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“To be Hospitable to Madness”: Derrida and Foucault Chez Freud
0 1 900000January 2005 Originalfor Francis Research 1479-7585 CulturalLtd Journal&Article2005 10.1080/0000000000000000000 RCUV9101.sgm Ltd Taylor and (print)/1740-1666 (online) Francis
This article revolves around Derrida’s return to Foucault on the occasion of a 30th anniversary commemoration of his Folie et déraison. This was an occasion, too, for Derrida to reflect on the contamination of the personal by the intellectual, recalling the once hostile exchange between them, which had taken place long ago, concerning the relation of Reason to madness as a figure of absolute alterity. Here I investigate Derrida’s later post-mortem of the ambiguous place of Freud in Foucault’s thought, and argue that the deconstructive re-reading of his text in relation to psychoanalysis can itself be understood as a discursive gesture of “hospitality”, as this has been explored in Derrida’s later work and as it bears on Foucault’s idea of what to be “hospitable to madness” means. As such it is indicative of the ethical dimension of deconstruction as a discursive practice, which, I suggest, could be called “hospitable reading”. I show how Derrida’s text revisits and critically reassesses the difficult intellectual proximity to his “dead friend”—and is, therefore, an expression without the possibility of a personal response—whilst being commemoratively responsive to the Other to which Foucault’s text still gives expression, beyond his death. Derrida’s death came between the submission of this article and its publication here. I dedicate it to his memory.
To wait without waiting, awaiting absolute surprise, the unexpected visitor, awaited without a horizon of expectation: this is indeed about the Messiah as hôte, about the messianic as hospitality, the messianic that introduces deconstructive disruption or madness in the concept of hospitality, the madness of hospitality, even the madness of the concept of hospitality. (Derrida 2002, p. 362) The essence of language is friendship and hospitality. (Levinas 1969, p. 305 cited by Derrida 2001, p. 207)
Prologue: Two old friends meet. The purpose of their rendez-vous is to readdress an old dispute between them. It is a difficult meeting for many reasons, not least because one of them has been dead for many years and must for this
ISSN 1479–7585 print/1740–1666 online/05/010003–19 © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1479758042000333680
these two friends will not meet (as friends might be expected to) in the “intellectual home” of either one of them (for neither can ultimately offer hospitality to the other in that sense). the venue for this meeting will be a hotel: it will not be in the home of either of them. Not least. though in part in the idiom of personal exchange. Old Hostilities. Fortunately. This text was originally delivered as a lecture in the main Amphitheater of Saint-Anne Hospital on November 23. Derrida “bears witness to singularity of a friendship and to the absolute uniqueness of each relationship”. the new critique returns to the work from its own future. courtesy of an institution—a form of critical discourse—where intellectual hospitality can be arranged so as to provide a place of neutrality. new angle is. 1992). revisited now. was also published and widely disseminated and read. a collection in which. “the work in question” itself calls for the re-reading and the new commentary it is given. In this sense. so to speak. . concerning madness. The dispute between them. as the book’s sleeve notes appropriately declare. I propose thinking of this as a kind of “hotel”. What was said between them once. appropriately titled The Work of Mourning (2001a).4 BOOTHROYD ghostly reunion rely on the memory of the other. revisited and discussed by Derrida in his 1991 lecture “‘To Do Justice to Freud’: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis” (TDJF). a place where no one is on his own turf so to speak. entitled “‘To Do Justice to Freud’: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis” in Resistances of Psychoanalysis (Derrida 1998a. a new position subtended from an alternative. In TDJF Derrida revisits his decades old exchange with Foucault concerning the possibility of a “history of madness” once again in terms of the question of the 1. this reliance on memory is underwritten by the fact that the matter up for discussion is also a matter of public record. anchored by it. This other. 1961). in an abridged form in a collection of essays by Derrida. a triangulation. delivered at a conference to mark the 30th anniversary of the publication of the book and published in Resistances of Psychoanalysis (1998a). The meeting is instead staged here. For the sake of the argument elaborated below. though not only because death figures in this post-mortem of a dispute. but. Subsequently it was included in Résistances de la psychanalyse (Paris: Galilée. All references to it here are to the English translation of the text. or the archive. essays sur Michel Foucault (Paris: Galilée. no less for that. 1991 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the publication of Foucault’s Folie et déraison: Histoire de la à l’âge classique (Paris: Plon. after many years have passed (and from one side only) is approached from a different angle and in another age. For reasons that will become clear. indeed discussion and disputation of their “disagreement” was widely pursued. present but marginal in the early work of the dead friend. to which I shall give the name Chez Freud—I’ll take you there later. pp. because one can never be truly at home in the idiom of the other. New Hospitalities: Derrida’s Return to Foucault The “work in question” here is Foucault’s Folie et déraison (FD). third point. 70–118). It was originally published in Penser la folie.1 This essay was also republished in English. 1996).
TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 5 possibility or impossibility of access to madness. . we need first to recall how the original dispute between them had been ignited by Derrida’s 1963 lecture “Cogito and the History of Madness” (CHM). but also attacked the privileging of this (or indeed any other) particular text in the overall project of FD on the ground that all “madness-as-negativity” is inscribed into the very “structure of Reason in general” (Bennington 1979. The attempt to write the history of the decision. In fact one can summarise the cut and thrust of Derrida’s CHM as aiming to show that this is as true of Foucault’s own work as it is of Descartes’ or. Derrida reopens the problematic of openness to the alterity of the other (the ethical relation) in the context of the tension resulting from the requirement to submit one’s discourse to the law (of Reason and rational argument). rather. CHM had disputed not only Foucault’s substantive reading of the “progression of doubt” and the place of madness in Descartes Meditations. All references to Derrida’s text “Cogito and the History of Madness”. cited by Bennington 1979. p. All references to Foucault’s text “My Body. There is only ever. difference runs the risk of construing the division as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence. articulates and demonstrates the problem of this distinction.3 In CHM Derrida had originally attempted to show that the very project of Foucault’s book. 2. explicitly to write a “history of madness itself”. This theme will be pursued in greater detail shortly. more hospitable to Foucault. This Fire” are to the Geoffrey Bennington translation in Oxford Literary Review. this Paper. or. (4)1. (Derrida 1978. in that it plays less the role of policeman to Foucault’s discourse and is more “hospitable to madness” as Foucault had attempted to understand madness. any possible oeuvre—and it was Foucault himself who had defined madness as “absence of oeuvre”. thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation. 9–28. 40. Derrida’s approach to Foucault’s text in 1991 is less hostile. 3. which was both intellectual and personal. indeed. can only ever be. pp. p. CHM had challenged the book’s entire general account of the distinction between Reason and madness and had sought to do so throughout on its own terms. The occasion of Derrida’s return to that book (FD) and to the closure of that friendship. In other words. are to the English translation of Alan Bass in Writing and Difference (Derrida 1978. this Fire” (BPF). was an impossible undertaking. This Paper. it exemplifies it and the impossibility of the very thing it explicitly sets out to do. As Bennington summarises. 1963 at the Collège Philosophique. originally presented as a lecture on 3 March. 5) This was a bit like saying: “your book illustrates. still concerns itself with the double articulation of the personal and the intellectual and with what could be called the hospitable and the juridical. 31–78). but in order to make an inroad into the later engagement. 7).2 and how Foucault had later responded to this in an essay which was published as an appendix to the 2nd (1972) edition of his Folie et déraison (originally published in 1961) and translated as “My Body. division. a history of Reason’s account of its other”. Any “archaeology of silence”. p.
