and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas.

who agree to assign this precise time and place to that event. we may chuse any point of history. whether every object. whether every thing must have a cause or not. which it sees or remembers. without some mixture of impressions. or by an inference from other causes. Tho’ the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects. is at first founded on those characters or letters. must owe its existence to a cause. that the same answer will serve for both questions. by a visible gradation. Here are certain characters and letters present either to our memory or senses. no more than it follows. that every being must be preceded by a cause. that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects. be found in the end. either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses. and therefore. and so on. nor reason merely upon its own ideas. but there wou’d not be any thing fix’d to one end of it. Of the component parts of our reasonings concerning cause and effect. because every husband must have a wife. Every link of the chain wou’d in that case hang upon another. To give an instance of this. The true state of the question is. The next question. or at least of ideas of the memory. or by an inference from their causes. then. that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience. ’Tis impossible for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum. They are still more frivolous. how experience gives rise to such a principle? But as I find it will be more convenient to sink this question in the following. which are equivalent to impressions. Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning. When we infer effects from causes. ’Tis obvious all this chain of argument or connexion of causes and effects. and hope to have prov’d it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments. capable of sustaining the whole. effect being a relative term. Thus we believe that Cæsar was kill’d in the senate-house on the ides of March.point in question. who say. either by a present impression. and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain. and these ideas were either in the minds of such as were immediately present at that action. ’till we arrive at those who were eye-witnesses and spectators of the event. which we have only two ways of doing. and that again from another testimony. that can stop them. and that because this fact is establish’d on the unanimous testimony of historians. which we see or remember. till we arrive at some object. according to all just reasoning. Why we conclude. which are seen or remember’d. that therefore every man must be marry’d. we must establish the existence of these causes. and that without the authority either of the memory or senses our whole reasoning wou’d be chimerical and without foundation. which begins to exist. But this does not prove. that every effect must have a cause. and why we form an inference from one to another? we shall make that the subject of our future enquiry. which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner. it must never lose sight of them entirely. and 49 . of which cause is the correlative. shou’d naturally be. ’Twill. beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry. perhaps. it ought never to be taken for granted. SECTION IV. Every effect necessarily pre-supposes a cause. because ’tis imply’d in the very idea of effect. is an impression of the memory or senses. and consider for what reason we either believe or reject it. and the only thing. which characters we likewise remember to have been us’d as the signs of certain ideas. and receiv’d the ideas directly from its existence. or they were deriv’d from the testimony of others. that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new production.

A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of adventures. whether they be true or false. in my opinion. Secondly. or are deriv’d from the author of our being. and of the idea of that existence. while the imagination transposes and changes them. Thirdly. or reasonings upon a supposition. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions. The nature and qualities of that idea. which produces the object of the impression. from which they first arose. First. that it cannot lie in the simple ideas it presents to us. tho’ it may continue after the comparison is forgot. however connected. The transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. V. And this actually is the case with all hypothetical arguments. nor the nature of its simple ones. For tho’ it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas. These faculties are as little distinguish’d from each other by the arrangement of their complex ideas. and which. neither by the order of its complex ideas. perfectly inexplicable by human reason. and give them a force and 50 . whether they represent nature justly. were not the ideas of the imagination fainter and more obscure. I need not observe. and ’tis equally true. or make us know the one from the other. their ultimate cause is. whether they arise immediately from the object.consequently there wou’d be no belief nor evidence. Nor is such a question any way material to our present purpose. or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind. SECTION. which arise from the senses. we employ materials. as it pleases. or be mere illusions of the senses. there being in them. are yet essentially different from each other. Of the impressions of the senses and memory. The original impression. For even supposing these impressions shou’d be entirely effac’d from the memory. viz. and ’twill always be impossible to decide with certainty. As to those impressions. that we can reason upon our past conclusions or principles. Here therefore we have three things to explain. we must immediately perceive. from causation. wou’d endeavour to get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion. then. When we search for the characteristic. In this kind of reasoning. that ’tis no just objection to the present doctrine. the conviction they produc’d may still remain. who intended to represent a passion or emotion of any kind. it follows. in order to compare them with our present ideas. nor wou’d there be any possibility of distinguishing this from a remembrance of a like kind. and can never go beyond these original perceptions. it being impossible to recal the past impressions. as the assurance of a demonstration proceeds always from a comparison of ideas. All our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or senses. and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. A painter. which are of a mix’d and heterogeneous nature. that all reasonings concerning causes and effects are originally deriv’d from some impression. without having recourse to those impressions. since both these faculties borrow their simple ideas from the impressions. neither any present impression. or is produc’d by it. in order to enliven his ideas. in the same manner. which distinguishes the memory from the imagination. nor belief of a real existence. that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity. Since therefore the memory is known. yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their operation.

says one. who by the frequent repetition of their lies. as to be taken for an idea of the imagination. We are frequently in doubt concerning the ideas of the memory. may degenerate to such a degree. which constitutes the first act of the judgment. A long tract of time has almost worn it out of my memory. we call the one cause and the other effect. and to have felt that species of sensation we call heat. that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another. the same influence on the mind as nature. And as an idea of the memory. and have substituted any other idea in its room. or a repetition of that impression in the memory. and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. and also remember. We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects. the inference we draw from cause to effect. and wou’d imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different.vivacity superior to what is found in those. we might possibly have separated the idea from the impression. which are mere fictions of the imagination. Of the inference from the impression to the idea. from which we learn the conjunction of particular causes and effects. and lays the foundation of that reasoning. and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. as they become very weak and feeble. Such an inference wou’d amount to knowledge. SECTION VI. that the belief or assent. ’Tis easy to observe. This is noted in the case of liars. and when after a long interval he would return to the contemplation of his object. But as all distinct ideas are separable. if not wholly obliterated. so on the other hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity. as realities. I remember such an event. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses. and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment. 51 . and infixing the idea with equal force and vigour. is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present. as to pass for an idea of the memory. ’Tis therefore by experience only. when we trace the relation of cause and effect. that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them. that in tracing this relation. and leaves me uncertain whether or not it be the pure offspring of my fancy. as in many others. Without any farther ceremony. the clearer is the idea. which always attends the memory and senses. when it is not drawn in such lively colours as distinguish that latter faculty. and are at a loss to determine whether any image proceeds from the fancy or the memory. come at last to believe and remember them. I think. both the causes and effects have been perceiv’d by the senses. Thus it appears. he always finds its idea to be much decay’d. by losing its force and vivacity. The more recent this memory is. custom and habit having in this case. The nature of experience is this. which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves. Thus we remember to have seen that species of object we call flame. In all those instances. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. There is no object. which we build upon it. and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. but am not sure. and from such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependance of the one upon the other. ’Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception. and infer the existence of the one from that of the other. is not deriv’d merely from a survey of these particular objects. When we pass from a present impression to the idea of any object. ’tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind.

and as these must be deriv’d either from knowledge or probability. we shall continue the thread of our discourse. that these two relations are preserv’d in several instances. it wou’d proceed upon that principle. resemble those. that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects. which are all of the same kind. wherein we always find like bodies. which sufficiently proves. and it seems evident. To form a clear idea of any thing. at least at first sight. that the transition from an impression present to the memory or senses to the idea of an object. there never will arise any new original idea. we can never learn from a hundred. unless we perceive. so our memory presents us only with a multitude of instances. that what we learn not from one object. Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us. yet as it wou’d be folly to despair too soon. of which we have had experience. and on our remembrance of their constant conjunction. in order to discover the nature of that necessary connexion. or by a certain association and relation of perceptions. or motions. 52 . We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature. This relation is their constant conjunction. and having found. and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confin’d ourselves to one only. motions. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect. is founded on past experience. instead of the inference’s depending on the necessary connexion. let us cast our eye on each of these degrees of evidence. and the other is supply’d in conformity to our past experience. that the necessary connexion depends on the inference. But tho’ this reasoning seems just and obvious. and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature. that by this means we may at last arrive at our propos’d end. of which we have had no experience. For it implies no more than this. of which we have had no experience. We may now see the advantage of quitting the direct survey of this relation. we always draw an inference from one object to another. and are perfectly resembling in every circumstance. that instances. upon which such a proposition may be suppos’d to be founded. there is only one perceiv’d or remember’d. of which we have had experience. It may be thought. Since it appears. and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. which we call cause or effect. that there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove. such as that of a necessary connexion. Whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or of the imagination. whether we are determin’d by reason to make the transition. we shall now examine the nature of that inference. this new-discover’d relation of a constant conjunction seems to advance us but very little in our way. but not enlarge the objects of our mind. wherein we reason concerning them. the next question is. In order therefore to clear up this matter. or qualities in like relations.and are remember’d: But in all cases. There are hopes. when we least expected it. From the mere repetition of any past impression. let us consider all the arguments. even to infinity. which makes so essential a part of it. that by this means we can never discover any new idea. As our senses shew us in one instance two bodies. and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it. and were entirely employ’d upon another subject. and can only multiply. that such a change is not absolutely impossible. or qualities in certain relations of succession and contiguity. Perhaps ’twill appear in the end. that like objects have always been plac’d in like relations of contiguity and succession. tho’ to tell the truth. Thus in advancing we have insensibly discover’d a new relation betwixt cause and effect. must resemble those. and of the transition from the impression to the idea. that those instances. If reason determin’d us. is an undeniable argument for its possibility.

we reason in the following manner. and this is. and without determining whether our reasoning on this subject be deriv’d from demonstration or probability. It may. and that because ’tis the only one. that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind. which produc’d any other. merely upon the appearance of these qualities? Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case. of which we have had none. must in some respects be founded on the impressions of our memory and senses. and those. Such an object is always found to produce another. and that this power is connected with its effect. if it was not endow’d with a power of production. of which we have had experience. the action of the mind. and that no existence certainly and demonstratively implies a power in any other object. ’Twere easy for me to shew the weakness of this reasoning. perhaps. that the production of one object by another in any one instance implies a power. not reasoning. which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses. It shall therefore be allow’d for a moment. that such particular objects. and therefore ’tis impossible this presumption can arise from probability. and at the utmost can only prove. pretend that all conclusions from causes and effects are built on solid reasoning: I can only desire. ’Tis therefore necessary. According to this account of things. The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another. that this reasoning may be produc’d. in order to be expos’d to our examination. Were there no mixture of any impression in our probable reasonings. The past production implies a power: The power implies a new production: And the new production is what we infer from the power and the past production. which is. we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. wou’d. by resting one part of it on another. consider’d as such. But it having been already prov’d. that that very object. that the idea of production is the same with that of causation. which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. that the power lies not in the sensible qualities of the cause. was at that very instant endow’d with such a power. on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. were I willing to make use of those observations I have already made. but only those of objects. I ask. in every point unquestionable. The power necessarily implies the effect. in observing the relation. probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects. be said. or were it proper to anticipate what I shall have occasion to remark afterwards concerning the idea we form of power and efficacy. as it discovers not the relations of ideas. why in other instances you presume that the same power still exists. and that from this we infer something connected with it. which is not seen nor remember’d. that the same power 53 . or to breed a confusion in my reasoning. and there being nothing but the sensible qualities present to us. Shou’d any one think to elude this argument. the only proposition concerning that relation. The idea of cause and effect is deriv’d from experience. either seen or remember’d. which informs us. and in some respects on our ideas. be sensation. I shall endeavour to maintain my present assertion without any such assistance. I think. ’Tis impossible it cou’d have this effect. But as such a method of proceeding may seem either to weaken my system. perhaps. in all past instances. but can never prove.Probability. have been constantly conjoin’d with each other: And as an object similar to one of these is suppos’d to be immediately present in its impression. is that of cause and effect. and therefore there is a just foundation for drawing a conclusion from the existence of one object to that of its usual attendant. properly speaking. the conclusion wou’d be entirely chimerical: And were there no mixture of ideas. The only connexion or relation of objects. that after experience of the constant conjunction of certain objects.

Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects. and have asserted. depends solely on the union of ideas. but will be found at the bottom to depend on the same origin. that the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation. ’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason. of which we have had experience. In this case it is not absolutely necessary. nothing is requir’d but the hearing of that word to produce the correspondent idea. that a like power is always conjoin’d with like sensible qualities. and ’twill scarce be possible for the mind. and this we may establish for a general rule. tho’ aided by experience. that upon hearing such a particular sound. which clearly proves. For the thought has evidently a very irregular motion in running along its objects. and unite them in the imagination. and consider what idea has been usually connected with the sound. which have fallen under our observation. which at first sight may be esteem’d different from any of these. of which we have had experience. These principles I allow to be neither the infallible nor the sole causes of an union among ideas. We suppose. by its utmost efforts. but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction. we shou’d reflect on any past experience. that the idea or impression of any object naturally introduces the idea of any other object. which make us pass from one object to another. that the same power continues united with the same object. and that like objects are endow’d with like powers. I wou’d renew my question. When the mind. They are not the infallible causes. Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding. but by certain principles. therefore. yet I assert that the only general principles. but are never able to prove. much less. Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with another. But tho’ I allow this weakness in these three relations. or connected with it. that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects. why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances. and may leap from the heavens to the earth. are resemblance. nor repose belief in any matter of fact. Now this is exactly the present case. and this irregularity in the imagination. that we have experience. from one end of the creation to the other. even tho’ there be no reason to determine us to that transition. it is not determin’d by reason. For one may fix his attention during some time on any one object without looking farther. The principles of union among ideas I have reduc’d to three general ones.must continue in the same object or collection of sensible qualities. contiguity and causation. to prevent that transition. We have already taken notice of certain relations. passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another. it is influenc’d by these relations. that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any reason. that is resembling. we cou’d never draw any inference from causes to effects. and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. There is indeed a principle of union among ideas. therefore. why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular instances. Shou’d it be said. the appearance of any new individual of either species naturally conveys the thought to its usual attendant. even in infinitum. The inference. which associate together the ideas of these objects. which associate ideas. When ev’ry individual of any species of objects is found by experience to be constantly united with an individual of another species. contiguous to. The imagi54 . Thus because such a particular idea is commonly annex’d to such a particular word. They are not the sole causes. without any certain method or order. and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. If you answer this question in the same manner as the preceding. your answer gives still occasion to a new question of the same kind.

and can again separate and distinguish from them. The idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it. but that of certain objects. Of the nature of the idea or belief. which he forms. Thus tho’ causation be a philosophical relation. When I think of God. and when I believe him to be existent. let us weigh the following considerations. and is so accustom’d to pass from the word to the idea. we simply form the idea of such a being. and to be an essential part in all our reasonings from that relation. SECTION VII. In order then to discover more fully the nature of belief. that it must lie in the manner. I clearly understand his meaning. that the conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it. it follows. I likewise maintain. concerning matter of fact. that notwithstanding my incredulity. and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination. that it interposes not a moment’s delay betwixt the hearing of the one. and consequently we may establish this as one part of the definition of an opinion or belief. We have no other notion of cause and effect. But tho’ I acknowledge this to be a true principle of association among ideas. that ’tis an idea related to or associated with a present impression. and the belief of it. Suppose a person present with me. when I think of him as existent. nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea. which I cannot conceive. that Cæsar dy’d in his bed. ’Tis also evident. or conjoin any. that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions. nor is the existence. which compose the idea of the object. yet ’tis only so far as it is a natural relation. and produces an union among our ideas. which have been always conjoin’d together. we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. as implying contiguity. as he is represented to us. We only observe the thing itself. concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities. ’Tis evident. which I cannot conjoin. and the conception of the other. and constant conjunction. and form all the same ideas. which we conceive. we immediately form an idea of its usual attendant. and which in all past instances have been found inseparable. that silver is more fusible than lead. and that when after the simple conception of any thing we wou’d conceive it as existent. I therefore 55 . My imagination is endow’d with the same powers as his. that we are able to reason upon it.nation of itself supplies the place of this reflection. I assert it to be the very same with that betwixt the ideas of cause and effect. and not content with asserting. ’tis evident. But I go farther. We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We conceive many things. conceiv’d by a particular idea. to which I do not assent. which we attribute to him. or the qualities of those ideas we assent to. or mercury heavier than gold. Thus when we affirm. which we do not believe. in which we conceive it. But as ’tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object. which we join to the idea of his other qualities. that the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object. or draw any inference from it. my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes. that is. succession. and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea. but not the whole. that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those. When the impression of one becomes present to us. who advances propositions. that God is existent.

some object must always be present either to the memory or senses. we are not determin’d by reason. it represents a different object or impression. We may mingle. are more strong. wherein we dissent from any person. not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition. Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? The answer is easy with regard to propositions. that belief is a lively idea produc’d by a relation to a present impression. the person. but ’till there appears some principle. When you wou’d any way vary the idea of a particular object. than the loose reveries of a castle-builder. after having conceiv’d the object in the same manner with you. But belief is somewhat more than a simple idea. and in the same order. A lively idea related to or associated with a present impression18 . firm and vivid. Nothing is more evident. and confound. So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner. which lead us to this conclusion. it evidently follows. to which we assent. All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds. than that those ideas. that are prov’d by intuition or demonstration. and another as a true history. In that case. who assents. and that from which we dissent. that the belief must make some difference betwixt that conception to which we assent. An opinion. If one person sits down to read a book as a romance. in order to be the foundation of our reasoning. and has different ideas of it. impressions and ideas. this absolute necessity cannot take place. nor does the incredulity of the one. which fixes one of these different situations. you can only encrease or diminish its force and vivacity. But as in reasonings from causation. A particular shade of any colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness or brightness without any other variation. therefore. Wherein consists the difference betwixt incredulity and belief? since in both cases the conception of the idea is equally possible and requisite. as it plainly makes no addition to our precedent ideas. according to the foregoing definition. and represent them in all their parts. in which we conceive any object. This answer is unsatisfactory. can only change the manner of our conceiving them. This definition will also be found to be entirely conformable to every one’s feeling and experience. ’tis no longer the same shade or colour. If you make any other change on it. Here are the heads of those arguments. and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense u56 . it follows upon the whole.ask. that in all cases. who does not assent to a proposition you advance. and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question. but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner. but because it discovers not all the truth. immediately conceives it in a different manner. Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of another. When we infer the existence of an object from that of others. ’Twill not be a satisfactory answer to say. we conceive both sides of the question. nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive any thing contrary to a demonstration. and unite. ’Tis confest. they plainly receive the same ideas. and concerning matters of fact. and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways. but by custom or a principle of association. I still ask. that a person. But when you produce any other variation. not because it contains any falsehood. it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible. ’Tis a particular manner of forming an idea: And as the same idea can only be vary’d by a variation of its degrees of force and vivacity. and separate. which differ from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity. either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. since the mind cannot run up with its inferences in infinitum. Our ideas are copy’d from our impressions. or belief may be most accurately defin’d. we have in reality no opinion: And this principle. but as we can believe only one. viz. so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another. The case is the same as in colours.

by a natural transition of the disposition from the one to the other. our idea of him is evidently inliven’d by the resemblance. as the first experiment to our present purpose. acquires new force and vigour. that when any impression becomes present to us. tho’ the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other. rather choose to consider him directly. 57 . All the operations of the mind depend in a great measure on its disposition. In producing this effect there concur both a relation and a present impression. can receive little entertainment from it. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend. as well as the person. ’tis well: But I must confess I place my chief confidence in experience to prove so material a principle. it feels its idea to be rather weaken’d than inliven’d by that transition. and according as the spirits are more or less elevated. and what bestows the vivacity on the idea. to which the mind applies itself. when it performs them. The latter has a more lively conception of all the incidents. The change of the objects is so easy. but when ’tis remov’d. When therefore any object is presented. While the former. let us now proceed to examine from what principles it is deriv’d. and person. which elevates and enlivens the thought. the action will always have more or less vigour and vivacity. SECTION VIII. it never so much as conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent. We may. and changes the disposition. or passes easily and insensibly along related objects. which that idea occasions. and that facility of transition. Of the causes of belief. or at least was not intended for him. Now ’tis evident the continuance of the disposition depends entirely on the objects. but applies itself to the conception of the related idea with all the force and vivacity it acquir’d from the present impression. as on the contrary. tho’ his testimony has not the same influence on them. therefore. Where the picture bears him no resemblance. about which the mind is employ’d. will be more strong and vivid. when ’tis set before us. and shewn that it consists in a lively idea related to a present impression. and that every passion. and except on account of the style and ingenuity of the composition. every action. and that any new object naturally gives a new direction to the spirits. has a more faint and languid conception of all these particulars. that when the mind is once inliven’d by a present impression. and air. I wou’d willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature. and characters. and friendships. we can satisfy ourselves concerning the reality of this phænomenon. He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons: represents to himself their actions. observe. that the mind is scarce sensible of it. Having thus explain’d the nature of belief. and the attention more or less fix’d. it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it. than by reflexion in an image. and enmities: He even goes so far as to form a notion of their features. when the mind fixes constantly on the same object. whether of joy or sorrow. as long as that disposition continues. His words produce the same ideas in both.pon their author. which is equally distant and obscure. it proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related objects. Hence it happens. but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. If in considering the nature of relation. that upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend. who gives no credit to the testimony of the author. the disposition has a much longer duration. which is essential to it.

tho’ it does not discover itself to our senses. and every step appears to me sure and infallible. as well as of resemblance. ’Tis certain. and renders it more strong and lively. The present conclusion concerning the influence of relation is the immediate consequence of all these steps. 58 . from which we learn the reality of his existence. We shadow out the objects of our faith. in sensible types and images. if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. according to the precedent definition of it. that a present impression with a relation of causation may enliven any idea. and this influence they readily convey to those ideas. This phænomenon clearly proves. for the same reason that they seek after types and images. and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives. Superstitious people are fond of the relicts of saints and holy men. and postures. than ’tis possible for us to do. ’Tis certain. in inlivening their devotion. and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those. When I am a few miles from home. and this reasoning. and a relation or association in the fancy betwixt the impression and idea. one of the best relicks a devotee cou’d procure. tho’ even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends and family naturally produces an idea of them. to which they are related. in considering the effects of contiguity. but ’tis only the actual presence of an object that transports it with a superior vivacity. that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas. that they feel the good effect of those external motions. and which they resemble. whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant. The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous. that the effect of resemblance in inlivening the idea is very common. so that there can be no suspicion of mistake. We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind. it operates upon the mind with an influence that imitates an immediate impression. Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other. that the belief super-adds nothing to the idea. and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be consider’d in this light. The devotees of that strange superstition usually plead in excuse of the mummeries. notwithstanding there is an easy transition betwixt them. and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur.The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be consider’d as experiments of the same nature. in order to inliven their devotion. which they desire to imitate. and that upon our approach to any object. But why need we seek for other arguments to prove. ’Tis certain. we are abundantly supply’d with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle. in which respect they are to be consider’d as imperfect effects. with which they are upbraided. that distance diminishes the force of every idea. No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. and were mov’d and affected by him. ’tis because they were once at his disposal. I shall only infer from these practices. merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. wou’d be the handywork of a saint. for want of some immediate impression. There enters nothing into this operation of the mind but a present impression. which we believe. but only changes our manner of conceiving it. Now ’tis evident. and consequently produce belief or assent. which otherwise wou’d decay away. and quickening their fervour. both the objects of the mind are ideas. a lively idea. say they. that a present impression with a relation or transition of the fancy may inliven any idea. But as in this latter case. when this very instance of our reasonings from cause and effect will alone suffice to that purpose? ’Tis certain we must have an idea of every matter of fact. and actions. that this idea arises only from a relation to a present impression. and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types.

towards the production of this phænomenon of belief. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another. that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another. We must in every case have observ’d the same impression in past instances. Here ’tis evident. on its first appearance. 59 . then. and find nothing in the subject. from which. Being fully satisfy’d on this head. that however that object. and observe. that the present impression has not this effect by its own proper power and efficacy. which is to be consider’d as the true and real cause of the idea. and have found it to be constantly conjoin’d with some other impression. that all the belief. When I am convinc’d of any principle. I find. which attends the present impression. I conclude upon the whole. that it admits not of the smallest doubt. This is confirm’d by such a multitude of experiments. which strikes more strongly upon me. being entirely unknown. and form to myself ideas. Now as we call every thing custom. ’Tis not solely in poetry and music. and is produc’d by a number of past impressions and conjunctions. whose existence I infer by reasoning. as a single perception. ’tis only an idea. is absolutely requisite to this whole operation. without any new operation of the reason or imagination. which we at present examine. I make a third set of experiments. may be thought to influence each other by their particular powers or qualities.In order to put this whole affair in a fuller light. but likewise in philosophy. we may establish it as a certain truth. that the belief. without any new reasoning or conclusion. on which it can be founded. I say. let us consider it as a question in natural philosophy. and find that their only difference consists in their different degrees of force and vivacity. From a second observation I conclude. is merely internal. and when after this I compare an impression with an idea. beside the customary transition. which is present to my senses. Of this I can be certain. nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination. which I am said to believe or assent to. which we must determine by experience and observation. I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. the appearance or idea of the one immediately carries us to the idea of the other. limited to the present moment. when I have had experience of its usual consequences. by which ’tis enabled to produce so extraordinary an effect. We must therefore endeavour to discover by experiments the particular qualities. from which I draw a certain conclusion. and when consider’d alone. that an impression. that tho’ the customary transition to the correlative idea still remains. I can draw no conclusion. ’Tis the present impression. When we are accustom’d to see two impressions conjoin’d together. which proceeds from a past repetition. may afterwards become the foundation of belief. I therefore change the first impression into an idea. proceeding from its relation to a present impression. because I never am conscious of any such operation. First then I observe. yet as the phænomenon of belief. A present impression. we must follow our taste and sentiment. that this belief. Objects have no discoverable connexion together. can have no hand in producing it. and of the belief which attends it. whether any thing be requisite. Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. is deriv’d solely from that origin. arises immediately. and that other. which follows upon any present impression. in order to know. I suppose there is an object presented. yet there is in reality no belief nor perswasion. these powers and qualities. that belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea.

that not only in philosophy. on which all our judgments concerning cause and effect depend. the mind never carries its view expressly to consider any past experience: Tho’ in other associations of objects. and the idea of suffocating with that of sinking. but has generally call’d by the same term all such as nearly resemble each other.. which otherwise he wou’d never have dream’d of. The objects seem so inseparable. this is not the method in which he proceeds in his reasoning. But this difficulty will vanish. it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion. Nay we find in some cases. or reasoning upon that principle. But as this transition proceeds from experience. of which we have no experience. provided it be made with judgment. can draw an inference concerning the existence of its correlative. it may assist the custom and transition of ideas by this reflexion. so it may frequently give rise to doubts and objections in the reader. impulse. and not from any primary connexion betwixt the ideas. in order to discover the effects of water on animal bodies? No surely. upon the appearance either of the cause or the effect. but even in common life. yet we have many millions to convince us of this principle. foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward. that the understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past experience. And as this is a source almost inevitable of obscurity and confusion in the author. that we interpose not a moment’s delay in passing from the one to the other. if there yet remains any. that instances of which we have no experience. that the mind makes the transition without the assistance of the memory. and without being once thought of. that belief cannot in this case be esteem’d the effect of custom. much more without forming any principle concerning it. must necessarily resemble those. but this connexion is comprehended under another principle. of which we have. A person. that is habitual. and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances. that the reflexion produces the belief without the custom. The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of water. But can we think. which informs him of such certain conjunctions of causes and effects. &c.’Twill here be worth our observation. and calls to remembrance instances. Now as after one experiment of this kind. it may be thought. In general we may observe. which brings us back to our hypothesis. for asserting that the mind is convinc’d by reasoning of that principle. and may even in some measure be unknown to us. who stops short in his journey upon meeting a river in his way. may operate on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of. we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment. that tho’ we are here suppos’d to have had only one experiment of a particular effect. or more properly speaking. I explain myself. Thus my general position. will always produce like effects. if we consider. that on this occasion he reflects on any past experience. that he has seen or heard of. solidity. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment. we must necessarily acknowledge. the mind. In all cases we transfer our experience to instances. and as this principle has establish’d itself by a sufficient custom. either expressly or tacitly. that experience may produce a belief and a judgment of causes and effects by a secret operation. to which it can be apply’d. that the past experience. The custom operates before we have time for reflexion. that like objects. This removes all pretext. ’Tis certain. I must not conclude this subject without observing. such as those of gravity. because common language has seldom made any very nice distinctions among them. For we here find. that an opinion or belief is nothing but a strong 60 . and as a habit can never be acquir’d merely by one instance. that ’tis very difficult to talk of the operations of the mind with perfect propriety and exactness. that the reflexion produces the custom in an oblique and artificial manner. that in all the most establish’d and uniform conjunctions of causes and effects. and his knowledge of these consequences is convey’d to him by past experience. either directly or indirectly. which are more rare and unusual. plac’d in like circumstances. without reflecting on it.

However convincing the foregoing arguments may appear. All this I have observ’d. After this any one will understand how we may form the idea of an impression and of an idea. that certain je-ne-scai-quoi. my explication of our judgments concerning cause and effect. that it deserves to be comply’d with. and represents it as past. in order to confirm by analogy. Upon the same principles we need not be surpriz’d to hear of the remembrance of an idea. But this very argument may. that not only an impression may give rise to reasoning. I am able to conclude from this idea. from whence are the qualities of force and vivacity deriv’d. and so necessary to the examination of truth. and requires that every argument be produc’d. The idea here supplies the place of an impression. and how we may believe the existence of an impression and of an idea. of which I have forgot the correspondent impression. be turn’d against me. but also conceive the action of the mind in the meditation. may become an objection to it. it must be able to bestow on whatever is related to it the same quality. that if all the 61 .and lively idea deriv’d from a present impression related to it. which may stop them in their reasoning. of which ’tis impossible to give any definition or description. I have often observ’d. one is immediately present to the memory or senses. and instead of a confirmation of my hypothesis. For suppose I form at present an idea. and as this conclusion is attended with belief. of the idea of an idea. so far as regards our present purpose. and is entirely the same. in order to find some new points of view. beside cause and effect. It may be said. For as this idea is not here consider’d as the representation of any absent object. or force. which may tend to their satisfaction. from the present idea. A scrupulous hesitation to receive any new hypothesis is so laudable a disposition in philosophers. but which every one sufficiently understands. For it may be said. SECTION IX. by reason of a little ambiguity in those words strong and lively. that such an impression did once exist. that. from which we may illustrate and confirm such extraordinary. ’tis easily conceiv’d how that idea may have more vigour and firmness. of which we are intimately conscious. and of its force and vivacity superior to the loose conceptions of the imagination. especially upon my principle. that when of two objects connected together by any of these relations. but that an idea may also have the same influence. the two relations of resemblance and contiguity. are to be consider’d as associating principles of thought. with which the mind reflects upon it. than when we think of a past thought. Of the effects of other relations and other habits. of which we were thinking. of which we have no remembrance. In thinking of our past thoughts we not only delineate out the objects. and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another. it may be ask’d. but likewise conceives it with an additional force and vigour. perhaps. we must not rest contented with them. and every objection remov’d. may be liable to the following objection. but as a real perception in the mind. or solidity. by the united operation of that principle. not only the mind is convey’d to its co-relative by means of the associating principle. and such fundamental principles. that all our ideas are deriv’d from correspondent impressions. When the memory offers an idea of this. and is assur’d of its present existence. that is. and of the present impression. which constitute this belief? And to this I answer very readily. call it firmness. I have also observ’d. or vivacity. but must turn the subject on every side.

lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. as at another time he may by his fancy place himself in the midst of these fabulous regions. and must easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination. and misfortunes. when single. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination. it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas. A poet. which I believe. viz. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses. there is another connected by custom. and every thing else. by the relation of cause or effect. and encrease its influence. either to our internal perception or senses. the relation will serve to enliven the idea. that he prompts his imagination by the view of a beautiful meadow or garden. are nothing but ideas. which I neither see nor remember. which resembles an immediate impression. As to the influence of contiguity and resemblance. I form an idea of Rome. that if the continguous and resembling object be comprehended in this system of realities. ’tis observable that. Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system. it shou’d follow. by which it is determin’d. which are merely the offspring of the imagination. admits not of the least change. Mean while I shall carry my observation a step farther. it forms them into a new system. But the mind stops not here. the second of the judgment. which leads us into such difficulties. and fix my attention on any part of it I please. there is no doubt but these two relations will assist that of cause and effect. arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect. and every particular of that system join’d. must become of considerable moment in all the operations of the mind. This I shall enlarge upon presently. and that we can draw no inference from one object to another. and assert. and religion. For finding. ’Tis this latter principle which peoples the world. its several revolutions. and that belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea. I look backward and consider its first foundation. ’Tis evident. striking upon the mind with a vivacity. so is this 62 . and infix the related idea with more force in the imagination. and brings us acquainted with such existences. except they be connected by this relation. that there is some error in that reasoning. that whatever is present to the memory. which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities. and as it feels that ’tis in a manner necessarily determin’d to view these particular ideas. that with this system of perceptions. and manners. This is the objection. which I call the globe. and that the custom or relation. that belief arises only from causation. they distinguish themselves from the other ideas. let us now consider its solution. we may observe. that even where the related object is but feign’d.parts of that hypothesis be true. This idea of Rome I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object. I join to it the conception of a particular government. will be the better able to form a strong description of the Elysian fields. no doubt. As the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence. but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and books of travellers and historians. as by their removal in time and place. or if you will. that their effects in inforcing and inlivening our ideas are the same. but also from those of contiguity and resemblance. that by the feign’d continguity he may enliven his imagination. But tho’ I cannot altogether exclude the relations of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy in this manner. successes. to the present impressions. tho’ by their force and settled order. their influence is very feeble and uncertain. comprehending whatever we remember to have been present. that these three species of relation are deriv’d from the same principles. we may conclude. But as we find by experience. we are pleas’d to call a reality. All this. that that action of the mind may not only be deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect.

The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree. but still have some effect. than those who have not had that advantage. and each impression draws along with it a precise idea. who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever after more faithful and zealous believers. The remembrance of these fields and rivers has the same influence on the vulgar as a new argument. can never doubt of any miraculous events. that it seem’d not to require any proof. There is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and continguous objects. it has been remark’d among the Mahometans as well as Christians. nor is there any reason. why. whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red-Sea. which are suppos’d to have been related to them by contiguity. and of our mere good-will and pleasure give it a particular relation to the impression. which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists. And indeed such a fiction is founded on so little reason. without having recourse to any past observation. which arise in the imagination from a feign’d resemblance and contiguity. and that a reasonable man might immediately infer the motion of one body from the impulse of another. it still encreases by experience and observation. or what has preceded it. or. The objects it presents are fixt and unalterable.persuasion requisite to give force to these other relations. and the Desert. And as this imperfection is very sensible in every single instance. we shou’d be determin’d to place the same object in the same relation to it. there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same. without any difference or variation. For where upon the appearance of an impression we not only feign another object. without any choice or hesitation. which we observe in that object. consider’d in itself. and encreases the belief by encreasing the vivacity of the conception. that the conclusion. but likewise arbitrarily. as something solid and real. and from that particular impression to that particular idea. The relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages. Contiguity and resemblance have an effect much inferior to causation. and from the same causes. and even from the very first instant feels the looseness of its actions. beside what we have already observ’d. That this opinion is false will admit of an easy proof. The thought is always determin’d to pass from the impression to the idea. But not content with removing this objection. yet some philosophers have imagin’d that there is an apparent cause for the communication of motion. certain and invariable. ’twill be allow’d no inconsiderable argument. and augment the conviction of any opinion. A man. ’tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. which we draw from a present object to its absent cause or effect. I shall endeavour to extract from it a proof of the present doctrine. when we compare the several instances we may remember. To begin with contiguity. that ’tis impossible to determine. We may form a like observation concerning resemblance. and form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light. and Jerusalem. is never founded on any qualities. and that principle being fluctuating and uncertain. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy transition to the facts. The mind forsees and anticipates the change. upon the return of the same impression. and Galilee. that nothing but pure caprice can determine the mind to form it. what will result from any phænomenon. in other words. and if it feigns such. that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. But tho’ this be so evident in itself. and the vivacity of any conception. We have remark’d. otherwise than by experience. this can have but a small effect upon the mind. If this can be prov’d in several new instances. and the weak hold it has of its objects. 63 . which takes its place in the imagination. that those pilgrims.

than merely from hearing the roaring of the waters. that all belief arises from the association of ideas. nor is there any thing but our experience of the governing principles of human nature. and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify. Other effects only point out their causes in an oblique manner. and from effects to causes. has the same or a parallel influence with experience. ’Tis only by experience that he infers the greatness of the object from some peculiar qualities of the image. which they represent. or circular or elliptical motion: and in short. in which it came. however contrary to daily experience and observation. by forming a clear and consistent idea of one body’s moving upon another. which strengthens the relation. This latter connexion is generally much over-rated. Now ’tis evident. but the testimony of men does it directly. it must amount to a demonstration. that the inference of the judgment is here much more lively than what is usual in our common reasonings. of an infinite number of other changes. and prodigies. according to my hypothesis. which we may suppose it to undergo. These suppositions are all consistent and natural. enchantments. implies a formal contradiction: and ’tis impossible not only that it can exist. as is common on other occasions. and this inference of the judgment he confounds with sensation. No wonder. and must imply the absolute impossibility of any contrary supposition. beside the customary conjunction. or a too easy faith in the testimony of others. then. therefore. that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points. The words or discourses of others have an intimate connexion with certain ideas in their mind. and is to be consider’d as an image as well as an effect. and that a man on the top of a mountain has no larger an image presented to his senses. and binds the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other. which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts. which is here united to experience. and these ideas have also a connexion with the facts or objects. and of impulse. But we may soon satisfy ourselves of the contrary. which is another proof of it. or of its annihilation. our faith arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects. but have a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported. that when he is cooped up in the narrowest court or chamber. and as the only immediate effect of experience is to associate our ideas together. He feels a more sensible pleasure from its magnificence. and that a man has a more vivid conception of the vast extent of the ocean from the image he receives by the eye. and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the influence of resemblance. and the reason. then. beside the communication of motion. we are so rash in drawing our 64 . which is a proof of a more lively idea: And he confounds his judgment with sensation. No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call Credulity. it follows. but also than any other natural effect.For if such an inference may be drawn merely from the ideas of body. why we imagine the communication of motion to be more consistent and natural not only than those suppositions. this superior vivacity of our conception in one case can proceed from nothing but this. But as the inference is equally certain and immediate in both cases. we seldom regulate ourselves entirely by it. of motion. But tho’ experience be the true standard of this. when he stands on the top of the high promontory. Every effect. When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony. or of its returning back in the same line. as well as of all other judgments. and conveys the vivacity of the impression to the related idea with an easier and more natural movement. but also that it can be conceiv’d. ’Tis universally allow’d by the writers on optics. even concerning apparitions. that in drawing an inference from the sight. there is also a resemblance betwixt the image and the object we infer. and of its rest immediately upon the contact. so as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseparable. which can give us any assurance of the veracity of men. is founded on the relation of resemblance betwixt the cause and effect. Resemblance.

the rewards and punishments of this life with those of a future. as much as that latter principle encreases it. provided it regard this world. their family. whom without any scruple they condemn to eternal and infinite punishments. if these people really believe what is inculcated on them. that many eminent theologians have not scrupled to affirm. as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. who believe the immortality of the soul with a true and establish’d judgment. This appears very conspicuously wherever men have occasion to compare the pleasures and pains. yet they are really infidels in their hearts. and yet you’ll find few among the more sensible people of that communion. and however much assisted by education. fortifies our reasonings. so the want of it in any very great degree is able almost entirely to destroy them. however strong in themselves. and we have so obscure an idea of the manner. or bestow a sufficient authority and force on the idea. that tho’ the vulgar have no formal principles of infidelity. and the massacre of St. as they do a blind credulity on other occasions. we must in this case allow. All we can say in excuse for this inconsistency is. than to that deriv’d from its remoteness. and what they pretend to affirm. that all the reasons we can invent. In the common affairs of life. We may add to this a remark. Bartholomew. and their country are in any period of time entirely indifferent. and diminish the force of the idea. and there is no violent passion to disturb their judgment. I rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future condition. that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrify’d. even tho’ the case does not concern themselves. There is not indeed a more ample matter of wonder to the studious. The Roman Catholicks are certainly the most zealous of any sect in the christian world. when conjoin’d with causation. that they really do not believe what they affirm concerning a future state. as cruel and barbarous. in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body. tho’ projected or executed against those very people. nor is there any better proof of it than the very inconsistency. ’tis not strange the want of resemblance shou’d overthrow what custom has establish’d. their friends. and that there are few to whom their name. that tho’ in matters of rhetoric we ought to lay our account with some exaggeration. have taken care by repeated meditation to imprint in their minds the arguments for a future state. For let us consider on the one hand what divines have display’d with such eloquence concerning the importance of eternity. that the strongest figures are infinitely inferior to the subject: And after this let us view on the other hand the prodigious security of men in this particular: I ask. and at the same time reflect. and that no preachers are so popular. there scarce are any. where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject. such as is deriv’d from the testimony of travellers and historians. where they show as obstinate an incredulity. and ’tis with reason.inferences from it. As resemblance. For I observe. and are less guided by experience in our judgments concerning it. and ’tis only in dramatic performances and in reli65 . are never able with slow imaginations to surmount this difficulty. and have nothing like what we can call a belief of the eternal duration of their souls. A future state is so far remov’d from our comprehension. As belief is an act of the mind arising from custom. and of regret to the pious man. deriv’d from its want of resemblance to the present life. And indeed the want of resemblance in this case so entirely destroys belief. and the answer is obviously in the negative. that except those few. who do not blame the Gunpowdertreason. than to observe the negligence of the bulk of mankind concerning their approaching condition. than in those upon any other subject. nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror. Of this there is a remarkable instance in the universal carelessness and stupidity of men with regard to a future state. who upon cool reflection on the importance of the subject. that men are every where concern’d about what may happen after their death.

that one. that ’tis impossible for us. by the frequent repetition of their lies. without any of this curious and almost artificial preparation. and the more so. in which these two kinds of custom agree. we may certainly conclude. I have often heard in conversation. if that act of the mind was. Here we must not be contented with saying. which naturally belong’d to that principle. this idea must by degrees acquire a facility and force. As liars. that upon examination we shall find more than one half of those opinions. so the judgment. Custom may lead us into some false comparison of ideas. A person. This is the utmost effect we can conceive of it.gious discourses. that they can scarce believe him to be dead. that prevail among mankind. shou’d frequently make its appearance in the mind. and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and unusual idea. that ’tis founded on one of the most common phænomena. endeavours for a long time afterwards to serve himself with them. I have never seen such-a-one. ’tis a common remark of the whole family. but even on many occasions prevails over that which arises from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects. and if it appear. nor produce any act of the mind. and fixing the attention. being soften’d by the want of belief in the subject. over-ballance those. as well as of other relations. take such deep root. that is any where to be met with. and that the principles. has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind. that a mere idea alone. when we consider the nature and effects of education? All those opinions and notions of things. If we consider this argument from education in a proper light. but cou’d never possibly of itself produce belief. After the death of any one. I am persuaded. who has no acquaintance with him. if we examine the effects of other kinds of custom. For supposing that in all past experience we have found two objects to have been always conjoin’d together. and conceive them in so 66 . and by means of the present impression and easy transition must conceive that idea in a stronger and more lively manner. But let us next suppose. to which I attribute all belief and reasoning. The present hypothesis will receive additional confirmation. which are thus implicitely embrac’d. that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation. ’twill appear very convincing. which usually attends it. by the like means. we must from custom make an easy transition to the idea of that object. than we do any loose floating image of the fancy. to be owing to education. but still imagine him to be in his chamber or in any other place. may have ideas so strongly imprinted on it. and this habit not only approaches in its influence. that the vividness of the idea produces the belief: We must maintain that they are individually the same. In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea. will say. that custom. where they were accustom’d to find him. To understand this we must consider. annex’d only to a reasoning and comparison of ideas. to eradicate them. or rather the imagination. come at last to remember them. but especially of the servants. that is any way celebrated. and the passion. This is the only particular. The frequent repetition of any idea infixes it in the imagination. but almost fancy I have. which are owing either to abstract reasoning or experience. But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment. by the original constitution of our natures. by all the powers of reason and experience. so often have I heard talk of him. to which we have been accustom’d from our infancy. that their effects on the judgment are similar and proportionable. may operate upon the mind in invigorating an idea after two several ways. after talking of a person. that the foregoing explication of that faculty is satisfactory. But ’tis certain it cou’d never supply the place of that comparison. ’tis evident. that they ever give pleasure. All these are parallel instances. that upon the appearance of one of these objects in an impression.

which are seemingly so inconsiderable. I shall here anticipate a little what wou’d more properly fall under our consideration afterwards. the cause of every new resemblance they acquire. which might impel us to avoid them. yet we find by experience. and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason. our condition would not be much mended. chosen a medium. I expect not to make many proselytes to my opinion. Wherever we can make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity. in whole or in part. and their removal. The effect. and even to themselves in different times and places. as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. it is never upon that account recogniz’d by philosophers. SECTION X. Did impressions alone influence the will. that effects of such consequence can flow from principles. But as education is an artificial and not a natural cause. Of the influence of belief. as in the present ca67 . and tho’ the proofs I have produc’d appear to me perfectly conclusive. that they may operate upon the mind in the same manner with those. especially of goods and evils. can be deriv’d from nothing but custom and habit. therefore. are always wandering in the mind. This perhaps will be the fate of what I have here advanc’d concerning belief. with all our actions and passions. of which the one has effects very different from the other. For as the different degrees of force make all the original difference betwixt an impression and an idea. which the senses. But tho’ education be disclaim’d by philosophy. because. or only in idea. produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions. and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. and vice versa. of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions. ’Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far from being equal. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling. did every idea influence our actions. and is the cause why all systems are apt to be rejected at first as new and unusual. There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure. On the other hand. that the images of every thing. it would never enjoy a moment’s peace and tranquillity. Nature has proceeded with caution in this case. Impressions always actuate the soul. and that in the highest degree. Men will scarce ever be persuaded. but ’tis not every idea which has the same effect. we should every moment of our lives be subject to the greatest calamities. as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion. and seems to have carefully avoided the inconveniences of two extremes. then. which we believe either are or will be existent. But pain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind. as at present when I mention them. when we come to treat of the passions and the sense of beauty. For such is the unsteadiness and activity of thought. we should not be provided by nature with any principle of action. and has neither bestow’d on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will. they must of consequence be the source of all the differences in the effects of these perceptions. Nature has. tho’ in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects19 . which are immediately present to the senses and perception. nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind. where it imitates them in that influence. it prevails nevertheless in the world. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. Tho’ an idle fiction has no efficacy. tho’ we foresaw their approach. memory or reason present to us. that the ideas of those objects. and were it mov’d by every idle conception of this kind.full a light. To obviate this objection. and that the far greatest part of our reasonings.

When any affecting object is presented. As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions. This emotion passes by an easy transition to the imagination. Admiration and surprize have the same effect as the other passions. with which we may be already a little acquainted. so the passions in their turn are very favourable to belief. is commonly esteem’d a sufficient foundation for any fiction. and to make the mind acquiesce in them with satisfaction. always endeavour to give an air of truth to their fictions. as a person of a sorrowful and melancholy disposition is very credulous of every thing that nourishes his prevailing passion. since it causes an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions. that truth. they supply its place. that it resembles the inferences we draw from experience. but very often such as give pain. and prevail upon the fancy. and so vivifies and enlivens the idea. tho’ liars by profession. may both serve as an additional argument for the present system. which may easily be supposed to flow from that solidity and force. must make it resemble them in these qualities. and may give us a notion after what manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions. than if they kept themselves within the bounds of moderation. Belief. The conversation of those. But as this is an effect. make no impression upon the mind. This is a mystery. and which we shall have farther occasion to be let into in the progress of this treatise. and that because those ideas they present to us. A coward. then. and diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting object. that even when ideas have no manner of influence on the will and passions. the constant repetition of these ideas makes them enter into the mind with facility. or at least without reluctance. especially in persons who are naturally inclined to that passion. according to my system. will never be able to afford much pleasure. and accordingly we may observe. Venus. and excites immediately a degree of its proper passion. In short. Poets have form’d what they call a poetical system of things. in order to make them entertaining to the imagination. and consequently assent to it. ’Tis certain we cannot take pleasure in any discourse. it follows. Accordingly we may observe. therefore. makes us form that idea with greater force and vivacity. After this account of the influence of belief on the passions. Poets themselves. tho’ in affairs of no moment. This. Jupiter. truth and reality are still requisite. we shall find. which. where our judgment gives no assent to those images which are presented to our fancy. readily assents to every account of danger he meets with. we may observe. which tho’ it be believ’d neither by themselves nor readers. spreads itself over the whole soul. do upon that account become more readily the objects of faith and opinion. which naturally attends their miraculous relations.se. not being attended with belief. and give an equal entertainment to the imagination. according to the precedent system. We have been so much accustom’d to the names of Mars. never gives any satisfaction. quacks and projectors meet with a more easy faith upon account of their magnificent pretensions. that in the same manner as education infixes any opinion. their performances. it gives the alarm. and where that is totally neglected. that wherever that influence arises from any other principles beside truth or reality. that all the influence of belief upon the fancy may be explained from that system. who have acquir’d a habit of lying. The first astonishment. has no other effect than to procure an easy reception for the ideas. and not only such facts as convey agreeable emotions. whose fears are easily awaken’d. however extraordinary they may appear. however ingenious. But if we compare together all the phænomena that occur on this head. we shall find less difficulty in explaining its effects on the imagination. and is nothing but a morevivid and intense conception of any idea. this must proceed from its approaching them in force and vivacity. In like manner tragedians always 68 . that among the vulgar. however necessary it may seem in all works of genius. attend those ideas that are establish’d by reasonings from causation. without influencing the judgment.

as by so many pipes or canals. and sometimes as the present impressions of the senses. acquires such a vivacity as disorders all its powers and faculties. from any extraordinary ferment of the blood and spirits. and places the objects in their proper light. ’Tis difficult for us to withold our assent from what is painted out to us in all the colours of eloquence. To confirm this we may observe. but in order to procure a more easy reception into the imagination for those extraordinary events. The several incidents of the piece acquire a kind of relation by being united into one poem or representation. enter easily into the conception. This. since every idea. that the least reflection dissipates the illusions of poetry. or the conclusions of the judgment. from history. and produce belief from the very same principles. Belief must please the imagination by means of the force and vivacity which attends it. and is convey’d. but every loose fiction or idea. as may convince us. that they are deriv’d from the same origin. for they will frankly confess. This mixture of truth and falshood in the fables of tragic poets not only serves our present purpose. and are received without any such formality. that the assistance is mutual betwixt the judgment and fancy. as well as betwixt the judgment and passion. whose personages and incidents. When the imagination. being of a more familiar kind. and operates with equal force on the passions. that truth is not in any circumstance inviolably observed. and if any of these incidents be an object of belief. which is not required of comic poets. and that belief not only gives vigour to the imagination. We are hurried away by the lively imagination of our author or companion. a poet has a counterfeit belief. in order to procure a more easy reception for the whole. can never amount to a perfect assurance. and even he himself is often a victim to his own fire and genius. to every idea that has any communication with the primary one. it bestows a force and vivacity on the others. that in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm. is found to be agreeable to that faculty. which they represent. which has force and vivacity. A present impression and a customary transition are now no longer necessary to inliven our ideas. indeed. by shewing. so they influence the judgment after the same manner. and that because the union among the ideas is. even tho’ at first sight they be known to be fictitious. and cause it to make a deeper impression on the fancy and affections. which we formerly dignify’d with the name of conclusions concerning matters of fact. or at least the names of their principal actors. that poets make use of this artifice of borrowing the names of their persons. and the vivacity produc’d by the fancy is in many cases greater than that which arises from custom and experience. nothing con69 .borrow their fable. and the chief events of their poems. ’Tis however certain. The vividness of the first conception diffuses itself along the relations. there is no means of distinguishing betwixt truth and falshood. But this is a precaution. Every chimera of the brain is as vivid and intense as any of those inferences. in its influence. and the pure offspring of the fancy. having the same influence as the impressions of the memory. and even a kind of vision of his objects: And if there be any shadow of argument to support this belief. in a manner. but that a vigorous and strong imagination is of all talents the most proper to procure belief and authority. We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree. that the imagination can be satisfy’d without any absolute belief or assurance. from some known passage in history. ’Tis evident. and bears it a great resemblance in its operations. that as a lively imagination very often degenerates into madness or folly. and that not in order to deceive the spectators. only with this difference. Nor will it be amiss to remark. is receiv’d on the same footing. but may in another view be regarded as a very strong confirmation of this system. which are related to it. accidental: But still it approaches so near.

to distinguish human reason into three kinds. tho’ ’tis plain we have no further assurance of these facts. SECTION XI. We shall consider each of these in order. Those philosophers. I have follow’d this method of expression. A cause traces the way to our thought. its influence on the mind is contrary to that of causation. that which is founded on chance. By proofs. in which. is merely the negation of a cause. that from knowledge. Chance can only destroy this determination of the thought. we must allow of a cause.tributes more to his full conviction than a blaze of poetical figures and images. and leave the mind in its native situation of indifference. which we had before establish’d. which is regarded as contingent. and determines the event rather to that side than the other: That is. ’tis instantly re-instated. which have their effect upon the poet himself. are oblig’d to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. which are deriv’d from the same origin. those arguments. ’twould perhaps be more convenient. we must carry our eye from it a moment to consider its consequences. and may be receiv’d as a superior kind of evidence. we must at the same time affirm. viz. who have divided human reason into knowledge and probability. and mark the several degrees of evidence. and have defin’d the first to be that evidence. Probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds. than what experience affords us. that evidence. ’tis however certain. after any other manner. On the other hand. that ’tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow. I proceed to examine. For if we affirm that one chance can. which gives it the superiority. and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. For this reason. who wou’d say. as well as upon his readers. and destroy the supposition of chance. no one chance can possibly be superior to another. from proofs. to leave the imagination perfectly indifferent. or that all men must dye. which are deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect. and explain from the same principles some other species of reasoning. and 70 . Since therefore an entire indifference is essential to chance. The idea of cause and effect is deriv’d from experience. Of the probability of chances. which is still attended with uncertainty. But in order to bestow on this system its full force and evidence. viz. properly speaking. and from probabilities. either to consider the existence or non-existence of that object. and ’tis essential to it. One wou’d appear ridiculous. that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them in any other. which presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoin’d with each other. and that which arises from causes. and accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse. that in common discourse we readily affirm. in such certain relations. as chance is nothing real in itself. that many arguments from causation exceed probability. and. be superior to another. that there is something. But tho’ every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases. which arises from the comparison of ideas. By probability. in order at once to preserve the common signification of words. otherwise than as it is compos’d of a superior number of equal chances. I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By knowledge. in other words. A perfect and total indifference is essential to chance. upon the absence of a cause. ’Tis this last species of reasoning. and in a manner forces us to survey such certain objects. produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation.

that ’tis neither by arguments deriv’d from demonstration. that there are some causes to make the dice fall. nor can there be any circumstance to give one the advantage above another. and supposing likewise all the rest to be indifferent and to be determin’d by chance. form’d after such a manner as that four of its sides are mark’d with one figure. Proceeding then in that reasoning. which can be of consequence in this affair. since it appears. every notion. The mind is here limited by the causes to such a precise number and quality of the events. on which side the event will fall. he must conclude 71 . and may prove after the same manner. that chance is merely the negation of a cause. nor from probability. but is acknowledg’d by every one. ’Tis indeed evident. The question is. wherein we have advanc’d three steps. in order to be the foundation of any reasoning: We are next to consider what effect a superior combination of chances can have upon the mind. and two with another. In order to clear up this difficulty. that the most extravagant fancy can form. ’twill be on that side where there is a superior number of chances. that has four sides mark’d with a certain number of spots. Shou’d it be said. that forms calculations concerning chances. that we can never by the comparison of mere ideas make any discovery. we shall suppose a person to take a dye. I wou’d ask. rather than on the inferior. what is here meant by likelihood and probability? The likelihood and probability of chances is a superior number of equal chances. that ’tis more likely and probable. and produces belief or assent. yet ’tis impossible for us to conceive this combination of chances. than where there is an inferior: Shou’d this be said. which arises from causes. and that ’tis impossible to prove with certainty. ’tis easy to arrive at a notion of a superior combination of chances. and produces a total indifference in the mind. Where nothing limits the chances. or one number of spots. and at the same time is undetermin’d in its choice of any particular event. Thus unless we allow. which is requisite to render one hazard superior to another. is upon a footing of equality. and their perfect equality and indifference. we can form no calculation concerning the laws of hazard. with a total indifference in others. that any event must fall on that side where there is a superior number of chances. and of no consequence. and after what manner it influences our judgment and opinion. affords us an obvious and easy instance of this superiority. that tho’ in an opposition of chances ’tis impossible to determine with certainty. and consequently when we say ’tis likely the event will fall on the side. To suppose in this case any certainty. A dye.one total indifference can never in itself be either superior or inferior to another. yet we can pronounce with certainty. which is superior. that tho’ chance and causation be directly contrary. and where there is an inferior there is an inferior. that a superior number of chances produces our assent neither by demonstration nor probability. by what means a superior number of equal chances operates upon the mind. without supposing a mixture of causes among the chances. and lie upon some one of their sides. Here we may repeat all the same arguments we employ’d in examining that belief. This truth is not peculiar to my system. and preserve their form in their fall. that where there is a superior number of chances there is actually a superior. we do no more than affirm. were to overthrow what we have establish’d concerning the opposition of chances. and that there must always be a mixture of causes among the chances. and only two with another. And here ’tis remarkable. and a conjunction of necessity in some particulars. and to put this dye into the box with an intention of throwing it: ’Tis plain. that one negation of a cause and one total indifference can never be superior or inferior to another. But supposing these causes to operate. which are identical propositions.

&c. and the leaving the mind in a perfect indifference among those events. contains three circumstances worthy of our attention. than what is suitable to its proportion with the rest. We conclude in general. 72 . but naturally places it on the table. and the dye cannot turn up above one at once. this principle directs us not to consider all of them at once as lying uppermost. We have nothing but one single dye to contemplate. A certain number of sides. for in that case this side wou’d be consider’d as certain and inevitable. This belief arises from an operation of the mind upon the simple and limited object before us. Certain causes. and infers the existence of the one from that of its usual attendant. which are suppos’d contingent. the chances present all these sides as equal. The imagination passes from the cause. and that upon the appearance of the one. We have already observ’d. and turn up one of its sides. arising from the causes. First. but it directs us to the whole six sides after such a manner as to divide its force equally among them. This is the effect of the intermingled causes. a cubical figure. and the superiority encreases on the other side. First. But as all these six sides are incompatible. He in a manner believes. and views it as turning up one of its sides. ’Tis after this manner the original impulse. that some one of them must result from the throw: We run all of them over in our minds: The determination of the thought is common to all. tho’ still with hesitation and doubt. Thirdly. which are requisite to our forming any calculation concerning chances. that this will lie uppermost. that the mind is determin’d by custom to pass from any cause to its effect. and give the preference to that which is inscrib’d on the greatest number of sides. consider gradually and carefully what must be the influence of these circumstances on the thought and imagination. in proportion to the number of chances. that it always conjoins them in its thought. A certain figure. Let us. which are contrary: And according as these contrary chances diminish. one after another. and make us consider every one of them. viz. and to turn up one of its sides. that tho’ the dye be necessarily determin’d to fall. The very nature and essence of chance is a negation of causes. so far as relates to our present purpose. which we look upon as impossible: Neither does it direct us with its entire force to any particular side. Secondly. therefore. ’tis almost impossible for it not to form an idea of the other. Secondly. but that this is determin’d entirely by chance. and consequently are the only circumstances regarded by the mind in its forming a judgment concerning the result of such a throw. to the effect. Their constant conjunction in past instances has produc’d such a habit in the mind. such as gravity. and feels a kind of impossibility both of stopping short in the way. which determine it to fall. ’Tis suppos’d. as alike probable and possible. in order to comprehend one of the most curious operations of the understanding. solidity.the one figure to be more probable than the other. but no more of its force falls to the share of any one. to preserve its form in its fall. the turning up one of the six sides. This dye form’d as above. which are suppos’d indifferent. is divided and split in pieces by the intermingled chances. the throwing of the dye. viz. inscrib’d on each side. yet there is nothing to fix the particular side. and of forming any other idea. When it considers the dye as no longer supported by the box. and consequently the vivacity of thought. These three particulars form the whole nature of the dye. and therefore its nature will be the more easily discover’d and explain’d. his belief acquires new degrees of stability and assurance. it cannot without violence regard it as suspended in the air. When therefore the thought is determin’d by the causes to consider the dye as falling and turning up one of its sides.

they must concur in their influence on the mind. ’Tis evident that where several sides have the same figure inscrib’d on them. and belief is the same with the vivacity of the idea. that the mind. arises from the frequent conjunction of objects. ’tis evident. but are all deriv’d from the same origin. than to assist us in explaining the probability of causes. and if this maxim be not always 73 . But as the question is concerning the figure. these are all perfectly equal. and ’tis by these slow steps. therefore. it must arrive at its perfection by degrees. viz. What we have found once to follow from any object. Four sides are suppos’d in the present case to have the same figure inscrib’d on them. The first instance has little or no force: The second makes some addition to it: The third becomes still more sensible. The vivacity of the idea is always proportionable to the degrees of the impulse or tendency to the transition. and have learn’d how they give an impulse to the thought. viz. and divide that impulse into as many parts as there are unites in the number of sides. The probabilities of causes are of several kinds. upon which that figure is inscrib’d. the causes. and become stronger and more forcible by the union. the impulses likewise become contrary. which produces the association. who is arriv’d at the age of maturity. and two to have another figure. therefore. is what we must chiefly examine. and the difference betwixt these kinds of evidence is more easily perceiv’d in the remote degrees. that our judgment arrives at a full assurance. SECTION XII.We have already seen the influence of the two first qualities of the dye. can any longer be acquainted with it. having form’d another observation concerning the connexion of causes and effects. That species of probability. and no one cou’d ever have any advantage above another. that falls under our observation. gives new force to its reasoning from that observation. nothing is more common than for people of the most advanc’d knowledge to have attain’d only an imperfect experience of many particular events. the figures inscrib’d on each side. The impulses of the former are. superior to those of the latter. But before it attains this pitch of perfection. and as the same figure is presented by more than one side. We must now consider the effects of the third particular. we conclude will for ever follow from it. that what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal’d cause. and in all of them is only to be esteem’d a presumption or probability. the association of ideas to a present impression. that were dispers’d over the several sides. Were the question only what side will be turn’d up. Of the probability of causes. therefore. ’Tis true. What I have said concerning the probability of chances can serve to no other purpose. it passes thro’ several inferior degrees. from probabilities to proofs is in many cases insensible. ’Tis worthy of remark on this occasion. and must unite upon one image or idea of a figure all those divided impulses. As the habit. since ’tis commonly allow’d by philosophers. and ’tis impossible both these figures can be turn’d up. viz. yet no one. and must acquire new force from each instance. But as the events are contrary. and the number and indifference of the sides. The gradation. and by means of it can build an argument on one single experiment. as far as its strength goes. according to the precedent doctrine. than in the near and contiguous. when duly prepar’d and examin’d. which naturally produces only an imperfect habit and transition: But then we must consider. that tho’ the species of probability here explain’d be the first in order. that the impulses belonging to all these sides must re-unite in that one figure. and naturally takes place before any entire proof can exist. and the inferior destroys the superior.

