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soviet military intelligence

soviet military intelligence

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Viktor Suvorov is in his mid-thirties and now lives in the and West with his family. He was a Soviet army officer' the Soviet served in the GRU; he tann the world outside was Union for the first time in 1968 when Czechoslovakia to protect his invaded. He writes under a pseudonym

relations and friends who remain in the Soviet Union' He is the author of. The Liberators, described by Vladimir go[ou.Ly 'brilliant . . . this unique document' and by

Edward Crankshaw as 'unique and invaluable'' His book iirii, tn Soviet Army has alio been published iri paperback

I ;;

'This important book reveals the system by which "the tttiting force of world revolution'? is organized ' ' ' a dire
warning to the West'
Publishers WeeklY


that Soviet 'Worrying for the West, particularly his message graduated nuclear deterrence' grnrr.lt io not believe in


ffid very Pertinent reading'
lrlsh Times


'Much useful information'
Edward Crankshaw

rA revealing anatomy of the Sovigt army'
Elrmingham Post

By the same author
The Liberators Inside the Soviet Army


Soviet MilitatY


A Division of the Collins Publishing Group


Glasgow SetinTimes AII rights reserved.the publisher's priorconsent in any form of bindingorcovei other. mechanical. re-sold. without the prior permission of the publishers This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not. London W1X3LA Published by Grafton Books 19g6 PenkovskY Reprinted 1986 fint pub-lishedin Great Britain by Hamish Hamilton Ltd 1984 @ 1984 by Copyright Viktor Suvorov ISBN 0-58ffi5962 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Collins.than that in which it is published and without a similar conditior including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. or by any meins. be lent. No part of this publication may be reproduced. by way of trade or otherwise.- . photocopying.To the memory of Oleg Vladimirovich Grafton Books A Division of the Collins publishing Group 8 Grafton Street. electronic. stored in a retrieval system. or transmitted. hired out or otherwise circulated without. recordinc or otherwise. in any form.

78 83 85 10 Fleet Intelligence '11 The GRU Processing 12 Support Services PART TWO organs 94 . t Illegals t 2 The Undercover ResidencY 3 Agents 4 Agent Recruiting 5 Agent Communications 6 The Practice of Agent Work 7 OPerational Intelligence 8 TacticalReconnaissance 9 The Training and Privileges of Personnel 101 111 131 139 155 167 t77 2N 203 ftu. .8 9 The Triumvirate 17 History The PYramid The GnU anO the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) But WhY Is Nothing Known About It? The GRU and the 'Younger Brothers' The GRU and the KGB The Centre The Procurement Organs N 51 56 60 63 ffi 73 ..li..Contents Introduction PART ONE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 .

GRU Officers Only Appendix A: kaders of Soviet Military lntelligence Appendix B: The GRU High Command and Leading GRU Officers 223 225 237 242 247 Introduction Appendix C: Some Case Histories of GRU Activities Index the world There is but one opinion as to which country in service' Withpossesses the most powerful secret intelligence lrirfi" slightest doubt that country is the Soviet Union' and the name..long.. is also the Soviet Union''and the oiiunirution itself iJcalled the Chief Intelligence Directorate At first it was by r clrclg of sPEutauDrs' euurwYsv'rrJ it was revised :tiiit naffOw . .. mit falsehood was circulated in order to prove that mri. powerful secret organization..f.utui".iil wtrictr woutd be of little interest'... in the first forty'one days of its existence' rl ffi . there-is.1 ....a to record thai the organs of enforcement of December State were not created until the nineteenth igii. of certain definitions and technical .i"... Conclusion Contents 217 For. ii"t"-t".ilt"""b..ase (and the desire to understand I . the second most q.t.'Ji*"ut. in the history of mankind is the KGB' But on the as to which country possesses.e excision li'fi *tiJt-i" :ili . u *i0".r.iJ" or specialists.t power.'. Subsequently public'. ihe opinions of specialists 'OnLi. to be done' In 'i .d.io..of the monstrous secret organization without pi"*J"r.1 der to inderstind a Oi.d: fYi:io' il.d. nothing .A in the book many details of technical .rge as ii may seem' the country to which this .ough I may apologize. which may sometimes make for difficult reading. implies a desire to fight against i0' one must know of the General Staff.tl. the communists of the new O".Even a"TllHl i''.-.iuitr. S. was written in order to confirm this simple facl' rr conceived as an instructional manual for a --ilitL*t *"::"gyi liii' its pathology as well as its symptoms' For one of their very first chosen myths.iO..

. I. s'ecreuy destroyed by members of the Soviet government f^ *u.st h. which the Soviet prefer to forget iuir?. At all lower levels the same procedure is to be observed.of the Organs certain bloodt p6.is Pry. even after the People's Commissariat for Internal affairs wtrich sounds less innocuous in its abbreviation.rim'i. The method is an old one and has been used successfully for thousands of years. "ily^:l {1" ioint sessions of the Central Committee of the Party and the f'. the head of the laving announced to the world the to look at the editions of the Boishe. the most blood_ 'The answer is very simple.uf them so unceremoniously.*porlO.al organization in the world so easily and friely give up ii. In the beginning. If one visits any iegional committee of the Party and then the Regional Executive Committee one i5 struck by the fact that two separate organizations having almost identical structures and Each system of governing the State is duplicated and AeaAing idintical problems nevertheless take completely contradictory decisions. are. is valid.10 Introduction Security but in O. and ever since the communists have continued faithfully to carry out the instructions of the great founder of the first proletarian state. Neither the Council of Ministers of the gigantic State structure nor the Central Committee of the ruling Party is able.h. It boils down to the principle: 'divide and rule'. only a joint decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party *itt Pf*: State individual of a republic and the Council of Ministers of the same republic.nol going to guess about the futures of three still [. ffrut first night. NKVO. and subsequent th" fi. Neither one of these organizations rhas the authority-to decide anything independently. Lenin divided everything in Russia that was capable of being divided. Among tnem was comrade A. 'I t:: )' such crucial problems as the quality of children's toys are not decided. ieuaers to be torn to pieces? How is the politburi aUte to J. Seven comradei were stot oi hanged.ail-powlrfur peilonalities and the organizations headed by them? How ii it ttrat ttre politburo has practically no difficulties in displacinfnot onty Comrade Rikov was later shot. lies the secret of this limitless power of the politburo? .n men have le-a-!-ershin. or the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Executive Committee... could dispense with the mass executions so familiar to other revolutions. O.. in order to rule. have occupie{ 1::1i yT been equally the post. If we look at the really important decisions of i the Soviet leadenhip. later publicly admitted). joint resolution on raising the quality and widening the range- Stalin. I have in front of me as I write the last . but not before he irad . since neither has the power and authority.would oeen appomted to the post of Head of the Organg of which three were hounded out of the Soviei-government with ignominy.world. Why does the most powerful . This same system exists at all stages and at all levels of the ri Government. death oi . At these levels of course.ppoirred its leaders. would seem to be this.. we will find that any one g{them. the first infantile wail. but the principle remains that no separate and ffi . For example. The fare of tne Aeputy neaos nas violent. mass executions exisred-frgf dictatorship in its history.. The falsehood is easily .r"ri. fi. rit.' comrade The paradox of this endless bloody orgy .rtioyinf *iote flocks of the 1. the first minute. I.. and tortured with great refinement before their officiaipr"irf.*. those which are published in the ii. It is sufficient Introduction tl tl:]. Oigun.r9: "j most influential State Security officers? furrr.. One died at his post.of this Soviet po*"r..nunugJ-to write into the history. days which shook the.i. to take an independent decision on such an important matter. Soviet power itself is duplicated. of production of children's toys. Rikov.*in . reduplicated. But we are not talking here just about Ministers and First Secretaries. clearly not experiencing the slightest fear these seemingty.'papers for those ffr.'pup"r".' Council of Ministen.

independent of of the . but independently of the KGB other powerful organs are also aitive: the innocent:sounding People's Contiol for example. fn the meantime the tentacles of the Tcheka had spread srior...t 1918. of any deviation from the established norm. a visit of which to a factory or workshop iuur.tt. but as an organization -Bolshevik '1 6lite and. To control everybody and everything is absolutely impossible. of each . an organization called into existence to counter-balance the already growing powers of It is also the of the regime' In for the unprecedented stability itre People's Commissariat {or Internal Affairs'. The thinking goes: we have a newspaper independent decisions can be taken. the Tcheka. j.D"d:. a secret police organization subordinated to a politburo member who exercises almost as much influence as the Chief of the KGB. itre f.r . known today as the People's Conti'ol' The is still waiting forlomebody to research into its history' remembered by him even i.1.. Soviet power is everywhere duplicated.U"ka and thg People's Commissariat for Internal . and this ii why duplication exists.f" of the Registered Directorate time itWorkers' and is called the Army. Everybody jealously pursues his rival and any Pravda.r' ..ru.. as a counter-balance to it.' i. lii . it was seen as essential that each powerful organ or organization which is capable of taking independent decisions bi counter-baranced lii i ). Peasants' " bt i.let's have another on a similar scare Izvestia.ir deathbed.. above all' . the Worii.ion . from the planning oi -the I*!"j oflaunchings into space to the organizatiln for burial Soviet citizens. This organ.the whole of the civil war these two bloody organizations existed independently.igence directorate of the General Staff of the .g l: . Rabkrin was-Lenin's love'child.t i*r ii.organto-... and thus it has always been' tt" creation of a.. there also exist central control Organs which are independent to the local authority.. : ..12 Introduction ' Introduction stagnation of all walks of life in Soviet society' rru-Son of inspiration..i.critical mind. The Rabkrin or. ln addition to the People's Control. Neither lcapable of counter-balancing its external nor the Rabkrin was able to fulfil ir.tyoutthetaskofcontrolandretribution'the '. The basic one of these is of course the KGB.s commissariat the frontiers and the Bolshevik leaders were forced create yet another parallel organization to the Tcheka' intelligence service. hardly less anger than a visit of the bBHSS. DupliJation in everything is the prime principle and reason Ue'trina the terrifying flashes in good time informs whoever he jhould inform of but..ri Rabkrin.i i.simply for duplication. the Ministry of the Interior is also active and this is subordinated niither to the KGB nor to Control..ffi. There is also the Central Organ of the press. In. any effort to look at what is going on from the lydqoilt of a heatthy. more formally. the Politburo was able'to neutralize any . At the present Red .. and as rivals. completely . Their influence grew to immense proportions.. from the managernent of diplomatic missions abroad to iunatic asylums.-u. and rcnin suggested the creation of yet another independelt i. Not for competition by the existence of another no less powerful bureaucratic organization. Tass created...*it by thJm to raise the standard of revolt against their creators.ontrol of the ruling l.' Affairs.onthepersonalorderoftheindefatigableLeninon . duplicating the Organs. an external was created under the meaning.opre.addition to the goveming organs which give orders and see that they'are carried out. it" . On the initiative of Lenin. *"rr' and peasants' Inspectorate was not created as an organ ioi the whole population. ApN. and also known by its military classification as thisrole. Soviet A*y. In shape and form. I f : ' r. In this way the comradei in tl.e Politburo are able to live a quieter life. the socialist fraud squad.. . froil the construction of sewers to atomic ice-breakers.oorr" lr.n f.. iTO. system of parallel institutions began with the creation of itri tcnefa.f Inte. to activities.

on lhe front.14 Intoducrion 'unit 44388'. so that one can can only be explained the ruling class to guarantee the stability of inipite of the . The most . many ordeals it has been subjected to. all existed under the same duplication principle. the'Gestapo and the Abwehr. i-n addition.This desire of by the its regime. history largely independent from the KGB. the Wehrmacht Divisions and the Divisions of the SS. In history there is a number of examples of similar organizations within repressive regimes. understand the role of soviet miritary intefiigence in Soviet society and in the international areni.obvious of these is of course Hitler's Gerniany. and. Part I multiplication of institutions . The SS and the SA and. as did the two Intelligence Services. the reason why thisorganization has remained throughout Soviet It is important to clarily this.

i .orrnonist fanaticism and the deception of the treachery.otherwordswithouttheParty. Its natural state is a free life in a swamp. which plays the a quiet life for the other of a periorming crocodile. a constant underlying struggle between these three forces...t The Triumvirate The Party. the KGB and the Army form. enjoying the the people.t'supplementary. the Soviet Union. victordefeats. Thus the. Should this ever happen' the irrty unaine KGB would be swiftly destroyed' The fact.. the Army has never played the leading roli in the trio. with attacks and retreats. . ensuring two. l' .Partv and the KGB in mind each . armistices.is that'this crocodile does not need either the Party or the KGB. including those which appear officially position' But no wi-etd State power. occupy a subordinate all single one oi tt it t..t .oi.the triumvirate *hi. but with this to kill off its rival' Too possible 'understand's that it is not .:1. bloody skirmishes.ti" Jl. muctr depends on the continued existence of that rival' Both part the Party and the KGB need the Army. secret alliances and permanent ii .in the triulmvirate system the Army is the most powerful '' element but it is also the most deprived as regards its rights' Unlike the Party and the KCB. liolds aUsotute power' They are " have to share power with their rivals' intirAepenAent and There 'ies. aie strivini for'undivided rule.Eachofthetwoconsidersits lown function to be the important one and the function of its .... All other institutions and to organizations. The Party cannot exist without a continuous represslon 9f fr. . in other words without the KGB' The KGB in turn cannoi exist without a continuous fanning of the flames people' in ' oi.

"f. for purely practical reasons. announce the a bite at the Tchekists.rruunoof every minute directive lr€r€ral staff compietely lost the ability to think indepen:iently. Although the crocodile is-firmly tied.-kcg preferred.d .Y:i.6iU it a part of the general-staff. .Jr"t" wittr ttre work of its brain.. On those occasions whin the Army ..against any aggressor.iiit" I i. to direct it to another side.tw KGB. delPlte its enormous sze' .ti. The Party '' ttr" v bec-ame pru. They fulfil an auxiliary role. Every organ of the Army is penetrated by the Political Department of the party and thi Special Oepart_ different acts and collect money from the terrified spectators. and mititary intelligence is itseyes and ears' The .in t"a to thlnk along Party lines' The'Tttl . And at times when the KGB his been plotting agiinst the has attacked the party.rrf.i[t.nart o1 fe. the party has gone into action against it. Io-.i" fn the workirrg of the crocodile's brain.:it"tt*-p-h3l:. As a result the crocodile. the Party has invariably hllowed the crocLdile to take lhe Army has attacked the KGB. that the 1. They supply food to the trainers and the crocodile.ally incapable of fighting' from this sad. The party leasli is called Special gobble up whatever it wishes. Thus it is not possible for the Army to be left out of the triumvirate. but not a bite to the death. in the role of trainers of the performing crocodile. in other words 1. Both the party and the..and any capability to think and rfif tnii brought ihe system to the.. the Party ::-tr-: "::T":':S:.even if this nt i. of its sharp ears and ceased piercing eyes. on . They have even been able to give the crocodile a few kicks anA.the brain.*rpitt"fy lost its presence of mind. itu.edee-:f.18 1bili_tyj9 Soviet Mititary Intelligence The Triumvitate 19 the Political Department.at"ruflv. the Tchekists of the KGB have iome into action and quickly gained control over dissident elements in the Army. in fact it is that part which analyses what the eyes una the ears hear.":lir-:T.. the aimy ii sufficiently strong sometimes to pull its two trainers aftei it.to the Jii i. .. beginning with the military opposition of the twenties. its speed of reaction take independent decisions' . tearnl :Yt :t. thi *ar.experience and Yt?". as it is said . i". Its dependent situation notwithstanding.ryytlngnt.ll staff . The general staff of the Soviet Army is the brain of the way and from differen-t sides that it is impossible for any quarrel to have a conclusion. to keep I ontv the body of the crocodile under control and not to in. . After such incidents the situation has retumed to normal * the crocodile's trainers have manipulated their reashes in such a Party.iO tiains its ears to hear with precision every frrg"tt night. the part which concentrates the most interesting 'unlfinr. WUen of the KGB.. would be its first victims should the crocodile ever be set at liberty. and the Tchekists insisted strongly $e of the Party. it necessary.:t'i[. None of the remaining inhabitants of the Soviet Union has any. So why has the .independent part to play in the concert. ol.6pcodile.11. put on their make-up for the show.: I .ing eyes of the crocodile onto the rustle a.. ). which has happened several times... it "yi supervisedthe general ":l. as happened after the death of Stalin. i-he general staff and the integral GRU "rithe i'.KGB are perfectly well aware that they.The Party and the KGB hold the crocodile firmly in check !V qeans of two strong leashes. that of the KbB the ment crocodile never gobbled up its trainers? .ticallv independEnt of external control' Why this "[ g be is expl a.

There anrlies which did not *rn. The history of Soviet " . the diversionuty detachments reported to the Thfse diversionary iot"ttin n". for example.intelligence' . corps and sometimes iiniriont. most important. the advances o-f the in the Uials and in Siberia. And so on down the scale. Turkistan lffi. Subsequent to the formation of the . the GRU.rt"-. 'reconnaissance'. At the same time the superior echelons of intelligence exercised control and direction of the lower echelons. From the moment of the creation of the first detachment of the Red Army. new fronts were added to the Red Army: and' later' tfre Southern. The chief of intelligence of an army corp.. On the same day there was created a'registrational' gence) department in the Eastern Front' The depal' f. for the first time in the composition of the Red fThe Russian version of the English . in his turn. As the regular army developed into of the Army.to collect information on enemy porition. basis of underground . army cbrps and armiesfso these intelligence organs developed wiih it. North-Eastern and i. besides the agent. an agent norbet of aircraft for aerial reconnaissance. of information about actual 6r"potentiai spring of 1918. intelligence units at all levels were subordinated to. divisions.th€ coresponding staffs. and activities and to undermine and sometimes ihvsicallv destroy the enemy's command structure' The .t tt tn"t" diversionaiy units and their numerical . aerial and other t"ryit"-lTl . from the outset. The agent network for the Eastern Front organizations of fr"t iot . Northern. These intelligence chiefs are an integral part Soviet military intelligencer and iis superior organ. '""'*U. W.fitstrevifs and other parties which. indeiendent and separate was .surveiltaice'and 'intelligence'..network.. Ukrainian. intelligence can therefore only be surveyed in ihe ligtrt ot the history of the development of the Army and consequently in the light of the continuous struggle bitween the Army. to take prisoners especialiy staff officers .i*- collection and processing enemtcs.t 6uu. small intelligence groups were formed within these detachments quietly and oftLn without any order from above. Each divisional intelligence chief. newly-formed regiments. types of intelligence services..re were five armies and the volga military History .. Formed from the best cavalrymen in the Army' they ir dressed in the uniform of the enemy and were used to carry out deep raids in the enemy's rear.Eastern Front.uriun. armies. This front received the name of the Eastern Front' in it ttr.ad ttre inielligence chiefs of all five armies and the of the front r reporting to iI. had his own personal intelligence unii and in addition directed the chiefs of intelligenie of the divisions which formed a part of his army corps. agent groups and organizations intervened in the rear of the enemy P:J":: 1l: limiin forces attacked.. all activitj governint South-Eastern.a on ih..zupported them' Sub' ilqr"nUy the network grew arf: d]lng. On 13 June 191g a front was formed.Hisary 2 2l .'-:In tt" iiLt".iime cavatry squadrons and. The intelligence set-up for each front was organized were io tt" same way ui thut for the Eastern Front'.'F. and were called the 'cavalry of special assignoi"no'. brigades.h.. the Party and the KGB. chiefs of fronts..razvedka _ has wider-significance and includes everything we rlnderstand by the terms . had ftrs own intelligence unit at the same time as directing the activities of the intelligence chiefs of the brigades which formed his division. .g.

not in the enemy's rear. the 1""p..":fT.:Y:I.dition to this. One such atiempt occumed on-10 July 1918 when the Tcheka shot the whoie staff of the Eastern Front intelligence department.:::t':.iirorr"ri"riindispensable to its work at second-. Military intelligence had acquired " au.T. "'.: :Jl *:')T?"fiI the Republic.-':i[:.the given priority' and any rf the Tcheka. ln 1920. The Tcheka also had units of .an Trotsky' placed out raids..1119'il.t ordered Dzerzhinsky not to interfere in matters of imitituw intelligence. If the army inielligence service is separated more the army staff.. M.22 Soviet Military Intelligence History 23 several regiments and separate squadrons..t its capabilities were extremely one'sided' He . destroying those who were dissatisfied with the communist order. the Tcheka's attempts on.l.tiir.rnjt119' i'. on the staff of the Soviet forces. but in its bwn rear.":1i1:..central agent network and an agent network in local areas. lio. military intelligence suffered the greatest possible antagonism from the Tchekists. (As regards Vatsetis the Tchekists did indeed shoot him. tn spite of this.anothe'.T::'"1'H':"L:iJ:: services.tfili.iJ. now given to all special forces of the GRU. This of course brought iomotit" defeat. arid this was on top of strength comtantly increased. there was a separate cavalry brigade foi 'special assignments' with a strength of more i ll'ihan .a the Fietd staff.iir"i-"t. the absence of a superior intelli- li "ft"irr. I. Much later these divenion_ ary units received the name Spetsnaz. from regimental staff level up .u* before Lenin: either give me an independent Dzerzhinsky lead the .:l_Yi. The whole of the agent system of miiitary intelligence passed into the contror or the tchekists.".. and his chief of staff had no intelligence service of their own.was under. on the polish Front.. Leon Trotsky ieveral times approached Lenin-with . then the brain becomes nothing if the blind the brain of a blind and deaf man' Even essential information from one source or frptJ. They could only request information in a very tactful way..-"--io*.'urrlhi*.) its own control. but much iater.were dregsed in Polish uniform.p irilituty intilligence wentthe present day'efforts up to continue on a reduced scale military 1...tion.]. and were unable to ask for the necessary information. For this lrlffason the general staff remained blind and deaf' obtaining ''.iire aemano that he ihould create such a superior mititary .-il.::l::Ti:. The new commander.T:^l:1"".rmv '-1"'"i" ..tr n. and these {lt.tlt:] Naturally while the agent network. Several cases are knew what the Tcheka was capable of but he also irt.il"* .n. being well awire of tne Tcheka's attitude to those it disiikea.. Vatsetis. All these units . During the civil war the Tcheka strove to unite all speqial a'ssignment units under anyone else was operating similar secret networks.*. 1": staff of 1t".Tq?.ii. The Tchekists jealously guarded their right to have secret agents and could not resign themselves to the idea that than two thousand cavalrymen... I. who had been trying to intervene in favour of his intelligence department. The Tcheka had its own.ifuence the py'?ry.lr[" * ..of . The leader of the Red Army. From its inception.n ry 1* the Red Army (at that ''J*i.y intelligence.atas the end of 1918 the organization of .d *. A. together with the entire staff of the front and the commander himself.miiilt intelligence.tffig"n.special assignments' which carried . but this brought the front to the very edge of catastrophe. but the top of i ft Ct i"f of the Army and in charge of all military proI .d beeri virtually completed' There to the level of remained I [m" . its own work was i*k1ti it by'the Army Command w-ere given very low the forces very near to fiiiority..8 prramid siructure. Muravev."[. which had been in existence for only twenty-seven days. A.il:H-i.service or let with his Tchekists recorded of the Tchekists trying to take over organs of T!.. later the General Staff).ines t".

s .^-^. oeruices.t. A-communist woutd be decla.s . Lenin diiected his -oi Without restricting the terror.. military intelligence hom ttre organs of enforcement and their intelligence ser' troups of iorces. Since 1918.. who came irom the V. t lvices.i^L lof Siaff-J. fuel and mean intelligence organ.G. the provincial and town committees ttre iignt to take part in recovered..i*rhere the front networks already had active agents' The iorsanization created in 1918 has. creatini r'.e. but realizirig that this would a political crises present day. Secondly.. Tcheka.that tbf . in principle. Lenii and repeatedty reifused Trotsky. rnititury districts and groups of forces and i 'l*trt once.a desperate measure. diversionary intelligence is subiiOiury to agent intelligence. released from its restraints and drunk with blood. quite separate impoRantly. This step was taken i1 *. There was an-attempt on the life of Lenin himself. liiiituty staff must have its own independent intelligence set- of .u" lp !o !h9 Peopleh Commissariats (i. by mas executions. Certainly the founding rules are fully each own ipplicaUte [o i:iappllcaole to our uw time.i. Lenin was careful to o:-^. immediately resumed day+o-day another.. Une threat replaced ty Republic."pon to Trotsky and the A*y. he took . including those . The fcneta.p. to be called court cases against arrested communists. the agent network must be part of the.s its tristory..-.red. g.. He finally accepted Trotsky. in the cise of the slighte"si inevitably strengthening of the position of Trotsky.onopliy secret activity.. In order to save the regime the communists decided on. the intelligence set-up of subordinate staffs is ti U" futty under the command of the intelligence of superior Thirdly. eqorp it with a safeiy device by the name oJ Simon lvanovich i'" Atalov.t. far worse. Secondly.) Fourthly. not yet completely to the stability of the state had been l"ad. 1 but ul* a concession to Trotsky.Razucdupf ' in ior our pt"sent putpos"s the nam€ GRU will be used consistently' 2 . survived to discontent among the inhabitants.hi. fifthly and most mrrsl !e.. The Soulet state was saved. fiistly. In eich town and village they would take hostages and.. These are. the position of the cori"munists worsened sharply. Having entrusted this i . Aralov formally remained a i'i member of the collegium of the Tcheka. each one of these rules has been broken'at the level of armies and flotillas.ugg. io control it. production. It must be found on front or also at flpet level. r"''preservation on Lenin's part from the ravages of the Tcheka. firstly. In Tver and Toruhok the Tchekists. Armed uprisings were taking place against the communists. Understanding the necessity for the creation of such an organ. manifestation became more acute... The most important of his decisions were. got outoi control. nurb. together with destroyed communist teaders whJdispleaseJ ll:1"rpg. But at this time the directorate Lrm tne creation of a new network of agents which would active in countries all over the world. of in" purty Commit_ tee testified in his favour...composition of thl generil staff intelligence network azd . And.rti.not guilty if two memb". intellig. at this time it was called 'R egistuupf . On becoming chief the registrational directorate.s proposal and on 21 October 191g signed a decree. (In peace+ime this means military up.il. has been through several name chqnge.rformations.ii : The GRU.T'lr" creation of the GRU2 was not only an act of self- . oart'of the composition of the front and fleet intelligence districts and .. i. Lenin. if not more often. "these hostages would be shot. 1:]:T". latgr '. rnem.. of ..24 Soviet Military Intelligence History merelv co-ordinated them.h *.. but invariably the mistake has been summarily corrected. organ of Soviet military intelligence *i.d At the oeginning of autumn. Then another problem arose. the minisffi. like the KGB. The newly created directorate did not increase or decreaie the importance of the front and army the Registrationat DirectoratJ of the Field attention to the annulment of the icheka.

MVD and KGB and unofficially as 'the Organs')' This rule has also been broken several times. t' .. Slovaks. Aralov. Austrians. The GRUwould be u purt of it Army but the Army would not be able to. Remaining formally within the Tcheka. Serbs. but itJchief was the personal enemy of both the Army and the Tcheka. 4lry.o"tt"A and shot. at the eighth congress of the prirry in tvtarcti tgi6. and from that i.' Emboldened by Army' l.oi -came meddling in the affairi of. too.Army. tt. he had not been .o*"nt of the session Aralov spoke critically of tfie military opporiiior. fr{ifitaiy intelligence naturaily objected . maintained an icy . never count on the sossion cfoieO affected military intelligence too. after which inteifigell Only a few votes were necessary to secure the complete and legal victory of the.. fn the strulgle against the Party. Bulgars. The Army had learnt a i". and srrict neu_ trality.to* to-r.26 Soviet Military Intelligence History 27 gui:kfy. trom tne nrsi Jay of his work in ir'foice supported the Party. had to become ii". wourd dare to trust Aralov.military intelligerrce service. The overwhelming majority mans..rri"r."-that it would be impossible for Aralov to avoid Uaify sfrirmishes with the Tchekists on the most mundan" qulrtions. NKVD. and more than tOO^Oelegates'out oi 269 declaredthemselves in favour of tt struggle against the party and the Tcheka. *fl:. " CnU i. OGPU."Koreans. Lenin's calculations proved themselves sound i.. MGB. with one . but at tfris point the delegates officials of the Tcheka secret police (historically known as the V. Croats and others' Most of them were r"*i. Poles.t *oufO pi. a of the support of the military intelligence service.military Oplosition. *t in the interests of subterfuge.f"'u. :lld: lnylossibility Tchekist. there were more than four million foreigners: Ger' former p-riton"tt of war.. not one of the Armyt ." party and the . the so-called .f .on*"qu"ntiy enemy of the Tchekists. NKGB.nst the p*y. Then at the most dramatic . and that this would inevitably lead to a confront tio. [.rrilitary opposition shrank to ninety'five. l9^p?rty conferences.'no*ing the h. Hungarians. Czechs. In thJcase of any ugr.tists in the 7th Army who had displeased them' ..sharply to the :intettigence on 13 May 1919 of the staff of military I conference.. pJrsonat opinions llal "*p. and executed members il.ra. the Tcheka renewed its penetration of the ' Many unrepentant members of the military opposition.. f.ni with the Army..y programme. 11 the spring of 1919 the reinforceO army under Tro5Lf's leadership gnen]f out ag." oiit.victory.ifitr.iL._ of Aralov Ueing exptoited as a trusted this was not all.were . More than three hundred thousand of thernvoluntarily enlisted in the Red Army' There was no need to recruit such people. the delegates of the military frol tle. which was that the chief of th. But remarkably military intelligence. The number of supporters clear defeat' The i r. taking-the law into its own hands.. i I Tat"ku'. a" unitea group Army delegates. and even up to the present day has confused many researchers. GRU must be appointed only from among the senior thr T.t. o"r..'time on it was ils sworn enemy.enin was delighted' Military intelligence henceforth was an inseparable part-of the Army. but the Party has always been able to correct its mistake in time' The agent network of the GRU was reinforced at almost lightninispeed' There are several reasons for this' Firstly' iisiAe iusiia after the Revolution. GPU. The hurniliation of the Army inevitably with a victory for the Party' The military 'ooposition crumbled and many of its members never agam toof any action against the Party. This had " entered into ieninis calculations. p"rty influences.":i" widespread abstentions rcneKa tound themselves in a minority at their own " unJ tf. in her central provinces alone. . hand of Aralov. Anothei unwritten rule was established in the organization of the GRU."r. At tiye it was still permitted .n ded de facto independence of the Army f-. Tcheka.th"."r.on.