What I do want to take from it for my own purposes and. In other words. “outwards” to institutions. found in the French translation and referring to a mode of mental life. for example. juridical on the other)” (Foucault 1979. This error. is that it is all “a question of the modification of the subject by the exercise of discourse” (Foucault 1979. 27). he says it is precisely . As Derrida had built this critique of Foucault’s book around its reading of Descartes. what we should see in Derrida here is the reinscription of Descartes’ remarks on madness within the realm of pure philosophy and ideas. 18ff. aimed at challenging and refuting Derrida’s reading. or how the significant differences between Foucauldian archaeology and Derridean deconstruction might be read off this dispute. p. where the original Latin says only “the invention of something new”. etc. Most emphatically. including. or. especially. in BPF. what this entire “way of reading” Derrida embarks upon misses. leads Derrida to “hang his whole demonstration” on a reading which supposes dreaming for Descartes to be a figural. Foucault suggests. In other words. For instance. practices. in the discussion of the relation between dreaming and madness. rhetorical radicalisation of madness and a strategy devised purely for the purposes of his argument in the Meditations (Foucault 1979. to emphasise here. the fact that the Cartesian text significantly plays on “the gap between two determinations of madness (medical on the one hand. 19. are not the subject matter of this essay. This distinction is an important and decisive one in the project of FD because it effectively directs thought. 17). Now. p. especially the primary charge that Derrida had levelled at FD at that time: he thus argues that Derrida’s critique itself is caught up in the “traditional metaphysic” which it is most explicitly writing against.). such that we can see that the disqualification and “silencing of madness” in their progress. or philosophising. It points out his “many omissions” and the lack of attention to certain details. locations. therefore. my emphasis). At one point Foucault redirects Derrida to Descartes’ original Latin. the actual details of this argument about how to read Descartes well. of his reference and emphasis on the word “extravagant”. according to Foucault. for the main part consists of a further disputation of Descartes’ text.6 BOOTHROYD Derrida sets out to show.. rather than holding it in the world of concepts and ideas. and hence implicitly ends up repeating. Foucault draws his response to Derrida in BPF to a close with the now infamous characterisation of the nascent “Derridean deconstruction” as the “most decisive modern representative” of a tradition of philosophical discourse which “reduces discursive practices to textual traces” (Foucault 1979. is how in BPF Foucault clearly thinks he is turning the tables on Derrida and returning the charges to their sender. 18). p. p. indeed how to assign his place in the Foucauldian “history of madness”. For instance in respect. as an event or practice (Foucault 1979. Foucault’s detailed response delivered and published some 10 years after. noting his failure to check its translation into French. Foucault’s reading of Descartes focuses on how Descartes represents the difference between dreaming and madness within his “meditations” considered as a practice of thinking. is itself an articulation of the voice of Reason.
suggesting they betray complicity with the epochal silencing of madness FD had described. namely that whether or not one is dreaming or mad is not of any consequence for the certainty or truth of a thing. only someone who was unable to distinguish between dreaming/ madness and wakefulness/reason in the first place would make this mistake. This “last word” takes the form of an illustration of sorts: Foucault reminds Derrida of one of the “objections” put to Descartes by his contemporary. which. These “last words” of Foucault effectively dramatise and caricature the Derridean “replaying” of the Cartesian privileging of Reason and the concomitant exclusion of madness. Amongst the many historical forms of this silencing. 127). (1991). and that the departure from and return to the book “today” mirror. Pierre Bourdin. And. Foucault’s “last word” on the matter. Derrida’s return to this particular point in Derrida (1998a. for the modality of the experience. p. one of them. too: this is evident in Bourdin’s preoccupation with the “being of madness” or “being mad” rather than showing any concern for madness (itself)—or rather.5 Foucault implies that Derrida’s critique of FD is similar in this way to the Bourdin “objections” put to Descartes. says Foucault. as John Cottingham notes “were for the most part extremely hostile in tone. Although Descartes’ Meditations gets a whipping by Foucault in FD precisely for its historical role in “silencing” madness. 5. is Derrida’s “well-determined little pedagogy” (Foucault 1979. The second edition of Descartes Meditations (1642) included a “Seventh Set of Objections” by the Jesuit Fr.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 7 this highly traditional “textual reductionism” which actually constitutes an archetypal “silencing” of the “voices of madness” in the history of thought. Such thinking. Some 20-odd years later. and often deliberately malicious” (Cottingham 1993. Foucault reminds him. in the final paragraph of BPF. Father Bourdin. could justly have been called “metaphysical”. . nor indeed for the dreaming or mad subject. C. p. in a way. nonetheless reflecting on it is important for understanding the “return” to FD Derrida undertakes in his later essay TDJF. An English translation of these objections can be found in Cottingham et al. Foucault cites Descartes’ rejection of this account of his own thesis as a misunderstanding resulting from Bourdin’s evident inability to see what is stated clearly in the Meditations. he begins (TDJF) with some brief remarks reflecting on how the dispute in relation to this “great book” of Foucault had once “cast a shadow over” their friendship for a decade. when Derrida is invited to contribute to a conference commemorating the 30th anniversary of the publication of FD.f. as he gets up close and personal. He dismisses Derrida’s objections to his thesis. is intended to drive his point home like a coup de gras. even if one were asleep or mad. and the whole tenor of Foucault’s response to Derrida is similarly dismissive of them. p. or condition (of madness) in which the “old metaphysical distinctions” are neither made nor are important.4 Bourdin wrote that he understood Descartes to be saying that it was impossible to doubt what is true/certain. for whom it is simply not an issue. It barely tolerates summary. the departure from and return to friendship that had since taken place 4. 135). 85). this doesn’t stop Foucault from likening his own relationship to Derrida to that of Descartes to Bourdin.