’Twou’d be very happy for men in the conduct of their lives and actions. that a constant perseverance in any course of life produces a strong inclination and tendency to continue for the future. But however philosophers and the vulgar may differ in their explication of the contrariety of events. We find from common experience. that the connexion betwixt all causes and effects is equally necessary. and interpose not a moments delay betwixt the view of one object and the belief of that. When the conjunction of any two objects is frequent. that commonly it does not go right: But an artizan easily perceives. ’tis not for want of a sufficient number of experiments. it operates immediately. but because we frequently meet with instances to the contrary. of which we have had experience. There is no doubt but this principle sometimes takes place. and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes. and that causes and effects follow not in the same order. and take into consideration the contrariety of events. But philosophers observing. that almost in every part of nature there is contain’d a vast variety of springs and principles. perhaps by reason of a grain of dust. which are hid. From the observation of several parallel instances. but from the secret operation of contrary causes. When we follow only the habitual determination of the mind. a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes. tho’ they meet with no obstacle nor impediment in their operation. First. philosophers form a maxim. were the same objects always conjoin’d together. their inferences from it are always of the same kind. As the custom depends not upon any deliberation. A contrariety of events in the past may give us a kind of hesitating belief for the future after two several ways. tho’ there are habits of inferior degrees of force. and proceeds from their mutual hindrance and opposition. But as ’tis frequently found. The vulgar. and all the instances we have ever met with are uniform and of a piece. is concerning the nature and causes of the contrariety. tho’ I am perswaded. and produces those inferences we draw from contrary phænomena. which leads us to the second species of probability. without being entirely constant. that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels. but fails of its usual effect. that upon an exact scrutiny. find that ’tis at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause. who take things according to their first appearance.built upon as certain. But this method of proceeding we have but few instances of in 74 . that upon examination we shall not find it to be the principle. as makes them often fail of their usual influence. we are oblig’d to vary our reasoning on account of this uncertainty. without allowing any time for reflection. attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes. we make the transition without any reflection. that one observation is contrary to another. the mind is determin’d to pass from one object to the other. and we had nothing to fear but the mistakes of our own judgment. By producing an imperfect habit and transition from the present impression to the related idea. when they remark. The first question. in our actions as well as reasonings. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say. as when the union is uninterrupted. where there is a contrariety in our experience and observation. that most commonly influences the mind in this species of reasoning. which is often found to attend it. which puts a stop to the whole movement. without having any reason to apprehend the uncertainty of nature. proportion’d to the inferior degrees of steadiness and uniformity in our conduct. but not with so entire a habit. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation. that occurs on this head. by reason of their minuteness or remoteness. and founded on the same principles.

therefore. so it does that concerning their probability. but is deriv’d entirely from habit. In the former species of reasoning we commonly take knowingly into consideration the contrariety of past events. that of twenty ships. and a superior number to concur on one side. therefore. which we have observ’d to follow from it. and that effect. and consequently the first impulse of the imagination in this species of reasoning is endow’d with the same qualities. that when an object is attended with contrary effects. we compare the different sides of the contrariety. Any of these past events may again happen. that I need not here endeavour to render it more intelligible. viz. which we must now endeavour to explain. it being uncertain to us. the reasons which determine us to make the past a standard for the future. but in an oblique manner. and we judge. And as past experience regulates our judgment concerning the possibility of these effects. that is deriv’d from the impulse. that the supposition. which we have on each side: Whence we may conclude. only nineteen return. and diffuses itself over all those images. that the future resembles the past. But as we frequently run over those several ideas of past events. First we may observe. I have found by long observation. and represent to myself nineteen of these ships as returning in safety. to which we have been accustom’d. and always consider those as possible. ’Tis evident. is here broke into pieces. This habit or determination to transfer the past to the future is full and perfect. the images presented by our past experience must remain in their first form. when in considering past experiments we find them of a contrary nature. and draw together the divided images presented by experience. be to consider the proportions of contrary events in a great number of instances. by which we are determin’d to expect for the future the same train of objects. without either multiplying or enlarging the figure. Concerning this there can be no difficulty. this determination. which is supported by a lesser number of experiments. for instance. Each new experiment is as a new stroke of the pencil. we judge of them only by our past experience. and even fewer than in those. Suppose I see at present twenty ships that leave the port: I transfer my past experience to the future. Here then are two things to be consider’d. upon which we reason. since ’tis to it we refer the determination of that particular event. Every past experiment may be consider’d as a kind of chance. whether the object will exist conformable to one experiment or another: And for this reason every thing that has been said on the one subject is applicable to both. and one as perishing. Suppose. we always esteem the most likely. which has been the most common. which are deriv’d from the uninterrupted conjunction of objects. that our reasonings of this kind arise not directly from the habit. in order to form a judgment concerning one single event. not only than a mere fiction of the imagination. which go to sea. but also than any idea.our probable reasonings. they will be mix’d in the same proportion as in the past. secondly. and carefully weigh the experiments. and preserve their first proportions. but offers us a number of disagreeing images in a certain order and proportion. presents us with no steady object. is not founded on arguments of any kind. The first impulse. 75 . which bestows an additional vivacity on the colours. If our intention. this consideration must change the first form of our ideas. of which each partakes an equal share of that force and vivacity. tho’ full and perfect in itself. This operation of the mind has been so fully explain’d in treating of the probability of chance. But. These agreeing images unite together. that when they do happen. and the manner how we extract a single judgment from a contrariety of past events. and render the idea more strong and lively. Many of these images are suppos’d to concur. which appears uncertain.

which enters into every reasoning of this kind. is compos’d of parts. that perfect habit. that instances.Thus upon the whole. Just reasoning ought still. that is contingent. that compose the opposite probability. wherever any cause consists of a number of parts. Since therefore each part of the probability contributes to the production of the belief. Thirdly. each part of the possibility must have the same influence on the opposite side. in the same manner as matter preserves its solidity in the air. We may establish it as a certain maxim. the effect. therefore. 76 . which can give any event. and with those. attending the possibility. either by weakening the habit. and animal spirits. This possibility is compos’d of parts. however subtile. to retain its force. I shall propose the following considerations. To justify still farther this account of the second species of probability. we conclude that each part contains this quality and contributes to the gravity of the whole. and that ’tis only a superior number of them. as well as in the grosser and more sensible forms. and ’tis evident an experiment in the past proves at least a possibility for the future. and wou’d become a certainty. We may observe. Secondly. and is form’d by the concurrence of the several effects. That probability of causes. contrary experiments produce an imperfect belief. and arises from the union of the several effects. and that the only circumstance. To every probability there is an opposite possibility. that when we transfer the past to the future. which are of the same nature both among themselves. according to the variation of that number. or by dividing and afterwards joining in different parts. is a compounded one. that proceed from each part of the cause. that all single chances are entirely equal. of which we have no experience. because otherwise ’twou’d cease to be a probability. perhaps. which is most extensive. but not in kind. and consequently have the same influence on the mind and understanding. The absence or presence of a part of the cause is attended with that of a proportionable part of the effect. that there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility. must necessarily resemble those of which we have. The contrary belief. and which we at present examine. is a compounded effect. without fearing to give offence by that air of subtilty. the known to the unknown. of which each part arises from a proportionable number of chances or experiments. implies a view of a certain object. which can throw the ballance on any side. and differ in number only. and fire. which we have of any event. which proceed from each part of the probability. every past experiment has the same weight. that are entirely of the same nature with those of the probability. The belief. In like manner. properly speaking. The possibility. The component parts of this possibility and probability are of the same nature. encreases or diminishes according to the number of chances or past experiments. a superiority over another. This connexion or constant conjunction sufficiently proves the one part to be the cause of the other. which makes us conclude in general. As the belief. ’tis plain. is a superior number of chances. which attends the probability. where we reason with knowledge and reflection from a contrariety of past experiments. which attends them. Thus because the gravity of a body encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of its parts. the nature of these parts being entirely the same. Let us now join these three observations. as the uncertainty of causes is discover’d by experience. First. and the effect encreases or diminishes. which presents us with a view of contrary events. depends on a contrariety of experiments. that in all moral as well as natural phænomena. and see what conclusion we can draw from them. It has been observ’d. ’tis to be consider’d as a compounded effect.

or combin’d with others of the same kind. than what arises from any one alone. As to the concurrence. arising from the concurrence of a superior number of views. Let men be once fully perswaded of these two principles. and the likeness of their effects consists in this. their influence becomes mutually destructive.as well as the probability does an opposite view. consider’d in itself. it loses not upon that account its former power of presenting a view of the object. As to the manner of their opposition. tho’ perhaps very little are necessary to perceive the imperfection of every vulgar hypothesis on this subject. whether that experiment be single. is evident from experience. Suppose. First. is by producing a stronger and more lively view of its object. and with the easiest and most obvious principles of philosophy. or oppos’d by others of a contrary kind. and the little light. and only multiplies the number of views. But tho’ these parts be alike in their nature. it acquires both these qualities of combination and opposition. Now as the view they present is in both cases full and entire. in which past experiments concur. then. and. and comprehends the object in all its parts. who not being accustom’d to such profound reflections on the intellectual faculties of the mind. occasion’d by the transference of each past experiment. But that the first hypothesis is erroneous. and this difference must appear in the effect as well as the similarity. and ’tis impossible the object can at once exist conformable to both of them. as the only reasonable opinion. The component parts of the probability and possibility. and all these views uniting together produce one general view. being alike in their nature. That even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects. that have a like influence. which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it. which is fuller and more distinct by the greater number of causes or principles. therefore. that each of them presents a view of a particular object. they are very different in their quantity and number. therefore. I am sensible how abstruse all this reasoning must appear to the generality of readers. whether it be entire. ’tis evident. and the mind is determin’d to the superior only with that force. but only concurs with and opposes other experiments. from which it is deriv’d. Each part presents a particular view. and in many cases wou’d be too numerous to be comprehended distinctly by any finite capacity. will be apt to reject as chimerical whatever strikes not in with the common receiv’d notions. which wou’d only distract the mind. Here is almost the same argument in a different light. The only manner then. It remains. which informs us. nor is there any thing but a superior vivacity in the probability. Or. which can distinguish these effects. And no doubt there are some pains requir’d to enter into these arguments. and unite their forces. in which the superior number of similar component parts in the one can exert its influence. preserves itself entire. not in a multitude of similar ones. that the belief. which philosophy can yet afford us in such sublime and such curious speculations. may arise concerning the manner both of the concurrence and opposition. that these similar views run into each other. That there is nothing in any object. ’tis impossible that in this particular there can be any difference. and gives them a superior degree of force and vivacity. there is only the choice left betwixt these two hypotheses. That it runs into the other similar and correspondent views. 77 . when they are transfer’d to any future event. so as to produce a stronger and clearer view. must produce like effects. In this particular both these degrees of belief are alike. attending any reasoning. which remains after subtracting the inferior. All our reasonings concerning the probability of causes are founded on the transferring of past to future. That the view of the object. The transferring of any past experiment to the future is sufficient to give us a view of the object. A question. consists in one conclusion. and prevail above the inferior in the other. secondly. This is the manner. that as the contrary views are incompatible with each other.

serve to fortify and inliven it. and joins not its force with that of its fellows. we can only repeat these contrary experiments with their particular proportions. which the mind can judge of. tho’ supported by one past experience. follows not in the same degree. it casts its eye backward upon past experience. consider’d in itself. but from some operation of the fancy conjoin’d with it. they have no relation to each other. each act of the mind. Not being united by any common object. But. upon account of that superiority. even with regard to our most certain reasonings from causation: But I shall venture to affirm. The first may be explain’d after this manner. But suppose that this multitude of views or glimpses of an object proceeds not from experience. which is intense and lively in proportion to the number of experiments from which it is deriv’d. Beside the effect of design. Our past experience presents no determinate object. ’Tis obvious. yet this requires a long tract of time. the judgment gives the preference to the latter. and extracted from them one single idea or image. upon which we reason. and the minute differences it can observe betwixt them. of which those that are of the same kind uniting together. When the chances or experiments on one side amount to ten thousand. which may appear the most extraordinary. which cou’d not produce assurance in any single event. along with a very frequent and undesign’d repetition. nor wou’d our conclusion be uncertain. and consequently make no transition or union of forces. however faint. that with regard to these conjectural or probable reasonings they still acquire a new degree of evidence. In general we may pronounce. secondly. but from a voluntary act of the imagination. and this will throw them so loose from all common systems. This phænomenon we shall understand better afterwards. which is only probable. let men be once fully convinc’d of these two principles. that in reasonings of this kind. and as our belief. For tho’ custom and education produce belief by such a repetition. I say. wou’d be no more inclin’d to believe the existence of its object. First. which. unless the fancy melted together all those images that concur. ’tis evident that the belief arises not merely from the transference of past to future. has a separate influence. This may lead us to conceive the manner. than if he had contented himself with one survey of it. this effect does not follow.we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. tho’ ’tis plainly impossible for the mind to run over every particular view. that if the transference of the past to the future were founded merely on a conclusion of the understanding. being separate and independent. they wou’d no longer be conceal’d. affords us any reason to draw a conclusion concerning any other object or event. it cou’d never occasion any belief or assurance. and on the other to ten thousand and one. ’tis equally obvious in this species of reasoning. and running into one act of the mind. and as the uncertainty is deriv’d from a conceal’d contrariety of causes in the former. which may deserve our attention. and their superiority above their antagonists. and distinguish the superior vivacity of the image arising from the superior 78 . or at least. as is not deriv’d from experience. that a person. who wou’d 20 voluntarily repeat any idea in his mind. For as this latter object is suppos’d uncertain. and transferring it to the future. fixes itself on a determinate object. were any of the causes plac’d in the known qualities of that object. ’tis not the object presented to us. When we transfer contrary experiments to the future. These principles we have found to be sufficiently convincing. producing them. My second reflection is founded on those large probabilities. in which that faculty enters into all our reasonings. is presented with so many contrary views of its object. When the mind forms a reasoning concerning any matter of fact. that they will make no difficulty of receiving any. I shall conclude this subject with two reflections.

or assent to. which differs from them in some material circumstances. and we may farther 79 . Yet nothing can be more certain. that the present object invigorates and inlivens the imagination. nor cou’d render them distinguishable from each other. and allow’d to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion.number. is not a simple emotion. and of the resemblance. where the difference is so inconsiderable. viz. SECTION XIII. according to the principles abovemention’d. where the numbers are precise and the difference sensible. and by a general rule assigns to a thousand guineas. These general rules we shall explain presently. According to the hypothesis above explain’d all kinds of reasoning from causes or effects are founded on two particulars. The first probability of this kind may be accounted for thus. and the resemblance of a present object to any one of them. which is affected. and by that means weakens the evidence. if superior only by an unite. either where the conjunction of their objects is not constant. therefore. has in reality a thousand or more desires. a stronger passion than to nine hundred and ninety nine. which we are therefore said to believe. which arises from it. that the augmenting the numbers of any sum augments the passion. of a great number of weaker passions. The difference. the constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience. But beside these two species of probability. The effect of these two particulars is. but upon custom. Without some degree of resemblance. properly speaking. diminishes the facility of the transition. ’tis evident. Of unphilosophical probability. deriv’d from a view of each part of the object. along with the constant union. tho’ ’tis evident it may still retain as much as may be the foundation of probability. I say. as well as union. seem to make only one passion. and this it transfers to larger numbers. which varies according to the different quantity of the object. than that so small a difference wou’d not be discernible in the passions. as long as there is any resemblance remaining. as above explained. which are not exactly resembling. you weaken the principle of transition. that three guineas produce a greater passion than two. which is diminish’d. ’tis the constancy of the union. and general rules. which uniting together. the reasoning becomes proportionably more or less firm and certain. tho’ they have not had the good fortune to obtain the same sanction. The vivacity of the first impression cannot be fully convey’d to the related idea. who desires a thousand pound. and in the probability deriv’d from analogy. and of consequence that belief. If you weaken either the union or resemblance. ’tis impossible there can be any reasoning: but as this resemblance admits of many different degrees. because of the resemblance. We have a parallel instance in the affections. ’Tis evident. An experiment loses of its force. The diminution of the union. All these kinds of probability are receiv’d by philosophers. ’tis the resemblance only. that are deriv’d from the same principles. For otherwise ’twere impossible the passion shou’d encrease by the encrease of these parts. or where the present impression does not perfectly resemble any of those. that when an object produces any passion in us. by the preference he gives to the larger number. We have found in a multitude of instances. conveys this force and vivacity to the related idea. But there are others. The mind can perceive from its immediate feeling. tho’ the composition evidently betrays itself upon every alteration of the object. which are deriv’d from an imperfect experience and from contrary causes. and the resemblance. there is a third arising from Analogy. that the passion. of our conduct in preferring the greater number depends not upon our passions. but a compounded one. In those probabilities of chance and causes above-explain’d. Thus a man. whose union we are accustom’d to observe. when transferr’d to instances.

of which we can have any assurance. in which it is propos’d to us. as the chain of causes encreases. without any intermediate cause or effect. A lively impression produces more assurance than a faint one. which is close and immediate. A greater force and vivacity in the impression naturally conveys a greater to the related idea. of which the connexion with the foregoing is known only by experience and observation. the conviction is much stronger. by means of the customary transition of the imagination. that the vivacity of all the ideas is deriv’d. Before the knowledge of the fact cou’d come to the first historian. and secretly changes the authority of the same argument. ’Tis from the original impression. according to the foregoing system. and must lose somewhat in each transition. Perhaps. and which never fails to take place. that is recent and fresh in the memory. will be lost in time. therefore. our posterity. and runs on to a greater length. that the evidence of all ancient history must now be lost. and one must have a very strong and firm imagination to preserve the evidence to the end.observe. But here it may not be amiss to remark a very curious phænomenon. and ’tis evident this vivacity must gradually decay in proportion to the distance. because it has more original force to communicate to the related idea. or at least. each new copy is a new object. and after it is committed to writing. But as it seems contrary to common sense to think. affects us more than one that is in some measure obliterated. and the persuasion more lively. and dreads a like accident for himself: But as the memory of it decays away by degrees. by nothing but the multitude of connected arguments. and from the shading of those colours. which the present subject suggests to us. because in that case an argument must have a different force to day. A recent observation has a like effect. which thereby acquires a greater force and vivacity. which we may frequently observe in our degrees of belief and assurance. that when an inference is drawn immediately from an object. which we found on any matter of fact we remember. An experiment. ’Tis certain. it must be convey’d thro’ many mouths. and preserves better the original force in the communication. than from a long chain of consequences. is struck with that instance for some time. tho’ disclaimed by philosophers. that the same diminution of the evidence will follow from a diminution of the impression. but by passing thro’ many millions of causes and effects. because the custom and transition is there more entire. yet the former species of reasoning often degenerates insensibly into the latter. it may be concluded from the precedent reasoning. is more or less convincing. I add. that tho’ our reasonings from proofs and from probabilities be considerably different from each other. tho’ just and conclusive in each part. and has a superior influence on the judgment. yet notwithstanding the opposition of philosophy. ’Tis evident there is no point of ancient history. that if the republic of letters. under which it appears to the memory or senses. and tho’ the difference in these degrees of evidence be not receiv’d by philosophy as solid and legitimate. even after a thousand 80 . who has seen his companion die of a debauch. from what it shall have a month hence. his former security returns. and the danger seems less certain and real. Thus a drunkard. than when the imagination is carry’d thro’ a long chain of connected arguments. There is a second difference. Nay ’tis seldom such reasonings produce any conviction. according as the fact is recent or remote. The argument. according to the different times. however infallible the connexion of each link may be esteem’d. Sometimes this distance has a greater influence than even contrary experiments wou’d have. where it passes thro’ so many stages. and thro’ a chain of arguments of almost an immeasurable length. as well as on the passions. that the belief depends. as a third instance of this kind. ’tis certain. and ’tis on the degrees of force and vivacity. and a man may receive a more lively conviction from a probable reasoning. this circumstance has a considerable influence on the understanding. and the art of printing continue on the same footing as at present.

and however great that conviction may be suppos’d. I shou’d reply. This is true in general. Mean while to give a solution of the preceding objection upon the supposition. ’tis impossible we shou’d preserve to the end any belief or evidence. and which are the source of what we properly call Prejudice. that in my opinion it proceeds from those very principles. but with this difference. it wou’d decay by the length of the transition. and a Frenchman cannot have solidity. the mind runs easily along them. that in this manner of considering the subject.ages. (which however is not a true one) there is no history or tradition. and when we have been accustom’d to see one object united to another. which we rashly form to ourselves. Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv’d from habit and experience. and to be liable to a degree of doubt and uncertainty. and must at last be utterly extinguish’d: And vice versa. tho’ the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable. and which cannot be prevented by it. it must be something different from that vivacity. we know all of them. if compos’d of parts. that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason. yet they are all of the same kind. tho’ we shall find21 afterwards. If all the long chain of causes and effects. And indeed it must be confest. we have entertain’d such a prejudice against them. this may be consider’d as an objection to the present system. on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend. that historical evidence amounts at first to an entire proof. has as little effect in diminishing the original vivacity. By this means a long chain of argument. and so on. which were different from each other. even contrary to present observation and experience. Human nature is very subject to errors of this kind. as a much shorter wou’d have. and of the latter very judicious. that 81 . and allow them to influence their judgment. An Irishman cannot have wit. were compos’d of parts different from each other. and perhaps this nation as much as any other. that there is one very memorable exception. which is the foundation of belief. let us consider. and that into a third. by a natural transition. After we know one. and forms but a confus’d and general notion of each link. for which reason. which connect any past event with any volume of history. when objects are presented. that connect any original fact with the present impression. ’tis impossible it can subsist under such reiterated diminutions. we can have no scruple as to the rest. Before I answer this objection I shall observe. if belief on some occasions be not capable of such an extinction. If belief consisted only in a certain vivacity. jumps from one part to another with facility. and of which each requir’d a distinct consideration. but what must in the end lose all its force and evidence. that tho’ the links are innumerable. and will perpetuate the memory of the present age to the latest posterity. our imagination passes from the first to the second. There is no variation in the steps. and after we have made one. and which ’twere necessary for the mind distinctly to conceive. This circumstance alone preserves the evidence of history. which precedes reflection. Every new probability diminishes the original conviction. that from this topic there has been borrow’d a very celebrated argument against the Christian Religion. which is of vast consequence in the present subject of the understanding. and depend on the fidelity of Printers and Copists. But as most of these proofs are perfectly resembling. Now ’tis the nature of custom not only to operate with its full force. that the connexion betwixt each link of the chain in human testimony has been there suppos’d not to go beyond probability. till we come to that volume we peruse at present. convey’d from an original impression. A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that deriv’d from general rules. Shou’d it be demanded why men form general rules. One edition passes into another. can ever doubt if there has been such a man as Julius Cæsar.

if presented to him. yet ’tis seldom entirely destroy’d. where any considerable circumstances remain the same. and giving us a strong conception of any object. Now we may observe. but also to operate in an inferior degree. of which some are essential. be concluded. The same custom goes beyond the instances. and may remark. as to render it opposite to the former. tho’ he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling. and tho’ the habit loses somewhat of its force by every difference. and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner. when we discover such as are similar. This difficulty we can remove after no other manner. His imagination runs away with its object. In almost all kinds of causes there is a complication of circumstances. therefore. and tho’ the ideas of fall and descent. that tho’ custom be the foundation of all our judgments. That passion returns back upon the imagination and inlivens the idea. in the opposition betwixt the judgment and imagination arising from these effects of custom? According to my system. they have such an influence on the imagination. thus mutually supporting each other. and to which it perfectly corresponds. and produces a contrariety in our sentiments concerning the same object. from which it is deriv’d. but are not exactly the same with those concerning which we have had experience. will satisfy himself with melons. and others superfluous. In proportion as the resemblance decays. and remarkable. We shall afterwards23 take notice of some general rules. and frequently conjoin’d with the essential. that their influence cannot be destroy’d by the contrary circumstances of support and solidity. where he cannot find his favourite fruit. and these rules are form’d on the 82 . that custom takes the start.are exactly the same with those to which we have been accustom’d. that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary. while the present subject of [philosophical]22 probabilities offers us so obvious an one. will be carried almost with the same violence to white. by his experience of the solidity of the iron. and both his fancy and affections. all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom. who being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling. which ought to give him a perfect security. and excites a passion proportion’d to it. the probability diminishes. but by inlivening the imagination. This observation we may carry farther. and others are only conjoin’d by accident. when he surveys the precipice below him. But why need we seek for other instances. The circumstances of depth and descent strike so strongly upon him. who has become a drunkard by the use of red wines. From this principle I have accounted for that species of probability. by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects. and give to that conception a force and vivacity. I explain myself. which lively idea has a new influence on the passion. but still has some force as long as there remain any traces of the resemblance. than by supposing the influence of general rules. as one. who has contracted a custom of eating fruit by the use of pears or peaches. but ’tis still certain. and gives a biass to the imagination. which make it superior to the mere fictions of the fancy. and influences his ideas of such objects as are in some respect resembling. To illustrate this by a familiar instance. that when these superfluous circumstances are numerous. and custom has no influence. A man. which supports him. We may correct this propensity by a reflection on the nature of those circumstances. some are absolutely requisite to the production of the effect. where we transfer our experience in past instances to objects which are resembling. deriv’d from analogy. and in its turn augments its force and violence. It may. let us consider the case of a man. that even in the absence of the latter they carry us on to the conception of the usual effect. and harm and death. yet sometimes it has an effect on the imagination in opposition to the judgment. but fall not precisely under the same rule. be deriv’d solely from custom and experience. cause the whole to have a very great influence upon him.

Sometimes the one. This difference is to be attributed to the influence of general rules. as being more capricious and uncertain. The general rule is attributed to our judgment. which is much less shocking than the open flattery or censure of any person. where the connexion is common and universal. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first. as the secret intimation of our opinions is said to be the veiling of them. and the other to our imagination. and implies the condemnation of the former. and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding. that in the open discovery of his sentiments he makes use of signs. when conjoin’d with that latter faculty. and in the secret intimation employs such as are more singular and uncommon. I become sensible of it. or slyly intimates his contempt. But as this frequent conjunction necessarily makes it have some effect on the imagination. as if he did. But when we take a review of this act of the mind. that the open declaration of our sentiments is call’d the taking off the mask. that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances. and consequently conceives the object with greater force. and again sav’d by a new direction of the very same principle. makes the transition with greater facility. the opposition of these two principles produces a contrariety in our thoughts. as being more extensive and constant. than where it is more rare and particular.nature of our understanding. The only difference. and wise men by the second. Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason. Since we have instances. This is a second influence of general rules. then. tho’ the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature. Whether a person openly abuses me. we find it to be of an irregular nature. and ’tis only by signs. Here is the first influence of general rules. that the imagination. The effect of this circumstance is. betwixt these two cases consists in this. and when we find that an effect can be produc’d without the concurrence of any particular circumstance. However he may communicate his sentiments by such secret insinuations. which is the cause of our rejecting it. as if he flatly told me I was a fool and coxcomb. moves not my indignation to such a degree. where general rules operate on the imagination even contrary to the judgment. By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes. in spite of the opposite conclusion from general rules. One who lashes me with conceal’d strokes of satire. and yet ’tis only by following them that we can correct this. ’tis certain that their influence is not equally strong and powerful. by its effects. The exception to the imagination. and to observe that they bestow on the ideas they present to us a force superior to what attends any other. tho’ I equally understand his meaning. Every one knows. and make them known with equal certainty as by the open discovery of them. in running from the present impression to the absent idea. which are general and universal. the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect. When an object appears. that is. and all other unphilosophical probabilities. and destructive of all the most establish’d principles of reasonings. according to the disposition and character of the person. and causes us to ascribe the one inference to our judgment. sometimes the other prevails. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability. however frequently conjoin’d with it. we conclude that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause. The difference betwixt an idea produc’d by a general 83 . in neither case do I immediately perceive his sentiment or opinion. there is an indirect manner of insinuating praise or blame. we need not be surpriz’d to see their effects encrease. Accordingly we may observe. and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects.

This makes a conceal’d satire less disagreeable. which admit of many palliating excuses. which are almost imperceptible. Even those. that the fault is committed. with whom we converse. It becomes less disagreeable. and run from them to the correlative idea. as we shall observe presently24 . which forms the conclusion. but still this depends on the same principle. and this effect is augmented by another circumstance. The labour of the thought disturbs the regular progress of the sentiments. But this phænomenon likewise depends upon the same principle. is single. who know with equal certainty. and the transgression is secret and conceal’d. A secret intimation of anger or contempt shews that we still have some consideration for the person. Sometimes scurrility is less displeasing than delicate satire. A fault in words is commonly more open and distinct than one in actions. than when they are direct and undeniable. unless it be. For why do we blame all gross and injurious language. that employs it. that in the first case the sign. because it revenges us in a manner for the injury at the very time it is committed. and decide little or nothing when alone and unaccompany’d with many minute circumstances. and that it more easily excuses a person in acting than in talking contrary to the decorum of his profession and character. when the appearances are sav’d. For if an idea were not more feeble. and the less exercise it gives to the imagination to collect all its parts. merely because originally it is more so. and. and decide not so clearly concerning the intention and views of the actor. by affording us a just reason to blame and contemn the person. and consequently has no such influence on the passion and imagination. that any reasoning is always the more convincing. and that arising from a particular one is here compar’d to the difference betwixt an impression and an idea. pardon it more easily. whose violations. it wou’d never be esteem’d a mark of greater respect to proceed in this method than in the other. and gives a sensible pain and confusion to those. whereas in the latter the signs are numerous. The same idea is presented in both cases. because it affords an inference by general and common rules. because of the different manner.connexion. and avoid the directly abusing him. Now if we compare these two cases. and ’tis more disagreeable. unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? The rules of good-breeding condemn whatever is openly disobliging. of the open and conceal’d violations of the laws of honour. but which it is more apt to overlook. and suffices alone to be the foundation of our reasoning and judgment. when open and avow’d. who injures us. the world never excuses. that are palpable and undeniable. from which we infer the blameable action. To this explication of the different influence of open and conceal’d flattery or satire. There are many particulars in the point of honour both of men and women. when the proofs seem in some measure oblique and equivocal. This difference in the imagination has a suitable effect on the passions. From the same principles we may account for those observations of the Cardinal de Retz. is equally assented to by the judgment. the more single and united it is to the eye. in which the world wishes to be deceiv’d. and gives less pain upon account of its coarseness and incivility. which is analogous to it. that the difference betwixt them consists in this. and yet its influence is different. we shall find. which render the person despicable. The idea strikes not on us with such vivacity. properly speaking. After this is once establish’d. when only intimated. because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? And why is it contrary.that there are many things. But ’tis certainly true. abusive language is universally blam’d. 84 . in which it is presented. I shall add the consideration of another phænomenon.

and when the object. which they communicate to the ideas. we shall lose ourselves in perpetual contradiction and absurdity. proportion’d to that degree of force and vivacity. ’tis first divided within itself. that gives rise to this idea of necessity. or when these instances are contrary to each other. viz. But when we have not observ’d a sufficient number of instances. which at last prevails. that as we have no idea. upon which each part is founded. operates separately upon the imagination. This force and this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory. or the present impression is faint and obscure. which25 first occur’d to us. and this too is very great. and ’tis from some present impression we borrow that vivacity. where we observe a superior number of these experiments. and the necessity of one to explain another. especially when the conjunction is found by experience to be perfectly constant. and has an inclination to either side in proportion to the number of experiments we have seen and remember. but still with a diminution of force in the evidence correspondent to the number of the opposite experiments. of which we have had experience. what we call the belief of the existence of any object. What is our idea of necessity. beside the undoubted arguments.Thus it appears upon the whole. which attends our memory. where the mind decides from contrary experiments. that every kind of opinion or judgment. if we assert we have really such an idea. which is deriv’d from our judgments: Nor is there any difference betwixt that judgment. we must find some impression. is of the same nature with that. the agreement of these parts. in which we reason beyond our immediate impressions. and equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration. and which we dropt in our way. and that which depends upon an interrupted and uncertain. which is deriv’d from a constant and uniform connexion of causes and effects. ’Tis by habit we make the transition from cause to effect. that is not deriv’d from an impression. The belief. and ’tis the larger collection of possibilities. that in all determinations. or the connexion dependent on a long chain of objects. SECTION XIV. This therefore is the nature of the judgment and probability. which is present to us. or the inference deriv’d from general rules. of which the probability is compos’d. Each possibility. All these phænomena lead directly to the precedent system. and that with a force proportionable to its superiority. is deriv’d entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception. But below this degree of evidence there are many others. Having thus explain’d the manner. Of the idea of necessary connexion. Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe. which we diffuse over the correlative idea. In order to this I consider. and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable. or when the resemblance is not exact. ’Tis indeed evident. in what objects necessity is 85 . we must now return upon our footsteps to examine that question. which have an influence on the passions and imagination. Without considering these judgments as the effects of custom on the imagination. to produce a strong habit. and yet not conformable to them: In all these cases the evidence diminishes by the diminution of the force and intenseness of the idea. when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together. which amounts not to knowledge. and conclude that such particular causes must have such particular effects. exactly resembles those. What principally gives authority to this system is. This contest is at last determin’d to the advantage of that side. and that these qualities constitute in the mind. or the experience in some measure obliterated from the memory. nor will it ever be possible upon any other principles to give a satisfactory and consistent explication of them. The next degree of these qualities is that deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect.

commonly suppos’d to lie; and finding that it is always ascrib’d to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects suppos’d to be plac’d in that relation; and examine them in all the situations, of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances; where I find like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession. At first sight this seems to serve but little to my purpose. The reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a new idea. But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. ’Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity. I doubt not but these consequences will at first sight be receiv’d without difficulty, as being evident deductions from principles, which we have already establish’d, and which we have often employ’d in our reasonings. This evidence both in the first principles, and in the deductions, may seduce us unwarily into the conclusion, and make us imagine it contains nothing extraordinary, nor worthy of our curiosity. But tho’ such an inadvertence may facilitate the reception of this reasoning, ’twill make it be the more easily forgot; for which reason I think it proper to give warning, that I have just now examin’d one of the most sublime questions in philosophy, viz. that concerning the power and efficacy of causes; where all the sciences seem so much interested. Such a warning will naturally rouze up the attention of the reader, and make him desire a more full account of my doctrine, as well as of the arguments, on which it is founded. This request is so reasonable, that I cannot refuse complying with it; especially as I am hopeful that these principles, the more they are examin’d, will acquire the more force and evidence. There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus’d more disputes both among antient and modern philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which makes them be followed by their effects. But before they enter’d upon these disputes, methinks it wou’d not have been improper to have examin’d what idea we have of that efficacy, which is the subject of the controversy. This is what I find principally wanting in their reasonings, and what I shall here endeavour to supply. I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonimous; and therefore ’tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest. By this observation we reject at once all the vulgar definitions, which philosophers have given of power and efficacy; and instead of searching for the idea in these definitions, must look for it in the impressions, from which it is originally deriv’d. If it be a compound idea, it must arise from compound impressions. If simple, from simple impressions. I believe the most general and most popular explication of this matter, is to say,26 that finding from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, such as the motions and variations of body, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power and efficacy. But to be convinc’d that this explication is more popular than philosophical, we need but reflect on two very obvious principles. First, That

reason alone can never give rise to any original idea, and secondly, that reason, as distinguish’d from experience, can never make us conclude, that a cause or productive quality is absolutely requisite to every beginning of existence. Both these considerations have been sufficiently explain’d; and therefore shall not at present be any farther insisted on. I shall only infer from them, that since reason can never give rise to the idea of efficacy, that idea must be deriv’d from experience, and from some particular instances of this efficacy, which make their passage into the mind by the common channels of sensation or reflection. Ideas always represent their objects or impressions; and vice versa, there are some objects necessary to give rise to every idea. If we pretend, therefore, to have any just idea of this efficacy, we must produce some instance, wherein the efficacy is plainly discoverable to the mind, and its operations obvious to our consciousness or sensation. By the refusal of this, we acknowledge, that the idea is impossible and imaginary; since the principle of innate ideas, which alone can save us from this dilemma, has been already refuted, and is now almost universally rejected in the learned world. Our present business, then, must be to find some natural production, where the operation and efficacy of a cause can be clearly conceiv’d and comprehended by the mind, without any danger of obscurity or mistake. In this research we meet with very little encouragement from that prodigious diversity, which is found in the opinions of those philosophers, who have pretended to explain the secret force and energy of causes27 . There are some, who maintain, that bodies operate by their substantial form; others, by their accidents or qualities; several, by their matter and form; some, by their form and accidents; others, by certain virtues and faculties distinct from all this. All these sentiments again are mix’d and vary’d in a thousand different ways; and form a strong presumption, that none of them have any solidity or evidence, and that the supposition of an efficacy in any of the known qualities of matter is entirely without foundation. This presumption must encrease upon us, when we consider, that these principles of substantial forms, and accidents, and faculties, are not in reality any of the known properties of bodies, but are perfectly unintelligible and inexplicable. For ’tis evident philosophers wou’d never have had recourse to such obscure and uncertain principles had they met with any satisfaction in such as are clear and intelligible; especially in such an affair as this, which must be an object of the simplest understanding, if not of the senses. Upon the whole, we may conclude, that ’tis impossible in any one instance to shew the principle, in which the force and agency of a cause is plac’d; and that the most refin’d and most vulgar understandings are equally at a loss in this particular. If any one think proper to refute this assertion, he need not put himself to the trouble of inventing any long reasonings; but may at once shew us an instance of a cause, where we discover the power or operating principle. This defiance we are oblig’d frequently to make use of, as being almost the only means of proving a negative in philosophy. The small success, which has been met with in all the attempts to fix this power, has at last oblig’d philosophers to conclude, that the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us, and that ’tis in vain we search for it in all the known qualities of matter. In this opinion they are almost unanimous; and ’tis only in the inference they draw from it, that they discover any difference in their sentiments. For some of them, as the Cartesians in particular, having establish’d it as a principle, that we are perfectly acquainted with the essence of matter, have very naturally inferr’d, that it is endow’d with no efficacy, and that ’tis impossible for it of itself to communicate motion, or produce any of those effects, which we ascribe to it. As the essence of matter consists in extension, and as extension implies not actual motion, but only mobility; they conclude, that the energy, which produces the motion, cannot lie in the extension.

This conclusion leads them into another, which they regard as perfectly unavoidable. Matter, say they, is in itself entirely unactive, and depriv’d of any power, by which it may produce, or continue, or communicate motion: But since these effects are evident to our senses, and since the power, that produces them, must be plac’d somewhere, it must lie in the Deity, or that divine being, who contains in his nature all excellency and perfection. ’Tis the deity, therefore, who is the prime mover of the universe, and who not only first created matter, and gave it it’s original impulse, but likewise by a continu’d exertion of omnipotence, supports its existence, and successively bestows on it all those motions, and configurations, and qualities, with which it is endow’d. This opinion is certainly very curious, and well worth our attention; but ’twill appear superfluous to examine it in this place, if we reflect a moment on our present purpose in taking notice of it. We have establish’d it as a principle, that as all ideas are deriv’d from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, ’tis impossible we can have any idea of power and efficacy, unless some instances can be produc’d, wherein this power is perceiv’d to exert itself. Now as these instances can never be discover’d in body, the Cartesians, proceeding upon their principle of innate ideas, have had recourse to a supreme spirit or deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter. But the principle of innate ideas being allow’d to be false, it follows, that the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds. For if every idea be deriv’d from an impression, the idea of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and if no impression, either of sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, ’tis equally impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the deity. Since these philosophers, therefore, have concluded, that matter cannot be endow’d with any efficacious principle, because ’tis impossible to discover in it such a principle; the same course of reasoning shou’d determine them to exclude it from the supreme being. Or if they estem that opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it; and that is, by concluding from the very first, that they have no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object; since neither in body nor spirit, neither in superior nor inferior natures, are they able to discover one single instance of it. The same conclusion is unavoidable upon the hypothesis of those, who maintain the efficacy of second causes, and attribute a derivative, but a real power and energy to matter. For as they confess, that this energy lies not in any of the known qualities of matter, the difficulty still remains concerning the origin of its idea. If we have really an idea of power, we may attribute power to an unknown quality: But as ’tis impossible, that that idea can be deriv’d from such a quality, and as there is nothing in known qualities, which can produce it; it follows that we deceive ourselves, when we imagine we are possest of any idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly understand it. All ideas are deriv’d from, and represent impressions. We never have any impression, that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power. It has been establish’d as a certain principle, that general or abstract ideas are nothing but individual ones taken in a certain light, and that, in reflecting on any object, ’tis as impossible to exclude from our thought all particular degrees of quantity and quality as from the real nature of things. If we be possest, therefore, of any idea of power in general, we must also be able to conceive some particular species of it; and as power cannot subsist alone, but is always regarded as an attribute of some being or existence, we must be able to place this power in some particular being, and conceive that being

as endow’d with a real force and energy, by which such a particular effect necessarily results from its operation. We must distinctly and particularly conceive the connexion betwixt the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the one, that it must be follow’d or preceded by the other. This is the true manner of conceiving a particular power in a particular body: and a general idea being impossible without an individual; where the latter is impossible, ’tis certain the former can never exist. Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connexion wou’d amount to a demonstration, and wou’d imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceiv’d not to follow upon the other: Which kind of connexion has already been rejected in all cases. If any one is of a contrary opinion, and thinks he has attain’d a notion of power in any particular object, I desire he may point out to me that object. But till I meet with such-a-one, which I despair of, I cannot forbear concluding, that since we can never distinctly conceive how any particular power can possibly reside in any particular object, we deceive ourselves in imagining we can form any such general idea. Thus upon the whole we may infer, that when we talk of any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature, as endow’d with a power or force, proportion’d to any effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects are endow’d; in all these expressions, so apply’d, we have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clear and determinate ideas. But as ’tis more probable, that these expressions do here lose their true meaning by being wrong apply’d, than that they never have any meaning; ’twill be proper to bestow another consideration on this subject, to see if possibly we can discover the nature and origin of those ideas, we annex to them. Suppose two objects to be presented to us, of which the one is the cause and the other the effect; ’tis plain, that from the simple consideration of one, or both these objects we never shall perceive the tie, by which they are united, or be able certainly to pronounce, that there is a connexion betwixt them. ’Tis not, therefore, from any one instance, that we arrive at the idea of cause and effect, of a necessary connexion of power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy. Did we never see any but particular conjunctions of objects, entirely different from each other, we shou’d never be able to form any such ideas. But again; suppose we observe several instances, in which the same objects are always conjoin’d together, we immediately conceive a connexion betwixt them, and begin to draw an inference from one to another. This multiplicity of resembling instances, therefore, constitutes the very essence of power or connexion, and is the source, from which the idea of it arises. In order, then, to understand the idea of power, we must consider that multiplicity; nor do I ask more to give a solution of that difficulty, which has so long perplex’d us. For thus I reason. The repetition of perfectly similar instances can never alone give rise to an original idea, different from what is to be found in any particular instance, as has been observ’d, and as evidently follows from our fundamental principle, that all ideas are copy’d from impressions. Since therefore the idea of power is a new original idea, not to be found in any one instance, and which yet arises from the repetition of several instances, it follows, that the repetition alone has not that effect, but must either discover or produce something new, which is the source of that idea. Did the repetition neither discover nor produce any thing new, our ideas might be multiply’d by it, but wou’d not be enlarg’d above what they are upon the obser89

vation of one single instance. Every enlargement, therefore, (such as the idea of power or connexion) which arises from the multiplicity of similar instances, is copy’d from some effects of the multiplicity, and will be perfectly understood by understanding these effects. Wherever we find any thing new to be discover’d or produc’d by the repetition, there we must place the power, and must never look for it in any other object. But ’tis evident, in the first place, that the repetition of like objects in like relations of succession and contiguity discovers nothing new in any one of them; since we can draw no inference from it, nor make it a subject either of our demonstrative or probable reasonings;28 as has been already prov’d. Nay suppose we cou’d draw an inference, ’twou’d be of no consequence in the present case; since no kind of reasoning can give rise to a new idea, such as this of power is; but wherever we reason, we must antecedently be possest of clear ideas, which may be the objects of our reasoning. The conception always precedes the understanding; and where the one is obscure, the other is uncertain; where the one fails, the other must fail also. Secondly, ’Tis certain that this repetition of similar objects in similar situations produces nothing new either in these objects, or in any external body. For ’twill readily be allow’d, that the several instances we have of the conjunction of resembling causes and effects are in themselves entirely independent, and that the communication of motion, which I see result at present from the shock of two billiard-balls, is totally distinct from that which I saw result from such an impulse a twelvemonth ago. These impulses have no influence on each other. They are entirely divided by time and place; and the one might have existed and communicated motion, tho’ the other never had been in being. There is, then, nothing new either discover’d or produc’d in any objects by their constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity. But ’tis from this resemblance, that the ideas of necessity, of power, and of efficacy, are deriv’d. These ideas, therefore, represent not any thing, that does or can belong to the objects, which are constantly conjoin’d. This is an argument, which, in every view we can examine it, will be found perfectly unanswerable. Similar instances are still the first source of our idea of power or necessity; at the same time that they have no influence by their similarity either on each other, or on any external object. We must therefore, turn ourselves to some other quarter to seek the origin of that idea. Tho’ the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of power, have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in the object, which can be the model of that idea, yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its real model. For after we have observ’d the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that relation. This determination is the only effect of the resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy, whose idea is deriv’d from the resemblance. The several instances of resembling conjunctions leads us into the notion of power and necessity. These instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other, and have no union but in the mind, which observes them, and collects their ideas. Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another. Without considering it in this view, we can never arrive at the most distant notion of it, or be able to attribute it either to external or internal objects, to spirit or body, to causes or effects.

The necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustom’d union. These are, therefore, the same. The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey’d by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv’d from some internal impression, or impression of reflexion. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider’d as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienc’d union. Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas; in like manner the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of causes is neither plac’d in the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances. ’Tis here that the real power of causes is plac’d, along with their connexion and necessity. I am sensible, that of all the paradoxes, which I have had, or shall hereafter have occasion to advance in the course of this treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that ’tis merely by dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of mankind. Before we are reconcil’d to this doctrine, how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind, by that customary transition it produces: that this customary transition is, therefore, the same with the power and necessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceiv’d externally in bodies? There is commonly an astonishment attending every thing extraordinary; and this astonishment changes immediately into the highest degree of esteem or contempt, according as we approve or disapprove of the subject. I am much afraid, that tho’ the foregoing reasoning appears to me the shortest and most decisive imaginable; yet with the generality of readers the biass of the mind will prevail, and give them a prejudice against the present doctrine. This contrary biass is easily accounted for. ’Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses. Thus as certain sounds and smells are always found to attend certain visible objects, we naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and qualities, tho’ the qualities be of such a nature as to admit of no such conjunction, and really exist no where. But of this more fully29 hereafter. Mean while ’tis sufficient to observe, that the same propensity is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not

that the case is here much the same. If we remove the power from one cause. and this power must be plac’d on the body. We do not understand our own meaning in talking so. we make the terms of power and efficacy signify something. indeed. but must draw the idea of it from what we feel internally in contemplating them. But when. that I doubt not but my sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. and is not known to us any other way than by experience. that being a quality. and suppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them. But if we go any farther. as if a blind man shou’d pretend to find a great many absurdities in the supposition. that objects bear to each other the relations of contiguity and succession. and which is incompatible with those objects. that like objects may be observ’d in several instances to have like relations. that is no ways related to the cause or effect. the contrary notion is so riveted in the mind from the principles above-mention’d. it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object. or reason concerning them. and this determination of the mind forms the necessary connexion of these objects. and their necessary connexion is that new determination. But tho’ this be the only reasonable account we can give of necessity. and we are led astray by a false philosophy. to pass from the idea of an object to that of its usual attendant. is a gross absurdity. nor light the same with solidity. when we transfer the determination of the thought to external objects. to which we apply it. which we feel to pass from the idea of the one to that of the other. even tho’ there was no mind existent to contemplate them. ready to allow. and make that secondary. instead of meaning these unknown qualities. I can only reply to all these arguments. that the operations of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning. notwithstanding it is not possible for us to form the most distant idea of that quality. This is the case. When any object is presented to us. which can only belong to the mind that considers them. What! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate entirely independent of the mind. or of any real connexion betwixt causes and effects. As to what may be said. in that case the impression is to be considered as the cause. from the objects to the perceptions. that there may be several qualities both in material and immaterial objects. If we have really no idea of a power or efficacy in any object. I am. But when we change the point of view. and the lively idea as the effect. and bestow it on a being. Thought may well depend on causes for its operation.in our mind. and wou’d not continue their operation. and accordingly have observ’d. and if we please to call these power or efficacy. this is what we can never observe in them. and that all this is independent of. Now the nature 92 . And this I carry so far. obscurity and error begin then to take place. To every operation there is a power proportion’d. and antecedent to the operations of the understanding. which is usually found to attend it. we must ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all causes. and contrary to the most certain principles of human reason. ’twill be of little consequence to the world. ’twill be to little purpose to prove. but not causes on thought. with which we are utterly unacquainted. I allow it. This is to reverse the order of nature. that an efficacy is necessary in all operations. that operates. when it is not taken for the determination of the mind. The uniting principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects. that I am ready to convert my present reasoning into an instance of it. which it will not be difficult to comprehend. which is really primary. that considers them. and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to these objects. by a subtility. of which we have a clear idea. which are entirely distinct from each other. but by perceiving them. but ignorantly confound ideas. that the colour of scarlet is not the same with the sound of a trumpet.

which determines the imagination to make a transition from the idea of one object to that of its usual attendant. I find. but shall repose myself on them as on establish’d maxims. and make use of terms before we were able exactly to define them. ‘A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another. that have very much prevail’d in philosophy. ’tis a real cause. that all causes are of the same kind. we may substitute this other definition in its place. of first examining our inference from the relation before we had explain’d the relation itself. I know no other remedy. to draw some corrollaries from it. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv’d from the constant conjunction of two objects. and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects. that like objects are constantly plac’d in like relations of succession and contiguity. For the same reason we must reject the distinction betwixt cause and occasion. should substitute a juster definition in its place. wherever this is observ’d.’ Shou’d this definition also be rejected for the same reason. by their presenting a different view of the same object. ’tis no relation at all. and material. which makes the subject of the present enquiry. If not. But for my part I must own my incapacity for such an undertaking. Again. had it been possible to proceed in a different method. which are only different. and making us consider it either as a philosophical or as a natural relation. but only accustoms the mind to pass from one to another. because drawn from objects foreign to the cause. when I consider the influence of this constant conjunction. However extraordinary these sentiments may appear. and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction. and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of the other. and formal. I think it fruitless to trouble myself with any farther enquiry or reasoning upon the subject. or as an association betwixt them. the cause is efficient. When I examine with the utmost accuracy those objects. and in inlarging my view to consider several instances.’ If this definition be esteem’d defective. and final causes. and cannot give rise to any argument or reasoning. by which we may remove several prejudices and popular errors. viz. or fix their meaning. we have been oblig’d to advance in this seemingly preposterous manner. and so united with it. I perceive. when suppos’d to signify any thing essentially different from each other. than that the persons. We shall now correct this fault by giving a precise definition of cause and effect. that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other. First. We may learn from the foregoing doctrine. and where it is not. and by joining them together form an exact definition of the relation of cause and effect. We may define a cause to be ‘An object precedent and contiguous to another. which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes. there can never be a cause of any kind. in considering a single instance. There may two definitions be given of this relation. If constant conjunction be imply’d in what we call occasion. who express this delicacy. I find only. and causes sine qua non. either as a comparison of two ideas. which are commonly denominated causes and effects. or betwixt efficient causes. and exemplary. that such a relation can never be an object of reasoning. and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. 93 . This order wou’d not have been excusable. that resemble the latter. But as the nature of the relation depends so much on that of the inference. ’Tis now time to collect all the different parts of this reasoning. but by means of custom. that the one object is precedent and contiguous to the other.and effects of experience have been already sufficiently examin’d and explain’d. It never gives us any insight into the internal structure or operating principle of objects. ’Twill only be proper. before we leave this subject. and can never operate upon the mind.

and that the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature. and30 that properly speak94 . which might arise against the following reasonings concerning matter and substance. This is so evident. Such an influence on the mind is in itself perfectly extraordinary and incomprehensible. by which we endeavour’d to prove. that there is but one kind of necessity. which we often make betwixt power and the exercise of it. For as all our reasonings concerning existence are deriv’d from causation. there are no objects. is equally without foundation. were it not to obviate certain objections of this kind. volition. that resemble the latter. The same course of reasoning will make us conclude. As objects must either be conjoin’d or not. In weakening this conjunction and determination you do not change the nature of the necessity. we can determine to be the causes of any other. This clearly appears from the precedent explication of necessity. and as all our reasonings concerning causation are deriv’d from the experienc’d conjunction of objects. which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes. Such an opinion will not appear strange after the foregoing definitions. the same experience must give us a notion of these objects. SECTION XV. which ’tis so natural for us to entertain against the foregoing reasoning. I need not observe. nor can we be certain of its reality. We may now be able fully to overcome all that repugnance. which constitutes a physical necessity: And the removal of these is the same thing with chance. without consulting experience. If we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to another. or from any other object we can imagine. According to the precedent doctrine. If we define a cause to be. but from experience and observation. The distinction.Secondly. of which we cannot form an idea. Rules by which to judge of causes and effects. Any thing may produce any thing. Nor will this appear strange. these have different degrees of constancy and force. I shall add as a fourth corrollary. if we compare two principles explain’d above. reason. that ’twou’d scarce have merited our attention. and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects. since even in the operation of bodies. ’Tis the constant conjunction of objects. that a full knowledge of the object is not requisite. that the necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive. Creation. as there is but one kind of cause. and as the mind must either be determin’d or not to pass from one object to another. that every beginning of existence shou’d be attended with such an object. we shall make still less difficulty of assenting to this opinion. we may easily conceive. Thirdly. ’tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity. not from any reasoning or reflexion. annihilation. and must remove all mystery from our conclusions. An object precedent and contiguous to another. which by the mere survey. and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. that we can never have reason to believe that any object exists. that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity. along with the determination of the mind. that the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation. and no objects. but only of those qualities of it. and so united with it in the imagination. motion. that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other. without producing a different species of that relation. all these may arise from one another. which we believe to exist.

from which the first idea of this relation is deriv’d. 95 . Where objects are not contrary. which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect. is not the sole cause of that effect. in which they differ. if you diminish that heat. deriv’d from the union of the several different effects. The cause must be prior to the effect. 7. 4. we immediately extend our observation to every phænomenon of the same kind. which hangs upon this. 8. for we find that it degenerates into pain. by which we may know when they really are so. wherein we discover the resemblance. The same cause always produces the same effect. and is the source of most of our philosophical reasonings. 1. This principle we derive from experience. When any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its cause. and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. that where several different objects produce the same effect. it may be proper to fix some general rules. The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular. when in any instance we find our expectation to be disappointed. 2. that an object. beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments. which we discover to be common amongst them. This constant conjunction sufficiently proves. which arise from the several different parts of the cause. The absence or presence of one part of the cause is here suppos’d to be always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable part of the effect. We must. nothing hinders them from having that constant conjunction.ing. 5. and in a contiguous time and place. that these causes are not compleat ones. ’Tis chiefly this quality. it must be by means of some quality. no objects are contrary to each other. the pleasure will likewise augment. For as like effects necessarily follow from like causes. without waiting for that constant repetition. on which the relation of cause and effect totally depends. The eighth and last rule I shall take notice of is. that the one part is the cause of the other. Since therefore ’tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other. but it does not follow. but requires to be assisted by some other principle. ’tis to be regarded as a compounded effect. For when by any clear experiment we have discover’d the causes or effects of any phænomenon. their separation for a moment shews. 3. that constitutes the relation. viz. The following principle is founded on the same reason. There is another principle. For as like effects imply like causes. A certain degree of heat gives pleasure. the pleasure diminishes. which may forward its influence and operation. however. For as like causes always produce like effects. 6. There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time. but existence and non-existence. that if you augment it beyond a certain degree. we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance. we must conclude that this irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes.

and that ’tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions. as well as that of human creatures. The smallest attention will supply us with more than are requisite. for which reason it may be proper in this place to examine the reasoning faculty of brutes. When therefore we see other creatures. ’Tis needless in my opinion to illustrate this argument by the enumeration of particulars. If any thing can give me security in this particular. in millions of instances. how much more in moral. which tend to self-preservation. and perhaps even this was not very necessary. and the same principle of reasoning. If this be the case even in natural philosophy. to the obtaining pleasure. and enquire by new experiments. which seems the most natural and simple of any. the causes. where there is a much greater complication of circumstances. requires the utmost stretch of human judgment. Of the reason of animals. is that of taking much pains to defend it. therefore. The arguments are in this case so obvious. must also be resembling. and even experimental philosophy. The resemblance betwixt the actions of animals and those of men is so entire in this respect. These new experiments are liable to a discussion of the same kind. Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth. all our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like cause. and no truth appears to me more evident. that in order to arrive at the decisive point. will afford us an incontestable argument for the present doctrine. and direct them to like ends. but even unknown in their existence? I am much afraid. but might have been supply’d by the natural principles of our understanding. lest the small success I meet with in my enquiries will make this observation bear the air of an apology rather than of boasting. which is 96 . in philosophy. that we judge their internal likewise to resemble ours. that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant. will make us conclude that since our internal actions resemble each other. All the rules of this nature are very easy in their invention. from which they are deriv’d. perform like actions. and avoiding pain. ’twill be the enlarging the sphere of my experiments as much as possible.Here is all the Logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning. by which we may try every system in this species of philosophy. in adapting means to ends. ’Tis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform. that we ourselves. that the very first action of the first animal we shall please to pitch on. and are not only unaccountable in their causes. There is no phænomenon in nature. SECTION XVI. This doctrine is as useful as it is obvious. and the utmost sagacity to choose the right way among so many that present themselves. and furnishes us with a kind of touchstone. is advanc’d to explain a mental operation. We are conscious. which are essential to any action of the mind. Our scholastic headpieces and logicians shew no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reason and ability. we must carefully separate whatever is superfluous. but what is compounded and modify’d by so many different circumstances. than that beasts are endow’d with thought and reason as well as men. but extremely difficult in their application. When any hypothesis. are so implicit and obscure. and where those views and sentiments. if every particular circumstance of the first experiment was essential to it. are guided by reason and design. as to give us any inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and precepts to direct our judgment. so that the utmost constancy is requir’d to make us persevere in our enquiry. carry’d one step farther. that they often escape our strictest attention.

that chooses with such care and nicety the place and materials of her nest. They can never by any arguments form a general conclusion. who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons of the most accomplish’d genius and understanding. affords us an instance of the first kind. that no false one will ever be able to endure it. that avoids fire and precipices. The common defect of those systems. from which it is deriv’d. is evident almost without any reasoning. and sits upon her eggs for a due time. and on his observation of the conjunction of objects in past instances. and seem to be on a level with their common capacities. which philosophers have employ’d to account for the actions of the mind. I assert they proceed from a reasoning. that is not in itself different. of which they have had no experience. A dog. independent of the influence of custom on the imagination. But at the same time I demand as an equitable condition. he judges his game not to be far distant from him. furnishes us with a lively instance of the second. so I may venture to affirm. Here we must make a distinction betwixt those actions of animals. As to the former actions. is. Such a subtility is a clear proof of the falshood. which can answer to all these terms. Secondly. and afterwards upon another. as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals. and caresses his master. that experience operates upon them. And that ’tis the only one. that there be some impression immediately present to their memory or senses. and give an account of the principles. and in a suitable season. A bird. and foresees his own punishment. which we call belief. that they suppose such a subtility and refinement of thought. nor founded on different principles. ’Tis necessary in the first place. which are of a vulgar nature. according to his most recent experience. that shuns strangers. of any system. resemble those of which they have. we must apply the same hypothesis to both. and those more extraordinary instances of sagacity. ’Tis therefore by means of custom alone. and see whether it will equally account for the reasonings of beasts as for these of the human species. but even of children and the common people in our own species. Let us therefore put our present system concerning the nature of the understanding to this decisive trial. that if my system be the only one. But with respect to beasts there cannot be the least suspi97 . in order to be the foundation of their judgment. Make a beating follow upon one sign or motion for some time. and as every true hypothesis will abide this trial. which they sometimes discover for their own preservation. and the propagation of their species. and after he has done this. As you vary this experience. ’Tis therefore by experience they infer one from another. Beasts certainly never perceive any real connexion among objects. as the contrary simplicity of the truth. Now let any philosopher make a trial. From a certain sensation affecting his smell. with all the precaution that a chymist is capable of in the most delicate projection. it may be receiv’d as entirely satisfactory and convincing.common to men and beasts. that those objects. from that which appears in human nature. The inference he draws from the present impression is built on experience. From the tone of voice the dog infers his master’s anger. and he will successively draw different conclusions. and endeavour to explain that act of the mind. All this was sufficiently evident with respect to man. and let his hypothesis be equally applicable to beasts as to the human species. he varies his reasoning. I promise to embrace his opinion.

reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls. that this gradual encrease of assurance is nothing but the addition of new probabilities. but can any one give the ultimate reason. merely because it cannot be reduc’d to the very same principles. as a check or controul on our first judgment or belief. habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature. than this. and endows them with particular qualities. according to past experience and observation. wherein our understanding has deceiv’d us. In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible. of which truth is the natural effect. but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes. which must be own’d to be a strong confirmation. which carries us along a certain train of ideas. of which we can have a fuller security. Every time he runs over his proofs. and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances. that they admire the instinct of animals. arises from past observation and experience. and is deriv’d from the constant union of causes and effects. or rather an invincible proof of my system. according to their particular situations and relations. of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy. his confidence encreases. as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it. at the same time. Now ’tis evident. tho’ uncertain and variable. according to the degrees of his experience and length of the accompt. but by the artificial structure of the accompts. For that is plainly of itself some degree of probability. SECTION I. produce a probability beyond what is deriv’d from the skill and experience of the accomptant. Nothing shews more the force of habit in reconciling us to any phænomenon. and by the inconstancy of our mental powers.cion of mistake. Merchants seldom trust to the infallible certainty of numbers for their security. Now as none will maintain. Our reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause. and fall into error. to re98 . ’tis true. according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding. PART IV. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability. but a mere probability. any more than why nature alone shou’d produce it? Nature may certainly produce whatever can arise from habit: Nay. In accompts of any length or importance. and this probability is greater or less. but still more by the approbation of his friends. compar’d with those. by gradually diminishing the numbers. Of scepticism with regard to reason. and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question. in every reasoning form a new judgment. To consider the matter aright. that there scarce is any proposition concerning numbers. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science. or regard it as any thing. our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them. This instinct. For ’tis easily possible. wherein its testimony was just and true. I may safely affirm. and is rais’d to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and applauses of the learned world. therefore. We must. why past experience and observation produces such an effect. that our assurance in a long numeration exceeds probability. may frequently be prevented. and derives all its force from that origin. that men are not astonish’d at the operations of their own reason. but when we apply them. and find a difficulty in explaining it.

and fix its just standard and proportion. I have less confidence in my opinions. as well as concerning knowledge. and so on in infinitum. a greater assurance in his opinions. or discover that particular number. Besides. deriv’d from the nature of the understanding. however great we may suppose it to have been. in proportion to the degrees of our reason and experience. if any single addition were certain. by another judgment. and having adjusted these two together. and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects. being founded only on probability. every one wou’d be so. and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence. In every judgment. and even the vastest quantity. Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first. and must itself be weaken’d by a fourth doubt of the same kind. But this decision. beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject. which can be form’d. as well as every other reasoning. to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties. Since therefore all knowledge resolves itself into probability. whether I sincerely assent to this argument. must in this manner be reduc’d to nothing. that this was certain. and that because they will not divide. which we can form concerning probability. and of which. we are oblig’d by our reason to add a new doubt deriv’d from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. But knowledge and probability are of such contrary and disagreeing natures. than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason. Let our first belief be never so strong. that it must reduce itself. so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind. No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum. since even such-a-one must be conscious of many errors in the past. a new uncertainty deriv’d from the weakness of that faculty. and upon this supposition we shall find it impracticable to shew the precise limits of knowledge and of probability. at which the one ends and the other begins. which immediately occurs to us. Having thus found in every probability. and from knowledge degenerate into probability. Shou’d it here be ask’d me. which I seem to take such pains to inculcate. and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. tho’ it shou’d be favourable to our preceeding judgment. which can enter into human imagination. and must still dread the like for the future. unless the whole can be different from all its parts. that they cannot well run insensibly into each other. but I reflect. we ought always to correct the first judgment. who hold that all is uncertain. I had almost said. deriv’d from the nature of the object. and whether I be really one of those sceptics. even with ourselves. of which each diminishes somewhat of its force and vigour. till at last there remain nothing of the original probability. all the rules of logic require a continual diminution. This is a doubt. When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment. but must be either entirely present.duce the longest series of addition to the most simple question. and that our sentiments have different degrees of authority. or entirely absent. wherein the nature of our understanding. it must infallibly perish by passing thro’ so many new examinations. than one that is foolish and ignorant. we must now examine this latter species of reasoning. to an addition of two single numbers. which we employ in common life. In the man of the best sense and longest experience. As demonstration is subject to the controul of probability. and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence. this authority is never entire. and when I proceed still farther. and usually has. and 99 . and see on what foundation it stands. and consequently the whole or total sum. we cannot avoid giving a decision. which judges. if we wou’d closely pursue our reason. must weaken still further our first evidence. ’Tis certain a man of solid sense and long experience ought to have.

and the ballancing of oppo100 . when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine.that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood. by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel. that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom. and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive. upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression. there is some question propos’d to me. I feel a stronger and more forcible conception on the one side. and reason as usual. and after what manner the mind ever retains a degree of assurance in any subject? For as these new probabilities. I suppose. nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light. must. and of the situation of our mind. of which some lead to truth. as are commonly conjoin’d with them. that these arguments above-explain’d produce not a total suspense of judgment. how it happens. I have prov’d. or seeing the surrounding bodies. is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis. I consider it as regulated by contrary principles or causes. and the ideas faint and obscure. I say. has really disputed without an antagonist. how it happens. by continually diminishing the original evidence. and by the opposition. who thinks it worth while to try. that the very same principles. which make us form a decision upon any subject. and think. and some to error. he may safely conclude. and in ballancing these contrary causes. and in every case terminate in a total suspense of judgment. I answer. were a simple act of the thought. reduce the mind to a total uncertainty. and that neither I. This strong conception forms my first decision. nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. it may be demanded. I diminish by a new probability the assurance of my first decision. and render’d unavoidable. and carrying my thoughts from them to such objects. and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty. in infinitum. that tho’ he can find no error in the foregoing arguments. that in either case they must equally subvert it. whether of thought or sensation. and correct that decision by the consideration of our genius and capacity. as the action of the mind becomes forc’d and unnatural. But as experience will sufficiently convince any one. ’Tis therefore demanded. which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind. and that after revolving over the impressions of my memory and senses. are founded on the very same principles. My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect. I suppose. that his reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception. which by their repetition perpetually diminish the original evidence. But here. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism. it must infallibly destroy itself. than of the cogitative part of our natures. tho’ the principles of judgment. when we examin’d that subject. even upon my hypothesis. than on the other. either in philosophy or common life. and utterly subvert all belief and opinion. I have here prov’d. If belief. which ’tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy. Nature. it may seem unavoidable. that afterwards I examine my judgment itself. than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake. therefore. that even after all we retain a degree of belief. and so on. which is sufficient for our purpose. at last reduce it to nothing. I shou’d reply. when carry’d farther. This new probability is liable to the same diminution as the foregoing. and observing from experience. without any peculiar manner of conception. that this question is entirely superfluous. as the primary judgment. yet he still continues to believe. that ’tis sometimes just and sometimes erroneous. that after the first and second decision. perhaps. and apply’d to every new reflex judgment. that these same principles. either of contrary thoughts or sensations. or the addition of a force and vivacity.