. For . states' simply told any suspicious person who or . France and China.ni. owner of a safe.. Secondly. some of these.history.luiti. their recruitment presented no the First World War the world veereJ . to tie a necktie."J"r.t.an torty GRU failur.n. fanatical communist doctrines. Tt they could.. the Finnish communist Otto the Hungarian Sandor Rado. |telgwere. after the Revolution Moscow communists. fhe GRU was unPerturbed by these philosophy being tirat if it could not have quality io*lu. by this method alone' 'do. but thousands more remained unknown.. are now well known Iu.ili.28 Soviet Military Intelligence simp_ly sent them History 29 of them were convinced. T1r"r" were many elementary errors and early field officers who had no experience ' ..il il..tt:f: point) find a tall handsome man who has lost a leg . and in this manifesto it was helped from all sides. pa.' failures in the ..l:ou:ty millions of 6migr6s organizations.. agents were unmasked-in these three small if.of these example.. 'ot Litt oania. its If one it would go tbr quantiiy. It was an astute calculation' to be ug. eny SoviJt intjflig"n. Communist parties were strong and united.tor. the Tcheka and the GRU in particutar developing their espionage activities.many Embittered and depresed. Military difficulty whatsoever.fl:Tfl worldwide commuiist revolution'. all over the world.In Germany and Hungary there were communist revolutions.frurpfy towards to country without attracting the slightest suspicion. the counter'intelligence officers whatsoever..ho::: :t-... lnrrdty. activists states worldwide under the contror of the'soviet int"ttig"nz" became the Mecca of communism. The Soviet Union will never admit the people it sends out belong to Soviet intelligence' -_r[it iarge-scale attack wai highly successful' Out of the . The heat of the conflagration was f.. people who had lost their hopes and ideals.k. td-.the world h. Soviet intelligen-ce skilfully exploited the situation which was unfolding..na in"u hundred ient abroad showed himself lack of ifi"nt"a. .tr..d gi". Ts{fl E." officer who had undergone the most elementary linguistic training could move about freely from country to tutfir P::i* after the Revolution the wil of Soviet interrig"n.es' countries. discovered' Let them get out 9f that lhe .ilffi I The Communist Interr '#Hlx.O to be a fugitive Russian officer. or engineer more In 1920. then that was enough' Nobody was worried apieared.. The First Woria Wir also. In one of the early GRU instruction .. and his natural talent made up for his about eJucation. m.hgent (a radio operator.". destruction-of capitalism. Latvia and Estonia..tiesoithe.. :1.il there is the following advice: 'If you-need a facilities ilt*il foreign i'the needs of esPionage. The Comintern openly declared ."""#Ti?i'J ii.g"". like the German communists |ictlaf Sorge and Karl Ramm.. External circumstances favoured communism too.i *ho *"r. communists from a[ countries flocked to Moscow. which at the time were i"A"r. and after the foundation of the comintern.. thousands of communists spread into off to their own countries as llelli8ence trKU agents. After from Russia.left behind a legacy of "despair .t *iJ"ir... to..i[it. on the orders of the uomtntern.

rf[Oj.or"t to bring the revolution about' They decided I to trigger off a revolution in Europe.result of the negligence'of the intelligence service'' But the GRU was a compGtety unknown entity. the "ut"gotically hurope it i.. Both Lenin and Trotsky red themseives outstanding thinkers.na tn.was striving to"innaie the hostiliry between the GRU ..te fiiO before them 'grey' and unevaluated: they would then on the '&aw their orun ..i. The next conflict seueral years."to t"k" . GRU as its chief source of .* .i. 'We have suffered this defeat as a .p of communists l?-ig atso begin.or"y put was sent unOJJffirl'.lrf qr"ri.. perfectty tegal and hisht [rrlii"" ricences :!:aiyng T*.J .. they found help and support from the Mrachkovski network.o to the rank'and'file Party members' All eyes turned towards the Tchekists. Both the organizers ''immediately started to hunt for a scapegoat' The only possible explanation for the scandal was that the intelligence service had done its work badly.on.basis Marxism had very precisely of Marxist doctrine' But foretold that there would be a world'u'ar in iinO rirnperialist war would develop into a worldwide revolution' which a golden age wbuld begin' Yet the war had 'after had finisheO two yein befori and no worldwide revolution reported that there were no :9":.lotions and analyse the material $l.r In order to calm the Tchekists and to . operution. GRU documents. Inielligence i:this'revolution coming about. was evident. as it was officially.rrcr...lradr...'. Their unpopularity among the people.."rr. Lenin announced to the . buying up new enterprises. widely used for the legalization of newly. .. tt *orld.# country to countrv.o tight that no undertaking ever suspected tne exisilnce of another.ilririi Enterprises" or." om. it"-'.tng #. even before this. and Relations with the Tchekists were gradually stretched to their limit.. ."". *"i" gr..ilig"i. either compelled to admit that Marxism Yt. the United States and_fin"ly Ctir" iil..t.io.'was used by the . Dzetzhinsky caused a scandaf in the Kremlin and demanded explanations from the Politburo' support his own ..noiey . installing one " or two of his own people and . profits of tens of rr. creation of the .ril .tnt"nlfen... On" tdit" first outstandins successes was the. 'the network of commerci"f millions Mrachkovski of pounds.rs who by . *lonF. Mrachkovski himself trav.lougr. ih.clean.y began to creep rnto the work of the GRU. as did his successors.ringr. patents.oU Mrachkov_ ski (his brother was a mernber of thetentral Committee) of intefligence agents sent abroad. ir"* rank and file of the Party. starting with Poland' out in the spring of 1920.o1 '.o*V. Lenin made a o. ih"y jobs and after some months received the most laudatory references and went off into other countries *fr"r" place' This went on untir the ug"ni"ur'uire to stand on his own two feet. in fictitious names.. . and much .J..t. pqrt"J iri.t*or['*. ru. money which had never been on SovietieniffianO b:. fou_"ying-r.r..SubsequeJi fr. even to some of the hi{hest represeniativei of the Soviet bureaucracy... After Lenin's announcement their authority finally fell.30 thousands Soviet Military Inrclligence success History these undertakincs quickly to Germany where he organized a small shop anj thin a small factory.."_. . into .ur". theoreticians practical men. .*1.ri"rt. beginning ro be better traiied. and naturally the l. au.t would be the last war of mankind' The s. men of deep knowledge a1 regards irv affairs and international relations.91 happenea.-. so both Lenin and Trotsky l. Creat ti.1. that is..adveniure ended in complete failure. Naturally neither noi th" other took any notice of evaluated intelligence' y both demanded thai the intelligence material should of this.6r..lled alt oue.lo te]r.oonconsequently to obtaining l"_rld money the Mrachkovski undertaking.i. several factories-in France..e assessments were ignored. The partv.*:9 for agents. .f". some dozen began to give posi'live . The security of ti.ritair.

ritit*y "na oili.r.t ffi.. but also that Soviet armaments must be the best in the world' Monumental sums of money were spent to attain this aim: practically the whole of Russia's gold reserves was thrown into the task. N"ither Lenin nor Trotsky had any idea of . not even the many members of tlie i"nrrul Committee.r*... Lithuirnia 1at that time still independent) and Finland' This '. . Uo.f.-. . on L..to the time oi . - Gnil..il int.ih..ooting iii.uoild out..ii...iiion. and this f<ir eminentry sound . A tidy sum of money was realized.i. We are richer now than we were then. but now information was made available to.-. of command in the new districts A ." oi-iie civil war. *ouia nur" "#rt"il This was the year in which the first five-year plan was drawn up.'ini"ffig"r.".. o:rv.r intelligence centres were moved out to the irontiers and it was from there that the direction oi agent intelligence work of a very activities in any future war. was that its agent inteltigence no salutary effect on others .'... Up to this time there had been no need to account for the GRU's activities. for the bd. 32 History 33 "". thloygseSs untouched. rcO1or" specialists to the 'mistaken conctusion that the exist untit this time."[ig"n. indffii.. each orher. officers who had allegedly faited to situation corectly were shot. as alsci has money :"ivailable for intelligence... peacetime to carry on agent where the district *oura of the staff of each district aiJnt.militarv district operated on the territoriei of Poland.f.t. i"..oUoAy-*ould hear about them.into .ficers I.[i.[hry inr.ttig"r.. pictures by Rembrandt and Nicholas II's stamp collection.ra .iJ.-r. in the Red Army.registration^' qui.i oY"T"1'. ug".. The lists included equipment for bombers and All GRU residents received bookJength lists .tt have become more nume. strength :-!ung_.rriuJnltu.Soviet Military Intelligence version of the storv. continued in country. some party members.rrded on the but the chain iar"i." .rily ir".. The other reason.. except that-the districts iahd fl. independent circumstances. at the same time the internal district. This may be exptained by the facr that organs of tn" CfrU **"'pr".in.rous." *ort-*'. which aimed (as all subsequent five-year plans have) eiclusively at the growth of the military potential of the The internat military districts rr.ii.tl ig2O purge there were fifteen mititary'distri.g. the GRU did lEach internal military district also has its_tasks in wartime. The Soviet leadeiship made haste and demanded from its designero not only the creation oi new kinds of weaponry and military technology.k iriiri. the fronts were transformed.ally However.'. ..r.""r*I. of forefgn military technology which they would have to steal in the near future. irnd its intelligence work is based around these tasks' The ion of activities of a frontier district is very precisely .enin's gr. but also rnnocent. For example.. They a[ .. "f."il. *s undertaken. At Western auctions the Soviet authorities sold off Russian corn and wood.""ouery of the GRU nefu. Conseently its agent network in peacetime operates in different too." .. .ir"ry districts was also left untouched at tf. 'ihe plan stipulated the creation and speedy growth of the tank. in 1920 agents of the Moscow . This t u. aviation and artillery industries' The Soviet Union set itself the target of creating the most powerful army in the world.i 1920. $:-Y::".9r* il.."rr... any essential A"purtriri'*".ir*t thiir deaths of. Lenin permitted the Tchekists to purge the GRU.1?' becarrse not take long to recover from the 1920 purge.bystem has prevailed in all respects. may operate in different directions.lfter 1977 Soviet military intelligence began to blossom' l'.. ahip-building. The first bloody purge took place in November 'drdr".

#iil. Lr. Military district intelligence always operated independently of the GRU illegals true today.i. u_.on Communists the . Centre were frequently accomplished through the Soviet beginembassies.reat depression threw into the arms ot soui"i wirld 6r"..Sometimes Soviet copien selected the best assemUlies ani*rpon"nts and constructed out of them a new type which often turned out to be the.il."..on. th" sph... posing as Soviet diplo:mats.uJin!-uy'fliorertak"nteadthe political intelligence work of .ire. Ir was hardty . . Only .r*ni.Inagentorganizationssubordinatedtomilitary-districts the and fleeti the recruitment of agents was carried out from officers rarely did certain .. from different countries and then . ttrritoty of the Soviet Union. not..of Ind Soviet embissies... The recruitment of new ag-ents was carried out either on Soviet territory or on the teiritory of neighbouring countries by me4ns of agents who had been recruited earlier.and running of agents was in the hands of tllegals'. at the beginning of .ur" time in Jf a"y ii-if.riitr"nt. . b] the d.....f tr" *rs on the side of Soviet military intelligence... anti-aircraft. o. of the te30s.very best in the world. manufactured in the sirorterrp"riiUi" .and anti_tank guns. submarines and torpedo Uouti.r. in the fierd. Soviet resiaenJs were able to throw their monev round. In the international sohere it did "" iJiiL. Germany and Grear Britain. of torpedoes in Italy. wirhin Soviet influence.. the technolopl for th" p. trade representatives. emphasis.t"rtilrOr.il'#upied parties.ij. ..was concentrated il.. inijtg"r& mistake was subsequently rectified. intelligence directorates of districts travel abroad iOf i'with forged d6cuments for short periods' Before diplomatic '].or_ pedo.t.r. seek to enter opportunists who feared losing their helping Soviet intelligence.r"ayirg best. The GRU illegals and undercover residencies acted I independently from eich other but in the Pf-wa1p"":i 1l' .d aheady fully developed by the end to the GRU the agent organizations directly subordinated .trilr. into the poriticar riie of ctean eqpionage the thousands of fu.h" soui". targer than the overseas budget or trrJ ocit_1.".'ncies. rwitti torgea documents and offices.ion remains GRU-.. . plun. ..iui .rrpl".y seriously the efforts of the Soviet i-inion t. howitzers and mortars..l.on tf. This was a very serious mistake' With the were closed or blockning of the war when the embassies adJd.. that is.. .r"r"- our. had.e activities of illegals." beginning of the 1930s the GRUbuag"t.ry.i.. attained unprecedentea heigtrts territory the GRU had practicjly "f . Soviet inteflisenle. by the idea of it.o select the Soviet military intelligence succeeded-in I"""1i"g.-iirir'.iori"r. Gradually a tendency became noticeable in the operations of military district intelligence services to limit the use of Soviet officers even for shirt trips abroad. the communication with illegals was disrupted' The . correspondents and so The system in use today of recruitment and running of of the 1920s' Bnts h. underI couer residencies were idded to the numerous illegal residel.i'tt.i*. co-nsuls. and for this reason at the beginning of the war it was practically unharmed. Faced with wartime conditions the military district intelligence services began to recruit and run their agents only from Soviet territory.. .re.t. f... dCp'u. and firrit th"'. yet another GRU fighters. Nobody toof .f. and few countries went to ereat pains to hide tfr"i. the ing position in the wo1ld..ir". the Unlted fr.. France.r. GRU officers posted abroad undercover .34 Soviet Military Inteliigence History 35 tradition first saw tle. .r.aio valves and tank engines.is period: that of ii". but after its recognition.tighl stealing analogous kinds-of of atuminium and-equipment for boring out gun barrels. . Thus.ii"-?gjAi. conformed to the highest international . workshops or l[*:. communications of illegals from GRU residencies with the . . recogniilon of the Soviet Union.rpilr.

. being in no way desirous that its agents should fall into the hands of the NKVD' So the ex-agents ended up in the GRU cellars.. the GRU did not want to reiuse. through the candidacv s1aqe.The demand .order to pay trreir memuership fees the group members refused to productivity redoubled. to oarty. had p3rty cards. inl. sums of in. whose moral In the pre-war period..news the group's acceptih. there were communists who were unwilling.j. party_ The vast'majority accepted this holds.il...irpl. an employee of the Soviet embassy in Berlin. c"Tlny.frs enemy..n. sometimes hundreds of communists became Soviet secret -Ciii agents..lt_.36 Soy iet Mititary Intelligence History : 37 XY_r:lrhe uerman communists .aor. informed the group'jr".'but the GRU intervened. T^r]!I: rne Jovlet communist than that..o"r ttui trr"ir demands had b:"T r..-the first ihing the agents did was to declare a hunger strike and demand a meeting with the higher leadership of the GRU...and the Central Committee threw out their application. and the natural questions arose: 'Were you ever members of the communist party? Why did you leave it?' The fanatics told exactly what had really happened but were damned out of their own mouths. punctually they handed over to *i This took up a $eat deal of time during tfre ageii meetings. had been accepted without goin! r". O"i. At a routine meeting the GRU case officer.oring members of the CPSU and informed tnlm. To burn one's party card is a cardinal sin . More their case officers all'document.. Some_ times however.r. accepted them into the Soviet communist party' The GRU officials had of course assumed that the agents would never set foot in the Soviet Union and that therefore it would be very easy to dupe them. .1^"::.f"'. France to Spain where Ito Switzerland anO finally through the civil war was going on.r.o . it. The Comintern simply made a decision unA jr'r"Aiutely scores.ty cards. *rrt..rtyGU.orruO" Stalin.ri_"y. The meeting took place and the GRU leadership did all in its power to help the Germans join the party. congratitated i.. There is an interesting story to be told about the recruitment of agents at this time. the not difficult for the GRU to write out u O'or. Some time later.pional case. Inlhe meantimi.. recruitment little time.UO. ferriUle disippointments awaited them in the capital of the proletariat of all the world. concerning their earnings together wirh their p. after going through the candidate stage.fully.-. d. til . and as the new agent group was working . camouflage.lfptions. Theirparty'cardr ----' to be kept in the Ceniral Lommittee. bui tni3."u.urembers of the group managed to escape into Austria. but all the then il. From Spain they were brought to Moscow. the Gestapo got on their trail.As un .one group agreed to the GRU. one.*. naturally.ui.J.fr . for it is without demur. . The Germans again declared a hunger strike and demanded a meeting with Stalin in person' At this point the NKVD offered its help to the Central Committee.iy 11 on condition that it was accepted into the Corrunisi furt! of the Soviet Union. the chief of which was that nobody had at any time written out their party cards.. But foreigners -onty bE accepted in the CPSU through the Central Ian Committee. It was supposed to receive a certainium of money for its work..on. In the interests of successful agent ii" always demanded from them that theysiiould from the communist. Hitler had become Stalin's best friend and the communists likewise friends df the fascists. There ensued 'an exchange of gifts * the most up-to'date German military aeropla-nes foiStalin (including the top secret MEl09..lr.. naturally ' :*. JU87. they began to hand over to tieir case-offi..fusion. that the General Secretary of the party trimsett. the political situation had changed sharply. Aftir ail.r-. .. was "r. Howevet' on their arrival in . a* . but Moicow.r. . or i prbli. a Bolshevik manoeuwe to help defeat . the Germans were working very productively and nobody wanted to offend them..

1r3..i"i 6."y shot them att..orprorise. but suggJsted they . in the Moscow area. JU88.. Zhdanov.ourd shoot them in situ.s calculation was very simpre. The purge began secretly as early as 1935 and at that stage ioncerned only the organs and the overseas residencies of the NKVD...ii n.l. l1{: For almost two years the Special Commission prepared of mankind.ighten anybody.h.."t"gether with the editors of the communist newspap.y were in Moscow and proposea u . travelled .i. to.r.t . iarrived face to face with the ultimate necessity of subjugating all layers of Soviet society and utterly eradicating dissension.."-i*"H#.rourJl.i. They inew too-rr. then. embassy in Moscow was informeJ iiiey Spain and had never got as far as Moscow."r. was not a member of the Commission. In order not to fr.th.38 Soviet Military Intelligence History 39 have the heads Russians woutd not. [t is interesting to note that the then head of NKVD. . addition to the ordinary members.. Shkiriatov. :rr.y kroyns anything.-ice nists and now he wo. GRU were issued. The fascists could shoot their victims in tr. l itaken the decision to create a special security commission r. The Germans. Today we have irrefutable proof that the 'Great Terror' was carefully planned and ii. Naturally it was the GRU which was entrusted with the task of purging the NKVD overseas organs.rhe Gestapo burnt the bodies in the turnaces of the power station. there were C-entral Committee and the p"fitUrr".il. but the Gestapo t"rJ'ii. [n other words. Malenkov and i ' Voyshinski.". In 1935 Yan Karlovich Berzin.t. Avtorhanov the Central 'Committee of the Party had.:for carrying out mass repressions in the country.rrion. ""'. under cover ofprotracted whistling of fJ"oinoii""r. In the short time uetore war broke out.iJ.. Its members . under the leadership of Stalin.nr one more 1gt aircraft at the same pn1 Unfortunui.bject. the NKVD organs." uroig the huge coal bunkers of the Kashierski ff.d..about tfre Uaffiing that on.be able to DO2|T. The Soviet side-. Til" In .prepared.. On the testimony of A.fir"J nrrn.res.ni. it. the Centrat Committee of the Soviet "iii.!. Before. decided their fate. purge the surgical instrument itself. mistake .r.f. Gestapo men had p"rrorufiy ru..irion had been taken not to hand them over.h. without hesitation. But no order was issued for Benin to t tnrirt. ' going again declared a hunger strike. The decision was taken by the Party to purge the whole country of potential dissidents.rilidl.o to the Far East with special powers and a group of trusted helpers.o too relinquish his post.. deat for starin too. The execurion1o9k pfu. it was carried out secretly and without public trials.tt..pi. #p. the appointment of . S.* the but he would It was a fruitful German commuto the cestapo ithat ii . the Party took pains to . The fascists did o. without tarking to them. was former agents.. i.rril. Yagoda. and this was a sensible move."r*riiro in exchange for who had taken political asylum in the Soviet Urir.ly.. which took m. Secret orders appointUritski as chief of the ing one I.i u." soui. of his potiticat *pt..ntified each of the people to be execut."u.e most bloody page in the history were Stalin. However.. Before carrying out its massive bloodJetting of the whole of society. th.ung pirorogr. the a.the GRU's lrplace in 1937 to 1938.. tt.i'r. irJ-iii. .nowidmitted to ..r. the GRU will sell him In the meantime the Party..*iT. joint a.HBlll and even the M8110) the surender of all Germ-an .toia-I iiey uetieveO too quickty in the promises of tne . po*""r't.. TIr. Yezhov. as long ago as 13 May 1935. Unshlikht and later S.!geni. H9 was uor"iiit'r. chief. r.un u9 able in exchange for the Uest-Cerman-.. cRtf. on the GRU's fulfilling its promises..ii. and they forgot iomebody puts a high enough price on the head of an however good he may be. were not taken to Germany. as far as the former GRU agents were concerned..'Ciru. Afterwards.

arry -tra! to be dealt with.-iie help of the C\U.40 Soviet Mititary Intelligence History 4t in.London he had i as an been oeputy chief of the GRU' His execution served purge in for the NKVD to carry out a special f . It is interestmg to.f appointed purge of the ll1!:l By the autumn of 1937.#... all military " i. purged the NKVD. Until his ippointment to.GRY:199* also those intelligence officers of the GRU and NKVD who had refused to return io ifr" So'itt Union and certain' destruction. with til.pp. was among the .". the intelligence chief of the. tt pors" first the acting head of the GRU. . . In all probabilitytlutski was aware that Berzin and the GRU had .ruoy V"rrs at last came out into the open Il t|:.'*iliiurt attach6.note that yagoda's death followed an open trial. But in the summer of 1938' in the course of a iecond wave of terror. he did not forget his most irpiJunt task. the GRU was alain destroyed.*" "1 was .even down to the lavatory attendants to reand cooks on its payroll.orn. .. p"iroruUy ran from Spain the whole of the overseas. . Yagoda.t" . fiquidarion of the generat staff.in Spain.Ilower. More than 3. a post in which he was extremely active."rt NKVD .*. fr. party.. was dismissed fr-o1 pil. The head 9f j. i.. had create the GRU from scratch.strength' This time Berzin -tll: d.orn.r. by a special effort of the Comintern particularly in Spain with JLe--h:lp. Evidence has been preserved which shows that Slutski and Berzin had clashes practically every day.. but Slutski was murdeied secretly.imsetf.r" .i rhe GRU.i. losing its entire.and he no lglegr rIqrir"J GRU. and coerc$ Iniernationaiftig"'d. was also in spain.*"d-ii Spain. i'- *"i" ir. His official job was Chief Advisor to the Siunirt Coulrnment. literally destroying .:":. Ezhov himself began a . in the areas of western . At the end of September 1936 the NKVb chiei. Secondly.. .-. jo rhe person of Ezhov "rO '*. liquidated the leading illegals of the NKVD. but Putni.ir"-.everything. on Ezhov.f...iJ Cnu now exchanged roles.etorn"dlo its stbrmy activities.L-. NKVD men with special . commanders and The blow delivered automatically meant a blow to all orjanizations subordinate to the GRU. one of the cleverest and most successful leaders victims' GRU has had.000 Tchekists . o ttre same time. back from Spain.r.ngt.he.. in-tle followin g year Berzin. Uritski' " rest' The NKVD Lrr"rt"dund shot.. firsUy. fre endeavoured to direct the activities of ihe Spani. After the l11{.h. it Soviet miliUboreevich and Corps Commander Putna.r. t[.utJ together with Marshal Tukhachevs[i were army yakir In the Far East Berzin and his assistani. Berzin. arso personafly supervising-itre activities of ail his iverseas agents.Foreign Directorate of the NfiVO. l.. .. with his assistants..url runf.was not simply 1 . E.ir.iif.r "*. As might-be e-xpected. A lear later Soviet military intelligence had .i.his place.s including yagoda and Stutski ttremsefres. Among those militarv leaders nrrt .net are GRU officers. And finally.tr. way as his illegal residents had b"-"n "*"cui"A-pi"rio*fy..ecretly of Berzin.and tfie c6mpJte of the GRU.iiiiury d'istricts iire inielligence directorates had extended the existing reserves of underground armies in case of the the tr. was Uritskirvas simply a cover_up for the long absence iaitu.iion witfr the mysteri_ ous disappearance of NKVD ilregars.t of the GRU.'nnaing himself increasingly -subject to the chief of soviei military intelri_ gence. and after him all the ..NKvD-r"u. This porg" b"gu. Hatred which had been collecting for po*ttt 'and i i I went around the world destroying L":1. iuring the pre-war yean. the secretary of the Crntral Committee of^the Li. that is to the inteligence directorates of the military districts' Here the dea-h-dealing whirlwind came twice. CJn*rent along lines favourable to Moscow. Slutski. In the course of the 1937 purge the GRU was completely destroyed ."r" fo.t . the tary attacne in Lond-on.the GRU had somewhat recovered iir ttt.il.

whose . the head of the NKVD. o*i military delegation to obtuin American and British the urrurn"ntt.t to thequestion must-lie in G-olikov's '"il. as the agent to been that Stalin spared Golikov in order He was certainly told to testing assignment' *i*ort hitl.. ment of_the Party Central Committee).. whose strength at the moment of the attack was more than four milliori men. yet he went . instead oi the usual two.i rt 6"riunt*. but it will not bite feeds it.'thousands of tanks burned in Proskurov's disagreement with him over GRU.t gi* f. saboteurs. Stalin did not order a purge of were opened -the ooom or secret factories and laboratories intelligence had been trying for decades pi".ih" new head of the GRU.nd tens of thousands of trained partisans and.'gui Ezhov.) The second reason was the intelligence service. " In the winter of..tbrgets to specify that from 1937 to 1939 Slvi-et military intelligence was practically non-existent.r:right'. It is probable that at that time there was nobody lt'ii". even t"o tt i.""tion that Golikov could give. in tt" terror. were shot or perished in prisons and. A'rry.i of rr. claim the same reason for its defeat in the winter of l94l was pd.igih was only 27.ry-n:Iday. had made a fataimistake in fking Berzin's place when he was executed on 29 July 193g..""A"J in securing a strategic initiative'.. aU this was destroyed..mtlr. Under Golikov the GRU was reborn I"iiigry qrickty into an effective intelligence force' There hiG."r'. day.91: . he set ii train tt &Lnti which would lead to Ezhov.ii'. and the staff becau-se Hitler-Stalin Jt.e cold. rlr ttre itrier of the GRU and his colleagues After the Finnish scandal. And not only military intelligence..yt{ on to become *.*ta"red. with a numerous antouttgt. the . leaders before him andStalin's D:. In i-he first 'Soni. :. Secret depots and stores of weapons and explosives hia been established....rr..:l his .0U men. 1939t40 there occurred an improbable scandal.p. fartf. The Red A*y.42 Soviet Military Intelligence History 43 [S. ready to meet the enemy. was unable to crush the resistance of the Finnish A*y.. 30 July.il.iilplans for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union " two after him' i&." still ordered I11:""'Y1i9o :t:::'.iit a iuf. Thousandsand destr6yed on their airfields serviceable aircraft were their own parks' ..i-s.* S"viet ". and military inOustryltoo. The implication was clear: monopoly of secret activity had -a begun.. and Stalin now had no *ay'to balance the power of the NKVD.i.tt*". a.. uri i. In all Soviet historical works (which may be-pub- occupation of these areas by an enemy.:d poor intellig-ence are the reaions always given. Military intelligence ceased to exist. ihe hand that for the The war had begun with a catastrophic defeat few hours the German Army Union. tn lon" Lg4dGeneral Filipp Golikov was appointed i"f of ...ett abroa-d and revive and renew the cut off immediately.tle . the Army had been bled white.1"6.i GRU t im.s removal and execution.irch sieculation about this period' D^td !h:..t" GRU.. radio sets had been secretei and refuges for partisans and intelligence officers had been set up. }:-y.. He went first which had been give him io B"gf*O and then to the United States and' to succeeded in carrying out his work in this time he to Great Britain and the an exemplary manner. For his visits did not use faked documents' He United States tre naturally head of an official came..i.y This historical visit was the beginning of intense i"ifuii. With his customary precision anO OetiUeratioi he realized that his control of S&ift int"lfi!*ce was stipping away and the same day.d unanimously denied.l. at tte :ily wirh th_e permission of ttre iropiganAa Oeiart- -i.. h*e wish. (The Germa.. Stalin received only one report on both GRU and NKVD activities.concentration camps. .rL .f and"Marshal of the Soviet Union' The political il.'The ::t9 Party...hi may not take the right decision' -eveL.. Reasons for this wire quickly fouiOOf course there was th.

.r't"ginning of GRU penetration of the German general statr from many different quarters.th this task severat of the former .iGRU in the Europe were assigned to him. and he eventually In the autumn of 1941.iif iltegals who weie tunctionint oi iJrrirory occupied by Germany.rd"p.n.tuurirr. oitt" German High C"ommand were known io Soviei front_line generals before they were known to the cermr. but this_also signail#tf. a very large role .iil.* ll.rerated several *. plans. ".L. 45 of Americ.... of ii"'n. penetration by Soviet military intelligence of the armaments -6..td. Oper' aiional intelligence meanwhile developed activities unparal' leled in scale. One of the newlyiieated organizations was directly answerable to Stalin and tntitled the Chief lntelligence Directorate of the Supreme High Command.ry of the Council of People's Commissars on euestion. "U"giriin. il.."grrO to Hitter.hd"yad points as to the contents of British ... could nor... and the new title of 'operational intelligence' was given to the Intelligence Directorate of Fronts and the GRU of the general staff which controlled these directorates' Both the strategic and operational intelligence services of the Red Army conducted themselves with great distinction in the course of the war.." f1! -Sreat GRU.q"iitJ ..op he attributes such enlightenr"ni ro Sr-u'firi . ot course.s intentions in t94t and the b"gr..il-... though g. he was relieved of the command of the GRU commander of the 10th Anny.iiy-. starin gave Gorikov yet another chance to his guilt with regard to the sudden-G"rrun :*plu(" attack. And the The 'other' GRU was subordinated to .lll-..44 1ll.:l :lty GRU Soviet Military Intulligence atso succeeded.iil..a ana giitain...of this organization was coicentrated the agent network controlled by illegals and liindercover residencies of the GRU in a small number of .Soviet mititary teadership temporarily.i'. and even kept his General's rank. H. On fg O"t"i". The on-ry thing thai did not display a simitai. *u.:turn. the United trate all its attention on carrying out intelligence operations ir against German forces' In order to distinguish between the ..anders.rd ru-b. In the hands. the Americani . expect to keep his post...q. being able .. after Golikov had relinquished his bost..i. In October he was aoooi-nted pf"ripolrti.-"*her exceptionatty successrJ Jilir. but he stayed alive. ttre G'RU was divided into two. Churchill bears witness to the fact that $. Union severat million people who were practically all shot on arrival. Besides its agent intelligence. two GRUs.. industries History the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.. In the autumn of. succeeded in returning to "rr'ru ""-rhe help of the rhe a.utions with ". ing the tuture. . _. The consequences of this were tt ut. in ilrruni. Iater.patriation of Soviet Citizens. u" himself again credit and..nim in foresee- t94t coilko.Sbviet embassies.il.rfightened as to the plans of its allies. is why Statin Jrt . The finest achievements of the strategic agent network were of course the penetration of the German general staff through Switzerland (via the illegal residency 'Dora') and the theft of American atomic secrets by way of Canada (through the residency 'Zaria').r.irish. with $talingrad.d. in 1944. At the same time as f. ffii.il. ikov's career was on the up and up. the term 'strategic intelligencet was introduced for the first time and applied to the GRU of the Supreme Command. even top secret pt.

e. All inteliigence work would henceforth be subordinaie to the rurtysi. *"i" Oi. all the intelligence services passed !9 t!' control of the ivtinistry of Stati Security.uttr. so Stalin technically-promoted tini.:aoiruSon.s:ic'"^"1-. to expel him. whichlnO"prrO"nliy strove their own former organizations. they exerted pressure on 'informition at second hand. Both sets of officers Information' io r"Uot"g" the actiiities of the Committee^of Ift. Stalin deci-ded . were in action at the rear of the Girman forces..u.ottully . Stalin immediately opinion' the r. Between these two. lecurity. parailet wittr ihese Oiversionary was allocated to diversiondry intelligence. analogous group. Uui in fact this Jep. iontinued.jof the committee of Information. Thus the Army and Ministry of Stut" S".. both of which had strengthened thef positions during the war to such an extent -that they had'stopped acknowledging the civil leadership.the Army and the Ministry After the-war. Irless than a year four chiefs one were appointed and dismissed. by .? direct leadership of the Organs of State because his title of minister was taken away. acting in . uppoiniir! his deputy to succeed him. of one intelligence service.ii"iriw of State. . Then their former officers in oider to try to make the Committee oiintorrution collapse from inside' The Central Committee .h. GRU General Staff."rou.. The man closest to Stalin was appointed to lead this organization. of NKVD men the Molotov. It would obviously not be a simpte . .irda' hi. to the ifre feuO"tsfrip of the Pirty.M Soviet Military Intelligence History rnot suit the Army or the Ministry of State Security' and they the first time united against the Party' the Committee of [nformation was an elements and armies whose basic purpose ias to hunt down the German military staff.i". b"t. military_intelligence was once again fused into one organization.f*Aini".f S. and this Tchekists t.i "itortt io. must sooner or later lead organization.u. iniormed the Centrai Committee that they could .*"unr to return from under the control of the Party to ii" . Within tne fiamework of the programme for weakening..r"rti". not naturally found support from the Army which had easy one.. 4rry and Beria was-alio deprived of the leadership of the Tchekists.Security an! lhe GRU.ri.ting power over this -endanger the Party' There was only one *ouiJ . The intelligence wtro f9rryf r. a pupil and favourite of became Chief of the Committee of Information' ah" Party made to improve the effectiveness of the u stroke. Ai this time the party and Starin took care to weaken.. T\e GRU and the organs iipoliticat intelliMinistry sjale sgcurif were joined rogether .iiy were deprived of ihtelligence.o . Groups of guardminelayers were fornned in the intelli-gence units of the fronts of the GRU.h .red from tI.1.tty of State Security and the Army' AAer long struggles u"frinOifr" Beria' scenes Abakumov. for the reason that not strqngth of tle of them was able to counter the unified frfmi. 9f rn one organization called the KI: the committee of"Infor_ carried out strategic intelligence and directed oierationj and tacticar inte[igence. sitiation: immediately to liquidate the *"V "ri"t of Information and divide the intelligence service C#mittee - et Army' into two hostile camps . and this was the activisi'of politburo.r.-u ritruiionJii mation.try of State Security and the Army. the Army and the Ministry oi State Security.. stroveback all iii.." CI" a mistake irad been made' In his it was under even if . tne farty.-To get round the problem' the Party . headed by Zhukov.military intelligence to the Security' But the coup was and political intelligence to State il. fne ieaAing commanders.mitte" of Information..lnielligence from both the Army and Sgle Seguriry.groups the traditional enmity fostered br. work effectively since they were receiving their Frgm its'inception officers of Utteriy inefective organization. i. This plan was put into effect in 1947.

