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East European Politics and Societies 2009 Go Biowska 371 91

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East European Politics & Societies http://eep.sagepub.

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Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland
Ewa Golebiowska East European Politics and Societies 2009 23: 371 DOI: 10.1177/0888325409333191 The online version of this article can be found at: http://eep.sagepub.com/content/23/3/371

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Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland
Ewa Gołębiowska
Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan

East European Politics and Societies Volume 23 Number 3 Summer 2009 371-391 © 2009 SAGE Publications 10.1177/0888325409333191 http://eeps.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

Since its democratic revolution was set in motion, Poland has enjoyed tremendous progress in its degree of democratic consolidation. For example, significant institutional changes have taken place in the status of Poland’s ethnic, national, and religious minorities. Yet, institutional protections alone do not fully capture the extent of openness to diversity. More comprehensive depictions of the quality of democracy need to encompass investigations of the democratic citizens’ “hearts and minds.” In this article, using data from a recent nationally representative survey, the author examines the extent and sources of Poles’ tolerance of ethnic and religious difference. She focuses on social tolerance of difference, using questions about acceptance of interethnic and interreligious marriage as the dependent variables. As part of the inquiry, the author compares and contrasts the levels and sources of tolerance of interreligious marriage over time and discusses the political implications of the findings and future research directions. Keywords: ethnic tolerance; religious tolerance; Poland, interethnic marriage; interreligious marriage

n the almost twenty years since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet bloc, institutional seeds of liberal democracy have taken strong root in several Eastern European countries.1 Eastern European countries, including Poland, that have recently completed their accession to the European Union have enjoyed tremendous progress in their transition to democracy as well as in the degree of their democratic consolidation. By one measure, “the extent of rights and liberties in the new EU member countries reached the level enjoyed by stable Western democracies shortly after the transition.”2 In part because of the pressure from the European Union, the institutional guarantees of important democratic rights and liberties have been explicitly extended to those countries’ ethnic, national, and religious minorities.3 Yet in countries that have relatively recently emerged from communist rule, the practice of respect for minority rights may not be well entrenched even in the presence of legal instruments that protect those rights and liberties because socialization agents have not had enough time to internalize widespread respect for minority rights. Poland is a good case in point. Since the downfall of communism, significant institutional changes have taken place in Poland in the status of minority groups.4

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I compare and contrast the levels and sources of Downloaded from eep. and religious difference are especially rare. 2012 . the country’s dominant religion.sagepub.com by Aras Roxana on October 9.372 East European Politics and Societies For example. minority religions are placed on the same legal footing as Catholicism. religious minorities have gained many legal protections since the beginning of Poland’s transition to democracy. I set out to examine the extent and sources of Poles’ tolerance of ethnic and religious difference.5 An important law concerning national and ethnic minorities in addition was codified in Poland in 2005. Ascertaining the contours of attitudes toward ethnic. parallel investigations of the democratic citizens’ “hearts and minds. Poland’s 1997 Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for separation of the church and state.7 It is important. Because Poland’s pre. national. Because ethnicity and nationality on one hand and religious affiliation on the other are significantly correlated. Thus. I focus on social tolerance of ethnic and religious difference. finally. institutional protections alone do not fully convey the extent of openness to diversity. As part of this inquiry. in addition. giving ethnic and national minorities recognized by law the right to preserve their culture. and religious difference is important. to investigate attitudes toward ethnic and religious groups because widespread feelings of antipathy for minority groups.” Such investigations are imperative because laws can best protect minority groups only when majorities are aware of legal protections afforded minority groups and personally make a choice to respect those protections in their attitudes and behaviors. More comprehensive depictions of the quality of democracy in a particular country need to encompass.9 Well-specified. and religious minorities—whether residing in Poland or in the greater European Union community.and postwar history is punctuated with intergroup conflict and laws are relatively easier to change than long-standing attitudes. even in ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries like Poland. national. using data from a 2006 nationally representative survey of Poles.6 While institutional guarantees of important rights and liberties to minority groups are defining characteristics of liberal democracies. Poland has “ratified several international human rights documents that provide minimum standards for minority protection. multivariate scholarly analyses shedding light on the sources of ethnic Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic. because public opinion “sets the parameters of acceptable public policy” in democratic systems of government.10 In this article. may have important implications for electoral campaigns and thus different groups’ access to political power. I elaborate on this latter point in the concluding section. in addition. national.8 it could be expected that acceptance of minority groups in Polish public opinion has lagged behind recent democratic changes in Poland’s legal infrastructure. using questions about acceptance of interethnic and interreligious marriage as my dependent variables. Like their ethnic and national counterparts. customs.” including bilateral treaties with its neighbors. Yet we know relatively little from previous empirical research about the extent to which Poles are willing to afford equal treatment to ethnic. In addition. and language. many of the rights afforded the former have been automatically bestowed on the latter.

in addition.11 In addition. this exploration of tolerance is also only suggestive with regard to what drives Polish tolerance all else being equal because the empirical portion of the work is limited to bivariate cross-tabulations. national. finally.or son-in-law. I from now on refer to “ethnic” minorities when writing either about national or ethnic minorities. Jakubowska-Branicka and her collaborators have tackled the theoretical and empirical problems of tolerance broadly conceived.S. emerged as a separate dimension in my earlier analysis. Downloaded from eep.sagepub. While many scholars writing on the subject of minorities distinguish between ethnic and national minorities. In one of the more comprehensive and multi-faceted analyses to date. place my research in the context of extant scholarship on attitudes toward ethnic. 2012 . In an exception to this generalization. they have not established their relative importance because published empirical work to date has consisted of only bivariate and (occasionally) trivariate analyses. Orthodox Christians.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 373 tolerance of interreligious marriage over time.15 Systematic empirical evidence concerning Poles’ attitudes toward other ethnic and religious groups has been more meager. for ease of exposition. an overwhelming majority of Poles endorse the general concepts of religious and ethnic freedoms while at the same time expressing support for a privileged position for Catholicism or refusing to allow Poland’s ethnic minorities to use their language in public places.13 Social scientists studying Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference have been particularly interested in the nature and sources of Polish anti-Semitism.-based research. In research that serves as the immediate point of departure for this article. Muslims. these analyses show that large numbers of Poles endorse tolerance as a general. In keeping with U. Tolerance of non-Catholic in-laws.12 with much writing involving historical and largely descriptive sociological analyses. abstract notion while at the same time responding intolerantly in concrete situations. and Protestants. and discuss the political implications of my findings and future research directions. Previous Research Many students of the attitudinal component of democratization in the post-communist countries have focused on general support for democracy or support for abstract democratic rights. and religious difference in Poland. I demonstrated that Poles as a group appear highly tolerant of Jews.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. I explored religious tolerance of (some of) Poland’s religious minorities. I showed that the levels of Polish tolerance were low on questions about interreligious marriage involving respondents’ daughter.14 While Polish scholars’ explorations of anti-Semitic attitudes have pointed to a number of correlates of anti-Semitism.16 For example.18 Employing several measures of social distance as my dependent variable. scholarly interest in ethnic and religious minorities in Poland has virtually exploded in post-communist Poland.17 Like research on anti-Semitism.