Belief.site causes be the same as at the very beginning. tho’ contrary in their operation and tendency. without taking as much from its antagonist. were it possible for them to exist. Her enemy. where it is not founded on something natural and easy. and cannot approve of that expeditious way. from which it is deriv’d. nor does one of them lose any force in the contest. The straining of the imagination always hinders the regular flowing of the passions and sentiments. but even the disposition chang’d. which arises from a subtile reasoning. even tho’ it be perfectly comprehended. they still continue so. and imposing maxims. If the sceptical reasonings be strong. since in that case the force of the mind is not only diverted. and as their forces were at first equal. on which the belief depends. The sceptical and dogmatical reasons are of the same kind. to reject at once all their arguments without enquiry or examination. This is more evidently true. and that because there is requir’d a study and an effort of thought. the same principles have not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas. then. proportion’d to the present and immediate authority of reason. As the emotions of the soul prevent any subtile reasoning and reflection. are not govern’d in their movements by the same laws. which wou’d have been esteem’d convincing in a reasoning concerning history or politics. but at the expence of all the rest. that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time. No wonder. that reason may have some force and authority: if weak. and were they not destroy’d by their subtility. nor does the imagination feel a sensation. at least not to the same degree. as well as the body. Where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and facility. till at last they both vanish away into nothing. as long as either of them subsists. This I take to be the true state of the question. it gradually diminishes the force of that governing power. therefore. A tragic poet. ’twill not be very difficult to find them. If we desire similar instances. which it never employs in one action. so that where the latter is strong. and the spirits being diverted from their natural course. ’Tis happy. being a lively conception. and still more of performing both at once. seems to be endow’d with a certain precise degree of force and activity. the conviction. produces. which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judgments and opinions. so these latter actions of the mind are equally prejudicial to the former. as when they flow in their usual channel. because the sceptical reasonings. that wou’d represent his heroes as very ingenious and witty in their misfortunes. The case is the same in other subjects. which some take with the sceptics. The mind. yet their influence on the imagination. wou’d never touch the passions. But as it is suppos’d to be contradictory to reason. by a regular and just diminution. say they. in order to its being comprehended: And this effort of thought disturbs the operation of our sentiments. The same argument. they can never be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding. The present subject of metaphysics will supply us abundantly. so as to render us incapable of a sudden transition from one action to the other. and to conceive it in all its parts. is oblig’d to take shelter under her protection. diminishes in proportion to the efforts. The attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy. therefore. or diminish from the thought. and by making use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of reason. prescribing laws. in a manner. has little or no influence in these abstruser subjects. This patent has at first an authority. is by no means equal. a patent under her hand and seal. Reason first appears in possession of the throne. can never be entire. wou’d be successively both strong and weak. and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the under101 . which the imagination makes to enter into the reasoning. where the actions are of quite different natures. ’tis a proof. and the vigour they add to. and its own at the same time. This argument is not just. it has an enemy of equal force in the former to encounter. with an absolute sway and authority. according to the successive dispositions of the mind.

and supposes that the senses continue to operate. and have totally destroy’d human reason. To begin with the senses. tho’ he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. therefore. that are intelligible on the present subject. must produce the opinion of a distinct. not of a continu’d existence. For if the objects of our senses continue to exist. is evident. they must continue to exist. their external position as well as the independence of their existence and operation. and why we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception. ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects. and has doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. after they no longer appear to the senses. if they have any influence in the present case. Under this last head I comprehend their situation as well as relations. that produces the opinion of a continu’d or of a distinct existence. viz. which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. then. or the imagination. For as to the notion of external existence. even tho’ he asserts. but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. from whence the decision arises. even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation. We may well ask. and shall consider. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses. or as these very distinct and external existences. even when they are not perceiv’d. The subject. and vice versa. must present their impressions either as images and representations. ’till they have first subverted all conviction. we shall carry along with us this distinction. and in order to that. What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but ’tis in vain to ask. and external. SECTION II. whether it be the senses. 102 .standing. but which will contribute very much to the perfect understanding of what follows. We ought to examine apart those two questions. that can never take place. But tho’ the decision of the one question decides the other. even tho’ they be not perceiv’d. Nature has not left this to his choice. reason. yet that we may the more easily discover the principles of human nature. their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception. that he cannot defend his reason by reason. even when they are not present to the senses. because they convey to us nothing but a single perception. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence. These faculties. and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body. which are commonly confounded together. and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions. Were we to trust entirely to their self-destruction. which at first sight may seem superfluous.31 we have already shewn its absurdity. or independent. Of scepticism with regard to the senses. of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body: And my reasonings on this head I shall begin with a distinction. That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct. Why we attribute a continu’d existence to objects. Whether there be body or not? That is a point. These two questions concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body are intimately connected together. These are the only questions. if their existence be independent of the perception and distinct from it. Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe. For that is a contradiction in terms.

I perceive a great extent of fields and buildings beyond my chamber. we need only weigh the three following considerations. pains and pleasures. suggest any idea of distinct existences. Secondly. therefore. therefore. sensations. that no other faculty is requir’d. ’Tis certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity. to convince us of the external existence of body. they must convey the impressions as those very existences. that setting aside the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking substance. Add to this. by a kind of fallacy and illusion. properly speaking. is how far we are ourselves the objects of our senses. but certain impressions. that all sensations are felt by the mind. is an act of the mind as difficult to explain. they appear. ’tis impossible any thing shou’d to feeling appear different. and that when we doubt. That. to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects. being in reality as the perception. so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions. and as several impressions appear exterior to the body. as impressions or perceptions. our own body evidently belongs to us. when we regard our limbs and members. The difficulty. ’tis not our body we perceive. in their true colours. This were to suppose. they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are. both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses. From all this it may be infer’d. ’Tis absurd. The walls of the chamber beyond the table. tho’ commonly regarded by the mind as 103 . which constitutes a person. So far from being able by our senses merely to determine this question. such as they really are. and represent our perceptions as distinct from ourselves. if we consider the matter aright. we suppose them also exterior to ourselves. is beyond my hand. it may perhaps be said. Now if the senses presented our impressions as external to. If our senses. but concerning their relations and situation. that every impression. than in the nature of our impressions. otherwise they cou’d not be compar’d by these faculties. But not to lose time in examining. are originally on the same footing. when from a single perception it infers a double existence. we must have recourse to the most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it. and that whatever other differences we may observe among them. First.and it certainly looks farther. And in casting my eye towards the window. The paper. which enter by the senses. Sounds. and supposes the relations of resemblance and causation betwixt them. on which I write at present. and tastes. as that which we examine at present. ’tis scarce possible it shou’d be otherwise. To begin with the question concerning external existence. and whether this error proceeds from an immediate sensation. But to prevent this inference. and in common life ’tis evident these ideas of self and person are never very fix’d nor determinate. or from some other causes. and be what they appear. or as mere impressions. all of them. the difficulty is not concerning their nature. we might be mistaken. then. let us consider whether they really do so. or to their objects. and the nature of the uniting principle. affections. and independent of ourselves. nor is it conceivable that our senses shou’d be more capable of deceiving us in the situation and relations. The table is beyond the paper. and smells. Every thing that enters the mind. that is as external to and independent of us. passions. external and internal. And indeed. whether they present themselves as distinct objects. that even where we are most intimately conscious. beside the senses. whether ’tis possible for our senses to deceive us. For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness. Upon this head we may observe.

The reason. again. bulk. We may. To confirm this we may observe. that we can attribute a distinct continu’d existence to objects without ever consulting reason. and that the difference we make betwixt them in this respect. that colours. Thus to resume what I have said concerning the senses. that there are three different kinds of impressions convey’d by the senses. The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing. sounds. wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole. whatever may be our philosophical opinion. Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continu’d existence. To offer it as represented. appear not to have any existence in extension. we have commonly more in our eye their independency than external situation in place. &c. but any opinion we form concerning it. that as far as the senses are judges. motion and solidity of bodies. or weighing our opinions by any philosophical principles. whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can 104 . smells. tastes. They as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence. when its Being is uninterrupted. and consequently interrupted and dependent beings. that arise from the application of objects to our bodies. but on the imagination. and think an object has a sufficient reality. Even our sight informs us not of distance or outness (so to speak) immediately and without a certain reasoning and experience. heat and cold. both of them. because they neither can offer it to the mind as represented. The third are the pains and pleasures. The second those of colours. Thirdly. and independent of the incessant revolutions. must be deriv’d from experience and observation: And we shall see afterwards. conclude with certainty. and such like. nor is it possible they shou’d. as is acknowledg’d by the most rational philosophers. they give us no notion of continu’d existence. Both philosophers and the vulgar. as far as appears to the senses. are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel. and even in that case they do not. Now ’tis evident. in which they really operate. that when the contrary opinion is advanc’d by modern philosophers. Mean while we may observe that when we talk of real distinct existences. therefore. colours. heat and cold. To make it appear as original. As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves. and this falshood must lie in the relations and situation: In order to which they must be able to compare the object with ourselves. sounds. they must convey a falshood. they must present both an object and an image. The first are those of the figure. deceive us. which we are conscious of in ourselves. people imagine they can almost refute it from their feeling and experience. sounds. all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence. esteem the third to be merely perceptions. shall be consider’d 32 afterwards. exist after the same manner with motion and solidity. we may conclude. and that their very senses contradict this philosophy. We may also observe in this instance of sounds and colours. as by the cutting of our flesh with steel. because they cannot operate beyond the extent. arises not from the mere perception. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct continu’d existence of the former qualities. nor as original. that the opinion of a continu’d and of a distinct existence never arises from the senses. For as they are confest to be. ’Tis also evident. this can never be an object of the senses. then.continu’d independent qualities. that our conclusions from experience are far from being favourable to the doctrine of the independency of our perceptions. why we ascribe a place to them. and consequently cannot appear to the senses as situated externally to the body. And indeed. nothing but perceptions arising from the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body. that. and pleasure that proceeds from a fire. and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason.

that as long as we take our perceptions and objects to be the same. that we attribute to them a reality. that all the conclusions. is not taken to have any being except in the perception. For ’tis evident our pains and pleasures. To which we may add. to which we attribute a continu’d existence. have always appear’d to me in the same order. the notion of their distinct and continu’d existence must arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination.produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind. This sentiment. we shall find. voluntary or involuntary. but the pain. whose existence depends upon our perception. which we suppose to be permanent beings. and attribute a distinct continu’d existence to the very things they feel or see. whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects. and houses. as the impressions of figure and extension. My bed and table. After a little examination. that ’tis neither upon account of the involuntariness of certain impressions. 105 . and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them. and that ’tis not by them. by which we may discover those peculiar qualities in our impressions. which lie at present under my eye. present themselves in the same uniform manner. that all those objects. is suppos’d to exist in the fire. Since all impressions are internal and perishing existences. colour and sound. when moderate. must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding. being rejected. and is the case with no other impressions. which we never suppose to have any existence beyond our perception. nor is it possible it ever shou’d. Those mountains. as it is entirely unreasonable. Even after we distinguish our perceptions from our objects. ’tis obvious these arguments are known but to very few. ’Twill therefore be easy for us to discover these qualities by a comparison of the impressions. our passions and affections. and continu’d existence. have a peculiar constancy. which are confirm’d by philosophy. are directly contrary to those. We may observe. which we regard as internal and perishing. that every thing. we must search for some other hypothesis. and appear as such. nor of their superior force and violence. that we are still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one to that of the other: So that upon the whole our reason neither does. and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head. and are equally involuntary. it must arise from certain qualities peculiar to some impressions. which is the only one that can assure us of matter of fact. give us an assurance of the continu’d and distinct existence of body. operate with greater violence. which makes us attribute to them a distinct and continu’d existence. then. that are voluntary or feeble. The heat of a fire. which it causes upon a near approach. and the greatest part of mankind are induc’d to attribute objects to some impressions. ’twill appear presently. as is commonly suppos’d. and deny them to others. whether gentle or violent. and dependent on the mind. For philosophy informs us. peasants. then. which distinguishes them from the impressions. is nothing but a perception. that children. whose objects are suppos’d to have an external existence. This is the case with all the impressions. Accordingly we find. which we refuse to others. That opinion must be entirely owing to the imagination: which must now be the subject of our enquiry. and trees. and since this notion does not extend to all of them. then. with those. nor form any argument from the relation of cause and effect. my books and papers. which the vulgar form on this head. to which we attribute a distinct and continu’d existence. and is interrupted. These vulgar opinions. which appears to the mind. upon any supposition. we can never infer the existence of the one from that of the other. I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration.

and therefore conclude. which we form concerning the connexions of causes and effects. yet ’tis of somewhat a different nature. whether I am present or absent. which was at first entirely arbitrary and hypothetical. but on no occasion is it necessary to suppose. they are contradictions to common experience. and that it was open’d without my perceiving it: And this supposition. we may observe. and I have not occasion to suppose the continu’d existence of objects. are contain’d in a few yards around me. First. as this porter must have done to arrive at my chamber. informs me of the existence of many objects. and which hinders it from mounting in the air. that even in these changes they preserve a coherence. ’Tis evident I can never account for this phænomenon. that this noise cou’d proceed from any thing but the motion of a door. and have a regular dependence on each other. I am accustom’d to hear such a sound. I find not my fire in the same situation. without spreading out in my mind the whole sea and continent between us. wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me. or otherwise lose. and all the objects. and a little after see a porter. I receive a letter. Again. This coherence. When I return to my chamber after an hour’s absence. I have always found. and revolve over these thoughts. unless the door. which we regard as fleeting and perishing. Our passions are found by experience to have a mutual connexion with and dependance on each other. My memory. Those require a continu’d existence. but then this information extends not beyond their past existence. unless I suppose that the door still remains. when they were not perceiv’d. which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation. This gives occasion to many new reflexions and reasonings. which upon opening it I perceive by the hand-writing and subscription to have come from a friend. upon which I can reconcile these contradictions. These observations are contrary. who advances towards me. is not so perfect as not to admit of very considerable exceptions. conformable to my experience in other instances. from that which we discover in bodies. however. that a human body was possest of a quality. nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of their being. There is scarce a moment of my life. and may be regarded as objections to those maxims. I now proceed to examine after what manner these qualities give rise to so extraordinary an opinion. But here ’tis observable. in order to connect their past and present appearances. as I have found by experience to be suitable to their particular natures and circum106 . unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. acquires a force and evidence by its being the only one. which I call gravity. that the present phænomenon is a contradiction to all past experience. I have not receiv’d in this particular instance both these perceptions. When therefore I am thus seated. To begin with the coherence. The case is not the same with relation to external objects. and see such an object in motion at the same time. who says he is two hundred leagues distant. I never have observ’d. Bodies often change their position and qualities. and produces the opinion of their continu’d existence. of which we have had experience. that strike my senses. according to my memory and observation. To consider these phænomena of the porter and letter in a certain light.This constancy. I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges. in which I left it: But then I am accustom’d in other instances to see a like alteration produc’d in a like time. But this is not all. therefore. in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects. that tho’ those internal impressions. be still in being. I am here seated in my chamber with my face to the fire. have also a certain coherence or regularity in their appearances. and give them such an union with each other. in order to preserve the same dependance and connexion. as well as their constancy. which I remember on t’other side the chamber. that they have existed and operated. and supposing the effects and continu’d existence of posts and ferries. the regularity of their operation. in a great measure. and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. near or remote. indeed. Having found that the opinion of the continu’d existence of body depends on the coherence and constancy of certain impressions.

after considering several loose standards of equality. in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion. but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles. even when it is no longer present to my perception. which are not perceiv’d. till it renders the uniformity as compleat as possible. in examining the foundation of mathematics. and gives us a notion of a much greater regularity among objects. 107 . since this supposes a contradiction. and the frequency of their union. it naturally continues. We remark a connexion betwixt two kinds of objects in their past appearance to the senses. that since nothing is ever really present to the mind. and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions. But ’tis evident. therefore. in order to avoid confusion. and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner. we proceed to imagine so correct and exact a standard of that relation. a habit acquir’d by what was never present to the mind. than what they have when we look no farther than our senses. as something real and durable. carries on its course without any new impulse. and that the irregular appearances are join’d by something. I have already33 observ’d. For ’twill readily be allow’d. but this coherence is much greater and more uniform. and regulated by past experience. ’tis not only impossible. why. as is not liable to the least error or variation. is apt to continue. gives rise to the opinion of the continu’d existence of body. viz. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world. which is prior to that of its distinct existence. or the shutting of our eyes is able to break it. and as the mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity among objects. as being deriv’d from custom. and as preserving its existence. But tho’ this conclusion from the coherence of appearances may seem to be of the same nature with our reasonings concerning causes and effects. ’tis in order to bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observ’d in our mere perceptions. and like a galley put in motion by the oars. we shall find upon examination. that any habit shou’d ever be acquir’d otherwise than by the regular succession of these perceptions. as is that of the continu’d existence of all external bodies. This I have assign’d for the reason. This inference from the constancy of our perceptions. can never be a foundation for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects. But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle. and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence. but that these objects still continue their usual connexion. that the imagination. besides its own perceptions. like the precedent from their coherence. but are not able to observe this connexion to be perfectly constant. The same principle makes us easily entertain this opinion of the continu’d existence of body. since the turning about of our head. and afterwards draw out all its parts in their full compass. Objects have a certain coherence even as they appear to our senses. and correcting them by each other. and that this inference arises from the understanding. that they are at the bottom considerably different from each other. even when its object fails it. As the explication of this will lead me into a considerable compass of very profound reasoning. notwithstanding their apparent interruption. but also that any habit shou’d ever exceed that degree of regularity. that whenever we infer the continu’d existence of the objects of sense from their coherence. The simple supposition of their continu’d existence suffices for this purpose. I am afraid ’tis too weak to support alone so vast an edifice.stances. the extending of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion. and produces that latter principle. of regularity in our perceptions. when set into any train of thinking. Any degree. of which we are insensible? But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arises only from custom. What then do we suppose in this case. to give a short sketch or abridgment of my system. if we suppose the objects to have a continu’d existence. I think it proper.

One single object conveys the idea of unity. I have already observ’d34 . and considers them as forming two. were no ways distinguish’d from that meant by itself. we find ourselves somewhat at a loss. that time. For when we consider any two points of this time.When we have been accustom’d to observe a constancy in certain impressions. and are involv’d in a kind of contradiction. of which we are insensible. no more than betwixt existence and non-existence. Thirdly. let us have recourse to the idea of time or duration. Account for that propensity. whose existences are entirely distinct and independent. there are four things requisite. This supposition. in which case we have the idea of number: Or we must suppose it not to exist. for instance. or rather remove it entirely. upon account of their resemblance. or any determinate number of objects. acquires a force and vivacity from the memory of these broken impressions. that the view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. Explain that force and vivacity of conception. First. ’tis only by a fiction of the imagination. and the second as newly created. As to the principle of individuation. we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different. why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them. On the other hand. in a strict sense. and ’tis by means of it. To explain the principium individuationis. by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence. After one object is suppos’d to exist. But to tell the truth. First. that the perception of the sun or ocean. we may observe. which however are imply’d in this affirmation. In order to justify this system. object. if the idea express’d by the word. plac’d before us. is able to give us a notion of identity. Since then both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity. the very essence of belief consists in the force and vivacity of the conception. and according to the precedent reasoning. as at its first appearance. and have found. implies succession. a multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea. as much as possible. and that when we apply its idea to any unchangeable object. Give a reason. to suppose them the same. and from the propensity. Betwixt unity and number there can be no medium. nor wou’d the proposition contain a predicate and a subject. For in that proposition. we must either suppose another also to exist. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty. three. returns upon us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and in a like order. This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place. in which case the first object remains at unity. not that of identity. at first sight this seems utterly impossible. we disguise. to unite these broken appearances by a continu’d existence. Secondly. it must lie in something that is neither of them. we may place them in different lights: We may either survey them at the very same in108 . an object is the same with itself. The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other. however resembling they may be suppos’d. we really shou’d mean nothing. and makes us regard the first impression as annihilated. which this illusion gives. the interruption. by which the unchangeable object is suppos’d to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects. and survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation. or idea of continu’d existence. and in particular of that of our perceptions. which arises from the propensity. or principle of identity. But as this interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity. Fourthly and lastly. (which they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the same. that a single object. To remove this difficulty. which they give us.

which enter by the eye or ear. This circumstance I have observ’d to be of great moment. say. Of all relations. That I may avoid all ambiguity and confusion on this head. which I have already prov’d and explain’d35 . is either of them. which is not comprehended by the generality of mankind. without going the length of number. that whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar ones. both by themselves and by the object. imagine afterwards a change in the time without any variation or interruption in the object. betwixt the idea meant by the word. or stone. that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another. are very apt to be confounded. according to the view. ’tis wholly incapable. similar to that by which we conceive the other.stant. thro’ a suppos’d variation of time. which they suppose co-existent and resembling. In order. object. in order to be conceiv’d at once. who as they perceive only one being. but also of dispositions. and at the same time without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity. To enter. therefore. of which. or shoe. I shall at first suppose. can never assent to the opinion of a double existence and representation. that there is only a single existence. in which we take it: And this idea we call that of identity. unless we mean. Nothing is more apt to make us mistake one idea for another. to accommodate myself to their notions. as existent in these two different points of time: Or on the other hand. generally speaking. which must be multiply’d. which is immediately perceiv’d. which is a medium betwixt unity and number. nor can they readily conceive that this pen or paper. or any other impression. and we may establish it for a general rule. therefore. in which case they give us the idea of number. according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose. and makes us conceive the one idea by an act or operation of the mind. when I return to a more philosophical way of speaking and thinking. I shall be sure to give warning. and makes it pass with facility from one to the other. and therefore must entirely conform myself to their manner of thinking and of expressing themselves. convey’d to him by his senses. without any break of the view. in any propriety of speech. yet this is a distinction. and perceives not the change without a strict attention. Those very sensations. we may trace the succession of time by a like succession of ideas. than any relation betwixt them. understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat. by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence. upon the question concerning the source of the error and deception with regard to identity. that I here account for the opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body. invariableness. 109 . which associates them together in the imagination. Here then is an idea. and that meant by itself. I shall observe. tho’ there be very long intervals betwixt their appearance. represents another. and without being oblig’d to form the idea of multiplicity or number. which I shall call indifferently object or perception. and that because it not only causes an association of ideas. along with the object then existent. but resembling it. and they have only one of the essential qualities of identity. We cannot. By this means we make a difference. Now we have already observ’d. or more properly speaking. and shew why the constancy of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect numerical identity. that of resemblance is in this respect the most efficacious. in which case it gives us the idea of unity. notwithstanding their interruption. are with them the true objects. that however philosophers may distinguish betwixt the objects and perceptions of the senses. and conceiving first one moment. I now proceed to explain the second part of my system. when we attribute it to our resembling perceptions. The mind readily passes from one to the other. which is different from. viz. that an object is the same with itself. I must here recall an observation. Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object.

’Tis therefore very natural for us to mistake the one for the other36 . we may certainly conclude. and which subsists without variation or interruption. and take no more exercise. that their interruption produces no alteration on them. But as the interruption of the appearance seems contrary to the identity. which is present to the senses. The very nature and essence of relation is to connect our ideas with each other. and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those. and then find some other object. and are taken for them in most of our reasonings. that there is such a constancy in almost all the impressions of the senses. and hinders them not from returning the same in appearance and in situation as at their first existence. and as the continuation of the same action is an effect of the continu’d view of the same object. The passage from one moment to another is scarce felt. by causing a similar disposition. and upon the appearance of one. as if it consider’d only one object. we here find ourselves 110 . and of causing the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one idea to another? This question is of the last importance. is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception. who entertain this opinion concerning the identity of our resembling perceptions. But tho’ this question be very important. We shall afterwards see many instances of this tendency of relation to make us ascribe an identity to different objects. we must first examine the disposition of the mind in viewing any object which preserves a perfect identity. representing and represented. are capable of placing the mind in the same disposition. to facilitate the transition to its correlative. which may require a different direction of the spirits. and therefore confounds the succession with the identity. that is confounded with it. The thought slides along the succession with equal facility. and naturally leads us to regard these resembling perceptions as different from each other. The very image. We find by experience. and suppose it to continue the same for some time. The faculties of the mind repose themselves in a manner. in order to its conception. than what is necessary to continue that idea. and never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object. beside identical ones. I shut my eyes. that it produces little alteration on the mind. is with us the real body. The passage betwixt related ideas is. and is consider’d with the same smooth and uninterrupted progress of the imagination. An easy transition or passage of the imagination. that they are very naturally confounded with identical ones. as attends the view of the same invariable object.In order to apply this general maxim. and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation. that a succession of related objects places the mind in this disposition. ’tis not very difficult nor doubtful. when it considers them. and seems like the continuation of the same action. along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions. all of us. which formerly struck my senses. For I immediately reply. and distinguishes not itself by a different perception or idea. Now what other objects. therefore. ’tis evident we suppose the change to lie only in the time. and ’tis to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity. and afterwards open them. at one time or other) and consequently such as suppose their perceptions to be their only objects. so smooth and easy. from the foregoing principle. but shall here confine ourselves to the present subject. ’tis for this reason we attribute sameness to every succession of related objects. are in general all the unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind. and never think of a double existence internal and external. of which we were formerly possest. When we fix our thought on any object. The persons. and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. I survey the furniture of my chamber. For if we can find any such objects. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances. (that is.

nor to be brought into existence by our presence. is the real body or material existence. and will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness. ’Tis certain. In order to clear up this matter. The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. But here the interruptions in the appearance of these perceptions are so long and frequent. and suppos’d. and as the appearance of a perception in the mind and its existence seem at first sight entirely the same. it must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other. which we shall have occasion to explain more fully afterwards37 . ’Tis also certain. First. than that any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness. and may be consider’d as separately existent. it evidently follows. that the very being. is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions. As to the first question. but that we do not feel. it may be doubted. Now as every perception is distinguishable from another. or see it. Here then may arise two questions. Secondly. and perceiving. and learn how the interruption in the appearance of a perception implies not necessarily an interruption in its existence. and the interruption of their appearance. is sure to give a sensible pleasure. with that connected mass of perceptions. We may begin with observing. which is intimately present to the mind. whether it proceeds from without or from within. The interrupted manner of their appearance makes us consider them as so many resembling. When we are absent from it. but still distinct beings. ’twill be proper to touch upon some principles. and feeling. the mind must be uneasy in that situation. or from the combat of internal principles.at a loss how to reconcile such opposite opinions. and even philosophers themselves. from the opposition of external objects. that ’tis impossible to overlook them. 111 . which appear after certain intervals. that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind. Nothing is more certain from experience. or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu’d existence of its perceptions. therefore. we say we feel. we do not see it. whatever strikes in with the natural propensities. to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity. On the contrary. which constitute a thinking being. and suppose. But as the smooth passage of our thought along our resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity. whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contradiction. When we are present. but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is form’d. and suppose a perception to exist without being present to the mind. We must. and neither to be annihilated by our absence. we say it still exists. united together by certain relations. we can never without reluctance yield up that opinion. After what manner we conceive an object to become present to the mind. Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles. that is. and are by that means entirely the same. for the greatest part of their lives. but preserve a continu’d as well as an invariable existence. and principles from which it is deriv’d. tho’ falsely. The perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continu’d existence. and what we mean by this seeing. Now there being here an opposition betwixt the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions. turn to the other side. and either externally forwards their satisfaction. take their perceptions to be their only objects. and suppose that our perceptions are no longer interrupted. which is the third part of that hypothesis I propos’d to explain. How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated. that this very perception or object is suppos’d to have a continu’d uninterrupted being. without some new creation of a perception or image. that almost all mankind. or internally concurs with their movements. that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact. that what we call a mind. we may observe. in breaking off all its relations.

that as the vulgar suppose their perceptions to be their only objects. The supposition of the continu’d existence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contradiction. and sometimes absent from it. that it scarce perceives the change. ’tis because the manner. and in storing the memory with ideas. and as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory. which are perfectly new to us. therefore. ’Tis indeed evident.The same reasoning affords us an answer to the second question. but retains in the second a considerable share of the vivacity of the first. and felt. We may easily indulge our inclination to that supposition. the question is. Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling each other. than to comprehend it fully and distinctly. Impressions are naturally the most vivid perceptions of the mind. besides that of relation. I believe an intelligent reader will find less difficulty to assent to this system. by reason of the smooth transition and the propensity of the imagination. It is excited by the lively impression. and avoid the contradiction. that this propensity arises from some other principle. and this quality is in part convey’d by the relation to every connected idea. and convey the vivacity from the impression to the idea. Now this is exactly the present case. that return at different distances of time. and leads us to attribute the same qualities to the similar objects. and that an idea may acquire this vivacity by its relation to some present impression. that belief in general consists in nothing. and after considerable interruptions. in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems necessarily to involve us. and become present to the mind. The relation causes a smooth passage from the impression to the idea. that is. we must account for the origin 112 . and also a propension to connect them by a continu’d existence. the name of object. and of whose constancy and coherence we have no experience. without any great diminution in the passage. An interrupted appearance to the senses implies not necessarily an interruption in the existence. from whence arises such a belief. Here then we have a propensity to feign the continu’d existence of all sensible objects. This resemblance gives us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same. The same continu’d and uninterrupted Being may. be sometimes present to the mind. and will allow. The mind falls so easily from the one perception to the other. makes us believe the continu’d existence of body. But suppose. in order to justify this identity. but the vivacity of an idea. as to influence them very considerably in augmenting their number by present reflexions and passions. and preserve a perfect and entire identity to our perceptions. If sometimes we ascribe a continu’d existence to objects. and at the same time believe the continu’d existence of matter. after a little reflection. or in other words. they acquire such a relation to a connected heap of perceptions. that every part carries its own proof along with it. it bestows a vivacity on that fiction. without any real or essential change in the Being itself. When the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity. External objects are seen. resembles that of constant and coherent objects. ’tis evident it must still have the same effect. and this question leads us to the fourth member of this system. we may remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continu’d being. But as we here not only feign but believe this continu’d existence. standing for the very same thing. can never render their conjunction impossible. in which they present themselves to our senses. and this vivacity is convey’d to the related idea. which may fill those intervals. It has been prov’d already. If the name of perception renders not this separation from a mind absurd and contradictory. and even gives a propensity to that passage. and this resemblance is a source of reasoning and analogy.

as well as the identity. which is the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity. and reason a little upon them. as is acknowledg’d by all philosophers. since that fiction. which first takes place. according to their distance. The imagination is seduc’d into such an opinion only by means of the resemblance of certain perceptions. and without much study or reflection draws the other along with it. This propension to bestow an identity on our resembling perceptions. and perishing. which we have a propension to suppose the same. and different at every different return. This leads us backward upon our footsteps to perceive our error in attributing a continu’d existence to our perceptions. This opinion is confirm’d by the seeming encrease and diminution of objects. How much more when aided by that circumstance? But tho’ we are led after this manner. since we find they are only our resembling perceptions. that are peculiar to itself. which is perfectly convincing.of the belief upon that supposition. which convince us. I assert that ’tis only a palliative remedy. to ascribe a continu’d existence to those sensible objects or perceptions. The natural consequence of this reasoning shou’d be. by the apparent alterations in their figure. that they change their system. that our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence. and by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind. or perceptions. we quickly perceive. by the changes in their colour and other qualities from our sickness and distempers. (as we shall do for the future) betwixt perceptions and objects. that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs. ’Twill first be proper to observe a few of those experiments. since without the remembrance of former sensations. 113 . When we press one eye with a finger. But when we compare experiments. and that all of them together form a consistent system. yet a very little reflection and philosophy is sufficient to make us perceive the fallacy of that opinion. as a necessary consequence. In the last place this propension causes belief by means of the present impressions of the memory. A strong propensity or inclination alone. and that we no sooner establish the one than the other follows. without any present impression. by the natural propensity of the imagination. that our perceptions have no more a continu’d than an independent existence. that our sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence. and to preserve a continu’d existence and identity. But however philosophical this new system may be esteem’d. and as they are both of the same nature. ’tis a false opinion that any of our objects. and has no other effect than to remedy the interruption of our perceptions. Now upon that supposition. we immediately perceive all the objects to become double. we clearly perceive. is really false. of which the former are suppos’d to be interrupted. and distinguish. and indeed philosophers have so far run into this opinion. from all which we learn. wherever the mind follows its first and most natural tendency. but must arise from the imagination. and consequently the opinion of their identity can never arise from reason. and one half of them to be remov’d from their common and natural position. and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. that there is an intimate connexion betwixt those two principles. which we shall here endeavour to account for. Thus in examining all these parts. the latter to be uninterrupted. that the doctrine of the independent existence of our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest experience. which we find to resemble each other in their interrupted appearance. of a continu’d and of a distinct or independent existence. and that it contains all the difficulties of the vulgar system. with some others. we find that each of them is supported by the strongest proofs. are identically the same after an interruption. ’tis plain we never shou’d have any belief of the continu’d existence of body. But as we do not attribute a continu’d existence to both these perceptions. produces the fiction of a continu’d existence. I have already observ’d. ’Tis the opinion of a continu’d existence. and is the origin of many very curious opinions. will sometimes cause a belief or opinion.

we may observe. which lead us directly to embrace this opinion of the double existence of perceptions and objects. and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv’d. As to the second part of the proposition. therefore. Whoever wou’d explain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body. ’Tis impossible. ’Tis no less certain. but can never observe it between perceptions and objects. Were we not first perswaded. have fallen upon such a principle. I confess it will be somewhat difficult to prove this to the full satisfaction of the reader. and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other. we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter. and wou’d invent a system. we shou’d never be led to think. and are the first foundation of all our conclusions. The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another. command our strongest assent. which we shall endeavour to prove as distinctly and clearly. which in many cases will not admit of any positive proof. For as the philosophical system is found by experience to take hold of many minds.’ This proposition contains two parts. but yet continu’d. from the very abstractedness and difficulty of the first supposition. and that that faculty wou’d never. it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions. of which we are certain. it must derive all its authority from 114 . and has alone any primary recommendation to the fancy. which being immediately present to us by consciousness. I promise to renounce my present opinion. because it implies a negative. by which we find. to pronounce a certain judgment in the present subject. But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions. but acquires all its influence on the imagination from the former. and interrupted. ’tis the most natural of any. and by its original tendency. resembling these perceptions in their nature. either to reason or the imagination. and let any one upon this supposition shew why the fancy. of itself. that two beings are constantly conjoin’d together. we may soon satisfy ourselves with regard to reason by the following reflections. The idea of this relation is deriv’d from past experience. and that our objects alone preserve a continu’d existence. are perceptions. to account for the direct origin of this opinion from the imagination. are still different from each other. The only existences. that this philosophical hypothesis has no primary recommendation. and are always present at once to the mind. that it has no primary recommendation to reason or the imagination. that our perceptions are our only objects. Mean while I cannot forbear concluding. that the philosophical system acquires all its influence on the imagination from the vulgar one.There are no principles either of the understanding or fancy. that from the existence or any of the qualities of the former. or ever satisfy our reason in this particular. that ’tis an improper subject for the fancy to work upon. nor can we arrive at it but by passing thro’ the common hypothesis of the identity and continuance of our interrupted perceptions. is by means of the relation of cause and effect. ‘The latter hypothesis has no primary recommendation either to reason or the imagination. must take the mind in its common situation. that this is a natural and unavoidable consequence of the foregoing conclusion. If any one wou’d take the pains to examine this question. that our perceptions and objects are different. that this philosophical system has no primary recommendation to the imagination. that our perceptions are our only objects. directly and immediately. as such abstruse subjects will permit. and identical. proceeds to the belief of another existence. As to the first part of the proposition. and in particular of all those. and uninterrupted. which shews. Let it be taken for granted. by the examination of that system. and must proceed upon the supposition. that there is a connexion betwixt them. we shou’d be able. and after he has done this to my satisfaction. and however like. and continue to exist even when they no longer make their appearance to the senses. who reflect ever so little on this subject. that our perceptions are broken. Tho’ this opinion be false.

But as a little reflection destroys this conclusion. that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence. Not being able to reconcile these two enemies. and different from each other. and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. which are both at once embrac’d by the mind. which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy. the philosophical and study’d principle may prevail. and at the same time reason is so clear in the point. that there is no possibility of disguising her. The imagination naturally runs on in this train of thinking. that tho’ all sects agree in the latter sentiment. Nay she has sometimes such an influence. The case. since it has no original authority of its own. Thus tho’ we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions. That opinion has taken such deep root in the imagination. that there is such a thing in nature as a continu’d existence. a continu’d and uninterrupted existence. that our dependent perceptions are interrupted and different. therefore. therefore. and which are unable mutually to destroy each other. and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse. In order to set ourselves at ease in this particular. and keep us from running on with all the consequences of any philosophical opinion. we contrive a new hypothesis. If these opinions become contrary. even when absent from us: Our sensible perceptions have. however broken or uninterrupted in their appearance: This appearing interruption is contrary to the identity: The interruption consequently extends not beyond the appearance. but the moment we relax our thoughts. and draw us back to our former opinion. are connected together. But tho’ our natural and obvious principles here prevail above our study’d reflections. The manner. As long as our attention is bent upon the subject. who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only. however strongly attack’d by reason. Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction. which is. its necessary consequence. in attributing a continu’d existence to something else. which is preserv’d even when it no longer appears to the senses. in allowing. we en115 . in a manner. by shewing that they have a dependent one.the vulgar system. and the perception or object really continues to exist. however. which pleases our reason. which are contrary to each other. as follows. and never upon that account reject the notion of an independent and continu’d existence. that our resembling perceptions have a continu’d and uninterrupted existence. ’tis certain there must be some struggle and opposition in the case. tho’ directly contrary. the interruption to perceptions. ’tis not difficult to foresee which of them will have the advantage. that she can stop our progress. has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics. and are not annihilated by their absence. on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind. the former. in which these two systems. even in the midst of our most profound reflections. and will not quit the field. nor will any strain’d metaphysical conviction of the dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for that purpose. ’twou’d naturally be expected. that we must altogether reject the opinion. Our perceptions are our only objects: Resembling perceptions are the same. Nature is obstinate. Reflection tells us. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection. that our perceptions have a continu’d existence. is the monstrous offspring of two principles. may be explain’d. is otherwise. by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences. that ’tis impossible ever to eradicate it. at least so long as these reflections retain any force or vivacity. we stop short in our carreer. which we call objects. This philosophical system. nature will display herself. The imagination tells us. and at the same time is agreeable to the imagination. and the continuance to objects. which seems to comprehend both these principles of reason and imagination. This hypothesis is the philosophical one of the double existence of perceptions and objects.

But to be ingenuous. and wou’d never regard it any farther. that philosophers neglect not this advantage. That opinion. we naturally add the latter to compleat the union. The constancy of our perceptions has the most con116 . We never can conceive any thing but perceptions. that our perceptions are dependent. that it borrows all its ideas from some precedent perception. when it becomes trouble-some and sollicitous. I have already shewn. First. in a very conspicuous manner. that every particular object resembles that perception. which happily at last is found in the system of a double existence. I feel myself at present of a quite contrary sentiment. wherein we may remark its dependence on the fancy. which arises upon reviewing those systems. that this opinion arises. than to place in it such an implicit confidence. Again. is deriv’d from nothing but the quality of the fancy above-explain’d. and identical. and am more inclin’d to repose no faith at all in my senses. can easily return to our vulgar and natural notions. Secondly. The relation of cause and effect determines us to join the other of resemblance. that even tho’ they cou’d afford such a conclusion. and that this wou’d be the conclusion. as makes us seek some pretext to justify our receiving both. and from such an adherence to these two contrary principles. and yet upon its least negligence or inattention. that our perceptions are our only objects. and therefore must make every thing resemble them. that our resembling perceptions are continu’d. ’Tis therefore from the intermediate situation of the mind. as we shall have occasion to observe presently38 . and by feigning a double existence. Having thus given an account of all the systems both popular and philosophical. I shou’d draw from the whole of my reasoning. since in that case we shou’d clearly perceive the error of our first supposition of a continu’d existence. Accordingly we find. therefore.deavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible. and wou’d not look beyond. Were we fully convinc’d. can ever lead to any solid and rational system. conducted by such false suppositions. and the ideas of these existences being already united together in the fancy by the former relation. that the relation of cause and effect can never afford us any just conclusion from the existence or qualities of our perceptions to the existence of external continu’d objects: And I shall farther add. and different. I cannot forbear giving vent to a certain sentiment. that has all the conditions it desires. As we suppose our objects in general to resemble our perceptions. that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses. we shou’d never run into this opinion of a double existence. by successively granting to each whatever it demands. with regard to external existences. which it causes. we shou’d never have any reason to infer. we shou’d be as little inclin’d to embrace the opinion of a double existence. by which means we can humour our reason for a moment. We have a strong propensity to compleat every union by joining new relations to those which we have before observ’d betwixt any ideas. or rather imagination. that our objects resemble our perceptions. tho’ these qualities of perceptions have no perceivable connexion with such an existence. There are other particulars of this system. which produce the opinion of their continu’d existence. I begun this subject with premising. I shall observe the two following. They are the coherence and constancy of our perceptions. where each may find something. We suppose external objects to resemble internal perceptions. since we shou’d find satisfaction in our first supposition. I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy. and interrupted. Another advantage of this philosophical system is its similarity to the vulgar one. so we take it for granted. but immediately upon leaving their closets. and continue identically and uninterruptedly the same in all their interrupted appearances. and independent. were we fully convinc’d. mingle with the rest of mankind in those exploded opinions. Of these.

I am persuaded. fear. and which we find to have a constant union with each other. and accidents. and is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity. even when they are not present to the senses. however we may chace it away. that these perceptions are uninterrupted. and as continuing the Same under very considerable alterations.siderable effect. and policy have no place. Our character is the same throughout. there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy. and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such. and yet is attended with the greatest difficulties. Of the antient philosophy. and uninterrupted. our courage or pusilanimity. and are still existent. and substantial forms. and ’tis this illusion. of which objects are compos’d. ’tis certain we commonly regard the compound. the farther we carry our reflections. and discover themselves in the most glaring colours. but must return upon us every moment. As the sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects. perhaps. Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same. it always encreases. and sometimes may seem entirely free from it. ’Tis a gross illusion to suppose. Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method of becoming acquainted with our own hearts. This is the case with our popular system. as One thing. concerning substances. have a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature. For this reason I rely entirely upon them. is a malady. In like manner. and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner. whatever may be the reader’s opinion at this present moment. however unreasonable and capricious. The acknowledg’d 117 . Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy. SECTION III. This will not. and appears best where artifice. The generosity. that they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions. a new set of perceptions: For we may well suppose in general. and examine them with the same rigour. influence the fictions of the imagination with the most unbounded liberty. and occult qualities. before I proceed to a more particular enquiry concerning our impressions. which they form. What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood? And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? This sceptical doubt. our meekness or cruelty. but ’tis impossible for us distinctly to conceive. in the end be found foreign to our present purpose. and going upon that supposition. to which they attribute these qualities. which can never be radically cur’d. to recollect our dreams in a morning. ’Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses. that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same. and knowing our progress in virtue. which leads us into the opinion. But however these qualities may in themselves be entirely distinct. whether in opposition or conformity to it. ’tis liable to the same difficulties. and take it for granted. objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions. say they. both with respect to reason and the senses. and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others. ’Tis confest by the most judicious philosophers. which have been propos’d of both. that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections form’d by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities. I say. that it at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition. I intend to examine some general systems both ancient and modern. that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world. which. And as to our philosophical one. or baseness of our temper. that we wou’d our most serious and most deliberate actions.

and seem entirely to destroy the identity. which make us almost universally fall into such evident contradictions. When we compare its situation after a considerable change the progress of the thought is broke. It may. readily deceives the mind. which view of things being destructive of its primary and more natural notions. without change or variation. therefore. earth. in which we survey the object. and distinguishable. When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes. hence it proceeds. the mind. in that case the variations. The connexion of parts in the compound object has almost the same effect. and other qualities. notwithstanding its diversity and composition. obliges the imagination to feign an unknown something. solidity. At the same time it assigns to each of these species of ob118 . and so unites the object within itself. where their influence on the mind is similar. that any such succession of related qualities is readily consider’d as one continu’d object. and will no more perceive the change. Hence the colour. or original and first matter. water.composition is evidently contrary to this suppos’d simplicity. from the different points of view. The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought. and air. must be carry’d from one part of it to another by an easy transition. and as what may give the compound object a title to be call’d one thing. and as the imagination readily takes one idea for another. and the variation to the identity. as if perfectly uncompounded. and compare the different conditions of the successive qualities. and this unintelligible something it calls a substance. by a single effort of thought. We entertain a like notion with regard to the simplicity of substances. along with another object. existing without any variation. which it supposes to continue the same under all these variations. it finds that all these qualities are different. or original substance and matter. ’tis evident the actions of the mind. But when we alter our method of considering the succession. and from the nearness or remoteness of those instants of time. are not very different. and separable from each other. the smooth progress of the thought makes us ascribe an identity to the succession. and considers fire. figure. whose co-existent parts are connected together by a strong relation. This easy transition is the effect. taste. ’Tis evident. and from like causes. which we compare together. combin’d in a peach or melon. By this means there arises a kind of contrariety in our method of thinking. being alike in both cases. as a principle of union or cohesion among these qualities. and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities. which were insensible when they arose gradually. in considering these two objects. The peripatetic philosophy asserts the original matter to be perfectly homogeneous in all bodies. which makes them affect the thought in the same manner. that the fancy feels not the transition in passing from one part to another. are conceiv’d to form one thing. But the mind rests not here. survey at once any two distinct periods of its duration. on account of their gradual revolutions and changes into each other. Whenever it views the object in another light. and instead of tracing it gradually thro’ the successive points of time. that as the ideas of the several distinct successive qualities of objects are united together by a very close relation. with facility. and that on account of their close relation. or rather essence of relation. be worth while to consider the causes. because ’tis by a similar act of the mind we consider an unchangeable object. do now appear of consequence. and consequently we are presented with the idea of diversity: In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible. than if it contemplated the same unchangeable object. Suppose an object perfectly simple and indivisible to be presented. The imagination conceives the simple object at once. in looking along the succession. as of the very same substance. as well as the means by which we endeavour to conceal them.

who form them. according as the persons. which makes us infer a connexion betwixt cause and effect. is entirely incomprehensible. But these philosophers. Had they fallen upon the just conclusion. that ’tis not from a view of the nature and qualities of objects we infer one from another. may be conceiv’d to exist apart. of which they have as imperfect an idea. where we shall find upon enquiry. that the true philosophy approaches nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar. and yet is deriv’d from principles as natural as any of these above-explain’d. that of a false philosophy. sounds. which they do not understand. But philosophers. and concluding. as existences. They have sufficient force of genius to free them from the vulgar error. they are apt to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. instead of drawing this conclusion. immediately perceive the falshood of these vulgar sentiments. which cannot subsist apart. This conceit. And in order to indulge ourselves in both these ways of considering our objects. The whole system. and such as the poets 119 . we suppose all of them to be of the same substance or essence. Every quality being a distinct thing from another. For having never discover’d any of these sensible qualities. in which this agency consists. they frequently search for the qualities. which it supposes to be the source of all those different qualities they possess. and an accident supported. who abstract from the effects of custom. that there is a natural and perceivable connexion betwixt the several sensible qualities and actions of matter. not only from every other quality. for the reasons above-mention’d. The custom of imagining a dependance has the same effect as the custom of observing it wou’d have. At present they seem to be in a very lamentable condition. ’Tis natural for men. and other properties of bodies. nor can we forbear looking upon colours. tastes. and are displeased with every system. is no more reasonable than any of the foregoing. acquire new degrees of reason and knowledge. and wou’d have regarded all these disquisitions with indolence and indifference. in their common and careless way of thinking. and to be a new foundation of simplicity and identity to each particular species. When we look along the insensible changes of bodies. Every different object appears to them entirely distinct and separate. and because custom has render’d it difficult to separate the ideas. but require a subject of inhesion to sustain and support them. we attribute to each of them a substantial and essential difference.jects a distinct substantial form. All depends on our manner of viewing the objects. and discover that there is no known connexion among objects. that rise above each other. where. which their reason suggests to them. but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance. they wou’d have return’d back to the situation of the vulgar. and compare the ideas of objects. makes us here infer a dependance of every quality on the unknown substance. and may exist apart. These opinions are that of the vulgar. in order to explain it. we suppose all bodies to have at once a substance and a substantial form. But these philosophers carry their fictions still farther in their sentiments concerning occult qualities. but not sufficient to keep them from ever seeking for this connexion in matter. and both suppose a substance supporting. or causes. to imagine they perceive a connexion betwixt such objects as they have constantly found united together. the same habit. figures. The notion of accidents is an unavoidable consequence of this method of thinking with regard to substances and substantial forms. and that of the true. and they perceive. When we consider their sensible differences. but only when in several instances we observe them to have been constantly conjoin’d. however. I say. instead of drawing a just inference from this observation. and belonging to causes. than to those of a mistaken knowledge. therefore. that we have no idea of power or agency. separate from the mind. In considering this subject we may observe a gradation of three opinions. we did not likewise fancy a substance to exist.

and arrive at last. such as the customary transition from causes to effects. and true philosophers by their moderate scepticism. according to my own confession. tho’ that conclusion 120 . and to have a secret meaning. by these fictions of sympathy and antipathy. irresistable. but on the contrary are observ’d only to take place in weak minds. and there is an end of all dispute and enquiry upon the matter. so it naturally happens. but has reserv’d them a consolation amid all their disappointments and afflictions. and allowing themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. is suppress’d by a little reflection. I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for makeing use of that faculty. which we wou’d express by them. ’tis true. or so much as useful in the conduct of life. This inclination. It appears in children. antipathies. arises from a faculty or an occult quality. being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy. and horrors of a vacuum. and makes us imagine a thorough resemblance and conformity. than to seek with eagerness. The resemblance of their appearance deceives the mind. we fancy them to be on the same footing with the precedent. where ’tis impossible it can ever exist? But as nature seems to have observ’d a kind of justice and compensation in every thing. that any phænomenon. by their desire of beating the stones. and the latter rejected. as is usual. This consolation principally consists in their invention of the words faculty and occult quality. For this reason the former are received by philosophy. that the imagination. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions. which are really significant and intelligible. because they profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy: But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness? SECTION IV. to omit the idea. and the antient philosophers. In order to justify myself. poets. such as those I have just now taken notice of. may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent. by which we recal the idea at pleasure. what for ever flies us. nor necessary. she has not neglected philosophers more than the rest of the creation. They need only say. poets. and to preserve only the custom. and from effects to causes: And the principles. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind. at the same indifference. by an illusion. which are changeable.have given us but a faint notion of in their descriptions of the punishment of Sisyphus and Tantalus. For what can be imagin’d more tormenting. by their readiness to personify every thing: And in the antient philosophers. weak. so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. For it being usual. which we might discover by reflection. that after the frequent use of terms. But among all the instances. which the people attain by their stupidity. which it observes in itself. and universal. and irregular. By this means these philosophers set themselves at ease. and to find every where those ideas. We must pardon children. which hurt them: In poets. after the frequent use of terms. which puzzles them. and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning. because of their age. One who concludes somebody to be near him. which are wholly insignificant and unintelligible. when he hears an articulate voice in the dark. and only takes place in children. no one is more remarkable than their sympathies. to bestow on external objects the same emotions. Of the modern philosophy. which are most present to it. wherein the Peripatetics have shewn they were guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination. But here it may be objected. and seek for it in a place. There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature. reasons justly and naturally.

of light. be said to reason. which infixes and inlivens the idea of a human creature. are like the spectres in the dark. and consistent principles of the imagination. and to arise from causes. This principle being once admitted. Upon examination. are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature. deriv’d from a like origin. from the rank of continu’d independent existences. We conclude. The conclusion drawn from them. the most agreeable and most natural situation of man. that deriv’d from the variations of those impressions. decay. their fictions of substance and accident. with their different mixtures and modifications. The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours. Upon the difference of their external situation and position: Colours reflected from the clouds change according to the distance of the clouds. which no ways resemble them. ’Tis certain. Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men: That seems bitter to one. heat and cold. figure. sound. These impressions are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of colour. The opinions of the antient philosophers. even while the external object. colours. who is tormented he knows not why. Many of the impressions of colour. These primary qualities are extension and solidity. to all appearance. Instances of this kind are very numerous and frequent. and according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous body. which. and other sensible qualities. all of them. as also the operations of all bodies on each other. and as the same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different. and are deriv’d from principles. that many of our impressions have no external model or archetype. The modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from this defect. be endow’d with different qualities of the same sense. deriv’d from the operation of external objects. permanent. The generation. &c. at the same time. gravity. that when different impressions of the same sense arise from any object. These variations depend upon several circumstances. Upon the different situations of our health: A man in a malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats. and that of pain at another. are confest to be nothing but internal existences. viz. Now from like effects we presume like causes. and corruption of animals and vegetables. continues the same. it evidently follows. and to reason naturally too: But then it must be in the same sense. which before pleas’d him the most. that a malady is said to be natural. which is sweet to another. For upon the removal of sounds. and their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities. may. Fire also communicates the sensation of pleasure at one distance. encrease. as the only real ones. as arising from natural causes. of which we have any adequate notion. are nothing but changes of figure and motion. cold. One figure and motion pro121 . and to arise only from the solid. I find only one of the reasons commonly produc’d for this opinion to be satisfactory. Upon what grounds this pretension is founded must now be the subject of our enquiry. &c. earth. air. sound. tho’ it be contrary to health. is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin’d. and cohesion. and of all the elements and powers of nature. every one of these impressions has not a resembling quality existent in the object. water. of fire. and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. tastes. with the apprehension of spectres in the dark. For as the same object cannot. smells.be deriv’d from nothing but custom. we are reduc’d merely to what are called primary qualities. on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. motion. But one. perhaps. therefore. which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind. sounds. that they are. all the other doctrines of that philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence. heat. however common.

to which we suppose solidity to belong? To say. extension and solidity. which is a false idea. and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. We may make the same 122 . which being impell’d by the utmost force. but because it may seem abstruse and intricate to the generality of readers. Now I ask. we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without any penetration. we utterly annihilate all these objects. then. cannot penetrate each other. is perfectly incomprehensible alone. The idea of motion depends on that of extension. Extension must necessarily be consider’d either as colour’d. Colour is excluded from any real existence. of which we can form the most distant idea. For that wou’d be to run in a circle. endow’d with colour or solidity. or as solid. which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on. therefore. that we paint them out to ourselves as extended. ’tis evident this is a quality altogether inconceivable alone. Now what is our idea of the moving body. because they never possess any place. This argument will appear entirely conclusive to every one that comprehends it. if I endeavour to render it more obvious by some variation of the expression. In order to form an idea of solidity. but as compos’d of parts. much more without conceiving any. and make one idea depend on another. The idea of motion necessarily supposes that of a body moving. nor can be endow’d with any quality. The idea of solidity is that of two objects. and ’tis impossible to arrive at this idea. and without the conception of some bodies. that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means. when we confine ourselves to one object. I have prov’d to be true with regard to extension. it must at last resolve itself into such as are perfectly simple and indivisible. while at the same time the latter depends on the former. tastes. or returns in a circle. and the idea of extension on that of solidity. is to run on in infinitum. of our idea of extension depends upon the reality of that of solidity. I hope to be excus’d. nor consequently of matter. not being ideas of extension. but still maintain a separate and distinct existence. either resolves all into a false idea. Our modern philosophy. that we conceive them merely as solid. and consequently the reality of motion depends upon that of these other qualities. sounds. that the idea of solidity can depend on either of them. I assert. either active or passive. nor can the former be just while the latter is chimerical. which brings us back to the first question. The reality. The idea of extension is a compound idea. These simple and indivisible parts. sounds. what idea do we form of these bodies or objects.duces another figure and motion. Now what idea have we of these bodies? The ideas of colours. Let us. without which motion is incomprehensible? It must resolve itself into the idea of extension or of solidity. and have shewn that ’tis impossible to conceive extension. If colours. which is in my opinion very decisive. nothing we can conceive is possest of a real. which is universally acknowledg’d concerning motion. and smells be merely perceptions. must be non-entities. leaves us no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity. therefore. which are solid. lend our attention to the examination of the idea of solidity. unless conceiv’d as colour’d or solid. ’Tis impossible. and without a reference to some other object. This opinion. not even motion. continu’d. therefore. Two non-entities cannot exclude each other from their places. therefore. I believe many objections might be made to this system: But at present I shall confine myself to one. To begin with the examination of motion. To affirm. Solidity. and other secondary qualities are excluded. but as it is not compounded of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas. and maintain this separate and distinct existence. and independent existence. nor does there remain in the material universe any other principle.

The impressions. there remains nothing. ’twill readily be allow’d. Now the difficulty still remains. viz. except when consider’d with regard to their extension. solidity or impenetrability is nothing. that tho’ bodies are felt by means of their solidity. therefore. along with contiguity and impulse. First. that the sensation. that they neither represent solidity. and proves that this whole impression has no archetype or model in external objects. and those that persuade us of the continu’d and independent existence of body. and need but touch any object in order to perceive this quality. heat and cold from the rank of external existences. betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect. A man. which can afford us a just and consistent idea of body. conveys a certain sensation to the mind. how to form an idea of this object or existence. to make these two cases alike. of which there is no appearance in the latter. To which we may add. For let us put two cases. the feeling as the only sense. that can convey the impression. which is original to the idea of solidity. that we feel the solidity of bodies. and that they have not the least resemblance to each other. sounds. obliges us to remove the whole. and that resistance. but that in the former there is conjoin’d with the solidity. which is suppos’d to be real. that these two cases are not in every respect alike. There remains. Secondly. and upon the whole must conclude. or more properly speaking. and resistance are any ways resembling. by itself. the smell and taste. which enter by the sight and hearing. but it does not follow. and consequently the idea of solidity. that after the exclusion of colours. which the man feels by his hand. a feeling or sensation. whose annihilation we suppose impossible. or any solid body. Add to this. properly speaking. and indeed we naturally imagine. as when he feels the same table with the other hand. But this method of thinking is more popular than philosophical. An impossibility of being annihilated cannot exist. which press each other. the impressions of touch change every moment upon us. Nor must we omit on this occasion our accustom’d method of examining ideas by considering those impressions. and that of two stones. that of a man. An object. which is a clear proof that the latter are not representations of the former. nor any real object. but necessarily requires some object or real existence. and can never be conceived to exist. In order. with his hand. we con123 . which being a compound object. who presses a stone. who has the palsey in one hand. The impressions of touch are simple impressions. without having recourse to the secondary and sensible qualities.observation concerning mobility and figure. meets with resistance. as39 has been already observ’d: For which reason ’tis the more necessary for us to form some distinct idea of that object. which makes nothing to the present purpose: And from this simplicity I infer. can never be deriv’d from any of these senses. Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses. by the motion it gives to the nerves and animal spirits. Not to mention. can never be represented by a simple impression. therefore. When we reason from cause and effect. and that being impossible in a simple impression. ’tis necessary to remove some part of the impression. when he observes that hand to be supported by the table. from which they are deriv’d. that solidity necessarily supposes two bodies. that tho’ solidity continues always invariably the same. ’Tis easy to observe. to which it may belong. has as perfect an idea of impenetrability. yet the feeling is a quite different thing from the solidity. that presses upon any of our members. that. but an impossibility of annihilation. or organ of sensation. as will appear from the following reflections. are affirm’d by modern philosophy to be without any resembling objects. motion.

and from what object it is deriv’d. who pretend that we have an idea of the substance of our minds. What is known concerning it. is distinguishable. which is different. which has been already acknowledg’d. and whatever is clearly conceiv’d. or the soul from its perceptions. These philosophers are the curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substances. and uncertain. I know no better method. Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist. any one shou’d evade the difficulty. to point out the impression that produces it. which we are apt to imagine so much more obscure. As every idea is deriv’d from a precedent impression. and in the idea of matter. and by what causes is it produc’d? If instead of answering these questions. For thus I reason. ’Tis true. and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident.clude. and every thing 124 . or does it only return at intervals? If at intervals. and what is unknown. that neither colour. that this definition agrees to every thing. I shou’d observe. after any manner. and that this definition ought to satisfy us: Shou’d this be said. I desire those philosophers. in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere. from which the subject is of itself exempted. as those we have discover’d in the natural. that can possibly be conceiv’d. Of the immateriality of the soul. ’tis burthen’d with some additional ones. if not impossible. ’twill then be reasonable. for that other what actually is. taste. is not perplex’d with any such contradictions. we must be contented to leave so. by saying. agrees with itself. and the nature of the mind. which are peculiar to that subject. wou’d we hearken to certain philosophers. and not till then. which has such an existence. This is one principle. What they mean by substance and inhesion? And after they have answer’d this question. In order to put a stop to these endless cavils on both sides. For how can an impression represent a substance. at what times principally does it return. or indifferent? Does it attend us at all times. than to ask these philosophers in a few words. we shall naturally expect still greater difficulties and contradictions in every hypothesis concerning our internal perceptions. to be conceiv’d. it labours under all the same difficulties. since. otherwise than by resembling it? And how can an impression resemble a substance. and has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance? But leaving the question of what may or may not be. and tell distinctly after what manner that impression operates. The intellectual world. Having found such contradictions and difficulties in every system concerning external objects. which we fancy so clear and determinate. we must also have an impression of it. they promise to diminish our ignorance. may exist after the same manner. sound. according to this philosophy. nor smell have a continu’d and independent existence. that the definition of a substance is something which may exist by itself. which is very difficult. or painful. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe. But in this we shou’d deceive ourselves. had we any idea of the substance of our minds. every thing. it is not a substance. Again. SECTION V. tho’ involv’d in infinite obscurities. to enter seriously into the dispute. Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? Is it pleasant. but I am afraid ’tis at the hazard of running us into contradictions. This question we have found impossible to be answer’d with regard to matter and body: But besides that in the case of the mind.

not with the extension: Or if the thought exists in every part. therefore. and makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself. that has parts dispos’d after such a manner. They are. and separable. four desires. without parts or composition. which seems to me remarkable. This argument affects not the question concerning the substance of the soul. and these dispos’d and situated in such a manner. which is evidently absurd. therefore. as far as this definition explains a substance. when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question? There is one argument commonly employ’d for the immateriality of the soul. The first notion of space and extension is deriv’d solely from the senses of sight and feeling. Whatever is extended consists of parts. it must also be extended. Inhesion in something is suppos’d to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. and extension are qualities wholly incompatible. and have no need of any thing else to support their existence. or indeed to any impression or idea. and the perception is conjoin’d only with it. therefore. as to have a determinate length. My conclusion from both is. and from every thing else in the universe. Nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception. wou’d the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? On the surface or in the middle? On the back.which is distinguishable. For in that case ’twou’d be possible. What is extended must have a particular figure. and divisible. except of these two senses above-mention’d. if not in reality. to make two. no idea of a substance. Neither ought a desire. which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul. If it exist within its dimensions. When we diminish or encrease a relish. A substance is entirely different from a perception. it must exist somewhere within its dimensions. and an inch in thickness? Thought. This is another principle. and then that particular part is indivisible. For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length. substances. What possibility then of answering that question. as well as the body. tho’ indivisible. ’tis not after the same manner that we diminish or increase any visible object. and whatever consists of parts is divisible. We have. but only that concerning its local conjunction with matter. Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas. Whatever marks the place of its existence either must be extended. custom and reflection alone make us form an idea of the degrees of the distance and contiguity of those bodies. from which they are deriv’d. three. therefore. nor by means of a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance. Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance. as square. no idea of inhesion. We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. triangular. a foot in breadth. We have. and may lead us to some discoveries of considerable moment. or are not susceptible of a local conjunction. it must either exist in one particular part. or must be a mathematical point. nor is there any thing. and never can incorporate together into one subject. and therefore it may not be improper to consider in general what objects are. and when several sounds strike our hearing at once. and may exist separately. they are also distinct and separable. 125 . breadth and thickness. This is a curious question. but what is colour’d or tangible. which is a being altogether inseparable and indivisible. to be consider’d as a mathematical point. For supposing such a conjunction. is separable by the imagination. But ’tis impossible any thing divisible can be conjoin’d to a thought or perception.or fore-side of it? If it be conjoin’d with the extension. and may be consider’d as separately existent. which is utterly absurd and contradictory. as to convey that idea. by the addition of others. that since all our perceptions are different from each other. round. none of which will agree to a desire. at least in the imagination.

that upon the appearance of one it will immediately turn its thought to the conception of the other. they may possibly exist in the same manner. as well as from the sight and touch. but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner. which are simple. of causation. in order to compleat the union. A moral reflection cannot be plac’d on the right or on the left hand of a passion. that exists without any place or extension. and contiguity in the time of their appearance. that we may render the transition more easy and natural. For ’tis a quality. or at least in correspondent points of view: Why? but because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of resemblance. but that even in common life we have every moment occasion to examine it. and an olive at the other.’Twill not be surprizing after this. that those perceptions. An object may be said to be no where. we may consider. that this is not only possible. since ’tis impossible to found a relation40 but on some common quality. and ’tis upon the application of the extended body to our senses we perceive its particular taste and smell. viz. that it may be proper to consider the principles. as to form any figure or quantity. and ’tis as evident. but likewise endeavour to give them a new relation. that we incorporate and conjoin these qualities with such as are colour’d and tangible. contrary to what we have already establish’d. It may be better worth our while to remark. are incapable of any conjunction in place with matter or body. The effects of 126 . ’tis evident. and exist no where. must have such an effect on the mind. If they appear not to have any particular place. if I deliver a maxim. and to be separated from each other by the whole length of the table. And as to the absurdity of supposing them to be no where. that if the passions and sentiments appear to the perception to have any particular place. Thus the taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from its other qualities of colour and tangibility. are absolutely incompatible with it. except those of the sight and feeling. ’Twill not now be necessary to prove. or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities. from which it is deriv’d. and is esteem’d contrary to the most certain principles of human reason. when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other. and even the imagination cannot attribute it to them. which exists without any particular place. and shall explain more fully in its proper place. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects. Thus supposing we consider a fig at one end of the table. that this question of the local conjunction of objects does not only occur in metaphysical disputes concerning the nature of the soul. then. which is extended and divisible. This maxim is that an object may exist. and yet be no where: and I assert. Nor are they only co-existent in general. ’tis certain they are always co-existent. nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance. so far from requiring any particular place. since whatever we conceive is possible. and which-ever of them be the cause or effect. but also co-temporary in their appearance in the mind. nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or a square figure. which I shall often have occasion to remark in human nature. These objects and perceptions. The bitter taste of the one. that when objects are united by any relation. These relations. yet are they susceptible of many other relations. We not only turn our thought from one to the other upon account of their relation. in contiguity to each other. the idea of extension might be deriv’d from them. and sweet of the other are suppos’d to lie in the very visible body. that in forming the complex ideas of these substances. which is condemn’d by several metaphysicians. we have a strong propensity to add some new relation to them. In our arrangement of bodies we never fail to place such as are resembling. Nor is this all. one of the most obvious is that of their different relishes. This is so notable and so natural an illusion. that of a conjunction in place. Tho’ an extended object be incapable of a conjunction in place with another. betwixt the extended object and the quality.

and divisible. of totum in toto & totum in qualibet parte: Which is much the same. and that a certain number of smells. We cannot reply. as if we shou’d say. who conjoin all thought with extension. that the taste exists within the circumference of the body. and without the interposition of an image or perception. This figure is moveable. But whatever confus’d notions we may form of an union in place betwixt an extended body. For shou’d we ask ourselves one obvious question. is in every part of it or in one only. it resolves itself into the second opinion. and supposes. which we so readily suppose betwixt particular impressions and their external causes. But we shall not find a more evident effect of it. that scholastic principle. we feign likewise that of a conjunction in place. For as to the supposition of their existence in the manner of mathematical points. which appears ridiculous upon the bare mentioning of it. viz. than in the present instance. in order to strengthen the connexion. or that they are figur’d and extended. which. we must quickly find ourselves at a loss. and that endeavour again arises from our inclination to compleat an union. and the whole in every part. yet a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists. All this absurdity proceeds from our endeavouring to bestow a place on what is utterly incapable of it. and our reason. if the taste. Here then we are influenc’d by two principles directly contrary to each other. and perceive the impossibility of ever giving a satisfactory answer. we renounce neither one nor the other. which is absurd and incomprehensible. Being divided betwixt these opposite principles. The perception consists of parts. but involve the subject in such confusion and obscurity. or that when they are incorporated with extended objects. That table. appears so shocking. that several passions may be plac’d in a circular figure. breadth. and yet is not there. And to cut short all disputes. as a fig. In short. where from the relations of causation and contiguity in time betwixt two objects. the very idea of 127 . either to suppose that some beings exist without any place. which we conceive to be contain’d in the circumference of the body. We can as little reply. by attributing to the objects a conjunction in place. that in the present case it must prevail. Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity. For we have only this choice left. of length. Mobility. The absurdity of the two last suppositions proves sufficiently the veracity of the first. that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately. and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects.this propensity have been41 already observ’d in that resemblance. and a contiguity of time. But if ever reason be of sufficient force to overcome prejudice. separable. and thickness. when crudely propos’d. who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance. ’tis certain. that we no longer perceive the opposition. conjoin’d with a certain number of sounds. But tho’ in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists. but in such a manner. which shows us the impossibility of such an union. The most vulgar philosophy informs us. and exists entire in every part without separation. We suppose. The termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure. that every part has the same relish. that a thing is in a certain place. may make a body of twelve cubic inches. and its particular taste. These parts are so situated. that it exists in every part: For then we must suppose it figur’d and extended. that inclination of our fancy by which we are determin’d to incorporate the taste with the extended object. is only a perception. we use in our most familiar way of thinking. the whole is in the whole. which just now appears to me. viz. and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Nor is there any fourth opinion. ’tis certain that upon reflection we must observe in this union something altogether unintelligible and contradictory. that it fills the whole without extension. that ’tis only in one part: For experience convinces us. which is founded on causation.