Let’s just linger a little further here and ponder this reference to the “last word”. I am not surprised that this fellow can’t tell the difference between them’” (Foucault 1979. feel that. but can you even tell it is him?” This provocation itself performs an unsettling experience of uncertainty. mimicry. which rings like a refrain in CHM. unfixed in their meaning and open to several interpretations. I suggest. is made to resonate by appealing to Foucault’s own account of the epistemo-historiographical “exclusions” of madness. isn’t it!” Foucault thus closes his well-considered response by showing how he too can play the part. “refusing”: it is a sort of performative slap in the face. These “last words” of Foucault on the matter. though. Foucault’s “very last words” in BPF are actually left to Descartes: “‘But only as the wise can distinguish what is clearly conceived from what only seems and appears to be so. but in the end—in the “last words” of Foucault on the matter—it is also the impossibility of fixing meaning in language that is finally and demonstratively. On the one hand we are shown by Foucault how Descartes. and those who might be interested can analyze it… right up to the last word. The “last word”. it’s your master telling you off. a proximity between the two of them and for them between poets . in fact. in Foucault’s terms. incarcerations and other institutionalisations of the subject. however. 27). Bourdin paragraph I have just referred to (Foucault 1979. of states of mind. The counter-attack in BPF may well emphasise that philosophical cleverness can tend to be disinterested or forgetful of events and actualities. it produces an “event” of the very kind Foucault charges “Derridean textualism” with forgetting. But as an illustration of Foucault’s view of Derrida it is. in response to Bourdin’s hostility4 aggressively slaps down Bourdin and simultaneously excludes madness: Bourdin’s inability to discern the true meaning of Descartes is effectively likened by Descartes to madness itself. act in the name of. On the other hand. these remarks can just as readily be read as serving Derrida’s critique as they can be taken as a successful expression of Foucault’s position. I believe can be taken as a reference to the final. is Foucault masking himself as Descartes and saying to Derrida “Look. Foucault is making it clear beyond doubt that he has understood very well indeed—and better than Derrida had understood him—the nature of the criticism and charge being directed at him. remain ambiguous. 27). Paradoxically there is. 71. This “ending” of the dispute consequently left it open too. historical conditions. a certain Descartes.8 BOOTHROYD and also marked a changed relation to the work. In this final refusal of Derrida’s critique then. There is bluff. the debate is archived. therefore. etc. Derrida’s argument about the impossibility of a history of “madness itself”.. if he wishes to do so. and remains unshaken and unsilenced by Foucault’s counterattack. trickiness and a barrage of assorted arguments in Foucault’s 1972 response to Derrida. my emphasis). This citation. p. a “here. or rather. masking. peculiarly double-edged and ambivalent. From a philosophical point of view. and especially the last word” (Derrida 1998a. Derrida emphasises how he does not want “now” (as he had in fact been invited to for the occasion) to return to that old dispute: “In the end. it is truly maddening. p. p. irrepressible and inescapable.
reading it as a work belonging to the age of psychoanalysis (Derrida 1998a. Especially the figure of Nietzsche. obsessional to the point of pathological. In my title “the history of madness” must be in quotation marks since the title designates the history of the book. p. psychoanalytic mode: There is in all this a compulsive repeated participation…Though I have decided not to return to what was debated close to thirty years ago. it is a question as much of what went unsaid about Freud and psychoanalysis in it. p. 70–72) This relationship to that book. Returning to the book in this way. but I’m also thinking of the role of the artist as liminal figure. in general. the 6. namely from the point of view of its relation to Freud and psychoanalysis rather than on the basis of its more overt central concerns with Descartes. for example. or more importantly. not to the old dispute (about Descartes) but nonetheless “revisiting” the old dispute. In TDJF he revives the figure of the “tragic Freud” to counter Foucault’s relegation of Freud to the science of psychology (see below). Foucault regularly attempts to objectify psychoanalysis and reduce it to that of which he speaks rather than to that out of which he speaks (Derrida 1998a. being a creature of the border between epistemes. from the point of view today. that is. on the basis of a certain psychoanalysis. has to be understood.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 9 and philosophers whose writings are directly concerned with the limits and borders of expression. This approach is more hospitable to Foucault’s project in that it implicitly acknowledges. and unavoidably to what had ensued previously. as it is about what was said about the role of the “Cartesian moment”. 75). “tragic” figures or “figures of the tragic”—and it is to such a list that Derrida will propose adding the figure of Freud. pp. . (Derrida 1998a. Derrida goes back to the book.1991) in TDJF. and to the text which Derrida in re-reading it “today” produces. to give in to a sort of fetishistic denial and to think that I can protect myself from any contact with the place or meaning of this discussion. Derrida chooses to approach the book from another point of view or “border”. to say nothing of impossible.6 Chez Freud: Hotel or Hospital? On his return to FD and its contemporary reading (c. in terms of the questions brought to it and the critique as it unfolded. as we shall see. this time to restate “the impossibility” of the book’s speaking from “outside” of its own “age”. as far as this is possible. of madness itself in the age of psychoanalysis. 76). even though. today “in the age of psychoanalysis”. The History (historia rerum gestarum) of Madness—as a book—in the age of psychoanalysis and not the history (res gestae) of madness. it is as much about what is unsaid as is said. who is the “mad” poet-philosopher par excellence. it would nevertheless be absurd. Derrida goes into a confessional. In this rereading of it from the point view of the place of psychoanalysis in it.