"sioo of umov."n.. beginning of 1954 more weight wllhin Security. After two yeirs Shtemyenko and the GRU.48 Soviet Militory Intelligence nroduced from the thiffit.. was-a blow.ffistry li was transformed into a committee' "li*oit. all happy with State Security's monopoly of the intelligence service.#. The united strength of Army and party was automati_ control of Abakumov and given to the Army.alone was clearly secretly removed from was hurriedly convened' Zhukov was . 3... seeking' to please Stalin. The action continued against the general staff and the GRU.. Stalin immediately appointld General shtemyenko as chief of the generar stafr.ihe senior curator of the GRU...i to stop Political Directorate of the soviet Army and at the same interfering any more in Army affairs' i*"liqrii"eo all ttre special d"Puttt"ntt of State Security i" the Army. exill under Stalin' After a slort lqrg Zl:T'. General Shtemyenko.. Abakumov was immediately shot. Zhukov's next stef..il. During secret trials.uiion of the brgans of State.. Shtemyenko'was demoted to Lt_ General and expelled from the general staff.l"^ ot statJSecurity lost its status as a ministry and . and even against Stalin himself who was removed as general secretary of the Communist Party later that year.t Stalin. dangerous pretender to the throne was. rni'Russian Bonaparte" having returned ."il".blind general stafiP. influence ei*y. rcg l""t"*"r.". became Mini't"t of Defence' with the fall of the Ministry.. a plenum of the Central soo"n no doubt againsi the Army' There was absolutely ot power' since thl Party. .against Partyand Party political workers On his od"tt all et He also ordered "v' commissars were expelled from in" Amy' i. Stalin was opposed to the move.".'" lffi. t i il. On the instructions of Stalin.i. return i"d Ministry of State Security could them to key positiont.ing him as a full general-after dependent om the The GRU became an organization solely. Beria.il. presented documents about the existence of an agreement among subordinates of Abak- F. But Ministry of State Slcurity did not forgive the -the general staff and the GRU for having taken such liberties.9f q::f . Beria *as arreited at a joint .iil. 1952was a year of struggle between the politburo and Stalin.y History 49 llny una Army leaders and immediately done away with.-i.. For his distinguished services. immediately after the death of ^ +. the Army acquired more and Marof ihe iiut".. of course.[ur 7t uto". incriminating documents were cally against him.iiiJ."..". il.otity torture was carried out in the ihe i'itilitui-il. But in (ictober 1957 Zhukov to Yugoslavia and in his !iur" "rror.rk il".of committed a itre situation. The Ministry of State Security presented documents which tl. and the usual purge carried out in the ranks of State Security.-bil..i" "pp"ini Shtemyenko to the his demotion' dnU.l sessions Zhukov openlv contradicted Khruschev and PubliclY abused him' -in deprivfarty understood how rashly it had behaved id A.. r:. made a report to the politburo on the subject of the . after which the GRU was removed from the GRU concerning the leaders of its leaders the 'Iif ' on Gogol Boulevard' At the '..L."y_{tT"! proved the existenie of a plot in rhe ranks of the GRU.*: iolitburo' He quicklv effected the "t1ii" T tiil-:1 of all the exiled generals and marstrals h" ilil. but the Politburo insisted.ri il P... the first deputy of the chief of the general staff. He went on a visit Committee of the Party ib. the Committee of Information finally abolished. The crocodile was clearly throwing off ". This time it was the turn of the GRU and all the geyyl lrfjo be purged.t ft e ."ty the Armv wluld u:-1ot: the only master. he was therefore not exercise any restraint on Zhukov and post of Chief of the . thg beginning of 1953.u. AJter this there began the usual p"r.-t"i:nLo. there ensued a fierce squabble among his disciples and comrades at arms for the diJtribution of trie inheritance.neously and many oi Yt:-tlg "fi.

r. To look at the GRU in isolation from its 'from subordinaie organizations is to look at Gengis Khan without his innumerable hordes.rf. axe governments and kill statesmen..e political Direc"tie of StatC The GRU may formally be described as an immensely powerful intelligence organization forming part of the general staff and acting in the interests of the higher military : command of the Soviet Union.l.. .fip] p. The central apparatus of the GRU processes espionage information coming from a thousand secret agents and it also carries out cosmic. a person was eminently suitable is far as th. learne atery seni a Th. a we approach the term GRU in a formal way in order to 'explain everything that is covered by those three letters."u. [n addition.bonanarti*.*y"iijnirt.. elec' tronic.. Serov.9: appomtment. arch_rival and enemy of the KGB.i . . ifri"ryenko followed him. according to Lenin. ready to serve anybody who Oeiireo tris services a report only the data which woutd ptease su. General The Pyramid torate of the Soviet Security. under the direction of the GRU steal top-secret documents. again reduled to the rank ["#. What is more important is that...If "i ii" cnu.. fut Iv_an meSnber Now once more the post of chief of the GRU was held bv of the KGb.Ii'"i?r. uppoinr.s .il ail.:'ff:ffi.v returned ..s again firmly on the leash.. who had been from 1951 to rg5i. in addition to all this..riir. On its strength there are I rnore than five thousand senior officers and generals who have specialist academic qualifications in intelligence matters.i"i.y. on his :r]9_. (Some survive vicissitudes better ttran oifieis:*unoq Brezhnev. Golikov was .ij th"i.-petr fr. tn u ."u". Shtemyenko. we picture but one that is far .h.. trade representatives and so on.i from Yugoslavia straisht into-renewed e*if r. shill get a very impressive iomplete. T#t.r-general.j.50 Soviet Military Inklligence the Politburo and also from his duties as Minister of Defence because of . *.lry_Arry .k. automatically turned into "u. officers of the GRU operate under cover in every country of the world as diplomats.ouflnot exploit him party and the rCs... .#ffi xl tlrxri.th: int"rotr-of-rt""funy. order to General Golikov. ilr-. air and sea intelligence on a global scale.. . succeeded Golikov a. Serov's successor as _chief-oi1il'6iu was ColonelGeneral of the KGB. since he had been a general of the KGp.nora.. who then. and was not in the last interested in the fusion of these two organizations.ierat yepishev. military attach6s.ir'vrur tG.""ijrg. Both the illegals ' and the undercover officers independently from each other carry out the recruitment of agents. But we have not mentioned the most important point yet.'i.f: but it was intercenred by the Ket Ai.. I Shtemyenko was again . concerned.rk*.r. Up to now we are talking about Gengis Khan but not his hordes."*dir. 1*y.i.irrt.J. The GRU has its illegal representatives in every country I of the world.-C. . the GRU is also the superior crocodile was ....d chief of the Politicat Directorate of the SovLt a former Tchekist and potiticai. the former crriet oiJrre seror.. rn 1-slnrlthe control the Armv in. in addition to carrying out intelligence work in the interests of the general staff. i:..

t. they gather information on the enemy. group and fleet there are inte[igence directorates. and there are in the Soviet armed forces at La'rt nrty. up bridges. But each satellite also has its vassals .il.t and io on. *:::::::r :o. and so forth..gch intelligence..hi.rate' The intelligence agent department (RO) of an irmy or flotilla does run an of each intelligence neiwork of iis own. The GRU authority tontrols every step of the pyramid' assistance of the agent-terrorists.. nuttut of thJ superior intelligence directorate and . group or fleet as a mini-GRU..rganizationally.g. _ in Germany. the intelligence directora'tes recruit spef cial agent-terrorists destined io murder statesmen or senior military officers and to carry out general terror in tfre counifi group of countries.g. And these Spetsnaz units are supillr". ::[. th. they have a imporrant means. .f. "i1!-i fi::t: ' states' the -*y:There are twenty-four lesser satellitethe head of (RU).the Northern. air and other types of intelligence . subordinated to .intelligence directorates . With all the forces at their disposal.. and this is cosmic o. 1g lnteilrgence. form of subordination is that Soviet military ttrir pyt"rii vassal intelliiience does not operate on the nnn{npltrat'the fully and without oiry"uu*d is not my vassal'. secret information..-. We only mean that the intelligence directorates (RU) of staffs are smaller than the chief directorate of the general staff. When we speak of an intelligence directorate of a district.l"lr$lTe of ln me territories But each of these twenty-four intelligence directorates -agents wartime. Hungary and czechoirovakia .4i". dams' oil . On the strength J"putt*"nt. group o.i. instead of this. without assistance. ipu. F. ieudal state --the GRU.tiff top"tiot chief intelligence diiecto.n.uting into the enemy's territory to murder b6.ii*gtt of one intelligence directorate.network. In all. these directorates f9ll.." to* '. Poland.t n. . Pacific.y are all subject to the GRU and numbertwenty-a are. and each of these in its turn has its own army' and L"" at that.. "'tit*g of"from has his own aimy and his own vassals' also ". Thus each district. GRU in miniature. this does not in the leasi mean that the intelligence directorate is small or weak. Each flLet consists of flotillas which are equivalent army to ifr. In Jpetsnaz units..forces consists of armies. be abte to recruit countries or groups is best iiragine Soviet military intelligence in the of u powerful.trii" tte territory of a contiguous r1.t - sum"i"it porn. Brack sea and Bartic fleets.:fl': l--d. At the same time.O. the to ordinary agents providini riiritary district and group of . "u"-t. on the staff strengths of each district. ut*i.nt r"t*orks."fri. 6"s1. fo-u1. ro disrupt life in any *'nti!uous-country or group of countries. addition ..directorate pdr"sre.and four fleets .. a.t" i. The-only difference as regards *iit "t*i. the Soviet Army consists of sixteen the second fust being the ordinary espionage..s of the land forces. There is only one form"of intelligence possesserl by the GRU which possess.irUers 115 saboieurs and cut-throats. in effect. which are the diversionary f*-1p-r_":]::: are in the sphere of interest of th-e given district.t to be able. Each of these mini-GRUs utilizes its own facilities. an intelligence the iuil.i.. electric pgwer stations. and fi. inte[it. On the staff of each department (RO)-which is in effect a it. Lio"tin.+errorisinetwork ialled Soyn11' suffrcient to iiii" . group 9r of forces oi fleet has its own two independent secret ug".iOO ptot"tsional cut'throats continually in readiness state and go to the pun. both in peacetime and military districts..52 Soviet Military Intelligence The Pyramid 53 direcling organ of the gigantic formation cailed Soviet miritary intelligence.rilo uy the intelligence department's wide choice of Llectronic. there is a Spetsnaz gomplny' This company' .iuting of inaepenaentry countries whicir These stePs need to be examined' -'8. it is ierne*Ui that each one clontrols ah entire Spe*naz brigade: to i. is capable of and kidnap n"nrt.pffi .oups of forces.


Soviet Military Intelligence

The Pyramid



,nilr: Atl the-spetsnaz brigades and companies of the milrtary drstricts and armies, all the reconnaissance battalions

tank and electronic reconnaissAnce, has a sabotage co*pury which is also staffed with cut-throats capable of successful operations in the enemy's rear. In the interests of accuracy it is_necessary to add that not ail of the rg0 tank and motorized rifle divisions.have a full complsrirent of personneil;;;".* time; many of them have a complete tecirnical staff and full offiyg1_slreneth, but only a pa.iiat complement of soldiers and NCOs. However, this ruie does not apply to reconnais_

the heads of regimental reconnaissance and their troops. The reconnaissance battalion of each division, apart fr6m

each division there is a chief reconnaissarice officer. He has his own lroops, a reconnaissance battalion, and ht.

,{1 army in the Soviet Union consists of from four to six In peacetime there are in the soviet armed forces about 180 tank and motorized divisions. In the interests of simplification we can omit the eight divisions of airborne forces (VDV), the brigades of maine infantry belonging to the fleets and still many more branches of tne Souieiaimy IIg! h-*l inteltigence units subordinated directty ro it l GR-U-{ the general staff. On the strength of the staff of

vassals who carry out the orders of the GRU as y and with as much jealous zeal as do the intelligence Ltes of military districts, the intelligence departments

armies and the chief reconnaissance oifrcers of divisions regiments. These are the military intelligence services of

a, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary'
in the full meaning of the word ls of the Soviet Union. Their secret police forces are r the complete control of the Soviet KGB and take the of a miniature copy of the KGB. Their armies are in to the Soviet Army and their military intelligence ices are full vassals of the GRU, with all their gg!1 ls, rlili!4ryj!!g![, LaFotase agents' .s and so on. But of these later.
ies are satellites and

ia, Mongolia and a number of other countries' These




qompanies (more than 700), are always kept at full strength and staffed by 6lite officers and NCOs.

of the divisions, a[ the regimentJ


all. In addition to its ;fficial

twenty-four separate espionage organizations, each 1""rk:9 or wnrch ls as powerful as the intelligence service of one certral European country. He will havl overlooked 100,000 €lite troop_s_possessing as many fighting vehicles as a wellequipped Western European c-our-try. [ut .r.n that is not

Everything that we have listed comes under the indivisible control_of the GRU, although none of it is called by this name. The researcher who studies the GRU but does not take into consideration the GRU,s vassals will have

the GRU also


The GRU and the Military Industrial Commission



4 The GRU and the Military Industrial

The price of the ship is paid to the Ministry of Shipbuilding.by

Commission (VpK)

the bouncil of Ministers under the debit item 'shipbuilding industry'. This Ministry, by the way, has never constructed any non-military vessels. Non'military vessels are, without

to the Soviet Army we must have in mind not orl"y tne frainistry oi Defence, but also the twelve other ministries whose

When we use the term ,army, with regard


to it. For example, an {rcraft carrier is under construciion in the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Defence does not U"r, .nyoi the cost of this.

receives the armaments neceisary

billion roubles a year. This nineteen billion, however, is the budget of the Ministry of Defence alone. The budgets of the remaining twelve ,irl.tri., produce armaments are kept secret. The Soviet system"trich is conitructed rn sucn a way that the Ministry of Defence does not buy; it

in the interests of defence, the irp.oU.Lfy small sum of nineteen

rovler unton itself. Theoretically the Soviet Uni6n spends,

own. The economic and financial might of the military industrial can onty be corpui"d with the might of the ::iit.,.,,_".1

collegium of the military- industrial commission are: one of thi first deputies of tlie ctrairman of the council of ministers, thirteen ministers, and the chief of the general staff and the chief of the GRU. The military industrial commission is the-Army and the arry i, tt" ,ifitury industrial commission. When we ,uft of-u ,iruggle between the Army and the party and the KGB *. frur" in mind the struggle of the whole military industrial .o.rirrior,;;;; fortunes, wax and wane in perfect fr.-ory ,"ith the A;/;


weapons una rilit"ry technology. rogemer alt these ministries form the high_powered monoilth



by the military industriat lorimission
in the


exieption, bought for the Soviet Union in Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark - it is difficult indeed to list all of them' It is probably true that only Switzerland is an exception to this list. The same thing is true of aircraft, tanks, rockets, nuclear bombs, military electronics, every item of hardware' Nobody in the Soviet Union knows exactly how much the military industrial commission swallows up, but in any case it is an astronomical figure. At the heart of any Soviet five'year plan for economic

. development

- not the propaganda plan which appears,in all the newspapers, but the genuine, secret plan - will be found the military industrial commission's plan. For all the other branches of the Soviet economy, metallurgy, machine tool

construction, energy, transport, agriculture, have no inde' pendent significance but only provide for the activities of the military industrial commission. Soviet science is another

- nary compact, imall-engined car? The Sotiet Union has had to buy all its technology for the production of small cars from ltaly. What are Soviet scientists up to if the Soviet Union has first-class military poisons but has to buy fertilizor technology from the United States? What are the sixty billion roubles spent on if the USSR constructs gigantic trans-horizontal radar, ultra'high frequency transmitters for

organ providing for the military industrial commission.' Officially it is allocated about sixty billion roubles a year' three times more than defence. But what sort of science is it, if the Soviet Union can produce the first automatic satellite destroyer in the world but cannot produce an ordi'

communications with submarines whose undergtound aerials amount to thousands of kilometres in length but has to


is yet

Soviet Military Intelligence

bly rF technology for the production of ordinary household television sets from France? Sixty bilion roubrei on science

TheGRl]andtheMititaryIndwtriatCommission(vPK)59 industries and science' In the course of
Soviet armament maior GRU operation, such


the theft of all the technologi

GRU, it has a vast apparatus within ttre coiitry and its political influence is colossal. So why is the financial might of the GRU many times greater tlian that of the KG-B? (Some specialists consider it to be several tens of times greater.) The business may be explained as follows. The fGB_!t_ its budget, which is without doubt enormous, and the GRU also has a moderate budget. Both form a part of State expenses and naturally the Slate tries to limii these expenses. But in addition.to its ,clean'budget the GRU has colossal orders from themilitary industriafcommission and from Soviet science which provides for the military com_ mission. These orders are incalculably greater than thi actual 'clean' budget of the GRU. For example, on receiving an order from the military industrial commission to steal a tank engine, the GRU receives money allocated as a debit item to''science' or 'industry'. With this money the GRU will recruit an agent without spending a single cent of its own money, industry and science will receive the engine they want and save enormous expense, and finally ttri CnUt 'free' agent will continue to work on its behaif for the rest of his life. All twelve ministries of the. military industrial commission, plus all of military science, are ready to place money with the GRU if only they can obtain the tichnology which is essential to them. Designers and factory directois receive medals and prizes for copying foreign iamples of armaments in the same way as they would ii they worked ou! their own examples. The KGB depends oniy on its actual budget, but the pRU draws on the buOgit of all

another means of camouflaging Soviet military expendi_ ture and the true might of the military industrial commission. What has the GRU to do with itris? The connection is this.: the ludget of the GRU is many times greater than the budget of the KGB. But the KGB is muchiigger than the

;;ru";tii-erfiion tot the American nuclear submarine e;r;;;-,irtiinston (which enabled the Soviet Union to the GRU build a perfect copy - nicknamed'Small George')' Other




*i..ii" ;n"o Eye' and the Anglo'French Concorde'
many others.

a single dollar of its. own- budget' American examples were the copying of the

itilffi;;; i,

the armaments Why does the KGB not carry out orders for very simple' The chairmen of the Council inJrrttyf This is Soviet of frfinitt"tt and Gosplanr are responsible for the whom Trrey ptan hiw much money to allocate' to the Council of and for what purpose. To the chairman of f"flriri"" .r. *boiOinated both the armaments industry and *r. Uinirt", of Defence with the general staff and the GRU' of the The KGB, alas, is not answerable to the chairman the GRU C""*il of Mini.t"t . Having given money tothe Council to of interesting]tile chairman of oU,uin something com' chriirmariof the military industrial



;ii ;;;.; the goods. The Kdg is not usuallv il *uth-:1-1I1X'tff: The ' ilei;;u.- u."n handsomely and generously paid'. to right and arrogant courtier, having the

mission may bang on the table and demand 1!'1*d:li'"Y. they op. eutit they give money to the KGB then deliver wait quietiv-until the KGB is readv to


KGB is a vain pocket' .r.uf. u, the King's.oun.Il, but without a sou in his -CnU ready to is an-ugly hunchback: a moneylender' h. r.rr.-uniUody ani'making millions in the pro99s::..Tle would kill the courtier hates the moneylen'-der' The courtier ;;;ft;"t were it noi fot the fact that he serves the King
I Thc State Planning committee'

i. power? can so little be about the GRU. He mentioned the destruction of the comrpunist leaders in 1937 but omitted the destruction of the peasants in 1930.. of which the GRU is part. the main function of the Organs is to exert pressure on the people themselves. y|-t comes all espionage information..[i. Traditions live. His attitude is analogous to his rlurr. underlining that it was only the nomenclature that changed. a thousands of colonels simply consider that . but only ihat which at a given moment might bring him undoubted political capital. . He poirtted to the mass executions in Stalin's time but forgot to mention the mass executions in Lenin's time. in his struggle for power.. The GRU did not need such publiciiy and therefore nothing official was-given out about the police. given that it certainly exists and cgrtainly po. and it is still forbidden to complain about the Organs.i.d. Later Lenin's succ€ssors informed people of all the changes in the names of the Organs. KGB officials who guard Soviet embassies overseas but are not members of -the inteffitence organization consider. Consequently in dark.the ordinary Western man in thel street h. il M3gg. or the.i. a branch of the fCf "rfi. Revelations of crimes iommitted overseas did not enter into Khruschev's plans." to the people the existence of an .. others do attitude-to the mythical animal from a Scottish " Much is known about the GRU by Western specialists. that of tt icCg.But Why ls Nothing Known About It7 . blt-decidedly Nevertheless. rr. but simply lih: either it [r [i nobody is frightened "known of the animal. Secondly. colossal ::t. so let us discuss the most important ones. way quite a few reasons. in many cases. Tcheka. . He demonstrated the role of the NKVD but completely forgot the role of the communist party as the main.. i. khruschev by no means revealed everything.r*ring Lenin when he informed the people about the birth of the V. for the GRU is unknown "r"rybody. Naturally people il'remember the kGB (on any pretext). _ including the mass ffrey aid this through the mouth of . He was therefore silent in this regard and did not mention the i! pleased with the piople executions of millions..61 5 But Why Is Nothing Known About It? In the Soviet Union the registration plates of certain cars fr9r.y no idea at all about it. Khruschev *as int.r".extraordinary' orgun oiih" dicih. but. The essence remained as before. how There are exists. the communisis had t6 unroun.. nobody had given it this function. underpeople's consciousRess everything tlqis ground and secret is connected with the KGB but not at all GRLI.rerted in showing up the crimes of the Organs within the country and he did show up several of them. Jhe its existlnce.r. The effect was so strattering that part in the struggle against the people. in tire Soviet Union except to a small circle of enlightened ones.r. but never the GRU' 1 Tniraty.r. there have been photographs puUtlstreA of it. Moreover. Khruschev made known to a siunned world some of the crimes of his predecesors and honourable Tchekists. . In practical terms the GRU did not take iitt tt. They could not bring him any political advantage. leading and directing force.. Not because it was iott of humanity and love for its fatherland. Firslly having established their UfooJy dictatorship. g"orgra end with thi tetters 'ciiu.. that there is residency in the embassy. Sorne berieve. b. of the proletariat which was permitted to deal in whatever from that moment the whole world unreservedly saw the leadership of the KGB in all spheres of secret criminal activity.uo. Even in the general staff. again-perhaps it does not exist.military d"purtr"nt coincidence goes unnoticed by almost inril.



Military Intelligence

as Tchekists, and this at a time when iiRU inteiiigence ofihcers hated the fchglists many times more than thJy did the Gestapo. The GRU did not object to this. It preferreJ to maintain silence, not only about its crimes and .but . mistakes, also about its successei. The spying breed of animal ketip,s itself in the depths; muddy J.t.I.io darkness are more to its liking than publicity.

advertising the 'attainments' of the Tchekists. In this connection all intelligence officers, KGB or GRU, were categorized

the KGB- Lastly, havingtmadJ rivers of blood from the people, the KGB strove to whitewash itself at all costs

greater attention. Fifthly, any unpleasant things which happen to foreigners in the Soviet Union are first and foremost connected witf, tne KGB and this gives rise to a corresponding flow of information about

to the KGB

organs of mass information in general. They certainly devote

overseas brimes of the KGB and, of course, those of the GRU. Fourthly, the struggles against dissent, emigration, and western radio stationJbroadJasting to the SovieiUnion are the-.sole responsibility of the fGE Uut not the GRU. Naturally the most talented representatives of liberation movements and immigration address their best efforts to enlightening the KGB itself. It is the same as regards radio station b-roadcasting to the Scviet Union and the Western


The GRU and the'Younger Brothers'


The state structure of any communist country strikingly if it finds resembles the structure of ihe Soviet Union' Even Union or has been able to itself in conflict with the Soviet character' escape frorn its influence, it is much the same in general rule for all co-mmunist ffr"Lft of personality is a countries, .nd ury 'big brother' needs an all'powerful secret potio otgunization to-counter'balance ihe power of the first

It is usually military intelligence which fulfils this cottnterbalancing roie, the more solince all communist countries'

of the kind of'communism they adopt, are warlike there an? aggressive. In a number of communist countries secret police organization' but *ouHlppear to be only one in these'cases closer inspection will clearly show a minimum


Sooner or later the his secret service into two dictator will be forced to split parts. In the countries within the orbit of the Soviet Union itrat separation has already been carried-out, for all of them

of two mutually hostiie groupings'

have bien created in the image of the elder brother'

The military intelligence sirvices of the satellite countrips show great activity ii the collection of espionage multl3!' GRU' unA ufT such material obtained is sent directly to the

The fact is that the intelligence services of the satellite of countries are even legally inswerable to the Ministry The military intelligence serDefence of the Soviet Union. vice of each Warsaw Pact country is subordinate to its chief of the general staff, but the chief of staff is in his turn subordiiate to the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact' Theor' may etically a general from any country of the Warsaw Pact



Mititary Intulligence

is all very welll some sceptics will object, but after .This yhal hpnened in 1939, f&" iuO'l i"r.. dislike for the Soviet communists, and their "u"ry iri"[ig";.; services would hardly work their best in tf," int"i"ri, ";'rl" GRU, would they? After 1953 the Easr Germanri;ily;i;;"d the feelings of the potes. In 1956 Hungary dr.; ttreir,*ano in 1968 the Czechs and Slovaks. Surefi ,fi" i"r.ifig"r."'re*i.e, of these countries would not wor[ hard i, ,[" irr"i.sts of Soviet military intertigence? unfortunater,,hr, ;;"rusion which has gained too wide an accentrr,.l;::::. contiadicts rt. rt,, u rult thrall to the Soviet Union hare th;-$;;;t"communists; but

all the forces of staffs of the .fraternri".r"ri"r,, including, of course' the military inteiligence s"r"i.", oiito." .ouni?"r, and we are not talking of-aor" .*op.ruLr, but of direct subordination in the legal sense. -r--Er'v

of defence in one of those states. There ir-J;;;.;;;;y for you. The USSR Minister of Defence-, through f,i, ?'.prty, directs

ever been Soviet favg or" of them is already well known to us: the former .fri"t of the GRU, Generat Shtemyenko. After tf," faiiof iiirscheu, Brezhnev, trying to ptease the Army, Airgru."d general from exile and reinstated irim as a fuli-general. As chief of staff of the Warsaw pact, his Air".i.up"ii-or High Commander of the Unitei-irr.O was (and is) the Forces of the member-countries. To this post i, t u, u-ioiuy. been a Soviet marshal who has been appointed. FirsriJ was Konyev, then Grechko, after him yat<ubovst<i .ra ir"fi, Xulikov. But the ,offcial titte of all rhese the time they commanded the united- forces was .firsi Oeputy of the Minister of Defence the USSR _ CorrurO"r_in_Chief _of of the United Armed Forces ot ir," ,;;;;;'.ountries of the Wdrsaw pact,. In other words, the armies are the armies of several states subordinated to a deputy

be appointed to this position. In practice of course there only

s;;r;;;;inr"a. ,"*[rt ri,



'The solution to ihe tiddle is this. By means of harsh economic treaties the Soviet Union hai enchained all its 'younger brothers'. For Soviet oil and coal, electric energy and gas ' they all have to pay very heavily. The Soviet Urrion propGes to its satellites that 'you may pay by means of your orvn wares or you may pay by providing the secrets of other, people'. This alternative offer is a very tempting one,.to wtrictr ttre general secretaries have unanimously responded by orderin-g their intelligence officers- to-- redouble their .ifortt. So the intelligence services of all countries tied economically to the Soviet Union make the g[eatest possible efforts. By itealing Western secrets and transmitting them to Soviet military or political intelligence they reduce their countries' indebtldneis and raise their peoples' standards of living. Wistem states have been surprised by the extent of the intelligence interests of communist states' Why should Mongolian intelligence be interested in atomic reactors, or Cuban intelligenci in high'powered rocket engines? These questions arJeasily answered as soon as one realizes that t'h.y .t. all part oi on" gigantic formation. [n the ranks of

none the less their intelligence services work to the full extent of their powers in the interests of the elder brother'

officiats of Sbviet state institutions overseas it is almost imposible to find one 'clean'one. All Soviet citizens' from ambassadors to cleaning staff, in one way or another co' operate with the KGB or the GRU. The same thing is true oi the official institutions of the 'fraternal countries'' There it is also diffficult to find a single 'clean' official' All of them are to some extent co-oPerating with the Soviet KGB or GRU - even though frequently they themselves do not realize it.


The GRIJ and the




but these are all either a part of the main function or not of

The GR(l and the'KGB

prime importance. ' The function of the GRU may also be stated


parallel, but quite different phrase: to prevent the collapse

The working methods of the GRU and the KGB are absol_ utety identicat. h is imposriUfe ioie[ ,igr.trr"s apart. Bur their funcrions differessentially;il;;, the orher. The basic functiqn of the fCA may Ue':_pr..*O in one guiding phrase:


of (liion from an extemal blow. ln the opinion of

the general staff luch a blc


UniJn in peacetime, even in the course of routine Soviet in Asia, Africa or Europe' This, -the military


may be struck at the Sovict





lhe protection oi communist VIps; the suppression of any clashis o, Jir."* .rong rhe popu_ jont rhe. carrying oit o1 oisinformation; ll prohibition the of any-contact betwein tte p"opl" and the outside world - including tt. i*t.iion'oi'ior"ign visitors _ and the cutting off of an-y .orr..i, .ii.Jdi established with and

some of those functions:

ailow cgttapse Union from specific function ir"rJr.o, In*;r. To enumerate




"d".ntutes most important function of the GRU, is undertaken on four fg!s. On the ryi!'mrv i@!, literally everything is of interest importance, of course, are the and deployment of the armed forces composition, quantiiy of ail countriei of the world; the plahs and thinking of the military leadership and staffs; mobilization plans in case of

tffi" GRU.tTt;;e

the guarding

parties wirh rhe aim of nippini i" "orrunist *,. Lrj .nl rreresy which might emerge from trlm;-the of all. Sovier -t-hemr"tres; citizens abroad, including fCg ;m;"; th. seeking our and destructio-n of tfre mosi altir" oppon.nt, or the communisr regime. The KGc funoions,

Soviet population ; observing tr,"

'wirhin rhe srare or iorkers religious organizations which

in the-same way inro.irs.fi" u*ggi. *irt emigration and efforts to diminish iis influence oni't internal life of the Soviet Union; the srruggle with " Wesiein radio stations broadcasring ro the SovietUrr, urj'J,r,ir'r"un, of mass information which pive a correct picture of the situation

Ij,.l.,t::1,..r i actrvttres rotate around the same main axis _ to prevent the collapqe of the ussR from within. can be divided


,i rr*tL^ d;;;r. ren disrricts of Kct ;i;;-.il'or.o..s but ts

war; the type and direction of military training of forces;the organization of forces; the means of supply; morale and so onl Ot prime importance on the llilllgy'+oliticgl,fiont Le the relaiions between the different oountries of the world: overt and covert disagreements; possible changes in political



and military leadership of military and economic blgcs; new alliances; any, eren the slightest, change in the political and

military orientation of armies, governments, countries and
whole 6locs and alliances. On the @lary'Echnologicdftmtthe GRU handles intelligence related t0 the devebPment or new kinds of armaments and military technique in the countries of a probable enemy; the carrying out of trials and




tte srruggte with innu.n.. on the

tests; new tecirnological processes which might be utilized



for military ends. And the @ry-rgrykfront presents exceptional interest for theTF[l]Fl6t and foremost it is fascinated by the capacity of such and Such a state or grouP of states to produce modem types of weapons, but it is also extremely klen to learn about industrial potential, energy' transpori, agriculture, the presence of strategic reserves, vutnirable areas of economy, and energy. The general staff considers that if the GRU can give accurate information in

.lot is a branch of the KGB' Both the iCg ie" . For the KGB qu":j.i. for Union from within.il. for example in politics.{" *rrf" .i.f.y and mutual hatred between .h. vlce-versa:..it ft.*6. il i.nted the GRU from actively opposing io it".. the Soviet Union by means of a blow from outside..se..s of personnel lirptlfa in the Chinese politicat and military feaOerriip.ffi an.. superficial possible examination of the presid"nt.rirt itt" CnU is under the control ih.f. because his human rights poticies 8 weipon which coulj T-e the Soviet ril il'.In. .f*. not even daring to bark tour". Soviet Union has an embassy. But invulnerability il"" lr..iigrrtry on his colleague from. iCg lo jiili"r"" no interesr dependence on the KGB_ In the'chafter on history we endeavouied to show the character of th'ese mutual relations KGB we have to return to the question of .sent day.ror.o ..--tlre KGB' he or brawl quarrel never iniisiife dare to diffei with.[o* it. fCg may tlave some unfavourable information on a *.'idB it.i. - joining the GRU The second argument is that everybody aPPears has to be vetied by the KGB' This argument i1 that each new .m GRU. Ano good time from every country in the world on these four then it can count it impossible to Jestroy !1o1ts. the GRU exceptionat interesr in the . b"ginning vith Aralov' and .h"* mutual relitions which perfectly suit the Party' the GRU and i.ii ily. . and it is pycisell lhh provides proor ol noticeable even to'unarmed eyes.t until he becories a Central Committee official or of the KGB and possibly I.and to consider the are inclined from ihe KGB.. still less wilh T.rity ot President Carter fror ArJrr.rritt.tou.l[:iIfftili]: fl:"j'. Some specialisis d.. almost an empty ptace.ees of their ind€Pendence-. and even sometimes on the order p"tty striking the Tchekists sudden and heavy blgl!: oi .i"i of tire GRU i. appears to be the mostdangeroui opponent "i"w possible.i .. The same mutual relations have been KGB are readv at .different."t". China is. usually adducing in -defence of ttris opinion two arguments' Fintln ihey say.o*runir.l.r.gn posed practica[y no iri.i.i.". military exercises are of any interest to rhe KGB residents.t to the police of every country where the t"*l!l .'which the independence of the GRU' If the fate or career of a GRU resident were to depe4 would .. prrron"iity the GRU infallibly decided thar he *ouH-i"r.many instances_the interests of the'KGB and the GRU a..y'.-p"..h.hekists: he would be like a cowed laqdo-g for the between his legp.. inl pr"*n. The KGB very well knows that afte-r siity yean or. Even in those fieldJ where the GRU and the KGB have what would seem to u" iit.i"r*ffl "i. their approa.. . But that same man. "r. particular problem would differ in esse:ce.i. The GRU and the to deitroy each other' Between them exist .Vt the efforts i"ner otJ".ing only at first glance' The fact the of"the ientral Coirmittee is under the control of Central Commit"in. fo'r exarnple.9"t 9: general' but this .t a branch of th. an object of the greatest posible interest to the preserved in the past. the KGB.68 Soviet Military Intelligence The GRII and the KGB 69 ::I: yly.on"in. irom the poiit oi of the KGB.. be the fint lu. [kJ the 'clean' diplomats in all Soviet officers of the GRU do not do this' They t *iti. KGB.na the GRU select for themselves the people necessary and in this connection consult the KGB' for any io .. ln lnott.t. eiu .Ty out a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union. a demonstration of €migrds is of absolurely no{nterest ro the Iussran o:.[V . Urt tir. In examining mutuar ieiaiions between the GRU and the . of great interest to GRU residents.re diametrically. For example.- the Soviet population will not Ue in ttre least interested in from China or Korea or yugosravia j :rtTil::ii:lil"d9ey that not rr rs aso qurte convinced one defector fipm the Soviet Union will ever seek refuge in Cnli.r ll! is ahiays a former KGB has been the . ii.r.