’tis still incomprehensible to us. and we are oblig’d either to conceive an external object merely as a relation without a relative. The same substratum. or to make it the very same with a perception or impression. and are not possest of any separate or distinct existence. and necessarily existent being. and preserve in themselves their characters of distinction. in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere. any conclusion we form concerning the connexion and repugnance of impressions. that this hideous hypothesis is almost the same with that of the immateriality of the soul. and consequently must perfectly agree to it. and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible. supports the most different modifications. without any variation. that my adversaries will not have any pretext to render the present doctrine odious by their declamations. From this topic. let us42 remember. every configuration of matter. and tho’ I have condemn’d that question as utterly unintelligible.extension is copy’d from nothing but an impression. how they can incorporate a simple and indivisible subject with an extended perception? All the arguments of Theologians may here be retorted upon them. yet I cannot forbear proposing some farther reflections concerning it. inhere in the same substance. and will account for the union of our indivisible perceptions with an extended substance. ’tis impossible our idea of a perception. Neither time. This gives me an occasion to take a-new into consideration the question concerning the substance of the soul. simple. however different and various. nor all the diversity of nature are able to produce any composition or change in its perfect simplicity and identity. I say then. in which they inhere. but never can conceive a specific difference betwixt an object and impression. Whatever difference we may suppose betwixt them. on the left or on the right hand of the perception? Is it in this particular part. Every passion of the soul. There is only one substance. that as every idea is deriv’d from a preceding perception. and having found there are impressions and ideas really extended. simplicity. all these are nothing but modifications of that one. when they see that they can be so easily retorted on them. To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing. and will serve to justify all those sentiments. I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist will be sufficient for the present purpose. or in that other? Is it in every part without being extended? Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? ’Tis impossible to give any answer to these questions. which has become so popular. says he. whatever we feel internally by reflection. I shall be able to shew. I hope at least to reap one advantage. The fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe. or immaterial substance. nor place. that the doctrine of the immateriality. and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other. that since we may suppose. is to say it is extended. and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism. Is the indivisible subject. without any local presence. but what will both be absurd in itself. The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn. without communicating them to that subject. if I may so speak. and exists every where. in the world. and that without entering farther into these gloomy and obscure regions. I assert. if you will. for which Spinoza is so universally infamous. The consequence I shall draw from this may. will not be known certainly to be appli128 . Whatever we discover externally by sensation. To make this evident. may ask his antagonists. and varies them. appear a mere sophism. but upon the least examination will be found solid and satisfactory. without any difference in itself. and the unity of that substance. at first sight.

we cannot be sure. and cou’d not be conceiv’d. uncompounded. We can never. that the object may differ from it in that particular. by any principle.cable to objects. must be in a manner identify’d with that simple. that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn. supposing we form the reasoning upon the impression. Upon my enquiring concerning these. and tells me. yet to make it more clear and sensible. We have no idea of any quality in an object. Every idea of a quality in an object passes thro’ an impression. discover a connexion or repugnance betwixt objects. may not likewise be discover’d in that of Theologians44. and indivisible. viz. unless it were common to an impression. according to the scholastic way of talking. houses. and may not represent a quality in an impression. men. whether of connexion or repugnance. rivers. houses. Here Spinoza appears. ’Tis still possible. and indivisible substance. which extends not to impressions. mountains. The reason is not difficult. which have been found in the system of Spinoza. ’tis beyond doubt. find any repugnance betwixt an extended object as a modification. consider’d in general. and therefore every perceivable relation. and see whether all the absurdities. which does not agree to. let us survey it in detail. and other productions either of art or nature. and find that they have the same fault of being unintelligible. since we have no idea but what is deriv’d from that origin. there are two different systems of beings presented. must be the very same with its substance. and the same uncompounded essence. It has been said against Spinoza. seas. After this I consider the other system of beings. upon which the argument is founded. as its substance. and that because all our ideas are deriv’d from our impressions. rather than thinking. the earth. in which the universe is suppos’d to inhere. an earth. to which I suppose myself under a necessity of assigning some substance. and a simple uncompounded essence. I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so great a partiality. But this. that we can never. But when we first form our reasoning concerning the object. and tell me. it may be pre129 . To apply this to the present case. not being any distinct or separate existence. unless that repugnance takes place equally betwixt the perception or impression of that extended object. that ’tis impossible to discover any absurdity in one. that these are only modifications. Thus we may establish it as a certain maxim. but that on the other hand. that the circumstance. and modifications of one simple. As an object is suppos’d to be different from an impression. moon and stars. Immediately upon which I am deafen’d with the noise of a hundred voices. and seas. that all the discoverable relations of impressions are common to objects. in which they inhere. that the same reasoning must extend to the impression: And that because the quality of the object. animals. must at least be conceiv’d by the mind. I observe first the universe of objects or of body: The sun. will most certainly be applicable to impressions. is common to both. and that as far as we can understand them. which is not common to both of them. must be common both to objects and impressions. and that the subject. plants. is simple. the universe of thought. and in short every thing I can discover or conceive in the first system. cover’d and inhabited by plants and animals. uncompounded essence. or my impressions and ideas. tho’ the inverse proposition may not be equally true. that these also are modifications. But tho’ this argument. but by an irregular kind43 of reasoning from experience. Theologians present themselves. and consequently the extension of the universe. There I observe another sun. whatever conclusions of this kind we form concerning objects. seems evident beyond all doubt and contradiction. that a mode. ships. incompounded. and the second with applause and veneration. therefore. First. or ground of inhesion. towns. they are so much alike. moon and stars. upon which we found our reasoning.

so as to answer to the indivisible substance. to apply the same argument to our extended perceptions. Thirdly. But betwixt a person in the morning walking in a garden with company. is utterly impossible and inconceivable unless the indivisible substance expand itself. Matter. which. that the word. according to the precedent reasoning. something. which are contrary and incompatible. but a change in the terms. or the extension contract itself. and resentment. and distinguishable from each other. only attended with the supposition of a difference. and yet more modish name of an action. we shou’d give it the more antient. that we have no perfect idea of substance. so when we make these ideas themselves our objects. and find that the answer is no more satisfactory in one case than in the other. It appears. as will appear from the two following reflexions. as far as we can understand it. By an action we mean much the same thing. can never justly be apply’d to any perception. that we have no idea of substance. rather confounds than instructs us. and therefore ’tis impossible to conceive. which is not applicable to every distinct portion of matter. how they can be the action or abstract mode of any substance. ’tis evident every perception is a substance. that this substance being the support or substratum of every thing. It has been objected to the system of one simple substance in the universe.tended. The instance of motion. Secondly. and full of terror. and of quite another kind. and is only conceiv’d by a distinction of reason. that is unknown and incomprehensible. for that of action. How then is it possible. the same difficulties follow us. if instead of calling thought a modification of the soul. which is commonly made use of to shew after what manner perception depends. which is not applicable to matter. as what is commonly call’d an abstract mode. so as to correspond to the extension. but a distinct substance. The round and square figures are incompatible in the same substance at the same time. that is. I observe. than what is produc’d on a body by the change of its situation. that to whatever side we turn. As we conclude from the distinction and separability of their ideas. and from every thing else. ’tis impossible for 130 . as an action. that the same substance can at once be modify’d into that square table. and ’tis plain nothing is requir’d. therefore. nor do we free ourselves from one single difficulty by its means. ’Tis the same case. and every distinct part of a perception a distinct substance: And consequently the one hypothesis labours under the same difficulties in this respect with the other. but that taking it for something. that external objects have a separate existence from each other. is neither distinguishable. But nothing is gain’d by this change of the term of modification. must at the very same instant be modify’d into forms. nor any idea of a distinct substance. and into this round one? I ask the same question concerning the impressions of these tables. action. despair. and the simple essence of the soul. First. we must draw the same conclusion concerning them. and that we cannot advance one step towards the establishing the simplicity and immateriality of the soul. I have already prov’d. that can exist by itself. This argument seems just. that having no idea of the substance of the soul. upon its substance. or an abstraction. as deriv’d from a mind or thinking substance. then. and separable. and each part of matter is not a distinct mode. Our perceptions are all really different. without preparing the way for a dangerous and irrecoverable atheism. there seems to be a radical difference. but only varies its relation to other objects. the ideas of objects and perceptions being in every respect the same. according to this explication of it. which we can imagine. Motion to all appearance induces no real nor essential change on the body. nor separable from its substance. It has been said. properly speaking. agreeable to him. At least it must be confest. and a person in the afternoon inclos’d in a dungeon. is not a mode but a substance.

and consequently can never tell in what sense perceptions are actions of that substance. Divide a body as often as you please. and that the meeting of two triangular ones shou’d afford a pleasure. that thought can ever be caus’d by matter. are susceptible of a constant conjunction. and as these never afford us any idea of thought or perception. for instance. concerning the cause of our perceptions. you still find motion or a change of relation. but at the same time assert. animals. however great. ’Tis absurd to imagine. Now as all objects. Now as these different shocks. and may perceive a constant conjunction of 131 . I own ’tis unintelligible. shou’d also be a passion or moral reflexion: That the shocking of two globular particles shou’d become a sensation of pain. and even contrarieties of perception without any fundamental change. The use. that such a position of bodies can never cause thought. and produce only a difference in the position and situation of objects. of which matter is susceptible. according to the principles above-explain’d. you will never find in these bodies any principle of motion dependent on their distances from the center. which absurdity will not be applicable to a like supposition concerning impressions and ideas. or the relation of parts. and affirm that plants.45 I have inferr’d from these principles. unaccompany’d with any meaning. From these hypotheses concerning the substance and local conjunction of our perceptions. For do our Theologians pretend to make a monopoly of the word. why any object may or may not be the cause of any other. Place one body of a pound weight on one end of a lever. and variations. which is more intelligible than the former. makes no addition to our knowledge. nothing ever results but figure. Few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this argument. you must by the same course of reasoning conclude. and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute it. that all the various objects in nature are actions of one simple substance. we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. I add in the second place. which are not contrary. that motion in a circle. But as this latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience. action. and more important than the latter. that it can never produce motion. as in an ellipse. ’tis nothing but a position of bodies. we may pass to another. Move it in any manner. that if it brings any advantage to that cause. and that ’tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction. are nothing but particular actions of one simple universal substance. viz. and mixtures are the only changes. If you pretend. ’tis still body. it must bring an equal to the cause of atheism. and as ’tis possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the mind. instead of that of modification. and that we shall never discover a reason.us to tell how it can admit of such differences. however vary’d. while motion in another direction. action. shou’d be nothing but merely motion in a circle. because turn it which way you will. that ’tis impossible to discover any absurdity in the supposition. and another body of the same weight on another end. to prove a priori. and as no real objects are contrary. ’tis concluded to be impossible. &c. We need only reflect on what has been prov’d at large. or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent reasoning concerning the cause of thought or perception. of the word. and may not the atheists likewise take possession of it. For tho’ there appear no manner of connexion betwixt motion or thought. Matter and motion. nor is of any advantage to the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul. any thing may produce any thing. therefore. more than of thought and perception. are still matter and motion. Place it in any figure. men. which exerts itself from a blind and absolute necessity? This you’ll say is utterly absurd. the case is the same with all other causes and effects. therefore. ’tis commonly said in the schools. that to consider the matter a priori. since there is no more apparent connexion in the one case than in the other. that we are never sensible of any connexion betwixt causes and effects.

we can only define power by connexion. but ’tis certain we have it. But. that nothing can be the cause of another. which evidently gives the advantage to the materialists above their antagonists. either to assert. For upon the same account. none of which contain any efficacy. or rather an inconsiderable part of volition. which he wills. when from the mere consideration of the ideas. when apply’d to the operations of matter. much less of one endow’d with infinite power. which are found to be constantly conjoin’d. that the idea of an infinitely powerful being is connected with that of every effect. And shou’d it be said. are upon that account only to be regarded as causes and effects. that the different dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments. 132 . is connected with every effect. that they are constantly united.thought and motion. that this exception is a mere pretext. and by experience. and actually is. viz. that there is no such thing in the universe as a cause or productive principle. to avoid the dangerous consequences of that doctrine. and assert that matter cannot of itself communicate motion. which being all the circumstances. I say. that the connexion betwixt the idea of an infinitely powerful being. you reason too hastily. and that confining ourselves to the latter question we find by the comparing their ideas. are susceptible of a constant conjunction. that motion may be. we really do no more than assert. the supreme being is the real cause of all our actions. which is an identical proposition. and if this inactivity must make us have recourse to a deity. are upon that account to be regarded as causes and effects. Thus we are necessarily reduc’d to the other side of the dilemma. that for ought we can determine by the mere ideas. viz. these are the consequences. or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflexion. it follows. that this depends on the union of soul and body. secondly. upon the very same account. vicious as well as virtuous. nor seem to have any connexion with any other existence. but where the mind can perceive the connexion in its idea of the objects: Or to maintain. First. you conclude that ’tis impossible motion can ever produce thought. not even the deity himself. I answer. whose volition is connected with every effect. We in reality affirm. or produce thought. If nothing be active but what has an apparent power. There seems only this dilemma left us in the present case. As to what may be said. Now as all objects. tho’ ’tis easy to perceive. is necessary and unavoidable. which he wills. which are not contrary. since every one may perceive. we must acknowledge that the deity is the author of all our volitions and perceptions. we may certainly conclude. and that of any effect. this leads us into the grossest impieties and absurdities. But if we will change expressions. that the deity were the great and efficacious principle. that we have no idea of a being endow’d with any power. that a being. I wou’d answer. since they have no more apparent connexion either with one another. any thing may be the cause or effect of any thing. the cause of thought and perception. bad as well as good. that we have recourse to him in natural operations. which we find constantly conjoin’d. which supplies the deficiency of all causes. This agency of the supreme Being we know to have been asserted by46 several philosophers with relation to all the actions of the mind. supposing. that thought and motion are different from each other. that all objects. that we must separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought. and as no real objects are contrary. thought is in no case any more active than matter. that all objects. since our idea of that supreme Being is deriv’d from particular impressions. and gives us no insight into the nature of this power or connexion. If we choose the first part of the dilemma. except volition. or with the suppos’d but unknown substance of the soul. Nay ’tis not only possible we may have such an experience. that enter into the idea of cause and effect. and then in saying. because there is no apparent connexion betwixt these objects.

and that is. as far as we have any notion of that relation.To pronounce. The strongest sensation. when religion may seem to be in the least offended. the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible: All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union. matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought. thro’ the whole course of our lives. since no proof can be deriv’d from any fact. nor have we any idea of self. and ’tis an evident principle. if we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. shou’d imagine that the foregoing arguments are any ways dangerous to religion. who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self. either with what is extended or unextended. If my philosophy. that impression must continue invariably the same. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence. to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her conclusions. that whatever we can imagine. then. whose sovereign authority ought every where to be acknowledg’d. Now this is no more true of matter. and are indeed the same. of which we can be certain. that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence. whose rights are as dear to her as her own. after the manner it is here explain’d. There are some philosophers. that gives rise to every real idea. when philosophy will think it necessary and even honourable to justify herself. Of personal identity. and some of the other: And as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect. since self is suppos’d to 133 . If any one. which may be offended at her. therefore. the most violent passion. beyond the evidence of a demonstration. therefore. there being some of them of the one kind. or to be annihilated in a moment. than of spirit. than of a simple and unextended. and in both cases the moral arguments and those deriv’d from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing. both of its perfect identity and simplicity. say they. In both cases the metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally inconclusive. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self. ’Tis certainly a kind of indignity to philosophy. of an extended compounded substance. Any object may be imagin’d to become entirely inactive. and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. and are certain. I hope the following apology will remove his apprehensions. But self or person is not any one impression. but that every thing remains precisely as before. This puts one in mind of a king arraign’d for high-treason against his subjects. I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them. of which ’tis possible for the human mind to form a conception. nor is there any thing. There is no foundation for any conclusion a priori. the final decision upon the whole. Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience. either concerning the operations or duration of any object. It must be some one impression. There is only one occasion. which is pleaded for them. of which we are so intimately conscious. but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference. and yet ’tis a question. if we doubt of this. only fix it the more intensely. and justify herself to every particular art and science. which must necessarily be answer’d. SECTION VI. For from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d? This question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity. instead of distracting us from this view. makes no addition to the arguments for religion. is possible.

of heat or cold. nor is there any single power of the soul. as if there was no manner of relation among the objects. when I enter most intimately into what I call myself. But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind. and separable from each other. perhaps. which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity. and distinguishable. and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of diversity. perhaps for one moment. nor feel. nor identity in different. tho’ I am certain there is no such principle in me. I must confess I can reason no longer with him. we must distinguish betwixt personal identity. and may be separately consider’d. that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro’ a suppos’d variation of time. We have a distinct idea of an object. They are the successive perceptions only. love or hatred. so long am I insensible of myself. pain or pleasure. and a succession of related objects be in 134 . And were all my perceptions remov’d by death. and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. where several perceptions successively make their appearance. It cannot. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. nor love. which we attribute to plants and animals. which remains unalterably the same. or of the materials. and have no need of any thing to support their existence. where these scenes are represented. and cou’d I neither think. We have also a distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession. The mind is a kind of theatre. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Pain and pleasure. perceive something simple and continu’d. passions and sensations succeed each other. grief and joy. After what manner. that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions. therefore. and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change. nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. as it regards our thought or imagination. The first is our present subject. thinks he has a different notion of himself. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception. that he may be in the right as well as I. nor see. I always stumble on some particular perception or other. that constitute the mind. and may exist separately. and are in a perpetual flux and movement. or from any other. be from any of these impressions. But tho’ these two ideas of identity. But there is no impression constant and invariable. do they belong to self. there being a great analogy betwixt it. as by sound sleep. and that we are essentially different in this particular. nor have we the most distant notion of the place. glide away. If any one upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion. What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions. and never can observe any thing but the perception. and account for that identity. which he calls himself. pass. I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind. light or shade. and the identity of a self or person. of which it is compos’d. I shou’d be entirely annihilated. and never all exist at the same time. and consequently there is no such idea. and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. therefore. that the idea of self is deriv’d. Our thought is still more variable than our sight. and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep. and may truly be said not to exist. All I can allow him is. and connected together by a close relation. and how are they connected with it? For my part. But farther. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time. re-pass.exist after that manner. nor hate after the dissolution of my body. and this idea we call that of identity or sameness. He may. what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different. and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question.

and return to a more accurate method of thinking. beside their relation. by which we contemplate one continu’d object. either of something invariable and uninterrupted. we often feign some new and unintelligible principle. it can only be from the resemblance. suppose any mass of matter. provided all the parts continue uninterruptedly and invariably the same. of which the parts are contiguous and connected. connected together by resemblance. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake. which this act of the mind bears to that. to be plac’d before us. then. that all objects. and tho’ we incessantly correct ourselves by reflexion. must be to prove. instead of that of related objects. in an improper sense. and run into the notion of a soul. and an easy transition of the imagination from one to another. without observing their invariableness and uninterruptedness. or causation. which leads us into this mistake. is really nothing but a quality. However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted. and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects. or of something mysterious and inexplicable. For when we attribute identity. yet ’tis certain. nor is there much more effort of thought requir’d in the latter case than in the former. is to shew from daily experience and observation. That action of the imagination. yet as we seldom think so accurately. which produces an association of ideas. or at least with a propensity to such fictions. The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another. that in our common way of thinking they are generally confounded with each other. that the error arises. to disguise the variation. that we fall into it before we are aware. by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object. and makes us substitute the notion of identity. are such as consist of a succession of related objects. and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu’d object. or take off this biass from the imagination. And even when this does not take place. Our last resource is to yield to it. nor find any thing invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of identity. to remove the interruption. tho’ this absolutely destroys the identity of the whole. are such only as consist of a succession of parts. that connects the objects together. our mistake is not confin’d to the expression. our propension to confound identity with relation is so great. ’tis plain we must attribute a perfect identity to this mass. and as the relation of parts. Our propensity to this mistake is so great from the resemblance abovemention’d. and regard it as invariable and uninterrupted. contiguity. In order to this. But we may farther observe. that we are apt to imagine47 something unknown and mysterious. yet we cannot long sustain our philosophy.themselves perfectly distinct. whatever motion or change of place we may observe either in the whole or in any of the parts. it can only be by mistake we ascribe to it an identity. we still feel a propensity to confound these ideas. to which we ascribe identity. however interrupted and variable. strictly speaking. but is commonly attended with a fiction. and substance. we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity. But supposing some very small or inconsiderable part to be added to the mass. connecting the parts. and even contrary. Thus the controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words. are almost the same to the feeling. Our chief business. and prevents their interruption or variation. that the objects. Thus we feign the continu’d existence of the perceptions of our senses. which are variable or interrupted. What will suffice to prove this hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer. to variable or interrupted objects. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity. and self. For as such a succession answers evidently to our notion of diversity. tho’ we are not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that particular. and yet are suppos’d to continue the same. or substracted from it. we scruple not to pronounce a mass 135 . that where we do not give rise to such a fiction. and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same. and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables.

than that the mind. and making them proportionable to the whole. The addition or diminution of a mountain wou’d not be sufficient to produce a diversity in a planet. that in a very few years both vegetables and animals endure a total change. This is the case with all animals and vegetables. we make a scruple of ascribing identity to such different objects. The effect of so strong a relation is. An infant becomes a man. while their form. says. But whatever precaution we may use in introducing the changes gradually. This may be confirm’d by another phænomenon. The passage of the thought from the object before the change to the object after it. sometimes lean. that tho’ the change of any considerable part in a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole. another artifice. but also a mutual dependance on. yet we still attribute identity to them. in which the parts conspire. and are apt to imagine. it must be the uninterrupted progress of the thought. From which continu’d perception. that where the changes are at last observ’d to become considerable. not absolutely. where we find so trivial an alteration. is still consider’d as the same. that we scarce perceive the transition. and is sometimes fat. and connexion with each other. it ascribes a continu’d existence and identity to the object. that is frequently interrupted and renew’d. that tho’ we commonly be able to distinguish pretty exactly betwixt numerical and specific identity. however. The common end. that grows from a small plant to a large tree. ’Twill be impossible to account for this. without any change in his identity. tho’ ’tis evident the sounds have only a specific identity or resem136 . But this is still more remarkable. feels an easy passage from the surveying its condition in one moment to the viewing of it in another. but by reflecting that objects operate upon the mind. of which a considerable part has been chang’d by frequent reparations. that tho’ every one must allow. There is a very remarkable circumstance. when we add a sympathy of parts to their common end. yet it sometimes happens. and a combination to some common end or purpose.of matter the same. We may also consider the two following phænomena. by which we may induce the imagination to advance a step farther. Thus a man. it is still the same noise. size. that attends this experiment. tho’ there be not one particle of matter. ’tis certain. and at no particular time perceives any interruption in its actions. and in our thinking and reasoning employ the one for the other. the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. which are remarkable in their kind. There is. by producing a reference of the parts to each other. but by its proportion to the whole. nor does the difference of the materials hinder us from ascribing an identity to it. which constitutes the [perfect?] [imperfect] identity. that we confound them. since this interruption makes an object cease to appear the same. and that is. or figure of its parts the same. is the same under all their variations. A change in any considerable part of a body destroys its identity. that where the change is produc’d gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. is still the same oak. and suppose that they bear to each other. which is. in following the successive changes of the body. is so smooth and easy. but according to their proportion to each other: And therefore. The reason can plainly be no other. where not only the several parts have a reference to some general purpose. and affords an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of the body to another. The first is. An oak. who hears a noise. that ’tis nothing but a continu’d survey of the same object. but ’tis remarkable. and break or interrupt the continuity of its actions not according to their real greatness. and substance are entirely alter’d. yet we must measure the greatness of the part. A ship. tho’ the change of a very few inches wou’d be able to destroy the identity of some bodies.

we admit of a more sudden transition. that the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects. which is still closer and more immediate. when strictly examin’d. which we attribute to them. that the change of parts be not sudden nor entire. and that even the union of cause and effect. that the identity. Here neither the form nor materials are the same. and what is expected makes less impression. In like manner it may be said without breach of the propriety of language. and according to modern architecture. whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together. a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity. and yet this alone is sufficient to make us denominate them the same. which produc’d them. and animals. expected. Thus as the nature of a river consists in the motion and change of parts. we observe some real bond among his perceptions. because of the union of their 137 . which we attribute to the human mind. This question we might easily decide. than what is unusual and extraordinary. is only a fictitious one. and separable from every other perception. and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature. is a distinct existence. that in these cases the first object is in a manner annihilated before the second comes into existence. Secondly. the same method of reasoning must be continu’d. we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity. if we wou’d recollect what has been already prov’d at large. but the cause. nor is there any thing common to the two objects. that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions. That is. and houses. that tho’ in a succession of related objects. we are never presented in any one point of time with the idea of difference and multiplicity. whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person. either contemporary or successive. where all the abstruser sciences are study’d with a peculiar ardour and application. tho’ in my opinion perfectly decisive. ’Tis evident. by which means. A considerable change of the former kind seems really less to the imagination. and uniting them together. that every distinct perception. We may remark. It cannot. and that the parish rebuilt the same church of free-stone. tho’ in less than four and twenty hours these be totally alter’d. which enters into the composition of the mind. that such a church. this hinders not the river from continuing the same during several ages. For from thence it evidently follows. And here ’tis evident. But. have a different origin. or only feel one among the ideas we form of them. and distinguishable. or only associates their ideas in the imagination. than wou’d otherwise be consistent with that relation. yet where the objects are in their nature changeable and inconstant. let him weigh the following reasoning. which are essential to them. and appears of less moment. but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. fell to ruin.blance. however perfect we may imagine it to be. but their relation to the inhabitants of the parish. and there is nothing numerically the same. notwithstanding this distinction and separability. which we ascribe to the mind of man. and is different. and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. especially of late years in England. which has become so great a question in philosophy. and by breaking less the continuity of the thought. But we must observe. in a manner. as. We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity. The identity. which was formerly of brick. in other words. therefore. in order to preserve the identity. What is natural and essential to any thing is. But lest this argument shou’d not convince the reader. it be in a manner requisite. than the most trivial alteration of the latter. ’Tis still true. and for that reason are less scrupulous in calling them the same. resolves itself into a customary association of ideas. which has so successfully explain’d the identity of plants. and ships. and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference. but is merely a quality. is not able to run the several different perceptions into one. has less influence in destroying the identity.

ideas in the imagination. must not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought. and actions. and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions. and appears not to have any more connexion with any other object. which constitutes his mind or thinking principle. are these three relations above-mention’d. and as the very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas. but also its laws and constitutions. One thought chaces another. In this respect. The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others. These are the uniting principles in the ideal world. influence. by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object. contiguity and causation. and observe that succession of perceptions. it follows. and can comprehend times. without losing his identity. As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions. ’Tis. is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences. For what is the memory but a faculty. we never shou’d have any notion of causation. suppose we cou’d see clearly into the breast of another. by which it is expell’d in its turn. the memory not only discovers the identity. that the true idea of the human mind. in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination. nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects. The only question. which has little or no influence in the present case. when we reflect upon them. and modify each other. we can extend the same chain of causes. then. Whatever changes he endures. ’tis to be consider’d. To begin with resemblance. which constitute our self or person. Now the only qualities. and draws after it a third. destroy. convey the imagination more easily from one link to another. when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person. is. and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory. in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition. and must drop contiguity. And here ’tis evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members. and give rise to other persons. and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. and mutually produce. proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas. and may be separately consider’d. and circumstances. which can give ideas an union in the imagination. which remains. that our notions of personal identity. that identity depends. which are link’d together by the relation of cause and effect. we may observe. and without them every distinct object is separable by the mind. I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth. But having once acquir’d this notion of causation from the memory. upon that account chiefly. ’tis evident that nothing cou’d more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its variations. than if disjoin’d by the greatest difference and remoteness. by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. by the making our distant perceptions influence each other. on some of these three relations of resemblance. as well as his impressions and ideas. according to the principles above-explain’d. by what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produc’d. As to causation. which we have 138 . Had we no memory. and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object? In this particular. and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures. who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. but also contributes to its production. his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. as the source of personal identity. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination. therefore. therefore.

All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal. and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union. ’Twill be incumbent on those. and in our miscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics. and these relations produce identity. and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. who having struck on many shoals.entirely forgot. and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object. Methinks I am like a man. who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity. What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of our notion of identity. may be extended with little or no variation to that of simplicity. having fully explain’d the nature of our judgment and understanding. and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity. when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. An object. that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time. SECTION VII. but suppose in general to have existed. both of the intellectual and moral world. therefore. for instance. But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy. For how few of our past actions are there. by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. or prepare the way for our following opinions. and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. as apply’d to the human mind. The wretched condition. by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time. to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory. by means of that easy transition they occasion. and to ponder that voyage. viz. makes me diffident for the future. which lie before me. weakness. and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties. I find myself inclin’d to stop a moment in my present station. and to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature. I must employ in my 139 . Identity depends on the relations of ideas. and disorder of the faculties. which is of great importance in the present affair. as we have already observ’d. and having narrowly escap’d ship-wreck in passing a small frith. The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion. because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days. and the 3d of August 1733? Or will he affirm. the 11th of March 1719. which will either illustrate and confirm some preceding part of this discourse. has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weatherbeaten vessel. and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees. which I have undertaken. what were his thoughts and actions on the first of January 1715. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it. operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible. Conclusion of this book. ’Tis now time to return to a more close examination of our subject. My memory of past errors and perplexities. memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity. whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation. Thus we have finish’d our examination of the several systems of philosophy. we have no just standard. and by that means overturn all the most establish’d notions of personal identity? In this view. But as the relations. of which we have any memory? Who can tell me. that all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided.

Fain wou’d I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth. I have expos’d myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians. by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial. I am first affrighted and confounded with that forelorn solitude. that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves. Without this quality. on which I am at present. we cou’d only admit of those perceptions. and understanding are. ’Tis this principle. even if fortune shou’d at last guide me on her foot-steps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings. or the vivacity of our ideas. which convinces us of the continu’d existence of external objects. in which I am plac’d in my philosophy. nor carry our view beyond those few objects. and as ’tis usual for that passion. but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. logicians. than others. which determines me to expect the same for the future. and can I be surpriz’d. when implicitely follow’d (as it must be) in all its variations. Nay. I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. and even theologians. even to these objects we cou’d never attribute any existence. mathematicians. and dreads that storm. Every one keeps at a distance. No wonder a principle so inconstant and fallacious shou’d lead us into errors. when absent from the senses. Habit is another principle. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy. but what was dependent on the senses. has been expell’d all human commerce. and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster. which makes us reason from causes and effects. which beats upon me from every side. and must comprehend them entirely in that succession of perceptions. I foresee on every side. and ’tis the same principle. all of them founded on the imagination. The memory. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties. contradiction. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me. I find so many which are common to human nature? Can I be sure. and so little founded on reason) we cou’d never assent to any argument. when unsupported by the approbation of others. rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean. when beside those numberless infirmities peculiar to myself. encrease my apprehensions. which are immediately present to our consciousness. and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view. and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate. and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock. who not being able to mingle and unite in society. which constitutes our self or person. Every step I take is with hesitation. Experience is a principle. and by what criterion shall I distinguish her. nor cou’d those lively images. under which they appear to me. if they shou’d express a hatred of mine and of my person? When I look abroad. yet in some circumstances they are48 directly contrary. I cannot forbear feeding my despair. be ever receiv’d as true pictures of past perceptions. and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar’d my dis-approbation of their systems. reduces me almost to despair. that in leaving all establish’d opinions I am following truth. calumny and detraction. to indulge itself. tho’ such is my weakness. above all others. even with relation to that succession. in order to make a company apart. nor is it possible for us 140 . anger. I call upon others to join me. and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination. which runs out into immensity. which are present to our senses. I can give no reason why I shou’d assent to it. which are not attended with the same advantages. When I turn my eye inward. with which the memory presents us. senses. therefore.enquiries. but no one will hearken to me. dispute. which the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance. But tho’ these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind. Nay farther. For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprizes. and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning. with all those desponding reflections. make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner.

entirely subverts itself. whom the scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings. nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes. that when we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating principle. Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imagination. then. perceiv’d in common life. We wou’d not willingly stop before we are acquainted with that energy in the cause. since it appears. and adhere to the understanding. as in the most unusual and extraordinary. but even prevents our very wishes. if the consideration of these instances makes us take a resolution to reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy. which are more easy and natural. and are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression. and is nothing but that determination of the mind. if steadily executed. on which the tie depends. even this resolution. they lead us into such errors. that we must at last become asham’d of our credulity. till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title. and at the same time believe the continu’d existence of matter. and according to its most general principles. we either contradict ourselves. Shall we. which is acquir’d by custom. But the case is quite contrary. and obscurities.to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects. which connects them together. This is our aim in all our studies and reflections: And how must we be disappointed. but push on our enquiries. that in the most usual conjunctions of cause and effect we are as ignorant of the ultimate principle. and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition. We save ourselves from this total scepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy. But this proceeds merely from an illusion of the imagination. and reduces us to a very dangerous dilemma. This has already appear’d in so many instances. as we do those. nor are we sensible. wou’d be dangerous. that no refin’d or elaborate reasoning is ever to be receiv’d? Consider well the consequences of such a principle. as seem to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry. and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. For I have already shewn. when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction? This49 contradiction wou’d be more excusable. This question is very difficult. that this connexion. that is. or energy lies merely in ourselves. which resides in the external object. and that efficacious quality. that tie. absurdities. as something. or talk without a meaning. and the question is. and attended with the most fatal consequences. Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compar’d to those angels. Nothing is more curiously enquir’d after by the mind of man. than the causes of every phænomenon. and causes us to make a transition from an object to its usual attendant. By this means you cut off 141 . How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither of them. we find it to lead us into such sentiments. to the general and more establish’d properties of the imagination. how far we ought to yield to these illusions. when we learn. when it acts alone. When we trace up the human understanding to its first principles. establish it for a general maxim. beside that these suggestions are often contrary to each other. by which it operates on its effect. indeed. whichever way we answer it.50 that the understanding. But on the other hand. For if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy. but successively assent to both. tie. that we may spare ourselves the trouble of enlarging upon it any farther. were it compensated by any degree of solidity and satisfaction in the other parts of our reasoning. either in philosophy or common life. by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things. and to discourage us from future enquiries. as is usual among philosophers. and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other? Such a discovery not only cuts off all hope of ever attaining satisfaction. which binds them together. This deficiency in our ideas is not.

then. and strain’d. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings. and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty. that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire. that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy. which will be allow’d to be sufficiently refin’d and metaphysical. that reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting. which is so agreeable. that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of. that I must seclude myself. I dine. I can only observe what is commonly done. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity. is quickly forgot. and that I must torture my brain with subtilities and sophistries. nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its means at truth and certainty. We have. and even where it has once been present to the mind. shall we choose among these difficulties? If we embrace this principle. which implies a manifest contradiction. For my part. and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court. that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning. Most fortunately it happens. Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live. The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me. and condemn all refin’d reasoning. or for my own private interest? No: If I must be a fool. and ridiculous. which obliterate all these chimeras. in submitting to my senses and understanding. that they ought not to have any influence. and heated my brain. But does it follow. I may. since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning. we subvert entirely the human understanding. and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable. and act like other people in the common affairs of life. and yet we do not. no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. and talk. and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium. and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. which is. as all those who reason or believe any 142 . or by some avocation. they appear so cold. inviron’d with the deepest darkness. Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind. Where am I. in some measure. therefore. and when after three or four hours’ amusement. and lively impression of my senses. But what have I here said. we run into the most manifest absurdities. nay I must yield to the current of nature. from the commerce and society of men. and leaves but a small impression behind it. and condemning from my present feeling and experience. nature herself suffices to that purpose. I play a game of back-gammon. and cannot establish it for a rule. and am merry with my friends. and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world. I know not what ought to be done in the present case. which governs me at present. and by a parity of reason must embrace all of them: And you expresly contradict yourself. What party. I wou’d return to these speculations. either by relaxing this bent of mind. that I must strive against the current of nature. or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions. I still feel such remains of my former disposition. which leads me to indolence and pleasure. that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds. Very refin’d reflections have little or no influence upon us. I converse. or what? From what causes do I derive my existence.entirely all science and philosophy: You proceed upon one singular quality of the imagination. at the very time that I cannot satisfy myself concerning the reasonableness of so painful an application. For those are my sentiments in that splenetic humour. and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles. and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence.

about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation. which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. But even suppose this curiosity and ambition shou’d not transport me into speculations without the sphere of common life. or water refreshes. it never can have any title to operate upon us. I shall have a good reason for my resistance. that philosophy has nothing to oppose to them. The Cynics are an extraordinary instance of philosophers. Generally speaking. we ought only to deliberate concerning the choice of our guide. as I have hitherto met with. that I am tir’d with amusement and company. Philosophy on the contrary. and this is the origin of my philosophy. can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments. If we believe. and while the latter contents itself with assigning new causes and principles to the phænomena. 143 . Since therefore ’tis almost impossible for the mind of man to rest. I am concern’d for the condition of the learned world. it ought to be assented to. and will no more be led a wandering into such dreary solitudes. and have indulg’d a reverie in my chamber. therefore. and is often able to disturb us in the conduct of our lives and actions. or in a solitary walk by a river-side. I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition. For as superstition arises naturally and easily from the popular opinions of mankind. and expects a victory more from the returns of a serious goodhumour’d disposition. and beings. that fire warms. Where reason is lively. And in this respect I make bold to recommend philosophy. and objects. that superstition is much more bold in its systems and hypotheses than philosophy. the former opens a world of its own. who from reasonings purely philosophical ran into as great extravagancies of conduct as any Monk or Dervise that ever was in the world. call one thing beautiful. which appear in the visible world. it wou’d necessarily happen. and another deform’d. which are altogether new. and presents us with scenes. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object. it ought only to be upon sceptical principles. the errors in religion are dangerous. ’tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise. without knowing upon what principles I proceed. I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure. and shall not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination. its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and general speculation. like those of beasts. in that narrow circle of objects. and seldom go so far as to interrupt the course of our natural propensities. and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. decide concerning truth and falshood. and mixes itself with some propensity. I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil. and ought to prefer that which is safest and most agreeable. my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. which are the subject of daily conversation and action. if just. which actuate and govern me. Where I strive against my inclination. I feel my mind all collected within itself.thing certainly are. by attaching myself to any other business or diversion. and am naturally inclin’d to carry my view into all those subjects. ’Tis certain. and from an inclination. and rough passages. that from my very weakness I must be led into such enquiries. and if false and extravagant. which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. it seizes more strongly on the mind. and the cause of those several passions and inclinations. These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence. and indeed I must confess. Nay if we are philosophers. those in philosophy only ridiculous. the nature and foundation of government. than from the force of reason and conviction. Where it does not. and disapprove of another. At the time. In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. and shou’d I endeavour to banish them. reason and folly.

of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers. we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions. and wait the returns of application and good humour. Nor shou’d we despair of attaining this end. let him follow me in my future speculations. which if not true (for that. is more truly sceptical than that of one. as well as of his philosophical conviction. and which wou’d serve to temper those fiery particles. and perhaps we are still in too early an age of the world to discover any principles. nor any sentiments. of which they are compos’d. 144 . which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body. wou’d we consider the shortness of that period. which sometimes prevail upon me. nor conceited idea of my own judgment. While a warm imagination is allow’d to enter into philosophy. as totally to reject it. and a sceptic still less than any other. and under such mighty discouragements are a small space of time to give any tolerable perfection to the sciences. which will suit with common practice and experience. and guard against that assurance. because of the many chimerical systems. which they commonly stand much in need of. let him follow his inclination. nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. than to check ourselves in so natural a propensity. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others. I wish we cou’d communicate to our founders of systems. and pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects. Two thousand years with such long interruptions.I am sensible. ’tis undeniable. in particular. as an ingredient. a share of this gross earthy mixture. and make use of such terms as these. and yet has been hitherto the most neglected. if I can bring it a little more into fashion. in which we survey them in any particular instant. and imply no dogmatical spirit. which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points. which always arises from an exact and full survey of an object. but I here enter a caveat against any objections. that I may contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge. to prevent. They do well to keep themselves in their present situation. but even our modesty too. who studies philosophy in this careless manner. is yet so over-whelm’d with doubts and scruples. Human Nature is the only science of man. perhaps. And indeed. which are every day expos’d to their senses. A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts. If not. wherein these questions have been the subjects of enquiry and reasoning. which a due deference to the public ought. If the reader finds himself in the same easy disposition. by giving in some particulars a different turn to the speculations of philosophers. perhaps. we can never have any steady principles. which offers itself. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism. and hypotheses embrac’d merely for being specious and agreeable. and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object. The conduct of a man. and invigorate it from that indolence. and might stand the test of the most critical examination. notwithstanding our sceptical principles. or amusing themselves in common recreations. who feeling in himself an inclination to it. ’Tis easier to forbear all examination and enquiry. upon account of either of them. many honest gentlemen. is too much to be hop’d for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind. But were these hypotheses once remov’d. and instead of refining them into philosophers. have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects. according to the light. where alone they can expect assurance and conviction. my only hope is. that these two cases of the strength and weakness of the mind will not comprehend all mankind. but also that we shou’d yield to that propensity. Nor is it only proper we shou’d in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical researches. which will bear the examination of the latest posterity. and the hope of this serves to compose my temper from that spleen. For my part. ’tis certain. and that there are in England. ’Twill be sufficient for me. who being always employ’d in their domestic affairs. which have successively arisen and decay’d away among men. which may be offer’d on that head. ’tis evident. and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction.

and other emotions resembling them. must begin somewhere. of pride and humility. fear. which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. in Cheapside. from the constitution of the body. SECTION I.Book II: Of The Passions A TREATISE OF Human Nature: BEING An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into MORAL SUBJECTS. or in the body. & quæ sentias. As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas. Tacit. For this reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses. so the impressions admit of another division into original and secondary. Of the sec145 . Rara temporum felicitas. Division of the Subject. OF THE PASSIONS. at the White-Hart. into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. as arising either from the original impressions. that the mind. or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones. there must be some impressions. without any preceding thought or perception. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action. or from the application of objects to the external organs. LONDON: Printed for John Noon. Secondary. both when felt and consider’d by the mind. hope. but is not deriv’d immediately from any affection or idea. either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions. near Mercers-Chapel. ubi sentire. from the animal spirits. Book II. and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions. MDCCXXXIX. viz. as grief. but arise originally in the soul. dicere licet. quæ velis. As these depend upon natural and physical causes. The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds. composition. ’Tis certain. and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas. This division of the impressions is the same with that which51 I formerly made use of when I distinguish’d them into impressions of sensation and reflexion. in its perceptions. or from their ideas. which I have call’d secondary and reflective. and external objects. the examination of them wou’d lead me too far from my present subject. PART I. A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions. whichever you please to call it. Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul.

from pain or pleasure. And under the direct passions. it cou’d never produce any degree of the one passion. This division is far from being exact. The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions. tho’ directly contrary. we feel either of those opposite affections. fear. or indeed of any of the passions. be always the object of these two passions. these impressions have been commonly distinguish’d from each other. or that succession of related ideas and impressions. which is supe146 . When self enters not into the consideration. vanity. or be sufficient alone to excite them. ’tis impossible we can ever. in a manner. SECTION II. which we call self. grief. give a just definition of them. with their dependants. According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height. love. Of pride and humility. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity. of himself. properly called passions. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles. which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various. were their object also their cause. This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. generosity. the one annihilates the other. every one. have yet the same object. ’Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble. and are elated by pride. origin. as frequently happens. and the impressions they represent the most common of any. otherwise they wou’d never be able either to excite these passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them. as attend them: But as these words. or if they encounter. hatred. ’tis impossible it can be their cause. there is no room either for pride or humility. but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other. by a multitude of words. or dejected with humility. despair and security. pride and humility. their objects and causes. and have the same object in common. the passions either take place alternately. But tho’ that connected succession of perceptions. Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind. humility. I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these passions. by an enumeration of such circumstances. their nature. are of general use.ond are the passions of love and hatred. desire. When we take a survey of the passions. of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. I can only observe in general. there occurs a division of them into direct and indirect. and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas. while those other impressions. not to lose time upon preliminaries. ambition. that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride. may decay into so soft an emotion. will be able to form a just idea of them. and effects. This object is self. By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil. hope. joy. that I may proceed with the greater order. ’Tis evident. envy. or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. causes. grief and joy. shall now explain these violent emotions or passions. malice. I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and specious division. that pride and humility. and the remainder only of that. but by the conjunction of other qualities. without any danger of mistake. they are always consider’d with a view to ourselves. Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions. pride and humility. as to become. pity. aversion. and where he has different reasons for these passions. For which reason. as far as its strength goes. I shall begin with the former. imperceptible. For as these passions are directly contrary.

which excites them. Pride and humility. the quality. has as little influence on that passion. We must. learning. and there is a necessity for their conjunction. which is that of self. betwixt that idea. continues to operate upon the mind. is that of the cause or productive principle. nor is the distinction vain and chimerical. gardens.rior. any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility. From the consideration of these causes. or which he has himself built and contriv’d. in order to produce the passion. it appears necessary we shou’d make a new distinction in the causes of the passion. courage. represents the cause. and their opposites of humility. on which they may be plac’d. wit. strength. is vain of a beautiful house. 147 . integrity. The first idea. is immediately to undo what was done. and the subject. consider’d as his property or contrivance. address in dancing. but extend their view to the body likewise. The quality is the beauty. or something else in its place. Nor are these passions confin’d to the mind. dogs. make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions. houses. Here then is a passion plac’d betwixt two ideas. good-sense. and that passion. horses. that their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of subjects. Here the object of the passion is himself. or in other words. which belongs to him. relations. The passion looking farther. A man may be proud of his beauty. whether of the imagination. and that to which they direct their view. A man. in which the quality inheres. and the subject is the house. To begin with the causes of pride and humility. and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture. and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent. children. therefore. because supposing it to be the view only of ourself. which is peculiar to one of the passions. when excited. consider’d merely as such. the second the object of the passion. But this is not all. justice. Beauty. But in the present case neither of the passions cou’d ever become superior. This excites the passion. these two particulars are easily separated. which operates. riding. therefore. good mein. agility. that is presented to the mind. riches. Every valuable quality of the mind. Both these parts are essential. for instance. memory or disposition. family. which excited them. when excited. we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause. and infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction. being once rais’d. which operates upon the passion. immediately turn our attention to ourself. Our country. on which it is plac’d. that being perfectly indifferent to either. of which the one produces it. and regard that as their ultimate and final object. can produce neither. we may observe. and the subject. viz. without beauty. comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally’d or related to us. and the other is produc’d by it. cloaths. therefore. and produces not both in the very same degree. never produces any pride or vanity. betwixt that quality. Since. and the strongest relation alone. unless plac’d upon something related to us. turns our view to another idea. To excite any passion. must produce both in the very same proportion. and the cause is the beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts. all these are the causes of pride. judgment. and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist. connected with it. The first idea. fencing. but there is something farther requisite in order to raise them: Something.

and arise partly from the industry. will likewise appear evident. perhaps. and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages? But tho’ the causes of pride and humility be plainly natural. partly from the caprice. and that ’tis utterly impossible they shou’d each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision. make it a greater question. and primary constitution of nature. we now proceed to examine what determines each of them to be what it is. if we cast our eye upon human nature. from the subject. that produce the passion. is itself the object of an original principle. if we consider that ’tis the distinguishing characteristic of these passions. As this appears evidently ridiculous. men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power. and is besides very inconsiderable. to which it is directed. ’Tis evident in the first place. by principles different from those. beauty or personal merit. Caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities. that these passions are determin’d to have self for their object. many of them are the effects of art. nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us. and assigns such a particular object. which we must consider as original. and whenever the passions look beyond. therefore. produc’d pride in him. are such as are most inseparable from the soul. And good fortune frequently contributes to all this. By this means we shall fully understand the origin of pride and humility. ’Tis absurd. and subject to these affections. which till then lay conceal’d in the soul.SECTION III. which operates on the passions. and partly from the good fortune of men. riches. and to distinguish in the cause the quality. and is only by accident at last brought to light. that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature. Whence these objects and causes are deriv’d. That this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse. No one can doubt but this property is natural from the constancy and steadiness of its operations. that invented a fine scritoire. and that every new production of art. cloaths. furniture. Beside their prodigious number. and quality. Now these qualities. not only by a natural but also by an original property. and that upon the view even of a stranger. If there be any variation in this particular. be as natural as the object. that each cause of pride and humility 148 . ’Tis always self. that naturally operates on the mind. Industry produces houses. it proceeds from nothing but a difference in the tempers and complexions of men. it cou’d never have any secondary ones. Thus the first mechanic. ’tis still with a view to ourselves. in which it inheres. Being so far advanc’d as to observe a difference betwixt the object of the passions and their cause. whether the causes. which causes pride or humility. We may. which made him proud of handsome chairs and tables. Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind. that while human nature remains the same. we can know pretty nearly. Can we imagine it possible. what will either encrease or diminish his passions of this kind. and whether all that vast variety proceeds from caprice or from the constitution of the mind. instead of adapting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality. which determines the object of pride and humility. that they are not original. because in that case it wou’d have no foundation for action. nor cou’d ever begin to exert itself. This doubt we shall soon remove. which is the object of pride and humility. and consider that in all nations and ages. who became possest of it. by discovering the effects that result from the different mixtures and combinations of bodies. to imagine. and can be resolv’d into no other: And such is the quality. the same objects still give rise to pride and humility. we must conclude. we shall find upon examination.

or produc’d by it. that tho’ the effects be many. moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural. The antients. generosity. and gave place at last to something more simple and natural. Of the relations of impressions and ideas. united by these relations. tho’ sensible of that maxim. which I have so often observ’d and explain’d. instead of adapting it to the old. But however changeable our thoughts may be. is to pass from one object to what is resembling. as wou’d be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility. are certain proofs. to confine itself to that passion alone. courage.is not adapted to the passions by a distinct original quality. are commonly but few and simple. ’Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time. SECTION IV. with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus. and the other resembling affections. when elevated with joy. In like manner our temper. Changeableness is essential to it. they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. ’Tis difficult for the mind. pride. and malice to grief again. How much more must this be true with regard to the human mind. We shall now proceed to enquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser number. In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature. naturally throws itself into love. envy to malice. on which their efficacy depends. which being so confin’d a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles. till the whole circle be compleated. and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. pity. to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind. and find among the causes something common. When one idea is present to the imagination. and that ’tis not by a different principle each different cause is adapted to its passion. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger. the principles. Thus we have establish’d two truths without any obstacle or difficulty. on which their influence depends. Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. that none of these principles is the just one. The rule. contiguous to. from which they arise. without any change or variation. which tho’ they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions. and that ’tis the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality. by a number of falsehoods. when actuated by any passion. Besides. The first of these is the association of ideas. therefore. and enters with more facility by means of that introduction. we find in the course of nature. are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like association of impressions. All resembling impressions are connected together. by which they proceed. naturally follows it. anger to envy. contriv’d such intricate systems of the heavens. that nature does nothing in vain. To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phænomenon. any other. but that there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them. and that we only desire. as seem’d inconsistent with true philosophy. And to what can it so naturally change as to affections or 149 . were each distinct cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles? Here. nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. to cover our ignorance of the truth. in order to explain every different operation. that ’tis from natural principles this variety of causes excite pride and humility.

These principles being establish’d on unquestionable experience. especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person. Again. as the music of birds. that these subjects are either parts of ourselves. and make even the colours and verdure of the landschape appear more agreeable. and a sordid one displeases. which also appears probable from many obvious instances. Thus if there arises a fragrancy of smells or perfumes. there is an attraction or association among impressions. produces a separate pleasure. and impressions only by resemblance. by its peculiar qualities. without any farther proof. Thus the beauty of our person. and of humility a separate uneasiness. and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object. or something nearly related to us. set off one another. ’tis observable of these two kinds of association. and receive an additional beauty from the advantage of the situation. by revolving over all the causes of pride and humility. awakens every moment the mind of the beholder. when they are well disposed. in considering the subjects. and by its very appearance. viz. or a fall of waters. The new passion. and both uniting in one action. Thus any continu’d sound. and causation. as well as among ideas. and agree with that set of passions. therefore. fear. tho’ with this remarkable difference. impatience. then. who expresses himself in the following manner. bestow on the mind a double impulse. that operate. by any injury from another. so it is capable of receiving a new satisfaction by the assistance of another sense. I begin to consider how we shall apply them. that lie before him. gives pleasure. as well as pride. is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent. to which these qualities adhere. or as the subjects. Of the influence of these relations on pride and humility. whether these causes be regarded. SECTION V. and its deformity. What I discover to be true in some instances. that they very much assist and forward each other. which are suitable to the temper. that ideas are associated by resemblance. independent of those affections. which I here endeavour to explain. on which the qualities are plac’d. of itself. Thus the good and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice. Thus a man. here concur with those. as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other. as the qualities. which forward the transition of ideas. strange. that every cause of pride.’ In this phænomenon we may remark the association both of impressions and ideas. and determine our personal character. ‘As the fancy delights in every thing that is great. I suppose to be so in all. Upon this occasion I may cite the authority of an elegant writer. for the ideas of both senses recommend each other. and makes him more attentive to the several beauties of the place. In examining these qualities I immediately find many of them to concur in producing the sensation of pain and pleasure.emotions. and is still more pleas’d the more it finds of these perfections in the same object. I make a new supposition. who. and the transition to it must be render’d so much more easy and natural. is very much discompos’d and ruffled in his temper. and other uneasy passions. or beautiful. must arise with so much greater violence. which then prevail? ’Tis evident. they heighten the pleasure of the imagination. Those principles. and are pleasanter together than when they enter the mind separately: As the different colours of a picture. In the third place. which operate on the passions. than which nothing operates 150 . A magnificent feast delights us. pain as well as humility. and take it for granted at present. contiguity. who was the cause of his first passion.

and that the subjects. The organs are so dispos’d as to produce the passion. is related to the object. ever lose sight of this object. which is self. in that situation of mind. in order to find something in them. that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin’d by an original and natural instinct. the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence. from the primary constitution of the mind. which the cause separately produces. viz. and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas? That we may comprehend this the better. This contrivance of nature is easily conceiv’d. that these passions shou’d ever look beyond self. that nature has given to the organs of the human mind. viz. viz. which is either pleasant or painful. If I compare. That cause. the passion is deriv’d. the sensation. on which the qualities are plac’d. of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. 151 . The same qualities. houses. these two establish’d properties of the passions. by which we are render’d either vain or humble. correspondent to the suppos’d properties of their causes. when transfer’d to subjects. Having thus in a manner suppos’d two properties of the causes of these affections. which resembles and corresponds to it: With how much greater facility must this transition be made. or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul. and which constitute their very being and essence. but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality. as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: The sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects. In like manner. All this needs no proof. and the passion. which excites the passion. which I discover in these passions. which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign’d a certain idea. ’Tis evident we never shou’d be possest of that passion. their relation to self. naturally produces a certain idea. that taking these suppositions to be just. which are suitable to each appetite. where these movements mutually assist each other. and that ’tis absolutely impossible. which it never fails to produce. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation. and the one impression into that. First. which bear us no relation. to the two suppos’d properties of the causes. is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions. I proceed to examine the passions themselves. For this I pretend not to give any reason. I immediately find. and humility a painful. Here at last the view always rests. We have many instances of such a situation of affairs. or furniture. and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances. when we are actuated by either of these passions. there is in reality no pride nor humility. after its production. The nerves of the nose and palate are so dispos’d. are related to self. I find. or that individual person. and beyond our feeling. The one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative. nor can we. and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain. viz. their object. that of self. is their sensations. that the qualities produce a separate pain or pleasure. that the passion always turns our view to ourselves. therefore. we must suppose. ’tis here in vain to reason or dispute. were there not a disposition of mind proper for it. and their sensation. which nature has attributed to the passion. and which I likewise consider as an original quality. The second quality. and ’tis as evident. influence not in the smallest degree either of these affections. independent of the passion.more strongly on these passions. and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure. These two circumstances are united in pride. a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion. equipage. Of this our very feeling convinces us. ’tis the beauty or deformity of our person.

and languishes when unsupported by some excellency in the character. When I consider after this the nature of relation. without making any change upon that of ideas. upon this supposition. which are. nor will the one in any case be unattended with the other. For first. and sets those organs in action. daily experience convinces us. related to the first idea. produces humility. and has self for its object. be perpetual likewise. ’Tis after this manner. and thereby the sensation of pleasure. I immediately find a hundred different causes. The double relation between the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases. or must destroy the contrary passion from the very first moment. The palate must be excited by an external object. Whether nature produces the passion immediately. and that the one has no influence without the other. either must. while the relation to self continues the same. upon these suppositions. if it arose immediately from nature. exert not themselves like the heart and arteries. and there is no disposition of body peculiar to pride. equipage or fortune. If these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object. Accordingly we find.This being fully comprehended. Upon the whole. Tho’ pride and humility are directly contrary in their effects. nature has bestow’d a kind of attraction on certain impressions and ideas. I can no longer doubt. is only to discover this cause. naturally introduces its correlative. and are plac’d on a subject. The difficulty. that ’tis the very principle. that produce pride. and in their sensations. related to an impression. by which one of them. without the concurrence of any external object. which is related to humility. Secondly. and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride. that of themselves they produce an impression. excites the passion of pride. by an original internal movement. in cloaths. in order to produce any relish: But hunger arises internally. and that the organs. Upon my consulting experience. and therefore. still belonging to ourselves. which being naturally dispos’d to produce that affection. must be revers’d. which gives rise to pride. so that ’tis requisite only to change the relation of impressions. that a beautiful house. and its effects both on the passions and ideas. we may rest satisfy’d with the foregoing conclusion. and is related to self. what at first I perceive to be probable. ’tis certain. belonging to ourselves. that pride requires certain causes to excite it. ally’d to the passion. arising from the causes. Humility is in the very same situation with pride. since the object is always the same. as there is to thirst and hunger. which corresponded to pride. so that none of them cou’d ever make its appearance. that pride requires the assistance of some foreign object. in order to resolve this difficulty. that in this particular her conduct is different in the different passions and sensations. When an idea produces an impression. it may now be ask’d. in bodily accomplishments. that the particular causes of pride and humility 152 . But however the case may stand with other passions and impressions. require only a first impulse or beginning to their action. or whether she must be assisted by the co-operation of other causes? For ’tis observable. that gives a pleasant sensation. as well as an object. which is connected with an idea. which is also agreeable. that all of them concur in two circumstances. these two impressions must be in a manner inseparable. In a word. when by any accident its beauty is chang’d into deformity. they have notwithstanding the same object. and bestows motion on those organs. and produces an easy transition from the one emotion to the other. for which reason the separate sensation. and that the same house. of herself. which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion. ’tis evident pride wou’d be perpetual. and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility. The sensation of humility is uneasy. upon its appearance. then. and upon examining these causes. produces pride. What I have said of pride is equally true of humility. Any thing. is transform’d into pain. ally’d to the object of the passion. that pride must have a cause. Thirdly. I suppose. they mutually assist each other. as that of pride is agreeable. which produce it.

produce pride. that the agreeable or disagreeable object be not only closely related. and convert the satisfaction into vanity. and make it give us any satisfaction. produces likewise pride or humility. Limitations of this system. But before we proceed farther in this subject. The second limitation is. humility: And these limitations are deriv’d from the very nature of the subject. A relation is requisite to joy. and examine particularly all the causes of pride and humility. which is often 153 . Without the present impression. that every thing related to us.are determin’d. that in all judgments of this kind. that appears on this occasion. and that many things. to the related idea. has the additional passion of self-applause and vanity. that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation: Which analogy must be allow’d to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses. the first passion. ’Tis a quality observable in human nature. and this latter relation not only excels. and has no farther consequence. which are too foreign to produce pride. and disagreeable ones. that every thing. we must make to our general position. and a closer than is requir’d to joy. but also peculiar to ourselves. To which we may add. is related to self. that joy arises from a more inconsiderable relation than vanity. nor the spirits excited. by an easy transition. related to ourselves. consisting of a quality and of a subject. where our senses are regal’d with delicacies of every kind: But ’tis only the master of the feast. there is always a present impression. and the relation conveys this vivacity. we may compare it to that. II. I. that all agreeable objects. by an association of ideas and of impressions. by which I have already explain’d the belief attending the judgments. and a related idea. but a close one. produces separately an impression resembling it. and this passion discovers itself upon a slighter relation than pride and vain-glory. which produces pleasure or pain. is joy. and which we shall endeavour to explain afterwards. We may feel joy upon being present at a feast. the subject. and our present one of an impression and idea. Without the relation. or at least common to us with a few persons. but even diminishes. and sometimes destroys the former. To illustrate this hypothesis. Suppose an agreeable object to acquire a relation to self. who. I have observ’d. this must in general be own’d. the attention is not fix’d. as we shall see afterwards52 . it must be endow’d with double force and energy. The reason of the difference may be explain’d thus. does so unavoidably give rise to the passion. ’tis requisite to pride. As it has a double task to perform. the object of the passion: No wonder the whole cause. which we form from causation. and by so small a relation convert their pleasure into pride: But however. are yet able to give us a delight and pleasure. to which the quality adheres. they commonly do to some other person. and that the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy. at which they have only been present. which operates on the passion. But beside this. SECTION VI. There is not only a relation requir’d. There is evidently a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis. in order to produce a transition from one passion to another. which is common to both passions. beside the same joy. Here then is the first limitation. that where agreeable objects bear not a very close relation to ourselves. men sometimes boast of a great entertainment. ’twill be proper to make some limitations to the general system. The quality. in order to approach the object to us. this attention rests on its first object. ’Tis true.