Czech. Muslim.20 Respondents were asked about their reaction to this possibility with regard to six ethnic (Chinese. More information about CBOS and the methods it uses to conduct surveys is available at www.sagepub. The survey.19 some that belong to the broader European Union community (French and Czechs). I further explore Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference and their sources. and Russian Orthodox) groups. Respondents expressing more moderate levels of opposition or approval to their child’s intermarriage (or marriage to a Catholic) were able to pick from one of two middle responses: Downloaded from eep. French. Muslims. and a group with which few Poles can be expected to have had much direct contact to date (Chinese). Note that the question about a Jewish in-law was asked twice: first in the group of questions asking about marriage to a member of a particular nationality and second in the group of questions asking about marriage to a member of a particular religion. All questions were scored on a 1 to 4 scale anchored with 1 (yes) at one end and 4 (no) at the other. and Jews) as well as atheists. I only examined social distance responses toward some of Poland’s religious minorities. My analysis of ethnic tolerance focuses on groups with a relatively significant presence in Poland (Russians. Germans. based on in-person interviews. I focus here on attitudes toward interreligious marriage. Because no questions measuring attitudes toward ethnic minorities were available in the survey at my disposal. They were in addition asked about their willingness to accept their child’s marriage to an atheist. and Jewish) and five religious (Catholic. German. Evangelical. finally. an aspect of social distance that proved most controversial in my earlier analysis. Orthodox Christians. allow me to compare and contrast Poles’ attitudes toward Jews described as an ethnic group with their views toward Jews qua a religious group. Data and Measures I use data from a nationally representative survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion (CBOS) in Warsaw. The data I describe in more detail below.cbos. Poland. Jewish.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. and Jews). drawing on a more recent data set that includes explicit indicators of both religious and ethnic tolerance. and juxtapose those with attitudes toward interethnic marriage. I did not directly compare and contrast the extent and sources of religious and ethnic tolerance (albeit I argued that my findings indirectly illuminated Poles’ tolerance of ethnic minorities because religious affiliation and ethnic group membership tend to be strongly correlated in Poland). 2012 .374 East European Politics and Societies In my previous research on tolerance in Poland.pl. The questions that serve as measures of my dependent and independent variables were included in an omnibus survey on sociopolitical topics. My dependent variables are based on a series of social distance questions asking respondents whether they would oppose their daughter’s or son’s decision to marry a member of a particular ethnic or religious group. Russian. In this article. was conducted in September 2006 (N = 937). My analysis of religious tolerance zeros in on several of Poland’s religious minorities (Evangelicals.

5 284 25.2 151 22.7 23.3 180 13.2 47.3 451 44.0 103 12.0 410 34. A Simple Portrait of Poles’ Willingness to Welcome a Minority Group Member into Their Family A good place to begin my empirical exploration of Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference is to describe Poles’ willingness to accept a member of an ethnic or Downloaded from eep.8 474 48.4 190 17.7 128 19.3 394 29.3 26.0 307 38. of all predictors is included in the appendix.9 251 26.6 726 42.9 55 19. The CBOS survey I rely on in this article also included a number of questions I use to measure my predictors.5 209 27.1 224 2.3 37.0 20.6 248 15.8 380 8. 2012 .8 324 30.3 115 13.1 113 20.5 5.0 177 23.4 490 50.2 20.9 38.2 272 33.0 243 25.0 205 77.7 100 11.5 191 43.0 94 12.3 357 40.1 2 (likely yes) or 3 (likely no).6 24 12.1 486 52.2 235 24.9 12 16.5 219 22.6 99 10.1 55.4 162 13. where more appropriate.8 259 26. The wording or a description.7 128 10.1 122 13.1 234 20.7 146 19.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 375 Table 1 Poles’ Tolerance of Ethnic and Religious Difference Yes Would you be opposed to a son or daughter marrying a member of the following nationalities? Chinese % n Czech % n French % n German % n Russian % n Jewish % n Would you be opposed to a son or daughter marrying a member of the following religions? Catholic % n Evangelical % n Muslim % n Jewish % n Orthodox % n Atheist % n Likely Yes Likely No No All “Yes” 20.5 31.com by Aras Roxana on October 9.6 89 10.0 177 34.0 121 14.3 189 9.0 131 26.sagepub.5 406 52.6 35.

and this observation pertains to attitudes toward all religious groups included in both surveys (Jews. German. Poles are less comfortable with the idea of their children marrying an ethnically Jewish or Chinese individual and more comfortable with a possibility of their children marrying a Czech. The data in Table 1 contain the relevant information.1 percent and 48. that they minded it).com by Aras Roxana on October 9. with the last column reporting the total percentage of respondents inclined to oppose the intermarriage. As a baseline for assessing the extent of Poles’ tolerance of religious difference. Second. Whether or not this over time disparity reflects a meaningful change in underlying attitudes is not clear because of associated changes in question wording and the cross-sectional nature of the data at my disposal. indicated they would mind it if their daughter or son married a Muslim or a Jew. In the 2001 survey. I would speculate that the change may be meaningful. Levels of opposition to intermarriage with other religious minorities are also substantial. I also inspect reactions to a possibility of respondents’ child marrying a Catholic. a member of the dominant religious group in Poland.sagepub.22 the extent of tolerance varies with the group to be tolerated. 36. 2012 . In the 2006 survey. or an atheist in-law. and Protestants—or Evangelicals in the 2004 survey). the data I have so far summarized also point to a good deal of variation in attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference. an apparent rise in intolerance I detect in my data is consistent with Krzemiński’s over time analysis of an upsurge in modern anti-Semitism in Poland. as in the earlier survey. as in my previous research.0 percent. not lower tolerance in 2006.0 percent and 34. opposition to an atheist child-in-law in this deeply Catholic country is lower than opposition to either a Jewish or a Muslim in-law. For at least two reasons. I describe my Downloaded from eep. and almost 50 percent are opposed to their child’s marriage to a religiously Jewish person. Second. respectively. First. are lower in the 2006 survey than in the 2001 survey I had scrutinized in my previous article. Orthodox. Interestingly. if nothing other than the wording of the questions changed. an Evangelical.0 percent of respondents. While my exploration of Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference reveals a good deal of intolerance. the questions asked in the 2006 survey arguably made it harder for respondents to express intolerance because they required them to indicate more fervently that they were against interreligious marriage (respondents had to indicate that they opposed intermarriage rather than.376 East European Politics and Societies religious minority into their family. we would expect greater.23 Poles express the most opposition to their child marrying a Muslim. Also consistent with my previous writing on the subject. with about one-third of respondents expressing discomfort about an Orthodox. even in the case of the least popular groups. The levels of tolerance for interreligious marriage. First. overall levels of ethnic tolerance are higher than those of religious tolerance. French. finally. respectively. the corresponding numbers are 55. This raises a question of what predicts more or less favorable attitudes toward interethnic and interreligious marriage in Poland. for example. Following the lead of previous research on tolerance in and outside of Poland. Put differently. Muslims. or Russian.21 Several patterns are evident in Table 1.