10 BOOTHROYD Foucauldian sense of the episteme and the thinking which it articulates “on the border” between identifiable. for instance crediting him thus: Freud went back to madness at the level of its language. reconstituted one of the essential elements of an experience reduced to silence by positivism… [and] restored. 76). In doing so. almost always. Derrida’s reading once again unsettles the project’s attempt to write a history of “madness itself” and . and Derrida summarises his “negative” characterisation of psychoanalysis describing how for Foucault Freud would free the patient interned in the asylum only to reconstitute him “in his essential character” at the heart of the analytic situation. (Derrida 1998a. Derrida goes on to show how Foucault saw “the tradition” that runs from Descartes through Tuke and Pinel and then on to nineteenth and twentieth century psychiatry. the tradition of the pathologization and medicalisation of madness. p. p. How is one to understand. p. conceptually and linguistically determined epistemic totalities. is attempt to draw out and consider the manner in which in Foucault’s text. 198 cited by Derrida 1998a. “since the end of the 18c. (Foucault 1961. moreover. the liberation of the mad has been replaced by an objectification of the concept of their freedom” (Derrida 1998a. historically. 81) Foucault. more often than not. 81). is included in the account of how. “when it confers all powers on the doctor’s speech” (Derrida 1998a. What he does do. 91f). “negative”. Derrida returns to Foucault’s FD not in order to challenge Foucault’s reading of Freud and psychoanalysis as such—no more so (nor less) than in his first approach to FD in the 1963 essay he had challenged Foucault’s reading of Descartes (in the sense he supposes Foucault to have taken it). 91) This second. namely. in a critical fashion. in order to take shape?”(Derrida 1998a. his questioning of the nature of the indebtedness of FD to psychoanalysis: “Does the project owe psychoanalysis anything? What? Or would it on the contrary define the very thing from which the project had to detach itself. and evidently so. p. but equally that of the authority of the analyst/ doctor. a duplicitous figure. in medical thought the possibility of a dialogue with unreason. rather. why having done a certain “justice” to Freud by acknowledging him. p. Foucault’s particular objectifications of psychoanalysis are central to Derrida’s attempt to evaluate Foucault’s own declared intention “to do justice to Freud” (Foucault 1961 cited by Derrida 1998a. against this background.. nonetheless. characterisation of Freud and psychoanalysis in Foucault is not only a matter of the psychoanalytic delimitation of madness as a disease susceptible to a therapy. Freud is already for Foucault. as actually converging on Freud. 97). p. In TDJF. and. doubly and ambivalently inscribed within the project of FD itself. The figure of Freud. later moves to conclude that psychoanalysis should be inscribed in the same tradition as the likes of Tuke and Pinel. inscribed in terms of what Derrida thinks of as indebtedness.
he suggests. Derrida’s approach to FD is once again based on the deconstructive strategy of demonstrating the indebtedness of Foucault’s thought—here to psychoanalysis—insofar as it is. has a principally strategic function in relation to a further aim beyond that. escapees. Van Gogh. or futural. Though the modern episteme is not “purely” or “exclusively” psychoanalytic. that is. This epistemic situation of Foucault’s own thinking. Derrida’s new aim in rereading FD is to restore to Freud. to Chez Freud: effectively to the issue of the institutional identity of psychoanalysis and “Freud’s place” within the modern episteme and identifies the inescapable debt of Foucauldian thought to psychoanalysis. so to speak. artists and philosophers (e. is also its evental precondition. must be derived from Foucault’s thinking itself: with reference. to put this in its simplest formulation. with certain “mad” poets. before the door (and doorkeeper) of psychoanalysis (and Freud). let’s say of Freud’s place (and Freud’s place in Foucault). the direction signposted by the psychoanalysis inscribed within FD. drifters or outcasts. in a sense. it is nonetheless partly structured by the set of all psychoanalytic “statements” (to use the technical terminology of Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge). for instance. a work written within the “age of psychoanalysis”. which. Nietzsche. the same) but it is also different. unanticipated . the status of what might be called “liminality”: the liminality which Foucault super-valorises and associates explicitly in FD. the “critical” part of Derrida’s essay belies the “compulsion to repeat” what he had said decades ago in his initial response to FD—namely that any thought of “madness itself” was “metaphysical”. the critique thus far. That is to say. which emphasises the epochal imbrication of psychoanalysis within Foucauldian archaeology and proposes a Foucauldian understanding of this imbrication. but now from a different direction. Before the door. inhabitants of the border zones between epistemes. within the context of that work. the ground or “historical a priori” of Foucauldian “archaeology” itself. aspect to them: they appear within the waning episteme as unexpected. Artaud. Nerval. As already noted in this article. Hölderlin) and even with certain artworks (Las Meninas) or fictional characters (Don Quixote). Freud as the Doorkeeper of an Ambivalent Institution The scene for this new meeting of the two “old friends” is staged. in TDJF. They all have a messianic. Derrida directs us. within the “age of psychoanalysis”. And Derrida effectively pays homage to the most insightful thinking of this notion of the “age” or epoch.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 11 highlights a familiar aspect of Derridean deconstructive practice. All of these figures Foucault either substantially or symbolically invokes as transgressors. to everything which is to be associated with his notion of the episteme. However. “the history of madness”.g. then. which is the “compulsion to repeat”: the critique presented in his earlier response to Foucault is repeated (is thus indeed. Beyond this (repeated) move now. Now this “same but different” is not just a case of making the same sort of “argument” again: he approaches the same Foucauldian problematic.