IV. By two comparisons so disadvantageous the passion must be entirely destroy’d. Health. than a passion. We are rejoic’d for many goods. suitable to the power or riches they are possest of. by which means its inconstancy appears still greater. and to which we have been long accustom’d. affords us a very sensible satisfaction. I take to be. The fourth limitation is deriv’d from the inconstancy of the cause of these passions. but are still more ostentacious of our virtues than of our pleasures. We foresee and anticipate its change by the imagination. which are common to all mankind. which. or rather enlargement of this system. pride has in a manner two objects. the cause or that object which produces pleasure. tho’ perhaps of a more excellent kind. that goods. V. because ’tis shar’d with such vast numbers. This may be accounted for from the same princi154 . like the two foregoing. which makes us little satisfy’d with the thing: We compare it to ourselves. which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their possessions. viz. which is the real object of the passion. yet that is only requisite in order to render it agreeable. and that not only to ourselves. and ’tis remarkable. but is seldom regarded as a subject of vanity. as follows. we find we are not in the least distinguish’d. It seems ridiculous to infer an excellency in ourselves from an object. therefore. than those on which. loses its value in our eyes.presented. that which gives pleasure. when we appear so to others. Upon comparing ourselves with others. that where neither of them have any singularity. We likewise judge of objects more from comparison than from their real and intrinsic merit. that the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and obvious. why pride is so much more delicate in this particular than joy. We are not much satisfy’d with the thing itself. the object of this passion. and upon comparing the object we possess. These qualities of the mind have an effect upon joy as well as pride. The third limitation is. the passion must be more weaken’d upon that account. for their singularity. give us no pride. that general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility. which has only one object. but to others also. which I shall endeavour to explain afterwards. and from the short duration of its connexion with ourselves. Since. since the idea of self is not so essential to the former passion as to the latter. whose existence is more durable. The reason. there are always two objects we must contemplate. and self. to which it directs our view. and are still less apt to feel any new degrees of self-satisfaction upon its account. In order to excite pride. we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in them. on account of their frequency. Hence we form a notion of different ranks of men. and have become familiar to us by custom. properly speaking. why this cause operates not with the same force in joy as in pride. and this notion we change not upon account of any peculiarities of the health or temper of the persons. and attends us during so small a part of our existence. This proceeds from causes. III. that this bear some relation to self. viz. ’Twill be easy to comprehend the reason. as well as more virtuous or beautiful. we set a much higher value. give us little satisfaction. when it returns after a long absence. We fancy ourselves more happy. and where we cannot by some contrast enhance their value. and is in a little time despis’d and neglected. What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy. and tho’ it be requisite. This circumstance. as well as pride. But tho’ this circumstance operates on both these passions. and less pride. we discover still the same unlucky circumstance. it follows. But joy has only one object necessary to its production. which is of so much shorter duration. has an effect upon joy. nor is self. as well as on all the other passions. I may add as a fifth limitation. as we are every moment apt to do. it has a much greater influence on vanity.

that if a person full grown. To begin with vice and virtue. which are the most obvious causes of these passions. that the persons. that vice and virtue. and who in the eye of the world have most reason for their pride. that my system maintains its ground upon either of these hypotheses. as they are found to do. Every passion. whether these moral distinctions be founded on natural and original principles. are not always the happiest. which I shall hereafter ascribe to particular passions. that may arise concerning some causes. and this we may observe to be strenuously asserted by the defenders of that hypothesis. and guide us. This reflection is. I shall close this subject with a reflection deriv’d from these five limitations. who are proudest. nor the most humble always the most miserable. and see. and which may be esteem’d too refin’d to operate so universally and certainly. without being peculiar: It may be real. SECTION VII. Of vice and virtue. produce in us a real pain and pleasure.ples. For granting that morality had no foundation in nature. perhaps. tho’ they have little tendency to diminish pride: And perhaps the most real and the most solid evils of life will be found of this nature. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles. there will remain no farther scruple with regard to the present system. For ’tis evident. let us proceed to examine the causes of pride and humility. and these do not always play with a perfect regularity. that explain’d the influence of general rules on the understanding. gives a 155 . The passions are often vary’d by very inconsiderable principles. If we find that all these causes are related to self. and have settled the just value of every thing. whether in every case we can discover the double relations. or turn of character (say they) which has a tendency to our advantage or prejudice. serve to obviate difficulties. as well as in our reasonings. especially on the first trial. We shall principally endeavour to prove the latter point. and of the same nature with ourselves. The examination of this I reserve for the following book. that the influence of general rules and maxims on the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles. were on a sudden transported into our world. as may at first sight be imagin’d from this system. tho’ its cause has no relation to us: It may be real. it must still be allow’d. Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions. and produce a pleasure or uneasiness separate from the passion. habit. which we shall explain in the progress of this treatise. without shewing itself to others: It may be real. It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion. without falling under the general rules. or arise from interest and education. by which they operate on the passions. pride or humility. he wou’d be very much embarrass’d with every object. without being constant: And it may be real. the former being in a manner self-evident. Taking these limitations along with us. this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions. which will be a strong proof of its solidity. An evil may be real. by means of general establish’d maxims. and wou’d not readily find what degree of love or hatred. and in the mean time shall endeavour to show. in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another. which of late years has so much excited the curiosity of the publick. Such evils as these will not fail to render us miserable. or any other passion he ought to attribute to it. either from self-interest or the prejudices of education. This remark may. ’twou’d be entirely foreign to my present purpose to enter upon the controversy.

according to this hypothesis. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue. have been comprehended as parts of moral duty. The very essence of virtue. and ’tis from thence the approbation or disapprobation arises. and such another rejected. and that of vice to give pain. The 156 . But supposing this hypothesis of moral philosophy shou’d be allow’d to be false. and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these qualities. and founded on nature. but constitute their very nature and essence. that may result from our own characters. according to the vulgar systems of ethicks. who maintain that morality is something real. never fails to charm and delight us. or from those of others. without our being able to tell the reasons of that pleasure or uneasiness. and of uneasiness from false. being the primary causes of vice and virtue. therefore. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit. A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey. essential. from which true and false wit in a manner receive their being. but are always in danger of losing by their avarice: Courage defends us. On the other hand cruelty and treachery displease from their very nature. must also be the causes of all their effects. We easily gain from the liberality of others. But I go farther. The virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility. good humour. But pride and humility arise not from these qualities alone of the mind. that from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions. nor are we possest of any other standard. Now what is this taste. and the other at worst agrees with it. unless check’d. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. which has been advanc’d to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue. all the effects of morality must be deriv’d from the same pain or pleasure. the passions of pride and humility. The pain and pleasure. and the origin of moral rights and obligations. ’Tis only by taste we can decide concerning it. and among the rest. are at least inseparable from them. ’tis still evident. tho’ only in a poem or fable. and others in like manner excite a pleasure. which arises from the prospect of any loss or advantage. For these reasons the former qualities are esteem’d virtues. if not the causes of vice and virtue. produce a pain. upon which we can form a judgment of this kind. wou’d quickly prove its ruin: Humility exalts. Now since ’tis granted there is a delight or uneasiness still attending merit or demerit of every kind. or any other accomplishment. by the very view and contemplation. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is. but pride mortifies us. is. but injustice. which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction. this is all that is requisite for my purpose. and without which no thought can have a title to either of these denominations? ’Tis plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure from true wit. and observe.delight or uneasiness. but cowardice lays us open to every attack: Justice is the support of society. ’tis an absolute and invincible proof of the latter. is to produce pleasure. allowing the former to be just. and consequently of pride and humility. Thus one hypothesis of morality is an undeniable proof of the foregoing system. For if all morality be founded on the pain or pleasure. that pain and pleasure. What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? The same unquestionable argument may be deriv’d from the opinion of those. but also that. The most probable hypothesis. which. that this moral hypothesis and my present system not only agree together. but from any other that has a connexion with pleasure and uneasiness. and to shew why such a system of thought must be receiv’d under that denomination. and the latter regarded as vices. and when presented to us. either in ourselves or others.

But this effect of personal and bodily qualities is not only a proof of the present system. we shall find that all of them resolve into this. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. or assent to those philosophers. perhaps. ’Tis evident the former impression is not always vicious. But not to dispute about words. we shall make no scruple to assent to this opinion. without troubling ourselves at present with that merit or blame. Wherever. we may expect with assurance either of these passions. and of vice as producing humility. therefore. And indeed. if we consider. upon whatever subject it may be plac’d. or by caprice. by shewing that the passions arise not in this case without all the circumstances I have requir’d. and consequently the cause of that pride or humility. as either by the primary constitution of our nature. we can find the other relation of impressions to join to this of ideas. that a great part of the beauty. The beauty or deformity is closely related to self. which I have asserted to be necessary to the causes of pride and humility. I observe. which produces strength. No wonder. as deformity produces pain. therefore. than that in which they place it. which have been form’d either by philosophy or common reason. which they have been taught to consider as a virtue. There may. If the beauty or deformity. is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. the very essence of true and false wit. Let us. whether plac’d on the mind or body. that beauty is such an order and construction of parts. it must still be allow’d to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations. SECTION VIII. The most rigid morality allows us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action. that by pride I understand that agreeable impression. whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness. therefore. be some. when the view either of our virtue. and deformity of humility.power of bestowing these opposite sensations is. according as the impression is pleasant or uneasy. In like manner the rules of architec157 . are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity. If we consider all the hypotheses. which arises from them. and ’tis by none esteem’d a virtue to feel any fruitless remorses upon the thoughts of past villainy and baseness. by custom. be plac’d upon our own bodies. nor the latter virtuous. and whether survey’d in an animate or inanimate object. and forms all the difference betwixt it and deformity. Of beauty and deformity. which we admire either in animals or in other objects. which they look upon as a vice. but constitute their very essence. Pleasure and pain. is deriv’d from the idea of convenience and utility. Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves. beauty. therefore. examine these impressions. the object of both these passions. But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction. who being accustom’d to the style of the schools and pulpit. therefore. than its mere figure and appearance. this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility. This is the distinguishing character of beauty. The order and convenience of a palace are no less essential to its beauty. and that which is a sign of agility in another. consider’d in themselves. then. riches or power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves: And that by humility I mean the opposite impression. to explain the difference betwixt beauty and deformity. That shape. and enquire into their causes. and having never consider’d human nature in any other light. is beautiful in one animal. who regard it as something external. as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and ideas. our own beauty becomes an object of pride. which may attend them. which arises in the mind. but may be employ’d as a stronger and more convincing argument. may here be surpriz’d to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride.

For this reason the present phænomenon will be sufficiently accounted for. ’Tis not the beauty of the body alone that produces pride. and agrees in nothing else. have at least no connexion 158 . ’tis plain the pleasure must in both cases be the real and influencing cause of the passion. by a natural transition. seems already sufficiently confirm’d by experience. then. that as surprize is nothing but a pleasure arising from novelty. Now there is nothing common to natural and moral beauty. produces pride. whereas the contrary form gives us the apprehension of danger. the sensations are at least inseparable from the qualities. when plac’d on a related object. it is not. therefore. and among the rest pride and humility. Thus we are vain of the surprising adventures we have met with. This system. Again. heap up a number of extraordinary events. Hence the origin of vulgar lying. and that because such a figure conveys to us the idea of security. which produces pleasure. Placing. that the top of a pillar shou’d be more slender than its base. be from that impression. and different from the power of producing pleasure. of humility. a quality in any object. beautiful or surprising. which is wanting in the other. beautiful. and it’s contrary. or if true. then. ’Tis certain. then. is an object of pride. that there is nothing in us or belonging to us. that if the power of producing pleasure and pain forms not the essence of beauty and deformity. which is pleasant.ture require. humility. which is excited by the beauty of our person. that every thing useful. all the effects of these qualities must be deriv’d from the sensation. whether beauty be not something real. From innumerable instances of this kind. properly speaking. and dangers we have been expos’d to. Tho’ it shou’d be question’d. that whatever in ourselves is either useful. it can never be disputed. Concerning all other bodily accomplishments we may observe in general. This argument I esteem just and decisive. And it arises so naturally. and merely out of vanity. but in order to give greater authority to the present reasoning. and see what will follow. the escapes we have made. viz. that pleasure. with the relation to self must be the cause of the passion. as deformity is a structure of parts. of their different influence upon the passion of pride. in explaining that passion. The pleasure. that beauty is nothing but a form. but is discern’d only by a taste or sensation. and its contrary. where men without any interest. Strength is a kind of power. there is nothing originally different betwixt the beauty of our bodies and the beauty of external and foreign objects. which conveys pain. we may conclude. must be the cause of all their other differences. and since the power of producing pain and pleasure make in this manner the essence of beauty and deformity. as a related or resembling impression. but merely a passion or impression in the soul. cannot be defin’d. that does not at the same time excite that other passion. as well as from considering that beauty like wit. and among the rest. and therefore the desire to excel in strength is to be consider’d as an inferior species of ambition. which are either the fictions of their brain. Now ’tis obvious. It must. This original difference. but that the one has a near relation to ourselves. agrees in producing a separate pleasure. or surprising. which produces surprize. therefore. which is uneasy. these two conclusions together. that pride by a natural transition arises. therefore. let us suppose it false for a moment. (both of which are the causes of pride) but this power of producing pleasure. but is not affected in the least by that of foreign and external objects. which of all their effects are the most common and remarkable. but also its strength and force. tho’ we have not yet exhausted all our arguments. we find they compose the preceding system betwixt them. and as a common effect supposes always a common cause. and ’tis even difficult to consider them apart.

which if we compare them together. they appropriate such as belong to others. because when we cut off that relation the passion is immediately destroy’d. And tho’ young men are not asham’d of every head-ach or cold they fall into. nor mortify’d with the other. Their fruitful invention supplies them with a variety of adventures. 159 . if it has not something peculiar to ourself. and are never consider’d as connected with our being and existence. This sufficiently proves that bodily pain and sickness are in themselves proper causes of humility. What farther proof can be desired for the present system? There is only one objection to this system with regard to our body. who is solely or certainly fix’d in either. and more painful than sickness. By the other experiment we find. A surprising adventure. and by that means produces pride: But the adventures of others. Men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves. tho’ they may cause pleasure. that an object produces pride merely by the interposition of pleasure. that the pleasure produces the pride by a transition along related ideas. that wherever a malady of any kind is so rooted in our constitution. yet for want of this relation of ideas. Now as health and sickness vary incessantly to all men. their rheums and gouts. They endeavour. never excite that passion. yet no topic is so proper to mortify human pride. according to the known rules. from that moment it becomes an object of humility. propos’d to our general system. that every cause of that passion must be in some measure constant. This will easily be accounted for. tho’ the custom of estimating every thing by comparison more than by its intrinsic worth and value. makes us overlook these calamities. This has evidently appear’d in some of the foregoing reasonings. natural philosophy. and where that talent is wanting. nor do they ever confess them without reluctance and uneasiness. whom nothing mortifies more than the consideration of their age and infirmities. as is evident in old men. and other sciences.with themselves. because it is infectious: Of the king’s-evil. In this phænomenon are contain’d two curious experiments. will be an undeniable argument for that influence of the double relations above-mention’d. By one of these experiments we find. as also. by which we judge of cause and effect in anatomy. to conceal their blindness and deafness. And that this account is just appears hence. and be more fully explain’d afterwards. by which it produces pride. if we consider the second and fourth limitations. that tho’ nothing be more agreeable than health. which we find to be incident to every one. and will appear still more evidently. in which we have been ourselves engag’d. that we no longer entertain any hopes of recovery. is related to us. and are either dangerous or disagreeable to them. these accidental blessings and calamities are in a manner separated from us. and there is none. It was observ’d. yet commonly men are neither proud of the one. that we are every moment of our lives subject to such infirmities. than this. and causes us to form an idea of our merit and character independent of them. Of the epilepsy. and that because the quality. because it gives a horror to every one present: Of the itch. in order to satisfy their vanity. which is. and hold some proportion to the duration of ourself. because it commonly goes to posterity. is in reality nothing but the power of producing pleasure. that no object ever produces pride or humility. and make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature. We are asham’d of such maladies as affect others. as long as possible. which is its object.

nor is of any considerable moment in these affections. the causes of our vanity. obscur’d and lost by the multiplicity of foreign and extrinsic. are connected with the whole. an animal in a desart. It must be some way associated with us in order to touch our pride. A beautiful fish in the ocean. therefore. and these relations are nothing else but qualities. and the passion finds its ultimate and final cause. and indeed any thing that neither belongs. properly speaking. yet they considerably influence even a passion. and tho’ these external advantages be in themselves widely distant from thought or a person. For this I assign the following reason. But besides that this multitude of relations must weaken the connexion. we must. and by that means form a chain of several links betwixt ourselves and the shining qualities of the person we resemble. ’tis there the view fixes at last. we find by experience. has no manner of influence on our vanity. and that the primary one is. Now let us consider what effect these can possibly have upon the mind. possess the quality. This happens when external objects acquire any particular relation to ourselves. and by what means they become so requisite to the production of the passions. that tho’ the relation of resemblance operates upon the mind in the same manner as contiguity and causation. yet ’tis seldom a foundation either of pride or of humility. So that tho’ a likeness may occasionally produce that passion by suggesting a more advantageous idea of ourselves. betwixt the cause and object of pride and humility. But here ’tis remarkable. equipages. which is directed to that as its ultimate object. upon that of ourselves. There are instances. If we resemble a person in any of the valuable parts of his character. in which we resemble him. in some degree. that the association of ideas operates in so silent and imperceptible a manner. These qualities. when we wou’d found upon it any degree of vanity. whatever extraordinary qualities it may be endow’d with. that this extends not very far. and this quality we always chuse to survey directly in ourselves rather than by reflexion in another person. or other minute circumstances. But tho’ pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body. by which the imagination is convey’d from one idea to another. and the transition from the one to the other must be easy and natural. indeed. These trifles are connected with the resembling qualities in us. of contiguity. in passing from the shining qualities to the trivial ones. and are associated or connected with us. then. ’Tis evident. gardens. that we are scarce sensible of it. which produce these affections. ’tis evident the mind. Now after what manner are they related to ourselves? They are parts of the person we value. We can never have a vanity of resembling in trifles any person. or that of causation. We found a-vanity upon houses. and consequently connected with these trifles. that contribute not in any degree to his reputation. in conveying us from one idea to another. shape. Its idea must hang in a manner. air.SECTION IX. and be in some measure asham’d of the comparison and resemblance. is alone requisite to give rise to these passions. which are also suppos’d to be parts of him. being parts. in some measure. must by that contrast the better perceive the minuteness of the latter. and discover it more by its effects than by 160 . for their natural and more immediate causes. wherein men shew a vanity in resembling a great man in his countenance. by means of their relation to ourselves. but it must be confess’d. The relation. which give us a respect and veneration for him. as well as upon personal merit and accomplishments. are. that there are many other objects. nor is related to us. Of external advantages and disadvantages. that is self. and whatever degree of surprize and admiration it may naturally occasion. unless he be possess’d of very shining qualities. and these qualities in us.

Thus one part of the preceding system. Men are vain of the beauty of their country. whether the emotion first produc’d be the passion itself. This question we cannot be long in deciding. whereas their distant relation to a foreign country. that ’tis in a manner lost to them. and how the two different associations. The question is. or some other impression related to it. ’Tis evident. For besides all the other arguments. as well as from undoubted experience. that the relation of ideas. to which they have travell’d. Men are also vain of the temperature of the climate. of the softness or force of their language. may assist each other’s operation. and surrounded with their countrymen. These objects have plainly a reference to the pleasures of the senses. then. it must evidently appear. an emotion or original impression produc’d by some other principle. and gives rise to no new impression of any kind. produc’d by it. concerning the relations of ideas is a sufficient proof of the other. and affect to depreciate their own country. not only in proportion to the encrease or decrease of its qualities. that discover a vanity of an opposite kind. is augmented by their con161 . An easy transition of ideas. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleasure. but only modifies those ideas. with other particulars of that kind. that ’twou’d be lost time to endeavour farther to prove it. This will appear still more evidently in particular instances.any immediate feeling or perception. of the goodness of the wines. taste or hearing. in which they were born. we may conclude. beside the relation or transition of thought. If nature produc’d immediately the passion of pride or humility. that the same object causes a greater or smaller degree of pride. with which this subject abounds. or even useful to the passions. except by means of that transition above-explain’d? There are some. in which we can conceive this subject. related to self. were it not to second a relation of affections. This is not only easily conceiv’d. that an association of ideas. and wou’d require no farther addition or encrease from any other affection. The object or cause of this pleasure is. which. of their county. a transition is made from the one impression to the other. by the supposition. in comparison of those. it wou’d be compleated in itself. is not alone sufficient to give rise to any passion. however necessary. wou’d be entirely superfluous. This pleasure is related to pride. concerning that of impressions. and facilitate the transition from one impression to another. fruits or victuals. It produces no emotion. which is form’d by their having seen it and liv’d in it. can never be necessary. By this double relation of impressions and ideas. and are originally consider’d as agreeable to the feeling. that the strong relation betwixt them and their own nation is shar’d with so many. of impressions and ideas. when they are at home. causes no emotion. of which the mind was formerly possess’d. there is. But supposing the first emotion to be only related to pride or humility. of itself. Not to mention. that when the mind feels the passion either of pride or humility upon the appearance of a related object. which is a clear argument for the transition of affections along the relation of ideas. of the fertility of their native soil. but by forwarding the transition betwixt some related impressions. which experience shews to be so requisite a circumstance to the production of the passion. by uniting their forces. but I will venture to affirm ’tis the only manner. and is itself so evidently founded on experience. ’tis easily conceiv’d to what purpose the relation of objects may serve. These persons find. and which it cou’d recal upon occasion. since every change in the relation produces a proportionable change in the passion. of their parish. From this reasoning. or the object of pride. How is it possible they cou’d ever become objects of pride. but also to the distance or nearness of the relation.

the male sex has the advantage above the female. which in ourselves produce pride. by means of the double relation of impressions and ideas. and dwells entirely upon the latter. As in the society of marriage. climate or any inanimate object. and whatever weakens the relations must diminish the passion. address. thro’ the relation of parent and child. and arrives at him with greater facility than his consort. when they can boast. are glad when they can join this circumstance. merit. and as we cannot prevent poverty in some distant collaterals. ’tis no wonder we are vain of the qualities of those. which we shall consider53 afterwards. that their ancestors for many generations have been uninterrupted proprietors of the same portion of land. but also their riches and credit. and excites a greater degree of pride and vanity. Since we can be vain of a country. so to satisfy our vanity we desire that every one. the subjects of his vanity are not merely the extent of time and number of ancestors. credit and honours of their kindred are carefully display’d by the proud. ’Tis evident. who boast of the antiquity of their families. As we are proud of riches in ourselves. Accordingly we find. that this property must strengthen the child’s relation to the father. utility and rarity of what is abroad. and weaken that to the mother. who are both their heirs and their descendants. that the very same qualities. and conveys the fancy with greater facility from one generation to another. He first considers these objects. the husband first engages our attention. usually leaves the former. For this reason we remove the poor as far from us as possible. whatever strengthens any of the relations must also encrease the passion. that those. and where two objects are presented to it. that ’tis an additional subject of vanity.sidering how few there are who have done the same. which bears a relation to us. and that the honours and fortune have never past thro’ any female. or been transplanted into any other county or province. when discover’d in persons related to us. For this reason they always admire the beauty. among our friends and relations. who are connected with us by blood or friendship. that is mean or poor. a small and a great one. I have frequently observ’d. as some of their most considerable sources of their vanity. and our forefathers are taken to be our nearest relations. that these possessions have been transmitted thro’ a descent compos’d entirely of males. from the remotest ancestors to their posterity. Now ’tis certain the identity of the possession strengthens the relation of ideas arising from blood and kindred. I have also observ’d. ’Tis a quality of human nature. and whether we consider him directly. who has any connexion with us. is elevated with the passion of pride. Let us endeavour to explain these phænomena by the foregoing system. that the imagination naturally turns to whatever is important and considerable. By this facility the impression is transmitted more entire. and then returning back to himself. For as all relations are nothing but a 162 . The beauty. Since therefore the passion depends on these relations. and to be descended from a long succession of rich and honourable ancestors. The case is the same with the transmission of the honours and fortune thro’ a succession of males without their passing thro’ any female. or reach him by passing thro’ related objects. the thought both rests upon him with greater satisfaction. and are asham’d of any one. upon this account every one affects to be of a good family. and that their family has never chang’d its possessions. shou’d likewise be possest of them. which are suppos’d to reflect a lustre on himself on account of his relation to them. that when any one boasts of the antiquity of his family. above what is at home. produce also in a lesser degree the same affection. ’Tis easy to see. is affected by them in an agreeable manner.

These agree in giving pleasure. If justice. the general rule still retains such an efficacy that it weakens the relation. His wine. we may soon satisfy ourselves by the most cursory view of human life. if you’ll believe him. hounds. and passes from father to son. if justice. we may be certain. and of the proprietor to the property. and therefore. his table more orderly. the free use and possession of it. and as we have a stronger propensity to pass from the idea of the children to that of the father. property may be look’d upon as a particular species of causation. and are esteem’d to be of nobler or baser birth. and therefore must be the quality that 163 . and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride. as to make the children rather represent the mother’s family than the father’s. as when the transition is conformable to the general rules. according to the system of certain philosophers. horses. SECTION X. join’d to that of impressions. whether we consider the liberty it gives the proprietor to operate as he please upon the object. and ’tis easy to observe. that the mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor. in which he lives. or are related to such. his fruits ripen earlier and to greater perfection: Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty. notwithstanding the exception. equipage. more healthful. furniture. For then honour. excel all others in his conceit. according to his family. that are useful. the air. such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him. according to the doctrine above-explain’d. and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience. may. This in the mean time is certain. or when any other reasons have such an effect.propensity to pass from one idea to another. but forbids any other. shou’d be esteem’d an artificial and not a natural virtue. whatever strengthens the propensity strengthens the relation. which being a proof of a perfect relation of ideas is all that is requisite to our present purpose. And tho’ the mother shou’d be possest of a superior spirit and genius to the father. he draws a new subject of pride and vanity. his servants more expert. which has a natural and original influence on the human mind. The imagination runs not along them with facility. This alone is common to them. by means of property. if the foregoing system be solid and satisfactory. and makes a kind of break in the line of ancestors. as often happens. Nay even when a superiority of any kind is so great. And whether it be so or not. connected with us by property. that property may be defin’d. nor is able to transfer the honour and credit of the ancestors to their posterity of the same name and family so readily. His houses. the general rule prevails. which he reaps from it. that belong’d once to such a prince or great man: All objects. without violating the laws of justice and moral equity. or from brother to brother. cloaths. his cookery is more exquisite. which is esteem’d the closest. is that of property. and custom. such another for its antiquity: This is the workmanship of a famous artist. A relation of ideas. in some degree. beautiful or surprizing. the soil he cultivates more fertile. Every thing belonging to a vain man is the best that is any where to be found. and produce. that from the least advantage in any of these. This relation ’twill be impossible for me fully to explain before I come to treat of justice and the other moral virtues. But the relation. whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an object. has a finer flavour than any other. therefore. always produces a transition of affections. we ought to regard the former relation as the closer and more considerable. that either pride or humility must arise from this conjunction of relations. than from the same idea to that of the mother. or the advantages. be a virtue. give rise to this passion. ’Tis the same case. Of property and riches. This is the reason why children commonly bear their father’s name. and agree in nothing else. the same effects. in a word. ’Tis sufficient to observe on this occasion.

Now riches are to be consider’d as the power of acquiring the property of what pleases. we suppose a possibility either of his acting or forbearing. is entirely frivolous. beauty or novelty. When we see a person free from these motives. but in order to give a just explication of the matter. ’tis certain it is not the philosophy of our passions. Nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions. be consider’d as riches. and are displeas’d when another acquires a power of giving pain. but only as it has a relation to the pleasures and conveniences of life. and consider myself as his subject or vassal. Paper will. I do not think I have fallen into my enemies power. enters very little into common life. and that neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possest of any ability. that the person never will perform that action. when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side. which is their common effect. while I am unprovided of any weapon. which is in itself so evident. and that of another. I then attribute a full power to him. as it is a metal endow’d with certain qualities of solidity. shou’d have the same effect. which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his future actions. Now if we compare these two cases. and account for this satisfaction and uneasiness. we shall find. but also that he may punish or reward me as he pleases. which we sometimes make betwixt a power and the exercise of it.produces the passion. yet 164 . motives deprive us not of free-will. According to that doctrine. and that because it may convey the power of acquiring money: And money is not riches. who has very strong motives of interest or safety to forbear any action. nor is there any thing but strong motives. produces also pride by a double relation of impressions and ideas. where very considerable motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires. we need not be surpriz’d. we must weigh the following reflections. independent of its actual exercise. ’Tis evident the error of distinguishing power from its exercise proceeds not entirely from the scholastic doctrine of free-will. without any dread of punishment in his turn. that he possibly or probably will perform it. that scarce any system was ever so fully prov’d by experience. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron. that in the former case we conclude from past experience. on many occasions. that the power of acquiring this property. that the distinction. according to the philosophy explain’d in the foregoing book. that not only there is no external obstacle to his actions. but that many things operate upon them by means of the idea and supposition of power. and in the latter. we may draw from it one of the strongest arguments I have yet employ’d to prove the influence of the double relations on pride and humility. as that which I have here advanc’d. I may venture to affirm. Taking then this for granted. that of a person. who lies under no such obligation. and has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking. and ’tis only in this view they have any influence on the passions. and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chain’d or imprison’d. weight and fusibility. But when a person acquires such an authority over me. We are pleas’d when we acquire an ability of procuring pleasure. It has been observ’d in treating of the understanding. which. and determine him to forbear what he wishes to perform. indeed. and as the instances are here without number. This is evident from experience. that gives pleasure either by its utility. than the will of man. If the property of any thing. that the only known difference betwixt them lies in this. unless it be exerted and put in action. As every new instance is a new argument. But tho’ this be strictly true in a just and philosophical way of thinking. and tho’ in general we may conclude him to be determin’d by motives and causes. nor take away our power of performing or forbearing any action. But according to common notions a man has no power.

as if it were perfectly certain and unavoidable. Now ’tis evident. whenever all external obstacles are remov’d. and refuse it to such as have. the person never had any power of harming me. and there neither is any physical impediment. And indeed. 165 . By means of this image the enjoyment seems to approach nearer to us. that the pleasure is still closer and more immediate. and consequently ’tis uncertain whether he will injure me or not. And tho’ perhaps I never really feel any harm. where I shall54 explain that false sensation of liberty. as our passions always regard the real existence of objects. either actual or probable. that this satisfaction encreases. nor any very strong motive to hinder our enjoyment. which might formerly have hinder’d him. nor the influence of that uncertainty on the passions. or at least possible he may exert it. For farther satisfaction on this head I must refer to my account of the will. we judge from experience. that power has always a reference to its exercise. But we may farther observe. Since therefore we ascribe a power of performing an action to every one. I must be uneasy in such a situation. than its existence when there is no external obstacle to the producing it. when any good approaches in such a manner that it is in one’s own power to take or leave it. than that power consists in the possibility or probability of any action. But this accounts not sufficiently for the satisfaction. than if he were entirely depriv’d of all his possessions. tho’ he knows he has enjoy’d his riches for forty years without ever employing them. The will seems to move easily every way. and we always judge of this reality from past instances. A miser receives delight from his money. and casts a shadow or image of itself. which oppose it. we judge from an illusion of the fancy. on which it did not settle. and that he will probably obtain it. and discover by the event. it may justly be concluded. and conveys the same joy. and consequently cannot conclude by any species of reasoning. In that case their imagination easily anticipates the satisfaction. The agreeable passions may here operate as well as the uneasy. this prevents not my uneasiness from the preceding uncertainty.this removes not the uncertainty of our judgment concerning these causes. which makes us imagine we can perform any thing. that the pleasure will exist. from the power it affords him of procuring all the pleasures and conveniences of life. philosophically speaking. which attends riches. But when ourselves are in that situation. that. The passions are not only affected by such events as are certain and infallible. and gives us the same lively satisfaction. nothing can be more likely of itself. But tho’ he cannot form any such conclusion in a way of reasoning concerning the nearer approach of the pleasure. and men perceive no danger in following their inclinations. As all men desire pleasure. that is. without any farther reasoning. who has no very powerful motive to forbear it. that the real existence of these pleasures is nearer. and that we consider a person as endow’d with any ability when we find from past experience. upon the removal of any strong motives. that ’tis probable. even to that side. that is not very dangerous or destructive. as if they were perswaded of its real and actual existence. that there is no very powerful motive to deter him from injuring me. along with the more powerful motives of interest and danger. ’tis certain he imagines it to approach nearer. but also in an inferior degree by such as are possible and contingent. that wherever a person is in such a situation with regard to me. nothing can be more probable. and cannot consider the possibility or probability of that injury without a sensible concern. since he did not exert any. and convey a pleasure when I perceive a good to become either possible or probable by the possibility or probability of another’s bestowing it on me. Whenever any other person is under no strong obligations of interest to forbear any pleasure. as discover’d by experience and the practice of the world.

exposes us to a thousand wants. and as its cause is some possession or property. This is not only conspicuous in children. or shame of slavery. and mortifications. and to prove. our character. But beside these original causes of pride and humility. and which is thereby related to us. a very considerable pleasure. To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation. betwixt ourselves and the person we command. whose condition. beauty and riches. power must produce the former emotions. and first explain the nature of sympathy. by a true or false reasoning. ’tis only by means of a double relation of impressions and ideas. The very essence of this power consists in the probability of its exercise. or who exercise it over us. by subjecting us to the will of others. But there is a peculiar advantage in power. who implicitly embrace every opinion propos’d to them. that when riches produce any pride or vanity in their possessors. but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding. SECTION XI. Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of any thing. No quality of human nature is more remarkable. are much augmented by the consideration of the persons. as they never fail to do. in itself. which we enjoy. The comparison is obvious and natural: The imagination finds it in the very subject: The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy. that riches cause pleasure and pride. And that this circumstance has a considerable effect in augmenting its influence. and even the other causes of pride. virtue. Power or an authority over others makes us capable of satisfying all our desires. and poverty excites uneasiness and humility. but not to such a degree. The very essence of riches consists in the power of procuring the pleasures and conveniences of life. ’tis evident the possession of them wou’d give pleasure and pride. that this resemblance arises from sympathy. as the same authority. and in its causing us to anticipate. that the vanity of power. Of the love of fame. we here clearly see all the parts of the foregoing system most exactly and distinctly drawn out before us. in a manner. ’Tis here worth observing. our name are considerations of vast weight and importance. will appear afterwards in examining the nature of malice and envy. or even contrary to our own. makes it seem more agreeable and honourable. when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others. This anticipation of pleasure is. and slavery the latter. and ’tis much more probable. have little influence. than from any influence 166 . the real existence of the pleasure. both in itself and in its consequences. Our reputation. For supposing it possible to frame statues of such an admirable mechanism.’Twill now be easy to draw this whole reasoning to a point. than that propensity we have to sympathize with others. as slavery. For the same reason. there is a secondary one in the opinions of others. who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination. in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. when exerted over sensible and rational creatures. A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing it to that of a beggar. being compar’d to our own. over whom we exercise our authority. and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments. In order to account for this phænomenon ’twill be necessary to take some compass. which is. that they cou’d move and act in obedience to the will. by the contrast. presented to us. which has an equal influence on the affections. however different from.

All these relations. which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher. Accordingly we find. especially when by an inference from cause and effect. or language. 167 . as also acquaintance. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be. tho’ they may the person himself. all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition. However the parts may differ in shape or size. tho’ they continue invariably the same. esteem. and embrace them with facility and pleasure. but receives new force from other relations. The relations of blood. we may not find a parallel in ourselves. is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception. mirth and melancholy. therefore. A good-natur’d man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his company. So remarkable a phænomenon merits our attention. Whatever object. ’Tis evident. which operates in the same manner with education and custom. and by the observation of external signs. that the idea. as we shall see more fully55 afterwards. or country. beside the general resemblance of our natures. that ’tis not possible to imagine. and must be trac’d up to its first principles. Now ’tis obvious. and produce an equal emotion. which has this effect. or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us. when united together. There is a very remarkable resemblance. A chearful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind. we are inform’d of the real existence of the object. Hatred. and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind. that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures. which convey an idea of it. it proceeds from certain views and reflections. which preserves itself amidst all their variety. being a species of causation. as to become the very passion itself. Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected. it must still have a considerable influence. resentment.of the soil and climate. and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner. according to the foregoing principles. who makes them. may sometimes contribute to the same effect. When any affection is infus’d by sympathy. to make them communicate themselves entirely. it facilitates the sympathy. that may accompany it. or character. love. of which. it is at first known only by its effects. and this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others. which is resembling or contiguous. in some degree or other. there is any peculiar similarity in our manners. are not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together. The sentiments of others have little influence. and require the relation of contiguity. and tho’ this relation shou’d not be so strong as that of causation. that where. Nor is resemblance the only relation. as any original affection. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object. that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. with which we always form the idea of our own person. courage. the more easily does the imagination make the transition. This idea is presently converted into an impression. and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance. and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception. as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me. their structure and composition are in general the same. and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person. and that we never remark any passion or principle in others. convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others. as with that of the body. and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation. which. when far remov’d from us.

with which we sympathize. Ourself is always intimately present to us. and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them. What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phænomena give to the foregoing system concerning the understanding. we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone. or riches. with which they strike upon the soul. in some measure. as we conceive any other matter of fact. that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov’d. in which he appears to his admirer. they are so clear of themselves. therefore. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself. which makes us regard their judgment. by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas. That science can only be admitted to explain the phænomena. We may observe. and from reasoning. if real. ’Tis also evident. than any other impressions. and are conceiv’d to belong to another person. This is the nature and cause of sympathy. according to the hypothesis above explain’d. to its influence on pride and humility. Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this particular. in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity. may serve to strengthen and inliven an idea. and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. when these passions arise from praise and blame. ’Tis indeed evident. Our affections depend more upon ourselves. that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent. from reputation and infamy. that sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding.It has been remark’d in the beginning of this treatise. I say. and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are. besides this. or family. which wou’d not. ’tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion. he wou’d first receive a separate pleasure. by which we are convinc’d of the reality of the passion. and ’tis there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression. these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas. that all ideas are borrow’d from impressions. tho’ at the same time it must be confest. may by this means be so inliven’d as to become the very sentiment or passion. that no person is ever prais’d by another for any quality. All this is an object of the plainest experience. that if a person consider’d himself in the same light. since these are analogous to each other. both from sympathy. so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition. that we have already explain’d and accounted for. and make a malady real by often thinking of it. The elogiums either turn upon his power. ’Tis now time to turn our view from the general consideration of sympathy. and ’tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others. and depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy. as a 168 . and ’tis certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination. for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination. produce. whenever we discover them. then. of itself. and consequently to the present one concerning the passions. which renders all their sentiments intimately present to us. And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression. Let us compare all these circumstances. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. and from every lively idea we form of them. all of which are subjects of vanity. the only particulars. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections. The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression. and we shall find. In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. or virtue. and the internal operations of the mind. and afterwards a pride or selfsatisfaction. a pride in the person possest of it. that when we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others. and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former. For besides the relation of cause and effect. that there is but little occasion to employ it. ’Tis certain.

that being conscious of great partiality in our own favour. where we go. but receive an additional satisfaction from the former. upon whose judgment we set some value. in a great measure. that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves. however unreasonable. 169 . In examining these sentiments. The judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person. than of those. in which we chiefly excel. This is accounted for after the same manner. and rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers. when we judge of our own worth and character. which diffuses itself over the imagination. that tho’ fame in general be agreeable. whom we hate and despise. Hence we seek to diminish this sympathy and uneasiness by separating these relations. and precipitate us into any opinions. We may infer from them. but narrow circumstances. as well as that of a wise man. We are not only better pleas’d with the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool. but in order to bestow a full certainty on this reasoning. whom we ourselves esteem and approve of. wou’d equally excite that desire or aversion. we are peculiarly pleas’d with any thing. No body will suspect from what family we are sprung. when he is conscious he is not possest of it. A mere soldier little values the character of eloquence: A gownman of courage: A bishop of humour: Or a merchant of learning. We shall be remov’d from all our friends and acquaintance. say they. These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our opinions. All this appears very probable in theory. Nothing is more usual than for men of good families. the opinions of the whole world will give him little pleasure in that particular. The praises of others never give us much pleasure. To which we may add. and gives an additional force to every related idea. abstractedly consider’d. according as it were favourable or unfavourable. and contiguous in place. who are both related to us by blood. I find they afford many very convincing arguments for my present purpose. In like manner we are principally mortify’d with the contempt of persons. and is only inferior in its influence on our own judgment. First. when ’tis obtain’d after a long and intimate acquaintance. that the uneasiness of being contemn’d depends on sympathy. we must examine the phænomena of the passions. and nothing tends more to disturb our understanding. and placing ourselves in a contiguity to strangers. and that sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves. Such judgments are always attended with passion56 . But if the mind receiv’d from any original instinct a desire of fame. and see if they agree with it. and our poverty and meanness will by that means fit more easy upon us. and every opinion. yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those. and extol us for those qualities. since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons. fame and infamy wou’d influence us without distinction. Whatever esteem a man may have for any quality. unless they concur with our own opinion. than among those. and at a distance from relations. than their connexion with passion. who are acquainted with their birth and education. and that because they never will be able to draw his own opinion after them. but must have a peculiar influence. and aversion to infamy. Among these phænomena we may esteem it a very favourable one to our present purpose. to leave their friends and country. indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind. and are easily shock’d with whatever opposes it. and are.kind of argument for what they affirm. We shall be unknown.

Secondly. A violent lover in like manner is very much displeas’d when you blame and condemn his love. if any one suspects him to be of a family. We may conclude. than when I was every day expos’d to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen. whatever you say has no effect upon him. arises from a communication of sentiments. which is natural to them. he has the disagreeable reflexion and comparison suggested only by his own thoughts. that the pleasure. which may seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions. but ’tis because their multitude gives them additional weight and authority. Fourthly. but they are strangers. tho’ tis evident your opposition can have no influence. but this is a kind of castle-building. which we receive from praise. A peasant wou’d think himself happy in what cannot afford necessaries for a gentleman. For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist. not absolutely consider’d as relations. But as the persons are not the same. If he despises you. This double contempt is likewise strengthen’d by the two relations of kindred and contiguity. who despises the vulgar. Here I feel a double contempt. and is very uneasy. This phænomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above-explain’d. and never unite. I yet find myself easier in that situation. or thinks himself intitled to it by his birth and quality. but ’tis because of the opposition betwixt the passion. and that receiv’d by sympathy. upon examination. This very circumstance of the diminution of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention. The contempt of my neighbours has a certain influence. will serve to confirm it. or perceives you are in jest. 170 . which they are conscious they do not deserve. this difference of ideas separates the impressions arising from the contempt. A person in these circumstances naturally conceals his birth from those among whom he lives. which must contribute very much to his ease and satisfaction. and never receives it by a sympathy with others. when taken in a proper light. but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments. where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions. but as those. who are connected with me by those two relations. that these objections. Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man. and consequently am but lightly treated. but they are absent. much superior to his present fortune and way of living. and keeps them from running into each other. as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are at once both my neighbours and kindred. we shall find. as has also that of my kindred: But these influences are distinct. from my relations. and strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others. Suppose I am plac’d in a poor condition among strangers. Every thing in this world is judg’d of by comparison. they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy. from those about me. by means of the association betwixt the idea of their persons. are ignorant of them. Plagiaries are delighted with praises. that relations are requisite to sympathy. Thirdly. tho’ they do not most readily assent to it. with whom he lives. every thing below is disagreeable and even shameful. and ’tis with the greatest industry he conceals his pretensions to a better fortune. but not being united in the same persons. and by his sympathy with you. and that of our own. If there be any objections to this hypothesis. When a man has either been accustom’d to a more splendid way of living. What is an immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince. Here he himself knows his misfortunes. but by the hold it takes of himself. Proud men are most shock’d with contempt.

Let us. and from the agreement of these experiments to derive an additional argument for any particular hypothesis. or turkey. that every species of creatures. Thus in whatever light we consider this subject. which give them this vanity. Add to this. but also that ’tis the only thing. the progress of the chyle. Thus tho’ the mixture of humours and the composition of minute parts may justly be presum’d to be somewhat different in men from what it is in mere animals. we may still observe. and that nothing can excite either of these passions. may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other. Such simple and natural principles. but especially of the nobler kind. which is found so just and useful in reasonings concerning the body. that have escap’d me. and are pleas’d with his praises and caresses. that a tendency to produce pleasure or pain is common to all the causes of pride or humility. and therefore that all their effects. are deriv’d solely from that origin. the circulation of the blood. ’Tis plain. that pride and humility are not merely human passions. and according as it agrees or disagrees with the experiments we may make in any species of creatures. independent of every other consideration. that in the two last species of animals. in the same manner as that passion is excited in mankind. the fabric and situation of the heart. of the lungs. In order to this we must first shew the correspondence of passions in men and animals. The vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing have been commonly remark’d. pride and humility. founded on such solid proofs. and afterwards compare the causes. which produce these passions. show an evident pride in his approbation. unless it be both related to ourselves. cannot fail to be receiv’d by philosophers. and his contempt of all others. and of every other animal in his particular excellency. We have farther prov’d. yet as the structure of the veins and muscles. but extend themselves over the whole animal creation. are the same or nearly the same in all animals. as likewise that of horses in swiftness. The very port and gait of a swan. we may draw a proof of its truth or falsehood on the whole. the causes of that operation cannot be different. that the most considerable causes of these passions are really nothing but the power of producing either agreeable or uneasy sensations. and therefore any experiment we make upon the one concerning the effects of medicines will not always apply to the other. This is the more remarkable. therefore.SECTION XII. Of the pride and humility of animals. or peacock show the high idea he has entertain’d of himself. must be applicable to every one. ’Tis indeed certain. the very same hypothesis. and the operation of these parts also the same. by which they operate. which approach so often to man. there are many evident marks of pride and humility. which in one species explains muscular motion. unless oppos’d by some objections. that almost in every species of creatures. of hounds in sagacity and smell. Nor are they the caresses of every one without distinction. as to familiarize themselves with him. All these are evident proofs. the pride always attends the beauty. the stomach. that where the structure of parts in brutes is the same as in men. apply this method of enquiry. and is discover’d in the male only. 171 . ’Tis usual with anatomists to join their observations and experiments on human bodies to those on beasts. to our present anatomy of the mind. and that whatever we discover to be true of the one species. and see what discoveries we can make by it. and amongst the rest. We have not only prov’d. the liver and other parts. that the causes of pride and humility correspond exactly to our hypothesis. which is common. and produces a pleasure or pain independent of the passion. and consequently is the quality. but those principally of the persons they know and love. of the bull and cock in strength.

will be found an objection to every other system. and since the causes. that has hid a bone. and deriv’d from the same causes. in the minds of animals as in those of men. and if we find upon trial. that ’tis applicable to every sensible creature. even tho’ he discover no signs of any present danger. that are necessary in us to produce either pride or humility. making a just allowance for our superior knowledge and understanding. According to all rules of analogy. In like manner. the manner. of which all animals shew so evident a judgement. A dog. and that their minds are frequently convey’d thro’ a series of connected emotions. since those passions are the same. that there is evidently the same relation of ideas. In like manner. whether of his master or of the sex. that the explication of these phænomena. A dog. when he has been heartily beat in any place. and are incapable of that of right and property. and supposes so little reflexion and judgement. But so far as regards the body. is in reality without foundation. but as that relation makes a considerable ingredient in causation. this is justly to be expected. Thus animals have little or no sense of virtue or vice. My hypothesis is so simple. which produces a relation among his ideas. often forgets the place. when elevated with joy. I am confident. be also the same. that these causes operate after the same manner thro’ the whole animal creation. The next question is. In order to decide this question. we may justly conclude. There are also instances of the relation of impressions. and ’tis on beauty. strength. that there is an union of certain affections with each other in the inferior species of creatures as well as in the superior. is by the smallest occasion converted into anger. in which the causes operate. For which reason the causes of their pride and humility must lie solely in the body. are common to all creatures. whether. will not apply to the rest. which excite these passions. we may conclude that the three relations of resemblance. contiguity and causation operate in the same manner upon beasts as upon human creatures. 172 . we may presume that that explication. which at first was grief. which we make use of in one species. runs naturally into love and kindness. and that passion.The causes of these passions are likewise much the same in beasts as in us. he becomes quarrelsome and illnatur’d. swiftness or some other useful or agreeable quality that this passion is always founded. The effects of resemblance are not so remarkable. but. when full of pain and sorrow. are likewise the same. and arise from the same causes thro’ the whole creation. his thought passes easily to what he formerly conceal’d. which must not only be allow’d to be a convincing proof of its veracity. but when brought to it. by means of the contiguity. however specious. let us consider. sufficient to convince us. they quickly lose sight of the relations of blood. Thus all the internal principles. the same qualities cause pride in the animal as in the human kind. and can never be plac’d either in the mind or external objects. he will tremble on his approach to it.

except from the injuries of others. This is sufficiently evident from experience. knowledge. But tho’ the object of love and hatred be always some other person. Of the objects and causes of love and hatred. and here repeat it concerning love and hatred. it wou’d produce these opposite passions in an equal degree. and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience. without any mixture or composition. but never feel any anger or hatred. which evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one. ’tis not in a proper sense. that we shall be oblig’d to begin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former. of whose thoughts. as likewise from the external advantages and disadvantages of family. that is possess’d of a stately palace. and the subject on which it is plac’d. commands the esteem of the people upon that account. As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person. in order to explain the latter. and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions. if that object were also their cause. good sense. cloaths. possessions. The removal of either of these destroys the passion. and secondly. A prince. destroy each other. swiftness. nation and climate. and as they must. or hatred and contempt. dexterity. and have not many things in common. by the beauty of the palace. ’Tis the same case with hatred. therefore. nor has the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion. of whose thoughts. wit. and that both because these are the subjects of our present enquiry. from the very first moment. There must. of love and hatred. such as beauty. good humour of any person. actions.PART II. and when we talk of self-love. and that because they produce merely a simple impression. The same passions arise from bodily accomplishments. For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their sensation. drawn from their nature. we shall find they are very much diversify’d. From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt the quality that operates. by the relation of property. actions. There is not one of these objects. and from their contraries. origin. which is excited by a friend or mistress. The virtue. hatred and contempt. as the opposite qualities. or alone sufficient to excite them. the cause of these passions. and that first. none of them wou’d ever be able to make its appearance. properly speaking. Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us. We may be mortified by our own faults and follies. so the object of love and hatred is some other person. If we consider the causes of love and hatred. thro’ all the observations which we have form’d concerning pride and humility. ’tis plain that the object is not. SECTION I. ’Twou’d be as unnecessary to attempt any description of them. force. which connects it with him. causes and objects. and sensations we are intimately conscious. This we have already observ’d concerning pride and humility. ’Twou’d be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred. and have the same object in common. but what by its different qualities may produce love and esteem. ’Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and hatred. and sensations we are not conscious. produce love and esteem. and which are equally applicable to both sets of pas173 . be some cause different from the object.

Experiments to confirm this system. cause love or hatred. that the cause of love and hatred must be related to a person or thinking being. beauty and deformity. will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter. that they become in a manner undistinguishable. But if love and esteem were not produc’d by the same qualities as pride. but too evident to be contested. SECTION II. which tells us what will operate on others. but are sufficiently guided by common experience. few can form exact systems of the passions. by what we feel immediately in ourselves. and that because in the transition the one impression is so much confounded with the other. we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular. There are few persons. and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable. and that the cause of the former produce a separate pleasure. according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others. when consider’d in the abstract. that a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions. in order to produce these passions. ’Tis not so evident at first sight. that every cause of these passions produces a separate pain or pleasure. or fortune. I might here observe the same method with the same success. that this person will pay me the same respect. are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation. we have easily been able to make the separation. all the arguments that have been employ’d to prove. A person looking out at a window. in examining particularly the several causes of love and hatred. excite no degree of love or hatred. as if I were owner of the palace. esteem or contempt towards those. or make reflexions on their general nature and resemblances. when plac’d on inanimate objects. especially as ’tis a 174 . that are satisfy’d with their own character. viz. who are not desirous of shewing themselves to the world. as well as by a kind of presensation. I delay this examination for a moment: And in the mean time shall endeavour to convert to my present purpose all my reasonings concerning pride and humility.sions. poverty and riches. that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion. or genius. when belonging to a third person. that the very same qualities and circumstances. Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humility. who have no relation to them. and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being. no one will make any scruple to assent to that conclusion I draw from them. Virtue and vice. with which I have no concern: I believe none will pretend. Now ’tis evident. We may also suppose with some shew of probability. nor cou’d men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person. that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person. But as in pride and humility. Upon duly weighing these arguments. concerning the transition along related impressions and ideas. sees me in the street. and beyond me a beautiful palace. is not only probable. which are the causes of pride or self-esteem. ’Twill be sufficient to remark in general. with those themselves have entertain’d. this method of proceeding wou’d be very absurd. But as I hasten to a full and decisive proof of these systems. and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy’d. One of these suppositions. by an argument that is founded on unquestionable experience. and of the latter a separate uneasiness. and of the latter uneasy. But without such a progress in philosophy. ’Tis true. and to prove.

The passions of pride and humility. To proceed with the greater order in these experiments. that wants both these relations can ever produce any passion. no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected. it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and humility. No object. let us bestow on it only one of these relations. viz. Upon the whole. Let us repeat the experiment in all the dispositions. This we must prove by our experiments. that belongs either to me or my companion. ’Tis evident here are four affections. belonging to neither of us. and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion. in company with some other person. that being plac’d in the situation above-mention’d. that has no relation either of impressions or ideas to any of these passions. or other common object. and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion. are connected together by the identity of their object. which opposition of the passions must destroy both. whom I formerly regarded without any sentiments either of friendship or enmity. Let us apply it to love. and by that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: ’Tis plain. which I have formerly touch’d upon. Here I have the natural and ultimate object of all these four passions plac’d before me. produce any passion without these relations. will. pride and love are agreeable passions. and of sensation to the passion itself. Let us change the object. in any disposition. to humility. to the second some other person. Again. and causing of itself no emotion.principle. I say then. none of them ever arises in the smallest degree imaginable. let us first suppose. let us suppose I am in company with a person. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love. pride is connected with humility. I regard a stone or any common object. But that we may place this system beyond doubt both with regard to love and hatred. humility with hatred. according as the object belongs to ourselves or others. Regard now with attention the nature of these passions. pride and humility. in a square or regular connexion with. viz. Myself am the proper object of pride or humility. that causes not 175 . Thus suppose. which to the first set of passions is self. as well as to recall a few of these observations. of which the mind is susceptible. that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly on the mind. In order to make these experiments. the other person of love or hatred. that has neither of these two relations. This reasoning a priori is confirmed by experience. to hatred. and distance from each other. and may be consider’d as the other two sides of the square. or independent pain and pleasure: ’Tis evident such an object will produce none of these four passions. Since an object. as well as those of love and hatred. love with hatred. in the vast variety of nature. These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square. ’twill be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions. For besides. by their sensations or impressions. and their situation with respect to each other. First Experiment. there is an object presented. Let us try it upon each of them successively. provided still we choose one. that nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation. by their objects or ideas: Pride with love. and see what will follow. to pride. love and hatred. Thus suppose we regard together an ordinary stone. as oft as we please. that to consider the matter a priori. Second Experiment. hatred and humility uneasy. No trivial or vulgar object. of ideas to the object of the passion. plac’d. so easy and natural. in itself. as it were.

which has only one of these relations. but. it can never be the immediate cause of pride or love. be able to produce the affections of pride or humility. it can found these affections. that bears either of us a closer relation. I choose an object. but an uncertain connexion with these passions. wou’d be. that is connected with the passion merely by a relation of impressions. But to leave as little room for doubt as possible. But what passion? That very one of pride. may give such a turn to the disposition.a pain or pleasure. and therefore if I found not the passion on some other object. and observe what follows from this alteration. this may put me into good humour both with myself and fellow-traveller. Having found. I remove first one relation. that the object will have a small. and let us observe the consequences. Third Experiment. than as an establish’d passion. on the contrary. The case is the same where the object produces uneasiness. that if the prospects be beautiful. there immediately arises a passion. What our reason wou’d conclude from analogy. either to ourselves or others. that cause a transition of that kind. we may from thence infer. such as virtue. and the inns commodious. But I am not content with this. that tho’ the one impression be easily transfus’d into the other. not to myself. which by their opposition destroy each other. then another. nor an object. love or hatred. therefore. without any farther experiment. Suppose I were travelling with a companion thro’ a country. ’tis evident. which is agreeable or disagreeable. and instead of removing the relation. that has only one relation. and find. upon which. independent of the passion. that this transition from the sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any principle. To consider the matter first a priori. that neither an object without any relation of ideas or impressions. humility or hatred. yet the change of objects is suppos’d contrary to all the principles. and find. Let us now remove this relation. and in its stead place a relation of impressions. which produces pleasure or uneasiness. and leaves the object perfectly indifferent. and see whether the event in this case answers our expectation. but has no manner of connexion either with ourselves or others. we may conclude. to which we are both utter strangers. reason alone may convince us. nor directs us with equal force to two contrary passions. to which this object bears a double relation. and search for other objects. That I may be sure I am not mistaken in this experiment. ’Tis evident. on the other hand. Its idea is related to that of self. that an object. that this country has no relation either to myself or friend. but has no relation either to ourself or companion. that causes a separate satisfaction: On this object I bestow a relation to self. but that an object. love or hatred. I suppose the virtue to belong to my companion. the roads agreeable. But as we suppose. But if we consider. by a double relation. that nothing will ever be a steady or durable cause of any passion. can ever cause pride or humility. that from this disposition of affairs. that this relation is not a cold and imperceptible one. can never give rise to any constant and establish’d passion. Most fortunately all this reasoning is found to be exactly conformable to experience. by presenting an object. that whatever has a double relation must necessarily excite these passions. that a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections. my emotions are rather to be consider’d as the overflowings of an elevate or humane disposition. by its property or other relations. Fourth Experiment. I immediately per176 . that each removal destroys the passion. after ballancing these arguments. the object of the passion: The sensation it causes resembles the sensation of the passion. I make a still farther trial. as in the preceding experiment. I only change it for one of a different kind. tho’ the most advantageous one. For besides. and the phænomena of the passions. will ever. since ’tis evident they must have some cause. let us renew our experiments. as that it may naturally fall into pride or love. it has not the inconvenience of the relation of ideas. that produces a transition of ideas.

that the person. that the affections wou’d rest there. by a change of their relations: And in whatever order we proceed. by means of its double relations. then. when plac’d on another. and suppose the vice to belong to myself. conformable to my hypothesis. in which I first found it. which for the same reason arises from virtue. of which he is the object. hatred.ceive the affections to wheel about. according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy. where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions and ideas. convert the pleasant impression. To give greater authority to these experiments. But to make the matter still more certain. indeed. viz. let us change the situation of affairs as much as possible. which arises from the former. along with whom I make all these experiments. The virtue of a brother must make me love him. as nothing mortifies us more 177 . the experiment is not in the least diversify’d. and have by these changes brought back the passion to that very situation. gives rise to pride or humility. The person has a relation of ideas to myself. He is. and leaving pride. Vice. whether thro’ pride. A subsequent change of the passion from hatred to humility. Being fully convinc’d of the influence of this relation. is closely connected with me either by blood or friendship. but by a new transition. Esteem and contempt. the passion. I alter the object. and find after all that I have compleated the round. let us determine what they ought to be. excites. my son or brother. Each of these objects runs the circle of the passions in the same manner. This humility I convert into pride by a new change of the impression. and by changing virtue for vice. I try the effects of the other. the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carry’d farther. who by means of a double relation is the object of my passion. This is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis. By repeating the same experiment. Fifth Experiment. But to judge only from the situation of affairs. and am pleas’d to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my expectation. Let us next suppose. To continue the experiment. but these are at the bottom the same passions. power and servitude. the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person. Before we consider what they are in fact. love. The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred. ’Tis plain. and place the passions and objects in all the different positions. that the cause of the passion acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person. the passion of hatred. which I have all along requir’d. of which they are susceptible. where there is only one relation. and let us see what the effects are of all these complicated attractions and relations. arise on some occasions instead of love and hatred. make the trial upon beauty and deformity. hatred. I shou’d not expect. riches and poverty. fall to the side of love. As there is here a person. I change anew the relation of ideas. from similar causes. in changing anew the relation of ideas. which proceeds from the latter. that. who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations. Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations. humility. of impressions. and instead of vice and virtue. only diversify’d by some causes. love. Let us suppose. as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion. or thro’ humility. into the disagreeable one. ’Tis evident. I bring the affections back to pride. by being either agreeable or uneasy. or is united to me by a long and familiar acquaintance. pride. that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred. and by a new repetition I again place them at love or kindness. we shall suppose. beside the relations above-mention’d. has a relation of impressions to pride or humility. and never transfuse themselves into any other impression. which we shall explain afterwards. The effect still answers expectation. according to the supposition. instead of love. What follows? What is usual.

which causes first love or hatred. shou’d no longer take place. tho’ ’tis evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility. however strong may be their relation to our first object. and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections. We never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves. its influence. and a perfect transition arise from the double relation. This easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions. we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves. This may at first sight be esteem’d contrary to my hypothesis: since the relations of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same. that while the relation of ideas. and appears in a full and strong light. For the same reason. their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person. our sentiments and passions. This difficulty we may easily solve by the following reflexions. ’tis evident its influence on the passions must also cease. and when they act upon the same object. how closely so ever connected with us. and preserving still the same relations. This exact conformity of experience to our reasoning is a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypothesis. that strikes upon us with vivacity. that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother. But every thing. they have very different effects on the imagination. and afterwards pride or humility. when it is once present. Besides innumerable experiments that prove this. The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility. that like causes must produce like effects. as in the preceding instance. In the one case the relation is aided by another principle: In the other case. in a manner. that even when the relation remains. that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke. forces itself. the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person. that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together. ’Tis evident. Myself am related to the person. begin only with a different passion. therefore. is 178 . who is related to us: Experience shews us. when their propensities are similar. it engages the attention. strictly speaking. Pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred. into our consideration. without any immediate connexion with the person. as in all other cases. which is a clear proof. It shou’d. The two impulses concur with each other. in causing a transition of the imagination. that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves. be expected. that the latter passions are chang’d into the former. This is the reason why pride or humility is not transfus’d into love or hatred with the same ease. ’tis oppos’d by it. and that the mind is not convey’d from one passion to another. The passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself. and render the whole transition more smooth and easy. and facilitates or retards their transition. upon which we reason. but with difficulty from lively to obscure. Now I have observ’d. as being dependent entirely on that transition. But if it shou’d happen. of whom we are every moment conscious. If a person be my brother I am his likewise: But tho’ the relations be reciprocal. Sixth Experiment. and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other. if by any particular circumstance its usual effect upon the fancy in producing an association or transition of ideas. continues the same. This evidence will be still augmented. The mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it. and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint and most trivial relation. that those two faculties of the mind. Suppose. and keeps it from wandering to other objects.than their vice or infamy. But when the affections are once directed to ourself. assist each other in their operation. we here find. The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas. if we reverse the experiment. the imagination and passions.

which determines the imagination to pass from remote to contiguous objects. is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects. nor is there any thing. tho’ entirely innocent of that. of impressions and ideas is able to produce a transition from one to the other. the less for the greater. but especially if the latter takes the precedence. before we proceed any farther. ’Tis evident. Some may. which displeases us. Thus ’tis more natural for us to love the son upon account of the father. much more an identity of impressions with a relation of ideas. than the father upon account of the son. that the very same reason. or resemble us. where our first quarrel is with the head of it. we must consider. in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate. and an identity of impressions must produce a stronger connexion. find a contradiction betwixt this phænomenon and that of sympathy. ’tis not natural to quit the consideration of it. In like manner we more readily contract a hatred against a whole family. and first engages our attention. like other objects. and the lesser takes the precedence. and as we have already seen the effects of related passions and ideas. than where we are displeas’d with a son.prevented. where the more considerable object is first presented. that tho’ all passions pass easily from one object to another related to it. Accordingly we find. perhaps. let us here suppose an identity of passions along with a relation of ideas. till the passion be exhausted. that can be imagin’d. where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us. Nothing is more natural than to bear a kindness to one brother on account of our friendship for another. or servant. But this difficulty will vanish. Ourself. than the greater for the less. There is only one difficulty in this experiment. independent of the perception of every other object. let us make a new experiment. and whatever is most taken notice of. We are more apt to overlook in any subject. To put this whole reasoning to a farther trial. Whatever has the greatest influence is most taken notice of. our passions. the servant for the master. the passions seldom continue within their first bounds. than the master for the servant. is in like manner prevented. since the relation of ideas is suppos’d still to continue. Instances of this kind are every where to be met with. than what appears of considerable moment. what is trivial. our fancy is naturally deter179 . but extend themselves towards all the contiguous objects. as in the present case. than the prince for the subject. Seventh Experiment. which it will be necessary to account for. and ’tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us. where we are suppos’d to be actuated with pride or humility. and let us consider the effects of this new situation. than the most perfect resemblance. If a double relation. wherein consists the difficulty of explaining this phænomenon. or some inferior member. with more facility than from contiguous to remote. that when we either love or hate any person. But when self is the object of a passion. ’Tis evident a transition of the passions from the one object to the other is here in all reason to be expected. yet this transition is made with greater facility. in conveying us from one to another. causes it likewise to change with more ease. A quarrel with one person gives us a hatred for the whole family. In short. and comprehend the friends and relations of him we love or hate. its usual effect upon the passions. if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion. without any farther examination of his character. That we may comprehend. descend with greater facility than they ascend. than where this order is revers’d. therefore. presents itself most readily to the imagination. the subject for the prince. that fixes our attention on ourselves. Thus if any accident makes us consider the Satellites of Jupiter. and the lesser follows it.

because the passage in that case wou’d be from contiguous to remote. that this repugnance may arise from a difference of degree as well as of kind. in every respect. for 180 . And on this is founded that reproach of Cornelia to her sons. But the love or hatred of an inferior causes not readily any passion to the superior. when disturbed with a violent passion. but the fancy returns not with the same facility to the consideration of the provinces. when the passions unite together. is so different. and actuate the mind at the same time. than by that of the mother of the Gracchi. A weak passion. as well as in the latter? The virtues of a friend or brother produce first love. when added to a strong. and they do not both of them exist at once. makes not so considerable change in the disposition. and then love to a friend or brother. when calm or only moderately agitated. But the same relation has not an equal influence in conveying us back again. provided the one passion upon its appearance destroys the other.min’d to form the idea of that planet. that of the subject carries our view to the prince. in other words. and that where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions. We might find many other instances to confirm this principle. These two phænomena appear contradictory. that faculty must be overpower’d by some stronger principle of another kind. whom we honour and respect. if it be not rather greater. causes a passion to the inferior. than in passing from the weak to the strong. that no two persons can be more unlike. that they ought to be asham’d she shou’d be more known by the title of the daughter of Scipio. A man. But the case is entirely alter’d. and denominate her by what was more considerable and of greater moment. The mention of the provinces of any empire conveys our thought to the seat of the empire. were it not already sufficiently evident. In short. passing from her who was intermediate. But ’tis observable. and plac’d in an equal relation to both. This was. Our own virtues produce not first pride. that impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance. as a strong when added to a weak. wou’d always leave them. than from a small to a great degree of either of these affections. contrary to its propensity. The idea of the servant makes us think of the master. because in that case the imagination passes from remote to contiguous. nor do we experience a greater difficulty in passing suddenly from a small degree of love to a small degree of hatred. nor is it easy to pass from the one extreme to the other. As the transition of ideas is here made contrary to the natural propensity of the imagination. a repugnance in the dispositions produces a difficulty in the transition of the passions. the same facility of transition operates not in the same manner upon superior and inferior as upon contiguous and remote. rather than husbands that of their wives. without a considerable interval betwixt them. it very naturally passes from the one to the other: As on the contrary. and as there is nothing ever present to the mind but impressions and ideas. from himself. this principle must necessarily lie in the impressions. as also the ceremony of giving the precedency to those. and require some attention to be reconcil’d. but if we first reflect on the principal planet. ’tis more natural for us to overlook its attendants. in passing from the strong passion to the weak. tho’ that be the natural propensity of the imagination: While the love or hatred of a superior. contrary to its propensity. exhorting them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather. according to its propensity. as from remote to contiguous. On the same principle is founded that common custom of making wives bear the name of their husbands. otherwise the imagination of the people. why does not this easy transition of ideas assist the transition of passions in the former case. The difficulty is not less. Now since the fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater. Now it has been observ’d. and then pride.

which. a passion directed to the former. but ’tis commonly by complying with it. the passage is by that means render’d more easy and natural betwixt them. that a relation of ideas. when the very cause of the pride and humility is plac’d in some other person. and by seeking another quality. viz. than betwixt the small degree and the great. As in the foregoing experiment we found. if we consider the manner in which the mind here reconciles the contradiction.which reason there is a closer connexion betwixt the great degree and the small. I must. ceases likewise to operate on the passions. from whence the opposition arises. and an affection directed to a person. by any particular circumstance. we little think of his children or servants. ceases to produce its usual effect of facilitating the transition of ideas. And these proofs will be confirm’d. nor can it possibly confine its view to ourselves. and the addition of the weaker making no considerable change on the disposition. when duly weigh’d. When we turn our thought to a great and a small object. or when it lies any ways in our power to serve them. When we love the father or master of a family. and that the difficulty. however. the imagination finds more facility in passing from the small to the great. Thus nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person. when the great and little are related together. which brings the matter to an equality. than from the greater to the less: But on the contrary a violent passion produces more easily a feeble. which the fancy makes to the transition of the affections. If the imagination finds a difficulty in passing from greater to less. produces always a similar passion towards the latter. produces a more sensible alteration on the temper. But when these are present with us. so in the present experiment we find the same property of the impressions. In this opposition the passion in the end prevails over the imagination. than his approbation of our conduct and character: As on the other hand. who is considerable in our eyes. and draw the mind to their side. Eighth Experiment. which may counter-ballance that principle. it finds an equal facility in passing from remote to contiguous. is more easy than from pride or humility to love or hatred. In spite of the difficulty of passing from the idea of great to that of little. and that because the addition of the great to the little. fills and possesses the mind much more than one. The strongest passion in this case takes the precedence. it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater. Two different degrees of the same passion are surely related together. or at least removes that opposition. than from the great to the small. no wonder they prevail over it. The idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master. I have observ’d betwixt the passions and the imagination. which has for its object a person we esteem of less consequence. but if the smaller be first present. I have observ’d that the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility. the nearness and contiguity in this case encreases their magnitude. but the affections find a greater difficulty: And as the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination. Here then the contradiction betwixt the propensities of the imagination and passion displays itself. but the hatred or love of the master produces with greater facility anger or good-will to the servant. The degree of any passion depends upon the nature of its object. which the imagination finds in passing from contiguous to remote. than that does a violent. These phænomena. make one exception. For in that case the imagination is necessitated to consider the person. than his blame or con181 . The fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater. than the addition of the little to the great. will be found convincing proofs of this hypothesis. and leaves the way open from the one passion to the other. nothing inspires us with a stronger hatred. is the cause why we scarce have any instance of the latter transition of the affections.