. keen thar this should continue.. and always rts own has been. These shows are not of great interest to my chaps and unfortunately not one of them was there with a cin€ camera. The securiiy oiiil. of @urre..70 Soviet Military lwelligence discred.*iii. but he has no.J-::Ti:lo. the telephone rang and it was Andropov.jl.onr.p". the Soviet supersonic passenger aircraft Tupolev TU144 had crashed.irurion.i:. The guard :Jik.hr'ii-G. comrade Andropov?' 'Peter lvanovitch. how are you?' Peter Ivanovitch lvashutin (present chief of the GRU) did not hasten to match the friendly tone. may refuse enrry to an engineer *ho. I hear you have got some films showing the catastrophe. Now the operational the Kci.30 in the morning.'f. ".:f-. I need the film about the catastrophe.r. The films had not been developed in PariJbut brought straight to Moscow.ir..*.. ffi . this il i-ra ud. test pilots and of course the GRU and the KGB. and if. This day began fbr tnejnU felO-JJnin at the unusualty early hour of 3. :.[riil!. If it so Jesires.:t'.in tfre GRU. The KGB in rhis case plays the part of a filter.l. the minister of aviation production..fi.:ffiI technological inititute of the GRU would develop them immediaiely.{ tam-. *::t.."r. The CRII and the KGB 7l the command point that the aircraft from Paris had landed at the centrat iirport and taxied up to the GRU building' The day before. don't be so official..1-^ ..ro-^^.ili Ceitrat Committie irrlO"'ii" jt *ll Li'. at which they would hear evidencc from Tupolev.. flil'j' j::If . CnU had at its disposal no fewer than twenty films showing the same moment..i:T.o. U"our"'it.lr.ig[t to engineer's safe..".fi. How are you.:y :r!ilrj ..nts of that i{{fi . would you be very kind and give me just one little film? You know yourself that I have to make a report to the Politburo but I have no material.it any unwantea-omciar inside the The KGB *.. the director of the Voronesh aviation factory.1. ffr.i.. bnu is assured Dy . his deputies..rgotten his pass at home.111. ..l I*"ff ?.il GRU there is department'.xT:l i[ Jas informed by :.". I guard ar rhe gate or.".:lil r#:f GRU. Help me to get out of this mess. xi'tr.from "?[:j:ft f f..ilnri.r. At nine o'clock in the morning the Politburo sesion was to begin. 'Peter lvano' vitch.' All service telephone calls to the GRU chief are relayed through the GRU command point.. Have you forgotten my name? Peter lvanovitch. there is something I want to talk to you about. . The moment of catastrophe had been photographed from different points by different officers. To illustrate the unear. at the time head of the KGB. The duty shift of operators is always in readiness to prompt their chief with a ... ffi il:r" ji':: jl.ray. given person. that if the KGB were to orsanize its own i$anment.from the opinions or tne CnU ciiii..t forces. The whole bf the paris residency had been at the show and the majority had had cin€ cameras.o_i. direc' tors of subsidiary concerns..'il'#:.' Peter lvanovitch said nothing. *t"n rj::3l*.i.ryucg and the paradox of the fleet pendenr...RU or rhe Centrat However.11_:il"J. 'Peter lvano' vitch.on.fi .ny..t'r. at I-e Bourget airport.. jil. But at seven.. a similar dloartment would swiftly be introduced into the Politburo.Hrffi . T. There exists still another irrefutable indicator of the independence of the GRU. 'Well..li:.Jiilffi _T. "*"r-inJrn. .i. ...

ins guarded. t ut what would be the decision of the GRU chief.:l9Jid"rbredty refuse if the GRU asked for its rreip. the GRU does not try to the capital . The senior operator.. No. The parades finish. because an5/ attack from Andropov could easily have upset the fragite party-Army balance'with unpredict:able consequences for Andiopov himself.KGB? Central Cornmittee to give you all tne ntms..iit*gr. the KGB ::.. choking with laighter.ll rwenty. A concerted roar of laughter shook the walls of the underground command point. or fact. behind one loses count.ffi.ra. among which are the drms and 6ne rocket construction firm' and i.are J"g. un it'pty field in the centre or civil aircraft frf"*"" p". it is in Moscow.rotLa Uy watchdogp' Not one the watch' i . Very.nrpotted somewhere into the trans-Volga goes uP i"rting. i.i. From the fourth side. t. is rhe lnstitute of cosmic Biology."r at night liki wolves' How many rhe-re? .r.."CnU building and unloadi a foreign For two afte. life as if half-asleep. barbed wire. is by no means-easy to find' Itis airpgrt' the old enctosed from three sides by the central Ill.l-' 'Yuri Vladimirovich. too' on the fourth . wtrictr everything becomes peaceful again' out for the months of the ye"t irepatations are carried B..i Jisturbs tire quiet oi Khodinka. loaded onto a transPort steppe for . of the KGB and ex-deputy chairman of Finally. with more dogs little. in friendly.ilrilrte of tank engines can srandiose military paradei..:t ?arty and Soviet Leader.) slammed down the leceiver. from three sides it is impossible ltt" cnu. give you one film. Their help was not called foiat all..t head office does not rise in the centre of of the GRU' on-io *ort crowded square' The head office . A narrow which lane leads through is the 'Aquarium'' a hlind wall ten metres high.io! . Only I will showihem at nine o.t. and at ten oUock I'il send my chaps over to the Andropov angrily advertise itself' Unlike the KGB. *fii.J..Jirg ""ioion . entered the conversation in the log book.r. and the roar ii.rmp. Sometimes another transport-aircraft lands' tank or rocket' io . At this point the entire duty shift was frozen to the spot. . even tones he answered . ({frcl Andropov became Generat Secretary of the Com- on all sides by Xt oOinfu field. a covered'op t"ti"g" of a fighter aeroplane taken oui of a hangar.nJ i. I. but the guarded of ui. or to help him over a mistake 8 The Centre Andropov. The duty operators were quite certain that in a similar situation.nJ.clock in-the Politburo..n. The aerodrome is surrounded offices of three restricted buildings. 1. very rarely' aircraft is of the night.ury aviation academy and the aviation institute' [n cames on the centre bf thes" secret institutes the aerodrome in the middh *iitt i.ll give py.*9r'.n. an ei_ conversation.n. only of them .r.72 necessary figure Soviet Military Intelligence in colonel-general the The GRU chief remained silent for some time. Ivashutin stilt surviviJ as GRU chief..

Nobody may bring in'so much as . deputy ^l-"39t-:j diiections and departments.ffing has.r. centimetre by centimetre."d-r.your person. .'otr. of an operational officer lieutenantcolonel. lilie an Many families of GRU officers :1" c!U. All necessities for work and life tronic equipment.futi"s are colonels.-ltthough ilis. point.fio". fat faces. bil.. does not at all mean it ri tft. however. the iions.p*t treaO *i[.y b. the windows of w-hich " give onto the centrar -*indo*..lro belongs to deputy chief and a grouP of advise. ftoygver. Seniority is judged not byrhe pips [n.s for example the personnel directorate' Directions and . The lfte1.n. NoUoO/ is . .Lo"ry people . Under him are a first deputy tn ttre case where the deputy has several directorates under his command. stilt tess a Urilfcasel Th"r" metallic object on.fr .. ih. his miliiary rank will be colonel' g.op.s19reV building adjacent to tf. directorates. The rank-and-file members of opef' sections'are called senior operational officers and senior operational ational officers. the The chief of the GRU .. . from the tele-cameras and narrolted continuousty .n"ral.. a cigare. the heads of sections and tr.. are used for livini purp"*r.. there utguld be apprehended immediately.. Iriunits which are not directly concerned .irporir.'fi unJ . of course...tiont.h.the UtsU recommends braces.". One is oiiy uomitted after !.-en are ro be iound inside.y are equal amongst each other' Between the colonel the duties of i senior operational officer and the "i"irihri of a direction who ii also a colonel there is a J.fter'ttrey rrave ouet*t elming number of GRU officers hold the mili' tuiy trnt of colone-!. The high service ranks existing in the GRU do or not pieclude the appointment of a very young captain operational officer' senior lieutenant to the post of senior .n. Buieven if it *.h big. service in the GRU) would immediarely inform .t"di.i:-. an/ of the little old "ririA"li lir" tLi.6rr*o he holds' directorates: most of them In total the GRU has sixteen do have a number from one to twelve' Certain numbers is simply called by its name' not e*itt and the directorate .na mt.ituated externar wa[s. The military rank of a officer is colonel.f. ile Jtrole of rhe area. The head office of the GRU is a nine_storey extended rectangle.-.r. departments and sec' . but by the position is subordinate to the chief of the general staff and is his deputy. fy men seated on benches (minimum t*"nty years. fountain pens: The GRU gives been checked.f. acquisition and processing of information there "i. If he onty has one directorate..rn aaoptio by the soviet Army permits this' n captain may be an icting major.-rnilrre1." ur*u . or a senior lieutenant on .it" rigr.oi tiur] a strange. Ttre military rank of the chief of the GRU is and deputies' nity C.. gassine through a speciat inspection and s-ifnisticated elec- car into the GRU's inngr area. are used by the service for official p."i.f. of the flats. lieutenant-genelal' Lni"t of directorates are lieutenant-generals' The depu. not even a bert-buckre . divisions of dirictorates. not even the Minister of Defence or General Secretary. Directly subordinate to the chief of rhe GRU are the bRU.pp""r"n."r. is..t!.undercur". officer's lhoulder. heads of directions and"t departments are maior'generals' The.tq Soviet Military Intelligence The Centre 75 In order to penetrate into the inner fortress of the GRU one must negotiate either the area of the secret aerodrome or the area of the top secret institute.O to bring if a ordinary block of flats..i. The external walts have no at all.iit.-.i. directions.*ir.!q untoward. On all sides..t.t"o uno th. ir. itrf.rs' The.-onry a certain nuru. ryr.the building is surroundei Uy trnostorey structure.ig. a completely normal .-.r heads of directorates.n..il.. courtyard.ii O. This. acting colonel.tte tighter.r. if..organizational uniti ionrtituting t['e GRU ..

I o I*tr1 " vi itre Chief of Fleet intelligence (vice'admiral)' vii The Chief of the Cosmic Intelligence Directorate (lieutenant-general)' -of the soviet Army Academy (colonelviii ihe Head iIi tri i* "tt. -t \. The hierarchy iJl-rrpl" oftheGRUhasonefirstdeputyandsevendeputies beneath him.i €95 Chief of the GRU (colonel'general)' organs which beneath whom are all the Procurement provide information' !s I. (. -'r.. t5 JC l€ t. E (. iii tt" GnU is as follows' The chief GRU.r*g f.pury iii . GRU added. n6Uody knows' He also directs his own first deputY.F E 6E 'The chief of Information (colonel-general) in charge of all the processing organs of the.o. ii" r. general).riei.. I iifi .*nufly directs effective i"f.GRU' iv The chief of ttre pilitiJal section (lieurenant-general). rie E section he The Illegals Section' With the help of this illegals and agents about p.The Centre have numbers' departments forming parts of a directorate 'at piriciion' means the first direction of not the fourtir directorate' Directions and departments with single i.ri ot a directorate have a the firstnumber department for example. EEI Fi5 E ii F*i b. (lieutenant-general) EE v The Chief of the Electronic Intelligence Directorate i TB x! [] I EI Et !8 E! c o C a I ./ / ti . He controls: i ' & : : i E. (lieutenantHead of the personnel Directorate general).E 6 -I ol oa b .

e.:: residencies ii:'*:"'.putvmavuJi:'::*::""-H:fl ::ffn*. the Merchant Navy....ii ' activities oi unaligned movements' iiliri.The his iGgals for canyllg iglq .'rha directnrete or direction .the^ Pird djricto=late.:"rifr".. Among its :nregars rrom the p..'i.organi."*"* i"l service . The greai majority of the prgcurement the pioviders of information.o'lte' -Yli ^. and about 300 airoad.fua. continue to work in their covering organization and not in the head i':J li[:xdli rhe. or entire continents'.iffi f^T.oi" ittt iilegals andof group' of tefrtories under cover at the same-timt .P1.. geiides these four directorates. the Academy of Sciences and representatives fit their young officers into T .J. .#:l oi fiie directorates but are answerable to the first deputy chief. In-addition some GRU officers.'.ilr.ft.tl6nu J*s not considerand several of the : sary. European territory. which carries out agenr dir€ctorate contains about 300 high-ranking officers in the Moscow centre.:". controlled by the fint deputy chief of the GRU.!r."se. iitltttttt t'"tat direction heads have'ii"i-1ntit .[l*{.[ #' f Tffi i ffi Hf . . Aeroflot.X..ilJ 9! 1: no ttpitutt unit for directing Drocurement organs ii"it it such a unit neces' Iiffio:'. hilh-quaritv me gars' "i'-oi'.The Procurement Organs 9 The Procurement Organs *ffi:..io "..folh:.. processing and support.in. bottiNorth which cariies out agent inteiligence on and consists of five directionsJeach of which-carries out agent intelligence on the territories of several countries (each direcr:on consists of sections which direct undercover residencies in one of the countries con_ $" &t !t*StSfet". T::*::". All units of the GRU are divided in their designations into procurement.oi ::A:T ffiTffi: 1!.n.::1Tt:9.t'" inteuigence to direct and the endeavours . Each of .' are ve rv. there are also four directions which undertake the sanie duties.il tii'n .t.ouniti.ffi ill and. #1i'iili.'1" .lr."d 5:' *' head may at Siiei6ffil institutions used by the GRU as cover: rhe Ministry of Foreign Affain..r'.."""iffi:Lll'i. on their return from overseas.nrsto.nt principle in running its The GRU adhere.i. [". the Ministry of External Trade..iirJ{.. Ttresejir:ffiot form pu.-!)tSe gpC-dirgBge with an analogous organizatron carrying out agent intelligence in Americi.#k"ffi{[ .direction ::ffi ". are . They in.1"n.. and The fourth from countries. .'il. stors tn tne tnsfitution serving as cover and guarantee their smooth progress in their future activities.^!-^-.

. However... having in its turn four more fleet inteltgJnce directorates beneath it. underJover residencies and agents of the above-mentionid directorates and departments operate.. which is atso concerned . its functions differ from those of the four directorates and four directions listed above. operate on all the same territories where ilegars. so they are not considered i1-for directorates and four J!.t.. W ffik M /sll t-ir EI .n.. gr*4pets. Directly under its control are tyentf intelligence directorates_ belonging td the military districts. subordinate to the firsi deputy chief of the GRU.g.80 Soviet Mititary Intelligence is a. The numbelo{ secrer agent. aeent intelligence.fi_tth*Gj.. The chiefs of both rhese direcrorates answer to the chief of the GRU and are his deputies..g 4ifctp-tgtg. the number of all the agents controlled by the first four a€€nts ultimately controlled by the nftr.. . Prgqure and partly process information.. ttre latie'."i districts. but not first deputies.ni. there are two nlore GRU directorates which are concerned with the procurement of information: the sixth directorate and the cosmic intelligence directorate. T[ffii'ectorffiTffi of vassals.y 8j9u. This arrangement works in reverse too: with the help of agents of the first fouf directorates and four directions he can check the activities of the . Wth their help the first deputy.".n.l i 1 IJ iilI ItB It?i ti:j tE_i I .-""J oir"^i#.r. fleets and groups offorces. may secretly-check on the aciivities of his drrectorate. These directorates procurement directorates and are not ".l.Jhere wrn procurement and controlled by the first deputy. gfoups of forces and ffeet inl[i"gence. but they do not go I pu.te exceeds dir. The fifth directorate does In addition to the proliferation of units outtined above. or indeed the chief himself.il.BI d S$Ictl'controller Krno o[ ar"..ror. fgryeq.jy -r r--l l. .

the fleet' 'utt exclude the GRU chief service. special ships. are'as of ttre chief as a deputy. It works out the technical details for spy satellitis inde-pendentty and prepares them in its own works.Iltt'soviet High Command quite chief of fleet intelligii. a number of research institutes.onuiiootti--1"* comes under the GRU enemy.onrio"'Jitt"i' u""ting i'tn" itJ own cosmic intelligence r.tti"iiv o"6n"a tpr'"1" of responsibility of ttt" four Soviet fleets time of war. There are also many regiments of electronic inteiligence on the territories of thi Eastern bloc and Soviet Union.."ii". The electronic espionage services of each military district.. All the information 10 Fleet Intelligence twenty intelligence direc' The GRU fifth directorate directs of fott"t directly' and torates of military oi. regiments oi military distri..N'nttern' intelligence. groups of forces and fleets which in their turn havi their own regiments. operate in widely tull information on the each ship . with the exception of those who undertake onty It has ifffff-cosmodromes. work for half their time in space in the interesrs of the GRU.ging .i. electronic battalions of armies.. For this purpose its officers are posted to undercover residencies in the capitals of foreign itates and there form groupc which intercept and deciphir transmissions on governmental and military networks.82 Soviet Military Intelligence demonstration flights...e other through the cosmic intelligence airJoitt"' . cocmonauts.tt ..' was introduced forces has a very ..and the ne* Lsmic activities he is under information service. caused bv rnaritime. The KGB lies far behind the GRU in this respect.ff. and one in three of them Detongs to the GRU. this directorate contrors the electronic intelligence services of the miritary districts.nO of forces and spy shipa of the fleet.nu. four intelligence *"J. and the fleet intelligence J"r"t "t ffi*i. This of t".o-daf GRU fifth directorate' it" it "'il". And so it goes on.*i. a co-ordinating computer centre and huge resources. iott not . is iollected in thl sixih directorate and analysed there.0fi) cosmic objects for different purposcs... group and fleet correspondingty control similar services in the armies and flotiilas.fu -iiil. The Soviet Union has sent into orbit more than 2.. Furthermore.i. The chief of fleet intllligence co-ntrols the.. aircraft and helicopters for electronic es-pionage."t' fulfilled.' in mind the tasks to be reasonably . the electroniccompanies of divisions. "t'O Pacific' Black Sea and directorates of naval ti. ."iu!ence "io"^ "tthe similar to directorates have a structure There are small tifi'"ty districts' that of the directorattt for our pur' 't .t.t. The GRU cosmic irtdligg1*jit_g_ql_9gr-lejs no tess power- aquired from intelligerice. The vast majority of Soviet fu|.'it" t"JO"l* niets co-ordinated by an four intelligence directorates organization known tt. and thJse in their turn contror those of the divisions. whereat'itt" tt'ip world's oceans and intelligence' Fleet intelligence gro-up of u"ou'"'JJtn-*iritlty district and if in gr*f. .directorate and Baltic .o military districts will be ll?iiiio'ii' a..yhich directorates i"tignificant. ii iir o"y-.ii itrt"tt-under the heading of 'oper- ational Intelligence" two indeoendent cosmic The GRU chief has at his disposal 5nt'l-Ut"tl"tn him dirictly-' the 91U intelligence and th.factgn'. and these are integralparts of the sixth directorate.

but alio that of the fleets has its own spy satellites.rw' -details ffiin iesiile?itl@ETrtrlllegal' give information.t.!r gp. 'ot" iliffiffiil' *"u.rUri.O.il. without pt"tlte -"f !:--t:*L* i"ttttiq:i:: . of all publishes a top it . we may say'that out of all the controlling his own cosmic intelligence service with the help 11 The GRIJ Processing Organs The GRU processing organs are sometimes simply'informition'' The mation service or ro'"-t"q'ently of colonel-general and is a chief of information h....source rasr arty Jve. rank control: called the infor- .a *..i"i-.84 Soviet Military Intelligence satellites put into orbit by the Soviet Union. i" v the information sernG of intelligence if. the material atr preriminaiy procissing.:::'-::l 3iffiai#.il'i" . about half are directly or indirectly subordinated to the GRU.-cnu'.iiiii...i militarY districts and grouPa. of the other and vice-versa.i' rl'e' inrormatio". :"'"T"T1 ryii: days off' without holidays' It works without breaks.#i' Th" rollowing are under his i the information command Point. iii the institute of information. eactr morning at-six o'clock of the .-Ltg"nir"tiont u:t miiitary intelligence whichareconcernedwithiheprocesingofsecret material acquired' Theinformationcommandpointissecondonlytothe GRUcentralcommandpoint. Considering that not only the GRU cosmic intelligence service..*rf{n lnItfact any. ii six information directorates.up6 t *.P*i: to from the intelltgence has full Poweli:. listed bclow ." info*ation services of fleet intelligence.i"*[igence sumirary' destined for members .lt.ttreceivesallintelligence material coming from ug. directorates of ..

Thepteve4t[__q1!rIli.anv . The many Th.. nugle.r"tii"" of strategic 1uclel forces in anv . qn{ stratggic .. the institute--sludjes outside . strategic reiurces and points. .86 Soviet Military Intelligence The GRIJ Processing Organs 87 rysgggqd *!ichdrrectorate witb a q$y. bpeciat attention is paid to questions of folitical structure.icfffi*iqn ii'stitute functions independently the chief of information of tf.olnruna point.d yet been made' Immediately after the announcement has as ..o"r"tes.ar.. - rithli ftr[ ril"a '-o::1' ltiuth dilg-cjgt$e -qtsdr* ntlitery lgglrnqlgey...the SALT iiE-u.nripttJt"a telegram.-r .p". when it was pointeO out that.tions nof at ptoblt't in narrow' parochial question but giving their opinions not on the whole e unified opinion is worked out bv the head irt" nlp of his best exPerts and the organs .. The nlTFIng begins of course with the seventh directglqlg directorate carefully may in the future possess them' This activity' any change in oi-inttttt"o .rtl .il.i..to forces and economies.rJrpiiLtes the activity of its neighbour directorates' prevents a one- satils. The idea of an oil embargo first saw -vulnerable the light of day in this directorate a.-. criffiliy*warching duction and technological developments.ontrolled by opposed.. each of which consists of sections.* jet fighter is -states and no offrcial in ttre united "?"f. ..'. It is the only link between the Soviet armaments factories copyrng foreign weapons and the residents of Soviet intelligence who obtain the necessary secrets. .:. there are six directorates plus the information institute on the strength of the information service. Each department and each section . in the Proceq the effect ih.'"iitt . a suggeslion in the 'Locomotive Report'of 1954..i. studying fro. !o Immediately after this the Soviet penetration of the Arab .nt.pf-tHlgi" anffiffi lhe consists of six departments.#*:'i. or appioach to problems' Director' *.iilIt ii .":uglgVj4p-.i"P. by agent' elec' exclusively on secret documents obtained ov:l and cosmic intelligence.tt"tty of each information directorate in *..i'i".. and special imphasis is put on a study of the personal activities of statesmen and miiitary leaders. The tenth dlr"9g-!oqq!g studies military econori. wortowii-{ [fi spediv. AnU are analyzed simultaneously by several Let us "i in'^if unitt of the information at the same time' to an example.r. that a case officer belonging from an residency receives a short verbal report un'a'.Or.n. Happily this stunning idea of the tenth directorate has not as yet been pui into practioe. in itre form officen ot ilffi". forces of all countries who possess such capaliliiiei...s-osotries of wheiEittraiEunifi beffi6 td NAto oinot.rlrr...t n.procurement even or ir.i. to wreck the 'locomotive of capitalism' it was not neoessary sna$ the engine. an with the agint the case officer would send Moscow' But .or.++!gglg!-gf Politburo and the higher military command. iir".l.ruone it Soviet on the information Unfortunately we do noipo*it reliable directorate' activities of the twelfth --'ifr" any signi -activities gig..rpS.tor.r.ffi-..r.rrg..lre eleh1!^gggdg:llg.""ii..i" oir. and in the morning all material which has come to hand during the previous twenty-four hours is transmitted to the inform-ation directorates of the GRU for detailed analysis.o.-ggIieq^ il. one brief sentence' to this other report on the information command point has no enioence to supPort it' The rePort would .il thi walls of the GRU' As which base their analyses of the situation .'. It is very tightly conneced with rhe Sovief ilsign omces and with the armarnents industry as a whole.i"" arid a subjective i . '!g!y1tiq!.Ttre delegations tttis directorate talks' to. only to deprive it of a crucial ingrcdient.A carries responsibility for the study of individual tren& or aspects or' NATO activities. Many reports from the.it"g nations began..ge of such a set'uP is-that it .iil. I.'gr"u".. In all..e_s strate-gic *1." .*1rJ .

The next morning all memben of the Politburo and the higher military commlnd would receive the volume printed during the night. .. on the basis of an analysis of military orders. Simultaneously with this tha eighth directorate responsible for individual countries including US studies wbuH thoroughly research the question as to who insisted on the dccision to develop a new aircraft. questions of training special' The GRU lays great stress on professional informati* littJotti"s' Alongpide ists for the bts snecill$s from a wide' intelligence officers industrial fields' The GRU range of scientific. tttiiitti-tnO . The seventh directorate. trying to put itseif i. Japan' Germany than lic of France and the Federal Repub' its own'. Ouriig unceremoniously co'opted the o}'tne. might be able to foretell the basic technical parameters of ihe aircraft. their .. u""titoi the Soviet union to b€ in the ii.ili.pt"Jt'tlv operating asents' an with regard to trre queJiion' S*t' By the evening rePorts received by the 'you.In conformity with dramatic moments of the this the GRU.pp'op'itte orders order would also be r"I.88 Soviet Mitinry Intelligence The GRIJ Processing Organs 89 be published in the 'tntelligence Summary'under the heading all branches of information would be studying .. At the and quantity of nuclear weapons reolacement in service..out ir" .il trre mosi moJern achievements of thc United about know . The question of which country of the United States' allies would be likely to buy such an aircraft would also be studied.a ttrai night in the routine pl..'nttion fimmand intelligence oi itt" .i.' ii it . wfiich aviation companies would actually be involved and to what extent. t. The eleventh directorate would study the problem from the angle of the aircraftis potential use as a carrier of nuclear weapons.i.p*...... The ninth directorate.ruaii'fit" first into outer sPace weht to the seater spacestrip...and. which aviation companies might be drawn into the development of the '4fuuaft by tendering for the contract. states.lr.[.t..ns canied orbitatflight' the first multi. aerodynamics.r"l similar reports already of "ii Summary'..tk-il frg-cosmic rescarch has the right to . the report. military budgets and the budgets of the country's main corporations. Units of the seventh directorate would immediately start searching their archives for information on what NATO leaders have said about the future development of avillign. rvas ct . how it would affect the balance of power in Europe and in the utorld.. with .. simply on the evidence of existing carriers of atomic weapons..tp.:il::'ifir. present its own ::##. The tenth directorate would uneningly tell. would endeavour to calcutate same time 'unchecked and unconfirmed report'. It would be able to draw conclusions without knowing very much about the new aircraft.l what present and future value this fighter would have for NATO and. the eiir'" same time' the inrormation publications which might problem. the shoes of NATO leaders.' 1"" il:ii# ffiii..-.'gt' brothers" *thc-ied at the command of all the branches .'u. aviation electronics. fi..li.uiotnt that every Soviet days or even but launched based on an American model' out theirs' As a result mirnths before th.p''u have some bearing poini' end all resi' ooinion to the into..tiJi"in. if it were really to be taken into service...e' in. on the basii of an analysis of the latest American achievements in the sphere of engine building..ffi sroups or rnititttv disiricis' flelts a1! armv activity to increase their would receiv. what forces in the country might oome out against such a decision..i.. tp"atntt technology' or atoniic energy' rnittoUiotogy or computerSuch a rigltt relations' strategic planning "i'in"rnttffrral the geniralPmmittee on the was accorded to trre bnU ui it i."d. 'Intelligence u" ptint. who would be likely to win and who to lose.. field of piloted cosmic flights leading Soviet specraiisit-in tf't every ste? of the Americans' and. 'iitit'' '*' programme 'onitored . tne f. amongst i"iai"ft confirmed.i.rst entry .i.

. So what more was Golikov to do? Thirteen years later. tfi"ittn'tttting subordinates' The his shoulders to ttre:s-i"fJt" separated by thousands of kilo' overseas intelligence o'gu*. not dare. rcaaerirrip exert anv. General Golikov did possess detailed German plans for the invasion.mand otherwise. serviies.b.J all responsibility from most obiective way.." .. not without reason.d. :ff '"..y""' t'tt ieen-well+ried Soviet Union' and this is why ' *mouflages his fi:. h. and iiut then no have an inconect view of thingp' crushing influence *pt.i"' the Party at a given it is necesary to. He ordered the publication of an intelligence summary each night.tly:[ ol senllal secretarv position .:#. Nor does first'clas It is not the fault'of the it"tp..stei when the latter do not wish to listen to any which contradicts their own' "l But the totalitariai system still exerts. and the GRU teadenhip.imJuna . their rulers hold at which can be directly forced to give simply oUfioi* material wav can the the higher lommand' onlv in this t gi"tn momeni' They are-'h:ffot't . This state of affairs continued right up to the time when the adventurism of the Soviet programme produced a series of tragic accidents. or information service can convince it equipment American the supreme ildoe.hl:ffi .*. the new chief of the GRU. tlme he is able rno"i'i and at the sume of tightning conductor' il. the answer lies in the communist system itsetf. considers that the technical equipment of the processing organs of the GRU is vastly superior to that of comparable units within the CIA . is no organ dependent on its superio'. (This stroke of genius on the part of the GRU was immediately adopted by the KGB too...'e.this way the gallant general implied that 'this is not my opinion. which would include 'grey'. including the supreme li.a the intelligence services' on all branch"s of socieiy. It is impossible to deny either of these facts.. although one may complain that they belong to past history and not the present. found the solution. ."roping tituo'ion to.in spite of the fact that some Western specialists have said that the GRU information service is not as effective as it should be. Two yean before.. General Shtemyenko.*. very Uest specialists' fault' In cases where in1iiig..trlr'*i.tu as a kind which can . iiIJ .. They base this on two facts: that in 1941 the GRU had all the data on the forthcoming German invasion but was unable to evaluate correctly the information it had.".il. If the GRU information service is truly less effective than it should be.Ld.n.or*tJ is fran[ty deluded' .. . The GRU chief and the head of information would only give their own opinion twenty-four hours later in the next isue of the summary. it is the opinion of my residents'.lT 1'--:t::5: opmron . -t"nnot possibly know what opinion in o.the leadership a "tiis metres from t*toscow. In...l1n" recourse to "iit.J. but Stalin was not of a mind to believe them..t the right to bbittt to' or contradict' Khruschev and Stalin and command. that much of the intelligence material was reported to the higher command in a 'grey' unprocessed state.ilil... and secondty.. it is the systeT: as Stalin was in . unprocessed information and unsubstantiated data.. tnd'thtte superior' This is the very its defend it from the caprices of si:4h#.r""* The information directorates of the GRU have at their disposal the highest quality etectronic equipment produced by the best American firms.l" P.90 Soviet Military lntelligence The GRU Processing Organs 91 Soviet Union.il such cunning.. he had twice liquidated the whole staff of Soviet milit'ary intelligence from the chief of the CRU downwards.. of Soviet intelligence kaders up to the The .rt" cnij adopted ft: own opinion'. Tnu". Thus it was under Lenin it will be in the future' Should the and Brezhnev.

he fean no opposition or discussion. frirther anatysis showed that all publications dealing with atomic physics irad them required the expenditure of so much silver. had such a large amount of silver been spent for the needs of rgsearch. had at the same time disappeared without trace from tht scientific horizon. The specialist *"i" surprised that arf unexpectedly large amounf of silver was allocated 'for scientific research'. fire "u"n " GRU has canied out its most briltiant operations a-t exactly such moments.i report A week later the GRU presented to Stalin a detailed a.". . intelligence has absolutely no chance of influencing him and its effectiveness at that moment is nil.t urLonnrm"O fact. fugitives from occupied Europe.[prents in the USA of atomic weaPons' It was a one "i had been compiled ol Pe basis of only i.92 Soviet Military Intelligence The GRIJ Processing Organs 93 been suppressed in the United Siates and that ail aromic scientists. either in {mgrica. The GRU information anatysed all the fields of military research known to it. During the Second World War a section of the tenth dircctorate (economics and .pott doubt for "tti. the study of this strange phenomenon. when the opinions of the dictator and thi intelligence service coincided.or in any other country. the totalitarian system is not a brake but an accelerator. tf the desires of the dictator and his inte[igence service coincide. then the ratter's effectiveness grows many times greater. Never before. The second reasonable assumption by the GRU was that it was some new field of research concerning the creation of a new type of weapon. and he is able to supply his intelligence service with any amount of money. And the information service 1941. Every information unit was brought to Ueaion of pecious metals in the United States. but not one of Lct us consider one example. it is not atways like that. The dictator does not care at all for moral sides of a question. However. tn this case. but its contents left no room of the deductions it made' Stalin was about the correctness delighted with the report: the rest is well known' . moment when the country is suffering from hlnger.tlrt"gr. He is not at all answerable before society for his aciions. Tfiere was a war going on and the specialists reasonably supposed that the research was military. resources) wT slgdyrng the trends in the exchange has played a first-ctass rote on these occasions.

...il curency middlei"t..-ii-it"qu"ntty . especially as regards staff movements. The political department of thd GRU has considerable weight in Moscow. Overseas the residents are personally responsible for the ideological monitoring of their officers. tt . in ffeet inttirig".. ?taio appliances' io name but a few' Its material..*ational market' secret uses them in order to exert "" is the lu":r"'# il. There are also several other differences."nt organs. but we will simply take briefly the most important of them.. The directorate is staffed only by intelligence officers who.ontiort all the curency speculative operations the GRU and also . however..'-inteiligence r"ili"ty hritr".i'#mm'*PJflx:1"J1l}."nt''capitalNo ress...it oittttotate commission and the rniiitttv industrial resources of users.i"#.-il..." is with -concerned itt espionage equipment the development ano. fhg pollggl&el4ue[E is concemed with the ideological monitoring of all GRU personnel. . The GRU political department. of the GRU..ar"ss to say.i.. in common with C bi rectora t tte nil]fr6"fiiilfof tiie is also a deputy to the chief ......j.... tr.....il . It is not possible for us to examine all of these. not only intiJt'trtl Onu' directorates of satellites.i:%fii unit*-N..ir. a ieutenanr-gene ra l. il.important'GRU bclonging to the for the gr8*rh or resoonsible . wi t'i" io Jo'inionundertakingp'scientific On the research institute tJ tp"tftfized direclorate PrePares orders of the procu.i to work at domestic Postincs' influence bgth The personnel direct'8iate has exceptional th" tnon"*tnts of all in the GRU and outsiie'-it ditects sidered-as support services.ffi.ffii... it controls scveral and its overscas .. is subordinated directly to the Central Committee administrative department....ni-and "ti'i'ui"'!r'esyears and then return a period of several .d micYphotography' officially as a dePutY' departments.ni fot the acquisition of 'clean' curency' te.Support Services 95 L2 processing organs' the polili' officers of the procurement and of tfie gRU' regularrv Support Services . but it has no right to interfere in intelligence work.'^and countnes' intelliience services of Eastern bloc also in the "'iir.ilil altirough eavesdropprng ffi. The military rank of the head of the political department is lieutenant-general and again he is a deputy to the GRU chief. "na gffi ol ptt"t-11.iri. The Personnel DirectoB.the several equipment for secret - kinds of dead-letter il*. which is at the same time one of the Centrat Committee organs which are not directly concerned with the provision or processing of intelligence material are con- All GRU but in a number of officers.i.t-q is directly beneath the chief of "*i ffi.." individuaf businessmen' statesmen and some- it is lfir.t. All political directorates and departments of the Soviet Army are subordinated to the chief political directorate of the Soviet Army. i".. As opposed to any other political departments the GRU political department is made up not of party officials but of professional intelligence officers.A"ttt""? fail several .:1'... It exerts practically no influence on the activities of overseas branches of the GRU.-."ti"t out secret Possessed of colossal curency . armaments and poisons' he is not classed head is a lieutenant..

air and sea tickets.. The department can at any moment say what documents are required at any given control point in the world. In ihii punuii bt tris esoterii duiy it has the greatest collection in the world of passports.y experience. and other documents. In every file lies the fate of an inAiriaoU.p-q*gg3l is possibty the mosr intere5ting me Ei&&g--BU-Dspaflrqerlis the most secrer of an the top secret units of the GRU. railway. material on everyone from statesmen and designers of io prostitutes and homosexuals ily.gs__9_q. It is here that the enciphering . passes.d. the preparation of tha papers which will preserve one's true identiiy can be Aone in a very cards. what sort of questions and what stamps are to be put on the passports "rj "ik.. for example. the finantid department deals onty with powerful reception and transmision centres of its own.. driving licences. Within a few houn.ruf on. ll . domestic i"riJ"n. The Afgliv. The eighth department possesses all the GRU's secrets. tlre"fi olgd{PSeel1-41gl[ untike the administrative/tech_ nical directorate. ro"["t."r-.. ideniity short time."ilt and files on illegals.(p-assport)studiespassport regulations worrdwide. in case of a worsening of operational con_ ditions. customs and police posts.and visa regulations of that country. hiving at its disposal hundreds of thousands of blanks for new passports.t). military documents.}6 Soviet Military Inrelligence SuPPort Services 97 Soviet money. The financial department carries out regar financial operations in the soviet Union. but should the need arise to secure special channels of personal of all the departments. not with foreign currency. and submarines. it can forge'the passport of and deciphering of all incoming and outgoing documents ii carried out. identity cards and driving licences for every couniry in the *gll9.gent.i". communication. then it can maki use of the services of the cosmic intelligence directorate. successful relruitment of foreigners (and unsuc' and . any oountry to conform with the latest changes in the qassport. Thl depariment keep maps of many thousands of frontier posts. and so on. in every file there is an unwritten novel' TheE$l*GjU*P'ep"egt. communicating with illegals and agents by means of GRU satellites. police documents. In its cellars are millions'of officers' undercover .