for example.”27 Thus. Expectations Previous research suggests that how enthusiastic or tepid Poles feel about ethnic or religious difference in their family might depend on their political and psychological predispositions. 2012 . Elite attempts to mold Polish appreciation of ethnic and religious diversity have.26 Poland’s political elites have taken the lead in reshaping Poland’s reputation as a hotbed of intolerance and anti-Semitism. included an establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Israel and formal proclamations by the former twin Polish heads of state and government (the Kaczyński brothers) that “there is no room for anti-Semitism in Poland.25 I expect that Poles who self-locate on or closer to the left end of the ideological self-identification scale will express more tolerance of ethnic and religious difference than Poles who place themselves on the right or closer to the right end of that scale. Psychological Predispositions While attention to psychological influences on tolerance of ethnic and religious difference has been relatively sparse in previous research focusing on Poland.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 377 expectations in the next section and empirical tests of these expectations in the subsequent two sections of the article.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. I expect. The notion of predispositions or antecedent considerations refers to relatively enduring.24 I include two political predispositions in my analysis: ideological self-identification and general interest in politics as a measure of exposure to Poland’s normative environment.28 research on political tolerance in the United States demonstrates that psychological Downloaded from eep. assessments of their own and the country’s well-being. attitudinal prisms through which an individual may respond to information in the political environment. Political Predispositions Much previous research on tolerance suggests that various political predispositions may influence Poles’ responses to diversity. In line with previous research. and their sociodemographic attributes. individuals with a greater interest in politics should be more aware of the tolerance norm promulgated by the Polish elites and should as a result exhibit more charitable views toward interethnic and interreligious marriage than individuals for whom politics is of more marginal or no importance. long-term.sagepub. Willingness to embrace ethnic or religious diversity might also move as a result of exposure to the normative environment currently dominant in Poland. As elites in the United States set changes in racial norms in motion in the wake of the civil rights revolution.

29 In this article. First. Finally. For reasons that have nothing to do with prejudice or intolerance.33 In my analysis. pointing to the importance of economic and political distress in understanding the sources of hostility toward out-groups. I anticipate individual differences in ethnic and religious tolerance as a function of ethnic prejudice. economic. is in fact the most wellknown theoretical explanation concerning the roots of anti-Semitism. I hypothesize that faith in people will be linked with Poles’ ethnic and religious tolerance. some individuals might prefer that their spouse share their nationality or religious faith. In psychological terms. such people might be said to display a form of in-group favoritism bias rather than prejudice. and workplace situation. Second. with respondents having greater faith in people expressing more tolerance of ethnic and religious difference than respondents with less faith in people. I examine a possible connection between egocentric (assessments of respondents’ own finances) and sociotropic (the extent to which people are happy or unhappy with the performance of the country as a whole) assessments on one hand and ethnic and religious tolerance on the other.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. its empirical tests have produced mixed results. Assessments of Respondents’ Own and the Country’s Well-being While tolerance judgments can be expected to vary as a function of longstanding factors—whether political or psychological—willingness to tolerate ethnic and religious difference may also be affected by more fleeting sociopolitical assessments. 2012 . I assess the potential role of a general preference people might have with regard to their ideal spouse in their reactions to a possibility of an in-law from a different ethnic or religious group.30 I consider here the potential impact of three variables: individual assessments of their own finances. I anticipate a positive relationship between sociopolitical assessments and tolerance. Individual assessments of their own finances as well as the country’s economic and political situation have been linked with anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland.32 While this theory has a lot of intuitive appeal. I expect that people who do not care that their spouse share a similar nationality and/or religion will be more accepting of interethnic and interreligious marriage than people who have a principled preference for a spouse of a similar nationality and/or religion. to elaborate. individual assessments of Poland’s political. I inspect three psychological variables I hypothesize should be linked with ethnic and religious tolerance in Poland. with respondents evaluating non-Polish ethnic groups more positively also more willing to support interethnic or interreligious marriage within their family.sagepub. and individual assessments of the performance of incumbent officeholders.31 The scapegoat theory. Downloaded from eep. with respondents more satisfied with their own finances and/or the country’s situation also more charitable in their views toward ethnic and religious diversity than respondents with a more grim view of the state of their own finances and/or the country’s well-being.378 East European Politics and Societies variables (including personality traits and predispositions) constitute particularly important sources of political tolerance.

with whites living in areas with a greater proportion of African Americans displaying less favorable racial attitudes than whites living in areas with a smaller presence of African Americans. How well educated. political. I compare Downloaded from eep. points to the importance of sociodemographic predictors in understanding the sources of more or less favorable intergroup attitudes. I expect childless Poles. where they live. and less religious Poles to be more accepting of interethnic and interreligious marriage than their less well-educated. or religious people are.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 379 Previous research on Poles’ commitment to the rights of political dissenters. I investigate a possible nexus between ethnic and religious proximity and individual contact with a foreigner working in Poland on one hand and ethnic and religious tolerance on the other. with individuals critical of highly visible officeholders scoffing at the idea that [minority] groups are entitled to the same democratic rights and freedoms as anyone else.38 I expect urban residents and nonfarmers to be more accepting of a religiously or ethnically different in-law than rural residents and farmers. Whether a person lives in a rural or urban area and draws income from farm employment may also be significantly linked with tolerance.36 I expect more well-educated. to be more accepting of interethnic and interreligious marriage than Poles with children and/or those with school-aged children. Finally. and religious diversity. older. and whether they are men or women may mold their reactions to social. younger. suggests that assessments of the performance of incumbent officeholders may be linked with general tolerance of political dissent. with men more tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity. and more religious counterparts. In short.sagepub. I in addition compare and contrast the views of respondents with children or those with children of school age on one hand and those without children or without school-aged children.37 I expect a significant link between respondents’ sex and their ethnic and religious tolerance. Previous research on race identifies racial proximity as an important contextual influence on American whites’ racial attitudes. In keeping with the bulk of previous research. presumably younger children that is. I anticipate that “unhappiness about the work of incumbent officeholders might spill over to support for the rights of political dissenters. 2012 . In keeping with that research.”35 Sociodemographic and Other Variables Previous scholarship on intergroup attitudes. and especially those without school-aged children.34 finally. Poles with children or those who plan to have them in the future should be more threatened by the prospect of an ethnically or religiously different inlaw than those who do not have children or do not plan to have them in the future. based on previous research on religious tolerance in Poland.39 In my analysis of Poles’ ethnic and religious tolerance. Given the focus of my dependent variables on respondents’ children or future children. finally. In addition. Even more notably. Poles who have children in school.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. old. should be even more threatened by interethnic or interreligious marriage than those who have older children.