Nay we may observe. prevents not the transition. as well as of courage and conduct. If the general of our enemies be successful. that prevents the transition. and that ’tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas. and is a pattern of virtue. where that circumstance. In examining the compound affections. tho’ present. And indeed. to render himself useful or agreeable to us. Difficulties solv’d. as is reported of Oliver Cromwell and the Duke of Luxembourg: He is bloody-minded. This rule we find still to hold good61 . But if the success be on our side. In removing some difficulties. which upon examination is found to proceed from some particular circumstance. humility nor hatred. whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred. concerning particular causes of these passions. and as relation is frequently experienc’d to have no effect. that the imagination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote. never produces either of these passions. we detest them under the character of cruel. and gives rise neither to pride nor love. or his flattery. but because that very person is the real cause of our first passion. has not its usual effect of producing a transition either of 60 ideas or of impressions. whose object is some other person. which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions. which counterballances it. Nothing is more evident. then. When our own nation is at war with any other. or is expos’d to our ill-will. that the original passion is pride or humility. rather a confirmation of the rule. love and hatred are produc’d. perfidious. humility. is sure of our affections: As on the other hand. therefore. No wonder. by any particular circumstance. moderate. or 58 with but one. and ’tis 59 found that the passion always varies in conformity to the relation. whose object is self. and that the passions keep pace exactly with the sensations in all their changes and variations. his beauty. the imagination returns back again attended with the related passions of love and hatred. we shall find that the same principle appears in all of them. in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him. notwithstanding the rule I have already establish’d. An object without 57 a relation.tempt. employ the sequel of this part. After so many and such undeniable proofs drawn from daily experience and observation. it ceases to operate upon the passions. This is not a contradiction. and an exception that arises from the same reason with the rule itself. than that any person acquires our kindness. Here ’tis evident. I shall. and of consequence is intimately connected with it. ’tis found to arise from some other circumstance. Secondly. Thus not only the variations resolve themselves into the general principle. He is a sorcerer: He has a communication with dæmons. Such an exception as this is. our commander has all the opposite good qualities. Whoever can find the means either by his services. SECTION III. but an exception to the rule. His treachery we call policy: His cru182 . that where the relation. if we consider all the eight experiments I have explain’d. and disapprobation. so even in instances. ’Tis his approbation that produces pride. ’tis with difficulty we allow him the figure and character of a man. First. and merciful. but even the variations of these variations. therefore. even under the appearance of its contrary. and takes a pleasure in death and destruction. unjust and violent: But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable. and that this passion is transfus’d into love or hatred. pride and humility. it may seem superfluous to enter into a particular examination of all the causes of love and hatred. But the transition in this case is not made merely on account of the relation betwixt ourselves and the person.

We can never think of him without reflecting on these qualities. which approaches it. but still is sufficient to shew. In like manner. It reaches not the sensible and thinking part. and require not only that the pain and pleasure arise from the person. but passes in a moment. and with a particular design and intention. every one of his faults we either endeavour to extenuate. But when the violence of the impression is once a little abated. On the other hand. but likewise that it arise knowingly. But we must farther consider. nor is there any thing more certain. ’tis necessary. By the intention we judge of the actions. the mere harm gives us a less sensible uneasiness. removes the mortification in the one case. The removal of the intention. in order to produce some relation. that there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger. why an intention is requisite to excite either love or hatred. or dignify it with the name of that virtue. who does us any service after the same manner. I grant. I am sure. than that men often fall into a violent anger for injuries. which remaining after the action is perform’d. For ’tis observable. and connect this action sufficiently with the person. But here we must make a distinction. In short. and according as that is good or bad. But then I ask. and vanity in the other. and must of course cause a remarkable diminution in the passions of love and hatred. A man. and neither proceeds from any thing durable in him. unless repentance and a change of life have produc’d an alteration in that respect: In which case the passion is likewise alter’d. This therefore is one reason. a good office is agreeable. that it be deriv’d from a particular fore-thought and design. be constant and inherent in his person and character.elty is an evil inseparable from war. which they themselves must own to be entirely involuntary and accidental. nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one. that the principal part of an injury is the contempt and hatred. in diminishing the relations of impressions and ideas. There are some. in order to give rise to these passions. who performs it. and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other. nor leaves any thing behind it. which it shews in the person. ’Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro’ common life. which pleases or displeases. that an intention. but an action. it will cause love or hatred independent of the intention: But otherwise a knowledge and design is requisite. But if the uneasiness proceed not from a quality. and have him for its immediate cause and author. who add another condition. and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas. an intention shews certain qualities. that the action arise from the person. that injures us. which is produc’d and annihilated in a moment. if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? Experience. indeed. ’Tis not enough. and is as if it had never been. nor able to remove every degree of these relations. This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions. tho’ nothing be more certain. that these effects of the removal of design. and as the character of a person is no wise interested in 183 . cannot be of long continuance. and is a proof of the kindness and esteem of the person. who wounds and harms us by accident. connect it with the person. and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness. chiefly because it flatters our vanity. informs us of the contrary. besides its strengthening the relation of ideas. One that is disagreeable by his deformity or folly is the object of our aversion. becomes not our enemy upon that account. and without that. they become causes of love or hatred. the defect of the relation begins to be better felt. than that he has not the least intention of displeasing us by these qualities. are not entire. This emotion. If that quality in another. is often necessary to produce a relation of impressions.

we are apt to imagine him criminal. 184 . How few criminals are there. tho’ we must acknowledge. The harm and the justice are two contrary objects. or more properly speaking. that this circumstance is not decisive. and a lesser degree of the same affection. it seldom happens that on their account. and the knowing cause of our sufferings. of which the one has a tendency to produce hatred. This is a clear proof. without proving that the anger arises only from the injury. that accuses them. that. in order to produce either love or hatred. Let us examine a little this phænomenon. which we find by experience to produce these passions. Nor has consanguinity alone this effect. proceeding not from hatred and ill-will. if we be in any degree reasonable. as the relation lessens. we entertain a lasting enmity. SECTION IV. that when we receive harm from any person. excite not any degree. The removal of injury may remove the anger. proportion’d to the connexion. why several actions. that not only the uneasiness. wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects. Here the idea of injury produces not the passion. any harm or uneasiness has a natural tendency to excite our hatred. and ’tis according to their different degrees. viz. Whoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love. that this relation is always attended with both the others. since otherwise it must suffer a considerable diminution. we may observe. even tho’ they be conscious of their own deserts? In like manner our antagonist in a law-suit. that condemns them. or to the judge. and excites its proper passion. Nor is it any wonder that passion should produce the opinion of injury. without enquiring into his other qualities. and the other love. One that has a real design of harming us. but from justice and equity. which all the passions avoid as much as possible. are commonly regarded as our enemies. Of the love of relations. and tho’ it may be able to diminish the passions. that cause a real pleasure or uneasiness. that either of the objects prevails. But tho’ this be universally true. that their motive is entirely as justifiable as our own. notwithstanding he is both the cause.such injuries as are casual and involuntary. if we wou’d but reflect a moment. has but little force to excite our passion. but also that which arises from an acknowledg’d necessity and duty. According to the preceding system there is always requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect. Besides we may consider. draws not upon him our anger. which proceeds from another by accident. independent of the opinion of iniquity. ’tis seldom it can entirely remove them. ’Tis evident in the first place. and our particular turn of thinking. but arises from it. ’tis remarkable that the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind. ’twill be necessary to shew. and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion. betwixt ourselves and the object. or but a small one. Having given a reason. and our competitor for any office. of the passion of love or hatred towards the actors. To illustrate this doctrine by a parallel instance. Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children. and ’tis with extreme difficulty we allow of his justice and innocence. who have no ill-will to the person.

which are caus’d by any object. have observ’d. Every one of these relations is esteemed some tie. it operates after the manner of a relation. From this. We love our country-men. 185 . Hence company is naturally so rejoicing. of which he is possess’d. This must. of itself. when the proper object of kindness and good-will. This being once admitted. he immediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair. because such an idea becomes a kind of passion. without any kind of relation. and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects. when not sustain’d by some brisk and lively emotion. gives rise to love and kindness. so the company of our relations and acquaintance must be peculiarly agreeable. and lets us see. be the influencing quality. and is of more durable influence. in the very instant of their production. or acquaintance facilitates the entrance. than any other image or conception. proceeds that continual search after amusement in gaming. our neighbours. by which we endeavour to forget ourselves. that people associate together according to their particular tempers and dispositions. and that when you loosen all the holds. therefore. There is another phænomenon. by producing a connexion of ideas. to its own entertainment. and may be both explain’d from the same principle. tho’ in frequenting his company we have not been able to discover any very valuable quality. and strengthens the conception of any object. it operates by some other principle. say they. which always arises betwixt similar characters. and even name with ourselves. and that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay. And as reasoning and education concur only in producing a lively and strong idea of any object. that acquaintance. as it were. in hunting. viz. When we have contracted a habitude and intimacy with any person. viz. and agitate the spirits. and makes us have an affectionate regard for every thing. it must be from the force and liveliness of conception. as the serious bear an affection to the serious. which is common to relation and acquaintance. and gives a title to a share of our affection. the second to education. Those. from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour. into which they fall. all the rest is easy. Every lively idea is agreeable. who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature. profession. On the appearance of such an object it awakes. and excite our spirits from the languid state. that I own the mind to be insufficient. To this method of thinking I so far agree. that produces it. all the emotions. by which they produce all their common effects.but any other relation without exception. as presenting the liveliest of all objects. by inlivening our thought. Whatever is related to us is conceiv’d in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object. ’Tis obvious. makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections. which he has of external objects. The first case is parallel to our reasonings from cause and effect. who communicates to us all the actions of his mind. in business. For as the company of strangers is agreeable to us for a short time. Such a conception is peculiarly agreeable. of whose superior merit we are fully convinc’d. and love or kindness being one of these effects. but especially that of a passion. These two phænomena of the effects of relation and acquaintance will give mutual light to each other. and by a certain sympathy. yet we cannot forbear preferring him to strangers. Custom also. Where they do not remark it. which is parallel to this. which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments. that the passion is deriv’d. so is this the only particular. those of the same trade. because it has this effect in a greater degree. that man is altogether insufficient to support himself. but also by the natural course of the disposition. and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind. where they remark this resemblance betwixt themselves and others. This not only happens. Where they remark the resemblance. a rational and thinking Being like ourselves. which may produce a lively sensation.

to which we are related. yet as we become familiar with the objects. not only that the imagination be convey’d from one to the other by resemblance. than any other. that belong to us. in treating of the affection we bear our acquaintance and relations. and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. we may learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits. It often happens. these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same. and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. If one object be the cause of another. and contract an acquaintance. In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression. ’tis requisite. to observe some pretty curious phænomena. and of all objects. it must be receiv’d as a confirmation of the foregoing reasoning. The great propensity men have to pride may be consider’d as another similar phænomenon. are more agreeable. however at first it might be disagreeable to us. by her second marriage. By the same quality of the mind we are seduc’d into a good opinion of ourselves. in themselves more valuable. the latter object must necessarily resemble the former. ’Tis easy to remark in common life. Nor does this happen only. that after we have liv’d a considerable time in any city. but even without any of these considerations. and merely because she has become part of another family. but in a much less degree: And ’tis certain the ties of blood are not so much loosen’d in the latter case as by the marriage of a mother. This also takes place with regard to the second marriage of a father. and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea. which attend it. that children esteem their relation to their mother to be weaken’d. as if she had continu’d in her state of widow-hood. or when her husband is much her inferior. and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object. These two phænomena are remarkable in themselves. contiguity or causation. 186 . It may not be amiss. and no longer regard her with the same eye. perhaps. ’Tis the same case with contiguity: And therefore the relation being always reciprocal. to have also a strong relation to a third object. returns not back with the same facility. In order to produce a perfect relation betwixt two objects. tho’. tho’ merely with the streets and buildings. in a great measure. and resemblance. the second object is effect to its cause. If one object resemble another. and naturally prefers them to others. They appear in a stronger light. The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us. But this change must be produc’d with the greater ease. acquaintance. but also that it return back from the second to the first with the same ease and facility.and if this latter principle be similar to the former. since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to relation. passing from the first object to the second. that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression. For supposing the second object. it may be thought. when they have felt any inconveniencies from her second marriage. and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity. And as in both cases a love or affection arises from the resemblance. beside its reciprocal relation to the first. At first sight this may seem a necessary and unavoidable consequence. to which it is accustom’d. not only by means of the relation. that the return of the imagination from the second to the first must also. the aversion diminishes by degrees. which. be equally natural as its passage from the first to the second. which we observe in others. but much more so when compar’d. in every case. are less known to it. But upon farther examination we shall easily discover our mistake. but also by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression. and at last changes into the opposite passion. tho’ the relation continues the same. in that case the thought. The mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects.

But after the imagination is arriv’d at this point of view. The thought has no longer the vibration. requisite to set it perfectly at ease. and gives a new impulse to the imagination. that tho’ the imagination goes easily from the view of a lesser object to that of a greater. The double motion is a kind of a double tie. that present themselves. The satisfaction we take in the riches of others. When my imagination goes from myself to my father. His superiority prevents the easy transition of the thought from him to his spouse. By this indulgence of the fancy in its inconstancy. of which I am myself a part. it finds its object to be surrounded with so many other relations. Of our esteem for the rich and powerful. and is at a loss what new object to pitch upon. but returns with difficulty. weakens the tie betwixt the first and second objects. This new relation. than his power and riches. which makes us 187 . Thirdly. such as houses. but as continuing the head of that family. because ’tis shar’d with a brother. than where the transition is easy only in one of these motions. and considers always two objects as more strongly related together. To the expectation of advantage from the rich and powerful by our sharing their possessions. because ’tis shar’d with her husband: Nor a son his with a parent. To sympathy. that it knows not which to prefer. It goes with facility. The fancy is by its very nature wavering and inconstant. and prevent that return of the fancy from her to myself. which.but is readily carry’d on to the third object. which is necessary to support the union. Now to give a reason. equipages. Here it happens most fortunately. but keeps the passage still open for a return to myself along the same relation of child and parent. being agreeable in themselves. and indulge its inclination to change. The third object is here related to the first. or a contempt. so that the double motion or vibration of thought is still easy and natural. yet it returns not with the same facility from the greater to the less. ’twill be proper in this place to explain these phænomena. the tie of child and parent still preserves its full force and influence. He is not sunk in the new relation he acquires. and by that interruption finds the relation much weaken’d from what it wou’d be were the passage open and easy on both sides. as well as to the second. To the objects they possess. The second marriage of a mother breaks not the relation of child and parent. which presents itself. it passes not so readily from him to his second wife. therefore. SECTION V. Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person. and binds the objects together in the closest and most intimate manner. Secondly. than his poverty and meanness: And as esteem and contempt are to be consider’d as species of love and hatred. that the greatest difficulty is not to discover a principle capable of producing such an effect. so that the imagination goes and comes along all of them with the greatest facility. by means of the new relation. which challenge its regard. The ties of interest and duty bind her to another family. gardens. First. A mother thinks not her tie to a son weaken’d. why this effect follows not in the same degree upon the second marriage of a father: we may reflect on what has been prov’d already. and the esteem we have for the possessors may be ascrib’d to three different causes. that either considers or surveys them. and that relation suffices to convey my imagination from myself to her with the greatest ease and facility. where it finds the passage equally easy both in going and returning. necessarily produce a sentiment of pleasure in every one. nor considers him as entering into a different family. but to choose the chief and predominant among several.

partake of the satisfaction of every one, that approaches us. All these principles may concur in producing the present phænomenon. The question is, to which of them we ought principally to ascribe it. ’Tis certain, that the first principle, viz. the reflection on agreeable objects, has a greater influence, than what, at first sight, we may be apt to imagine. We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho’ these sensations appear not much in our common indolent way of thinking, ’tis easy, either in reading or conversation, to discover them. Men of wit always turn the discourse on subjects that are entertaining to the imagination; and poets never present any objects but such as are of the same nature. Mr. Philips has chosen Cyder for the subject of an excellent poem. Beer wou’d not have been so proper, as being neither so agreeable to the taste nor eye. But he wou’d certainly have preferr’d wine to either of them, cou’d his native country have afforded him so agreeable a liquor. We may learn from thence, that every thing, which is agreeable to the senses, is also in some measure agreeable to the fancy, and conveys to the thought an image of that satisfaction, which it gives by its real application to the bodily organs. But tho’ these reasons may induce us to comprehend this delicacy of the imagination among the causes of the respect, which we pay the rich and powerful, there are many other reasons, that may keep us from regarding it as the sole or principal. For as the ideas of pleasure can have an influence only by means of their vivacity, which makes them approach impressions, ’tis most natural those ideas shou’d have that influence, which are favour’d by most circumstances, and have a natural tendency to become strong and lively; such as our ideas of the passions and sensations of any human creature. Every human creature resembles ourselves, and by that means has an advantage above any other object, in operating on the imagination. Besides, if we consider the nature of that faculty, and the great influence which all relations have upon it, we shall easily be perswaded, that however the ideas of the pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which the rich man enjoys, may become lively and agreeable, the fancy will not confine itself to them, but will carry its view to the related objects; and in particular, to the person, who possesses them. And this is the more natural, that the pleasant idea or image produces here a passion towards the person, by means of his relation to the object; so that ’tis unavoidable but he must enter into the original conception, since he makes the object of the derivative passion. But if he enters into the original conception, and is consider’d as enjoying these agreeable objects, ’tis sympathy, which is properly the cause of the affection; and the third principle is more powerful and universal than the first. Add to this, that riches and power alone, even tho’ unemploy’d, naturally cause esteem and respect: And consequently these passions arise not from the idea of any beautiful or agreeable objects. ’Tis true; money implies a kind of representation of such objects, by the power it affords of obtaining them; and for that reason may still be esteem’d proper to convey those agreeable images, which may give rise to the passion. But as this prospect is very distant, ’tis more natural for us to take a contiguous object, viz. the satisfaction, which this power affords the person, who is possest of it. And of this we shall be farther satisfy’d, if we consider, that riches represent the goods of life, only by means of the will; which employs them; and therefore imply in their very nature an idea of the person, and cannot be consider’d without a kind of sympathy with his sensations and enjoyments.

This we may confirm by a reflection, which to some will, perhaps, appear too subtile and refin’d. I have already observ’d, that power, as distinguish’d from its exercise, has either no meaning at all, or is nothing but a possibility or probability of existence; by which any object approaches to reality, and has a sensible influence on the mind. I have also observ’d, that this approach, by an illusion of the fancy, appears much greater, when we ourselves are possest of the power, than when it is enjoy’d by another; and that in the former case the objects seem to touch upon the very verge of reality, and convey almost an equal satisfaction, as if actually in our possession. Now I assert, that where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor, and that without such a sympathy the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, wou’d have but a feeble influence upon us. An avaritious man is respected for his money, tho’ he scarce is possest of a power; that is, there scarce is a probability or even possibility of his employing it in the acquisition of the pleasures and conveniences of life. To himself alone this power seems perfect and entire; and therefore we must receive his sentiments by sympathy, before we can have a strong intense idea of these enjoyments, or esteem him upon account of them. Thus we have found, that the first principle, viz. the agreeable idea of those objects, which riches afford the enjoyment of; resolves itself in a great measure into the third, and becomes a sympathy with the person we esteem or love. Let us now examine the second principle, viz. the agreeable expectation of advantage, and see what force we may justly attribute to it. ’Tis obvious, that tho’ riches and authority undoubtedly give their owner a power of doing us service, yet this power is not to be consider’d as on the same footing with that, which they afford him, of pleasing himself, and satisfying his own appetites. Self-love approaches the power and exercise very near each other in the latter case; but in order to produce a similar effect in the former, we must suppose a friendship and good-will to be conjoin’d with the riches. Without that circumstance ’tis difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others, tho’ there is nothing more certain, than that we naturally esteem and respect the rich, even before we discover in them any such favourable disposition towards us. But I carry this farther, and observe, not only that we respect the rich and powerful, where they shew no inclination to serve us, but also when we lie so much out of the sphere of their activity, that they cannot even be suppos’d to be endow’d with that power. Prisoners of war are always treated with a respect suitable to their condition; and ’tis certain riches go very far towards fixing the condition of any person. If birth and quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument of the same kind. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one who is descended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors, and who acquires our esteem by his relation to persons whom we esteem? His ancestors, therefore, tho’ dead, are respected, in some measure, on account of their riches, and consequently without any kind of expectation. But not to go so far as prisoners of war and the dead to find instances of this disinterested esteem for riches, let us observe with a little attention those phænomena that occur to us in common life and conversation. A man, who is himself of a competent fortune, upon coming into a company of strangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect and deference, as he is inform’d of their different fortunes and conditions; tho’ ’tis impossible he can ever propose, and perhaps wou’d not accept of any advantage from them. A traveller is always admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune.

In short, the different ranks of men are, in a great measure, regulated by riches, and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors, strangers as well as acquaintance. There is, indeed, an answer to these arguments, drawn from the influence of general rules. It may be pretended, that being accustom’d to expect succour and protection from the rich and powerful, and to esteem them upon that account, we extend the same sentiments to those, who resemble them in their fortune, but from whom we can never hope for any advantage. The general rule still prevails, and by giving a bent to the imagination draws along the passion, in the same manner as if its proper object were real and existent. But that this principle does not here take place, will easily appear, if we consider, that in order to establish a general rule, and extend it beyond its proper bounds, there is requir’d a certain uniformity in our experience, and a great superiority of those instances, which are conformable to the rule, above the contrary. But here the case is quite otherwise. Of a hundred men of credit and fortune I meet with, there is not, perhaps, one from whom I can expect advantage; so that ’tis impossible any custom can ever prevail in the present case. Upon the whole, there remains nothing, which can give us an esteem for power and riches, and a contempt for meanness and poverty, except the principle of sympathy, by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasures and uneasiness. Riches give satisfaction to their possessor; and this satisfaction is convey’d to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity. This agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion. It proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises, according to my hypothesis. The best method of reconciling us to this opinion is to take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of sympathy thro’ the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another. In all creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any advantages they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when enjoy’d a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable. Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wou’d they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others. Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him: He will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy. This conclusion from a general view of human nature, we may confirm by particular instances, wherein the force of sympathy is very remarkable. Most kinds of beauty are deriv’d from this origin; and tho’ our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, ’tis seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures. A man, who shews us any

house or building, takes particular care among other things to point out the convenience of the apartments, the advantages of their situation, and the little room lost in the stairs, antichambers and passages; and indeed ’tis evident, the chief part of the beauty consists in these particulars. The observation of convenience gives pleasure, since convenience is a beauty. But after what manner does it give pleasure? ’Tis certain our own interest is not in the least concern’d; and as this is a beauty of interest, not of form, so to speak, it must delight us merely by communication, and by our sympathizing with the proprietor of the lodging. We enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion in him. This observation extends to tables, chairs, scritoires, chimneys, coaches, sadles, ploughs, and indeed to every work of art; it being an universal rule, that their beauty is chiefly deriv’d from their utility, and from their fitness for that purpose, to which they are destin’d. But this is an advantage, that concerns only the owner, nor is there any thing but sympathy, which can interest the spectator. ’Tis evident, that nothing renders a field more agreeable than its fertility, and that scarce any advantages of ornament or situation will be able to equal this beauty. ’Tis the same case with particular trees and plants, as with the field on which they grow. I know not but a plain, overgrown with furze and broom, may be, in itself, as beautiful as a hill cover’d with vines or olive-trees; tho’ it will never appear so to one, who is acquainted with the value of each. But this is a beauty merely of imagination, and has no foundation in what appears to the senses. Fertility and value have a plain reference to use; and that to riches, joy, and plenty; in which tho’ we have no hope of partaking, yet we enter into them by the vivacity of the fancy, and share them, in some measure, with the proprietor. There is no rule in painting more reasonable than that of ballancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on their proper center of gravity. A figure, which is not justly ballanc’d, is disagreeable; and that because it conveys the ideas of its fall, of harm, and of pain: Which ideas are painful, when by sympathy they acquire any degree of force and vivacity. Add to this, that the principal part of personal beauty is an air of health and vigour, and such a construction of members as promises strength and activity. This idea of beauty cannot be accounted for but by sympathy. In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees. Thus the pleasure, which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again, being perceiv’d and sympathiz’d with, encrease the pleasure of the possessor; and being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder. There is certainly an original satisfaction in riches deriv’d from that power, which they bestow, of enjoying all the pleasures of life; and as this is their very nature and essence, it must be the first source of all the passions, which arise from them. One of the most considerable of these passions is that of love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from a sympathy with the pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflexion of that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others. Here then is a third rebound of the original pleasure; after

which ’tis difficult to distinguish the images and reflexions, by reason of their faintness and confusion.

SECTION VI. Of benevolence and anger. Ideas may be compar’d to the extension and solidity of matter, and impressions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells and other sensible qualities. Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow’d with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture. On the other hand, impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. Some of the most curious phænomena of the human mind are deriv’d from this property of the passions. In examining those ingredients, which are capable of uniting with love and hatred, I begin to be sensible, in some measure, of a misfortune, that has attended every system of philosophy, with which the world has been yet acquainted. ’Tis commonly found, that in accounting for the operations of nature by any particular hypothesis; among a number of experiments, that quadrate exactly with the principles we wou’d endeavour to establish; there is always some phænomenon, which is more stubborn, and will not so easily bend to our purpose. We need not be surpriz’d, that this shou’d happen in natural philosophy. The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we must necessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involve ourselves in contradictions and absurdities. But as the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known, and I have us’d all imaginable caution in forming conclusions concerning them, I have always hop’d to keep clear of those contradictions, which have attended every other system. Accordingly the difficulty, which I have at present in my eye, is no-wise contrary to my system; but only departs a little from that simplicity, which has been hitherto its principal force and beauty. The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin’d with benevolence and anger. ’Tis this conjunction, which chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow’d by a desire of the happiness of the person belov’d, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated. So remarkable a difference betwixt these two sets of passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, which in so many other particulars correspond to each other, merits our attention. The conjunction of this desire and aversion with love and hatred may be accounted for by two different hypotheses. The first is, that love and hatred have not only a cause, which excites them, viz. pleasure and pain; and an object, to which they are directed, viz. a person or thinking being; but likewise an end, which they endeavour to attain, viz. the happiness or misery of the person belov’d or hated; all which views, mixing together, make only one passion. According to this system, love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable but the same.

But this is evidently contrary to experience. For tho’ ’tis certain we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination, and are not absolutely essential to love and hatred. They are the most obvious and natural sentiments of these affections, but not the only ones. The passions may express themselves in a hundred ways, and may subsist a considerable time, without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects; which clearly proves, that these desires are not the same with love and hatred, nor make any essential part of them. We may, therefore, infer, that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoin’d with them, by the original constitution of the mind. As nature has given to the body certain appetites and inclinations, which she encreases, diminishes, or changes according to the situation of the fluids or solids; she has proceeded in the same manner with the mind. According as we are possess’d with love or hatred, the correspondent desire of the happiness or misery of the person, who is the object of these passions, arises in the mind, and varies with each variation of these opposite passions. This order of things, abstractedly consider’d, is not necessary. Love and hatred might have been unattended with any such desires, or their particular connexion might have been entirely revers’d. If nature had so pleas’d, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex’d to love, and of happiness to hatred. If the sensation of the passion and desire be opposite, nature cou’d have alter’d the sensation without altering the tendency of the desire, and by that means made them compatible with each other.

SECTION VII. Of compassion. But tho’ the desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them, be an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature, we find it may be counterfeited on many occasions, and may arise from secondary principles. Pity is a concern for, and malice a joy in the misery of others, without any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy. We pity even strangers, and such as are perfectly indifferent to us: And if our ill-will to another proceed from any harm or injury, it is not, properly speaking, malice, but revenge. But if we examine these affections of pity and malice we shall find them to be secondary ones, arising from original affections, which are varied by some particular turn of thought and imagination. ’Twill be easy to explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy. We have a lively idea of every thing related to us. All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression. If this be true in general, it must be more so of affliction and sorrow. These have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure or enjoyment. A spectator of a tragedy passes thro’ a long train of grief, terror, indignation, and other affections, which the poet represents in the persons he introduces. As many tragedies end happily, and no excellent one can be compos’d without some reverses of fortune, the spectator must sympathize with

and this idea becomes still more lively. which we 194 . and if that virtue extends so far as utterly to remove all sense of uneasiness. which is the passion that generally attends it. and carrying our fancy from the cause to the usual effect. and that tho’ they shew no sense of shame. therefore. whom they find in any grief or affliction. is the more lamented on account of his patience. that he is more worthy of compassion the less sensible he is of his miserable condition. that the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original. I am at least sure.all these changes. which have no existence. We find from experience. In like manner a man. and then feel an impression of it. that it was committed upon persons asleep and in perfect security. it still farther encreases our compassion. tho’ in the hands of their best friend. yet the imagination is affected by the general rule. which makes them faint at the sight of a naked sword. it be asserted. which it were easy to produce. Thus when a person obtains any honourable office. it gives us a lively idea and sensation of sorrow. and even arises by a transition from affections. All this proceeds from sympathy. we are always the more rejoic’d for his prosperity. and even sight of the object. nor seem in the least conscious of their folly. and is not deriv’d from the general principle of sympathy above-explain’d. that this method of reasoning wou’d be consider’d as certain. To except any one in particular must appear highly unreasonable. When a person of merit falls into what is vulgarly esteem’d a great misfortune. is in every case the same. without considering the other. in a great measure. that every distinct passion is communicated by a distinct original quality. even tho’ the indifference proceed not from any virtue and magnanimity. who is not dejected by misfortunes. or only considering it so far as to encrease our admiration. on the contiguity. or inherits a great fortune. as if the person were really actuated by it. either in natural philosophy or common life. and the greater equanimity and indifference he shews in its enjoyment. who derive this passion from I know not what subtile reflections on the instability of fortune. Not to mention that women and children are most subject to pity. which arises from the first appearance. entirely overlooking that greatness of mind. that all of them arise from that principle. who behave themselves foolishly before us. Unless. which elevates him above such emotions. and wou’d entirely destroy that emotion. and the sensation more violent by a contrast with that security and indifference. There remains only to take notice of a pretty remarkable phænomenon of this passion. first as an idea. and views its objects only on one side. the transition must arise from the same principle. From the same principles we blush for the conduct of those. and afterwards appear in the mind of another. first conceive a lively idea of his sorrow. or rather feel the passion itself. ’Tis an aggravation of a murder. as historians readily observe of any infant prince. will find this observation contrary to them among a great many others. then as an impression. that pity depends. As we ourselves are here acquainted with the wretched situation of the person. Those philosophers. wherein an indifference and insensibility under misfortune encreases our concern for the misfortunate. as being most guided by that faculty. which has a contrary effect. that ’tis deriv’d from the imagination. and receive the fictitious joy as well as every other passion. and tho’ there be an exception in the present case. which is a proof. We have also instances. love and tenderness for him. As they are all first present in the mind of one person. makes them pity extremely those. which is. who is captive in the hands of his enemies. and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion. we form a notion of his condition. it must be allow’d. the less sense he seems to have of it. and our being liable to the same miseries we behold. and as the manner of their appearance. that such a degree of passion is usually connected with such a misfortune. but ’tis of a partial kind. in the same manner. Add to this. The same infirmity.

proceeding from the conjunction of the several ef195 . The question then is. that accompanies it. the image and idea of the object are still the same. ’tis evident. and that the admiration. that they always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value. is one of the most lively pleasures. This no one can doubt of with regard to our passions and sensations. For to instance only in the cases of extension and number. a crowd. any degree of perfection. whatever falls short of it. as on the other hand a violent pain. the other has been already accounted for. an extended plain. and similar to what we have every day experience of in our bodies. This variation in our judgments must certainly proceed from a variation in some perception. succeeding a gentle one. to separate and distinguish them. that follows a violent one. and in the brain or organ of perception. whether a great or small object has preceded. nor does even the imagination alter the dimensions of its object on account of a comparison with others. a vast chain of mountains. In order to explain this matter. I believe it may safely be establish’d for a general maxim. SECTION VIII. and ’tis on the imagination that pity entirely depends62 . The eyes refract the rays of light. one of which shall be more fully explain’d in the progress of this treatise. We must now proceed to account for the passion of malice. I shall just touch upon two principles. So little are men govern’d by reason in their sentiments and opinions. we may conclude. tho’ really esteemable. nor image form’d in the fancy. such as an army. and at one time admire its bulk. a fleet. that any very bulky object. and are equally extended in the retina. by careful and exact experiments. such as the ocean. A small degree of any quality. or rather becomes a pleasure. Of malice and envy. When an object augments or diminishes to the eye or imagination from a comparison with others. excite in the mind a sensible emotion. succeeding a greater. that no object is presented to the senses. it must lie in some other impression. as if less than it really is. Any gentle pain. A contrast of any kind never fails to affect the imagination. which arises on the appearance of such objects.observe in the person himself. is doubly grievous and uneasy. according to the disposition of the different organs. and however custom may make us insensible of this sensation. as what is defective and ill. produces the same sensation. how from the same impression and the same idea we can form such different judgments concerning the same object. seem both hot and cold. as pity does those of love. or any very numerous collection of objects. This is an original quality of the soul. that ’tis a compound effect. without any offence or injury on their part. a wide forest. especially when presented by the subject. But there may arise some difficulty with regard to our ideas and objects. which imitates the effects of hatred. but what is accompany’d with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it. the same water will at the same time. seems as nothing. and at another despise its littleness. has notwithstanding the same effect upon the passions. and gives us a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others. Let a man heat one hand and cool the other. or is accustom’d to. according to our foregoing63 principles. When the mind considers. Now as this admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of the objects. which human nature is capable of enjoying. but as the variation lies not in the immediate impression or idea of the object. and the optic nerves convey the images to the brain in the very same manner. ’twill be easy. and cause us to confound it with the object or idea. and even sometimes as the opposite quality.

that secretly attends every idea. of extension. from those which are felt by the person. and by its agitating the spirits to a just pitch. to which it is compar’d. in proportion to the degrees of riches. We have so many instances of this. a certain degree of emotion to a certain magnitude of the object. riches and poverty. and the latter uneasiness. which has such a mighty influence on the actions and understanding. and power. The former. in proportion as they appear more or less fortunate or unhappy. nor do we consider. and is able to impose on the very senses. are often perverted by it. it contributes to the production of admiration. The conclusion I draw from these two principles. or contrary sensations arising in the beholder. a sensation contrary to 196 . as if we had infer’d its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding. is very short and decisive. then. Nothing can undeceive us. when conceiv’d by the mind. join’d to the influence of comparison abovemention’d. we naturally imagine that the object has likewise encreas’d. that according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others. and seem to authorize its errors. which. a great object with a great emotion. instead of correcting this false judgment. and ’tis from this principle I derive the passions of malice and envy. from whence the discovery arose. The effect conveys our view to its usual cause. Every part. happiness and misery. succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one. that objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others. Every object is attended with some emotion proportion’d to it. who are acquainted with the metaphysical part of optics. ’Tis evident we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from reflecting on our own condition and circumstances. whenever the first object appears. a small object with a small emotion. which we think ourselves possest of. therefore. that comparison may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object. and merit. and his happiness of our misery. and other objects of that kind. when the emotion encreases. which is always agreeable. In general we may observe. we can make no difficulty with respect to virtue and vice. it follows. and tho’ that emotion be not always agreeable. whom he considers. and every unite of number has a separate emotion attending it. The second principle I shall take notice of is that of our adherence to general rules.fects. and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. we must at least allow of that principle. A great object. will easily conceive this whole operation. and know how we transfer the judgments and conclusions of the understanding to the senses. Here then is a kind of pity reverst. we must make an estimate of our own. When an object is found by experience to be always accompany’d with another. which commonly attends every magnitude of an object. But leaving this new discovery of an impression. that it is impossible we can dispute its veracity. Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value. which are always attended with an evident emotion. The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness. with and folly. but form our notions of them from a comparison with other objects. tho’ chang’d in very material circumstances. not even our senses. and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner. and reputation. But as there is a certain degree of an emotion. Now a great emotion succeeding a small one becomes still greater. Those. which arise from each part of the cause. therefore. yet by its conjunction with others. produces delight. and rises beyond its ordinary proportion. If this be allow’d with respect to extension and number. that in all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another. we naturally fly to the conception of the second.

we still desire a greater distance. His pain. When this distance diminishes. Nay a person may extend this malice against himself. but augments the idea of our own happiness.what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. A superiority naturally seems to overshade us. when we are satisfy’d with our present condition. our 197 . since we find the same comparison may give us a kind of malice against ourselves. in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison. and encrease his pains and sorrows. consider’d in itself. But as grief is here suppos’d to be the predominant passion. whose beauty is augmented by it. the idea of it is magnify’d by a comparison with his present ease and satisfaction. Nor will it appear strange. without operating in the least upon the contrary affection. First. beauty. which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own: Whereas malice is the unprovok’d desire of producing evil to another. that envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another. Hence arises that species of envy. whose deformity it augments. in order to augment still more the idea of ourself. makes us receive a new pain by the contrast with any thing ugly. A person. must be the same with happiness and misery. and make us rejoice for our pains. which forces him. as when we reflect on the sentiments of others. in order to avoid so disagreeable a contrast. must be attended with the same effects. When a criminal reflects on the punishment he deserves. which he himself enjoys. A small object makes a great one appear still greater. but on the contrary. and therefore produces pain when compar’d with our own. The only difference betwixt these passions lies in this. ’Tis the same case with those penances. in a manner. In this envy we may see the effects of comparison twice repeated. which is the object of envy. feels the reflected uneasiness from his friend more sensibly by a comparison with the original pleasure. indeed. as on the other hand our past pleasures give us uneasiness. and gives us pleasure. that ’tis not the great disproportion betwixt ourself and another. Upon the feeling any remorses for a crime. when we enjoy nothing at present equal to them. therefore. This contrast. becomes a real pain. Deformity of itself produces uneasiness. The case. This may happen upon two occasions. that we may feel a reverst sensation from the happiness and misery of others. while his friend lies under affliction. when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking them in the pursuit of glory or happiness. but makes us receive new pleasure by its contrast with a beautiful object. which arises from a superiority in others. of which he has been guilty. is commonly superior to our own. the comparison is less to our advantage. and grieve for our pleasures. A great object makes a little one appear less. even to his present fortune. which men inflict on themselves for their past sins and failings. and presents a disagreeable comparison. This reasoning will account for the origin of envy as well as of malice. which of itself produces pleasure. which produces it. who indulges himself in any pleasure. or person dear to him. by a new comparison with its preceding condition. ought also to inliven the present pleasure. who compares himself to his inferior. to seek uneasiness. and is swallow’d up in it. what shou’d only have been a decrease of pleasure. Secondly. and carry it so far as designedly to seek affliction. But even in the case of an inferiority. is painful to us. receives a pleasure from the comparison: And when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior. and consequently gives us less pleasure. The enjoyment. and is even disagreeable. Upon the distress and misfortune of a friend. ’Tis from the principle of comparison that both these irregular appetites for evil arise. A man. Thus the prospect of past pain is agreeable. ’Tis worthy of observation concerning that envy. every addition falls to that side. The direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives us pleasure. which men feel. The comparison being the same. as on the other hand.

the greater must be the uneasiness from the comparison. by their separation. that they depreciate those neighbouring nations. that the great feel a double pleasure in authority from the comparison of their own condition with that of their slaves. It may. Shou’d an author compose a treatise. which may be attended with no relation. I have observ’d in considering the nature of ambition. These examples from history and common experience are rich and curious. as in authors. When it cannot break the association. and by such a separation prevents their mutual operation and influence. or diminishes the effects of the comparison. than when view’d apart. and by breaking that association of ideas. which attends every object. but must be assisted by other relations. Yet even these relations. where the relations betwixt the different states are. that the proximity in the degree of merit is not alone sufficient to give rise to envy.proximity. or have any considerable influence on each other. the action of the mind is. Guicciardin applies this remark to the wars in Italy. upon a new footing. as it were. where superiority is conjoin’d with other relations. and that this comparison has a double influence. The mind quickly perceives its several advantages and disadvantages. and contiguity. however other accidents may bring two ideas together. in considering the second object. that any party in a civil war always choose to call in a foreign enemy at any hazard rather than submit to their fellow-citizens. and where you destroy these ties. that more nearly approach him. that the greater the disproportion is. A poet is not apt to envy a philosopher. because ’tis natural. Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation of ideas. nor does an eminent writer meet with so great jealousy in common hackney scriblers. which are no less remarkable. A mountain neither magnifies nor diminishes a horse in our eyes. or a poet of a different kind. and produce their distinct effects. begins. without any communication together. it feels a stronger desire to remove the superiority. seeks its repose as much as possible. that the great disproportion cuts off the relation. But we may consider on the other hand. passes not easily from the one object to the other. ’tis impossible they can remain long united. This too is the reason. at the same time. make it likewise more grievous. but we may find parallel ones in the arts. When the fancy. of which one 198 . or of a different age. The impression. From the same principle we may account for that remark of historians. indeed. the one appears greater and the other less. in the comparison of objects. The want of relation in the ideas breaks the relation of the impressions. why all objects appear great or little. broke. as they have no bond or connecting quality to join them in the imagination. seems not greater in that case by succeeding a less of the same kind. which may stand upon a foot of rivalship with their native country. be thought. and the fancy. but these two impressions are distinct. properly speaking. by making the comparison more natural. which renders the comparison so much more natural and efficacious. of a different nation. and by that means may have a less sensible influence on the imagination. in a great measure. but when a Flemish and a Welsh horse are seen together. and either keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us. A common soldier bears no such envy to his general as to his sergeant or corporal. and finding its situation to be most uneasy. and this is the reason why travellers are commonly so lavish of their praises to the Chinese and Persians. language. when join’d with superiority. All these differences prevent or weaken the comparison. and presented by the subject. merely by a comparison with those of the same species. and cause men to search for some other superiority. To confirm this we may observe. nothing but of name. and consequently the passion.

But it must be confess’d. is that which renders the mind incapable of passing in a moment from one passion and disposition to a quite different one. no ideas can affect each other. that the want of relation in the objects or ideas hinders the natural contrariety of the passions. unless they be united together by some relation. and of hatred or anger with malice. Yet this makes us not blame Mr. tho’ that admirable poet has succeeded perfectly well in the gaiety of the one. On the contrary. and consequently of the emotions or impressions. every one wou’d condemn so strange a mixture. according to the light. Even supposing the reader shou’d peruse these two compositions without any interval. after the following manner. we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one. pity shou’d naturally. These rules of art are founded on the qualities of human nature. and wou’d accuse him of the neglect of all rules of art and criticism. attending the ideas. and enters deep into them. arising from the misery of others. but because he considers these performances as entirely different. This contradiction I endeavour to reconcile. Suppose two objects to be presented to me. which requires a consistency in every performance. and hinders the one from influencing or contradicting the other? An heroic and burlesque design. and prevents their opposition. This principle is very remarkable. which are not connected by any kind of relation. In a word. we may certainly conclude that its presence contributes to the production of the effect. or by the passions they separately produce. and the quality of human nature. 199 . that this mixture seems at first sight to be contradictory to my system. he wou’d feel little or no difficulty in the change of passions: Why. either by comparison. and a grief from their joy.part was serious and profound. viz. wou’d be monstrous. and by this break in the ideas. another light and humorous. produce hatred. SECTION IX. without any scruple or difficulty. But these are only the first foundations of the affections of pity and malice. Both these affections arise from the imagination. and even close by each other. Other passions are afterwards confounded with them. as well as in the melancholy of the other. united in one picture. but in a particular manner of grief or sorrow. when we compare the sentiments of others to our own. in which it places its object. a joy from the grief of others. and malice a joy. When our fancy considers directly the sentiments of others. breaks the progress of the affections. and malice. Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice. Thus we have endeavour’d to account for pity and malice. tho’ we place two pictures of so opposite a character in the same chamber. and to separate what naturally shou’d have operated upon each other. which may cause an easy transition of the ideas. and may preserve the one impression in the passage of the imagination to the object of the other. Prior for joining his Alma and his Solomon in the same volume. and from both these phænomena we may safely conclude. since its absence alone is able to prevent it. as in all other cases. that the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions. and that the break in the transition of the thought removes the affections from each other. and that these two passions are in themselves contrary: We find from experience. For as pity is an uneasiness. There is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity. Suppose that each of these objects separately produces a passion. it makes us sensible of all the passions it surveys. When the absence of an object or quality removes any usual or natural effect. because it is analogous to what we have observ’d both concerning the understanding and the passions. love. ’Tis the same case with comparison.

Suppose. and aversion to his misery. Now pity is a desire of happiness to another. as we have all along suppos’d in the preceding cases. without any farther relation. the advantage or loss of one becomes immediately the advantage or loss of his partner. and so vice versa. Suppose again. because these are only pure sensations. and an aversion to his happiness. and aversion to his misery. To confirm us in any design. as malice is the contrary appetite. it admits of no difficulty. malice. Let us consider to what principle we can ascribe these passions. by a natural and original quality. tho’ living in different parts of the world. then. that benevolence and anger. his pain and loss causes 200 . and that whatever is for the interest of either is contrary to that of his rival. and malice to anger: And as benevolence has been already found to be connected with love. anger and hatred. hatred always follows upon the contrariety of interests. and anger with hatred. who from any motives has entertain’d a resolution of performing an action. shou’d so totally mix together as to be undistinguishable? As to the connexion betwixt benevolence and love. that in the first case. arise when our happiness or misery have any dependence on the happiness or misery of another person. Now ’tis evident. being original and primary. and give it authority and influence on the mind. and the same fortune necessarily attends both.In order to cause a transition of passions. shou’d enter into co-partnership together. not only when their sensations are resembling. What wonder. naturally runs into every other view or motive. that two merchants. but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent. nor is one relation sufficient to produce this effect. Benevolence or the appetite. We may add to this another experiment. then. But that we may understand the full force of this double relation. such as those of love and hatred. This cannot take place with regard to pride and humility. which attends love. I doubt not but this experiment will appear so singular as to excuse us for stopping a moment to consider it. and a desire of his misery and aversion to his happiness are correspondent to anger. of the happiness of another. and an aversion to his misery. A desire. We are. love arises from their union. viz. if we regard only the present sensation. is a desire of the happiness of the person belov’d. is related to benevolence. ’Tis plain they arise not from the double relations of impressions and ideas. therefore. being the same desires arising from different principles. that ’tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure. and anger. from honour. but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. A man. we must consider. we search for motives drawn from interest. One impression may be related to another. as in the second. This hypothesis is founded on sufficient experience. tho’ the pleasure and advantage of an antagonist necessarily causes my pain and loss. ’tis plain the success of one is perfectly incompatible with that of the other. which attends hatred. and consequently love and hatred. Pity. without any direction or tendency to action. which may fortify that resolution. is a desire of the misery of the person hated. from duty. that two persons of the same trade shou’d seek employment in a town. therefore. which determines the character of any passion. that is not able to maintain both. as are attended with a certain appetite or desire. that pity and benevolence. there is requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas. to look for instances of this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections. yet to counter-ballance this. are similar to benevolence. For takeing the first case of rivalship. ’tis by this chain the passions of pity and malice are connected with love and hatred. as anger or the appetite.

leaves the matter pretty equal. good or bad. but then his misfortunes afflict me in an equal proportion. without feeling some touches of kindness and good-will towards ’em. which determines the character of any passion. and why does sympathy in uneasiness ever produce any passion beside good-will and kindness? Is it becoming a philosopher to alter his method of reasoning. The only explication. so the pleasure of the former causes my pain. But here there occurs a considerable objection. hatred. From a sympathy with his pleasure there arises love. indeed. which ’twill be necessary to examine before we proceed any farther. then. as the injuries we do. no wonder the same parallel direction. not only cause hatred in the person. from that with his uneasiness. Since. ‘That ’tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure. a conformity in the tendency and direc201 . I have endeavour’d to prove. which give rise to love or hatred. which they produce in the person. the cause and effect has a farther relation of resemblance. viz. In general we may observe. of cause and effect is the same in both cases. who is present with us. or poverty and meanness. On the other hand. and gives us a secondary sensation correspondent to the primary. from whatever motive. I may by this means receive from him a superior degree of satisfaction. therefore. and a pleasure in the pain of a rival. being also a species of resemblance. after the same manner as by sympathy we feel a sensation correspondent to those. For as the pleasure of the latter causes my pleasure. which I have just now establish’d. But whether the fortune of a rival or partner be good or bad. I always hate the former and love the latter. deriv’d from sympathy and from comparison. and what is similar to it. according to the particular phænomenon. why does it not prevail throughout. that the latter sentiment may in many cases preponderate. we can give of this phænomenon is deriv’d from that principle of a parallel direction above-mention’d. and in short the same contrariety of sentiments as arises from comparison and malice. The connexion. may in part be accounted for from other principles. shou’d have the same effect. and if in the one case. Our concern for our own interest gives us a pleasure in the pleasure. A rival has almost as close a relation to me as a partner. who possesses them. and which is absolutely necessary to the explication of the phænomena of pity and malice. a double relation of ideas and impressions. that power and riches. but even in ourselves. without producing any original pleasure or uneasiness. and supposing him to be unsuccessful. pity or a sympathy with pain produces love. can give rise to benevolence or anger. and a pain in the pain of a partner. and ’tis easy to imagine. But ’tis a maxim. and that because it interests us in the fortunes of others. In the same manner the success of a partner rejoices me. which he wou’d explain? I have mention’d two different causes. and his pain my pleasure. from which a transition of passion may arise.’ For this reason. operate upon us by means of a secondary sensation deriv’d from a sympathy with that pain or satisfaction. the same concern for our interest makes us feel a pain in the pleasure. then. a parallel direction of the affections.my pleasure and advantage. they have that of contrariety in the other. in which it has the same influence with love and benevolence. These phænomena. but the general bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. and run from one principle to its contrary. which. This love of a partner cannot proceed from the relation or connexion betwixt us. which appear in any person. that ’tis impossible to do good to others. Since then this rule holds good in one case. who suffers them. proceeding from interest. and his pain my pain. in the same manner as I love a brother or countryman.

probable or certain. which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction. it follows. and aversion to his pain. By this diminution I destroy the future prospect. this sympathy is related to anger and to hatred. but that we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others. present. who. and gives me a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person. we must consider. to form such lively ideas even of the present sentiments of others as to feel these very sentiments. then. ’Tis certain. The bare mention of this is sufficient. however painful the 202 . ’Tis a great effort of imagination. and a pain proceeding from his pain: From which correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure. to make a passion run parallel with benevolence. If it be another’s misery. conformable to whatever I imagine in his. But as the extensive or limited sympathy depends upon the force of the first sympathy. even tho’ it were not necessary to the explication of any phænomenon. I may feel the present impression. as pipes can convey no more water than what arises at the fountain. Now I assert. but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas. If I diminish the vivacity of the first conception. it produces hatred or contempt by the former cause.tion of any two desires. upon account of the uneasiness it conveys to us. I never feel the extensive sympathy. that. nor the passions related to it. This is the solution of the foregoing difficulty. and feel a sympathetic motion in my breast. By means of this lively notion I am interested in them. Sympathy being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression. possible. that benevolence is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov’d. or future. we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern. the vivacity of the conception is not confin’d merely to its immediate object. that when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak. whom we consider. that the passion of love or hatred depends upon the same principle. I receive it by communication. I diminish that of the related ideas. it produces love or tenderness by the latter. while asleep in the fields. but carry my sympathy no farther. when strong. which seems so urgent. whether past. which are not in being. In order. But however we may look forward to the future in sympathizing with any person. without being aided by some circumstance in the present. For supposing I saw a person perfectly unknown to me. which arise from different principles. was in danger of being trod under foot by horses. as well as his bad. which makes me concern’d for the present sorrows of a stranger. when communicated. gives a double tendency of the passions. When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me. that sympathy is not always limited to the present moment. and in this I shou’d be actuated by the same principle of sympathy. and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination. which is necessary to interest me perfectly in the fortune of another. the extending of our sympathy depends in a great measure upon our sense of his present condition. nor at the present instant have any real existence. I shou’d immediately run to his assistance. but ’tis impossible we cou’d extend this sympathy to the future. in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person. and never transfuse the force of the first conception into my ideas of the related objects. correspondent to those of the person. Now in order to know what passions are related to these different kinds of sympathy. which strikes upon us in a lively manner. When we sympathize only with one impression. A strong impression. ’tis evident. which is presented in his feeble manner. and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures. and that a painful one. take part with them. ’tis requisite we shou’d feel these double impressions. that we ought to have establish’d it. and am affected with all the passions related to it: But as I am not so much interested as to concern myself in his good fortune. which neither belong to ourselves. nor is any one of them alone sufficient for that purpose. and this is a principle founded on such evident arguments.

as well as are sensible of his affliction? 203 . or any degree strongly sympathiz’d with: Hatred or contempt from a small degree. This. who go to the scaffold. according to my hypothesis. that where the present evil strikes with more than ordinary force. as to wish for their prosperity. A certain degree of poverty produces contempt. therefore. but also experience. A barren or desolate country always seems ugly and disagreeable. Nor have we only our reason to trust to for this principle. The view of a city in ashes conveys benevolent sentiments. that tho’ every one. and from that compleat sympathy there arises pity and benevolence. The encrease of the sympathy has evidently the same effect as the encrease of the misery. and commonly inspires us with contempt for the inhabitants. When we observe a person in misfortunes. Thus we find. that by being carry’d too far it ceases to have that effect. and readily imagine them to be uncommonly handsome and wellshap’d. nor is able to convey an equal concern for the future and contingent good. This deformity. or remote from us. arises from a great degree of misery. proceeds in a great measure from a sympathy with the inhabitants. feels no such tender emotions. that pity. perhaps. But ’twill easily be imagin’d. as to be sensible both of his good and bad fortune. therefore. we are affected with pity and love. Benevolence. yet one. which is disagreeable. because we there enter so deep into the interests of the miserable inhabitants. or is painted in very lively colours. that is painful. however. whereas in considering the sufferer we carry our view on every side. but a degree beyond causes compassion and good-will. who causes it. we become so interested in the concerns of the person. but it is only a weak one. but the author of that misfortune becomes the object of our strongest hatred. The passions. and reaches no farther than the immediate sensation. is that wherein by a change of the objects we separate the double sympathy even from a midling degree of the passion. and prevent that double sympathy. but is in a manner overcome with horror. it may entirely engage our attention. and feel in our heart evident touches of pity and benevolence. and is the more detested in proportion to the degree of our compassion. in which case we find. but especially women. and wish for his prosperity. Upon its acquiring greater force. who suffers the misfortune. it engages not the imagination. that operate in such certain degrees. as has been already observ’d. Now for what reason shou’d the same passion of pity produce love to the person. is related to anger and hatred by the resemblance of sensations. who is present at the cruel execution of the rack. and has no leisure to temper this uneasy sensation by any opposite sympathy. may be worth our notice. We may undervalue a peasant or servant. which makes the most clearly for my hypothesis. But tho’ the force of the impression generally produces pity and benevolence.first impression might have been. and hatred to the person. or one weakly sympathiz’d with. as for the present and real evil. A weak impression. above-mention’d. But the instance. instead of producing love and tenderness as usual. are apt to contract a kindness for criminals. we sympathize with him in his afflictions. always gives rise to the contrary affection. ’tis certain. which is the principle I intended to prove and explain. as well as feel their adversity. unless it be because in the latter case the author bears a relation only to the misfortune. but when the misery of a beggar appears very great. The same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees. must depend upon principles. When the uneasiness is either small in itself.

than mortify’d with the presence of one above us. from the first point of view. and of humility in respect. from their very feeling or appearance. produce love. as well as love. it readily produces that affection. Nothing that concerns them is indifferent to us. We rejoice in their pleasures. are the causes of pride. its proportion to ourselves entirely alters. That this mixture arises from a tacit comparison of the person contemn’d or respected with ourselves is no less evident. before I leave the present subject. SECTION X. which is the cause of an alteration in the passions. and are only compar’d to those. But here it may reasonably be ask’d. or contempt by his condition and talents. ’tis the reason why there is a much greater mixture of pride in contempt. tho’ the object may remain the same. and grieve for their sorrows. The good qualities of others. or pride. that it rouzes at the least call. I think. which we naturally bear our relations and acquaintance. Custom and relation make us enter deeply into the sentiments of others. too evident. along with the amorous affection. which cause love. from a comparison. cause either hatred. to require any particular proof. which we ourselves pos204 . according to the light in which we survey them. These passions. and appears in many instances. and have endeavour’d. when transfer’d to ourselves. who considers him. respect. Of respect and contempt. and its tendency to cause love. while they belong to others. may contribute to the production of the kindness. when plac’d on another person. from the second. that there scarce is any other passion discernable: Whereas in esteem or respect. That there is a mixture of pride in contempt. why this mixture takes place only in some cases. is render’d present to us by the imagination. that is. Contempt or scorn has so strong a tincture of pride. humility. arise from our observing the proportion. and appears not on every occasion. or contempt. we may either regard them as they really are in themselves. Whether my reasoning be receiv’d or not. therefore. The passion of vanity is so prompt. or may make a comparison betwixt them and our own qualities and circumstances. All those objects. than of humility in respect. Their bad qualities. and from the third. to assign a cause for this phænomenon. In considering the qualities and circumstances of others. after the same manner.I shall just observe. according as the person. that this phænomenon of the double sympathy. The same man may cause either respect. There now remains only to explain the passions of respect and contempt. love makes a more considerable ingredient than humility. from the principles of human nature. and why we are more elevated with the view of one below us. I have already observ’d. from his inferior becomes his equal or superior. or may join these two methods of consideration. in order to understand all the passions which have any mixture of love or hatred. In changing the point of view. and operates as if originally our own. merely from the force of sympathy. love. the phænomenon is undisputed. that the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility. is. Let us begin with respect and contempt. while humanity requires a stronger impulse to make it exert itself. and consequently ought to be causes of humility. which is a mixture of these two passions. and whatever fortune we suppose to attend them. and as this correspondence of sentiments is the natural attendant of love. Among the rest.

viz. ’tis observable. and a single one with hatred. Genius and learning are pleasant and magnificent objects. This is the case with good nature. ’Tis easy to extend the same reasoning to the opposite passions. that tho’ the conformity betwixt love and hatred in the agreeableness of their sensation makes them always be excited by the same objects. ought always to give rise to pride by comparison. This is evident. have some differences. We may. that the two agreeable. it may not be amiss to account for a pretty curious phænomenon. as belonging to another person. that tho’ the same object always produces love and pride. and consequently that latter passion is scarce felt in the compound. No quality in another gives rise to humility by comparison. facility. as well as the two painful passions. much more those of such objects as are esteem’d of consequence in life. beauty. and the two latter painful. produces hatred. ’Tis not with entire indifference we can survey either a rich man or a poor one. These have a peculiar aptitude to produce love in others. and by a mixture of these passions of hatred and pride ought to excite contempt or scorn. and does not always produce respect or contempt. good humour. ’Tis here we must seek for a solution of the difficulty above-mention’d. generosity. therefore. These two passions are contrary to each 205 . why we commonly keep at a distance such as we contemn. gives rise directly to a great degree of love. Of these qualities of the passions. therefore. and of contempt in the latter. and that the two former are always agreeable. Nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity. which is peculiarly fitted to produce love. Let us remember. this object. but not so great a tendency to excite pride in ourselves: For which reason the view of them. why they are excited in very different degrees. and produce not always the mixt passions of respect and contempt. while humility and shame deject and discourage us. which in the same manner gives them a double connexion with humility. which. according to its different situations. an object to be presented. but imperfectly to excite pride. with but a small mixture of humility and respect. belonging to another. I have suppos’d all along. humility and hatred. but to a small one of humility by comparison. But tho’ this be universally true. Ignorance and simplicity are disagreeable and mean. and love and humility infeeble it. that the passions of love and pride. unless it wou’d have produc’d humility by the direct survey. nor is able to convert the love into respect. It has already been observ’d. The same difference is observable betwixt the uneasy passions. consider it as certain. why any object ever excites pure love or hatred. and allow not our inferiors to approach too near even in place and situation. unless it wou’d have produc’d pride by being plac’d in ourselves. yet this other contrariety is the reason. produces pure love. tho’ at the same time love or tenderness is rather found to weaken and infeeble it. of respect in the former case.sess. even the ideas of number and extension. Before we leave this subject. at least. The difficulty then is. and fix our attention. and many other qualities. which distinguish them. objects always produce by comparison a sensation directly contrary to their original one. In like manner every quality. why any objects ever cause pure love or hatred. Anger and hatred bestow a new force on all our thoughts and actions. and those of humility and hatred are similar in their sensations. but must feel some faint touches. From this it follows. Suppose. and even contrarieties. and vice versa no object excites pride by comparison. that almost every kind of idea is attended with some emotion. that pride and hatred invigorate the soul. ’twill be necessary to form a distinct idea. yet it seldom produces either the two former or the two latter passions in the same proportion. and by both these circumstances are adapted to pride and vanity. by being directly consider’d. but have a relation to love by their pleasure only. by a mixture of humility or pride.