Part II .

fis illegals as principles' methods of wav each orgu.i an inhahitant of-a foreign fhings' t'i'ntelf off as a foreigner' S:ry^tli:.. Lieutenani-General V' T' centre unde."-...r:-iil". tfre ttuO""t'ip oi the illegals are put at the Gurvenko.even casean agenta when in the occlsioyl ... r.ilffi it" tu.t.1h" 's"nt in the interest 1d .'u"on. whereas an a Soviet officer pus'ing "t" to'i'pft1"fy .J itiails of the illegal Jv-stem separatelv' Th.i.. but these with frequentlv . ntter ttreir iiuining.i in the two runnmt illegals is entirelvdifferent directorate of illegal a special services.ot of the four geographical ffi..g"nt.r.'.f . intelligence and for Soviet foreigner has been t"trui*d by name and or ottrer chang"''t'it appearance or some reason then he is dbcuments' continues his activitiet--*iit' /alse called an illegal agent' their own illegal Both the GRU and the KGB have independent one from networks.'.:fi.i.: deserving agents recelve some of the most valuable and and are awarded the rank Soviet citizenship as un inttntiu" so' Gnu or ..".*otit oot ffik ffi ."il..i. Soviet intelligence.uit u"different confused The crucial :ffi#. Each organization selects' trains' the same it sees fit' In i"pf"V. directorates .r...ra utilizes.Illegals of strategic intelligence We can define an illegal as an officer of a on . asents. but these are completely prepares' tn" ott. "iitt" centre as athe territory ry1 foreigner Uyt who passes himself off foreisn state.".iri."riiiy *t " has beerr ieJruited bVtillegal-1o1ks and foremost is first of.r""f"t .'.". tn the KGB ti'"t?it in a training In the GRU] tli iff"g"h are trained activities.i..ifr*t ot t'rre go*eu"t.the KGB' but.' .

are not asked' but on the streets ..-i. Union.' doti"ti'*t in" cnu will select who have mainly those activities young Sou'ei citizens' Higher il.. granted only to not be in the Soviet only important thing is that they 1!o..Ji"ttach of' dac.. Directorate heads themselves frequently travel abroad for the same reasonS.has'T"be dachw area where tfrere are greut numbets well concealed among other ifftluft are for the training where outsiders are not to be seen questions.iilrs worked . i#. Recall to the Soviet Union is a particularly effective measure against any Soviet citizen serving abroad. 1"". f"tliy.ur oii"tio'utJt independentlv' .and he it is' been able to say exactly-where to riflect the existence of one Training Centre tt"t' ti'pty o".t* r.".t.pottinf avenues' HI dacha provides an T\e irit.".rganization those who return information of a very high calibre unprecedented or highly classified material which produces an intelligence breakthrough. If he is demoted to direction head level . to go to the target country and 'fine-tune' and help the activities of the illegal networks.r*t'. and there is a cream who are under the personal supervision of the head of the GRU. to that of the head of the GRU himself. .1.upiti *iitt'on" task' Either the organization tittle place is is constantly on the *o". The - the next step .d'ringirirti. If a young illegal begins to acquire really interesting information he is transferred from the control of the head of a directorate to that of the first deputy or.i.uo nor. regarded by all intelligence personnel as the direst form of punishment.i. A number of the more important ille'gals are directly controlled by the first deputy head of the GRU.. ot . ideally isolated the dacha suoervise him is...iourn h.h.iupt il. in the case of even greater success.'t'iliir.. tt . Thus both one and the other have small groups consisting of the most experienced and successful illegals who have returned from abroad and who exercise supervision over the daily running of the illegals.. the directorate head can call on a small group of advisers consisting in the main of former illegals (though not 'blown' ones) who are ready at any moment. i.-.iliBunoingl.therefore tJiff begin his training is?l to23 '"t'uii '"Ii.".i.nO uni"t"ttary b. . .out by each of The selection ot pottitiuiiiregalt candidates i. of course. and transfer to ttre soviet union.i ..t in higher education' minithe itquagtint'. This is.102 Soviet Military Intelligence lllegals 103 and are controlled personally by them.. It is all the same to them whether they are in Paris or in Pnom Penh. a very high honour. Equally an illegal may be demoted for failing to produce the goods..ufa even on promotion.him completely .. t"guta"a as the tragedv of a lifetime' is carried.w are selected ..tw-nNiomutit Academv *9 *::1v- are used of the so'iet ermv and Nalv Il"^1' expen- processtng for illegal i#"r*"". or a secluded in the Moscow individual irainee' normally ...ut lives and will be is also in two or three instructors also live and immelse . ilLgal who has defected 'Training Centre'. Thus each directorate head supervises a number of directions and separately a group of illegals. although he may not even be able to guess that it has happened.s of the ht"tr"riri. not informed about this could well be a recall to the Soviet Union.r. req'uirements' In basic on the basis of future i..'.. In order to help him.r...'riilirrr-r. using false papers.J"il'ii" "i'cun very'tJt"i"ffy all the-time' His wife held . seen walking in upt"u*ntt tf . This is a very critical stage for the illegal.ffi.. not-on'e ioniet The name is called the General Guryenko's o. of course.t.. In certain cases his grade may fall below that which is supervised by the head of a directorate and he will be supervised only by the head of a direction.. un "t'"t'ii-J mum age at which u nothing about the GIY s:T'times "GRU u" used' those who have com3m. qoi"t tr'?av ior training' In addition to the terr'i'toiy candidate and his *t. intelligencl or in the information in education i.

."""iiy *t. . the weather forecasts and everything that is going i iilothffi 1jl93Ts!tP1:a9'n he goes on to P. :*_often.tlie illegal comings which have of training for a and his instructors work out a programme ffifi aft:u+rslircrtjr+q+Hi':3 .. She scrutinizes his behaviour and or *urn tt GRU about his excessive interest in women Union' husband and alcohol. The instructional programme is tailormade for each trainee.c!!MlU." Cypii. for the most part former illegals.td. Hong Kong and Hawaii'.il. either by. read the same papers and listen to the same radio programmes and spend their time asking their pupil the most difficult quesiions imaginable with regard to what has been read."i. even smokes cigarettes and uses razor blades procured from overseas.to time' married.'itd to he is to work' The first thing he does is have been born' gone rti" city where he is supposed..nJ"''o"'orrnelleqSSW qt in a re.the dacha are prepared very thoroughly and carefully. the eventually as hostages. to. It is quite obvious that after a number of years of such training.ee or four years of intensive training' top GRU and Central the illegal passes a state commission of journey personnel. the hours of work of every restaurant and on in the realm of gossip as well as current affairs. These tape recorders continuously broadcast news from the radio programmes of his target country.J. is a very frequent occurrence. Attention is obviously paid to theJllCy_gl_lhe lansuage of the rarget . in country where he has never been in his life. He gets a job and works. he deiroys Jocuments new documentation entered the country and gols on under For example.oi.At each he has with which .slply. llus Prr o y"u'i and the shortthe basis of the experiefiffifi-as gained' light inihe training'.r.for^a Denoo aDroas.t as much u. the wife also acts as a control for the GRU on her years. In this connection he wears the clothes and shoes. subjected to a detailed individual debriefing on all life abroad' If the husband and wife have . On their return to the Soviet *it" ut.104 Soviet Military Intelligence Itlegals " 105 future illegal knows by heart the composition of ivery football team."rntries.-.il i".served "t dlcuments U..ii".rd.re und?iffiffiG . hostages are that much more effective. *"riJi" *i. In each room a tape recorder is installed which runs twenty-fsu1 hours a day.en prepared-for him.1 months ..ili. ryq5llng methods and to a cove. ttreTiE[eTfwi6iho she as a rule works as the radio operator.-i. It is considered that mateinal feelings are much the stronger and.. From the first day the candidate becomes accustomed to the circumstances in which he will be living and working probably for rnany long sometimes may husband.other:tt:gl} :1 fficfiTtage !9te! nightclub.r. giving due consideration to his knowledge. t . while he is occupying the dacha..t. The instructors.i. The internal fittings of. and eats the food. The posting of a husband and wife together. and goes abroad' Usually his a number of intercountry is effited through a.g"i . fuwait..Jrlieir the GRU' their decided to keep something secret from stories will eventuallY differ' -Afi. th. leaving their children behind as hostages. Perhaps more surprisingly.i oi tter.*. . with the wife posted. From the first day of his training he is supplied with the majority of papers and magazines. a-journey to the USA il. He sees many films and descriptions on video tapes of television broadcasts.. character and the tasks which he will be called upon to perform in the future.t. t tt"m the Soviet Union to Fiungary to Yugoslavia stage' .

-his obje-qting'lhil!!9g3!-sJts about basic On his arrival at r"eX#ffi ffi:riit"Efffi fr-. she will then be given a genuine it replaced futtport. birth but of course changes the place of his the date of his birth. to get hold of genuineiapers and character and work referencis. then Austria and Germany before Iungu. at which the head of the GRU or his first deputy have to be present. A man of forty has a balanced. He keeps irraiml. but not old harm as possible. unA n. in other words concocted life stories' The-basic or sround cover storv is created on the basis of r66i-ffiiilfi only changing a few details. usually along with the professions of his parenis. Any check may give jobs him away and for this reason he endeavours to change to get his name onto as many and places of work often . Both would consolidate their nationality every step of the way.the illelal endeavours to acquire as many frienis as possible. will 'loie' his false one to have wittr.. which is the last . The acquisition of a driving licence. After this he again undergoes state examinatioru. and so they are ideal hostages' ln the event of mobilization in the target country. to go to work. For operational purposes (though not for instructional purposes) much use is made of Finland as a window to the Wesi. he may well be able to avoid being called up for the army which would mean the breaking-off of relations and an end to his active working life. His children are sufficiently old to be ablJ to live without their parents in the complete care of the GRU.ornpuny lists as he can and to acquire character references obtain signeO by real people. conse*utive approach to life.a real one on the production of his wife's genuine document.intermediate legalization. but usually he is older. At the of these'years of "ia .intermediate legalization'. especially if he ever suffers tn" aif"*mu'of whether to continue working or to go to the police. this would mean period-s of residencl in to_begin with. dates of weddings and other details' The illegal is thus not telling an out-and'out lie but only a half'truth' He will not bat'in eyelid when he tells you that his fathe-r served all his life in t-he army.inclined to take ill-considered To take the case of an illegal whose target destination is Washington: hemight pretglA to bp a refug-ee from Hungary escaped in 1956. the illegal's stay in one of the period which lasts another one or two years. In the course of his operational journey. credit cards' membershipdocumentsofclubsandassociationsareavital element in ilegalizing' the status of an illegal' A vital role in the lives of illegals is played by cover stories.^6j-tl" Utl@rs of the GRU on genuine blant passports' At the same he is extremely vulnerable if he is not registered with the police or the tax departments. There is also the emergency cover story. An eventual Frenc'h illegal wodd be likely to make the journey via Armenia and kbanon. The dates of birth of his parents and relatives are also accurately recorded. The stormy passions of youth have disappeared and he is less .. Often he will marry another agent (wlto tiite may already be his wife). In the course of the . 106 Soviet Military Intelligence Illegals And 107 decisions.p. The only thing is that he will not tell you in which army he served. This stage goes by the name of the .preparation.. on average about forty. This age suits the GRU very well for a number of reasons. illegal is placed at thd diiposal of one of the heads of directorates again commences the operation for his -and roundabout journey to the target country. he at lasf appears in the country where he is to spend so many more yJars endeavouring to Ao it as much intermediate couRtries may continire for several years. Then the enough to live independently.emto"a-p.ry he arrives finally in America. The minimum age of an illegal clearly cannot be less than twenty-seven to twenty-nine. The ideal solution is for him to the police department under some nJ* documen6tion from pretext or another.

J. I ffiio."uttJ' no e ge!ag9-q"ner. W tturry yoDr f-r". it is ooncocted in such a way that the details it gives should be impossible to check.t a role is neitheifeasible nor a great deal of use' ir fr L piice e_ilFefi ffifrE"paganda paints @a.108 Soviet Miliiary I ntelligence Illegals inconspicuous 'man 109 line of defence of the illegal on having been arrested by the police. one illegal was arrested by the police while he was trying to obtain a new driving licence because a mistake had been found in his old one. Then he went over to his emergency cover story and inforrhed the police that he was a Polish criminal who had escaped from prison and bought a passport on the black market... weapon workers' If professional titters anOitren wiih atomic months' there is no he doesn't want to work for three dollars through the oroblem. It would have been easy to break the emergency cover story. But this is pure disinformation. he . ri.. During this time the in the street' such as millions would hurry past without noticing.om unother' Butattempts to is wo*i1s have talks and all his in vet anothe.0"*i' the general statt he a tr. ."rtuinf ue asked about the military schools the been' 1o .. il.ildepartmentskind of cover offered coto susiicion' No' the a blank wall or .i..rorrow f. go. informed the Polish authorities about the . a"pu.r... and perhaps *otiiiponantly' are inter' it.?-. He must be a grey. this cover story is only to be used as a last resort when the illegal perceives that the police no longer believe his basic cover story.-c'riu .if .pfortunitv to with If a colonel on the general staff consorted il .?:]Ill:t:T" . or he stands at the window and day ballerinas and Thousands of peopte-pass him every - ..'criminal'.ffiil:. For example. Such a cover is unacceptable to an illegal for a number of reasons. our illegal .o[ir."tt1*mediatelv' Thirdlv' for such bTfe lL Secondly.. However strange it may seem. But for the police it was sufficient that he spoke their language and did not object to being handed over to the Polish Consul. the police believed the story and handed him over to the Polish Consul. i*iri t. if the police had only thought to invite a real Polish immigrant for a tenminute chat with his supposed fellow countryman.""..ir. not having received from the illegal his routine and applied to a number of countries for his extradition.t'n"ni been met with have .. Firstly.ftiffi &ffi Jil hours' he would be exposed within forty-eight the requirements of Finally. The Poles published photographs of the criminal lffiffiF':'*it'i*l::li.. of the intelligence officer playing the role of grave pictrire a No less important than the cover story is the cover or the l**til{* ["ti...b"Yiit""fl.liil#.t ing" .""io .-. as a result of which his basic cover story was found to be inaccurate. He was subjected to questioning...fi..i."ittt great rapidity' Today they general of the department ested in documents trori-a certain he would not have known more than ten words of the language..i."unrr.i"r"galizationwouldhareto. ryi GRU. Designed to be used only when the illegal is in the hands of the police department.Iifr&-*er'he staff and himself his cover' [tour"'' tt is part-of example' He hires his for There are wants and for as long as takes the money' . he mwt keep himself away from counter-intelligence and the police.*. Of course sommunications. If he gets muny tt'oosunds -of a colonel in the enemy general staff. As its name suggests.have and academies where't'e it supposed which he has served' and his acquaintances Fourthlv' an illegal needs plentv 'taff'meet whoever he wants to meet' il.

i.ylivesasecludedand than It tonoint significantly fewer employees colonies Normally in Soviet either of the other offiizuiiont' people may.fiLt. civil airlines.". Soviet cotony--i' invisibly divided into three seas genuine diplomats the 'clean ones" thaf is th€ "rg""ir. senior diplomats for example the imbassador' his understand the difference and the more observant people' dividing them up I clgse between the two o'guii'"tions' meddle in the dav: .vy' and Intourist' headed . ""J trade. the residency may increase in size.[il.. unO tt undercover residency distinction " often..riJ."lti. - and colonels of the general 2 The Undercover ResidencY of the.ittre rcij. To one he gives money and instructions written in secret writing."urp tresidency. .t" 'tf"tn.*y without agents.ri"*: it"i representatives of external "* il"-ittt it.io"n. tr'"-onJo*ner iesidencv of the of the KGB'. from another he receives reports. ttre mercfrant .riO..J. so that if one residency is discovered the other does not suffer..110 Soviet Military Intelligence artists..J. Thereafter any contact between the two new residencies is of course forbidden... "g"".ruaoi. but usually the residencies are much smaller than this. one of whom may become his assistant.and the illegal remembered that the unOt"ontt An illegal residency is an intelligence organization compris-! . who continuallvcolony' and distant uttuirc ot tuti'' person in the .'Vikings' t"'n"ighboors'' . are not able to obtain anything.f"il "i . uio ir'" bRU ana cail them The. but to recruit agents for this purpose. be considered in the up to 40 Per cent tou"t does not prevent the 'clean' category' Ghil .' In every country completelv separate entities') exists there is a GRU where official Soviet 'Jpt"l"ntu'ion i" parallel with' and is analundercover .. -r-lng a mlnlmum of two wireless" a them.more enlightened 'savages'. Forthecnuono".'y' every overKGB undercover residency'.iite otttre soviet colonv (the GRU)' isolated life.. The GRU considers it counter-productive to have large residencies. Gradually.o.ff. the davtut" uutolutelv no il9l::t at all in . We i at least one) r. as a result of recruiting new agents. Five illegals and eight to ten agents are considered the maximum. Thus tr. For the basic task of the illegal is not himself to penetrate secret targets."'..no .basic forms of -ifie The undercover residency is one GRU abroad' (It should be intelligence . . More illegals may be sent out to the resideni. senators and scientists staff. This is his raison d'Atre. and correspondents. In cases where the recruitment of new agents has gone well the GRU prudently divides the residenry in twJ parts. iersonnel rn?I: Very 'o both dirty' between the KGB GRU.

are working againsf foreigners. the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. fnit is a difficult task. on the other hand.u residen-cies of the GRU. consulates' trade As the tations and so on grow and multiply and swell' deputies-. in opiiru. nor must it offend present-day technology ou. The. ior often with foreigners at all' ."V ambassador or resident slots' and Committee has to decide questions as to which each of the three organizaho* rnuny. as the Committee on the shadowing offend the KGB on questions of security' the GRU' of its own diplomats above all.t officers increases.d inio three categories . The minimum number of staff for any GRU undercover residency is two . The Central Committee and this same Central .ruiion on the. but who do not have personal These are radio/ agents.rfy concerned with and responsible contact with of intjligence. . deputy residents and operational officers who are technical-opeiations staff belong tho$e for the production ait.6"a1staff and te."ff iot *irt if.f iipt. each has its own boss in Moscow . Theoretically the Soviet colony in a very small co-untry may consist of six people.1I2 Soviet Military Intelligence The (Jnderc:over ResidencY 113 majority of them.. directs its intire potei_ tial against foreigners.. larger part of the KGB personnel is occupied with questions of security. This does not however mein that the intelligence potential of the GRU apparatus is less than that of the KGB. a radio moni.t. should be accorded to must not iiont. A technical services groupis organJ!J. bur they are not to be considered as professional intelligence offiiers.hnical staff' The operational staff with recruiting are tirose officers who are directly concerned operational staff are included and running agents. are officeis of the GRU. tt". techniur.the Minister of Foreign Affairs. When one adds to this the unequalled financial power of the GRU.the KGB or the head of the GRU. to a greater or lesser extent.riv in recruiting and running in New u. a tech-ops grolP. ihe ambassaOor and two residents. from cooperation with both the KGB and the GRU. ih" on" he had at firsi' The number of radio/ engaged intelfigence. Each of the three branches of the Soviet colony has its own enciphering machine and completely independent channel of communication with Moscow. are diplomats.it.. three of whom. and the other three radio/ cipher officers. and theiiown colleagues'in ihe KGB who have contact with foreigners and freqiently with officers of the GRU..operational staff' .neiworks of the police and counterioJng". cases half of the KGB personnel.V Uigg.. The number of operational officers agents increases' In the Jit". which in its turn has an interest in fanning the ffames of discord between the has the right to three organizations.. Supreme arbitration between them can only be carried out in the Central Committee. tire acquisition of data on [. in rare cases up to 25 per cent."t.i. diuid. people including the ambassador. operational group. that is with the collection of compromising material on Soviet people. vastly in excess of that of the KGB. the chairman of . qu"fity of the'soviet Army would remain static' Finally a ii . In the officers' To the residents.. it becomes clear why the most outstanding operations of Soviet intelligence have been mounted not by the KGB but by the GRU.in residency grows.il.) Up-to 40 or 45 per cent are officers of the KGB and only li to 20 per cent. The GRU.clean. not offend the 'clean-ones'' They also must have for the dark sufficient complement to serve as a screen activities of the two residencies' represenThis is why Soviet embassies. such as that may be from seventy to eightyofficers' Mediumcontain between sized residencies like that in Rome would residency it irty una forty officers' All officers on the staff of a yoit .the resident and a combined radio/cipher officer. such a theoretical minimum exists arso for the other organizations. Only a smali proportion. thJ resident acquires several . Eqrally.

rntinually gives them help and support' nllin's Loxes' emptying dead' money and passports i"*i'uo*"r^ foi the undercover resl' certain important questions' Very often dency is used to rescue illegals' them..il..r..." .r" been recruited other two "g.. in medium and small residencies that of colonel. The residents of very large residencies from Personal recruitment' . there residency are completely undercover residency una tn" illegal risidencv has no idea how ona"ttover they work' At the many illegals there are. and the security of the residency as a whole. officers of the technical services and operational technical services and the operators of the . if he copes successfully."". both as regards the work of each of his individual officers and recruited agents. from thl administrative and financial apply to residents' same time the same rules appty as a ri"* he is a full colonel with full rights' operational officer and three resident before his appointment. younger' less experiofficers and the deputy residents the iesidencies.. guards and accountants.all resident him"iiigJti"* tn *"diu'-tized risidencies' the . studying conditions and clarifying in dead-letter --iie efie ot is full colonel' military rank of an! deputy resident or even ffr.senior representative of the GRU in any given place.. on instructions ..i". tirI. He undertakes full colonel's or residency will hold the military rank of major-general. He is the boss of all GRU officers and out of the country immediately. To the technical staff belong chauffeurs.."r. but then.i. Sometimes the resident himself supervises the most experienced operational officers.s assistant and assumes his responsibilities when he is absent. and also enced officers. even in front of the head of the GRU and the Central Committee.iilt take a direct interest in recruitment or not as he Officer are exempted wishes. documents and'.-u*."si["n.'he *ill be A resident in a large . illegals.urf. In some very large on the part o{ G}U sometimes where there it gttut uttliuity illegals' The is a post callJd deputy resident for The Resident He is the.ll4 Soviet Military Intelligence The tJndercover ResidencY 115 cipher officers..adio monitoring post.. according to the GRU system.-a"p-ry resident may be a lieutenant-colonel points . This does not mean that a lieutenant-colonel cannot be appointed resident. oft"n having to take tharge . .I".. . The resident is completely responsible for security... recruiting work the duties given to him by the resident and carries on in the same way as all other operational working in one or another specialized field. ug"nJ*no nu'Jpteviously and increase fyiit-pt"O". or where-or low from the Centre' the undercover .r".ori.1".id. to five years as the deputy major-general's salary and. will have to fill posts commensurate with the higher rank.ooliiy is obliged of one or as well ..".on the their productivity.ver.y . The deputy resident serves as the resident. and answerable only to the head of the GRU inl tt " Central Committee. He is chosen from among the most experienced officers and as a rule must have a minimum of three to five years of successful work as an has the right to send any of them. In this case he dols not even have to justify his decision. of weaponry and military secret from the moment of technology' Every operational officer to recruit a minimum of his arrival in tr. An identical burden is he is fulfilling the deputy resident at the same time as small or a o"puiv' Thil svs19m is applied in.. including his own deputies.. Frequently a deputy resident heads teams of officers The Operational the recruitment of This is a GRU omcei who carries out or acquires the runs them and through them receives "g.J-it" . He is not afterwards permitted to return to a post ordinarily filled by a lieutenant-colonel. He must keep these ag€nts placed-.

. ig. is consiaereO to be idle.er officer possesses he .irgf. only the resident may replace him should he become incapacitated for any reason... It is natural .".*f0. but only in order to inform the GRU in a very therefore that great care is taken of cipher way.ecruited .r iiil.r. also the storage and use of ciphers and cipher machines.as .-o-riuna than the resident of the undercover residency. For this reason an operationuf omi."n abroad for three years and not r. time served. In small residencies. major-generat having many fewer p"-opr" una.s ori'ril.is known as zero...riit ury ug. resident fiimsetf of cipher officer to.. He ::Ti::::ll the his military rank is not usually higher than that of major' If he does not manase. The RadiolCipher Officer Although he ls an offi. of technical operational staff. t t us sat for three years doing absolutely nothing " anO tfreieflre tarafy me. in which case he becomes a '10.exercise silent watch over the behaviour if there is any shortcoming he must report thi resident.oi".rs' the residency. and "". is successful in his recruitmeni work tre_-.o1. and it cails it number onl 1i.nO . One may be added to zero ifa '.. with the sole -illegal difference that the iltegat reiideri. If both the resident and the ciphlr officer should become incapacitated at the same time tten the deputy resident and the whole residency will remain ccimpletely cui off from the Centre' Naturally the ambassador'i and the KGB's channels of communication can be general used. and again t". but of enciphered cables and for the tr-ansmission and reception The the storage of all secret documentation in the residency' all the secrets of the residency radio-cipf..'eil other work _ ga $9 performing of operations for others.zero'agent manages to recruit u for"i!r."" h.o .i.e also applicable fbr . as automatic promotion .g.. at any the right of access to his room' or undei any pretext has ftty Oo noi"r"n have the right to know-the number and typo of cipher machines installed there' These restrictions utio uppty'to GRU deputy residents' Even during periods *hen ihe-resident is away-and the deputy resident is acting for him he does not have the right to go into the radio/ cipher operator's room or to ask lim^aly specific questions *iri.r. which is clearly tne UJsi nlmber to be...uAioLipt "t He is not only responsible for cipher Tatte.r" for pro_ motion in the ordinary way.116 Soviet lrlilitary Intelligence The I|ndercover ResidencY tl1 Alongside his recruitment work. and it. or even a senior lieuten"ri.y.-*.iir. officer is the seiond most important person in . and he pays for "*"r.r... addition to certain other coiloquiaf *orJsl. It is the duty of the.inL he decipirers communications from Moscow than the resident' Nobody' knows the news even earlier time including the ambassador and the KGB resident.nt. was) or captain.orp.i.ir" the privilege because the ciphei officer is the only man in the iesidericy who is entitled to communicate with Moscow *itt oot the Lnowledge of the resident' He can send a cable the containing an adversi report about the resident of which will know nothing.. or irliii!"niJ mate. the operational officer thc acquisitio.military rank of... *r.r-is not granted to unsuccessful The military ranks prescribed for undercover residencies ar... a bearing on his work' Only the resident may airy control 6ver the cipher officer. te is deprived of all his colonel... According to the standards of the OnU. however mportant .t ttuu. where there is only one radio/cipher officer.1. even if he has achieved outstanding success in colilcting the most inleresting intelligence material. an ordinary senior lieutenant or capiain anO f.to . iirr.iis considerarion for anoiher my'm ::ltT " The.iar uy arr possible means.tays on ffifu tevel receiving automatic promotion colonel or colonel but in practi:: ant part of an officer's duty..an op"rrtiJnJotdcer is rieurenanta major (as I accordingio ttre lenlitr of offiters.

r.nt ano ttu.rpre.^ i. .aiional conditions are made "p..tt]^ :T-f:":t*:: [.even though he may be silent and in the company of his resident."l-tl:." .i. he is forbidden all leave.' .*:: juniot officers who will eventually become operatlonat recruitmen'.tinction to TS officers.i . "qdgrygqllg . Even if these foreigners are Bulgarians or Mongolians and are on guarded territory belonging to a Soviet embassy.was enough irig-rrrv p"prlated parts of the city.h .r"il.. the restriction remains in force.a results..them. embasJies. --Til ."i*i"" where at in the city police activity is at its highest mounted *t'"'e ffi. anO those who have'been abroad will give their right arms to get another posting abroad..by me?n:.ii.. During the time of his assignment abroad.. Sometimes -v1!1t1 o"l:. not beoperations may be for the mounted' Groups and where they should . no matter wtrir!.television .-.. una o"t!. He and his family must have a diplomatic escert on their journey out from the Soviet Union and on their return.seaj life is always better than in the Soviet Union.es'.. It is easy to see wh-y cipher officers are not posted abroad for longer than two years. diplomatic wireless communications. any restrictions on their family lives.t and oolice activities. The cipher officer is not allowed in the same room with.""fi"*g tt e radio networks of the police and security .*-11l1officers and be sent out on independent who continually sgql4l !9c41l9ry These are small groups to oPtaq..p". consulates. these are . Technical Service:.. They will agree to any conditions.o other' different groups.*p". u""g.t.'b"*t".n"tist 6n . no matter where Cilcutta. technical servicei They are concerned with electronic intelligence from the premises of official Soviet premises. .iil...$"Per the numbirs o{ notice Pictures. any climati..urnltut in order to survey the for this.rying to obtain state secrets' but the monitoring to in the interests of the residency trying . corresponding the GRU to become tnterested and to take .Iil. the technical services and the radio monitoring .". and so on. ffiil.118 Soviet Military Intelligence The lJndercover ResidencY 119 gfficers (this is just as true of the KGB as the GRU)... Neither the cipher officer nor his wife is allowed to leave the guarded but also cover groups not only obtain interesting information subordination the system of governmental comhunications' the military of the different components of the state and structure. They aie at all times led by an officer who enjoys diplomatic immunity. secret and cipher.l. embassy accommodation guarded around the clock.r."ri1:":i to a small newspaper reported a police _plan t. In one *T. They are only allowed to live in official Soviet territory independently or unaccompanied.t*..oniruOi. r^ are malor rnitituty ranks of technical services officers concerned with and lieutenant-colonel. Shaighai or Beirut. and military channels of communication..'r"t-. Rqdio Monitoring Station Officers Neither the officer nor his wife is allowed near places wheie foreigners are to be found.1a1111:: most ffi.nJi. D-raconian living conditions are imposed on all ciphir officers..k."d"..t"lled by the services work in the interests of them is that the technical i't.'oniv a.. Of course those cipher officers who have served their whole lives on the territory of the Soviet Union deeply envy those who have had postings abroad. Basic targets are the telecommunications appar_ atus of the government.k.. By monitoring radio transmissions. for they hive learnt with their mother's milk the rule that ore..p. independent of each -resident' The difference between .n.i . (TS) Officer in .

dead-letter box operations and so on. rank.ir. The Operational Technical Group [r.......7-ffi : . The officers ofthe group. us"o to an equal extent 'o*" Some residencies..ffi .l10aP3l* 3ffi.il. has a much superior . .*utnin" its to'"t' the official duties we have used by ""*tAtr'i" their secret activities' KGB and GRU officers to tu*ounuge .k or major.ffimffiilesses.guatat.. dispense with the services of drivers.ffii"iitr**'i't'' intelligenc" *:i^! Sttupi"a in l'#. is in tt'ot" explanations to operational officers and to instruct them on the use of this or that instrument or method.ti Ifi..n ol iepuligs " tions. sometimes an operational officer is to be found in the guise of a driver and he.e tv.is oi vii"ssp't'i*orficers in the rank internal -U"-9q"1^"ijlth" security of lieutenant or sen'o=r iiuiEnint' Therequest of consist guards of the reside"gV '1v attempts to penetrate the resident in countrres where KG-B guards the GRU get out O. This is a widespread method of deception.-Ylo are resPonsible for ' l2l police system of control by television and this enabled the whole residency successfully to avoid traps laid for them for several years.ia".t-. of course.. in itre..."uv. These officers continually monitor television programmes and collect useful items on video tape.*:'J sl"gqi. or his deqrty' answer directly to the resident employed only Th" internal security Naturally they the disposal of the group there are dead-letter boxes of all types. the carrying out of counter-surveillance.D-::. Both residents tnJ tt"it tht'ry information which would expose ot . Within a month the GRU resident was able to say with conviction that he was fully informed with regard to the be excluded. However.t...t. especially those in countries where blfoth organiza' are in possestig.. citizens "r Driven are only allocated to residents who hold the rank of general.120 Saviet Military Intelligence The [Jndercover ResidencY measures. Technical Personnel Only the very largest residencies contain technical personnel.t.t onry *a.with the officers of the group for the study of operational conditions..sti:En' ..ont. ln our examination of the undercover-residency' . The officers of this group are always on hand to give the necessary ittiO"ncies where the normal dollars' In other cases monthly budget exceeds one million of one of the deputy the financial afairs are the concern ""i An t"f" part in agent handling operations' oi captain accountant..".sry i.duty . radio transmission stations.the vast majoritv or miruffi :::: irit6ffigegc. microphotography and micropantography. photocopying equipment and the like. together residents.."i Y*::::i:: T::. worse' Some provide uettei possiuilities' some bv the KGB' Let us tnot" cRu.t be saii that any official.'trb. for who would pay attention to a driver? i look at the basic ones' -A.. At "i. ililexternal prote'uon"If it't UoilAing' The GRU internal the . The military ranks of officers of these groups are senior lieutenant and captain. signals organization.""ri"i.. This is concerned with the repair and maintenance of photographic apparatus. heads of 'j:il"'ru H:r1'ffi..ffi. many generals. giving to Moscow material it could not get from any other source. . s. are widely used for the security of agent operations. SW (secret writing) materials.itu....:id... .The military rank of a driver is an ensign. However. in an effort to be indistinguishable from other diplomats. Without exaggeration auiofo .. have a staff of attacks on the embassy cannot x'ci.

oils.) sphere of interest. which therefore rank extremely high in the KGB. The KGB only agrees to this on the grounds of practical considerations. high-tension materials. fuels. The consulate is entirely KGB. are bearers of diplomatic passports.r22 Soviet Military Intelligence .s it follows that the percentage of KGB officers in consulates is unusually high. This is because all exit and entry from and to the Soviet Union is in the hands of the KGB. even by Soviet standards. (There do exist very rare instances of GRU officers working in consulates. lubricants. they work officially in the embassies. Other officers of both organizations give themselves out as embassy diplomats too. those officers whom the GRU selects at advanced . KGB officers in the consulate issue visas. For this reason the KGB resident and his colleague from the GRU.E . and so that it should not appear to be too one-sided an organization.!!gQBIl. perfectly justifiable meetings with representatives of firms producing aviation o o I >:--'Kiffi o i o electronics. heat isolators and aero-engines. meetings with representatives of the leading aviation and space corporations.9[_qE o{. Every aspect of immigration and of flight and defection has some connection with consular * E E:FSE EiEg! EEiEE J !gEE!- llo' affairs._!his can be explaineil 6y thtfact that aviation of extreme interest to the Soviet armaments industry. So i"Y *!tye 9. and in this field lie the GRU's richest pickings. Happily. and the frontier forces of the KGB then control them later on.9 to an unacceptably high risk of arrest. and questions of transport and communications. Usually the firms which produce civil aircraft also produce military aircraft and rockets. and there is huge scope for any Aeroflot employee to inform himself about the progress of the West: international exhibitions. You will almost never find officers of the GRU there and only very rarely genuine diplomats.is. they are rarely found in cultural sections.e g B and scientific questions. and usually their deputies too. that . They all prefer to concern themselves with technological .