2012 .26*** Religious Tolerance Scale r .05 .07 –. religious proximity will be correlated with more positive attitudes toward interethnic and interreligious marriage.18 .) *p < .20*** .06 .36 .46 .380 East European Politics and Societies Table 2 The Sources of Poles’ Tolerance of Ethnic and Religious Difference: Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis Ethnic Tolerance Scale Predictor Political predispositions Ideological self-identification Interest in politics Psychological predispositions Principled spouse preference Faith in people Ethnic prejudice Assessments of respondents’ own and the country’s well-being Perceived finances Sociotropic beliefs Approval of government Sociodemographic and other variables Education Age Religiosity Sex Size of town or city Farm employment Having a child Having a child in school Ethnic and religious proximity Contact with foreigners R2 Adjusted R2 F (sig.40 I expect that Poles who have met a foreigner living in Poland will be more accepting of ethnic and/or religious diversity than Poles who do not know any foreigners living in Poland. **p < .31 .12 –.000) 9..25 .63 1.06 .36 .14*** .16*** .06 –.46 –.com by Aras Roxana on October 9.33 (.39 –.12*** .08 .29*** .38 .26 .31 –.09* .20 .52 .29*** B .03 .78 .01 –. Downloaded from eep.09* –. I expect that lesser ethnic and.29 .11 .03 .08** –.18*** .02 –.10** .24 .07** .12 .15 (.52 .31*** B .000) and contrast attitudes of Poles who live in regions (“voivodeships”) inhabited by a greater number of ethnic and religious minorities to those who live in regions that are most ethnically or religiously homogeneous (i.26 .23 .23*** .17*** .26*** . by implication.02 .14 .sagepub.17 .07** .07** .08** .02 .76 .34 .15 .12 .67 –.05.58 .09 .02 .58 .05 –. Consistent with much research on intergroup contact.08** .19 .47 .01 .14*** .10* .49 .22 –.51 .73 .76 .27 .03 . Polish and Catholic).11*** .07 .53 .02 .10** .30 .10.04 β .93 .25*** .77 .01.14 SE . ***p < .05 .11** .20 SE .99 –.12** .31*** .59 .11 .15*** .04 –.74 –.05 .03 .02 .02 .04 –.20 .17*** –.004 .23 .29 .02 –.02 .14 .14 .12 –. r .08 –.06 .01 .12*** .27 .48*** .22 .19 6.83 –.03 β .15*** .03 .05 –.39*** .35 .05 .19 .004 .02 –.e.01 .09** .08** .11*** .69 –.16 .11** .03 .29*** .03 .10*** .75 .

residents of more urban areas. with a stronger preference for an ethnically and/or religiously similar spouse. those who feel negatively about their finances. Poles that have come across foreigners working in Poland. and more religious counterparts as well as Poles who live in more rural areas and those with farm employment. All predictors are coded (recoded where necessary) with an expectation of a positive correlation with both ethnic and religious tolerance. A few variables are linked only with approval of interreligious marriage or only with approval of interethnic marriage. and lower in ethnic prejudice are more accepting of ethnic and religious intermarriage than Poles with less faith in people. and those who self-locate on the right end of the Polish political spectrum.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 381 What Types of Poles Are More Likely to Accept Ethnic and Religious Difference in Their Family? Bivariate Analysis In this section. The direction of all relationships. and approval of incumbent officeholders are significantly linked with religious tolerance only. Men. the bivariate correlations are supportive of the hypotheses I delineated above. The two columns labeled with an r heading under ethnic and religious tolerance in Table 2 report the bivariate coefficients. save for the link between approval of incumbent officeholders and tolerance of interreligious marriage. with respondents more interested in politics more tolerant of both ethnic and religious difference than those with less or no interest in politics. I start my empirical examination of the sources of Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference. is in keeping with my expectations. parental status. and those who self-locate on the left end of the Polish political spectrum are more accepting of interreligious marriage than are women. finally. the less religious. is significantly correlated with both ethnic and religious tolerance. and higher in ethnic prejudice. are more tolerant of both ethnic and religious intermarriage than Poles who do not know any foreigners working in Poland. assessments of their own financial situation. my proxy for exposure to elite norms. the younger. childless respondents. sex. Respondents’ ideological self-placement.42 those more critical of incumbent officeholders are more tolerant of Downloaded from eep. older.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. and those without farm employment are more accepting of ethnic and religious difference than their poorly educated. I combine the indicators of ethnic tolerance into an additive ethnic tolerance scale and those of religious tolerance into a religious tolerance scale. The well-educated. I use bivariate correlation analysis to identify those more or less tolerant of interethnic or interreligious marriage involving their child. Counter to expectations but consistent with my earlier research. Interest in politics. All three psychological variables are linked with ethnic and religious tolerance in the expected direction—respondents with more faith in people. 2012 .41 Both scales are coded such that a lower score indicates lower tolerance (or greater opposition to intermarriage). With a handful of exceptions. To this end. those who feel more positively about their finances.sagepub. respondents with children. with a weaker preference for an ethnically and/or religiously similar spouse.

Sociotropic beliefs are linked only with ethnic tolerance.sagepub. Because at least some of the bivariate predictors are correlated with each other (e. whereas a handful matter only in predicting tolerance of ethnic difference or tolerance of religious difference. standard model fit indicators (R2 and adjusted R2) suggest that tolerance of religious difference is accounted for better than tolerance of ethnic difference. Religiosity and government approval. More surprisingly. this analysis cannot establish conclusively which predictors are more causally important in understanding the sources of ethnic and religious tolerance. in the model of ethnic tolerance. Who Is More or Less Likely to Accept Ethnic and Religious Difference in Their Family? Multivariate Analysis The bivariate correlation analysis I discuss in the preceding section effectively differentiates between respondents who are or more less willing to accept interethnic or interreligious marriage involving their son or daughter. 2012 . for ethnic and religious tolerance.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. in contrast.g. less prejudice directed at non-Polish ethnic groups. less religious respondents and those who are more critical of government performance are more likely to embrace a religiously different in-law into their family. In keeping with the bivariate results. and more positive sociotropic assessments are associated with higher acceptance of both interethnic and interreligious marriage. Greater faith in people. In this section. Respondents without school-aged children are more likely to accept both interethnic and interreligious marriage (though only marginally in the former case). First. SE. economic. A number of conclusions are in order based on data reported in Table 2.382 East European Politics and Societies interreligious marriage than those more approving of the performance of Polish incumbents. most of the predictors are important in both models of tolerance. and workplace situation also more enthusiastic about interethnic marriage involving their son or daughter. and β in Table 2 correspond to unstandardized regression coefficients. I report the results of two multivariate regression analyses with ethnic and religious tolerance scales as the dependent variables and all the variables I included in the bivariate analysis as predictors. on the other hand. It becomes significant. and standardized regression coefficients. Higher levels of education are marginally important in predicting higher levels of both ethnic and religious tolerance. The significant effect of perceived finances in the model of religious tolerance washes out in the multivariate analysis.. The columns labeled B. the direction of the effect of perceived finances is inconsistent with my expectations and the weight of previous Downloaded from eep. Counter to my hypotheses. there is no significant bivariate relationship between ethnic and religious proximity and having a school-aged child on one hand and ethnic and religious tolerance on the other. finally. rural residence and farm employment). predict religious tolerance only. therefore. respectively. standard errors. weaker preference for having a spouse of the same nationality or religion. with respondents more positive about Poland’s political. Second.