A sense of superiority in another breeds in all men an inclination to keep themselves at a distance from him. Connected ideas are readily taken for each other. If an object. Of the amorous passion. melancholy. is evidently of the pleasant kind. The appetite of generation. than that love. But there is another principle that contributes to the same effect. viz. and a generous kindness or good-will. is deriv’d from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions. and deformity the second: Which is the reason why the former gives us a keener appetite for our 206 . as a rich man and a poor one. and kindness are all incentives to this desire. therefore. in that situation. and this is in general the source of the metaphor. and the desire of approaching the meat as the secondary one. and shews that he is not sensible of the disproportion. for which it affords us an uncontestable argument. however trivial it may appear.other. Now ’tis plain that beauty has the first effect. as those curious principles of philosophy. that any principal desire may be attended with subordinate ones. the objects must be someway related. and no less than a resemblance in their sensation. the bodily appetite for generation. connected together. as on the contrary. produces a connexion among them. and where they do not observe that conduct. which are connected with it. as well on account of its force and violence. when confin’d to a certain degree. and good cheer. poverty. The origin of kindness from beauty may be explain’d from the foregoing reasoning. dancing. mirth. no one better deserves our attention. and diminishes our inclination to them. it naturally encreases our appetite. which arises betwixt the sexes. and that because the near approach of the inferior is regarded as a piece of illbreeding. therefore. that this affection. The relation takes place wherever the persons become contiguous. ’Tis plain. we must consider. From this quality ’tis easily conceiv’d why it shou’d be connected with the sense of beauty. That we may fully comprehend the extent of this relation. otherwise the affections are totally separate and distinct. they are by that means related to the principal one. a nobleman and a porter. whatever inclines us to set our victuals at a distance. in its most natural state. Thus hunger may oft be consider’d as the primary inclination of the soul. inclines us to approach the meat. and is no way affected by it. as well as music. The ideas of distance and difference are. Joy. which is common to every spectator. which is a general reason why we are uneasy at seeing such disproportion’d objects. as we shall have occasion to observe afterwards. From hence too it proceeds. which proceed from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections. On the other hand. must be more sensible to the superior. Of all the compound passions. and has a strong connexion with all the agreeable emotions. that any great difference in the degrees of any quality is call’d a distance by a common metaphor. SECTION XI. The pleasing sensation arising from beauty. wine. humility are destructive of it. is founded on natural principles of the imagination. I have observ’d that the parallel direction of the desires is a real relation. sorrow. is contradictory to hunger. by any separate qualities. and never encounter. which. when they are oblig’d to approach him. and determines them to redouble the marks of respect and reverence. The question is how the bodily appetite is excited by it. vanity. A great difference inclines us to produce a distance. and to which if other desires are parallel. This uneasiness. ’tis a proof they are not sensible of his superiority. but in order to make this contrariety be felt. or love betwixt the sexes. since ’tis absolutely necessary to the satisfying that appetite.

to the same affections. which compose this passion. when actuated by that appetite. and that impulse we find to arise from the beauty of the person. The beauty of one person never inspires us with love for another. but is unavoidable on any hypothesis. yet these objects cannot alone be the causes of the passions. But this not being sufficient to produce the passion. ’Tis likewise necessary. We not only turn our view to it. and partakes of both their natures: From whence it proceeds. Sex is not only the object. and afterwards diffuses itself into kindness and into the bodily appetite. All this is easily applicable to the appetite for generation. there arises such a connexion betwixt the sense of beauty. Kindness or esteem. that tho’ self be the object of the first set of passions. who begin with kindness and esteem for the wit and merit of the person. and the appetite to generation. But the relation of passions is not alone sufficient. that ’tis indifferent which of them advances first. Of the love and hatred of animals. ’Tis certain. that ’tis only by their relation they produce each other. From these two relations. and benevolence. It has certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion. that they become in a manner inseparable: And we find from experience. but also the cause of the appetite. resemblance and a parallel desire. and advance from that to the other passions. This account of love is not peculiar to my system. since any of them is almost sure to be attended with the related affections. but the reflecting on it suffices to excite the appetite. therefore. perhaps. where it has only a distinct object. naturally turns the view to a certain object. But to pass from the passions of love and hatred. and the latter is sufficient to disgust us at the most savoury dish. This then is a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas. This situation is still more remarkable with regard to the appetite of generation. not 207 . One. The one is. there shou’d be a relation of ideas. But the most common species of love is that which first arises from beauty. the most refin’d passion of the soul. and has each of them its distinct object. that passion. The three affections. that is. Here then is the situation of the mind. the other the most gross and vulgar. But as this cause loses its force by too great frequency. how much more so. The love of beauty is plac’d in a just medium betwixt them. who is inflam’d with lust. I have observ’d. are evidently distinct. we may observe. This may also serve in another view to illustrate what I have insisted on concerning the origin of pride and humility. From one instance so evident as this we may form a judgment of the rest. without any determinate cause? SECTION XII. and from their mixtures and compositions. and bestow on them their first impulse. as they appear in man. which by a double relation of impressions and ideas may set these principles in action. viz. from a double relation of impressions and ideas. and object. are too remote to unite easily together. there is requir’d some other emotion. feels at least a momentary kindness towards the object of it. as they display themselves in brutes. when produc’d. the bodily appetite. as having each of them a relation to two contrary affections. that ’tis so singularly fitted to produce both. Since this double relation is necessary where an affection has both a distinct cause. love and hatred. ’tis necessary it shou’d be quicken’d by some new impulse. that cookery has invented.victuals. and some other person of the second. as there are many. and at the same time fancies her more beautiful than ordinary. as I have already describ’d it. which must from the very first moment destroy each other.

Yet ’tis easy to remark. 208 . Every one has observ’d how much more dogs are animated when they hunt in a pack. and very commonly meets with a return of affection. and excites the same emotions as in our species. Envy and malice are passions very remarkable in animals. that tho’ almost all animals use in play the same member. except in very obvious instances. and from that must regulate their affections towards them. and ’tis evident this can proceed from nothing but from sympathy. as in our species. that this effect follows in a greater degree. and comprehends almost every sensible and thinking being. no less than among men. but always leaves it to enjoy that of his own species. And ’tis remarkable. or the communication of passions. courage and other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another. without their knowledge of that cause. which they produce. ’Tis also well known to hunters. which produc’d the original passion. always produces love in animals either to men or to each other. a dog his teeth. perhaps. ’Tis evident. a lion. a cat their paws. The affection of parents to their young proceeds from a peculiar instinct in animals. that they may easily be suppos’d to operate on mere animals. For the same reason any likeness among them is the source of affection. A dog naturally loves a man above his own species.only that love and hatred are common to the whole sensitive creation. where two packs. Grief likewise is receiv’d by sympathy. that are strangers to each other. As animals are but little susceptible either of the pleasures or pains of the imagination. which is an evident proof of the sense brutes have of each other’s pain and pleasure. as above-explain’d. which has the same effect as relation. as requiring less effort of thought and imagination. they can judge of objects only by the sensible good or evil. and nearly the same action as in fighting. will naturally join their company. that sympathy. if we had not experience of a similar in ourselves. which are not peculiar to man. or any one species of animals. Every thing is conducted by springs and principles. They are perhaps more common than pity. a horse his heels: Yet they most carefully avoid harming their companion. an ox his horns. than when they pursue their game apart. An ox confin’d to a park with horses. even tho’ they have nothing to fear from his resentment. We might. and even in too great a degree. and produces almost all the same consequences. Thus acquaintance. if I may so speak. are of so simple a nature. and that by feeding and cherishing any animal. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows. Accordingly we find. but likewise that their causes. as well as in our species. where he has the choice of both. a tyger. Love in beasts is not caus’d so much by relation. that on some occasions it has a considerable influence upon them. has not for its only object animals of the same species. Love in animals. we quickly acquire his affections. are join’d together. Fear. anger. The conclusion from this is obvious in favour of the foregoing system. and that because their thoughts are not so active as to trace relations. There is no force of reflection or penetration requir’d. be at a loss to explain this phænomenon. as by beating and abusing him we never fail to draw on us his enmity and ill-will. but extends itself farther. that by benefits or injuries we produce their love or hatred. takes place among animals.

we shou’d never arrive at any idea of cause and effect. and considering on what the idea of a necessity in its operations are founded. or new perception of our mind. ’tis impossible to define. there are not the least traces of indifference or liberty. is nothing but a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant. and why we conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another. either by our senses or reason. We come now to explain the direct passions. It has been observ’d already. and ’tis from the constant union the necessity arises. like the preceding ones of pride and humility. and even after all. and that in the communication of their motion. in their attraction. while the union and inference remain. therefore. Of liberty and necessity. or spirit. and that we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies. I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of. ’Tis universally acknowledg’d. Of this kind are. grief and joy. and infer the existence of one from that of the other. when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body. viz. which enters into that idea. and tho’. in which it moves. love and hatred. we shall here make it the subject of our enquiry. As the actions of matter have no necessity. of matter are to be regarded as instances of necessary actions. shall examine that long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity. This impression. SECTION I. and needless to describe any farther. with which philosophers are wont to perplex rather than clear up this question. that in no single instance the ultimate connexion of any objects is discoverable. The actions. and can no more depart from that precise line. properly speaking. but what is deriv’d from these circumstances. of the will and direct passions. for which reason we shall cut off all those definitions and distinctions. the necessity. that the operations of external bodies are necessary. If objects had not an uniform and regular conjunction with each other. Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure. from pain or pleasure. as to perceive the principle. which arise immediately from good or evil. Here then are two particulars. and it is not by any insight into the essence of bodies we discover their connexion. must be acknowledg’d to be necessary. is necessary to the explanation of them. will 209 . I desire it may be observ’d. hope and fear. or the impressions. That we may know whether this be the case with the actions of the mind. ’Tis their constant union alone. there is none more remarkable than the will. we shall begin with examining matter. that by the will. than it can convert itself into an angel. Every object is determin’d by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion.PART III. and mutual cohesion. or any superior substance. which we are to consider as essential to necessity. with which we are acquainted. the absence of this insight. which occurs so naturally in treating of the will. and entering at first upon the subject. desire and aversion. and whatever is in this respect on the same footing with matter. it be not comprehended among the passions. and wherever we discover these we must acknowledge a necessity. yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties. the constant union and the inference of the mind. on which their mutual influence depends.

There are different trees. voyages. manufactures. The different stations of life influence the whole fabric. because uniformly. and shall first prove from experience. conditions. where all the fruits ripen and come to perfection in the winter. the same uniformity and regular operation of natural principles are discernible. the other by their delicacy and softness? Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? And wou’d a man be more ridiculous. and circumstances. along with the necessity of these actions. I shall examine these particulars apart. for which reason it might be thought sufficient. because we not only observe. traffic. than does the parents care for their safety and preservation? And after they have arriv’d at years of discretion by the care of their parents. tell us. To this end a very slight and general view of the common course of human affairs will be sufficient. external and internal. that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and necessary principles. and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments. Men cannot live without society. are the inconveniencies attending their separation more certain than their foresight of these inconveniencies. But are the products of Guienne and of Champagne more regularly different than the sentiments. that our actions have a constant union with our motives. and these different stations arise necessarily. cities. who wou’d expect that an infant of four years old will raise a weight of three hundred pound. law-suits. that does not confirm this principle. war. and their care of avoiding them by a close union and confederacy? The skin. from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature. Whether we consider mankind according to the difference of sexes. muscles. in which we can take them. and our reason in the latter case. is better than even that in the former. Shou’d a traveller. in order to establish the inference. or a prudent and well-concerted action? We must certainly allow. whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them: And for a like reason we must allow. leagues. But that I may bestow a greater force on my reasoning. For is it more certain.never. that human society is founded on like principles. which regularly produce fruit. fleets. remove the necessity. that he had seen a climate in the fiftieth degree of northern latitude. who from a person of the same age. if we prove a constant union in the actions of the mind. returning from a far country. Like causes still produce like effects. Government makes a distinction of property. that men always seek society. actions and manners. travels. which produces the inference. whose relish is different from each other. than one. in the same manner as in the mutual action of the elements and powers of nature. tempers. that two flat pieces of marble will unite together. ’Tis the observation of the union. and passions of the two sexes. pores. before I consider the inferences we draw from it. and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life. There is no light. actions. on which this universal propensity is founded. and all those other actions and objects. or methods of education. ports. which cause such a diversity. and establishes the different ranks of men. ages. of which the one are distinguish’d by their force and maturity. and cannot be associated without government. alliances. but can also explain the principles. and this regularity will be admitted as an instance of necessity and causes in external bodies. wou’d look for a philosophical reasoning. governments. and decay 210 . than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate? Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly. in any case. This produces industry.

proceeds with that degree of assurance or evidence. we really allow the thing. that is not to be found in all the operations of the mind. There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons. For what is more capricious than human actions? What more inconstant than the desires of man? And what creature departs more widely. he wou’d find few so credulous as to believe him. Necessity is regular and certain. which will not follow equally from the other. 211 . not in the things themselves. As long as actions have a constant union and connexion with the situation and temper of the agent. No union can be more constant and certain. that as the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy. as when we reason concerning external objects. but from his own character and disposition? An hour. which remains. that it passes from one to the other. nor does one single contrariety of experiment entirely destroy all our reasoning. We must now shew. on which it is founded. therefore. If this shall appear. they acquire such a connexion in the imagination. without any doubt or hesitation. however we may in words refuse to acknowledge the necessity. nor can we conclude any thing from the one irregularity. Even when these contrary experiments are entirely equal. especially on the present subject. which are in every case equally necessary. But were we to judge by their actions. and if in other cases the union is uncertain. but supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary and conceal’d causes. attribute necessity to the one. there is no known circumstance. we conclude. which we so commonly make use of in our reasonings. perhaps. I can imagine only one way of eluding this argument. that in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims. tho’ to appearance not equally constant or certain. and overturn what cost the greatest pain and labour to establish. When any phænomena are constantly and invariably conjoin’d together. and consequently we cannot. and refuse it to the other. ’Tis commonly allow’d that mad-men have no liberty. To this I reply. that flow from them. The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in the actions. and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity. which is by denying that uniformity of human actions. absolutely inconsistent. as that in any natural operations. and deducting the inferior from the superior. but is a natural consequence of these confus’d ideas and undefin’d terms. that enters into the connexion and production of the actions of matter. not only from right reason. Our way of thinking in this particular is. But below this there are many inferior degrees of evidence and probability. and consequently are farther remov’d from necessity. that the chance or indifference lies only in our judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge. as well as common to mankind. There is a general course of nature in human actions. as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate. we remove not the notion of causes and necessity. therefore. so its influence on the understanding is also the same. Now some may. than that of some actions with some motives and characters. The one. The mind ballances the contrary experiments. in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another. proceeds not from the other. Human conduct is irregular and uncertain. a moment is sufficient to make him change from one extreme to another. ’tis no more than what happens in the operations of body. who shou’d inform us of people exactly of the same character with those in Plato’s Republic on the one hand. after the same manner as in England they are produc’d and decay in the contrary seasons. or those in Hobbes’s Leviathan on the other. without a manifest absurdity. these have less regularity and constancy than the actions of wise-men. I am apt to think a traveller wou’d meet with as little credit.in the summer. find a pretext to deny this regular union and connexion.

in the attempt. A man. and the same influence in what we call moral evidence. and by its influence feels the necessity. as not to acknowledge the force of moral evidence. does ipso facto believe the actions of the will to arise from necessity. discovers the impossibility of his escape. consider’d in themselves. who has neither money nor interest. I ask no more. would affirm such facts. and deriv’d from the same principles. commerce. that have fallen under our observation. temper and situation. especially since they must. and even after all. The same prisoner. A merchant looks for fidelity and skill in his factor or super-cargo. as any two things in nature. we have the idea of causes and necessity. than upon the inflexible nature of the other. expose themselves to the derision of all their contemporaries. that whoever reasons after this manner. and wherever the union operates in the same manner upon the belief and opinion. by the most accurate survey of them. From this constant union it forms the idea of cause and effect. when conducted to the scaffold. wou’d never conspire to deceive us. we infer that the person. and that the necessary connexion is not discover’d by a conclusion of the understanding. the cruelty of Nero. A prince. are as distinct and separate from each other. foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the ax or wheel. the inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination. and in all attempts for his freedom chuses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one. Here is a connected chain of natural 212 . and both in speculation and practice proceed upon it. that we are able to form this inference. is follow’d upon impulse by motion in another. the success of Augustus. that those facts were once really existent. the greatest part of our reasonings is employ’d in judgments concerning them. the separation of the head and body. A prisoner. The same kind of reasoning runs thro’ politics.There is no philosopher. we shall make no scruple to allow. makes account of a certain degree of courage. convulsive motions. that ’tis impossible to act or subsist a moment without having recourse to it. and that he knows not what he means. A general. nor can we ever. as from the walls and bars with which he is surrounded. Now I assert. the action of the executioner. deriv’d from the consideration of their motives. and indeed mixes itself so entirely in human life. Thus when we see certain characters or figures describ’d upon paper. Motion in one body in all past instances. ’Tis impossible for the mind to penetrate farther. when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together. Wherever. the death of Cæsar. as upon a reasonable foundation. who imposes a tax upon his subjects. We must not here be content with saying. and remembring many other concurrent testimonies we conclude. when these facts were asserted to be recent and universally known. and death. without any interest. that ’tis the very same with the idea of these objects. and that so many men. and form only one chain of argument betwixt them. doubts not of the obedience of his servants. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape. as well from the obstinacy of the goaler. What remains can only be a dispute of words. but must affirm. whose judgment is so riveted to this fantastical system of liberty. infer the existence of the one from that of the other. Now moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men. who produc’d them. tho’ perhaps we may avoid those expressions. bleeding. when he denies it. ’Tis only from experience and the observation of their constant union. expects their compliance. As there is the same constancy. as nothing more nearly interests us than our own actions and those of others. who gives orders for his dinner. but is merely a perception of the mind. All those objects. And indeed. that they are of the same nature. oeconomy. of which we call the one cause and the other effect. therefore. we observe the same union. In short. who conducts an army. that the idea of cause and effect arises from objects constantly united. war.

which is regarded as an argument for its real existence. tho’ we confess we were influenc’d by particular views and motives. however absurd it may be in one sense. who may consider the action. The same subject continu’d. volitions and actions. is nothing but the want of that determination. and chance. ’till I know the meaning he assigns to these terms. I believe we may assign the three following reasons for the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty. that in performing the actions themselves we are sensible of something like it: And as all related or resembling objects are readily taken for each other. or figure and motion. and consequently liberty. upon a second trial. but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change. SECTION II. First. Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of spontaniety. cou’d have been compleated into the thing itself. ’tis difficult for us to perswade ourselves we were govern’d by necessity. but in any thinking or intelligent being. and produces an image of itself even on that side. and assigning a different meaning to the terms of cause. This image or faint motion. which it concerns us to preserve. and unintelligible in any other. Secondly.causes and voluntary actions. I dare be positive no one will ever endeavour to refute these reasonings otherwise than by altering my definitions. that it can. and that ’twas utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise. The necessity of any action. The same experienc’d union has the same effect on the mind. we perswade ourselves. and violence. and a certain looseness. whether the united objects be motives. and effect. but the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another. we find. which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other. and is at least directly contrary to experience. and have almost universally confounded it with the other. Now we may observe. on which it did not settle. there is a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference. this has been employ’d as a demonstrative or even an intuitive proof of human liberty. and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects: As liberty or chance. As chance is commonly thought to imply a contradiction. I cannot pretend to argue with him. removes also causes. According to my definitions. shou’d that be deny’d. of which we are not sensible. We may change the names of things. and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing. The first is even the most common sense of the word. We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions. and necessity. If any one alters the definitions. there are always the same arguments against liberty or free-will. on the other hand. yet it very commonly happens. necessity makes an essential part of causation. nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleas’d to call a physical necessity. and is the very same thing with chance. by removing necessity. and that which means a negation of necessity and causes. because when by a denial of it we are provok’d to try. because. and as ’tis only that species of liberty. our thoughts have been principally turn’d towards it. the idea of necessity seeming to imply something of force. and constraint. But these efforts are 213 . is not properly a quality in the agent. and liberty. we feel that it moves easily every way. After we have perform’d any action. as it is call’d in the schools. whether of matter or of the mind. that tho’ in reflecting on human actions we seldom feel such a looseness or indifference. and the liberty of indifference. betwixt that which is oppos’d to violence.

I ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind. therefore. nothing in the receiv’d systems. that without it there must ensue an absolute subversion of both. that we have no idea of any other connexion in the actions of body. put an invidious construction on my words. and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. therefore. There is no method of reasoning more common. Such topics. which is suppos’d to lie in matter. in the schools. I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity. and that every other supposition is entirely destructive to all laws both divine and human. Now necessity. and that those inferences are founded on the experienc’d union of like actions with like motives and circumstances. according to my explication of it. in the pulpit. and dare venture to affirm. as the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions. This I observe in general. and shall be glad to be farther instructed on that head: But sure I am. that intelligible quality. proceeds from religion. Now this is the very essence of necessity. with regard to the will. is not only innocent. but as ’tis usually conjoin’d with the action. whatever it may be to natural philosophy. according to the foregoing doctrine. but only to make the person of an antagonist odious. and yet none more blameable. that we can draw inferences concerning human actions. in both these senses. But I ascribe to matter. he concludes in general. ’tis suppos’d as a fundamental principle.all in vain. But as long as the meaning is understood. but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character. which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. than its antagonist. that perhaps he will refuse to call this necessity. I place it either in the constant union and conjunction of like objects. com214 . that these motives have an influence on the mind. that this kind of necessity is so essential to religion and morality. and whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform. that as all human laws are founded on rewards and punishments. and in common life. and assert. When any opinion leads us into absurdities. which has been very unnecessarily interested in this question. but only with regard to material objects. because ’tis of dangerous consequence. that he might. that I assert the necessity of human actions. ’Tis indeed certain. Now whether it be so or not is of no consequence to religion. tho’ tacitely. of which it makes an essential part. by saying simply. The only particular in which any one can differ from me. Or that he will maintain there is something else in the operations of matter. is either. as serving nothing to the discovery of truth. A third reason why the doctrine of liberty has generally been better receiv’d in the world. has universally. Let no one. but ’tis not certain an opinion is false. We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves. or in the inference of the mind from the one to the other. and even where he cannot. without pretending to draw any advantage from it. but even advantageous to religion and morality. were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper. and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. Nay I shall go farther. and no one has ever pretended to deny. I hope the word can do no harm. that the doctrine of necessity. I submit myself frankly to an examination of this kind. call it necessity or not. I may be mistaken in asserting. therefore. I define necessity two ways. and place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter. ought entirely to be foreborn. been allow’d to belong to the will of man. We may give to this influence what name we please. than in philosophical debates to endeavour to refute any hypothesis by a pretext of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. conformable to the two definitions of cause. I change. ’tis certainly false. we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity. but what must readily be allow’d of.

that even where he acts not in his magisterial capacity. But I also maintain. whatever may be their consequences. nor is his character any way concern’d in his actions. especially if attended with an evident reformation of life and manners. But according to the doctrine of liberty or chance they never were just proofs. it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not responsible for it. and can neither redound to his honour. ’tis only by their relation to the person or connexion with him.mon sense requires it shou’d be esteem’d a cause. than by declamations before the people. ’Tis only upon the principles of necessity. operates only by intervals. since they are not deriv’d from it. According to the hypothesis of liberty. and desire him to free his own system from these odious consequences before he charge them upon others. and is suppos’d to inflict punishment and bestow rewards with a design to produce obedience. therefore. which I wou’d establish. nor infamy. nor are men more accountable for those actions. Upon a review of these reasonings. so far as the deity is consider’d as a legislator. however the common opinion may incline to the contrary. if good. as at the first moment of his birth. and as it proceeded from nothing in him. they infix not themselves upon him. Men are not blam’d for such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually. they likewise cease to be criminal. But so inconsistent are men with themselves. as they perform hastily and unpremeditately. Here then I turn to my adversary. that punishments cou’d be inflicted compatible with justice and moral equity. This reasoning is equally solid. not only ’tis impossible. upon its account. But according to the doctrine of liberty or chance. that tho’ they often assert. and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion. if evil. and terminate in them alone. How is this to be accounted for? But by asserting that actions render a person criminal. and the wickedness of the one can never be us’d as a proof of the depravity of the other. Again. merely as they are proofs of criminal passions or principles in the mind. ’tis impossible he can. and concerning the nature of moral evidence and the regularity of human actions. this connexion is reduc’d to nothing. and infects not the whole character. Or if he rather chuses. that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions. and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person. without the necessary connexion of cause and effect in human actions. than for such as proceed from thought and deliberation. For what reason? but because a hasty temper. The constant and universal object of hatred or anger is a person or creature endow’d with thought and consciousness. and be look’d upon as an instance of that necessity. which are design’d and premeditated. yet they continue still to reason upon these very principles of necessity in all their judgments concerning this matter. and consequently never were criminal. Why? but because the causes of these actions are only momentary. become the object of punishment or vengeance. that this question shou’d be decided by fair arguments before philosophers. Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing. when apply’d to divine laws. I cannot 215 . a man is as pure and untainted. repentance wipes off every crime. that is durable or constant. tho’ a constant cause in the mind. and when by any alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs. who perform’d them. let him return to what I have advanc’d to prove that liberty and chance are synonimous. that necessity utterly destroys all merit and demerit either towards mankind or superior powers. The action itself may be blameable. Men are less blam’d for such evil actions. than for such as are the most casual and accidental. but also that it cou’d ever enter into the thoughts of any reasonable being to inflict them. and leaves nothing of that nature behind it. after having committed the most horrid crimes. but is regarded as the avenger of crimes merely on account of their odiousness and deformity.

to give the preference to reason. that this emotion rests not here. Where the objects themselves do not affect 216 . seems to be founded. A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? but that he may learn what sum will have the same effects in paying his debt. upon that account. than this suppos’d pre-eminence of reason above passion. that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will. The eternity. and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects. Nothing is more usual in philosophy. Abstract or demonstrative reasoning. from each other. The understanding exerts itself after two different ways. I proceed to explain what these causes are. we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity. and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. that such objects are causes. ancient and modern. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation. but making us cast our view on every side. ’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object. and arithmetic in almost every art and profession: But ’tis not of themselves they have any influence. which leads us to the second operation of the understanding. if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. is oblig’d to regulate his actions by reason. and such others effects. that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. As it’s proper province is the world of ideas. and going to market. ’tis said. and the reason why we employ arithmetic in fixing the proportions of numbers. and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct. that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object. as well for metaphysical arguments. or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. unconstancy and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. nor is there an ampler field. that all actions of the will have particular causes. It can never in the least concern us to know. or those relations of objects. But ’tis evident in this case. as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas. that the first species of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action. as it judges from demonstration or probability. and secondly. our actions receive a subsequent variation. Every rational creature. and even in common life.doubt of an entire victory. indeed. I shall endeavour to prove first. and therefore having prov’d. of which experience only gives us information. to be totally remov’d. SECTION III. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy. and according as our reasoning varies. invariableness. Mechanics are the art of regulating the motions of bodies to some design’d end or purpose. comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. that the impulse arises not from reason. In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy. he ought to oppose it. is only that we may discover the proportions of their influence and operation. but is only directed by it. therefore. and divine origin of the former have been display’d to the best advantage: The blindness. Of the influencing motives of the will. as all the particular articles taken together. ’Tis also obvious. Mathematics. than to talk of the combat of passion and reason. are useful in all mechanical operations. ’till it be entirely subdu’d. as popular declamations. I believe it scarce will be asserted. ’Tis obvious. and how they operate. demonstration and volition seem. and as the will always places us in that of realities. never influences any of our actions.

or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. properly speaking. Thus it appears. Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion. ’tis only in two senses. but the judgment.us. Since a passion can never. the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. When a passion. that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany’d with some judgment or opinion. What may at first occur on this head. Secondly. if you will. than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. as well as hinder any act of volition. and ought only to be the slave of the passions. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. that any affection can be call’d unreasonable. cannot be the same with reason. When in exerting any passion in action. According to this principle. In short. Since reason alone can never produce any action. The consequences are evident. This consequence is necessary. that as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason. despair or security. wou’d have been able to produce volition. and that impulse. it must follow. that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition. which they represent. or ever keep the mind in suspence a moment. ’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater. except what has a reference to it. it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations. which is unreasonable. that the principle. or when it chuses means insufficient for the design’d end. and must be able to cause. and is only call’d so in an improper sense. and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. or. and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. or more than five foot high. nor chuses means insufficient for the end. nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this. produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment. ’Tis impossible reason cou’d have the latter effect of preventing volition. a passion must be accompany’d with some false judgment. ’Tis impossible. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin. in any sense. is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects. and contains not any representative quality. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary. which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. in order to its being unreasonable. grief or joy. therefore. Reason is. that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will. and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason. which has such an efficacy. since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas. with those objects. First. ’tis impossible it can withstand any principle. but by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion. had it operated alone. ’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. from certain circumstances. which really do not exist. is. their connexion can never give them any influence. be call’d unreasonable. than when I am thirsty. and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference. I am actually possest with the passion. and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object. or sick. such as hope or fear. but a contrary impulse. or be contradictory to truth and reason. which opposes our passion. to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. modification of existence. A trivial good may. and ’tis plain. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions. But if reason has no original influence. that this passion can be oppos’d by. I infer. ’tis 217 . which is so obvious and natural. and even then ’tis not the passion. and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. but when founded on a false supposition. When I am angry. consider’d as copies. A passion is an original existence. we chuse means insufficient for the design’d end. that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion. it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us. or give rise to volition.

Beside these calm passions. and where they are contrary. apprehensions. scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness. is confounded with reason by all those. and are suppos’d to proceed from the same faculty. as soon as I discover the falshood of that supposition. my longing ceases. or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. that either of them prevails. When I receive any injury from another. tho’ we may easily observe. which judges of truth and falshood. to imagine. and aversions rise to a great height. tho’ they be real passions. and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. that they are causes of the propos’d effect. 218 . and produce a sensible emotion. and founded on the supposition. which determines them. ’Tis natural for one. which often determine the will. they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason. independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself. When I am immediately threaten’d with any grievous ill. The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles. Hence it proceeds. the love of life. implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent. or in the frivolous subtilties of the schools. there are certain violent emotions of the same kind. that does not examine objects with a strict philosophic eye. according to the general character or present disposition of the person. for instance. my fears. because their sensations are not evidently different. produce little emotion in the mind.impossible. where there is any contrariety of motives and passions. either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures. and cause no disorder in the soul. Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs: ’Tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone. there is no man so constantly possess’d of this virtue. Their nature and principles have been suppos’d the same. or the general appetite to good. When any of these passions are calm. that both these principles operate on the will. and kindness to children. I often feel a violent passion of resentment. who judge of things from the first view and appearance. I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir’d good. which makes me desire his evil and punishment. they must become indifferent to me. consider’d merely as such. with that. In general we may observe. From these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men. I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish. and supposing the other to have no influence. What we call strength of mind. that those actions of the mind are entirely the same. and are not immediately distinguishable to the feeling and perception. but whenever you convince me of my mistake. and aversion to evil. which produce not a different sensation. as never on any occasion to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire. Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion. which. that reason and passion can ever oppose each other. but as my willing of these actions is only secondary. These desires are of two kinds. which have likewise a great influence on that faculty. there are certain calm desires and tendencies. and except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy. that every action of the mind. which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity. Reason. Now ’tis certain. The moment we perceive the falshood of any supposition. or dispute for the government of the will and actions. such as benevolence and resentment.

But herein lies the difference betwixt them: The same good. and ’tis natural to imagine this change will come from the prevailing affection. of which they intend to inform him. however unpleasant and related to anger and hatred. A soldier advancing to the battle. before they give him a full insight into the business. As repeated custom and its own force have made every thing yield to it. As this subject belongs very properly to the present question concerning the will. which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion. in order to make a perfect union among passions. ’twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions. The predominant passion swallows up the inferior. and shall consider some of those circumstances and situations of objects. ’tis certain. and avoid evil. But notwithstanding this. and must regard the double relation. When two passions are already produc’d by their separate causes. than what is vulgarly call’d his reason. ’Tis true. when they wou’d affect any person very much by a matter of fact. we shall here examine it to the bottom. and is the predominant inclination of the soul. Both these kinds of passions pursue good. When a person is once heartily in love. ’Tis a remarkable property of human nature. will cause a violent passion. and are both present in the mind. which render a passion either calm or violent. and that a variation in this particular will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other. to which that commerce is so subject. tho’ they have but one relation. For we may observe. tho’ in their natures they be originally different from. and by that means raise his anxiety and impatience to the utmost. is easily converted into it. and converts it into itself. as requisite only to make one passion produce another. We must. the little faults and caprice of his mistress. is naturally inspir’d with cour219 . The spirits. ’Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence. that all depends upon the situation of the object. Of the causes of the violent passions. it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. betwixt a violent and a strong one. than betwixt any passion and indifference. but on the contrary. and even contrary to each other. and rather take him by his inclination. which. delay as long as possible the satisfying it. and sometimes without any. first to excite his curiosity. produces only a calm one.SECTION IV. when once excited. They know that his curiosity will precipitate him into the passion they design to raise. when remote. when near. or the disorder they occasion in the temper. easily receive a change in their direction. the jealousies and quarrels. There is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this of the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions. But tho’ this be confirm’d by undoubted experience. that when we wou’d govern a man. distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion. We ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to encrease the violence of the passion. The connexion is in many respects closer betwixt any two passions. and push him to any action. therefore. that any emotion. we must understand it with its proper limitations. which attends a passion. nor is one relation sufficient for that purpose. it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion. they readily mingle and unite. and assist the object in its influence on the mind. ’Tis a common artifice of politicians. that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action. are yet found to give additional force to the prevailing passion. there is always requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas. and both of them are encreas’d or diminish’d by the encrease or diminution of the good or evil.

it follows. immediately languishes. ’Tis certain nothing more powerfully animates any affection. Uncertainty has the same influence as opposition. therefore. as to cause any particular emotion. the uniformity and lustre of our habit. according to the different views: All these produce an agitation in the mind. so absence is observ’d to have contrary effects. whenever any object excites contrary passions. while the same objects in the enemy strike terror into us. which at the same time that it shews enough to pre-possess us in favour of the object. which succeed each other. the effort. and in order to preserve its ardour. as the wind extinguishes a candle. For ’tis observable that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits. The mind. and is struck with fear and terror. proceeds from the former naturally encreases the courage. The passion commonly acquires new force and violence in both cases. The Duc de la Rochefoucault has very well observ’d. and the conversion of the inferior emotion into the predominant. are naturally transfus’d into each other. There is not in my opinion any other natural cause. which encreases them. The agitation of the thought. that when good or evil is plac’d in such a situation. As despair and security. however independent. Hence it is that in martial discipline. augments the fear. The notion of duty. and gives an additional force to the passion. that latter passion must acquire new force and violence. than to conceal some part of its object by throwing it into a kind of shade. tho’ contrary to security. despair. the variety of passions. the quick turns it makes from one view to another. Long absence naturally weakens our idea. is apt rather to encrease them. Whatever new emotion. than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. when he thinks on his friends and fellow-soldiers. when left to itself. and encreases its violence. by the relation of ideas. that absence destroys weak passions. and transfuse themselves into the predominant passion. than because it removes that uncertainty. leaves still some work for the imagination. when he reflects on the enemy. and in different circumstances either encreases or diminishes our affections. when opposite to the passions. For the same reason. excite the spirits and inliven the passion. by producing an opposition in our motives and principles. produce the same effects. tho’ agreeable and beautiful in themselves. proceeding from the latter. The same effect follows whether the opposition arises from internal motives or external obstacles. but blows up a fire. why security diminishes the passions. This new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion. and diminishes the passion: But where the idea is so strong and lively as 220 . which the fancy makes to compleat the idea. Besides that obscurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty. among other cases. must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion. Hence we naturally desire what is forbid. the regularity of our figures and motions. with all the pomp and majesty of war. encourage ourselves and allies. is seldom able to overcome them. and produces more disorder. has a like influence. beyond the pitch it wou’d have arriv’d at had it met with no opposition. beside its direct passion of desire or aversion. which the mind makes to surmount the obstacle. rouzes the spirits. Since passions. and when it fails of that effect. This happens.age and confidence. and take a pleasure in performing actions. merely because they are unlawful. as the same emotion. but encreases strong. The efforts. tho’ contrary to each other. if they are both present at the same time.

and afterwards a tendency or inclination towards it. The pleasure of facility does not so much consist in any ferment of the spirits. where the facility goes not beyond a certain degree. becomes indifferent. to convert pleasure into pain. or any thing. as facility converts pain into pleasure. and give us a relish in time for what at first was most harsh and disagreeable. as well as the agreeable affections. and trees. and can never be the object of inclination. But when the fair sex. the passions subside. But again. But as in the active. and gives us either more pleasure or pain. and heavens. Hence every thing. or the conception of any object. the spirits are sufficiently 221 . however extraordinary. is easily converted into it. ’tis the source of wonder. encreases the passion. When the soul applies itself to the performance of any action. and stones. but likewise an inclination and tendency towards it. but such as are naturally attended with some emotion or affection. custom. and we survey the objects with greater tranquillity. that they are no longer able to interest and support it.to support itself. that is new. it not only augments our agreeable affections. that every emotion. Custom has two original effects upon the mind. But custom not only gives a facility to perform any action. One can consider the clouds. which precedes or attends a passion. and an infallible source of pleasure. but diminishes passive. than custom and repetition. which arise from novelty. but also our painful. and from these we may account for all its other effects. When it often returns upon us. the hurry of the spirits is over. yet as it puts the spirits in agitation. naturally belongs to it. And here ’tis remarkable that the pleasure. scarce any other objects become disagreeable thro’. And indeed. and a difficulty of the spirit’s moving in their new direction. and gives it new force and violence. however frequently repeated. Of the effects of custom. As this difficulty excites the spirits. the novelty wears off. where it is not entirely disagreeable. But tho’ surprize be agreeable in itself. in bestowing a facility in the performance of any action or the conception of any object. SECTION V. that naturally ought to be agreeable. and renders the actions of the mind so faint and languid. according to the observation of a late eminent philosopher. And this is the reason why custom encreases all active habits. which is destroy’d by the too frequent repetition. to augment the painful. than what. is most affecting. and is in itself very agreeable. The facility takes off from the force of the passive habits by rendering the motion of the spirits faint and languid. which will sometimes be so powerful as even to convert pain into pleasure. which is another very powerful principle of the human mind. as in their orderly motion. and pain into pleasure. or good cheer. which inlivens the mind to a moderate degree. arising from absence. so it often converts pleasure into pain. has not the same tendency with that which arises from novelty. there is a certain unpliableness in the faculties. strictly speaking. the uneasiness. which arises from a moderate facility. when it is too great. without ever feeling any aversion. But nothing has a greater effect both to encrease and diminish our passions. it easily produces the opposite affection. or music. surprize. according to the foregoing principle. By degrees the repetition produces a facility. and of all the emotions. to which it is not accustom’d. like every thing.

There is a noted passage in the history of Greece. says he. which wou’d be highly useful to the public. to whom ’tis easy in their schools to establish the finest maxims and most sublime rules of morality. Whether this proceeds from the principle above-mention’d. with which we are acquainted. but which ’twas impossible for him to communicate to them without ruining the execution. by which we represent a general one. ’Tis a whole people interested in the proposal. that any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant. but of whose nature we are wholly ignorant. and that nothing. Themistocles told the Athenians. and told them. and bends them more strongly to the action. and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations. order’d him to communicate his design to Aristides. SECTION VI. The design of Themistocles was secretly to set fire to the fleet of all the Grecian commonwealths. tend. that the imagination and affections have a close union together. which we own to be superior. The same reasons. but may easily be chang’d for other particular ones.supported of themselves. A general idea. which is made to them. that nothing cou’d be more advantageous than the design of Themistocles. which affects the former. Here. and whose opinion they were resolv’d blindly to submit to. and ’tis certain. I shall not determine. ’Tis sufficient for my present purpose. since its success depended entirely on the secrecy with which it shou’d be conducted. and which being once destroy’d. that we have many instances to confirm this influence of the imagination upon the passions. in whose prudence they had an entire confidence. The Athenians. and without hesitation. affects us more than any other. that the more general and universal any of our ideas are. as one of the most singular that is any where to be met with. which may serve for our present purpose. who decide that interest ought never to prevail above justice. Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity. Of the influence of the imagination on the passions. And tho’ 222 . ’Tis remarkable. For my part I see nothing so extraordinary in this proceeding of the Athenians. but at the same time that nothing cou’d be more unjust: Upon which the people unanimously rejected the project. because their decisions are general. merely because it is contrary to justice. Aristides return’d to the assembly. the tendency of the mind gives them new force. instead of granting him full power to act as he thought fitting. who consider it as of importance to the public good. which will serve equally in the representation. and that because no particular idea. is ever fix’d or determinate. the less influence they have upon the imagination. tho’ it be nothing but a particular one consider’d in a certain view. is commonly more obscure. can be entirely indifferent to the latter. that he had form’d a design. Philosophers never ballance betwixt profit and honesty. the passions become more violent. in part. and neither their passions nor imaginations are interested in the objects. they are not philosophers. wou’d give the Athenians the empire of the sea without any rival. which was assembled in a neighbouring port. A late celebrated64 historian admires this passage of antient history. to diminish the merit of such a conduct in that people. and who notwithstanding reject itunanimously. Any pleasure. which render it so easy for philosophers to establish these sublime maxims. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: The other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure.

which is foreign to it. that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. by which objects are represented in their strongest and most lively colours. as I have already observ’d. that lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination. Any satisfaction. why every thing contiguous to us. and sympathy. bestows these qualities on the idea of the future pleasure. SECTION VII. but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy. and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality. shou’d so unanimously have adher’d to justice. and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? The image of the past pleasure being strong and violent. than if they had been acquainted with all its circumstances: Otherwise ’tis difficult to conceive. In this respect. operates on the will with more violence. the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the person. Of contiguity. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions. This phænomenon may be explain’d from the same principle. it must have had a less considerable influence on their imaginations. and gives force to these ideas. There is an easy reason. and distance in space and time. But eloquence is not always necessary. in which we are engag’d. in its influence on the imagination. We may of ourselves acknowledge. they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections. yet as it was known only under the general notion of advantage. without being conceiv’d by any particular idea. why.in the present case the advantage was immediate to the Athenians. and such another odious. but ’till an orator excites the imagination. But where an object is so far remov’d as to have lost the advantage of this relation. ’Tis too weak to take any hold of the mind. and of which the memory is fresh and recent. and almost obliterated. A pleasure. nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon either of them. especially when inforc’d with passion. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication. the calm as well as the violent. will cause an idea of good or evil to have an influence upon us. than another of which the traces are decay’d. as well as others. Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind. than eloquence. which we lately enjoy’d. that such an object is valuable. unjust and violent as men commonly are. I have already observ’d. and rejected any considerable advantage. is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination. ’Tis remarkable. that a whole people. which is suitable to the way of life. or be attended with emotion. and have been a less violent temptation. excites more our desires and appetites than another. as the nature or situation of the object. and excel every other object. either in space or time. shou’d be conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity. which wou’d otherwise have been entirely neglected. Ourself is intimately present to us. From whence does this proceed. as it is 223 . which is connected with it by the relation of resemblance. The bare opinion of another.

Talk to a man of his condition thirty years hence. tho’ distance both in space and time has a considerable effect on the imagination. as when we reflect on a nearer object. and by that means on the will and passions. it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses. never presents to us more than one at once. These qualities of the objects have a suitable effect on the imagination. its idea becomes still fainter and more obscure. Here then we are to consider two kinds of objects. that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects. perhaps. tho’ it consists likewise of parts. we take them in their proper order and situation. ’Tis obvious. at least in a cursory manner. that he is not without concern about what passes in Jamaica. when abroad. and never leap from one object to another. The parts of extension being susceptible of an union to the senses. require a more particular examination. and capable of being at once present to the sight or feeling. of which the former. which are not much remov’d either in space or time. that men are principally concern’d about those objects. The fewer steps we make to arrive at the object. wou’d. than the burning of a house. Twenty years are certainly but a small distance of time in comparison of what history and even the memory of some may inform them of. or even the greatest distance of place this globe can admit of. approach an impression in force and vivacity. but still may be observ’d more or less in proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty. The cause of this phænomenon must evidently lie in the different properties of space and time. we are oblig’d not only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object. and yet I doubt if a thousand leagues. without running over. which are interpos’d betwixt them. in which we are existent. Speak of what is to happen to-morrow. which is distant from it. ’Tis also remarkable. and he will not regard you. But farther. yet the consequence of a removal in space are much inferior to those of a removal in time. enjoying the present. When we reflect.farther remov’d. that in the conception of those objects. and leaving what is afar off to the care of chance and fortune. the latter by reason of the interruption in our manner of conceiving them. all those objects. appear in a weaker and more imperfect light. Contiguous objects must have an influence much superior to the distant and remote. If my reasoning be just. A West-India merchant will tell you. The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home. they must have a proportionable effect on the will and passions. but also to renew our progress every moment. and as the appearance of one part excludes not another. any one may easily observe. time or succession. Accordingly we find in common life. that this interruption must weaken the idea by breaking the action of the mind. and the smoother the road is. and some hundred leagues distant. which we regard as real and existent. nor is it possible for any two of them ever to be coexistent. by means of their relation to ourselves. as to dread very remote accidents. tho’ few extend their views so far into futurity. and he will lend you attention. and hindering the conception from being so intense and continu’d. this diminution of vivacity is less sensibly felt. and diminish our passions. This is their effect on the imagination. being every moment recall’d to the consideration of ourselves and our present situation. the transition or passage of the thought thro’ the contiguous 224 . acquire an union in the fancy. ’Tis easily conceiv’d. on any object distant from ourselves. will so remarkably weaken our ideas. On the contrary. that space or extension consists of a number of co-existent parts dispos’d in a certain order. Without having recourse to metaphysics. that the imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time. therefore. the contiguous and remote.

and are oblig’d to overcome the difficulties arising from the natural propensity of the fancy. and from the present instant surveys the future and the past. and proceeds from the same quality of the fancy. therefore. Every part must appear single and alone. abstractedly consider’d. which seems most natural. which both contributes to the same effect. remove this quality of the imagination. in supposing ourselves existent in a 225 . There is another phænomenon of a like nature with the foregoing. we have another peculiarity in our method of thinking. ’tis evident. which is always observ’d in historical narrations. as proceeding from one point of time to that which is preceding. by which we are determin’d to trace the succession of time by a similar succession of ideas. and makes it more difficult for that faculty to trace any long succession or series of events. if we reflect on what I have before observ’d. from the order. and from that to another preceding. On the other hand. the superior effects of the same distance in futurity above that in the past. than a much greater in the future. Besides the propensity to a gradual progression thro’ the points of space and time. the progression of the thought in passing to it from the present is contrary to nature. and makes it conceive its object in a stronger and fuller light. For as the future will sometime be present. wou’d have a similar influence. But with respect to the passions the question is yet entire. which follows immediately after it. in interrupting and weakening the conception. When the object is past. than to that which went before it. This difference with respect to the will is easily accounted for. For as on the one hand. and that ’tis from thence we proceed to the conception of any distant object.parts is by that means render’d more smooth and easy. that. We may learn this. among other instances. If we cou’d. the incompatibility of the parts of time in their real existence separates them in the imagination. As none of our actions can alter the past. an equal distance in the past and in the future. their relation to the present is almost equal. We always follow the succession of time in placing our ideas. From this effect of it on the imagination is deriv’d its influence on the will and passions. but also when it changes its situation. and the past retire. A small degree of distance in the past has. when the fancy remains fix’d. when we turn our thought to a future object. and become more distant: So on the other hand. There is another cause. and from the consideration of any object pass more easily to that. in opposition to the natural course of the succession. so the past was once present. our fancy flows along the stream of time. than when we are continually oppos’d in our passage. and arrives at the object by an order. By this means any distance in time causes a greater interruption in the thought than an equal distance in space. which depend in a great measure. and in his narration give the precedence to an event. On the other hand. we find the future object approach to us. and well worth the examining. according to my system. and consequently the passions. passing always from one point of time to that which is immediately posterior to it. on the imagination. This easy progression of ideas favours the imagination. in supposing ourselves existent in a point of time interpos’d betwixt the present instant and the future object. nor can regularly have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is suppos’d to have been immediately precedent. therefore. and places us in different periods of time. a greater effect. This will easily be apply’d to the question in hand. which was in reality posterior to another. and consequently weakens more considerably the idea. that the present situation of the person is always that of the imagination. viz. ’tis not strange it shou’d never determine the will. which concurs in producing this phænomenon. Nothing but an absolute necessity can oblige an historian to break the order of time. When from the present instant we consider two points of time equally distant in the future and in the past. Nor is this only true.

and be certainly inform’d of the character. Accordingly we find. which accompanies not its beauty with a suitable greatness. The same subject continu’d. and bestow more fruitless pains to clear up the history and chronology of the former. the ocean. and surveys the object in that condition. We must now consider three phænomena. An equal distance. But from the property of the fancy above-mention’d we rather chuse to fix our thought on the point of time interpos’d betwixt the present and the future. even in our cabinet. and transports to the second all the passions excited by the first. rather than retard our existence. a distance in time has a more considerable effect than that in space. which is directed to the distance. We advance. conveys our view to the distance. I shall be oblig’d to make a digression in order to explain this phænomenon. the past approaches to us. which is regarded as the present. the reverse of these: Why a very great distance encreases our esteem and admiration for an object: Why such a distance in time encreases it more than that in space: And a distance in past time more than that in future. eternity. that ’tis not necessary the object shou’d be actually distant from us. by another natural transition. if. SECTION VIII. and the future becomes more distant. is always esteem’d a valuable curiosity. But tho’ every great distance produces an admiration for the distant object. it conveys our view to any considerable distance. conceiving something great and magnificent. ’tis evident that the mere view and contemplation of any greatness. as well as in that. I hope. A wide plain. ’tis certain we regard with more veneration the old Chaldeans and Egyptians. and from present to future. will pass for a very extraordinary person. receive the usual satisfaction. but that ’tis sufficient. and following what seems the natural succession of time. Now when any very distant object is presented to the imagination. returns back to the object. ’tho in the same chamber. why a great distance encreases our esteem and admiration for an object. enlarges the soul. which arises from that distance. than it wou’d cost us to make a voyage. 226 . all these are entertaining objects. and that because we consider the one as continually encreasing. learning and government of the latter. by a natural transition. has not the same effect on the imagination. and the past as retiring. naturally diffuses itself over the distant object. The fancy anticipates the course of things. Why distance weakens the conception and passion: Why distance in time has a greater effect than that in space: And why distance in past time has still a greater effect than that in future. The curiousness of the subject will. and excel every thing. To begin with the first phænomenon. whether successive or extended. A great traveller. which seem pretty remarkable. proceed from past to present. than the modern Chinese and Persians. excuse my dwelling on it for some time. and the other as continually diminishing. Antient busts and inscriptions are more valu’d than Japan tables: And not to mention the Greeks and Romans. in a manner. in the past and in the future. and give it a sensible delight and pleasure. however beautiful. But as the fancy passes easily from one idea to another related to it. as a Greek medal. therefore. we naturally reflect on the interpos’d distance. in order to cause our admiration. and the admiration. By which means we conceive the future as flowing every moment nearer us. Here the object. by the natural association of ideas. the admiration. which seem to be. and by that means. than on that betwixt the present and the past.point of time interpos’d betwixt the present and the past. Thus we have accounted for three phænomena. a succession of several ages. to which it tends.

in which it is situated. as peasants and day-labourers are said to be in the lowest stations. and inspires us with a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity. In collecting our force to overcome the opposition. and. are not of so little consequence as they may appear at first sight. which equally stops the body and our imagination. in a manner seeks opposition. finds an opposition in its internal qualities and principles. desires the former. to the place immediately below it. no wonder the mind. and so on. and of expressing ourselves. Any great elevation of place communicates a kind of pride or sublimity of imagination. and is averse to the latter. as on the contrary. Spumantemque dari pecora inter inertia votis Optat aprum. Compliance. what weakens and infeebles them is uneasy. and evil with lowness. continually operating upon our senses. till we come to the ground. which can proceed from nothing but the contrary tendency of bodies. To be convinc’d of this we need only consider the influence of heights and depths on that faculty. but opposition awakens and employs it. from custom. The very same direction. aut fulvum descendere monte leonem. that there is no natural nor essential difference betwixt high and low. Opposition not only enlarges the soul. in running from low to high. Prosperity is denominated ascent. we invigorate the soul. when full of courage and magnanimity. but the soul. is denominated descent in our antipodes. As opposition has the first effect. that the facility. is call’d the fall or cadency of the harmony or period. which is so much study’d in music and poetry. Whatever supports and fills the passions is agreeable to us. Kings and princes are suppos’d to be plac’d at the top of human affairs.’Tis a quality very observable in human nature. As a proof of this. This is also true in the inverse. a vulgar and trivial conception is stil’d indifferently low or mean. that we associate. A noble genius is call’d an elevate and sublime one. Hence it proceeds. do we not find. which does not entirely discourage and intimidate us. vice versa. These methods of thinking. has rather a contrary effect. the idea of whatever is good with that of height. that the tendency of bodies. by rendering our strength useless. and facility the second. which produces a motion from the one to the other. where its courage 227 . in a manner. and that this distinction arises only from the gravitation of matter. in the same manner as descent produces a facility? Since the imagination. and adversity descent. For a like reason we feel a difficulty in mounting. Heaven is suppos’d to be above. as well as philosophy. that any opposition. the idea of facility communicating to us that of descent. when elevated with joy and courage. must produce. and gives a fancy’d superiority over those that lie below. the idea of its weight gives us a propensity to transport it from the place. and pass not without a kind of reluctance from the inferior to that which is situated above it. a sublime and strong imagination conveys the idea of ascent and elevation. makes us insensible of it. therefore. and that when we consider any object situated in an ascent. which in this part of the globe is call’d ascent. as if our ideas acquir’d a kind of gravity from their objects. Now ’tis certain. On the contrary. and hell below. in certain dispositions. ’Tis evident to common sense. a like tendency in the fancy. and give it an elevation with which otherwise it wou’d never have been acquainted. in a manner seeks opposition. and since the soul. Atque udam spernit humum fugiente penna. These principles have an effect on the imagination as well as on the passions. and throws itself with alacrity into any scene of thought or action.

where the distance is small. or any object. mounted above us. and the facility of the contrary. has the contrary effect. which invigorates and inlivens the soul. when very great. by the original formation of our faculties. and as our imagination finds a kind of difficulty in running along the former. This phænomenon is the more remarkable. This difficulty. to whom descent is adverse. which. and consequently every one of their effects proceeds from that origin. and a facility in following the course of the latter. where the ideas flow along with easiness and facility. that every thing. but enlarges and elevates the imagination. All this is easily apply’d to the present question. all that has been said concerning it. and folly are conjoin’d with descent and lowness. As on the other hand. as appears hence.meets with matter to nourish and employ it. It may not be improper. ’Tis not every removal in time. and who cannot sink without labour and compulsion. from the consideration of the distance to the view of the distant objects. instead of extinguishing its vigour and alacrity. and this is the reason why all the relicts of antiquity are so precious in our eyes. Virtue. or equal our ancestors. it follows. the facility assists the fancy in a small removal. why a considerable distance in time produces a greater veneration for the distant objects than a like removal in space. this order of things wou’d be entirely inverted. of sustaining and encreasing it. and riches are for this reason associated with height and sublimity. is fitted to excite an appetite. yet a small removal has a greater influence in diminishing them. and determines it to run against the natural stream of its thoughts and conceptions. and appear more valuable than what is brought even from the remotest parts of the world. and being oblig’d every moment to renew its efforts in the transition from one part of time to another. but easily reaches the other: Which effort weakens the conception. and the difficulty. whether by touching the passions or imagination. power. in order to set the whole more distinctly before the eyes of the reader. elevated by the vastness of its object. The imagination moves with more difficulty in passing from one portion of time to another. The mind. to resume. What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind. which has the effect of producing veneration and esteem. the imagination. is still farther elevated by the difficulty of the conception. when join’d with a small distance. naturally conveys to the fancy this inclination for ascent. and our posterity to lie below us. genius. Tho’ a removal in the past. when attended with a suitable object. encreases our passions beyond a like removal in the future. when any good or evil is presented. feels a more vigorous and sublime disposition. and that because space or extension appears united to our senses. in a manner. while time or succession is always broken and divided. than in a transition thro’ the parts of space. We are not apt to imagine our posterity will excel us. interrupts and weakens the fancy: But has a contrary effect in a great removal. than in a transition thro’ the parts of space. Our fancy arrives not at the one without effort. In our common way of thinking we are plac’d in a kind of middle station betwixt the past and future. but such as 228 . By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former. This aspiring progress of the imagination suits the present disposition of the mind. as poverty. The third phænomenon I have remark’d will be a full confirmation of this. In this disposition. in a few words. as is usual. Were the case the same with us as Milton represents it to be with the angels. that the very nature of ascent and descent is deriv’d from the difficulty and propensity. passing. but takes off from its force when it contemplates any considerable distance. because any distance in futurity weakens not our ideas so much as an equal removal in the past. before we leave this subject of the will. gives us a proportionable veneration for it. Hence we imagine our ancestors to be. the difficulty conveys the notion of ascent. slavery.

but also from themselves in different times. and gives new force to our desire or volition. and seconded by resolution. and makes men so different not only from each other. as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion. but by concurring with certain dormant principles of the human mind. and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties. Both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable. are able to controul them in their most furious movements. which unites us to the object. by custom. and depend. and of most of our reflective or secondary impressions. Again. and this pleasure produces the direct passions. this struggle of passion and of reason. are founded on pain and pleasure. when these cloaths are consider’d as belonging to ourself. Thus a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty. grief and joy. when corroborated by reflection. ’Tis easy to observe. it produces joy. 229 . Upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred. which arise from good and evil most naturally. SECTION IX. or by exciting the imagination. and that arising from an object related to ourselves or others. with the consequent emotions. and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them. pride and humility. either by a change of temper. Upon the whole. but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions. and to avoid the evil. When good is certain or probable. Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war. joy or hope. When evil is in the same situation there arises grief or sorrow. The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good. These indirect passions. as it is call’d. that a calm passion may easily be chang’d into a violent one. along with volition. the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will. diversifies human life. Of the direct passions. give in their turn additional force to the direct passions. as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension. and the pleasure. that the passions. both direct and indirect. but in conjunction with the indirect passions. that the calm ones. still continues to operate. returns back to the direct affections. this does not prevent the propensity or aversion. But supposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure. and with the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion. which arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas. and that in order to produce an affection of any kind. love or hatred. desire and aversion. ’tis only requisite to present some good or evil. hope and fear. or of the circumstances and situation of the object. the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride. excites the new impressions of pride or humility. which attends that passion. or the impressions of volition and desire. tho’ ’tis often found. being always agreeable or uneasy. What makes this whole affair more uncertain. in a great measure. and be consider’d as to exist in any future period of time. is. or separates us from it. That propensity. Generally speaking. which is an indirect passion.operate more calmly. on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual. The impressions. tho’ they be conceiv’d merely in idea. and encrease our desire and aversion to the object.

when any object is presented. which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases. to rest on either. it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow. pain and pleasure. therefore. Suppose. Now if we consider the human mind. which is perfectly unaccountable. call it which you please. None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention. which we shall here endeavour to account for. The imagination is extreme quick and agile. whose existence we desire. and the mind. hunger. tho’ the fancy may change its views with great celerity. according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other. 230 . we shall find. These passions. by which the mind is not allow’d to fix on either side. Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes. An object. which by its certainty wou’d produce grief or joy. lust. and aversion is deriv’d from evil. the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct. and proceed not from them. and at one moment is determin’d to consider an object as existent. The pro and con of the question alternately prevail. by reason of the opposition of causes or chances. which produce it. Desire arises from good consider’d simply. which gradually and insensibly decays. fluctuates betwixt the opposite views. ’tis evident. and a few other bodily appetites. that the object. that with regard to the passions. that affords a variety of views to the one. the affections must in the same manner be divided betwixt opposite emotions. but rather resembles a string-instrument. or. the passion of joy or sorrow predominates in the composition: Because the nature of probability is to cast a superior number of views or chances on one side. and emotions to the other. concerning whose reality we are doubtful. is divided betwixt the contrary points of view. where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound. it gives rise to fear or hope. but the passions are slow and restive: For which reason. ’Tis evident that the very same event. surveying the object in its opposite principles. when we reflect on those causes. ’tis not of the nature of a wind-instrument of music. According as the probability inclines to good or evil. gives satisfaction. we must reflect on what I have already advanc’d in the preceding book concerning the nature of probability. The imagination or understanding. or in other words. and of happiness to our friends. and for the same reason excites grief or uneasiness from the opposite consideration: So that as the understanding. gives always rise to fear or hope. properly speaking. produce good and evil. ’tis impossible for it. when only probable and uncertain. to understand the reason why this circumstance makes such a considerable difference.When either good or evil is uncertain. is an object either of desire or aversion. and at another moment as the contrary. then. finds such a contrariety as utterly destroys all certainty and establish’d opinion. each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion. and tho’ perhaps it may be oftner turn’d to the one side than the other. but is incessantly tost from one to another. Beside good and evil. The will exerts itself. except hope and fear. In order. according as the mind turns itself either to the one side or the other. when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies. but the one passion will always be mixt and confounded with the other. like the other affections. in all probable questions. that.

and produce a third impression or affection by their union. by what theory we can explain these variations. and yet their relation is sufficient to mingle their fainter emotions. beside the encrease of the predominant passion (which has been already explain’d. except when their contrary movements exactly rencounter. produce by their union the passions of hope and fear. and instead of destroying and tempering each other. and is follow’d by a sensible vibration after the stroke. but ’tis necessary. can scarcely temper the one affection with the other. and commonly arises at their first shock or rencounter) it sometimes happens. by means of the contrary views of the imagination. mingling with each other by means of the relation. when they proceed from different parts of the same: And 231 . and preventing their opposition. For in that case. It more easily attains that calm situation. as well as in the sensation they produce. which are objects altogether incompatible. This exact rencounter depends upon the relations of those ideas. the want of relation in the ideas separating the impressions from each other. therefore. and remain betwixt them in a state of indifference. Thus when a man is afflicted for the loss of a law-suit. That is. ’Tis impossible by one steady view to survey the opposite chances. that the object is not a compound of good or evil. ’Tis observable. ’Tis after this manner that hope and fear arise from the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy. that where the objects of contrary passions are presented at once. the grief and joy being intermingled with each other. and contains something adverse and something prosperous in its different circumstances. and others on that of nonexistence. Each view of the imagination produces its peculiar passion. But this relation is far from being perfect. and from their imperfect union and conjunction. with whatever celerity it may perform this motion. and the events dependent on them. when the same event is of a mixt nature. The incompatibility of the views keeps the passions from shocking in a direct line. When the contrary passions arise from objects entirely different. sometimes. that they determine concerning the existence or non-existence of the same object. a superior degree of that passion. that both the passions exist successively. or since the dispers’d passions are collected into one. Upon this head there may be started a very curious question concerning that contrariety of passions. a superior number of returns of one passion. become mutually destructive. In the case of probability the contrary chances are so far related. contrary passions succeed each other alternately. according to the degrees of the relation. It may. the mind running from the agreeable to the calamitous object. which is our present subject. But suppose. since some of the chances lie on the side of existence. they take place alternately. and leave the mind in perfect tranquility. when they arise from different objects: They mutually destroy each other. if that expression may be allow’d. and by short intervals. that the contrary passions will both of them be present at once in the soul. that they destroy each other.which is the same thing. and sometimes that both of them remain united in the mind. and are opposite in their direction. be ask’d. but is consider’d as probable or improbable in any degree. and neither of them takes place. Upon the whole. and to what general principle we can reduce them. which decays away by degrees. and joyful for the birth of a son. in the third place. in other words. from which they are deriv’d. both the passions. will subsist together. and is more or less perfect. Contrary passions are not capable of destroying each other. in that case I assert. that the imagination shou’d run alternately from the one to the other.

into pure grief. We find that an evil. when they are deriv’d from the contrary and incompatible chances or possibilities. One view or glimpse of the former. is a composition of two others. even tho’ there be no probability. Encrease the probability. the passions of fear and hope will arise. that the passions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy. till at last it runs insensibly. being a wavering and unconstant method of surveying an object. as you diminish or encrease the quantity of either. which is common to both. and is toss’d with the greatest uncertainty. as in optics ’tis a proof. the uncertainty and fluctuation they bestow on the imagination by that contrariety of views. and by that means the grief. destroy each other. which. as if the evil were more probable. which finds a number of proofs on each side of the question. the passions are like an alcali and an acid. 232 . If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different. tho’ the object be already certain. and consists in the contradictory views of the same object. If the relation be more imperfect. A man cannot think of excessive pains and tortures without trembling. ’till it changes insensibly into hope. After you have brought it to this situation. But we may observe. when.they subsist both of them. on which any one object depends. viz. Are not these as plain proofs. barely conceiv’d as possible. Probability is of two kinds. which again runs. Nay. never perfectly unite and incorporate. either when the object is really in itself uncertain. because probability. as you encrease that part of the composition by the encrease of the probability. The passions of fear and hope may arise when the chances are equal on both sides. As the hypothesis concerning hope and fear carries its own evidence along with it. after the same manner that you encreas’d it. and no superiority can be discover’d in the one above the other. especially if the evil be very great. and to be determin’d by chance. ’Tis a probable good or evil. that wherever from other causes this mixture can be produc’d. A few strong arguments are better than many weak ones. if he be in the least danger of suffering them. by diminishing the probability on that side. and tincture it into fear. the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles. diminish the grief. which can only proceed from that property. as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon. you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the composition. in which they agree. that commonly produces hope or fear. in this situation the passions are rather the strongest. that a colour’d ray of the sun passing thro’ a prism. and mingle together. by slow degrees. the fear prevails still more and more. into joy. which. which must be allow’d to be a convincing proof of the present hypothesis. Both these kinds of probabilities cause fear and hope. and you’ll see the passion clear every moment. we shall be the more concise in our proofs. The smallness of the probability is compensated by the greatness of the evil. The influence of the relations of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair. does sometimes produce fear. If the objects be intimately connected. and the sensation is equally lively. Throw in a superior degree of probability to the side of grief. or when. yet ’tis uncertain to our judgment. causes naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of passion. you find it prevail proportionably more or less in the composition? I am sure neither natural nor moral philosophy admits of stronger proofs. after the same manner. being mingled. the passions are like oil and vinegar. has the same effect as several of the latter. however mingled. which have no influence on each other. as the joy continually diminishes.

but also as to its kind. which being very violent. be to him equally uncertain when present as when absent. but the kind of it uncertain: Consequently the fear we feel on this occasion is without the least mixture of joy. is immediately retracted. and to which we are not accustom’d. as to its existence. but even some allow’d to be impossible. as the mind always forms its judgments more from its present disposition than from the nature of its objects. but likewise of judging of the event of his sickness. wou’d not settle into pure grief. the life or death of his friend. while it continually presses in upon the thought. that are certain. Let one be told by a person. ’tis evident the passion this event wou’d occasion. but receives from the imagination a tremulous and unsteady motion. as when we tremble on the brink of a precipice. will feel more anxiety upon his account. whether it be good or bad. in which case the mind continually rejects it with horror. In this case. Evils. tho’ perhaps he is not only incapable of giving him assistance. trembles at the thought of the rack. that cause fear. without the least means of escape. This happens only when the certain evil is terrible and confounding. resembling in its cause. and causes the same kind of passion. From these principles we may account for a phænomenon in the passions. that surprize is apt to change into fear. The most obvious conclusion from this is. This proceeds from the immediate presence of the evil. This I say is the most obvious conclusion. The evil is there fix’d and establish’d. which at first sight seems very extraordinary. have sometimes the same effect in producing fear. from the strong and sudden impulse of the object. This commotion. than if he were present. and pre233 . as the possible or impossible. from which fluctuation and uncertainty there arises a passion of much the same appearance with fear.But they are not only possible evils. but upon farther examination we shall find that the phænomenon is otherwise to be accounted for. since upon the sudden appearance of any object we immediately conclude it to be an evil. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a strong connexion with fear. yet there are a thousand little circumstances of his friend’s situation and condition. the mixture and contention of grief and joy. A person. and resembles in its fluctuation and uncertainty. yet that passion cannot settle. as when from a contrariety of chances contrary passions are produc’d. again. viz. Thus a man in a strong prison well-guarded. naturally produces a curiosity or inquisitiveness. are at first affected with fear. and every thing that is unexpected affrights us. The suddenness and strangeness of an appearance naturally excite a commotion in the mind. which influences the imagination in the same manner as the certainty of it wou’d do: but being encounter’d by the reflection on our security. who has left his friend in any malady. which of his sons he had lost. and gives us a real apprehension of evil. that fear or hope arises. whose veracity he cannot doubt of. the sensation of fear or the mix’d passions of grief and joy. tho’ the principal object of the passion. viz. Here there is an evil certain. that one of his sons is suddenly kill’d. and without waiting till we can examine its nature. And tho’ each side of the question produces here the same passion. tho’ we know ourselves to be in perfect security. but the mind cannot endure to fix upon it. and have it in our choice whether we will advance a step farther. like every thing for which we are not prepar’d. as well as in its sensation. the knowledge of which fixes the idea. till he got certain information. This image of fear naturally converts into the thing itself. to which he is sentenc’d. that human nature is in general pusilanimous. becomes uneasy. But ’tis not only where good or evil is uncertain. and arises merely from the fluctuation of the fancy betwixt its objects. even tho’ they do not cause any opposition of passions by the opposite views and considerations they present to us.