" th.124 Soviet Military Intelligence The llnd'ercover ResidencY 125 aviation institutes for work in Aeroflot do not need lengthy spOcialist instruction.o serve in this hospitable country and .*y.even ttrotigtr in.l'i"tiO... Literally swarming with KGB and GRU officers.-...ffnd. f. An organization of exceptional importance to both services is the Trade Representation. The naval.t" during tris briefings will-frequentlyseen by the the life as military attach6s . Even the KGB in this field has very narrow powers. but an he has life and his eyes express pleasure' This means there Possibly recruited one of yooi f"ltot"'countrymen' even stands in front dangerous. oi yoo a deputy resident or the GRU of him' He is resident himself.-it Ministry of External Trade. -life Internal relations . This does not mean of course that their secret activities suffer in any way. .-"fficial ranks' uitituty ranks.i. Pravda and Izvestia are almost forbidden ground for the GRU.. .tiJJ r"oito t" plays the parl of doorman the deputy important person' attach6s.. and then for the same reasons as the very least-an operational always that before you stands at the is faced with the officer of an undercovei residency wiro does not recruiting foreigners 31q *T' if he ."" p.*t***. The seconi mosi .l bggd!*-so much so that it is not jdFt arlorgefiffition strongly influenced by the KGB... This is not his first time abroad' of successful atready chalkedup a significant number I irli lrrlil recruits.. your guard' for a note of anguish.-."rri. that is the organ of the I. Here there are no genuine diplomats.l rifA . remember ..""..i.k into tri.t. therefore KGB officers and officers of the GRU do not occupy key posts in these organizations..there with an have been cases wirere...his for those same ... 'rr. the only difference being that the officers there are selected to study cruisers and submarines and not strategic aviation. Press matters are very carefully kept in the Central Committee's own hands. KGB officers are only rarely employed at Aeroflot.. this organization provides exceptional access to business people whom both strive to exploit for their own ends.il work become single forei-g'ner.playthe officer in the important rol is ttre actual job of role. The merchant navy is almost identical.u' ti' and'be'careful like an old hand He is experienceO anO cunning . Whenever you talk to a Soviet military attach6. has his place in thein oaitv structure of the is onlv the whit we see . and one assumes that this has spread to one's Soviet colleagues. Representation in Tass.t.residents insignificant posts eve to cover havb occupied completely et thl same time the resident remains i^linr" Within the ii.the West one is accustomed to see in these people not spies but military diplomats. nor KGB. then be on he is happy with you if tre cin' But perhaps.vet una ask him if in his answer iu.y .. Sometimes Soviet military and civil aircraft have identical parts. .^i[ .i.". GRU wishes to show us' whatsoever on i. This deep misapprehension is fully exploited by the GRU.."rchv.. and under general . ies all. Intourist is in the KGBj. Anything to do with the military attach6s is staffed exclusively by officers of the GRU."..". military and air attach6s are regarded by the GRU as its particular brand of cover. residency' whatever Every GRU officer in an undercover whatever cover he his official duties may be. APN.tiO. The one rule wNch admits of no exceptions. h^ rt and that means be. ln.his other a "i GRU in consular affairs.over residency have no bearing an insignificart ... tyrannical' . and his authority is unshakeable' frequently wilful remains ir" tttiti...tt il[rifical ina uil t[ t'opet of ashining career crash to the how much longer he . tt attack il.."i"r*"n.

Their relations with each other in the residency might be compared with the relationships existing between fighter pilots in time of war. all officers the three attach€s.remainder nate to him have one agent each' to two including .... They also..i-..fr.il. vears.p"tiatty valuable agent-sources)' and .ni' and a yet noagents' The remaining officers have as He C.iS.. while the GRU has decreed that he. co'er-Assistant to thi Naval Attach6' Lt-Colonel two of whom t*'r-V-"perational otfrcers beneath him' Representation. five in the Merchani No*ry military .i. but still have the deputy resident as his own personal driver.. to whom all show the greatest respect. Their criterion of respect for a man is the number of enemy aircraft he has shot down..t". This dtputy "tid"nt-ltthas no officers He work' does not carry out recruiiment beneathhim... e'Lutty and ten in the. An operational officer may assume the official duty of assistant to a military attach6 or military attach6 himself..' uio" u. are beneath one d"p"il. All operational officers are legal equals. agent-running work.?n example and Let us take a typically large residency The resident is a Majorexamine it... in this case.. off duty. a lieutenant-cotonel.."^ (one of whom four .i..tun deputy residents. in their own circle.*ir"" 6iaU om". His situation is analogous to that of the Sicilian waiter who. The deputy resident in no way suffers from this... deputy.". TheY are: Representative' He has Colonel B.ry. this deputy work in the whole i"."i"*-ttlponsiure for i-nformation *ho u" to be recruited within one In addition to his Embassy (deputy resi' Colonel D. is better than them. Embassy' Directly beneath him verv experienced opera. is established by the resident exclusively on the basis of the quantity and quality of their recruitments.ra". Their seniority in the residency.ipt"t officers. however.. three an agent group' and two runs .i"ffr.resident it it::1T' assistant military aualne' The subordi.on- t'i'' work in.nt. and has given him full powers dispose of them and order them about..t26 Soviet Military Intelligence The lJndercover ResidencY ln resident."i..butwhenheiscarryingoutoperationsinthe .. Official cover again plays absolutely no part. is senior in rank to the restaurant owner within the Mafia hierarchy. pay little attention to length of service or military rank.. Naval u"a Xt Attach6s' be a diplornatic departments are considered to Aeroflot.. because he knows much more about intelligence matters concerning the residency than the deputy resident."ilrt if[gat).. rank or official duties.n'd"p. from senior lieuten4nts to full colonels.. They are only operational officers.il'. three in il. regardless of age. .' The only exception to this attitude is the radio/cipher officer.. and a lieutenant who has shot down ten aircraft may patronisingly slap on the shoulder a major who has not shot down a single aircraft. full colonels though they may be. Everything is tlctuat' (relativqly unimportant)' is General A and tris omcial cover are a group fir. cover Uefuty Trade all working in the Trade .departmelts-oJ All three of the the Military.. residencY. is in contact with one agent' one ofishis three agents' Another in officers runs an agent $oup of third officer has one agent' contact with two ug. to as.r. may only be a lieutenant-colonel with operational officers who are colonels but this does not prevent him from talking to them as he would to captains or lieutenants.i.. cover First Secretary' no agent and O. The attitude of the operational staff engaged in recruitment work to other officers may be summed up by comparison with the attitude of the fliers and the ground staff at a fighter base: '[ fly in the sky and you shovel shit. Recruitment work is the sole criterion for all GRU officers. Twelve other operaiional officers have The.dent from each other and from the Embassy' entering the three military However.

of Holland. Wherever there is official Soviet diplomatic representation with radio transmission. from studigs ofjbr ioreignelllgrroundins him to clearins dead-letter boxes. of whom. one group for the study of operationaicon_ I ditions-^(four officers)_. and one accounts officer. Lt-Colonel E. twenty operational forget to mention another category of people participating ai.llg! . In Marseilles. complicates work to a considerable degree but in the ipinion of the GRU it is better to have two imall residenciei than one big one.are clearly civil. as the GRU can control one resident by means Lf another.one group of operational technique I (two officers).those of the KGB are not. This also applies to the numerous missions of Soviet military advisers in developing countries. Everywhere it is possible-.128 r Sovict Mititary Intellilence The Undercover ResidencY 129 interests of illegals. where the In all there are sixty-seven officers in the residency. for example. For example. military communications mission or a permanent UN mission. military or mixed . Such possibilities are open to Soviet intelligence in many countriei. cover Second Secretary. consulate. military attach6.*aet. consisting of two men but independent and self- contained. this practice also ensures parallelism.s department."^ -ollllefuml a nurnbei of test-. in Paris there is one of the moit expansionist undercover residencies of the GRU' Independeni of it in Maneilles there is another. smaller residlncy. Geneva and Montreal the Soviet missions . He is in t I contact with one agent. In West Germany the GRU has been able to create five residencies. Where these two conditions obtain.s driver. uut may be of anY rank offirson to ambassador and he carries out very differriffi?66ffian ent tasks. five officers of the internal security guards for the residency. New York. Embassy.e[t by lhese. the radio monitoring staiion (three officers).. independent residencies. I residencies can be quickly organized. disguised as the military attach6. This is true. One operational officer is subordi_ I nale to_ him. The KGB hffilwayi6E. For this it has to observe two basic conditions: the presence of official Soviet diplomatic representation _ an embassy. the KGB may not have a residency.th. and the presence of an officially registered radio station in uldercover-residency is located in The Hague but part of the residency is in Amsterdam. as for example the Soviet observation mission in West Germany. Amsterdam.* in elpionage activities .ifizens-ebroud wt o - go-opted pgrsonn=e. The residency has th-irty-six agents. o$. In addition. In some cases part of the undercover residency. and in all these cities there are undercover residencies of both KGB and GRU.forty-one are operational staff. and I this officer runs an agent group. But where the mission is clearly military. Apart from the security angle. this deputy resident controls the following: one technical service gioui I I (six officers). Their performance is vastly enhanced by the fierce competition between them. even the very smallest possible.civil. functions in another city permanently detached from the basic forces of the main residency. iiCg. under the command of one of the deputy residents. of whom twenty-five work independlntly of each other. In speaking about the undercover residency we must not direct contact with Moscow. In this case any failure in one of the residencies does not reflect on the activities of the other. there is also an undercover residency of the GRU' In many cases there is also an undercover residency of the KGB' But while the residencies of the GRU are organized in any official mission .!-Ihese 4{eg". Such an arrangement technological staff and six technical staff. The KGB presence there is only for the maintenance of security among the genuine military advisers. the GRU endeavours to organize new. he can make use of any of the best officen of the first and second groups.

in Soviet official institutions. are divided into two of the GRU ' :. out of every ten 'clean' offieials. are not subject to tax.ision to do away with unwanted people who he can threat to it. [n other words. L'g"iiringagents]d6ffi-entalistsJtreownersof saf points' udir"ssei. girlfriend . All agents. The rewards for a co- 3 Agents In term present-day Soviet intelligence terminology the is a foreigner 'ug."*ice fn"y are invested with wide powers and possess Slnin. fall they are exeeutive leaders. yery tricky matter indeed to meet a man who has no connections with intelligence. The GRU is not so keen. or the sons of members of the Central Committee whom wild horses could not force to have anything to do with intelligence. seven are co-opted onto the KGB staff. whose main task is to kill. i-rrespective of the to *hi. of'. interested in the exploitation of co-opted persons. diff". unlike the basic salary. men and women and have given proof of their devotion to 'ouiy. Either they are complete idiots. In this and ofher emergencies organhnancial independence' In cases where the .nce between the group leader and the agent a whole range of resident is that the group leadei may take the group entrusted to him' irronun. the head agent must .i""n yrurc are the leaders of agent groups and agent most experresidenti. Its guiding principle is: 'don't trust even your best friend with your motor car. . using co-opted persons only in exceptional cases. one onto the GRU staff. Usually in every embassy.rnt iz"ation entrusted iil-iil .or agent'. or they are operators' alents....rr' fras only one meaning' An agent tasks r"iruir"a by Soviet intelligencelnd carrying out secret group or section on its behaif. theY are Pro' videri of information. decisions-conierning resident has a but he may not recruit agents at all' The agent to thim collapses. telephones and radio transmission Head Agents ehouses' ii. following the principle of 'don't stick your own neck out if you can get somebody else to stick it out for you'."O . it is a very. ut*uyt count on the full support of the GRU' Th. Head agents are selected from the who have had long ienced agents available. In the sJpflglg$ggglggp are wireless agent"Hasiggroups: the basic agent andthe sopplementary into four categories: they are residents or group in.g*r.a-' recruiting ..ri..h they belong.130 Soviet Military Intelligence opted person are monetary ones which. consulate and trade representation. only the remaining two are clean.

driving uno'u*pt.r[t. urJ subsidiary agents. but in smaller number.ttthorough vetting. becayle the fate of illegals is "+.. In other words.l"iiffy to them. access.have lost their Agent Recruiters Tf.t"d of the legalizing agent is to ensure the issue of tf.iuft of the police and passport departments.. 133 wider range of interests. have been able to obtain the A simiiar role to that of the legalizing agent is played by the documentation agents.132 Soviet Military Intelligence Agen* executive agent. communications clerks. Sometimes even strategic intelligence needs similar specialists.i=.Incontradistinctionto . it is first and foremost suggests.n ir*"nse service to illegals who. In the history of the GRU quite a few priests carrying have falsified documents and registers of baptism and death the basis of false on !ir. Agent legalizers are subjected to "rnptoy. to the illegal..e tast customs and immigrition officials. become accustomed to executing any orders thdy are given. consular . draughtsmen and other technical personnel. even thousands of i "or..the military district departments. computer operators. The group leader may be subordinate to the residency. documents or samples of military technology and weaponry. apart from secretaries. These are agents who directly obtain secret information. Executive Agents These are agents recruited to carry out assassinations. with passing time. When a Soviet illegal arrives in a country "niru. cipher officers.ii nu*. and small usually caried out by the central GRU...i iitr. They work in the interests of illegals' illegals and as a rull aie recruited and run only by Caididates for this category of agents are sought among om.or. These are recruited by the undercover licences residency and their job is to obtain passports. With this in mind. The recruitment of executive agents is not Agent Legalizers t[. military. technological and other secrets which is taken into account. any the leealizing agents' documentation agents do not have . Sources in cases where they may.*.ofofficialpoliceforms. urc the most devoted and thoroughly tested agents' As people who either never had access or who have lost it' ih.necessary documents' Intries. Frequently agents who have been acting as providers of information are transferred by both the strategic and operational branches of the GRU to the category of Jocuments by makiig the necessary entries in the registration the books and to ensure that the illegal is in possession of necessary documentation. the people of special interest to the GRU are workers in printing and typing offices which produce secret documents. tens and lJir. illegals. the GRU has contact with people occupying relatively unimportant posts but with possibly greater knowledge than their superiors. It is clearly unnecessary to recruit an officer from the Ministry of Defence if one can recruit his secretary. diplomatic couriers. Although they obtain they have passport-s' hundreds. of labour. In the recruitment of such people. diversions or sabotage.r. undercover or agent residency or directly to the Centre.tir"tknowledge of how and when the GRU is going to no ait. the most important being recruitment. The most successful will eventually become group leider or sometimes agent resident' their access to political. Executive agents are recruited from criminal elements and from that band of naturally brutish characters who. but by the local organs of the GRU .f. the GRU uses them solely for the recruitment of niw agents. but the agent resident may only be subordinate to the Centre.

tn.. then to Africa and only from Africa being conveyed to the Soviet Union. The GRU also makes very wide use'of countries of the Third World for this purpose. inventory. copious correspondence frorn-abroad. the work is normally restricted to inhabitants of 'soft' countries' in 5oor. i. in a word.ie{s.ut by general mobilization in the country' so that tt.. transmit the correspondence to officers of the of recruitment undercover residency.. all those places' The term 'safe flat' on"e but several flats or dwelling . As soft countries the GRU includes Finland.in. an opinion fortified by the experience of many years. o*n"r. Examples are'known of material obtained in the United States going first to Latin America. usuaiiy recruited from among who possess not erges and hotel owners. lar attention to *f. to lose their passports. Frequently documentation agents have successfully worked among poor students. the GRU virtually gave these at all' it is only for ing ... the GRU pays particu-1 quE!..". people i"i ir. usually recruited gium and Holland.it. up recruitairports became stricter. Documentation agents may be recruited from among criminal classes who are occupied with the forging and selling of documents on the black market and also from clerks concerned with the production. . Obviously it is not necessary to employ special couriers to transport the material into the Soviet Union or its satellites. who hane obtained information and intelligence tuia .:. Ireland and Austria among others. to cha4ge clothes and change and to hidle stolen miterials and-photograph .. the United States.rt*s of airliners. in GRU language these types of .rr"rrJ be understood not only-in its generally accepted garage or meaning but also as a well'equipped cellar' attic' selects quiet secluded places sto. tf. storage and issue of passports. be affected t@long:ar$gre I co m me "9!!. In the opinion of the GRU.ffi. the hardest country is Great Britain. for a financial consideration. The basic flow of agent material which is not subject to particular suspicion goes from countries with hard regimes into countries with more soft regimes. the Federal Republic of Germany. and couriers may sometimes make very long journeys before the material finally arrives in the hands of the GRU. is known .t"ssors of secret telephones the same rules applied to the teleorinters are recruited by . Frequently the GRU uses the passports obtained through the good offices of documentation agents only as a sample for the preparation of similar falsified copies.t . persuading them.. If it uses " trinsporting small-sized non-metallic objects' The Owner of a Safe Howe or Flat of great He is a supplementary agent occupying a position house-owners' concttrust.recruiJilg co_u!. One interesting aspect people who would not GRU prefers'middle'aged i. Bel- messages He is an agent who receives and transmits secret from among those..cret addre'sses. ind de-briefings.ri"fi"g. cfu.. .h.KK" The Safe Address Owner Couriers These are supplementary agents engaged in transporting agent materials ovcr state frontiers.ountties send letters in SW to these addresses and . The owner of a safe house or flat GRU by the abbreviation in ttre cotloquial language of the .urents.. fii-jacking of aircraft became more frequent and controls at rcial trave leFilil-s ai I oJiif Ge'iChint fl Wtre n I I ihe chain of clmmunication is not interrupted' '-fftt and' more recently' fo. F-"t safe flats the GR0 sometimes where they may want to be able to hide a man to carry out meetings' for a lenith of several months.ioi"n ao. followed by France.'134 Soviet Military Intelligence Agents 135 use them.

or 'Today we're having some shit-eaters to dinner. In the Soviet Union everybody without exception wishes to be abroad. later. sq4ll kiosks. We are talking about the numerouS members of Union. 'KT'.stregt--s. or what its quality or age . people from the free world who have sold themselves to the GRU. This avoids direct contact between the GRU and the agent.'and they will even come to meetings in secure places like the Soviet Embassy.eJlgrq"ir. Usually they are. Officially one is not allowed to call them agents.' [t does not matter which country it comes from. 'KTP'. Oh! to be abroad.r. The motives of agents are clear . ii. who can buy anything they want in the shops. to go absolutely anywhere. No.il. the agent himself has disappeared long before. But the behaviour of the numerous friends of the Soviet Union is utterly incomprehensible to Soviet people. stalls or paper stalls. not knowing who has filled instructions.' 'i]li ln examining different kinds of agents. and they are not agents in the full sense of being recruited agents. .ril' . perhaps the least appealing of all. k is difficult to say parifrilSiies the Central Committee. Hour. led by the children of Brezhnev. Gromyko and Andropov. The owners of transmitting points are used for transmitting agent materials within the limits of one city or area. all Soviet representatives regaid thile with touching feelings of friendship. Officially. A different one will be used for each operation. these people are nothing but shit-eaters according to Soviet intelligence. then no money and no easy life. The use of this word has become so firmly entrenched in Soviet embassies that it is impossible to imagine any other name for these people. even if only with one eye to look at Mongolia or Cambodia. The GRU will ' announce the dead-letter box's whereabouts to the transmitting point only after it hai been filled. They do everything free. but why bother to recruit them when they bring such advantages without being recruited? . To mount a surveilldnce operation in the neighbourhood of the dead-letter box is impossible since the transmitting point only acquires its location after it has been filled. The recruitment of such people is not recommended by over the material to the owner. 'Really. bui privately they call them 'shit-eaters' ('govnoed'). If you take risks and lose. To the end of his life the agent will not be able to tear himself away from this servitude . An agent who has acquired intelligence will stop and hand where this expression originated. When Soviet people want to say that a thing is outstandingly good. But suddenly one finds these friends of the Soviet Union. who enjoy all the fruits of civilization down to Gillette razor blades.' Officers of both the GRU and the KGB have very much more respect for their agents than for the shit-eaters. Increased security might mean the source ageirt using a dead-letter box which the stall holder will it. and so even if the police discover that the GRU has a special interest in the small shop or stall and subsequently establishes that this stall serves as a hansmitting point. it will still be very difficult to discover the souroe agent. A conversation might run as follows: 'Today we've got a friendship evening with shit-eaters'.136 Soviet Military Intelligence Agents 137 agent networks and their possessors are known by the abbreviations 'KA'. even bananas. one cannot avoid touching on yet another category. sometimes days. but it is truly the only name they deserve. GRU officers will visit the stall to collect the material and hand over money for the agents together with new empty.it has to be foreign. is the cry. and yet they praise the Soviet Union. The transmitting point is known by the abbreviation'PP'.as is the case in the criminal world. this must be foreign. they say.an easy life and plenty of money. The contempt felt for them does not prevent the GRU and KGB from using them whenever they can. Prepare a suitable menu.

head agent or supplementary agent. some for assassinating people. Sometimes one tm ls to organize an evening with one or another of his acquainianG$ The GRU usually makes use of the shit-eaters 'in the dark'.tr"::iT:l::_q 0 _ scruDulous collection of information on persons of interest !o . mlll- th@nment taifS-aiilOesign bureaux and people connected with these ffiJfi. The search for suitable candidates is implemented atthe same time in certain d. may be used very effectively for intelligence purposes. basic importance is attached to the provider of information.u foreigners without **pti"" *t'' 6) . No real problems can be solved without agent penetration in basic government. who have not had firm contacts with them. as the owner of a transmitting point will never on his own initiative go to the police.ilffi "?.---+:-i.138 Soviet Military Intelligence them information abour their neighbouffiEifiifiGiil workers and so on. Nevertheless.be an exaggeration to say that any citizen of the West.:-. in other words not saying what they are used for or how much they benefit from their services. for example. The GRU is convinced that a former sourie who is now working. but the same cannot be said of agents who hare neuet provided secrets for the GRU. They usually ask from 4 Agent Recruiting They are very good Agent recruiting is the most important task of both strategic and operational-intelligence. ----r thF-GRI I includins sovernment instltutlons tor sta[s." alfto recruit sources. having been recruited by the GRU. military and technological centres of the enemy In the previous chapter we examined the types of secret agents and also the various differences between them' [t would not. long experience has persuaded the GRU that it is essential above . and some for the transporting of agent materials' No citizen of any age and either sex would be idle for long once he or sni fe1 into the hands of the GRU. and only after the GRU has acquired through these sources all possible material may the sourcg himseif be used for other purposes' as a recruiter.*. some for the acquisition of secret documents.

which consists in a further definition of motiGs which will be used in the actual recruitment of the . telephone directories and the press. It was in this way that many Amirican creators of the first atomic bomb were . instead of at meetings nr.irt .1m person. or 'love at first sight' in GRU with the has a numbei of irrefutable advantages' Contact future agent takes place only once. normally extends for not less than a yeat1' only after ihis does actual recruitment take place.commences.opl". The cultivation process may be carried out after the establishment of an acquaintanceshipwith the candidate. There are two principal methods of recruitment'.as to how several p. Y of cultivation. oi for many months. jargon' The crash approach.qL9gt4s ual. to communicate secret new agenls. If an operational officer has a hundred acquain- p*. Their subsequent argument was that it was as a mark of protest againsi the bombing of the Japanese cities ifru.g information by word of mouth.llo Jesruit by means of which he may be f.A contact with the undercover residency of the CiU in Canada. the GRU will endeavour to turn his dispieasure inti hatred. It is desirable that he be sympathetic to communism without being a communist. The GRU may equally want a surveillance on him to collect extra data about his daily life. They also evaded the question. cond v -'in the position to_Jlgvigt .rets. but it already has a considerable wealth 7q of detail on him. of course fo[owing the secret cultivation which has gon. simultaneously and independently from one another' irta-Utitn. Subsequently the GRU enters the process . tt"y. established contact with Soviet intelligence.140 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting and 141 have anv contacts at all with officers of the GRU.*Ei After the selection of a candidate for recruitment. from the beginning of the search for a candidate to the completion of a cultivation period. the task of obtaining all available information about the candidate may well be given to other agents. If he is displeased with It also tries to exacerbate his weaknesses: for exam' tiilG3i6ne of these must surely be a potential provider of rr A candidate for recruitment must fulfil the following iat is he must 5e fi'.". on theii own initiative. However. or. *uiy months..displeasure with the regime or other political the political regime. but not with the undercover residency of the KGB in Mexico.There must exist . . Details are collected aboui ihe candidate. Up to now the person himself does not suspect that the GRU exists and he has had no contact with its-representatives. the sec@!r4g .tqlegail1anceq @ foreigners. and it is always recommended that agents recruited from communist parties should leave the partys- .approach and the crash approach' The crash approach ffiffifi""-ffiisbt agCnt woik. the GRU *ili endeauour to make them worse. GRU. ttre GRU may authorize the reJident to mount iuch an operation only if the resident of has been able to provide good irgumerlts for the taking such a risk. if the man experiences financial problems. as is the case with the gradual approach' After the first contact the newly recruited agent will himself motives.rnglives v recruited .r io'1r"fi.. gns $-!.r. The whole process. Communist parties everywhere have been compromised to a certain extent by their contacts with the KGB and the GRU. for examPle. . Quite a few examples are known of recruitment at the first meeting. for some reason they forgotto add that thiJ contact had been established long before the first experiments with the bomb.rrit"d.1-ql9!. or private motives like a desire for revenge on somebody or secret crimes which he is trying to hide. . when there was no cause for proiest. details which may be obtained through reference books.llformation of real use to the n information which will be of interest.6p-y. personal financial problems. This process sometimes gives very gratifying results.

this sort of thing happens very.142 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting t43 take action on his own security. and also from his own fellow countrymen. as the candidate gradually becomes. He will try to avoid the candidate visiting Soviet official institutions and places where Soviet people gather together. despite its shortcomings. In the gradual approach method.f insignificant favour from the man and pay him very generously for it. very often. He may consider that he is simply doing his business an<l doing favours for a good friend' Then. has not yet understood what it wants from him. and naturally he will not hide his good friendship with such charming people. At all costs he will try to avoid the candidate telephoning him either at home or in the embassy. The tasks become more serious but the payment for them gradually . It does not matter what sort of favours or services. The fact is that the GRU is not always. caf6s. The candidate has as yet not felt the deadly grip of the GRU. the GRU informs him what the affair is all about and there begins a new stage. During this stage the most important thing is that the future agent becomes accustomed to being asked favours and fulfilling them accurately. but the payment for them grows equally. However. able to collect a sufficient amount of material about the candidate without his knowledge to prepare him sufficiently for recruitment. He will never talk to his wife. then the Soviet. or to buy a complete set of telephone directories and give them to the officpr as if he did not know how or where this could be done' By degrees the tasks become more complicated. is frequently used. (The particular pretexts I used were that my office .an agent of the GRU without having fully realized it. In many cases it is necessary to establish contact and to use each meeting with the candidate to study his motives and to carry out vetting and cultivation. and that he is deeply ensnared in espionage work.Maybe he will be asked to accept at his address and forward to the officer letters ostenpibly from his mistress. He still nourishes his illusions. or he will be asked to talk about and describe his friends who work with him' In many cases the actual recruitment proposal is never made. or tell her that he has a charming friend in the Soviet military attach6 who is also very interested in stamp collecting. The only people who should know anything about an agent and therefore about candidates for recruitment are the resident. He will decline invitations to meet the candidate's family or visit his home. the man will one day find that all ways of extricating himself have been cut off. indeed not even in the majority of cases. the operational officer tries by every possible method to avoid'blowing'the candidate. from friends and acquaintances of the man himself. the gradual approach method. tf they exchange postage stamps. by apparent mistake or out agent a very valuable for a very innocent and stamp. the deputy resident and of course the cipher officer and the Centre nobody else. that never there. Perhaps he will be asked to acquire in his name some works of reference which are not on sale and are distributed only on signature. bars far from the place where the candidate lives and far from his place of work. Having estabhshed contact. he tries to hide the connection from the police. In order that he should'not blow the candidate from - the very first meeting. there was a small acquaintanceshiP will try to make every subsequent meeting as interest' ing and useful as possible for the candidate. After he has become aware of this for hirnself. much to his surprise. will give the future is. the operational officer will try to carry out meetings in secluded restaurants. The officer may then ask of frGndthip. so the candidate t After the woutO tell him.

The examination and construction of such samples as they have been able to obtain in the Soviet Union will occupy much more time and money. how much does it coit? 20. The experts of course know that at the exhibition there will be demonstrations of models whose sale to the Soviet Union is categorically prohibited. friendly at the GRU residency with a list of everything which is essential for the Soviet military and the armaments industry. the same result. vetting and cultivation #*-G.r-"'--4'. Could we not continue our talk the opening of exhibitions of military etectronics.000. There exists yet another method of recruitment. The exhibition iJtruge. ttre tist of essential things is too long' Another stand. The interpreter stays behind for a few seconds' 'It was so nice meeting you. ii does not matter' Not everything this been lost. All expenditure is approved and justified. hundreds ofwhich take place every year. Drinking martinis in the bar.' And that is all. It can only be used at exhibitions and only against the owners of small firms which produce military material. including the impossibility of recruiting generals and their secretaries. None the less. At thelame time they manage to let at just such operationaiofficer know that they hare arrived is not a firm as could be of use to them and that the exhibit forbidden. they wait their turn. spend it as they wish. Recruitment is accomplished' The delegation continues its inspection' New interpreters are proviied. the delegation will carry suitcases crammed full of money' with full powers to . air shows and so on. At each of these stands there are several salesmen and guides. perhaps the most effective and secure.000? Only 25.000? How cheap! We would pay twenty times that much for such a piece! Great pity that it is not for sale. The delegation is only really interested in the stands of small firms where the exptanations are . The experts pass themselves off as an offlcial the Soviet delegation. The exhibition is huge. This is done on the pretext What can he do? Go on strike? of his own security. The Soviet lelegation did not propose anything to anybody. but an actual piece. The delegation visits the exhibition and looks at the stands of the big corporations only to disguise its real object. but is distinct from the classical 'love at first sight' in that a lengthy search for a candidate. In spite of the fact that the method has so many limitations. It is very similar to the direct approach. just a short. 'Is it really Luy such a piece? Oh! What i pity. This method was worked out by the GRU in the first decade after the war and seems not to be used by the KGB.as'v - are absent.would give half a million piece cost? 25. Great pity that it's not for sale'' The delegation on. a scientific delegation appears over dinner this evening? No? You're busy? What a pity' Many thanks.carried out by the owner or a director conversation. It was very nice to make your acquaintance-" And that is all.incidental. it did not demand' It was merely its interested.to just a model. ship-building and engine-building conferences. N$yqjo be done' but teli us. "Before himself. The inierpreter stays for a few seconds' 'Could I !T !o". It did not ask. After a few minutes the delegation takes its leave in a friendly way. and equally its complete unacceptability for illegals it does. Hundreds of films and the list of equipment wanted by their government is very long' .144 Soviet Military Intelligence Agen. armaments and military technology. ior that.t Recruiting 145 decreases.' All this in a light-hearted way' as if. another firm. his tracing. however. any one or all of which may be from the security services. The delegation gets into conversation with him and an officer of the. There are still more stands' 'How much does we.local GRU residency acts the part o! interpreter. iot invite you to dinr"t this evening in the restaurant?' '[ don't know whether that would be all right' We hardly know each other. give positive results. In the meantime the delegation goes on with hundreds of firms' and inspection. nothing criminal. The conversation turns to another subject.

but only in some small part . using antediluvian technology. receives an agent who will serve it for long years afterwards. the owner of a components manufacturing firm. As for QBl]*jlbeat$. they gradually attract these people to play the part of agents. always keen to strengthen his situation. Weak Soviet industry. He is deeply mistaken. J. They have been facilitated by the fact that in these recruitments the GRU does not spend one rouble of its own money. Having bought the first model or set of documents. e ---------::!-::-L+-J-* the riame of Soviet intellieence. Very often Soviet designers are not interested in the whole rocket or the whole aircraft. an air show . but not for long because a military diplomat cannot be held. is always at great risk. certainly at a staggering price. in Northern Ireland as an . The only thing he has not taken into consideration is the wolf-like greed of the GRU. It is equally easy for him to hide the money he has received. and by means of proposing advantageous deals. even a very successful one. the number of exhibition recruitments by the GRU has steadily From the first moment he knows what is wanted from him and carefully evaluates the step that he decides on.y *uy pass themselves off as American industrial spies. at Le Bourget when the assistant Soviet military attach6 i was detained for endeavouring to carry out just such a lilt lilJ{ recruitment. (To blame the GRU for the trials and difficulties of the TUlzl4 Concordski is not justified.an engine. The only thing which is not clear in all these stories is the attitude of those countries who joyfully accept these supposed 'diplornats'. There is another verv imoortant factor.. After he has been milked.-s*f9_L&t _S?pdidqQl tnd their tracins and vetting. not able to copy the aeroplane properly. He hopes to dispose of the products of his firm. Exhibition recruitments are also r: grata. The work of illegals of course is made egjgr by the obvjous s:lqrg!!{:lti9rtptlbe. He was detained.146 Sovict Military Intelligence Agent Reuuiting 147 The GRU's calculation has shown itself to be unfailing. despite having all the necessary drawings and documents. The money which the delegation brings with it to the exhibition comes out of the budget of the armaments industry which is ready to spend as much money as it has to in profitable business. Declared persona non i:itri t ilill ll.. flr- ffi. s p g ggl e Ifiiloome-fi t5Ee qEn t cont aa r[nn tne ownerftTInffi-s producing military material. a heat sink or some such thing) * exactly the sort of thing that would be produced by a components lnanufacturer. For its money the armaments industry receives essential documents and samples. Since they very often play thj part oJ n aIE. without paying a penny. The owner of a small firm. supposing that this will be sufficient. Far from it. When he receives a proposal to sell his own wares at a price fifteen to twenty times the highest normal price. Thev alwals assume another attractive because they can be carried out with complete impunity. was simply increased. and the GRU. atter three years he went to another country in anothei official capacity as a deputy resident. must turn his attention to the recruitment of other agents in the big firms to which he supplies his parts. now turned agent. Only one case of detection is known. if he sells his product he can hide the fact from the authorities. which in several countries is not even considered a criminal offence. but this is not absolutely true. Then suddenly in the Soviet Union an aircraft exactly like Concorde appears. he thinks to himself: this is a matter of industrial espionage. they basically use the first two methods. the GRU will later on lower the prices and finally dictate them. [n any case. a steering system or some particular instrument (in many cases not even an important part but only a membrane. One might object that the really big secrets are all in the hands of the big firms.) Recently. Illesals hardlv ever recruit in. And of course recruitment in small firms does not in any way hinder the GRU's attempts to penetrate large firms.