the regression results in Table 2 point to a hierarchy of effects. is vying for second place with ethnic prejudice in the model of religious tolerance. Ethnic prejudice is the second best predictor of both types of tolerance. Those attitudes are also linked with Poles’ faith in people.44 In that research. ascribing greater importance to a spouse’s similarity in nationality or religion is the best predictor of ethnic and religious tolerance. the impact of education is only marginally significant.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 383 research because respondents with more positive assessments of their personal finances are less inclined to indicate they would be happy with a non–ethnically Polish sonor daughter-in-law. The demographics. emphasized in much previous research as the sources of tolerance broadly conceived. Orthodox Christians. Most surprisingly. The size of the effect of different predictors is largely comparable across the two models of tolerance. and. Conclusions. in the case of religious tolerance only. using several different measures of social distance toward Jews. Muslims. Approval of government. their approval of incumbent officeholders.43 Third. in addition.45 I more directly established that Poles’ openness to ethnic and religious difference should be scrutinized separately. competing for first place with the measure of principled beliefs about one’s spouse’s attributes in the model of ethnic tolerance. and that correlates of ethnic and religious tolerance partially overlap and are in part distinct. judging from the size of the respective unstandardized regression coefficients with one possible exception: the impact of faith in people is somewhat stronger in the ethnic than in the religious tolerance model.46 make a relatively poor showing in my analysis once controls for other variables are included in the model.sagepub. I investigated the levels and sources of religious tolerance in Poland but could only speculate about the extent and underpinnings of Poles’ ethnic tolerance. the impact of respondents’ age on both types of tolerance washes out in the presence of controls. and Protestants. with some predictors more influential than others. that the levels of religious intolerance seem to have risen over time.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. their sociotropic beliefs about the country’s economy. and the Downloaded from eep. judging from the size of standardized regression coefficients. Within both models of tolerance. Going beyond my earlier research. that Poles are more resistant to interreligious than interethnic marriage involving their son or daughter. The multivariate analysis I performed to establish what variables are more causally important in understanding the sources of Poles’ attitudes toward ethnic and religious difference demonstrates that their attitudes are to a large extent shaped by their principled beliefs about their spouse’s attributes and (especially in the case of interethnic marriage) their ethnic prejudice. and Discussion My goal in this article was to follow up on my earlier research on religious tolerance in Poland and in part to extend its analysis to ethnic tolerance. and workplace. Summary. 2012 . politics.

on the nationalist. While I could not test this possibility directly with the 2006 CBOS data I use in this article. In fact. in Poland. With this caveat in mind. it is unclear what to make of this finding because responses to questions measuring such beliefs were asked in the survey immediately after questions about intermarriage. then it would make sense that those more critical of the government (and thus lower in authoritarianism) should be more comfortable with ethnic and religious difference.47 I expected that people unhappy with the performance of incumbent officeholders. 2012 . ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Downloaded from eep. This is a question I plan to tackle in future research.” but at the same time their linkages (especially those of former Prime Minister Kaczyński) with the far right in Polish politics and anti-Semitic rhetoric (e.49 Thus. On one hand. including anti-Semitism.48 Their reactions to high-level incumbent officeholders associated with particular ideological stances. in keeping with the psychological notion of projection. would take out their frustrations with the government on ethnically and religiously different groups. Another possibility is that the government approval measure may actually be a better measure of my respondents’ ideological proclivities than the ideological self-identification measure I also control for in my model. One reason for this unexpected finding might be that my measure of government approval is actually tapping respondents’ authoritarianism. The only other influence on both types of tolerance that is worth mentioning is whether or not respondents happen to have a school-aged child. If this should be the case. may be better reflections of individual ideology than their self-identifications. While principled beliefs about spousal attributes emerge as the most important influence on both ethnic and religious tolerance.. This is a troubling finding and one that in turn raises a question about what makes some Poles more and others less comfortable with ethnic and/or religious difference in general. a more interesting and critical finding is that ethnic prejudice is the second most important correlate of acceptance of ethnic and religious difference. One surprising relationship I have replicated in this article concerns the effect of government approval on tolerance of interreligious marriage. approvers of government performance in the 2006 CBOS survey I use in this article may have been aware of the oftentimes mixed messages President Lech Kaczyński and his twin brother former Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński were communicating with regard to religious tolerance.384 East European Politics and Societies link between religiosity and tolerance of interreligious marriages is greatly attenuated. those more critical of incumbent officeholders were more supportive of interreligious marriage than those more satisfied with regime performance. consistency pressures may have induced respondents to bring their reports of principled beliefs in line with their answers to questions about interethnic and interreligious marriage.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. their ideological self-identifications do not necessarily correspond to a sophisticated understanding of the meaning behind the ideological labels.g. approval of incumbent officeholders and authoritarianism are completely unrelated in another recent CBOS survey (data available on request). Thus.sagepub. both the president and the then–prime minister were formally touting the principle of tolerance and “anti-anti-Semitism. If Poles resemble Americans in this regard. on the other hand.