Love may shew itself in the shape of tenderness. I leave this to the reader’s own observation. that they are scarcely to be distinguished. ’Tis for this reason I have all along confin’d myself to the principal passion. very naturally degenerates into fear. so embarrass the mind. and observe that any doubt produces that passion. without considering all the variations they may receive from the mixture of different views and reflexions. but the reason. good-will.vents that fluctuation and uncertainty so near ally’d to fear. and examine so many passions. ’Tis thus our uncertainty concerning any minute circumstance relating to a person encreases our apprehensions of his death or misfortune. that whatever causes any fluctuation or mixture of passions. anxiety. SECTION X. Horace has remarked this phænomenon. as well as of fear. which being. consternation. auxili Latura plus presentibus. Uncertainty is. that uncertainty alone is uneasy. A virgin. indeed. and has a relation of impressions to the uneasy passions. from whence arises a fluttering or unsettledness of the spirits. tho’ she expects nothing but pleasure of the highest kind. which it is not necessary to give any particular account of. and arise from the same causes. than that they are of the same nature. astonishment. ’Tis easy to imagine how a different situation of the object. which at the bottom are the same affections. is. since nothing is more evident. that it knows not on what passion to fix itself. in some degree. non. tho’ with a small variation. or at least a passion so like it. always produces fear. or the love of truth. as they appear in animals. with any degree of uneasiness. But methinks we have been not a little inattentive to run over so many different parts of the human mind. and what she has long wish’d for. or a different turn of thought. and excited by the same causes as in human creatures. intimacy. and other passions of that kind. friendship. esteem. why it inclines not to that side. desiring him at the same time to consider the additional force this bestows on the present system. and in many other appearances. Of curiosity. The same care of avoiding prolixity is the reason why I wave the examination of the will and direct passions. uneasy. ut adsit. even tho’ it presents nothing to us on any side but what is good and desireable. Magis relictis. and this may in general account for all the particular sub-divisions of the other affections. on her bridal-night goes to bed full of fears and apprehensions. I have here confin’d myself to the examination of hope and fear in their most simple and natural situation. But this principle of the connexion of fear with uncertainty I carry farther. in one respect as near ally’d to hope as to fear. without taking once into the consideration that love of truth. Thus we still find. since it makes an essential part in the composition of the former passion. Terror. 234 . are nothing but different species and degrees of fear. the confusion of wishes and joys. Ut assidens implumibus pullus avis Serpentium allapsus timet. may change even the sensation of a passion. The newness and greatness of the event.

where both the truth and the assurance are of the same nature. considers their strength and advantages. is not desir’d merely as truth. consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas. have destroy’d their health. ’tis plain. yet generally speaking. which we have examin’d. after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? The difficulty on this head arises from hence. that many philosophers have consum’d their time. which of all other exercises of the mind is the most pleasant and agreeable. natural or acquir’d. tho’ it appear’d from their whole conduct and behaviour. nor had any concern for the interests of mankind. to bestow a few reflexions on that passion. and shew its origin in human nature. To remove this contradiction. which is employ’d in its invention and discovery. This pleas235 . which alone gives the pleasure. and in the other only sensible. and that ’tis not the justness of our conclusions. that their discoveries were of no consequence. when we discover the equality of two bodies by a pair of compasses. ’Tis an affection of so peculiar a kind. The truth we discover must also be of some importance. We never are oblig’d to fix our attention or exert our genius. and without any stretch of thought or judgment. if rather it does not degenerate into pain: Which is an evident proof. but only as endow’d with certain qualities. merely as such. But tho’ the exercise of genius be the principal source of that satisfaction we receive from the sciences. we must consider. yet I doubt. consider’d as such. he will receive a suitable pleasure and satisfaction. suppose a man. Were they convinc’d. And in an arithmetical operation. that there are certain desires and inclinations. ramparts. but shou’d receive small entertainment from a person. and tho’ in the one case the proofs be demonstrative. and that tho’ the consequences be entirely indifferent to them. ’Tis easy to multiply algebraical problems to infinity. they wou’d entirely lose all relish for their studies. without danger of obscurity and confusion. in the search of such truths. is the genius and capacity. the pleasure is very inconsiderable. observes the disposition and contrivance of the bastions. and are rather the faint shadows and images of passions. which go no farther than the imagination. For these conclusions are equally just. and other military works. tho’ few mathematicians take any pleasure in these researches. if we come to the knowledge of it without difficulty. who takes a survey of the fortifications of any city. and even what is in itself difficult. In this case ’tis sufficient to have ears to learn the truth. Now the question is. but turn their thoughts to what is more useful and important. The first and most considerable circumstance requisite to render truth agreeable. that ’twoud have been impossible to have treated of it under any of those heads. proceeds not from it. and neglected their fortune. mines. which we sometimes receive from the discovery of truth. ’Tis certain. as they esteem’d important and useful to the world. We love to trace the demonstrations of mathematicians. Thus. that the former species of truth. ’Twill therefore be proper. who shou’d barely inform us of the proportions of lines and angles. tho’ we repos’d the utmost confidence both in his judgment and veracity. than any real affections. which seems to be a contradiction. as in the most profound algebraical problem.which was the first source of all our enquiries. before we leave this subject. or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence. is but little regarded. as when we learn it by a mathematical demonstration. that the satisfaction. nor is there any end in the discovery of the proportions of conic sections. What is easy and obvious is never valu’d. that they were not endow’d with any share of public spirit. if it be alone sufficient to give us any considerable enjoyment. that in proportion as all these are fitted to attain their ends. the mind acquiesces with equal assurance in the one as in the other. Truth is of two kinds.

that such a remote sympathy is a very slight foundation for a passion. But here I return to what I have already remark’d. the difficulty. which is the principal foundation of the pleasure. as in certain chymical preparations. in some measure. when we are in another disposition. It may indeed be objected. A man of the greatest fortune. than those of hunting and philosophy. feels no satisfaction in shooting crows and magpies. But beside the action of the mind. or fall into any error in our reasoning. that there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other. that we are very uneasy under any disappointments. Upon this head I shall make a general remark. and that so much industry and application. which is opaque and colour’d. or the discovery of that truth we examine. in order to their having any effect upon us. When we are careless and inattentive. ’Tis here. I shall observe. can be no other than a sympathy with the inhabitants. we acquire a concern for the end itself. there is likewise requir’d a degree of success in the attainment of the end. tho’ he takes a pleasure in hunting after partridges and pheasants. that the pleasure of hunting consists in the action of the mind and body. we may observe. and the uncertainty. or may even entertain a hatred against them. tho’ ’tis possible. that tho’ in both cases the end of our action may in itself be despis’d. and the farthest remov’d from avarice. tho’ separately they have no effect. which of itself it brings to our enjoyment. which arises from it. which affords a pleasure from the same principles as hunting and philosophy. since the same persons have no satisfaction. that where the mind pursues any end with passion. but merely from the action and pursuit. yet by the natural course of the affections. as we frequently observe in philosophers. and are uneasy under any disappointment we meet with in the pursuit of it. the motion. and the other as entirely useless. 236 . who over-looks a ten times greater profit in any other subject. for whose security all this art is employ’d. whatever disproportion may at first sight appear betwixt them. as a stranger or an enemy. and the same person. when they play for nothing: But proceeds from both these causes united. may in his heart have no kindness for them. and that because he considers the first as fit for the table. ’Tis evident likewise. that these actions must be attended with an idea of utility. but only because ’tis. that this person.ure. This proceeds from the relation and parallel direction of the passions above-mention’d. can never be deriv’d from so inconsiderable an original. requisite to fix our attention. not the form of the objects. which may be useful on many occasions. and the exercise of the genius and understanding in the discovery or comprehension of any truth. To make the parallel betwixt hunting and philosophy more compleat. that the pleasure of gaming arises not from interest alone. It has been remark’d. since many leave a sure gain for this entertainment: Neither is it deriv’d from the game alone. viz. we may consider the passion of gaming. yet in the heat of the action we acquire such an attention to this end. that the pleasure of study consists chiefly in the action of the mind. after having employ’d several hours in hunting after them. Here ’tis certain. the same action of the understanding has no effect upon us. as it arises from the utility. tho’ that passion be not deriv’d originally from the end. ’tis not on account of any considerable addition. ’Tis evident. To illustrate all this by a similar instance. but is only requisite to support the imagination. where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third. the attention. that the utility or importance of itself causes no real passion. If we want another parallel to these affections. If the importance of the truth be requisite to compleat the pleasure. and are sorry when we either miss our game. is pleas’d to bring home half a dozen woodcocks or plovers. nor is able to convey any of that satisfaction.

natural philosophy. which we have in any game. that whatever amuses them. but as he becomes farther acquainted with them. still farther interest us. This pain chiefly takes place. 237 . The same theory. and ’tis from that concern our satisfaction arises. when he arrives first at any town. By the vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy. which is a passion deriv’d from a quite different principle. As ’tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought. and has liv’d any considerable time among them. but their real connexions and existence. ’Tis not every matter of fact. may be extended to morals. yet their alteration gives uneasiness. ’Tis a quality of human nature. tho’ their interest be no way concern’d in them. and transport us suddenly from one idea to another. Some people have an insatiable desire of knowing the actions and circumstances of their neighbours. variety. as to give us an uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy. Both these circumstances are advantageous. politics. the same pleasure. which is conspicuous on many occasions. in which case there is no room for study or application. neither are they such only as we have an interest to know. that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us. and other studies. When we are reading the history of a nation. and is common both to the mind and body. either in that or in any other action. obliterated. by fixing one particular idea in the mind. and concerns us so nearly. does in the main give them a sensible pleasure. As the vivacity of the idea gives pleasure. which being sensible. and that however any objects may in themselves be indifferent. It has been prov’d at large. that occurs in it. where interest. Let us search for the reason of this phænomenon. and keeping it from wavering in the choice of its objects. that the influence of belief is at once to inliven and infix any idea in the imagination. that accounts for the love of truth in mathematics and algebra. which displays itself in the sciences. of which we have a curiosity to be inform’d. and are agreeable to the imagination. may be entirely indifferent about knowing the history and adventures of the inhabitants. the difficulty. And this pleasure is here encreas’d by the nature of the objects. But beside the love of knowledge.The interest. ’Tis sufficient if the idea strikes on us with such force. without which we can have no enjoyment. so its certainty prevents uneasiness. tho’ in a lesser degree. where we consider not the abstract relations of ideas. and sudden reverses of fortune. in a great measure. and they must entirely depend on others for their information. relation. and men generally are of such indolent dispositions. or the greatness and novelty of any event interests us in it. Our attention being once engag’d. Human life is so tiresome a scene. but become careless in such researches. we may have an ardent desire of clearing up any doubt or difficulty. and prevent all kind of hesitation and uncertainty about it. tho’ by a passion mixt with pain. he acquires the same curiosity as the natives. engages our attention. and produce. A stranger. it must of consequence be the occasion of pain. which arises from a moderate passion. when the ideas of these events are. there is a certain curiosity implanted in human nature. and of a narrow compass. are enter’d into with facility.

that was at first requisite for its invention. where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first propositions. however. and to reject every thing that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended. in a great measure. et posce exemplar honesti. of virtue and vice in general. without hopes. without convincing an antagonist. we conclude can never be a chimera. Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain’d.Book III: Of Morals A TREATISE OF Human Nature: BEING An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into MORAL SUBJECTS. 238 . Moral Distinctions not deriv’d from Reason. which. and ’tis difficult for us to retain even that conviction. When we leave our closet. This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of reasoning. OF MORALS. Lucan. wherein the greatest part of men seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement. I am not. we naturally think that the question lies within human comprehension. that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as it advances. SECTION I. and requires the same intense study to make us sensible of its force. M DCC XL. Book III. What affects us. and that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions. and as our passion is engag’d on the one side or the other. PART I. either of philosophy or common life. indifferent to us. Without this advantage I never should have ventur’d upon a third volume of such abstruse philosophy. Printed for Thomas Longman. which we had attain’d with difficulty. than where the subject is. we are apt to entertain some doubt of. and ’tis evident. its conclusions seem to vanish. Quære quid est virtus. — Duræ semper virtutis amator. Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it. in other cases of this nature. and engage in the common affairs of life. like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning. LONDON. There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning. and where we often lose sight of all the most receiv’d maxims. at the Ship in Pater-noster-Row. that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid. that it may silence. with an APPENDIX. in an age.

which informs us. The mind can never exert itself in any action. from reason alone. ’twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it. ’tis in vain to pretend. I shall only recall on this occasion one of these arguments. with which all moralists abound. viz. To approve of one character. that morality. that reason has no influence on our passions and actions. and if reason be inactive in itself. than by denying that principle. that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions. Whether ’tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue. Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason. that reason is perfectly inert. are not conclusions of our reason. Morals excite passions. Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical. that morality is discover’d only by a deduction of reason. by which I have prov’d65 . that they cannot be deriv’d from reason. is discern’d merely by ideas. The rules of morality. whether it considers the powers of external bodies. I believe. nor is there any other means of evading it. fall under this denomination. we need only consider. which we may not comprehend under the term of perception. to judge of these systems. An active principle can never be founded on an inactive. by which we distinguish moral good and evil. that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things. and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection. ’tis supposed to influence our passions and actions. and more applicable to the present subject. not only on human creatures. ’Twill be easy to recollect what has been said upon that subject. No one. and by their juxta-position and comparison. and nothing wou’d be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts. but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion. and that because reason alone. And this is confirm’d by common experience. than to every other operation of the mind. and produce or prevent actions. It would be tedious to repeat all the arguments. to condemn another. In order. it follows. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. therefore. like truth. judging. and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division. and are deter’d from some actions by the opinion of injustice. have an influence on the actions and affections. it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances. to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil. whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects. or whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction. on which it is founded. which I shall endeavour to render still more conclusive. and impell’d to others by that of obligation. and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. whether it be possible. can never have any such influence. impressions and ideas. Since morals. and thinking. and that all the actions of seeing. that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation. therefore. and reduce us to something precise and exact on the present subject. are only so many different perceptions. hating. that men are often govern’d by their duties. as we have already prov’d. with which we shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals. hearing. or the actions of rational beings. which are the same to every rational being that considers them. 239 . As long as it is allow’d. therefore. this distinction gives rise to a question.It has been observ’d. and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy? This will immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations. loving. and consequently that term is no less applicable to those judgments. If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions. Now as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds. will deny the justness of this inference.

therefore. which are found to have that influence. that these judgments may often be false and erroneous. nor their blame from a contrariety to it. it cannot be the source of moral good and evil. The action may cause a judgment. that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality. But reason has no such influence. They extend not beyond a mistake of fact. and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them. which philosophy will scarce allow of. can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it. or a sense of morals. that is really disagreeable. therefore. is incapable of being true or false. This argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations. But tho’ this be acknowledg’d. A person may also take false measures for the attaining his end. I am more to be lamented than blam’d. that tho’ no will or action can be immediately contradictory to reason. Whatever. by shewing us. which moralists have not generally suppos’d criminal. and by an abusive way of speaking. Moral distinctions. so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it. if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. the same contrariety may. that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason. in a strict and philosophical sense. are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable. A fruit. For it proves directly. The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict. or can be said to produce them in any manner. volitions. are not the offspring of reason.Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. by his foolish conduct. and implying no reference to other passions. in its causes or effects. How far this truth or falshood may be the source of morals. volitions. or to real existence and matter of fact. Now ’tis evident our passions. compleat in themselves. and thro’ mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious. are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement. and actions. or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. and actions. as being perfectly involuntary. for instance. instead of forwarding the execution of any project. It has been observ’d. ’Tis impossible. therefore. being original facts and realities. 240 . in a figurative and improper way of speaking. or may be obliquely caus’d by one. These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions. or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects. they can be pronounced either true or false. which are connected with them. and may be said to render them unreasonable. but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable: Laudable or blameable. Reason is wholly inactive. therefore. and be either contrary or conformable to reason. yet we may find such a contradiction in some of the attendants of the action. and it proves the same truth more indirectly. A person may be affected with passion. by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object. and it must be allow’d. which can accompany our actions. or which produces the contrary to what is imagin’d. is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement. and can never be an object of our reason. that is. ’tis easy to observe. But perhaps it may be said. that reason. ’twill now be proper to consider. and sometimes controul our natural propensities. appears to me at a distance. and may retard. when the judgment concurs with a passion. Actions may be laudable or blameable. and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience. that they are commonly very innocent. upon that account. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas. These are the only kinds of judgment. be ascrib’d to the action.

is attended with virtue or vice. may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. indeed. either true or false. but ’tis only a secondary one. which is discovered by our reasoning. and guilty of these two errors. But still I can see no pretext of reason for asserting. and that this may be the source of immorality: I would answer. that our actions never cause any judgment. A mistake. and is founded on some other. of which reason alone is incapable. to the action itself. that if moral distinctions be deriv’d from the truth or falshood of those judgments. that such errors are the sources of all immorality? And here it may be proper to observe. whether the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom. who thro’ a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour’s wife. since that distinction has an influence upon our actions. or deprive it of that character. and which. give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason. But to be more particular. that a judgment of this kind. only with this difference. that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another. It causes. As the operations of 241 . that this agreement or disagreement. or by directing a passion: But it is not pretended. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood. that the tendency to cause such an error is the first spring or original source of all immorality66 . I ask. ’Tis certain. be the mediate cause of an action. we may observe. by some odd figurative way of speaking. the other circumstances are entirely arbitrary. which is material. in this situation. To which we may add. when false. not admitting of degrees. or must be a matter of fact. or whether the error be avoidable or unavoidable. I choose certain means of reaching this fruit. either in its truth or falshood. on many occasions. therefore. the character of virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of objects. ’tis impossible. nor will there be any difference. they can still less bestow those moral qualities on the actions. As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions. in ourselves. they must take place wherever we form the judgments. nor is there any third one. we may weigh the following considerations. and that ’tis only on others they have such an influence. which can ever possibly enter into our reasonings concerning actions. a mistake and false judgment by accident. that those eternal immutable fitnesses and unfitnesses of things cannot be defended by sound philosophy. and can never either bestow on any action the character of virtuous or vicious. all virtues and vices wou’d of course be equal. may give rise to false conclusions in others. For as the very essence of morality is suppos’d to consist in an agreement or disagreement to reason. which are their causes. therefore. is to be regarded as vicious and criminal. that an action.Here is one error. that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil. and to shew. which are not proper for my end. antecedent to it. and that a person. by prompting. but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. If the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing the boundaries of right and wrong. can be made by reason. which are caused by our judgments. yet a mistake of right often is. a real distinction in morals. Thus upon the whole. of right may become a species of immorality. Shou’d it be pretended. Reason and judgment may. that ’tis impossible such a mistake can ever be the original source of immorality. that tho’ a mistake of fact be not criminal. Here is a second error. however. since it supposes a real right and wrong. This consequence is evident. independent of these judgments. that is. And as to the judgments. if a man. however unavoidable they might have been? Or if it be possible to imagine. and the falshood of its effects may be ascribed.

and as there is no one of these relations but what is applicable. as to our actions. it wou’d follow. contrariety. compared among themselves. and often places them where the enemy is not present. and external objects. and endeavour. that these relations. that we may know wherein they consist. it must be an object of one of these operations. that this science may be brought to an equal certainty with geometry or algebra. from which these moral distinctions arise. if these relations cou’d belong to internal actions consider’d singly. a man loses his blows in the air. passions. and after what manner we must judge of them. it follows. and independent of our situation. with respect to the universe: And in like manner. must lie only betwixt internal actions. requisite to justify this system. compar’d among themselves. But it will be still more difficult to fulfil the second condition. that vice and virtue consist in relations susceptible of certainty and demonstration. that even such objects must be susceptible of merit or demerit. which has never yet been explain’d. Upon this supposition. and the inferring of matter of fact. Shou’d it be asserted. begin with examining this hypothesis. First. if possible. compared to external objects. or to these external objects. the relations. ’tis not only suppos’d. were virtue discover’d by the understanding. and tho’ no one has ever been able to advance a single step in those demonstrations. you must confine yourself to those four relations. Let us. that morality is susceptible of demonstration. when placed in opposition to other external objects. the comparing of ideas. and in that case you run into absurdities. which relation might not belong either to these passions and volitions. nor is there any third operation of the understanding. that any relation can be discover’d betwixt our passions. that no matter of fact is capable of being demonstrated. For as morality is supposed to attend certain relations. ’Tis unquestionable. There has been an opinion very industriously propagated by certain philosophers. Resemblance. ’Tis impossible to refute a system. when we comprehended all demonstrable relations under four general heads: To this I know not what to reply. to fix those moral qualities. therefore. since ’tis allow’d on all hands. all these relations belong as properly to matter. from which you will never be able to extricate yourself. and must not be applicable either to internal actions. that morality lies not in any of these relations. which constitute morality or obligation. that even inanimate beings wou’d be susceptible of moral beauty and deformity. and are deriv’d from our situation with regard to external objects. that we might be guilty of crimes in ourselves. if these moral relations cou’d be apply’d to external objects. and that our enumeration was not compleat. till some one be so good as to point out to me this new relation.human understanding divide themselves into two kinds. For as you make the very essence of morality to lie in the relations. which alone admit of that degree of evidence. but also to an inanimate object. or to external objects. which have been so long the objects of our fruitless researches. not only to an irrational. and volitions. and proportions in quantity and number. distinct from these. nor the sense of it in their discovery67 . yet ’tis taken for granted. therefore. In such a manner of fighting in the dark. that the sense of morality consists in the discovery of some relation. rest contented with requiring the two following conditions of any one that wou’d undertake to clear up this system. I must. Now it seems difficult to imagine. According to the principles of those who maintain an abstract rational difference betwixt moral good and evil. which can discover it. therefore. volitions and actions. on this occasion. Point out distinctly the relations. 242 . and a natural fitness and unfitness of things. If you assert. degrees in quality. vice and virtue must consist in some relations. it wou’d follow. As moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind.

without the notion of any guilt or iniquity attending them. or rather a greater. that by the dropping of its seed. This question will soon be decided against the former opinion. In order. to prove. which springing up by degrees. that a choice or will is wanting. ’Tis a will or choice. I say. and let us suppose. if they really existed and were perceiv’d. This is acknowledg’d by all mankind. upon which such a distinction may be founded: And ’tis as impossible to fulfil the second condition. in treating of the understanding. that in the oak or elm arise from some other principles. to this trial. ’tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will. from which it sprung. that determines a man to kill his parent. and consequently produces the same relations. or be felt by an internal sense. are the same. and ’tis concluded they have no less. which the reflecting on such an action naturally occasions. wherein this character of moral good or evil is the most universally acknowledged. that those characters are not discover’d merely by reason. Thus it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition required to the system of eternal rational measures of right and wrong. especially when it is committed against parents. and they are the laws of matter and motion. wou’d be universally forcible and obligatory. it produces a sapling below it. which is discoverable otherwise than by experience. which is discoverable in parricide or ingratitude? Is not the one tree the cause of the other’s existence. Now besides what I have already prov’d. and by means of some sentiment. when consider’d by every rational creature. that in every well-disposed mind. at last overtops and destroys the parent tree: I ask. philosophers as well as the people. besides this. the question only arises among philosophers. obligatory on every rational mind. tho’ the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite. let us chuse any inanimate object. consider’d in themselves. To put the affair. it must take place and have its influence. and this influence we ought never to extend beyond experience. if we can shew the same relations in other objects. but is only the cause from which the action is deriv’d. because it is impossible to shew those relations. therefore. if in this instance there be wanting any relation. that these relations. Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing. such as an oak or elm. it must evidently follow. a will does not give rise to any different relations. and another to conform the will to it. and the discovery of their relations. that even in human nature no relation can ever alone produce any action. such as this is suppos’d to be.being eternal and immutable. influence in directing the will of the deity. therefore. All beings in the universe. because we cannot prove a priori. But to make these general reflexions more clear and convincing. that determine a sapling to destroy the oak. but their effects are also suppos’d to be necessarily the same. but still the relations are the same: And as their discovery is 243 . and must prove that this connexion is so necessary. that there is no connexion of cause and effect. whether the guilt or moral deformity of this action be discover’d by demonstrative reasoning. in the same manner as when a child murders his parent? ’Tis not sufficient to reply. it has been shewn. and appears in the more flagrant instances of wounds and death. ’Tis one thing to know virtue. and of which we can pretend to have any security by the simple consideration of the objects. appear entirely loose and independent of each other. These two particulars are evidently distinct. and if the same relations have different characters. and the latter the cause of the destruction of the former. ’Tis only by experience we learn their influence and connexion. Here then the same relations have different causes. the most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude. Reason or science is nothing but the comparing of ideas. For in the case of parricide. than in governing the rational and virtuous of our own species. that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws. we may illustrate them by some particular instances.

All the difference is. that is. but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals. For before reason can perceive this turpitude. and can never produce them. colours. then. I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation. that morality consists not in any relations. Examine it in all lights. and is their object more properly than their effect. towards this action. This is the second part of our argument. like that other in physics. and will. not of reason. it has little or no influence on practice. perhaps. which may. volitions and thoughts. whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder. but if examin’d. and therefore wou’d also be susceptible of the same morality. with respect to each other. and the same relations in animals have not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If it be answer’d. and why the very same action. but can never hinder these duties from existing.not in both cases attended with a notion of immorality. Vice and virtue. which arises in you. that this is evidently arguing in a circle. for which we ascribe praise and blame to human creatures. that has sense. 244 . Here is a matter of fact. being endow’d with that faculty. This argument deserves to be weigh’d. Animals are susceptible of the same relations. that it consists not in any matter of fact. because they have not reason sufficient to discover its turpitude. and a being. than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness. According to this system. in my opinion. in order to their being perceiv’d. and appetite. that morality is not an object of reason. not in the object. It lies in yourself. therefore. till you turn your reflexion into your own breast. entirely decisive. if the essence of morality consisted in these relations. Reason must find them. but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. it follows. There is no other matter of fact in the case. but ’tis the object of feeling. we may conclude. tho’. In every system of morality. since they must antecedently exist. be found of some importance. You never can find it. and consequently is independent of the decisions of our reason. which. Their want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality. the same action instantly becomes criminal to him. I would reply. that vice and virtue are not matters of fact. and if these be favourable to virtue. every animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues and vices. and unfavourable to vice. for instance. still more resembling. or concern us more. and by that means may augment the blame or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate being in these moral distinctions. is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences. according to modern philosophy. Nothing can be more real. The vice entirely escapes you. both in thought and reality. may be compar’d to sounds. Nor does this reasoning only prove. and which. as long as you consider the object. I would fain ask any one. which depends only on the will and appetite. why incest in the human species is criminal. But can there be any difficulty in proving. may be distinguish’d from the reason. like that too. In which-ever way you take it. will prove with equal certainty. which can be discover’d by the understanding. which ought to restrain him to his duty. no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour. you mean nothing. that this action is innocent in animals. that our superior reason may serve to discover the vice or virtue. should this be said. heat and cold. you find only certain passions. and see if you can find that matter of fact. which I have hitherto met with. as being. or real existence. I have always remark’d. which you call vice. but that man. are not qualities in objects. the turpitude must exist. every animal. and find a sentiment of disapprobation. that that notion does not arise from such a discovery. But to chuse an instance. that are the objects of science. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious. motives. as the human species. and if it can be made evident.

But as authors do not commonly use this precaution. and let us see. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. or ought not. when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find. of the last consequence. that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality. is. which have any near resemblance to each other. therefore. SECTION II. Now since the distinguishing impressions. and is not. Every moment’s experience must convince us of this. and am persuaded. and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy. expresses some new relation or affirmation. or the comparison of ideas. in order to satisfy us why the character is laudable or blameable. it will be sufficient to shew the principles. we in effect feel that it is virtuous. but is. as the greatest of all punishments is to be oblig’d to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. An action. is more properly felt than judg’d of. which make us feel a satisfaction or uneasiness from the survey of any character. according to our common custom of taking all things for the same. We go no farther. ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d. that in all enquiries concerning these moral distinctions. Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude. I shall presume to recommend it to the readers. to be agreeable. which arises from vice. or makes observations concerning human affairs. Of what nature are these impressions.that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all 245 . that instead of the usual copulations of propositions. because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner. are nothing but particular pains or pleasures. that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. In giving a reason. We do not infer a character to be virtuous. and pain. it follows. tho’ this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle. for what seems altogether inconceivable. how this new relation can be a deduction from others. we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. which are entirely different from it. and as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas. but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue. To have the sense of virtue. is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. by which moral good or evil is known. for the pleasure or uneasiness. or sentiment. The next question is. and establishes the being of a God. There is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action. Morality. and at the same time that a reason should be given. which virtue conveys to us. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity are evidently perceptions. A very play or romance may afford us instances of this pleasure. nor is perceiv’d by reason. and after what manner do they operate upon us? Here we cannot remain long in suspense. or character is virtuous or vicious. This change is imperceptible. or an ought not. therefore. nor any which gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and treacherous. Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense. it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion. I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought. No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we receive from the company of those we love and esteem. the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for the other. that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects. that we are apt to confound it with an idea. that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason. however. For as this ought. why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind.

that ’tis impossible to shew. and can distinguish betwixt his opposition to our interest and real villainy or baseness. which arises from characters and actions. concerning this pain or pleasure. But this hinders not. as is requisite to make them be express’d by the same abstract term. which makes us praise or condemn. which establishes eternal rational measures of right and wrong. and what is more. and produces a separate sensation related to the sensation of the passion. and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these illusions. in the actions of reasonable creatures. It may now be ask’d in general. might become morally good or evil. The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us. but may still command our esteem and respect. ’twere possible for inanimate matter to become virtuous or vicious. ’tis evident. and excite either pleasure or uneasiness. we comprehend sensations. without reference to our particular interest. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure. of that peculiar kind. from interest and morals. perhaps. be objected to the present system. the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind. or the music of a good flavour? In like manner an inanimate object. that if virtue and vice be determin’d by pleasure and pain. From what principles is it derived. and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions. that it causes such a feeling or sentiment. and sensations. in the one case as in the other. can separate these feelings. Pride and humility. these sentiments are produc’d by an original quality and primary constitution. first. love and hatred are excited. ’Tis true. give satisfaction. provided it can excite a satisfaction or uneasiness. or to allow it to be musical. and the character or sentiments of any person may. and whence does it arise in the human mind? To this I reply. but as the satisfaction is different. that ’tis absurd to imagine. in like manner.kinds of beauty. that the wine is harmonious. Secondly. in order to remark a still more considerable difference among our pains and pleasures. this keeps our sentiments concerning them from being confounded. and not to the other. in themselves. in246 . Now virtue and vice are attended with these circumstances. yet ’tis difficult for a man to be sensible. ’Tis only when a character is considered in general. It seldom happens. that often bear no relation to us: And this is. Now it may. and give praise to what deserves it. in a manner. and which have only such a distant resemblance. first. in every case. are apt to be confounded. their goodness is determin’d merely by the pleasure. both of them. any relations. But shall we say upon that account. that both bears a relation to the object of the passion. which are very different from each other. which clearly distinguishes them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects. They must necessarily be plac’d either in ourselves or others. but that the sentiments are. that under the term pleasure. We may call to remembrance the preceding system of the passions. arise from the sensations. For as the number of our duties is. and consequently any object. that distinguishes moral good and evil. and therefore. rational or irrational. those sentiments. that we do not think an enemy vicious. who has the command of himself. But a person of a fine ear. But tho’ this objection seems to be the very same. when there is any thing presented to us. tho’ ’tis certain a musical voice is nothing but one that naturally gives a particular kind of pleasure. whether animate or inanimate. I have objected to the system. that in every particular instance. distinct. and naturally run into one another. and tastes. it has by no means the same force. that the voice of an enemy is agreeable. which are not found in external objects. Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain. as denominates it morally good or evil. and makes us ascribe virtue to the one. In like manner. if morality always attended these relations. For. these qualities must. Our approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us.

Whether we ought to search for these principles in nature. Mean while it may not be amiss to observe from these definitions of natural and unnatural. But nature may also be opposed to artifice. that the actions themselves are artificial. that our sense of some virtues is artificial. But nature may also be opposed to rare and unusual. ’twill be impossible to fix any exact boundaries betwixt them. the sentiments of morality certainly may. by which nature is conducted. These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper. that we are not possess’d of any very precise standard. ’tis impossible that our original instincts should extend to each of them. being as unusual. Shou’d it. and are perform’d with a certain de247 . whether the sense of virtue be natural or artificial. in any instance. If nature be oppos’d to miracles. that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word. We readily forget. who was utterly depriv’d of them. when we enter upon an exact detail of each particular vice and virtue68 . which are contain’d in the compleatest system of ethics. ’tis certain. upon which all our notions of morals are founded. therefore. But in the second place. I am of opinion. but also every event. In saying. and in the second sense. be demanded. ’tis usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of nature. Nature. and find some more general principles. and as this number may gradually encrease or diminish. and from our very first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of precepts. ’tis evident. whether the notions of virtue be natural or not. as well as to what is rare and unusual. moist and dry: But taking them to be free and entirely our own. ’Tis necessary. As to the third sense of the word. that without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness. than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal. Perhaps it will appear afterwards. and who never. and in this sense of the word. both vice and virtue are equally natural. not only the distinction betwixt vice and virtue is natural. and one may in general affirm. We may only affirm on this head. that the designs. or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou’d reply. The discussion of this question will be more proper. nor any single person in any nation.finite. which cou’d be call’d natural in this sense. as oppos’d to what is unusual. that if ever there was any thing. and views of men are principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold. and out of nature. that both vice and virtue are equally artificial. where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe. and that of others natural. we make no very extraordinary discovery. For however it may be disputed. that virtue is the same with what is natural. that heroic virtue. and vice with what is unnatural. since there never was any nation of the world. that the sentiments of vice and virtue are natural in this sense. Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual maxims. shew’d the least approbation or dislike of manners. to abridge these primary impulses. which is the common one. For in the first sense of the word. Frequent and rare depend upon the number of examples we have observ’d. which has ever happen’d in the world. Nature. At least it must be own’d. and every thing is carry’d on in the easiest and most simple manner. there may often arise disputes concerning what is natural or unnatural. on which our religion is founded. is as little natural as the most brutal barbarity. should it be ask’d. which assert. and projects. and in this sense it may be disputed. whether the notion of a merit or demerit in certain actions be natural or artificial. then. by which these disputes can be decided. excepting those miracles. as opposed to miracles. perhaps virtue will be found to be the most unnatural. therefore. that nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems. that ’tis impossible for me at present to give any precise answer to this question. ’tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them.

that any action. sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation. in any sense. that the character of natural and unnatural can ever. upon enquiry. mark the boundaries of vice and virtue. that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure. But these actions are still considered as signs. as if he had actually perform’d the action. If we find. I flatter myself I have executed a great part of my present design by a state of the question. whether a natural or artificial virtue? I have already hinted. and this virtue must be deriv’d from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from 248 . gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness. Of this kind I assert justice to be.sign and intention. and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. but must be some other natural motive or principle. After the same manner. which bestows a merit on any action. that when we praise any actions. we retract our blame. we always suppose. in order to shew the origin of its moral rectitude or depravity. This decision is very commodious. and have the same esteem for him. convincing argument. Thus we are still brought back to our first position. We must look within to find the moral quality. and. or blame a person for not performing it. PART II. that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance. that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives. and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. before I examine the nature of the artifice. which never did exist in nature. otherwise they cou’d never be rank’d under any of these denominations. we regard only the motives that produced them. Before we can have such a regard. from which the sense of that virtue is derived. and shall endeavour to defend this opinion by a short. when we require any action. and vice by the pain. From this principle I conclude. that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast. which appears to me so free from ambiguity and obscurity. because it reduces us to this simple question. can never be a regard to the virtue of that action. nor even in our imagination. that one in that situation shou’d be influenc’d by the proper motive of that action. therefore. This we cannot do directly. the action must be really virtuous. as on external signs. tho’ check’d in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us. is to reason in a circle. that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural. The external performance has no merit. that produc’d them. therefore. that the first virtuous motive. SECTION I. which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind. It appears. but that there are some virtues. and therefore fix our attention on actions. by any clear and distinct conception. and are consider’d merely as signs of those motives. that the mere regard to the virtue of the action. ’Tis evident. which produc’d the action. Justice. without looking for any incomprehensible relations and qualities. and render’d it virtuous. I hope. may be the first motive. which we require of him. ’Tis impossible. To suppose. of justice and injustice. and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive. Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey.

and neglect. unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it. Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty. We blame a father for neglecting his child. And this answer. no doubt. that after the expiration of the term agreed on. For one in that situation wou’d immediately ask you. In short. he demands the sum: I ask. it may be establish’d as an undoubted maxim. all men suppose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty. fulfill’d his duty. and ’twere impossible we cou’d have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring. But tho’. if I have the least grain of honesty. perhaps. therefore. and may perform the action without the motive. distinct from the sense of its morality. be plac’d in the motive. a person may perform an action merely out of regard to its moral obligation. and thinks he has. Some virtuous motive. as much as possible. may hate himself upon that account. For ’tis a plain fallacy to say. that no action can be virtuous. Now to apply all this to the present case.the regard to the virtue of the action. that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest. tho’ perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophical terms. Actions are at first only consider’d as signs of motives: But ’tis usual. comforts the afflicted. I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money. therefore. Wherein consists this honesty and justice. A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. relieves the distress’d. We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest humanity. or sense of duty and obligation. or at least. is still pleas’d to perform grateful actions. This humanity bestows a merit on the actions. and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers. this answer wou’d be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical. must be antecedent to that regard. This motive can never be a regard to the honesty of the action. yet still this supposes in human nature some distinct principles. if you are pleas’d to call such a condition natural. in order to acquire by practice. without any other motive? I answer. and abstaining from the property of others? It does not surely lie in the external action. A regard to this merit is. be said. is just and satisfactory to man in his civiliz’d state. in this case. A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper. Here is a man. from a certain sense of duty. before we can have a regard to its virtue. But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action. a secondary consideration. It must. and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious. that my regard to justice. therefore. and deriv’d from the antecedent principle of humanity. When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature. but enters into all our reasonings in common life. It may: But this is no objection to the present doctrine. therefore. which is the duty of every parent. a person. that does many benevolent actions. What reason or motive have I to restore the money? It will. in some measure. or morally good. as in all others. and at the same time that a regard 249 . No character can be more amiable and virtuous. and also suppose. the care of children cou’d not be a duty. on some occasions. that virtuous principle. his want of it. from which the external action is deriv’d. by that means. which you find in restoring a loan. the thing signify’d. which is meritorious and laudable. to disguise to himself. are sufficient reasons for me. and abhorrence of villainy and knavery. In this case. which are capable of producing the action. on condition that it be restor’d in a few days. Why? because it shews a want of natural affection. Were not natural affection a duty. to fix our attention on the signs. But in his rude and more natural condition. who feels his heart devoid of that motive. and when train’d up according to a certain discipline and education. An action must be virtuous.

Men’s tempers are different. without correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appetite. then.to the honesty is the motive of the action. that men. that wherever that concern ceases. We love company in general. First. and operate with any force in actions so contrary to private interest as are frequently those of justice and common honesty. and the public is no longer interested in the actions of the borrower. that there is no such passion in human minds. contrary to what we find by experience. unless the action be antecedently virtuous. and in this lies the great difficulty. An Englishman in Italy is a friend: A Europæan in China. when brought near to us. But shou’d it be affirm’d. as worthy of our attention. and abstain from theft. may excite these passions. there is no human. that a concern for our private interest or reputation is the legitimate motive to all honest actions. or of relation to ourself. ’Tis requisite. if we suppose. or human nature. that self-love. and robbery. than what wou’d otherwise flow from them. when it acts at its liberty. and is no proof of such an universal affection to mankind. wit. but also in inflaming every other principle of affection. look not so far as the public interest. and every other circumstance. In general. since this concern extends itself beyond our own species. independent of personal qualities. must precede the regard to the virtue. affect us. and represented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely from sympathy. For shou’d we say. creature. and perhaps a man 250 . which by a double relation of impressions and ideas. and requires some other cause. is nothing but the object both of love and hatred. after an artificial convention for the establishment of these rules. nor can a man ever correct those vices. and injustice of every kind. distinct from our regard to the honesty. we may affirm. when they pay their creditors. as the love of mankind. it wou’d follow. who will affirm. We can never have a regard to the virtue of an action. is the source of all injustice and violence. in some measure. Were there an universal love among all human creatures. that man in general. honesty can no longer have place. and others to the rougher. and that it is necessary for the interest of the person. it wou’d appear after the same manner. to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty. tho’ I suppose there is no moralist. it may be affirm’d. and this passion not only appears in its peculiar symptoms. kindness. that the virtuous motive and the regard to the virtue can be the same. shou’d this be said. of services. as shall be shewn more at large hereafter. public interest is not naturally attach’d to the observation of the rules of justice. and raising a stronger love from beauty. perform their promises. and ’tis impossible. that the loan was secret. A virtuous motive. merely as such. Thirdly. but is only connected with it. and some have a propensity to the tender. Any degree of a good quality wou’d cause a stronger affection than the same degree of a bad quality wou’d cause hatred. experience sufficiently proves. to which nothing is more contrary than examples of injustice and dishonesty. Secondly. instead of engaging us to honest actions. independent of their merit. in the ordinary conduct of life. but ’tis as we love any other amusement. There are no phænomena that point out any such kind affection to men. I wou’d propose the three following considerations. That is a motive too remote and too sublime to affect the generality of mankind. that the reason or motive of such actions is the regard to publick interest. and indeed no sensible. therefore. that the duty and obligation ceases. An affection betwixt the sexes is a passion evidently implanted in human nature. No action can be virtuous. In vain wou’d we endeavour to elude this hypothesis. whose happiness or misery does not. that the money be restor’d in the same manner (as when the lender wou’d conceal his riches) in that case the example ceases. but so far as it proceeds from a virtuous motive. But ’tis certain. affections: But in the main. ’Tis true.

therefore. must absolutely fail. we pronounce them handsome and beautiful. and dependent on the preceding notions of justice and property. A rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate to those in necessity a share of his superfluities. and has given me just cause to hate him? What if he be a vicious man. that the chief reason. which is common to the species. much less can private benevolence. or a regard to the interests of mankind. there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. we must consider. but arises artificially. a man wou’d not be oblig’d to leave others in the possession of more than he is oblig’d to give them. A man’s property is suppos’d to be fenc’d against every mortal. as a corollary to this reasoning. and can make no use of what I wou’d deprive him of? What if he be a profligate debauchee. From all this it follows. that nature has establish’d a sophistry. without some motives or impelling passions. But this proceeds only from the relation to ourselves. the original motive to justice wou’d fail. and where the limbs and features observe that proportion. that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity. and render’d it necessary and unavoidable. or indeed in most persons. and along with it all property. than on what they never enjoy’d: For this reason. For what if he be my enemy. and as secur’d to them inviolably by the laws of society. and wou’d rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? What if I be in necessity. and ought to be. his nephews better than his cousins. we must allow. why men attach themselves so much to their possessions is. Were private benevolence the original motive to justice. Private benevolence. it wou’d be greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing. Men generally fix their affections more on what they are possess’d of. therefore. that this is the only foundation of justice? Besides. and as no action can be equitable or meritorious. Unless. therefore. If public benevolence. distinct from the sense of morals. but the very equity and merit of that observance. where it cannot arise from some separate motive. In like manner we always consider the natural and usual force of the passions. that they consider them as their property. or a regard to the interests of the party concern’d. right. I shall add. that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature. and deserves the hatred of all mankind? What if he be a miser. weaker in some persons. we always carry in our eye the œconomy of a certain species. in every possible case. ’Tis according to their general force in human nature. where every thing else is equal. were we to meet him in the moon. At least the difference wou’d be very inconsiderable. than not to give it him. and consequently the justice itself. In judging of the beauty of animal bodies. cannot be the original motive to justice.wou’d be belov’d as such. they are always disapprov’d as vicious. Hence ari251 . A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews. when we determine concerning vice and virtue. that we blame or praise. But this is a secondary consideration. that since no action can be laudable or blameable. and obligation. his cousins better than strangers. be this motive. which in these cases gathers force by being confined to a few persons. and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? In all these cases. these distinct passions must have a great influence on that sense. tho’ necessarily from education. than in others: And in many. and if the passions depart very much from the common measures on either side. But who will assert. we will allow. is not the original motive of justice. But private benevolence is. and human conventions.

I make use of the word. than ’tis possible for him. we shall find. we shall easily discover him to be very necessitous. and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary. We now proceed to examine two questions. Of the origin of justice and property. in which the rules of justice are establish’d by the artifice of men. his courage. he never attains a perfection in any particular art. as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue. Not only the food. may be observ’d in its greatest perfection. to defend him against the injuries of the weather. in the numberless wants and necessities. In another sense of the word. To avoid giving offence. and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures. nor other natural abilities. which is requir’d for his sustenance. with which she has loaded him. When every individual person labours apart. ’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects. I must here observe. and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy. natural. tho’ to consider him only in himself. they are not arbitrary. but if we turn our eye to his make and temper. so no virtue is more natural than justice. In other creatures these two particulars generally compensate each other. which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities. The sheep and ox are depriv’d of all these advantages. which she affords to the relieving these necessities. in preferring the one to the other. there is none towards whom nature seems. and even acquire a superiority above them. We shall begin with the former. 252 . which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity. viz. this unnatural conjunction of infirmity. our power is augmented: By the partition of employments. or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species. if by natural we understand what is common to any species. with which this globe is peopled. Of all the animals. and his force. SECTION II. he is provided neither with arms. By society all his infirmities are compensated. flies his search and approach. and only for himself. the least failure in either of these particulars must be attended with inevitable ruin and misery.se our common measures of duty. his agility. but their appetites are moderate. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions. nor force. in his savage and solitary condition. it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles. only as oppos’d to artificial. yet his abilities are still more augmented. and of necessity. and their food is of easy purchase. his force is too small to execute any considerable work. ever to become. that when I deny justice to be a natural virtue. If we consider the lion as a voracious and carnivorous animal. Tho’ the rules of justice be artificial. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature. and concerning the reasons. In man alone. but he must be possess’d of cloaths and lodging. to have exercis’d more cruelty than towards man. at first sight. Society provides a remedy for these three inconveniences. without the intervention of thought or reflexion. concerning the manner. or at least requires his labour to be produc’d. and tho’ in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him. By the conjunction of forces. his arms. These questions will appear afterwards to be distinct. that his advantages hold proportion with his wants. and in the slender means. Mankind is an inventive species. and as his force and success are not at all times equal. his labour being employ’d in supplying all his different necessities.

and the education of their children. ’tis requisite not only that it be advantageous. we may at the same time remark. as well as fashions them by degrees for it. till a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring. that by study and reflexion alone. which prevent their coalition. in their wild uncultivated state. where the parents govern by the advantage of their superior strength and wisdom. There are three different species of goods. another necessity. ability. which cannot but be dangerous to the new-establish’d union. For while each person loves himself better than any other single person. Among the former. So far from thinking. the representations of this quality have been carried much too far. may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of human society. Most fortunately. reserving the smallest portion for their own proper use and entertainment. and forms a more numerous society. and preserves their union. which affords it an opportunity of exerting itself. that. custom and habit operating on the tender minds of the children. But tho’ this generosity must be acknowledg’d to the honour of human nature. and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance. that this contrariety of passions wou’d be attended with but small danger. which they bear their children. and at the same time are restrain’d in the exercise of their authority by that natural affection. which unites them together. But in order to form society. which we meet with in fables and romances.our ability encreases: And by mutual succour we are less expos’d to fortune and accidents. who loves any single person better than himself. and that the descriptions. do not over-balance all the selfish. that men have no affection for any thing beyond themselves. This necessity is no other than that natural appetite betwixt the sexes. and in our outward circumstances. I am sensible. is almost as contrary to them. we may justly esteem our selfishness to be the most considerable. Consult common experience: Do you not see. and are even contrary to the requisite conjunction. the internal satisfaction of our minds. but also that men be sensible of these advantages. generally speaking. makes them sensible of the advantages. and security. yet there are other particulars in our natural temper. We are perfectly secure in 253 . that the case would be the same with others. that so noble an affection. they should ever be able to attain this knowledge. the external advantages of our body. this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions. by rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections. were they plac’d in a like situation. and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our industry and good fortune. This is what we may observe concerning such as have those endearing ties. that however the circumstances of human nature may render an union necessary. ’Tis however worth while to remark. and a consequent opposition of actions. which are very incommodious. are as wide of nature as any accounts of monsters. there is conjoin’d to those necessities. did it not concur with a peculiarity in our outward circumstances. in whom all the kind affections. In a little time. yet ’tis as rare to meet with one. that tho’ the whole expence of the family be generally under the direction of the master of it. instead of fitting men for large societies. whose remedies are remote and obscure. that society becomes advantageous. and ’tis impossible. I am of opinion. that tho’ it be rare to meet with one. taken together. This new concern becomes also a principle of union betwixt the parents and offspring. which having a present and more obvious remedy. therefore. which we are possess’d of. yet there are few that do not bestow the largest part of their fortunes on the pleasures of their wives. ’Tis by this additional force. For it must be confest. which they may reap from society. which certain philosophers delight so much to form of mankind in this particular. as the most narrow selfishness. and however those passions of lust and natural affection may seem to render it unavoidable. and may presume.

and make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances. that the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods. for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections. capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other. must not only have an influence on our behaviour and conduct in society. then. it cou’d never be enter’d into. as it is now understood. That virtue. This can be done after no other manner. By this means. on the same footing with the fix’d and constant advantages of the mind and body. than by such a convention. For the notion of injury or injustice implies an immorality or vice committed against some other person: And as every immorality is deriv’d from some defect or unsoundness of the passions. is the chief impediment. The remedy. or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind. from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind. as. either by too great an enlargement. so as to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality. As the improvement. in a great measure. 254 . in any opposition of interest. do rather conform themselves to that partiality. by abstaining from the possessions of others. than by a convention enter’d into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods. as far as possible. as well as to our own. Now it appears. our next is extended to our relations and acquaintance. where we blame a person. or more properly speaking. that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality. and when they have observ’d. by considering the natural. for if so. and ’tis only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons.the enjoyment of the first. Instead of departing from our own interest. or mere chance acquaintance. along with their scarcity. instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections. is not deriv’d from nature. but it is only contrary to their heedless and impetuous movement. by putting these goods. or be taken for a natural principle. Nor is such a restraint contrary to these passions. have become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it. then. and have besides acquir’d a new affection to company and conversation. which we call external. and usual force of those several affections. From all which it follows. but even on our ideas of vice and virtue. or from that of our nearest friends. with regard to others. while at the same time. which might controul those partial affections. from their early education in society. The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose. we cannot better consult both these interests. or contraction of the affections. and as this defect must be judg’d of. but from artifice. In vain shou’d we expect to find. The last only are both expos’d to the violence of others. which are directed towards them. but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them. so the instability of their possession. because it is by that means we maintain society. in uncultivated nature. and may be transferr’d without suffering any loss or alteration. and give it an additional force and influence. our strongest attention is confin’d to ourselves. as vicious and immoral. who either centers all his affections in his family. and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another. The second may be ravish’d from us. which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence. ’twill be easy to know. and the passions are restrain’d in their partial and contradictory motions. nor maintain’d. every one knows what he may safely possess. For when men. This we may observe in our common judgments concerning actions. to give the preference to a stranger. of these goods is the chief advantage of society. wou’d never have been dream’d of among rude and savage men. there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one’s desires and necessities. and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. they must seek for a remedy. that in the original frame of our mind. whether we be guilty of any immorality. nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding. or is so regardless of them. This partiality. a remedy to this inconvenience. and unequal affection. therefore.

This convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be call’d a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho’ without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform’d upon the supposition, that something is to be perform’d on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv’d from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And ’tis only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually establish’d by human conventions without any promise. In like manner do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange, and are esteem’d sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value. After this convention, concerning abstinence from the possessions of others, is enter’d into, and every one has acquir’d a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of property,right, and obligation. The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former. Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice. Those, therefore, who make use of the words property, or right, or obligation, before they have explain’d the origin of justice, or even make use of them in that explication, are guilty of a very gross fallacy, and can never reason upon any solid foundation. A man’s property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural, but moral, and founded on justice. ’Tis very preposterous, therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of men. The origin of justice explains that of property. The same artifice gives rise to both. As our first and most natural sentiment of morals is founded on the nature of our passions, and gives the preference to ourselves and friends, above strangers; ’tis impossible there can be naturally any such thing as a fix’d right or property, while the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary directions, and are not restrain’d by any convention or agreement. No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord. All the other passions, beside this of interest, are either easily restrain’d, or are not of such pernicious consequence, when indulg’d. Vanity is rather to be esteem’d a social passion, and a bond of union among men. Pity and love are to be consider’d in the same light. And as to envy and revenge, tho’ pernicious, they operate only by intervals, and are directed against particular persons, whom we consider as our superiors or enemies. This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, per255

petual, universal, and directly destructive of society. There scarce is any one, who is not actuated by it; and there is no one, who has not reason to fear from it, when it acts without any restraint, and gives way to its first and most natural movements. So that upon the whole, we are to esteem the difficulties in the establishment of society, to be greater or less, according to those we encounter in regulating and restraining this passion. ’Tis certain, that no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction to counter-balance the love of gain, and render men fit members of society, by making them abstain from the possessions of others. Benevolence to strangers is too weak for this purpose; and as to the other passions, they rather inflame this avidity, when we observe, that the larger our possessions are, the more ability we have of gratifying all our appetites. There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since ’tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy’d by its restraint, than by its liberty, and that in preserving society, we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than in the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal licence. The question, therefore, concerning the wickedness or goodness of human nature, enters not in the least into that other question concerning the origin of society; nor is there any thing to be consider’d but the degrees of men’s sagacity or folly. For whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous, ’tis all a case; since itself alone restrains it: So that if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same effect. Now as ’tis by establishing the rule for the stability of possession, that this passion restrains itself; if that rule be very abstruse, and of difficult invention; society must be esteem’d, in a manner, accidental, and the effect of many ages. But if it be found, that nothing can be more simple and obvious than that rule; that every parent, in order to preserve peace among his children, must establish it; and that these first rudiments of justice must every day be improv’d, as the society enlarges: If all this appear evident, as it certainly must, we may conclude, that ’tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, which precedes society; but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem’d social. This, however, hinders not, but that philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos’d state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and never cou’d have any reality. Human nature being compos’d of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding; ’tis certain, that the blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society: And it may be allow’d us to consider separately the effects, that result from the separate operations of these two component parts of the mind. The same liberty may be permitted to moral, which is allow’d to natural philosophers; and ’tis very usual with the latter to consider any motion as compounded and consisting of two parts separate from each other, tho’ at the same time they acknowledge it to be in itself uncompounded and inseparable. This state of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the golden age, which poets have invented; only with this difference, that the former is describ’d as full of war, violence and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and most peaceable condition, that can possibly be imagin’d. The seasons, in that first age of nature, were so temperate, if we may believe the poets, that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with cloaths and houses as a security against the violence of heat and cold. The rivers flow’d with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature spontaneously produc’d her greatest delicacies. Nor were

these the chief advantages of that happy age. The storms and tempests were not alone remov’d from nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy, were the only movements, with which the human mind was yet acquainted. Even the distinction of mine and thine was banish’d from that happy race of mortals, and carry’d with them the very notions of property and obligation, justice and injustice. This, no doubt, is to be regarded as an idle fiction; but yet deserves our attention, because nothing can more evidently shew the origin of those virtues, which are the subjects of our present enquiry. I have already observ’d, that justice takes its rise from human conventions; and that these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity: And the situation of external objects is their easy change, join’d to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men. But however philosophers may have been bewilder’d in those speculations, poets have been guided more infallibly, by a certain taste or common instinct, which in most kinds of reasoning goes farther than any of that art and philosophy, with which we have been yet acquainted. They easily perceiv’d, if every man had a tender regard for another, or if nature supplied abundantly all our wants and desires, that the jealousy of interest, which justice supposes, could no longer have place; nor would there be any occasion for those distinctions and limits of property and possession, which at present are in use among mankind. Encrease to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying its place with much nobler virtues, and more valuable blessings. The selfishness of men is animated by the few possessions we have, in proportion to our wants; and ’tis to restrain this selfishness, that men have been oblig’d to separate themselves from the community, and to distinguish betwixt their own goods and those of others. Nor need we have recourse to the fictions of poets to learn this; but beside the reason of the thing, may discover the same truth by common experience and observation. ’Tis easy to remark, that a cordial affection renders all things common among friends; and that married people in particular mutually lose their property, and are unacquainted with the mine and thine, which are so necessary, and yet cause such disturbance in human society. The same effect arises from any alteration in the circumstances of mankind; as when there is such a plenty of any thing as satisfies all the desires of men: In which case the distinction of property is entirely lost, and every thing remains in common. This we may observe with regard to air and water, tho’ the most valuable of all external objects; and may easily conclude, that if men were supplied with every thing in the same abundance, or if every one had the same affection and tender regard for every one as for himself; justice and injustice would be equally unknown among mankind. Here then is a proposition, which, I think, may be regarded as certain, that ’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin. If we look backward we shall find, that this proposition bestows an additional force on some of those observations, which we have already made on this subject. First, we may conclude from it, that a regard to public interest, or a strong extensive benevolence, is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice; since ’tis allow’d, that if men were endow’d with such a benevolence, these rules would never have been dreamt of.

Secondly, we may conclude from the same principle, that the sense of justice is not founded on reason, or on the discovery of certain connexions and relations of ideas, which are eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory. For since it is confest, that such an alteration as that above-mention’d, in the temper