in doing so. pp. 193). Freud’s essentially “fictional” rendition of the organic. figures who are not “at home” within “their own” episteme.8 Derrida reiterates how “the law” is ultimately without legal foundation. pp. is there in Freud’s early attempts. 78–79) Derrida’s invocation and appeal to the figure of psychoanalysis/Freud as the door/doorkeeper recalls the reader (and Foucault post-mortem) to his text on “Freud’s place” in his reading of Kafka’s parable (of the same title as his own essay) in “Before the Law” (Derrida 1992). strangers whose arrival heralds the coming episteme. 194). is available. All citations of Kafka’s text here are taken from Wedding Preparations in the Country and Other Stories. of Freud’s desire. founds it. on who produces it. 8. and this is the most important aspect here. p. but also the impossibility of any such a project. the huis: the double figure of the door and the doorkeeper… he closes one epoch and opens another… this double possibility is not alien to an institution. that every law is premised on a performative act of violence which “institutes” the law. of course. through a combination of self-analysis and the incorporation of aspects of Fliessian nasal reflexology. Rereading FD. to account for the origin of sexual repression. authorizes it in an absolute performative whose presence always escapes him” 7. 230–298. Derrida is at odds to discern the singularity of Freud’s “liminality” and the uniqueness of Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis. Harmondsworth: Penguin. The example to which Derrida applies the notion of aporia derived from Kafka’s parable of the man who seeks access to the law in “Before the Law”. that the law only depends “on who is before it (and so prior to it). to what is called the analytic situation as a scene behind closed doors (huis clos). though it was published as a separate text during his lifetime. to write “the history of the law itself”. 1978. However. Foucault consistently shows a kind of empathetic hospitality to such figures of “visitation”. of those that open as well as those that close the door. Willa and Edwin Muir. Mary Quaintance in Derrida 2002. to show that such an original “law” determining the identity of either of them is “neither presentable nor relatable” (Derrida 1992. at this specific point in his thinking. that is. the holder of the keys. provides the example in Derrida’s essay. but also. Derrida uses Foucault’s text to re-establish the place of Freud amongst them. Kafka’s short parable “Before The Law” appears as a sort of prologue to his great novel The Trial. evolutionary transition to the upright position. ) In his essay of 1990 “Force of Law the ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”. the Freud who speaks “on the side” of a certain “madness”. only. The complete version of the text “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority”.7 In that text Derrida explored the idea of access to a possible origin of the dissension between fact and fiction. trans. p. (Kafka’s parable serves as the mis-en-scène for this meditation on the aporia of access to the law itself.12 BOOTHROYD “visitees”. and to whom the Foucauldian “hospitality to madness” may consistently be extended. concerning the distancing of the nose from the anal–genital sexual stench (Derrida 1992. . The Freudian place is not only the technico-historical apparatus… Freud himself will in fact take on the ambiguous figure of a doorman or doorkeeper (huisser)… Freud as the doorman of today. (Derrida 1998a. trans.
preserves the connection between the problem of justice and question of hospitality as such. he reposes from this perspective. one can cast Freud either. This is shown to be “in keeping” with Foucault on madness. figuratively it can be said. lifted the “interdiction against language” and instituted “the return to a proximity with madness”. Freud and madness. Seen alternatively. for whom both “Freud and Nietzsche like two accomplices of the same age”. 2001b). cultural identity. Secondly. as Derrida does in this essay (in order to do him “justice”) as the author of a body of work which is in fact “hospitable to madness”—this “hospitality” being marked by the openness of psychoanalysis to the unknowable prior to any of the psychoanalytic institutionalisations of madness that might be identified. alternatively. from another point in the triangulation of Foucault. or. this involves acknowledging Freud’s being “hospitable to madness” whilst doing justice to the Foucauldian text (which is found. But it is also in keeping with the Foucault who “was able much earlier—and more hospitably—to say that Freudian psychoanalysis. Casting Freud now as the doorkeeper of “today” in TDJF. Derrida performatively exploits and reiterates the aporetic nature of the distinction between the ethical and juridical dimensions of “hospitality”. for example.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 13 (Derrida 2002. but it “keeps” madness as an unknowable alterity. His deconstructive reading. More recently Derrida’s reflections on hospitality have been carried through into discussions of politics. as an agent of the law (policing the threshold between Reason/madness) or. in various ways. the question around which their earlier discussion had revolved concerning the dissension of Reason and madness and the (im)possibility of access to madness. “to do justice Freud” with respect to madness. war. 2000. 1999.9 Casting Freud thus as a “doorkeeper” of an institution (psychoanalysis) which is “hospitable to madness”. Derrida raises the question of the place of madness in Freudian psychoanalysis in the context of FD with a view to the sense of madness Foucault would have been sympathetic to. in part at least—in a certain reading of it—to actually recognise this hospitality as such). by thinking of the conjunction of hospitality and madness in terms of openness to madness. 270 my emphasis). See. In TDJF. as his title suggests. He seeks in doing so. p. Derrida (1998b. to which one 9. He thereby provides the sense of “hospitality to madness” to which both Freud and Foucault subscribe. depending on how one reads him. took it upon himself to speak on behalf of. . In this way. ethics and rights in the context of world affairs. Without any hope of a direct response or dialogue now with his dead friend. he shows how. which neither rejects nor refutes either Freudian psychoanalysis or Foucauldian “archaeology”. as Foucault on balance tended to. Derrida principally does two things. Derrida undertakes to take Foucault to this “door” and considers “with him” its being also the threshold of psychoanalysis. serves to “remind Foucault” and Foucault’s readers that psychoanalysis may act as the keeper of madness. by way of an hospitable reading of Foucault. etc. racism. Firstly he sketches out a similarity between Freud and Foucault terms of their positions in relation to the “law” of dissension between Reason and madness (they are both “outsiders” to madness—they are not madmen).
In the context of revisiting FD he concedes that “from the outside”. say. each more powerful than the last. beyond the doorkeeper. the man stoops to peer through the gateway into the interior. what Derrida wants to highlight too. says Derrida. (Kafka) Whenever he approaches that door as a possible point of entrance. it only appears so if one forgets that: The Freud who breaks with psychology. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another. even mostly. is “especially” true of the Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. of Foucault’s approach to psychoanalysis as the possibility of access to madness itself (the theme of Derrida’s first critical reading of FD). ever ready to break down again and disintegrate into the inaccessible” (Derrida 1998a. is how Foucault repeatedly encountered the impassability of this door. to be a psychoanalytic hospital wherein madness is “hospitalised” yet again. with evolutionism and biologism. and the doorkeeper steps to one side. or what he thinks he discerns. who shows himself hospitable to madness (and I risk this word) because he is foreign to the space of the hospital. or. Foucault is more often. p. 104) This. And I am only the least of the doorkeepers. Observing that the doorkeeper laughs and says: “If you are drawn to it. (Derrida 1998a. is not a psychology as soon as it takes language into account” (Derrida 1998a. is the Freud who talks it out with death. Derrida is more directly concerned with the matter of psychoanalysis as an institution of hospitality—be this imagined as. Since the gate stands open. But rather than open up a dialogue on death at this point. a hospital or a hotel—which would always be a place of suspect. just try to go in despite my veto”. But take note I am powerful. and often despite himself. can indeed appear to be a “hospital” of sorts—a carceral institution. Talking it out not so much here with death itself then but with the . In other words. the tragic Freud. no matter how many instances might be cited of Foucault’s approaches to psychoanalysis. as I have noted. p. inclined to see psychoanalysis as a carceral institution. 97–98). as usual.14 BOOTHROYD must be fair or “do justice”. Foucault repeatedly recoils from what he discerns. However. (Kafka) Derrida’s argument in TDJF is that doing “justice to Freud” involves recalling how Freudian psychoanalysis was in fact “hospitable to madness”. Citing Foucault’s Maladie mentale et psychologie (1962). or rather a conditional. as an institution of “hospitality”. my emphasis) However. hospitality. really. pp. 102. in view of which Foucault would surely recognise the kinship with thinkers of what he called “originary finitude”. if it may be put this way. Derrida adds that “Freud appears [there] as “the first to open up once again the possibility for reason and unreason to communicate in the danger of a common language. the tragic Freud who deserves hospitality in the great lineage of mad geniuses. psychoanalysis.