Future studies of the etiology of Poles’ ethnic and religious tolerance should also include other predictors of tolerance that were unavailable in the data set I used in this article (e. reports that the link between prejudice and political tolerance is at best anemic and urges more scholarly attention to investigating the relationship between prejudice and intolerance. ethnic. and political tolerance and tolerance of homosexuality. the analysis I discuss in this article was also limited by the available measures. The research findings I summarize in this article raise many more questions than could be addressed with the secondary data on which I drew.51 a possibility remains that a culture of social intolerance focused on one target may fuel greater political intolerance directed at other target(s).Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 385 Maryja) were well known. Previous research investigating the linkages between social tolerance and prejudice on one hand and political tolerance on the other offers equivocal support for the notion that the different forms of tolerance are coupled. the fact that the constitutional principles that can be perceived as legitimately applying to the latter type of tolerance need not be seen as relevant to the former type of tolerance judgments).com by Aras Roxana on October 9.g. Some previous research in fact reports significant linkages between racial.52 Downloaded from eep. where appropriate.sagepub. for example. 2012 . Future research on attitudinal correlates of institutional tolerance in post-communist countries like Poland should also carefully investigate the political implications of ethnic and religious (in)tolerance. While there are good reasons not to expect a significant overlap between social and political tolerance of the same targets (e. stereotypic beliefs about ethnic and religious minorities. social intolerance.50 I suspect one reason why prejudice and intolerance do not significantly overlap in Gibson’s and other such analyses is because he focuses on the link involving the same targets. the measures of attitudes toward interethnic and interreligious marriage did not clearly indicate whether they were tapping attitudes toward the specified ethnic and religious minorities in general or. Most importantly. and measures of respondents’ psychological security and other psychological predispositions and personality characteristics).g. is important to examine because it may influence political intolerance judgments as well. There are at least two important reasons why studying ethnic and religious (in) tolerance in post-communist democracies is important. The question of Poles’ tolerance of the Polish ethnic and religious minorities is important to address in future research... It is possible that ethnic and religious (in)tolerance matter politically because ethnic and religious (in)tolerance may carry over to political tolerance judgments (or willingness to put up with political difference). it underscores the power of political elites in molding ordinary Poles’ responses to diversity. including ethnic and religious tolerance. While the findings I report significantly contribute to our understanding of the sources of ethnic and religious tolerance. attitudes toward the ethnic and religious minorities living in Poland. In short. I elaborate on this point more fully in the next paragraph. Whatever the reason for the independent role that government approval plays in understanding the sources of religious tolerance. Gibson. questions tapping perceptions of threat from different ethnic and religious minorities.

f. 2012 . Given high levels of animosity toward Jews and other ethnic and religious groups that emerge from Polish public opinion surveys and the fact that “Jewishness” and most other ethnic or religious group memberships in the Polish environment are concealable.386 East European Politics and Societies Social intolerance may also be politically consequential. the then–presidential candidate Kaczyński’s campaign made repeated attempts— whether wittingly or not—to unleash ethnic prejudice by raising questions about the ultimately unsuccessful candidate’s Donald Tusk’s ethnic background. negative intergroup sentiments are widespread. b. In the first semidemocratic presidential election. French.sagepub. The questions of how often and how the ethnic and religious card has been injected into campaign politics in post-communist Poland and how it may be affecting the dynamics of political competition and access to power in Poland deserve much more systematic attention.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. Chinese. Even where the normative environment prizes tolerance. Catholic. c. would you be opposed if your son or daughter wanted to marry a person of ____________ nationality: a. typically taking the form of allegations that one’s political opponent is Jewish.55 Anecdotal evidence alone of course does not capture the extent of the problem in Polish electoral campaigns. and asked to circle a number on the scale corresponding to their own ideological self-identification (continued) Downloaded from eep. Nonbeliever (atheist) II. and political elites choose to exploit such sentiments for electoral gain. Czech. Jewish. German. c. has been rearing its ugly head in Polish electoral campaigns since the first elections in which communists were ousted from power. anchored with 1 on the left. d. Appendix Wording and Description of the Dependent and Independent Variables I. when minority group memberships are not apparent with a naked eye. was Jewish. previous scholarship on racial communications in electoral campaigns in the United States demonstrates. b. 7 on the right. Russian. Measures of the Dependent Variables (all items were scored on a 4-point. d. with 2 to 6 in between. Evangelical.54 In the most recent Polish presidential election. f.53 political aspirants are able to inventively embed negative racial sentiments into their campaigns in an attempt to undermine their political opponents. Muslim. e. for example. even in ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries like Poland. *Ideological self-identification: Respondents presented with a “left” to “right” continuum. the then-candidate Lech Wałęsa was spreading rumors that his opponent. Measures of the Independent Variables 1. with many other candidates since playing the Jewish card in Polish electoral politics. e. it is then not surprising that the ethnic card. Tadeusz Mazowiecki. These are some of the questions that motivate the next step in my research on ethnic and religious tolerance in Poland. Orthodox. Jewish Would you be opposed if your son or daughter wanted to marry a person of _________ faith: a. yes to no scale): Regardless of whether you have children.

sagepub. anchored with very good on one end and very bad on the other. Town with between 100. Principled spouse preference: Please tell me regardless of what your marital status happens to be. Pretty low—I often miss even major events e. No (continued) Downloaded from eep. Neither good nor bad. b. Very high—I carefully pay attention to almost everything that happens in politics b. b. 2012 . c. French. would it be important to you that your spouse were similar in terms of: (both items were scored on a 4-point. c. typically once or twice a month. several times a year. Town of up to 19. Farm employment: Do you or any family members with whom you live work on a farm regardless of whether this employment is the main source of your/their income? a. High—I pretty carefully pay attention to what happens in politics c.000 and 49. economic. b. Town with between 20. Neither kind nor unkind. Village. Germans. Sejm. 6. 9. b.999 residents. Religion. b. Data available on request. Yes. President Kaczyński. Perceived finances: How would you describe your household’s economic well-being? a. Rather bad. Bad.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. Size of town or city: Recorded by the interviewer based on information provided in the sample: a. d. Factor and reliability analyses of the four items supported the decision to combine them into a scale. Nationality The above two items were combined into an additive scale 4. b. 8. e. and Jews on a 1 (dislike) to 7 (like) scales. a. Ethnic prejudice: An additive scale created by combining respondents’ evaluations of Chinese. c. Rather good. Good 7.999 residents. Religiosity: Do you participate in religious practices such as masses or religious meetings? a. *Approval of government: An additive scale created by combining respondents’ assessments of the performance of Prime Minister Kaczyński. I would describe it differently 3. Town with 500. 2 = female 13. Yes. once a week. *Interest in politics: How would you describe your interest in politics? I think my interest in politics is. Czechs. Factor and reliability analyses of the three items supported the decision to combine them into a scale. Factor and reliability analyses of the six items supported the decision to combine them into a scale. d.000 and 499. *Age: Actual age in years 11. d. and Senate. and workplace situations. e.000 or more residents 14. *Sociotropic beliefs: An additive scale created by combining respondents’ assessments of Poland’s political. yes to no scale) a.999 residents. on 1 to 5 scales. Unkind 5. e. Russians.999 residents. Kind.000 and 99. Yes. c. Yes. Education: A 9-point scale anchored with less than grade school and college 10. *Faith in people: Would you say that Poles are generally: a. Yes. typically several times a week. Average—I pay attention to major events only d. on 1 to 4 scales anchored with very good at one end and very bad on the other. *Sex: Interviewer recorded respondent’s sex: 1 = male. None—I am not really interested f. Town with between 50. f. Never 12.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 387 Appendix (continued) 2.