Be so kind as to leave the building or we will call the police.. This is when a foreigner comes in and says. but long experience has shown that the person who really wants to be recruited and really has something to sell does not say very much but simply hands over the riraterial.dr. He might add a note to the effect that 'this is not all the material I have but only a part.t p"opi. both of which occurred at the same residency in West Germany. In not concerned with such things. 'If. this or that red brigade. He is so full of pride that he has been selected for such secret work that he may not even tell those who think likewise about it. 'This is a diplomatic representation and not an espionage centre. if the visitor brings papers and documents to the embassy and begins to demand immediate financial reward. An American sergeant came to one of the Soviet observation missions in West Germany (each of which is a GRU residency). 'You have got the wrong address. why on earth should he not hand them some papers? By such a gesture he not only draws attention to himself but he gives time for reflection on his proposals and for the necessary checking with higher authorities and checking of the material.person.is concerned with secrets? Thus the answer to all is the same. The sergeant . if he is really ready to entrust his life to us.'The candidate is then recruited in the name of an organization fo' d-nscience all his lif@s a revolutionary and defends ideals near to his heart. why does he think that we would deceive him and not return the papers if they wqre of no use to us? And where is the guarantee that the papers There is one last method of recruiting. . and leaves.' This does not mean that it would not be interesting to have a look at what the caller has brought. However. he has decided on this step. together with instructions as to where he can be found. lPlegs--e recruit me. bringing with him the block of a cipher machine used in one of the American bases. for that matter) is sure that the caller is not a young reporter anxious to publish a sensational article or somebody purporting to sell secret documents but really only selling some nonsense. Can't you help us? If you can't we ask you not to let anybody know about our visit. we are not interested in such things.""r. 'We are reprLsentatives of such and such a liberation army. Sometimes such recruitments are implemented very quickly and without problems. Indeed if a person has decided to entrust his life and the happiness of his family to such dark and unknown personalities.ii-of:*.' However strange it may . if you are interested. organization going in for terrorist activities against the English military presence. in Arab countries as anti-Zionists. Even if the GRU (and the KGB. [t is only necessary for the illegal to know some of the important political views in order to be able to adopt them for himself and begin recruiting.u"ry y.' That these 'walk-ins' are an extremely unpredictable form of recruitment is perhaps best illustrated by two examples. come into Soviet embassies and the same answer awaits them all.. this leads one to think.ffi. We are which he has brought are not forgeries? Who would carry the can if we paid him money for papers which afterwards turned out to be forgeries? No. after careful consideration. not even suspecting the existence of the GRU and its illegals.148 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting 149 countries with dictatorial regimes GRU illegals recruit people in the name of anti-government organizations carrying on the underground struggle against tyranny. how can they be sure that the caller is not a police agent who wants to know who in the embassy.' Elementary psychological analysis shows that this is perhaps the only way to convince the GRU that they can trust the.' The police are usually not called but the embassy stdff chase the would-be agent out quickly. A Arethod often used by illegals is to pass themselves off as supporters of separatist movements.

The American and the three Soviets transferred the shell from one car to the other. The police could stop the car. although the major's main proposal was of vastly greater interest. There were two niore Soviet cars hidden nearby. In fact. in full readiness to come tearing out to the wood and in the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to defend the radio communications which had been intercepted earlier but remained undeciphered. and a thorough check was carried out. Diplomatic immunity is not to be trifled with. Later the shell was transported in a diplomatic container under armed guard to the Soviet Union. or more of its basic blocks. technology.150 Soviet Milinry Intelligence Agent Reouiting 151 announced that for a certain sum he could bring a second part of the machine and added that there could only be a deal on condition that the GRU would not subsequently attempt to recruit him. and the car drove peacefully into the courtyard of the Soviet diplomatic mission. many highly placed officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Tass were also on alert. to create more complete Soviet examples. the Tass and Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcements were already prepared. The GRU chief joyfully informed the Central Committee of the successful outcome of the operation. The sergeant got his money and an assurince that the GRU would forget all about him immediately after the deal was done. in the other three operational officers. by exploiting th! . having studied the she[.dmerican principles. it was tantamount to being on Soviet territory. A week later. but they were ready to announce to the world that the imperialists had mounted yet another provocation against the Soviet Union. The residency immediately accepted both proposals. must return it after two months. On another occasion a couple of years later an American major approached the same Soviet residency proposing to sell an American atomic artillery shell. but they did not have the right to search it nor remove anything from it. Some days later. The operational officers knew beforehand the serial number. The GRU leadership decided to buy the atomic shell and to pay the price demanded for it by the American. In the event nobody stopped the officers. The Soviet Consul dozed by his telephone. In proof of his good intentions he handed over free of charge to the residincy detailed plans of the atomic depots and instructions on checking procedures and standing orders for work with great value. The Soviets handed over a briefcase full of banknotes to the American and agreed to meet in two months' time for the return of the shell. But everything went according to plan. Many people did without sleep that The cipher machine which was obtained. These documents by themselves were of military diplomats. on a dark rainy night in a clearing in the middle of a forest. The major announced that he would demand a substantial sum for the shell. the exact weight and the markings which would identify it as a genuine shell. enabled the technical services of the GRU to decipher thousands of American accurately two night. the level of radiation. . Once the shell was in the Soviet car with diplomatic number plates. the specialists of the GRU information service confirmed the genuineness and very great importance of the documents whiih had been acquired. They also enablid them to study the principles of cipher work in the American Army and in the armies of its allies and. course he was . 'Where is the . two motor cars met. In one was the American major. and imposed the condition that the Soviet side. ready to intervene if necessary. All was as it should be. Of course they did not know what was going on or where. What about the sergeant? Of immediately recruited. On the orders of the Central Committee. A number of the senior officers of the residency were called to Moscow and given a crash course in American atomic atomic equipment.

as it is called. The officers had only been interested to see whether there was radiation or not. However. He had taken a written-off practice shell or. . The Special Commission of the General Staff and Central Committee established that the forgery had been very skilfully and thoroughly executed and that there had been little possibility of exposing it at the time of the handover. [t was established that he had been posted to the USA immediately after the sale of the forgery. the KGB.a genuine shell. of course.but a beautifully executed copy. and at the same time the GRU asked for permission to murder him from the Central Committee. At the time when it was first checked after having been handed over to the operational officers. because everybody and everything is controlled strong warning that flom Moscow. in a word.152 A Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting 153 bomb?' asked a voice on the telephone. everything which constitutes Soviet power.After protracted arguments and consultations. all the Military Academies. the Politburo. the GRU. as The shell was taken for the time being to the central aerodrome and a military transport aircraft speedily transported it to Novaya Z*mlya The shell did not explode. the general staff. had painted it as a real shell and put on a Committee. Steps were taken to find him in the United States.''In Moscow!?''Yes. At the same time there was no guarantee that it would not chief.' long and largely unprintable tirade ensued. . All the same the GRU was not happy about it. all the principal design bureaux. The first attempts proved unsuccessful. whose as follows: 'And what hhppens if there is a little spring inside this shell and it explodes right in the middle of the Soviet capital and turns Moscow into import was roughly Hiroshima?' The GRU had worked out the whole operation with the maximum number of precautionury *"urures and the plan to acquire the shell had been confirmed by all departments from the chief to the general staff up to the Central Committee. After all that had happened the officen who had taken part in the operation. the GRU chief received a 'service incompetence note' .a corresponding marking and number. all the Ministers and departments of State. Only then was it found that it was not a shell at all . No defence was possible. preliminary work on the shell had already disquieted the Soviet specialists. received no decorations but at the same time they were not punished and neither was the GRU in the future even the most trivial mistake wouldlead to dismissdl. The possibility of such an occurrence had only been realized in the Central Committee when the shell was already in Moscow. One shell and the whole system could have gone up. The American major from the depot for atomic armaments had known to the last detail how to do this. and it would not be so easy to find him there. could be instantaneously destroyed. Instead of the 6<pected decoration. explode while it was being dismantled and destroy the leading Soviet specialists who were working on it. the shell was dismantled with the greatest possible care. so the dismantling was conducted in a special pavilion hurriedly constructed on the atomic testing ground.We have it in GRU headquarters. a 'standard weight equivalent'. He had apparently known of the immlnence of his posting and chosen his moment perfectly. nobody had foreseen the possibility that there could be a timed device in the shell and that the Central it was much more radioactive than it should have been. However. Inside the shell he had put some radioactive waste which he had obtained. but this was not necessary. There was no answer. the Central Committee turned down the request . Of course he'was not able to regulate this to the extent that the level of radiation would conform to the level of radiation of . there had been no attempt to determine the exact level of radioactivity. It began a search for the American major.

was stopped dead. 1. Enormous damage was done - the utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to it willingly. however warmly they may be welcomed. It is much. personal meetings are an inescapable evil with which one has to come to terms. Agent Communications t 't I is extremely difficult to find real volunteers is a simple fact. The Soviet operdtional officer. and the volunteer. do not take into consideration another simple thing. very frequently feels GRU theoreticians officially admit that agent communications that complex of channels for transmitting instructions and material . All agent communications are divided into personal and non-personal. however. And historians will remember with gratitude the name of the GRU Colonel' Oleg Penkovsky. which was flowing tike a river into the hands of Stalin and his blood' thirsty clique. Personal contact is the most vulnerable element. recruitment and vetting. It is the fault of communications. agent communications is the most vulnerable sector of Soviet intelligence. Thanks to his priceless information the Cuban crisis was not transformed into a last World War. GRU residents always remember the American major. and preference is always given to non-personal contact. which was clearly absent in the old Russian intelligence service of the pre-rivolutionary period. By this one gesture the whole powerful current of technological intelligence on the production of atomic weapons. And when a GRU or KGB officer decides to break with his criminal organization. At the same time. I.t54 Soviet Mililary Intelligence on the basis that the major was incredibly cunning and could well outwit the GRU a second time as he had outwitted them earlier. it is indisputable that after the phenomenon of willing and mass defection to the side of the enemy. i t tt il li ) deal of the ugly face of communism. Even amongst those few who still believe in communism. we in the field know that by far the greatest damage to Soviet intelligence is caused by the defection of GRU officers. They were ordered to forget about the major and stop searching for him. much harder to discover a volunteer than an agent whom the GRU has spent a year and more in That processing. as agents gain experience and involvement . they say. i' when lgor Gusenko went over to the West. something which fortunately happens quite often. in the first stages. the intelligence officer will make a great distinction befween the agent he has recruited by using a whole arsenal of trickb and traps. that there are so many failures. Later on. especially during cultivation. Whatever the theoreticians say. having seen a great it t.is the weakest link in the chain. whenever a 'walk-in' appears at a Soviet embassy and suggests the purchase for an exorbitant price of technical documents of exceptional importance. But real volunteers. Nevertheless. the first thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer. and to some degree they are right. Now.

A complicated system of alternative meetings is set out for experienced agents. guarded state military or commercial undertakings . who does not even suspect its existence. and those who may communicate information of such outstanding importance that it brooks no delay at all. postcards or coins and will have these'objects spread out in front of them in the restaurant or cafd where they are meeting. and railway and police stations.' then the officer will come immediately. A man who has as yet done nothing for the GRU. If I am late. the GRU prefers that they should take place either on its own or on should be unable to get to the meeting we will meet in the same place in a week's time'. cin tfriiogie'pre$fii-thaiifisfn6ffii-ffitingbetween ordinary people discussing important topics. 'Ring John. the officer says. 'I shall be very pleased to meet you again but I simply don't know whether I shall be able to be on time. C!'Vo[g11wl!!t!Jl to avoid city quarters which are known 6-56-ih. and at the same time has a hundred reasons why he cannot use the telephone in such a simple case. Sometimes these meetings take place in cinemas or public conveniences. Experienced agents are often given a programme of meetings for six months ahead.156 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications 157 in their work. In all cases.Tris access is accorded only to the most experienced Iffits. For example an illegal will meet his agent or officers of the undercover residency their agents. The life of a diplomat contains so many unexpected happenings.Et. and in what circumstances they will meet. Usually the subject is introduced in various quite innocent ways.' [f you have a good friend in the Soviet embassy and he says that sort of thing to you.in other words all those places where police activitv mav bggrcts:d to be carbon copy of the main meeting for which arrangements are made at the same time as the main meeting: 'If one of us lil:itifriffilmffi This system of alternative meetingp is introduced by GRU officers long before recruitment. If the agent uses the second variant. be sure that the GRU has a thick file on you and that sooner or later you will receive a proposal of recruitment and notice with astonishment that all ways out seem to be blocked. sometimes a year. personal contacts gradually give way to nonpersonal ones. Frequently they will try to give the impressioh that they are collectors of such items as postage stamps. l ir ir rti . For example. 'I need John. In the same way the agent is also given the possibility of communicating danger. In any case we will rneet again in three days' time. l. If the agent says. and there may be up to three or four alternative meetings for each main meeting. will take place in hotels and camping places. and in some cases even flve years or more.onger meetings. especially during the vetting stage of agents. caravans. With so many alternatives it is essential that places and times are changed. Many of the most experienced agents have not had a personal meeting with their case officer for several years. isilready being indoctrinated into iecrecy and is already being introduced to the system of agent communications. neutral territory.rE!gIIu!$. yachts or boats which either are the property of the agent or are hired by him. when. The agent is told how he should go about calling the officer on stipulated telephones or telegrams or signals. Routine meetings are organized between agents. and this also applies to other operations involving agents. . for example.Taunt of criminals or prostitutes. The details for these meetings are worked out previously. if he rings up on the telephone and says. however. then don't wait for me more than ten minutes. Whoever is the senior man will give instructions to the junior as to where. airports. At the other end of the spectrum there is the eryerggru meetiye.' then they will reply that he has made a mistake. If such meetings are absolutely unavoidable.

the agent who had lost contact with his case officer would be obliged to go to a certain place on the 3lst of every month which has thirty-one days. However. they observe the presence of any suspicious movement in the area of the meeting place prior to the meeting. on observation platforms for tourists where there are powerful binoculars and telescopes insta[ed).because the secret one contact.talk often confused with the secret house or Yavotchnayi Kvartira.llgy. Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications 159 then he is showing the GRU that he has been arrested by the police who are trying to get to the case officer through -Brush contacts are for handing over material. the agent is obliged to repeat the process until such time as somebody does appear to re-establish contact. The officer and the agent carry out only without exception .158 the agent. They check his punctuality. On the other hand the transmission of the material must not attract attention especially if one of the participants is under strict surveillance. or an agent with his new case officer. the GRU officers may observe what he does. For example. and the means whereby they may be put together to make a long-range two-way set. If nobody comes to the pre-arranged place. elements of non-personal contact gradually take the place ofpersonal contact. This solves two problems at the same time. recognition signals. generally imagined as a special portable radio'set which may transmit information directly to the receiving centre on Soviet territory or to a Soviet ship or satellite. Fifst there is the long-range two-*ay radio link. for example two illegals. As the agent becomes more and more involved in his work. a tape recorder . they watch for anybody who follows him. if in extreme circumstances the whole of the Soviet embassy was declared persona non grata and had to leave the country. It has been replaced by the term 'secret flat' or KK but the word yavka is used to mean a meeting between two men who'are unknown to each other. in very populous places.and sev. In the appointed place another person will come towdrds him and will give the previously arranged password to which the agent gives the proper reply. The secret rendezvous as an element of agent communications is given to all agents rendezvous is essential for re-establishing lost contacts. Instead agents and illegals are issued with small written instructions containing several types of ordinary current components which may be bought in any radio shop. having previously agreed recognition signals (brief case in left hand. fheryklg2. money and so on. and so on). The most experienced agents have only one element of personal contact . After the agent has realized that nobody is going to come and meet him. his behaviour. In giving the correct reply the agent shows to his new leader that he has not made a mistake and secondly that the agent acknowledges the authority of his new case officer. The entry of the agent to the meeting place is checked from a great distance. for example. At the present time the term 'secret house' is not used in the GRU. where he goes after the aborted meeting and what action he takes. instructions. . time. [f an agent is arrested there is only to be found in his flat a pair of good Japanese receivers.et us examine these. that is seven times a year. Brush contact must be carried out with great precision otherwise the crowd may separate those taking part. the most junior of those taking part must not suspect that it is not a routine meeting and that he is in fact beirtg checked. in places where they can easily observe what is going on (for example. at peak hours and when the crowds come out --*- of stadiums. This classical element in all spy films is in practice only used in wartime. password and answer . A number of GRU officers take up position before the meeting.eral qlements of W L. on full buses. in the underground.they are given the place. The check meeting is carried out in the same conditions as the routine meeting. book in right hand.theSgg3J-legdggpgl .

A short-range i: special link is an alternative to short-range radio links: In I or a policeman. however. quick-acting and ultra-quick-acting sets are used. There is therefore no way that he can be . Someone may start building on the site. l' example. exploiting technica'i means of radio transmission in seconds or micio-seconds. The agent who hears such agent are transmitted phrases any criminal activity. There may be floods. or even which country. reliable and secure type of link is inevitably the one by which the'agent receives from the Centre. or the heat of summer may affect them. money. fhe most convenient.160 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications l6l in the form of previously agreed or numbers in ordinary radio programmes. by the police. ald working out new recommendations as to how they should be assembled. Pg&lgttel!9les-are the favourite GRU means of contact. For this the short-range radio link exists. They have the moct universal application and in addition to communications they may be used for the storage of everything that has to do with a spy's work . Satellites are used in conjunction with these sets and this makes it possible to transmit information on a narrow radio beam vertically overhead.documents. Thousands of types of dead-letter boxes are known. These can very easily be pushed into the ground in any public park. Significirnt research is also going on in the field of electro' optical communications. In times of war. The agent transmits information to the Soviet embassy with the help of small transmitters. even by archaeologists. ii' Their selection is always a complicated and responsible is that as far as possible they must not be prone to accidental discovery. They are business. special photographic equipment. Applied to the structure of a bridge among thousands of similar nuts and rivets this device is easily hidden and just as easy to undo. The primary criterion threatened by rnany possible happenings: they may be found by children. from cracks in gravestones and brickwork to specially devised magnetic'letter boxes' in the form of metal nuts. for the GRU it is often necessary that the agent himself a . ambulance driver. destined. radio sets. All radio connection with increasing the monitoring of radio exchanges.'!l. However. All lhis must be taken into account.urpett"d of cover of a fireman. The GRU is continually looking at the market as regards radio sets and components. And secondly the problein of the transportation and secret storage of a radio set of comparatively large proportions is avoided. One fisherman will transmit signals by means of a rod put in the water and another several kilometres distant from him will receive the signal by using the same method. The GRU also makes wide use of boxes constructed in the form of a plastic hollow wedge with a lid.1. The long-range one-way radio link does not replace. be used by the GRU for its dark ends. Even if a poiice force should by some means or another guess that the transmission they are hearing is not a coded transmissjon for cosmonauts or they cannot possibly determine for which spy it is rya1hip1. tl 'rl . or as a simple numerical code. transmission is also not exposed to any great risk. Instructions to the and other components which can be bought in any shop. for transmits. the GRU frequently undertakes the transmission of signals under water. Underwater dead-letter boxes are also widely used. Or water and gas pipes can be used. construction worker conversations within the city limits are thoroughly studied by GRU specialists and any of them may. tike the sort of walkie-talkie sets which can be bought in any shop and which are used for guiding model aeroplanes and ships (one cannot help noticing embassy). Oneway radio links are usually broadcast by Soviet radio stations or special ships or polar stations to be received anywhere in the world by ordinary radio receivers. but augments the two-way tink. Equally important is that the dead-letter how many aerials there are on the roof of tlie Soviei In this type of radio exchange the'GRU takes the .

The second dead-letter box was in the very centre of the American capital. together with thi document about the unused DLB. and shot. The doctment was very old.dis' covered . Some random examples from GRU As a general principle of security. So there were many documents which were completely forgotten and simply collected dust in the archives. and succeeded several"times .in various currencies to a total sum of 50. The officer informed his chief of what he had found and he in his turn informed the GRU chief. An ofEcer at a @mmand point. each dead-letter box (DLB) may only be used once. At the beginning of his lunch break.Soviet Mililary lruelligence Agent Communicatiors 163 box's location must be easy to describe to another person. once discoverid the description of a DLB on which there was no . in spite of the war. to nominate a of specially trusted officers for permanent archive ruorf . the agent would go into a park and hide top secret documents in the hollow of a tree.watches of very little value. One day'the case officer was making his way towards the dead-letter box. was able to walk in the park for a few minutes longer and retrieve his documents. The DLB consisted of a hermetically sealed container. and the enormous expansion in the development of the city. a hundred or so American dollars and a few thousand crisp German Marks of the time of the Third Reich. Suddenly his attention was attracted by a sheet of white paper blowing about with the group {U' . of a DLB operation the document is stamped .peitraps something else of interest might be. all that was inside was a few dozen old-fashioned silver. apparently .command point and after the completion \t 'i . and the agent. pre-war. who decided on an investigation. his presence there.and secondly. working in a GRU top secret archive. Some minutes later a Soviet 'diplomat' would appear. The GRU chief took two decisions.?.used' and transferred to the archives. It must also be located in a place where it is possible for the case officer to go at any time with a plausible cover story for practice are worth describing. If it was. in any case. Thi officer carefully inspected the document again. Then the new GRU staff was also liquidated. but there was nottiing on it to show that the DLB had been emptied. Much to the disappointment of all those present. remove the documents and with the help of two other'diplomats'copy them in his car which was parked at the Capitol.after the GRU chief had sanctioned repeated use of the DLB. the fierce bombing of Hamburg.used' stamp.. firstly. about the size of a small suitcase. stock and barrel for 'instructions'. the rebuilding of the city after the war. The DLB had bein stored in the GRU. then the value of its contents would have increased many times.000 American dollars. even by somebody who only knows about it at secondhand. to give an order to one of the GRU residencies in West Germany to find this old unused DLB' Suppose it was still there. The niw officers who took the place of those who had been shot were completety inexperienced and started work with new sets of documents-. The copying of the documents in the car did not take more than twenty minutes. All the materials of the residency had been handed in to the archives. The operation was an especially daring one. For gleater security it had been covered with an old tombstone which had been sprinkled alt over with sand and silt. The affair was not complicated and a week later the investigation disclosed that the dead-tetter box had belonged to the flamburg illegal residency which in 1937 had been recalled to Moscow lock.. The corytainer was removed to Moscow and opened there.money and valuables for the use of the illcgal residency in case of emergency. on his return from his lunch break. There was no time. to look into the old documents. Documents on all DLBs are selected in 1932 and three years later some material had been put in it . In fact the DLB ftad survived. which had been buried at the bottom of a lake in a quiet park.

although llth yr strictly forbidden. he casl his hook onto the ice until it was taken by the magnet. Had the river not been iced over.they had thrown tLem out. [gggestrfpr m99!!!gS and for . too."o.i. He. Signals. dead-letter box was in a small drainage pipe on the embankment of a river in northern Europe. but the GRU's swift action had saved him. dots. then. There was only one way out. '. the pieccs of paper had got in their way and. But instead it skidded on the ice right to the middle of the river. crosses. lipstick' A car parked in a pre-arranged plaee at a pre-arranged time may s€rve as a signal or a doll placed in a window of a house. and nor was it possible to throw things at the box acros the ice to send it to the other side. and a. A third. Within hours. for an' hour and'a half. an the agent had already appeared on the opposite side th- @.. which was unfortunately also covered with a thin sheet of ice. But the first frosts had started and the officer had not taken into account the fact that the interior of the pipe was covered with a thin layer of ice. pencil. By carefulty winding in his line. and after a few seconds flew out into the river. the officer carefully lowered the little box into the drainage pipe with the magret and took out his hand. signats are made with chalk. The officer ran into a shop and bought a fishing rod. euickly outlining the situatioi.d. immediately set about picking up the pieces. The officer picked it up and. The agent chose the second option. the officer. all this time he had been threatened with eiposure. The case officer hunied to meet him.. At that dramatic moment a policeman lppearedin the park. paints. even forgetting to thank his saviour and helper. bands. or he should wait for four d1ys. In the box was a film with instructions fo1 an agent. He looked around. many of which were torn by the sharp tieth and'claws of tlese lovable little animals. he succeeded in retrieving the valuable box. are a means of exchanging information which is highly favoured by the GRU. Having gathered a'comiderable number.n9. the box would have sunk and that would have been that. Without . Office pins are used as signals stuck in a predetermined place. The latter took them and smiled in the most foolish way. This happened in the heart of one of the Western capitals in broad daylight. Usually an agent who has worked for some years with the GRU will have as a minimum the following elements of first yellow and red leaves. who satuted ana wittrOiew. The box slid down the pipe.164 Soviet Military I ntelligence Agent Communicatbns had to lower into the pipe a small metal box with a magnet attached. Again only hours latei the GRU had carried out a complete forgery of the documents. Nevertheless the situation highly critical. suggested two posible ways out: Jither the ageni should tell his department that he had in error torn ufthe papen and thrown them into the waste-paper baskei but then had remembered in time. There was absolutety no -remained tir^. mi ofncer .!l l {Pi officer with diplomatic rank had made two changes of aircraft of the park. saw the stamp . AII over the plrk were dozens of similar sheets of paper.ou*". He evidently took the Soviei diplomat for one of the lillrite House workin who had had his papers blown out of his hands by the wind. The ice was too thin to walk on.edlsalion "of hundreds of other intentions. to the astonishment of passers'by.top secret'. The magnet was very strong and normally there would have been no risk that the box wbuld come unstuck' Pretending to tie up his shoe-lace. day later they were returned to the agent. the policemanheld them out to the embanassed case officer.dig * .'the " policeman also started to collect the papers. These are used as qarnlttg:-gf-gqqger. Of . The officer realized that squinels getting ready for winter had taken up residene in the hollowed-out trie. honified. giving out a harmonious ringing noise. as in Europe and arrived in Warsaw where i fast fighter interceptor was waiting for him.

and there hasTeen worked out for him a complicatdd system of including both personal and non' agent @ personal fonns of communication and also the actions to be taken in case of a sudden break of all channels of communication. What happens next is a new stage. Attempts by the agent to protest or refuse to work have been succcsfully Suppressed.11 .il4I. ffi .. all contact with the powerful agent network was lost.trf meetings(p9l$nsige$d!lp-t*g"$tIS-be. . . Second \ilorld War not only the agents of undercover residencies. were tied to the embassies. fiLi #. Elements of non-personal communication have been gradually introduced and have gradually super' seded the personal meetings. So far. the thinking behind which includes the segregation of the agent from the Soviet embassy and from all meetings with official Soviet representatives. Subsequently. The flow of agent information was cut off at the very moment when it would have been of the greatest value.Holland.16 Soviet Mitiury Intelligence A. The deputy head of rhe GRU was sent into occupied Europe with several radio officen and unlimited powers. ($.n aEent._aten"track). by means r' ' t. In these meetings thc agent has handed over photocopies of secret documents and has received in exchange small sums of money. . With the outbreak of war. ililI.gfoue in aqgliqn The Practice of Agent Work ljt tong-range two-way radio .. The material received from him has been thoroughly compared and checked with analogous material received from other souroes. but also illegals and agents subordinate to illegals. when the embassies were closed. {t..r i Up till the . all is going well.during long routine So our agent has been |}:f ' -h. Within a short time he had successfully organized a small illegal resident network on the territories of Belgium and.

that is. However. Then the GRU organized a riceiving centre on the territory of the Soviet embassy in Swedenl Information from all the illegal residencies came to the illegal rcsidency network and from there was transmitted directly to the Soviet Union. the . which had been established Ffor: the war. This was perhaps the only . All operations in support of illegals are worked out in such a way that the officers of the GRU undercover residency do .i. made it imposible for himself to go to the police.ing to obtain th6 favours of a girl. but only on instructions from the Crntre wiifiout having any idea for whom they are working. So the most powelful underground intelligence organization in history was discovered . there is the separation of agents from the embassy which is our present concern.posible solution at the time and of course ii naA many qisaqvantages.gj be tong before it collapsed.this organization *hich had penetrated many of Germany's most sensitive secrets. .].pletely separate from the embassies. The moment the Centre feels that such and such an agent is handing over material of exceptional importance. Nobody had supposed that the advance of the Nazis would be so precipitaii. cout! . And. are taken out of residencies very quickly. especially insofar as this concerns illegals.ii ffiffi#. The separated agent oom€s in three guises: the separated acting agent. a state of affain which compromised many hundreds of men. a[ the agents and-ilegars of this The GRU learnt its lessons very quickly. This now cast-iron rule ris observed by the GRU everywhere. Referred to by the Germans as 'the Red Orchestra'.rUnited States. he was able to re-establish contact with all the illegal residencies. the agent group and the agent rovidespeciarry important material. thirdly and significantly.168 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practice of Agent Work 169 station by the name of . The recruited. Another lesson leamt from the arrest of the 'Red Orchestra' is the division of residencies into even smaller independent parts. the organization was m the most vulnerable place. All attention is switched from of obtainins informatior to the steD 1 'ii . the agent radio . Already. The ships of the soviei Bartic fleet were brockadei in their own bases and coutd not be used for the reception of agent transmissions. Great Britain and Canada which were com. wisf. The process completely neutralized and gigantic octopus arested. their case officers and the illegals found themselves in one gigantic residency. not have one crumb of information which is not necessary.. and the radio station had notteen_designed to deal with iuch long distances. the agents. Operations are ptanned in such a way that there is no possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions of the undercover residency. Undercover residencies :support illegals.ll separating the agent is undertaken only after he has handed over to the GRU a significant quantity of sscret material. it will immediately demand that no more information or documents are taken from him. centre of organization. of coutse.illegal radio operators.Sever'. Fint of all. only a few months after what had happened.allies'. deep in the nerve this most unprecedently powerful underground of s . tested and trained agent must be kept separate from official Soviet institutions abroad. Tne girl. informed him of this fact. as he regularly listened to the radio (which was.f. forbiddin on occupied territgry). . One of the... illegal residenciei were functioning on the territories of its tire .' I of toa a to transferred i. and the coilapse It Degan of secret rendezvous. in her turn eager for the favours oi a certain German corporal. b-oasted to her that he knew a[ the latest news in the world. provgd useless.

independent agents. jill called. Hundreds. is The GRU tries by all possible means to limit tt e numUeioi type.secrer document is photographid on the film by the GRU. Should it happen that operating conditions become difficult. agents working-ln one'particular field of espionage are put together in one group.*. whether from a local illegal or__a rransiting illegal. Agents going into ageht groups do not by any personal contacts with. The processing of films (whidh are called schtchl'r: the Russian word foi shield) is carried out only in the Centre. of formulae have been worked out. Usually. which is designed to leaO the police on a wild out extremely rarely. Any attempt to develop the film outside the wails of the GRU Technicat operations scientific Research Institute teads to the real se6et text being destroyed and only the pseudo-secret text appearing. Usually he will transmit his material by means of dead-letter boxes.artist on tour' as they . nobody outside the Centre will know of the existence of this particular group. The residency which was responsible for the agent. The members of such a group may work in completely different fields of espionage. the group will be able to continue its activities in the same way as before. a separate and unrepeatable formula ""iry "nA used.e agent and he photogmphs genuine secret materiil on it. Other agents recruited by rgsidencies arg gradually organized into agent groups oI-.. like the resident himself.!!hree-to five m94 r4q-lr. The agent group. The GRU tolerates personal contacts with group leaders only in exceptional circumstances and where there is favourable security. The leader of an agent group is called a gropovod.an independent agent. which is why they are taken out of the residencies.is in contact with the undercorer residency for a period of time. and only he is in contact with Soviet officers. The film will be a dual-purpose one. By various channels the group sends its material directly to Moscow. .. for each The Scientific Research Institute of the GRU haldone much important work in developing films of the schtchit # . ffi goose chase.receiving these films. then gradually the system of oontact with the residency comes to an end and orders begin to be received directly from Moscow.or from an agent who has been recruitei by that pa. A group automatically organizes itself.. Sometimes a group consists of agents who for various reasons are known to each other.r. of non-personal communications and contacts must be wo$9d out for. an . Finally the ontac( with Mosgow becomes permanent and stable and the agent SrouP is entirely separated from the residency.170 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practice of Agent Work r7t Thence he will back to his own but as an have to take place.s recruitment may receive the order to empty such and such a numtlered dead-letter box of films. if personal meetingl valuable_agent. Let us suppose that one agent recruits two others.tt. Ilntly a pseudo. the cipher officers and the operational officers with whom there was once direct contact. The GRU obviously considen family groups containing the head of the family and his wife and children to be more secure and stable. In each iase. then the film is given to tf. The such an agent is thus carried out .rticular residency. or that the embassy is blockaded or closed down. In any case. Thus to a certain extent the members of agent groups are complctely isolated from Soviet diplomatic representation. It wili not know from whom it is. or even possibly t[ousands.. With gradual changes in penonnel at the residency. they are carried gi$_gf the deputy head of the GRU or the head himself. they aie only canied out in soft countries or secretly in the Soviet Union.