It also stresses the “juridical” requirements of critical thinking against the background of the personal friendship which had become imbricated in their critical exchanges “casting a shadow” over it. to be restaged indoors. Chez Freud. is comparable to that of Kafka’s man from the country. the “effacement of the limit between the private and public. however. For an interesting discussion of Derrida’s discourse on hospitality in the context of the immigration and asylum debate. on the threshold.) or the device. of the “absolute porosity” of doors and borders. betrayal and complicity with the police or “the law” “can happen in hotels but also in night shelters or hospitals” is indicative. registers. says Derrida.or herself to the risk of betrayal by it. it takes place rather. That this collusion. Freud and psychoanalysis on this occasion are made the “third party” to their life-long and protracted dispute about the possibility of a “history of madness”. hotels. Freud and psychoanalysis serves as a 10. too) of a hotel manager working with the police”—the hotel manager as the betrayer of his “guests” and thus of hospitality itself—but at that point says. already the issue. Derrida makes the difficult and ambiguous connection between the hospital. strange as it may seem to call it this. the place where Freud stands as the doorkeeper. passports. of the “the session” with the analyst: “pervertibility” is “virtually inevitable”. which makes hospitality possible) and the violation or impossibility of home” (Derrida 2000. he suggests. This positioning. and only analogous in relation to each other—of the confessor and psychoanalyst” (Derrida 2000. though. a place where being “hospitable to madness” is. parenthetically.10 In Of Hospitality. p. precisely. 65). the secret and the phenomenal (the home. the impossibility of using “devices” of any kind to keep secrets—be these computerised records (credit cards. This positioning is significant for several reasons. contrived and elliptical though it is. He refers to “the situation (a classic and common one. Whoever checks in with an institution inevitably exposes him. “let’s leave to one side the problems—only analagous. Derrida makes this concession to his thinking: there are always good reasons to be suspicious of the hospitality offered by institutions—be such institutions malign. benign or even apparently “welcoming”. Derrida’s post-mortem rendez-vous with Foucault then. More generally. and thus within the discourse of the institution. p. the police and what is internal to the psychoanalytic situation (namely to the analyst/analysand relationship) explicit when speaking directly of hospitality. It emphasises that any misunderstanding between Derrida and Foucault is a misunderstanding never solely of each other’s thinking (with respect to their singular intellectual homes) but of their relation (always and inevitably) to some “third party” (in this case Freud—just as much as it had once been Descartes). 65). (7)4 (2003) 367–386. The dispute is not. “before the door”. takes the form of a rereading of Foucault on Freud/ psychoanalysis in which he accompanies Foucault to a place regarded as an institution of hospitality.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 15 dead Foucault. etc. see Sarah Gibson’s “Accomodating Strangers: British Hospitality and the Asylum Hotel Debate” in this journal. let’s say a hotel. who comes to seek access to the law only to find his way barred by a doorkeeper. .
Derrida’s analysis is hospitable to Foucault in that it shows how Foucault’s thought too—despite his early preoccupations with “madness itself”—also exhibits an openness to madness as a figure of absolute alterity. therefore. and indeed to modern culture as a whole11. It finds within both of these discourses an ethical sensibility to what (or who) “is neither expected nor invited. “Not only is there a culture of hospitality. 361). or both appear as “keepers” of. I suggested we should consider TDJF as “less hostile and more hospitable” to that work. This is a form of hospitality Derrida defines as visitation—the encounter with an unknowable. Derrida shows how Foucault.f. 128–129). TDJF returns Foucault to his encounter with Freud. Can only the mad check in at such an institution? Can there be welcome without also exclusion? Isn’t a doorkeeper’s job precisely to exclude as well as allow entry? Does it depend who comes here? 11. is also always a conditional hospitality. All of this bears upon the difference between the earlier and the later approaches made by Derrida to Foucault’s FD. Uninvited Guests and Hostages Chez Freud: I have placed them all before the door. like Freud in his own way. mainly as evidenced in FD. involves acknowledging the “ethical moment” of his thinking: it involves discerning the manner in which psychoanalysis acts as a “keeper” of madness. but instead of simply reiterating the impossibility of objective knowledge of the Other. each appears to be in keeping with. All cultures compete in this regard and present themselves as more hospitable than others. Hostipitality: of Doorkeepers. in short. to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor. but there is no culture that is not also a culture of hospitality. Earlier. I would now qualify this description by appealing to this thinking of hospitality: the old objections—that Reason can never lay claim to “madness itself” are sustained. Derrida’s thinking on the relations between “culture” and hospitality can be followed through in the seminars collected in Acts of Religion: for example. unanticipatable alterity—and distinguishes from the hospitality of invitation. wholly other” (Borradori 2003. I welcome you into my home…” (c. to think with him again (though. was hospitable to the unknowable alterity of madness as wholly other. One can imagine a sign in the window—“Open to Madness” or “Madness Welcome”. Bringing them together at this point. we have learnt here. sadly actually without the possibility of response) the aporia of hospitality Chez Freud. p. Barradori 2003. Doing “justice to Freud”. facing these two up to each other. 128f. as a new arrival. which always implies the prior establishment of territorial boundaries between the inside and the outside (as in “I invite you.16 BOOTHROYD reminder of the “place” common to each of them. . the culture within which Derrida articulates and proposes a certain “hospitality to madness” as something shared by Freud and Foucault. nonidentifiable and unforeseeable.)). pp. the notion of the unassailable alterity of madness. as it were on the threshold of madness in several senses. Hospitality—this is culture itself” (Derrida 2002. Invitation.