*Contact with foreigners: Do you know any foreigners working in Poland? a. Podlaskie. P. 2004).” in Diversity in Action: Local Public Management of Multi-ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe. L. Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. ed. and Wojakowski. Yes. ed. “Rzeczpospolita dziesięciu narodów. Paxton. Ochrona mniejszości narodowych—Standardy międzynarodowe i rozwiązania polskie (Wrocław. Agnieszka Malicka. I. Cf. Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie: Raport z badań (Warsaw. Czy Polacy są anty-semitami? (Warsaw. 10.” Journal of Politics 54:2 (1992): 329-71.pl. “Equality in Law. No 17. Notes 1.” Political Research Quarterly 51:1 (1998): 37-68. 37-73 (Poznań. “Religious Tolerance in Poland”. Hungary: LGI Books. Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz (New York: Random House. 2012 . b. Bondyra and S.” Political Behavior 29:1 (2007): 89-113. L. Gross. Poland (Princeton. L.388 East European Politics and Societies Appendix (continued) 15.. J. Z. Tolerancja i jej granice (Warsaw. “Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w procesie przemian. J. Tedin. Jakubowska-Branicka. Ibid. Ekiert. J. Warmińsko-Mazurskie 18. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne. Dziadul. “Equality in Law. 4. Syposz.polityka. M. “Putting up with Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledgling Russian Democracy. T.” 6. Gołębiowska. 3. 2001). “Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union.. Cf. Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Having a child: Do you have any children? a. and K. Pomorskie. Krzemiński. R. high school. M. Poland: Oficyna Naukowa. A. Gołębiowska.. Bajda. Gibson. Protection in Fact: Minority Law and Practice in Poland. I. and Wojakowski. I. Yes.” 11. Małopolskie. E. K. 8. A.” www. and M. 2006). ed. Bajda. S.sagepub. E. Śląskie. No 16. Duch. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. 41. M. Downloaded from eep. 2002). 2002).” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 16:4 (2004): 391-415. 205-39 (Budapest. 9. Syposz. Dolnośląskie. T. “Equality in Law.. Wojakowski. 10. “In Principle and in Practice: Learning Political Tolerance in Eastern and Western Europe. 1996). 7. Gross. J. No Note: Items that were reverse scored in all analyses are marked with an asterisk. Kovacs. Gołębiowska. Lisiecki. respondents residing in seven voivodeships with the largest concentration of Poland’s ethnic minority groups were coded as 1 and all others were coded as 0 The following voivodeships were coded as 1: Opolskie. 2004). 2002). Kurcz. Biro and P. b. Bajda.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. b. Prawa człowieka. or a vocational school? a. Yes. “Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest?” East European Politics and Societies 21:1 (2007): 7-30. J. A. Vachudova. Marquart-Pyatt and P. Krzemiński.g. G. Poland: Wydawnictwo Fundacjii Humaniora. Syposz.. Gibson.” 5. Having a child in school: Are there any children in your household who are between 7 and 19 and who attend a grade school. ed.” in Odmiany Polskich Tożsamości. NJ: Princeton University Press. Poland: Uniwersytet Warszawski Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych. Kubik. and D. Ethnic and religious proximity: Using a variable coding respondents’ voivodeship (or state). 2.

Odmiany Polskich tożsamości (Poznań. E. Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.g. “Poles and Their Attitudes toward Other Nations: On the Conditions of an Orientation towards Others. “Struktura i wyznaczniki postaw antysemickich. Lisiecki. Niemcy: Studia nad stosunkami społeczno-kulturowymi na Śląsku Opolskim (Kraków. Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce: Państwo i społeczeństwo polskie a mniejszości narodowe w okresach przełomów politycznych (1944-1989) (Warsaw. 27-64 (Warsaw. E. Mniejszości narodowe—Bogactwo czy problem? (Warsaw. Adamczuk and S. and the Norm of Equality (Princeton. 1998). A. Krzemiński.. Krzemiński. Polacy. Krzemiński. P. Ochrona mniejszości. 20. Poland: Wydawnictwo Fundacjii Humaniora. Waldron-Moore. The Race Card: Campaign Strategy.. Datner-Śpiewak. Berdychowska. ed.” Polish Sociological Review 3:192 (2002): 255-74. Poland: Oficyna Naukowa. NJ: Princeton University Press. Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle narodowego spisu powszechnego z 2002 roku (Warsaw. Gołębiowska. S. Poland: Wydawnictwo Cykłady. Poland: Uniwersytet Warszawski Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych. B. 2001): Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Czy Polacy są anty-semitami. 22. “Poles’ Commitment to the Rights of Political Dissenters. 2002). L. 171-200 (Warsaw. cf.. It is debatable how numerically significant the presence of these groups. Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie. P. Gołębiowska. H. I. 24. 2002). 2001). 13. A. 2001). Poland. 17. Krzemiński. H. 25. Marcus. Ethnic organizations. Bokszański. Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce: Praktyka po 1989 roku (Warsaw. 15. tożsamość narodowa i antysemitizm. 14. Madajczyk. “Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition: Evaluating Support for Democratic Institutions. L.g. 12. Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie. C. Łodzinski. I. Bondyra and S. Wood. L. ed.” Comparative Political Studies 32:1 (1999): 32-62. E. K. 1998). Jakubowska-Branicka. Gołębiowska. K. “Polacy i Żydzi—wizja wzajemnych stosunków..” 26. Krzemiński.” in Trudne sąsiedztwa.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. Steinlauf. report considerably higher numbers.” Polish Sociological Review 2:154 (2006): 231-42. 16. “Tolerancja fasadowa—postawy Polaków wobec nietolerancyjnych schematow myślowych.. The most recent (2002) national census that included a question about ethnicity reports relatively low numbers. Budyta-Budzyńska. Poland: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.. Theiss-Morse. E. especially Jews. Poland: Universitas.g. Malicka. One caveat to keep in mind when interpreting the data in Table 1 is that they are based on responses of all survey participants regardless of what their own ethnic or religious identification may be.” in Czy Polacy są anty-semitami? ed. E. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. Krzemiński. The Center for the Study of Public Opinion survey unfortunately contained no measures of respondents’ own ethnic or religious backgrounds. Frysztacki.” 23. Poland: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN. eds. Gołębiowska. 2003). Pamięć nieprzyswojona: Polska pamięć zagłady (Warsaw.g. Z.” Journal of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 299-308.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 389 E. “Religious Tolerance in Poland.” in Prawa człowieka: Tolerancja i jej granice. 157-207 (Warsaw. “Mniejszości narodowe”. ed.. I. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. Ibid. Mniejszości religijne w Polsce 1945-1991: Zarys statystyczny (Kraków.sagepub.g. 18. Czy Polacy są anty-semitami. Satisfaction with Democratic Government. Ślązacy. Implicit Messages. Świda-Ziemba. and S. Ibid. 2012 . in contrast.. E.. ed. G. M. The levels of tolerance of ethnic and religious groups with a sizable presence in Poland may therefore be overestimated by as much as 1 percent to 3 percent (the estimated size of Poland’s ethnic minorities) in the case of ethnic tolerance and as much as 5 percent (the estimated size of Poland’s religious minorities) in the case of religious tolerance—assuming that is that members of Poland’s ethnic and religious minorities would not be opposed to their children marrying within their own group. K. 1995). Poland: Zakład Wydawniczy “NOMOS. 21. E. E. 1998).” 1994). Downloaded from eep.” 19. 1996). Poland: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 2006). is in Poland. “Measuring Social Distances. Jasińska-Kania. Sullivan. With Malice toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments (New York: Cambridge University Press. Bogardus. J. Kurcz. ed. and Consolidation of Democratic Regimes. Urban. T. M. Mendelberg.