but because we live in a world in which gestures of selfless generosity overlap with systems of violent exclusion. the possibility of welcome and hospitality is “preceded” by a necessary hostility and violence of appropriation of space as the home. p. chez Derrida. and that everything which unfolds will be (and was bound to be) a “compulsive” repetition of the objections Derrida once made to Foucault before and a kind of detour around any such solution (Lösung/analysis) to thinking the relationship between madness. a detailed consideration of the richness. Gil Anidjar notes that in French the hôte is the one who gives and the one who receives hospitality . . Derrida’s proximity to Levinas’ discourse is evident. Derrida inherits without any need to translate it into his own idiom. Hence the neologism “hostipitality”. classically exploits the undecidability of the notion of the hôte: in its Latin origin. However. 356). In a nutshell. Translation is key with respect to everything that has been said here: this inquiry concerns the ultimate translatability of one idiom into another. the face-to-face and welcome of the Other (Levinas 1969). hostis means both guest and enemy. this is not what we are looking for here: we are not attempting to bring these three together in a sort of cohabitation (in an articu12. and in others in the series. 355–420). for instance. Foucauldian and Derridean idioms. In this case it is possible to anticipate. in the following text: “[B]eing at home with oneself (l’être-soi chez soi—l’ipséité même—the other within oneself) supposes a reception or inclusion of the other which one seeks to appropriate. the translation for instance of psychoanalysis into hospitality. Fortunately. As soon as we mention the chez. In his brief editors’ preface to the essay. p. “Hostipitality” is the neologistic title of one of Derrida’s seminars belonging to a series of seminars on and around the theme of hospitality (Derrida 2002. Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality in this seminar. For instance.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 17 The hospitalities of invitation and visitation are in reality abstractions: not so much because they are logically mutually exclusive. it may help to have a single word which reminds us of this. control and master according to different modalities of violence” (Derrida 2001b. hospitality and psychoanalysis. 207). the other.12 Now. though not exclusively in. then we are already assuming a certain familiarity and being-at home-with. I do wish to draw particular attention to an idea of Levinas that. So the condition of possibility of hospitality is also marked by the impossibility of its not having been preceded by a certain violence toward. coined by Derrida to mark how there can be no hospitality which does not also bear the trace of a certain enmity. pp. Derrida 2001. and complexity of Derrida’s engagement with Levinas’ discourse on hospitality would take us on a too protracted digression at this point. p. p. or the triangular translation of the Freudian. 305. the establishment of the home of the one is the necessary act of territorialization so that the other may be welcomed in. In Adieu Derrida cites the following sentence of Levinas: “The essence of language is friendship and hospitality” (Levinas 1969. As Anidjar also points out. in an important sense. 17). and exclusion of. the theme of hospitality in Derrida can be traced through. all of Derrida’s writings on Levinas (Derrida 2002. the eventual impossibility of this translation and of translation in general. Levinas’ notion of the territorial “I” at-home-withitself (chez soi) is the “condition” for the ethical relation.
the question of who is taken hostage by whom in all of this remains open. so to speak. that the “host”. for his or her part in the overdetermination of the analytic situation (as representative of the authority of psychoanalysis as a doctrine or “law”) is always an old enemy. (3) We have to consider the possible ways of differentiating between hospitalities—such as those of the home. To offer hospitality is. madness chez Foucault and psychoanalysis chez Freud). p. unconditional hospitality. has already claimed the territory of this welcoming as his/her home (chez soi) and that this is. In other words. of questioning the chain of displacements (or links) between Hotel/Hospital/Hostility/Host/Hostage… linking. For Derrida. hotels and hospitals. therefore. 117). So. in accepting the guest. For Foucault. legitimates itself by taking “hostages”—for instance by sectioning the psychotic. eventually. one cannot in any 13. by providing. from within the analytic situation. in effect. as already noted. a home-from-home for the patient for the duration of the analysis. nor could there be any such thing as. that is. For instance he says “To be oneself. to be “before the law”. the condition of the possibility of hospitality per se. but this is not. which is under the control of the hostanalyst who. (2) There is. the guest-patient is welcomed into the analytic situation. etc. to be sure. the responsibility for the responsibility of the other” (Levinas 1981.13 No Unconditional Hospitality: the Aporia of Admittance Derrida’s return to FD shows that doing justice to Freud requires the acknowledgment of how psychoanalysis is “hospitable to madness”. Any critical approach to psychoanalysis is from the outside. welcoming the other. as a manifestation of the authority of Reason. Amongst other remarks about hospitality. therefore. but also that this (or any such) hospitality is subject to an unknowable “law”. is necessarily to be taken hostage by the guest for whom one is responsible. Levinas’ discussion of the “hostage” is to be found throughout Otherwise than Being . (And which analysand has never felt this at some point only to be told to reflect on it as a “projection” of him. even into one’s home.or herself?) The aim of the analysis is to enable the analysand to be-at-home-with-him. bearing in mind. These are the principal issues: (1) the mapping of the guest/ host distinction onto the analyst/analysand relation. the state of being hostage is always to have one degree of responsibility more.or herself by way of this process. elsewhere Derrida says: “An unconditional hospitality is. but the measure and definition of it as a “hospitable institution” must also be learned from within. It is more a case here of the location of hospitality in relation to critique whilst questioning what it means “to be hospitable to madness”. psychoanalysis is “hospitable to madness”. once one has entered into it as an accepted guest. as offering hospitality.18 BOOTHROYD lation of the chez nous of hospitality chez Derrida. “psychiatry”. practically impossible to live. or Beyond Essence. the issue of psychoanalysis as a specific form of “institutionalised hospitality” and the matter of “institution” and “institutional authority” as such. . to “psychoanalysis”. in all cases.
who once so stridently rebuked Foucault for supposing himself to be writing a “history of madness itself” that he provoked the hostile counter-charge of indulging in a “vicious little pedagogy”. (Borradori 2003. “the thought” of “pure and unconditional hospitality itself”. perhaps even the ethical. should himself reiterate with extreme insistence now. I cannot expose myself to the coming of the other and offer him or her anything whatsoever without making this hospitality effective. Without at least the thought of this pure and unconditional hospitality. and along with it. we are guided by and directed toward a certain “impossible” purity and universality. giving something determinate. (Borradori 2003. as all interpersonal praise. the juridical. etc. 129). . but the condition for all solidarity. of hospitality itself. and in persecution from the outrage inflicted by the other to the expiation of his fault by me” (Levinas 1981. but this expression reiterates also how this is a proximity constituted by the shared impossibility of any access to pure otherness (of which “madness” as “the other of Reason” is just one figure)—to what lies “beyond the door”. beyond norms and rules. Every accusation and persecution. Freud and psychoanalysis. I suggest the difference between Derrida and Levinas at this point is one of emphasis. recompense and punishment presuppose the subjectivity of the ego. a leap beyond knowledge and power. Hence the models of both psychoanalysis (which has laid its own special claim on the word) and hospitality being proposed by Derrida clearly must “resist” the tendency to collapse both into either forms of “absolution” (supposedly producing mental or spiritual health) or forms of violent “absorption” (such as incarcerations) of the other by the same. p. To relate this finally back to the discussion above: this “situation” and this aporia. amongst other sources.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 19 case and by definition organize it” (Borradori 2003. Unconditional hospitality is transcendent with regard to the political. This 14. political. in the course of our experience. In doing so his proximity to Foucault is given expression. 129) It seems at first extraordinary that Derrida. without in some concrete way. juridical. But—and here is the indissociability—I cannot open the door. substitution and the possibility of putting oneself in the place of the other. in our encounters with contingency and the singularity of the event and the situations (historical.14 This marks one of Derrida’s neo-Kantian moments in his discussion of hospitality: in practice. 129–130) The leap beyond “knowledge and power” (and isn’t this conjunction always a summoning of the ghost of Foucault?) is the desirous movement of thought. pp. a certain “hospitality to madness”. can be learnt from. p. Paradox. which refers to the transference from the “by the other” into a “for the other”. This remark can be usefully juxtaposed with the following of Levinas: “The unconditionality of being hostage is not the limit case of solidarity. we would have no concept of hospitality in general and would not even be able to determine any rules for conditional hospitality. in our contextual embeddedness. Heterogenous because we can move from one to the other only by means of an absolute leap. Derrida emphasises the practical impossibility of any such “transference”. Levinas articulates the relation to an absolute alterity which renders the “I” infinitely responsible. aporia: these two hospitalities are at once heterogenous and indissociable.) which we live. 117–118). pp.
one has to operate within its jurisdiction. However. This Paper. Cottingham. in the host’s home. a new arrival can only be introduced “in my home”. It therefore. Geoffrey (1979) ‘Cognito Incognito: Foucault’s “My Body. 129). we would not even have the idea of the other as someone who enters into our lives without having been invited” (Borradori 2003. one must have first appropriated the space as one’s own. support. orthodoxies. 5–8. clandestine. etc. corresponds to an abnegation of responsibility to the other. p. How can we distinguish between the guest and the parasite? In principle. Chicago. in the course of TDJF. Derrida acknowledges this. Giovanni (2003) ‘Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ trans. hospitality. pp. Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Nassi in Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. This Fire”’. etc. indeed concurs with it as a necessity: “Without this thought of pure hospitality (a thought that is in its own way also an experience). the welcome offered has to be submitted to a basic and limiting jurisdiction. translated into an “act” of hospitality—at once a personal gesture of remembrance of an old friendship toward Foucault and a critical encounter with his work: an invitation to think of Freud as his “doorkeeper” and of how there is a sense in which. like the “man from the country” in Kafka’s parable. and with that a certain violence. as this has been variously institutionalised in the history of its schools. Not all new arrivals are received as guests if they don’t have the benefit of the right to hospitality or the right of asylum. vol. a guest who is wrong. 61) A pure or unconditional hospitality would itself be “mad” and not consistent with any actual “political reality” in any given situation.20 BOOTHROYD post-philosophical gesture is the one always emphasised by Foucault. John et al. illegitimate. Without this right. References Bennington. . but for that you need a law. (Derrida 2000. But this does not constitute a rejection or refutation of his position. but rather as its doorkeeper.). It is not premised on a species of psychoanalytic hospitality. liable to expulsion or arrest. On the other hand. 4. the difference is straightforward. as a parasite. Oxford Literary Review. Cambridge University Press. to welcome the other (to “give something determinate”—such as protection. reception. perhaps paradoxically. (eds) (1991) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 3 The Correspondence. it is rather. “before the door” of Chez Freud. Borradori. 1. “this door was made only for you”(Kafka). etc. rights. as the use of English colloquial expression connotes. p. In other words there must be governance based on some cultural form of a power/knowledge nexus as such. Chicago University Press. Cambridge.no. And. though. Foucault is once again being “shown the door”. Freud “himself” (or rather his oeuvre) is not therefore cast as the manager of such an institution. The Derrida/Foucault rendez-vous had to be staged therefore. dear friend. factions.
London. Routledge. Derrida. Derrida. California. . Derrida.TO BE HOSPITABLE TO MADNESS 21 Cottingham. vol. New York. Routledge. Duquesne. London. Patrick Mensah. Pittsburgh. London. Jacques (1998b) Monolingualism of the Other: or. Stanford University Press. Derrida. Standard Edition. Foucault. Derrida. Pascale-Anne Brault. John (1993) A Descartes Dictionary. Gil Anidjar. Michel (1961) Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. pp. Jacques (2002) Acts of Religion. trans. Chicago. Blackwell. Routledge. Berkeley. abridged trans. Stanford University Press. ed. trans. Derrida. California. Derrida. Routledge. Michel (1962) Maladie mentale et psychologie. Chicago University Press. Jacques (1998a) Resistances of Psychoanalysis.no. Jacques (1978) Writing and Difference. Oxford Literary Review. Stanford University Press. Rachel Bowlby. Derrida. Alan Bass. Geoffrey Bennington. The Prosthesis of Origin. trans. Jacques (2000) Of Hospitality. ed. This Fire’. Mark Dooley & Michael Hughes. trans. eds Richard Kearney & Mark Dooley. Derrida. London. 1. Routledge. Random House. Parispresses. trans. 4. trans. PascaleAnne Brault & Michael Naas. R. Sigmund (1974) Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The Hague. Jacques (2001b) Of Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ in Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. ed. Foucault. Sheridan (1987) as Mental Illness and Psycholog. Emmanuel (1981) Otherwise Than Being. Hogarth Press. 9–28. A. Plon. Howard (1965) Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Jacques (2001a) The Work of Mourning. California. Freud. trans. London. Alphonso Lingis. Emmanuel (1969) Totality and Infinity. Jacques (1992) Acts of Literature. Levinas. Levinas. Or Beyond Essence. Paris. trans. Michel (1979) ‘My Body This Paper. Jacques (1999) ‘Hospitality. trans. Martinus Nijhoff. Foucault. Derek Attridge. Alphonso Lingis. Vol. London. XVIII. Peggy Kamuf. University of California Press. London. Univeristaires de France.
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