E. “A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. 28. and A. L. Datner-Śpiewak. K. Gołębiowska. 195-96. with the only difference that the effect of education becomes highly significant in the estimation based on all respondents.sagepub. Blikowska and W..” 29.g. Sniderman. The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge.” 31. 1975). M. MD: Lexington Books. A. E. E. Moreno-Riano. 30. 41. “Tolerancja fasadowa”. “Antysemityzm czy prowokacja?” Rzeczpospolita. J. Tuch. P. Stouffer. Cf. Reykowski. Howard. 113-37 (Lanham. 234. 129-154 (Warsaw. G.”. cf. E. Conformity. “Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect. Sullivan.. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. “Authoritarianism in Poland in the Years of Transformation 1990-1997.. With Malice. Nunn. “Poles’ Commitment.” 43. Czy Polacy są anty-semitami.” Political Research Quarterly 53:2 (2000): 285-303. J. “Struktura i wyznaczniki”.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90:5 (2006): 751-83. Crockett. Prawa człowieka. 29 May 2006. L. “How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. Gibson and M. Pettigrew and L. “Religious Tolerance in Poland.” Public Opinion Quarterly 53:3 (1989): 285-308. J. Hughes and S. A. C. Post. L. 1955). Datner-Śpiewak.390 East European Politics and Societies 27. K. Gołębiowska.g. “Struktura i wyznaczniki. 33. Gołębiowska.” British Journal of Political Science 37:2 (2007): 193-223. Tropp. Marcus.” 38. S. Gołębiowska. 1982). Z.. 1978). Gołębiowska..” Political Behavior 21:1 (1999): 43-66. 40. and factor analyses of all indicators of ethnic and religious tolerance suggest that it is appropriate to consider ethnic and religious tolerance as distinct albeit correlated manifestations of tolerance (results available on request). and G. Świda-Ziemba. J. C. This unexpected direction might be an artifact of listwise deletion of missing data that has resulted in a relatively large loss of cases. M.” Polish Psychological Bulletin 33:4 (2002): 31-38.. Gołębiowska.” 39. Gołębiowska. C. E. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. UK: Addison-Wesley. ed. (2) it was completely unrelated to ethnic and religious tolerance in my bivariate analysis. E. Personality and Democratic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press. T. 1954). “Gender and Tolerance. Rinden.g. Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. “Orientacja demokratyczna vs. A. One question that needs to be addressed here is whether ethnic and religious tolerance are qualitatively different or constitute different manifestations of the same form of tolerance.” 34.. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. E. ibid. Korzeniowski. reliability. E. “Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews. S. “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes. 2006). Gołębiowska. Bobo and F.. M. Licari. Krzemiński. Poland: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN. Correlational. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. The remaining effects are stable across the two estimations.. Ibid. E.com by Aras Roxana on October 9.g. and J. G. Stein.” 35. the effect of perceived finances is no longer statistically significant (results available on request). M.g. Tolerance of Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. L.” American Sociological Review 63:4 (1998): 512-35. Piereson. and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday. Gołębiowska. “Gender Differences in Whites’ Racial Attitudes: Are Women’s Attitudes Really More Favorable?” Social Psychology Quarterly 66:4 (2003): 384-401. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. 37. R..g. Cieśla. “Poles’ Commitment”. Korzeniowski. H. 2012 . When I recompute the ethnic tolerance model with mean substitution instead of listwise deletion.” in Wartości i postawy społeczne a przemiany systemowe: Szkice z psychologii politycznej. and (3) a large loss of cases due to listwise deletion of missing data would have occurred if I had kept income in the multivariate analysis. 42. Downloaded from eep. “Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. ed. J. Marcus et al. 32. 1993). Taylor.” in Tolerance in the Twenty-First Century. autorytarna w społeczeństwie polskim.g.” I do not use income as a predictor in my analysis for three reasons: (1) it was relatively unimportant in previous research compared to more subjective measures of financial well-being. Williams. Allport. Communism. 36. Gołębiowska. J. Gołębiowska. M. Jakubowska-Branicka.

and Civil Liberties.” 45. ethnic. Piereson. Gibson. 52.” 53. Gołębiowska.” in Ideology and Discontent.sagepub. Krzemiński. K.. Gebert. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. 242-67 (Warsaw.g. Conformity.” 51. Downloaded from eep. Political Tolerance. E.. 46. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. “Rola antysemityzmu. M.” Public Opinion Quarterly 56:4 (1992): 419-441. E. L. and religious tolerance in the United States and Poland. Jennings. E. In support of this notion. Gołębiowska. E. Gołębiowska. 50.” 48. “Gender and Tolerance. Her recent publications include “Poles’ Support for the Rights of Political Dissenters” in Polish Sociological Review and “Religious Tolerance in Poland” in International Journal of Public Opinion Research. 2008). “Anti-Detroit ads in Michigan Electoral Politics: The Case of Implicit Racial Appeals?” (manuscript under review. MI. Jakubowska-Branicka.. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. and Marcus. Mendelberg. 206-261 (New York: Free Press. She has written extensively on political.g.Gołębiowska / Ethnic and Religious Tolerance 391 44. ed. 1964). Ewa Gołębiowska is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University in Detroit.g. Poland: MYŚL. J. A. “Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffer’s Communism. Gołębiowska. 49. Converse. K.g. publicizing information that his grandfather served in the German army. Race Card. for example.” Perspectives on Politics 4:1 (2006): 21-34. P. Prawa człowieka. Grabowska and I. ed. E. Jennings demonstrates that ideological constraint based on ratings of wellknown politicians is higher relative to other measures of ideological thinking. David Apter.. Gołębiowska. Sullivan. 54. “Ideological Thinking Among Mass Publics and Political Elites. cf. 55.com by Aras Roxana on October 9. “Religious Tolerance in Poland. Tusk’s opponents emphasized his German–Kaszub roots throughout the campaign and raised questions about his Polishness by. Ibid. 1991). 47. 2012 . M.” in Bitwa o Belweder.

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