as the leader) in an agent residency of any sizr automatically transforms ihat resiiency Ao. diamonAs and other valuables which will be of use to them in their illegal activities will have been hidden in secftt hiding-places beforehand. by using the system of secret rendezvous.'D&limiints are not the subjective opinions or observations of agents but offrcial secret papcrs. even if it consists of only two men. The material acquired by the GRU breaks down into ig&Igq[qg.g. 172 Soviet Militory liulligence The Practice of Agent Work 173 a|wuyt know each other.. Sometimes the GRU will post one or more illegals to an agent residency. The new illegals 'never mix and never enter into contact with the old ones who have been working in the country for a long time. Information includes com' In ffi6mes-fr4'iaponi.. Thc formation of new illegal residencies where there were already old ones in action is yet another example of the constant striving for duplication.teader to recruit agents indlpendentty. ::T::fT* a group.ii ir. the exchange will take place and the newly fledged illegals will remain behind in safe houses and flats.'i' f i]. .rn resutts. they may go over-to illegal status and run the work of theirui"ntrl These officers are in possession of previousty prepareO documents and equipment. begin to establish the systern of contacts with agents and agent gloups which have recently been subordinated to the undercover residency. these officers will unobtrusively disappear from their embassies. However important the problems of recruiting agents. Specimens o1 samples are self-explanatory: actual weapons.X:i p. Interestingly this agent resident never made a mistake. on the order of the Centre. But how does the agent contrive to steal secret equipment and remain undetected? Many ways and means exist: we have already examined one of them when we discussed the recruitment of the owners of small private ffiF . nor is it necessary that Tearyj they should. fii*Jffi:"tJl1t":'.i 11 ! is. ui independent organizations continries enatGyl fn" simltar-tg the spread of a fearful iltness. Now they-all form a new illegal residency. The presenoe ofeven one Soviet iilegaLlfre is of co-urse considered. not guessing at the existence ofother agents. If the GRU feels that there is likely to be a ctampdown and that operating conditions wil beclme more difficurt at any moment. The photographing of documents and eavesdropping on conversations are in real life exactly as they are portrayed in spy films. nts agent group. Afterwards they will gradually. This status was acquirid by one of the American nuclear phpicistq whom the GRU permitted to and the gioupil. training them and organizing agent networks may be. Then it will capitulate.. wiitr the difierence tns case. This plainly makes life more secure for both Parties. 19t With this aim in mind some of the most experienced officen of the undercover residency are in a continual state of readiness so that at all moment.. The Soviet government will register a protest and will for a short time refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomas of the aggressive country. recruit his colleagues at his discretion. 9g. examples of military technology.il11tffi"il:"::f. it takes measures to ensure that it does not lose the agent network which has already been recruited but u: yet separated from the undercover residency. surgical intervention always gives excellent :nar:.*. there is still one overriding objective: the acquisition of secrets belonging to an enemy or a probable enemy.-They may know the group leader alone.. . drawingp or copies of them. books.fr it ottr". instruments and equipment which the GRU uses for study and copying.#."tf: ments and soecimens or samples.nfr . and gold. Hundreds of examples have proved thii.: lr case of war actually breaking out. me agent resident. An agent-group may gradually get bigger as the group leader recruilin g age n t contin uei Io rec.. acquires the status of anEElllgrdeluy.

jfr i.on" . From that time onwards. equipped with the requirei apparatus crashed. because this is the most favourable time for stealing military technology and armaments..utions onty be used once _ rockets. GRU agents were able to steal a written-off tank engine an item of exceptional interest to fact there were only ninety-nine. The main problem is to transport the specimen into the Soviet embassy.being noticed. The diplomatic mail is the most often-used method of transporting specimens to the Soviet Union. Soviet industry.'a number of to.oro.-The grouno.:: agents go . The yacht was straight away sent for a refit and. i. . But what aUout really big objects like a tank.. The GRU. was able to steal a broken radar.. It m.. !.O:1. GRU officers in the guise of a trade delegation will poach from a firm some completely unnecessary item of quite innocent nature.174 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practicc of Agent Work 175 small firm has not much difhculiy'in produ. in spitC of very strict control.. military dis_ plays or tests. There is. . ..t ii. Samples of oijects which can 1!.$i. A special team of fitters literally tore the tank engine out of the yacht in a few minutes. in one of the countries which had bought lropard tanks in the Federal Republic of Germany.^rreeuentty equipment so that secret arms and they b.. One agent iugiested to the GRU mat ne should obtain for them a lateral scanning radar for aircraft which permitted the aircraft to carry out i-ntelligence yrxk on the territory of the_enemy while it was actually itt own terrilory. The GRU agreed to wait. An entry may be made. torpedoes. Wide use is made of countries of the Third World which receive equipment from Western countries. of course.*iru -n"ry specimen of an instmment or a gadget and it is aOruntageous for him to sell it to the GRU.".tion"ip.panies producing military equipment. of . perhaps surprisintly. an aeroplane or an atomic reactor? Not only does one have to obtain such an object without its loss. Any armed conflict or change of government is usually accompanied by intense GRU activity. the small repair workshop installed the heavy tank engine in the yacht.?i. more reliable method of transporting heavy equipment exists.ightbe within a day or two. I Another. it mightiake years. it crosses all frontiers in sealed packing cases and accompanied by armed diplomatic couriers. for a very substantial sum. the agent.exist official documents certifying that it has been y"tt:n o-ff o1 destroyed. .L: .these problems.. agreed toover the suggestion.ing. The important thing is that the quantity of containers fT1. Very often written-off equipment is aUte io Ue sold because there. - d. as was made clear in the GRU's (unsuccessful) attempt to acquire a French Mirage III from the Lebanon. in the gmcilt. The owner of a written off and then sold.f. of a certain anti-tank rocket *h.i. and when an aircraft. for example. although the agent said that tre Oa not know exactly when he would be ible to acquire the apparatus. After an item has been acquired. The Soviet consulate then bought an old cruising yacht. Several months latJr the agent obtained the apparatus.. The theft went unnoticed but the engine weighed more than a ton and there was no way it could be accommodated in diplomatic containen. . cartridges _ are usually stolen during in. but it also has to be transported to the Soviet Union. aocounting documents that there were a hundred launchings com. The hundredth rocket will nave been quietly sold to the GRU without anybody noticing. and a year later it was taken int6 service with the agenr worked in an experimentaf trainiig *:::r. shelts. This was quite sufficieni for the Soviel4-y to catch up with the United States in that as far as detiberatery oamagng !11!. Sometimes the difficult problem arises of a specimen weighing several tons which cannot be accomrnodated in the diplomatic post" This happened when. The yacht went to sea on a number of pleasure trips and during one such trip fortuitously met a Soviet trawler. before being sold. The yacht put to sea several times after this to maintain its cover.rioor.

Only one technological secret exists which the GRU is incapable of obtaining. Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The head of I intelligence of a military district works exclusively in the corresponding recommbndations 'lr )t.ef of staff and the commandei of the military # . the whole structure of communism would have to be changed. It embraces In general :lntelligence organizations subordinated to operational units L'. Lithuanla. military districts. So items of exceptional importance their weight approximate to the packing of the secret O perational Intelligence transported aie L. or at the time of preparations for war. daily activity of the head of intelligence. all invasion. the groupc of fotces d. It is the Achilles' heel of socialism _ strike at it and stTl"tirq will fall to pieces. mllates the work experience of all operational intelligence and issues pieces. In #. Subsequently the markings on ttri packing cases are changed and they make their way innocintly tf. until Soviet firces no loiriei found thernselves in occupied Czechoslovakia. i' ri "(r.. armies. Sometimes. Sociafism. to :i! and instructions. specimen. Organizationally.. The chief of staff directs the. Soviet Military Intelligence to the Soviet Union in the form of equipment for. carries out the posting of senior officers of operational intelligence."li would only be necessary to withhold supplies of'grain for a few months. This secret is nothing more the means of producing br-e1d. military activity. and the whole edifice of socialism mlght fall equipment.Operational intelligence marks a complete departure from f the mna we have talked about until now. a canning factory. terms the GRU leadership is quite confident tlrat_i! is capable of obtaining any technblogical secret from the West provided it has UeJn aitocated a iufficient sum of p9ney. . intil such time as the Cubans no longer held.fronts.fi6 and. foi all its gigantic resourses. nationalization and collectivization will cease. How easy ii iould be. groups of forces.fl addition.. 'r. the head of intelligence is subordinated to the chief $l' of the military district staff. the Soviet system would not be able to copy it since for that. sent to a safe address in one of the Third Woim countries where they can be loaded onto Soviet ships without any trouble. to place-an embargo on the supply of bread to the Soviet Union.otillas .. !s19nia and Latvia. 'rf. sway in Africa. . [n war.whose job is to aid in the implementation of the . ur. in conformity with the orden of the chi. until the Berlin Wall OisappeareA. Poland..rough customs control. yet this technological secret is of vital importance to the Soviet system. the Soviet Army consists of sixteen military districts and four groups of forces in Germany. All twenty heads of military district intelligence and group of forces are under the command of the head of the GRU Fifth Directorate. say. Even if it did obtain it. one sometifies thinks. f. too.r' -interests of his military district. "'. The GRU Fifth Directorate supervises the activity of the intelligence directorates. is not capable of feeding itself. fleqts.

178 district. sometimes a corps is "f inciuded .l ri:ll works in the interests of the High Commander of the Soviet tl. of *. . the same task may be set at the same time to both services and the results arrived at then collated and compared.A reciprocal arrangement exists whereby the intelligence chief of the military district forwards informarion io his heads of army intelliglnce *f. groups of forces. group of forces.... The chief of the gpneral staff is between thJcommander of trre miliiary :*."..n" bnU pluy. He arso ranks two other officens: the chief of staif of his armi..iy disrricrs and the GRU. 'i The difference lies in the fact that while the army directorates t .i ll ' co-operation between the two cosmic services is co-ordinated by the chief of the General Staff. Although naval cosmic intelligence . At the same timi. The intelligence directorate consists of five departrnents and two groups: ffij' .urr rrc oone onty with the agreement of the military district commander.ri*. Its head is the chief of Naval Intelligence.. The organization of intelligence directorates (RUs) on the staffs of military districts. oifri.RU. *:::: -8. Each front.-t. all information obtained is forto the GRU too."qI section is calhdhOr or Army Staff Second Department. the four naval directorates fall under an organization called navai intelligence. Navy.. ' ::l' r. .three all-arms armies. The role . all information from it is handed over to the GRU. Normally a front air force.. two to.i.l{f{r f. . tlJ. Naval intelligence was created to co-ordinate naval information from every ocean of the world..."... [n addition to its normal powerful apparatus for gathering information. .i: intelligence organization. The ' thas a staff which includes an intelligence directoratb or Naval th"i6. obeying the orders of the army commander and the army chief of staff. in practice sucfi disputes occur extremety rarely. I Razvedyvotelnyi ordcl also forwarded to ihe interrilerrce"Hit the m. not about a narow sector like the troops of a military district. but on a much wider scale. ff.ia -' --.obtained Uy o*. T f.l tank army and !r".'.' 1.n. For this reason the ship need information.'i.f. The Soviet Union therefore possesses two independent cosmic intelligence organizations.-His relationship with riis chiefs is based on similar rines.itary district. li.. other armies. In its turn naval intelligence comes under the head of the GRU and is controlled by the Fifth Directorate. fronts and fliets is standardized..rlIl i/t7.e teuA of the ilt intelligence section is the ' iy fri* i.1 . and .fi. He works ex-clusively in the interert. fronts and groups of forces.:h intelligencecorps'r.which among whose memoers rs an . the Northern. all information acquireA and u . and front. the intelligence directorur. and is a component of the High Staff of the Navy of the USSR. Should a very serious situation arise. Soviet Military lntelligence warded collect information from alt heads of intefligence and forward to them information. The reason for this extra organizational step is that ships of all four ffeets frequently operate in all oceans as combined squadrons. Each of the fleets is the of a military district. the GRU's own and theNavy's cosmic .tn" chief of intelligence of the military district.work directly in the interests of the GRU but tiri. inillligence orgrnr.. is t Operational Intelligence 179 Black Sea and Baltic fleets. the interigence direciorate Liiie mititary district may. :$ *Jll . group of iorces ind mititary district consists of armies.o1loll": slsmct and the head of the GRU" However. head or att--intertigence unis -berow belonging-to a given army..i.rmy. Each army consists seven divisions.. . The Soviet navy consists of four fleets.two to ttrree At the same time. .are subordinated directly to the Fifth Directorate of the G. The naval directorates have the same organization as thobe in military districts. Sometimes. mifit. there is also the naval cosmic intelligence department.-..'j:::1..Staff Second Directorate.

that is. The recruitment of agents and the creation of agent networks is carried out on the territories of contiguous countries where the military district concerned would expect to operate in wartime. The centre is concerned with the recruitment of agents in the contiguous state. or Department of Agent Intelligence is concerned with the recruitment of secret agents and the obtaining through them of intelligence information of interest to the staff. An intelligence centre and three or four intelligence points are subordinated to the Second Department which is directly concerned with agent work. The officers of First Departments are usually experienced army and navy officers who have considerable experience of service in reconnaissance units.! c I6 6E o: )---)---)-- o (. I C r E . In naval terminology this department is called the S&rp Reconnaissance Department. The training of officers of First Departments is carried out in the intelligence faculty of the Frunze Military Academy and the corresponding faculty of the Naval Academy. Naval Intelligence is interested in recruiting agents from all territories. They work independently from one. The training of . another. whereas the intelligence points only recruit agents in specific sectors and areas. although they are coordinated by the chief of the Second Department.Operational Intelligence 181 Ithe activities First Department or Department of Reconnaissance directs of the reconnaissance units of the tactical wing. o o o E c o !' A o E o 6 o . reconnaissance battalions of divisions and reconnaissance companies of regiments.officers for work in the Second Departments and also in centres and points is carried out by the Third Faculty Second Department . It directs the collection of information which comes directly from serving surface vessels and submarines at sea. bearing in mind that what is meant here are normal warships and not special intelligence collecting ships. especially in large ports and naval bases.

information services. it trainini takes Thc lounh Deparrment or lnfornution Departmen carries out the collection and collation of all intelligence coming into the intelligence directorate. The Fifth Departmentis occupied with etectronic intelligence. During the course of a war. rather incongruously. the difference being thal it is'only responsible for the divisions of one army. whcre the fleet is concerned. with this differince: the brigades are S. It commands two battalions. The officers who work in the Speerzaz intelligence points and those who direct their activities in the Thirdbepartment and the carryrng out of terrorist operations with the aim of undermining the enemy's will to continue fighting. Soviet Military lntelligence the OPerational Intelligence 183 of the Military-Diplomatic Academy (the Academy of this canies out the recruitment of agent+errbrists on the tenitory of any possible future enemy. the destruction of lines of communication and supply The Inteltigence Directorate Technical Facilities Group is occupied with the interpretation of air photographs.s11in cilled Spetsnaz naval brigades (not to be confused with Naval infantry brigades) and the same .a specialist comPany of 115 cut-throat soldiers is part of it. whereas the Firrt Department of an Intelligence Directorate is resporsible for all the divisions of its milithry district.f divenionary acts on enemy territory. Every intelligence directorate is a kind of GRU in miniature with its electronic facilities.diplomats'direct the activity of all agent-asassins in the fleets. There is also a Spetsnaz brigade which onsists of l. The Intelligence Department of the Armf Staff This may be seen as an intelligence directorate are trained. It would be a mistake to think that operational agent intelligence is a kind of second+lass citizen compared with strategic intelligence. The training of specialists for such work is carried on at the Second Kharkov Higher Military Aviation and Engineering School. Third Group or Spetsnaz Group: responsible for terrorist acts in the area of operations of its army . . and this department directs two regiments. the Radio inteiligence Regiment and the Radio-Technical Intefiigence Regi_ ment.ln Soviet Army). Analogous organizations can the Navy. Specialists for this group aie prepared at the Military Institute (of Foreign Languages). Foutth Group . although for the Speinaz in the Third Faculty of brigade and the officers connected with place in the Frunze Academy.. Second Group or Secret lntelligence Group. and with the interrogation of prisoners of war.the Intelligence Department likewise has its own interpreters. its independent cosmic service. The Interpreters' Group'or 'the Inquisition' deals with the deciphering and translation of documents obtained.Informationah Fifth Group which ture.Radio_Intelligence carries out the interception of radlo signals and Radio-Technicat Intertigence is concerned witli tracking emissions from the enemy'Jradar. in minia' has very similar organization: Flrst @roup or Reconnaissance Group: analogous to the First Department of an Intelligence Directorate and concerned with directing tactical reconnaissance. secret agents and even. radio intelligence and radio-technical intelligence . A Spetszaz intelligence point is subordinated to this depaitmeni and The Third Department or Spetsnaz Department is concerned with the preparation and carrying out. the Military-Diplomatic Academy.30Ocut-throat sotdien. the liquidation of political and military leaden.

ilfelog in its scope to strategic intelfig.rrit"ory.Norway and Sweden. for example.dB9E t \t . including the central or immediately before war breaks out. Canada and the USA. Canada and government organs. Pacific Fleet . has created two agent networks independent of one another and each duplicating the other. rhe Norrhern Group of iHTE . ?g --. - it.:I cl \ = Ec Ee9 Ff. In other words the GRU.covering the USA. Sweden. Romania. Great Britain. This can be confirmed 6y examining the task of the different intelligence directoratesi Northern Fleet .l L1_j '/ llrt lhl l"El = I -! I tl I [l i:l I all countries of the pacific Basin. Austria.Sweden.or" than that Leningmd Military District . Denmark.2 o_f ::n?in Warsaw pact countries. Denmark.covering Norway. 8. B1lti9 leet _ covering Sweden.Ll \EI tEt Eq €a oo t gb t"l gEt' =t. Black Sea Fleet covering Turkey and the whole Mediierranean coastline. China. Turkey.u. Afghan_ istan and China the operationai intelligence agent network by far exceeds strategic inteiligence in sirength. in n-o way fo1m.a. West Germany.. Japan.184 Soviet Military Intelligence a very powerful intelligence conglomerate. in the form of strategic and operational intelli_ gence. llt*r. I I$3iI Ig EI l::1 . Agent intelligence work is not carried out on Finnish t. effectiveness and invulnerability. In countries like " Norway. Eg si o= \. Baltic Military District. Spain.. since this country is well inside the Soviet sphere of influence. and its behaviour pleases the Kremlin . There is no doubt thatNorthern Fleet intertigence is mainry restricted to targets on the sea shore or coastline.IdZG r-r. Portugal. the power of an intelligence directorate is immeasurably incrCased by the infiltration in the enemy's rear of thousands af Spitsntaz saboteurs. i lfrl l. West Germany. o Soviet Groups of Forces in Germany. althougir this certainly d-oes not preclude deep agent penetration of the whole territory of the country being investigated.nce.h . The intelligence directorates taken altogether E ! E. France.

Trans-Caucashn M ilitary D istrict -furkev. plus 6ve Spetsnaz intelligence points and a corresponding quantity of Spetsnaz brigades.n to twenty separate intelligence centres. but this is not so. Kiev and Odessa Miliury District -Turkey. lt may be thought that opcranonal mtelllgence p"irt. Without the possibility of recruiting foreigners in their own countries. West Germany and Turkey. Military District . The KGB provides a strategic network (one illegal residency and two undercover residencies). completely independently.ouffi it.these do not run alent networks in peace. as plus five intelligence points belonSllg ro the Speunazgroup. Afghanistan.186 Soviet Military Intelligence Republic... and a KGB operational network. fifteen to twenty intelligence poiltts. several illegal resideniies and agent grouf. and the Black Sea fleet. In oi-her words West C". operational intelligence seeks and finds other ways .Iran. five Spetsnaz brigades and up to-fift-. il6Elil-o-t have the range and potential of the strategic branch. recruitment. whose officers mainly work abroad. Sluthey Group of Forces in Hungary_ Austria. _. the Berlin direction of the GRU. Odesa.Afghani-stan.. work ir. Military District . Forces in Poland. it is also covered by the GRU operational-agent network. Northern Caucasian. rlp carried out by the intellige# by: the GRU strategic a blueprint for intelligence in many other countries.truteg c and operational intelligence networks and likewise the KGB networks: Wesr Germany has becn infiltrated Taking two countries. lntral Gloyn of Forca in Czechoslovakia German Federal Republic and Austria. (tral and Siberian Military Districu . Operational time.n intelligence and Central groups oi for. five undercover residencies-in Bonn and Cologne.ro eighte. Here. i.s. 9*po!y. Austria. Kiev and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts. 'ihe basic difference in working methods between strategic and operational intelligence in the GRU is that officers of operational intelligence do not in peacetime work on the territories of target countries. Soviet troops in Cerriany. and three Soviet*ontrolled missions in British. All operations concerning the identification of suitable cand@.:"Military District . agent network. the Byelorussian Military District_ ail are concerned with the study of the German Flderal Intelligence 187. especially those having activity common frontiers with the Soviet Union or its satellites.many is subject to the attentions of: the agent nefirorks of five and the Northern directorate of the Baltic Fteet. let us analyse the strengths and facilities of . This accounts only for GRU activities.coiering Greece and Turkey from Bulgarian territory. in the Byelorussian Military District.. Spetsnaz companies belonging to the same organization which are at full alert to carry out terrorist acts (the total number of cut-throats is up to 8. fi{een. Moscow. Turkey contains a similar proliferation of Soviet espionage: a GRU strategic agent network in the form of an illegal residency and twci undercover residencies in Ankara and Istanbuli a GRU operational network in the form of five intelligence-centres belonging to the Carpathian. The KGB agent network also runs several illegal residencies and agent groups and two undercover residencies in Bonn and Cologne. ly1lceynn yid-Aty. These two examples provide examples. trainins and all Dractical work are carried out ofr'-Th-siffitories within the Eastern bloc or from inside its frontiers. Thh network is subordinatcd to the KGB frontier troop6. Volga. Trarc-Baikal and Far Eastern Utttn y Districts_ China. China. emerican and French sectors.0(X) men)..

i"ronious in using _is f:Tjy-:11.". The meetingp were carried its quite un.citizens who r[ have relarives in countries of int"rot io ii.. Centres and points are mostly found on the premises of military buildings of exceptional importance.r.*o1re-o his brother who tived not far It*r:"::ry:lti oi at teti gen.rlful Il to study (|l the affairs of Soviet anA Ea"stern bloc .: agents canaiOates. o*-n tenitor).il. Firstly.".ll :.. but an officer of the operational network who did succeed in defecting would be able to reveal only one or trno intelligence points or centres ..: in.188 of Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence r89 establishing the necessary contacts. to give him short instructions and money. is years. r"p".i i ii il-. into Soviet-controlled territory. airport.-m. ri ffi . rr"tu".iffi." f Naval intelliience a I iiH. iB diversification.ffi.1.i. saitors i.-of . every jtime a journey to eastern Europe was planned.:"ffi.i f rovrer :.and there are more than a hundred of these in the Soviet Army... it is extremely difficult to unmask and expose such agents.:havingieturil. never met f:T*. and cases are known whlre agent.r..J attention is paid to stud€nts undergoing instruction in Soviet n t'iffi [:".delegations. l.ii. secondly. and 'pcrhaps more important. dil:i:: ::j::. ffi. to a great extent. the control of the The absence of contact with agents outside territory under Soviet Union gives GRU operational .r. or in the restaurant or evcn the lavatory.un . i W n bee-n eithei on Soviet or rqrry o.. Post' '.pols. :*'L:"3. qut in the shortest possible time so that the driver's mate would not suspect anything.. Jr. .*_t::1"1d llo.ii*j ships cauing at tr *fl*:-:_1s1nu pu"t..1i.*i":::'l?^-l :Tli.il'l. (In strategic intelligence this occurs quite regularly but we have as yet not 'one example of it happening amongst operational intelligence ' officers... officers met him either at customs.-t:5:ITU.his case officers in good time by means of pootcards..:lT officer a1d hlve never lir". he notified . A defecting officer from strategic intelligence can say a lot about the activities of the central spparatus of the GRU.rg.i.. The lorry driver only occasionally visited eastern .. and consequently wittf the maximum possible protection.iy.intelligence exceptional advantages.. and operational intelligencJis equally .cards with pre-arranged texts were sent to different addresses in the Eastern bloc and every time the driver. ists vi siti g the I Usj:: unron as members.) Yet another important advantage gpnoe.Europe and rarely had contact with Soriet offrcers because . However. camouffaged. i#le.there was always a driver's mate with him.ol-r3r1ign1ni1 travmg recrulted one foreigner.n.crossed . the Soviet officers of operational intelligence have no chance to defect to the West and expose the activities of the agents recruited by them.. the intelligence directoraie then uses him for selectin{and ..i. Its officers exploit .1y:l. and one which gives of operational intelliit exceptional invulnerability. Each of them is carefully isolated from the others and. ' operationar intefiigence methods of pressurizing. Even if an officer did succeed in disclosing the .*iring?ther candidates without a Soviet officer tak-ing p"rt.. seeing that the taking place on it.r-"-r1 insti tu tes.. il.

of couo. The homeni on". Unwittingly ihe intelligen. However.. oil and gas pipelines." Fiftt GRU Directorate (in turn.i-. be used to check the tf.*it agents for the prefen not to interfere. It cg_qslg!! sf1Wggk[g3ts .-gr. Both same lalget: For example. I^:: f:lfll . bridges. Ol". The GRU central apparatus talions (in other words. the intelligence directorate of a group of forces once recruited an ageit for an important scientific research target. On receipt of orders. naepenOlenipenetration is. their tasks differ in essence. stress is placed on carrying out acts of sabotage which will have a strong effect on the morale of the inhabitants over a wide area. The Spetsnaz detachment is quite different.froula-il. tunnels and railway equipment. Of rs en! course military district intelligence. electric power stations. they must be able and willing to carry out acts of sabotage upon these targets. for example.. the oI* . Intelligence directorates try to recruit these agents from within the most important economic and transport targets. the GRU).er vigilance in the work with the other ag€nt.SPtEI4g-?XgIls and Spesnaz-dclac-ilm?nts. as we know.recruited-anothi. a store for niclear weapons or a T. Spetsnaz agents are requited by an iriielligence point.or tne agenis Degan ro provide false information. it would be almost impossible to determine that in addition there also an intelligence point. All these organs anA organizations are inctuded in a rigid pyramid .q:lt.k:t depot. ei._ else is that he is ifr.pt.. Great io. such as the blowing up of a large dam or the burning of oil storage tanks.e daily running of tne intiffilence directorates provided that they wlrk in a"productive manner and toe the line. in the activiiies of tn" intelligence directorates there exists a certain freedom wtrictr invalaUiy engenders uscful initiative.. However.. Operational intelligence tries to limit its meetings with these agents to exceptional cases. intelligence is the sharpest and most effective weapon in the hands of the heads of intelligence directorates or departments. although. subject t" t'h" h. he could only say that it was.t *oii shoulO'stof with one agent and that there . military prisons). For the GRU the most import- ant thing is to render unserviceable power and transport targets.! country houses of important generals or the well-guarded premisls of punishment bat- true significance of a particular building. The basic task of the procurement agent is to provide necessary information.: rne same target.il headed UI tf. Cases _was are known where inteiligence points trav-e Uben located on in military districts check the heads of points and the head of the GRU checks his heads of . The task of the Spetsnaz agent i9 to carry out terrorist acts.190 Soviet Military lnulligence Operational intelligence and ceritres Intelligence 191 an intelligence point may check his agents and reveal negative aspects in their work in goodtime. It is the true heads"of dlite of the Soviet armed forces.". and the whole process of recruiting and running agent-saboteurs is identical to the work with ordinary agents of operational intelligence.rn th. it was spotted Ui ttre Fifth Directorate which demanded'tt.a the premises of the p.i dir. Its memben are crack . practised at all levels in'the GRU. The agents provided almost "g"nt identical information which was eventually received in Moscow where aytrsed.g:i:ther group of forces.^ii. The GRU will occasionally interfere. in cases where two different directorates have recruited ation of the operational networks in no way indicates the absence of coordination. electric power lines. Spetsnaz agents form the so' called'sleeping'agent network which does no work in peace' time but springs into action the moment hostilities break out.r*-n. fhe head oi ::1. it will always encourage a situation rylrere different intelligence directorates .

mainly because naval Spetsnaz ' use the uniform of marine infantry to disguise their soldien in armies and tank armies ' and officers. r A Spetsnaz brigade consists of a headquarters compaiy. Spetsnaz hardly ever use helicopters. because . forty-one separate companies. iir. a battalion of parachutists and two or three battalions of frogmen. (Of course they have no connection with airborne troops or 'signals. on satellite territories they are disguised as auxiliary detachments. exclusively in the interests of the strategic element acting higher command.) Spetsnaz detachments are an organ of the the deployment generally takes place at a considerable . Eight divisions of airborne troops are subject to the rlcommander of airborne forces.operational field and act in the interests of fronts. Spetsnaz companies of three platoons of saboteurs and one communiconsist cations platoon.. there are in peacetime alone 27. Some. though in the fleets frogmen also take part.300 soldiers and officers ready to t&. containing a headquarters i. A tt Spetsnaz naval brigade is similar. . I In all there are 900 to 1. company.uory out terrorist operations in the rear of the enemy.ffi0 to 30.! I o g \. . or five-fold by recalling reservists who have previously served 11 in these detachments. who in his turn is answerable st &Ee IE! 5ii !. The Soviet Army includes four naval Spetsnaz brigades (one to each fleet). * three or four airborne battalions and support detachments.' The airborne forces form a 'only to the Minister of Defence.000 first-class saboteurs available. The deployment of saboteurs'in the enemy's rear is normally carried out by parachute.-r t.gE o=a . )"6Fil \ lgl lil \ L:J rr i I E: iEs \m t-rl L4 J Ol iii dtE -iE: Eii + 6 l . fleets I and armies. sixteen Spe*iaz brigades .t t&l \ I I r-. j.EI iit i\ \ \ \l . During mobilization this number can be increased by four'r. a group of midget submarines.one ii to eactr group of forces and the basic military districts. Operational Intelligence 193 the 'soldiers and officers.. normally signals units.t the Spesnaz naval brigade is confused with the brigade of the fleet marine infantry.(. and 'li. all told. z fnrfw-nne cpnarate comnaniesi . On Soviet territory they wear 'uniform of airborne troops. This means that.

there are one brigade and four or five separate companies operating at a depth from 100 to 1.|: tisually three or four armies and one tank army in each front. but by 'ensigns'. At the same time the Spetsnaz agents are activated. the leading role is allocated to the staff companies of the Spetsnaz brigades.5fi) to 1. air attacks and sabotage activities. a Spctsnaz brlgade Organlzatlon of Tlre Spetsnaz detachments have two basiQ duties: the .700 men.professional .gotrbrt swhrn r Settifto". companies are specially trained for the kidnapping or destruction of . Spetsnaz brigades are dropped at a depth of 500 to 1.. memben of the #.i .Operational Intelligence 195 r distance from the front line.Parehuls brflrfion . In other words around 250 groups totalling 1.State leaders of the enemy. networks and lines of communication. the Spetsnaz detachments strive to disorganize the internal life'of the State and Army and to sow uncertainty and panic. It must be added that.Slgnrlg cotrisil Sr[rporUng -llo@monv rin[d l.' . destruction of the system of the State government and its armies. These Spetsnaz staff . There are 6- Z.men.attacks on depots and stores of nuclear weaponry and rockets.llOga dutniaancom . aerodromes.000 kilometres to act in the interests of the frontal forees who will be attacking through areas cleared by atomic action. and the destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of supplying them . . that is the destruction of staff. Simultaneously with these two basic tasks. on West German territory for example. These are also dropped in small groups. a maximum of fifteen consisting of five or six men each. Simultaneously with the dropping of the front brigade. so in the course of an attack at a frontal level . i' t 3 a 5 ll of its own Spetsnaz companies. In carrying out the first task. These companies differ from other detachments of Spetsnaz in that they are not manned by soldiers who are serving their time. but four or five fronts to operate. at depths of 100 to 500 kilometres. each army taking part carries out the dropping .000 kilometres in the rear of the enemy. Small groups of. preparations are in hand for not one. . rocket launchers and launching pads. . command points.

in the course of military operations. There is a constant alternition u. the photographs showed that the soldiersl work was unlikely to be concerned with cables. This was scotched by officers of the fifth department who had been invited for consultations and who said categorically that the Americans would not have a cable in that region. they l"will attack it even if it means the inevitable destruction of the entire group.. several groups may take part in an a"ttack on a certain target. then go on to coflect more informution on t.oo! movements. units oi the Byelorussian Military District on West German territory selected places for parachute landings by the Spetsnaz groups. who kept on appearing in close-up. While they were being studied.are kept apart from the normal brigade and camouflaged as parachutists. since the prime motive was sabotage. which extends even to theii own memberr. nobody area. dams and narrow passes in lakeland areas. are aiso thi only or"... mine_laying and the seizure All the rema-ining group cannot transport a wounded man.is r not the political situation or technology but pure military . tr.. marksmen.t96 Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence 197 agent-saboteurs civilian clothes or in the military or poli"ce uniform of the companies.T-. and after the attack they will disperse and go their task of prisoners in order to obtain information." Lnry unii which carries out its tasks not in camoufraged uniform but They. urongr. Their existence -ir"quently. *t o t m been in any way connected with Spetsnaz will deny their brutality. information: the deployment.of making sudden attacks on AFVs iitt it aim of stealing them for future. . inay establish contact and act together with the combat experts."1^. Thestaff company ot tle Speysnaz Arigii i.". and ail groups have the saboteurs undertake night flights. equipment and plans of the troops of a probable enemy in sectors where an attack by Soviet forces is likely. Obviously.tr"J"n . The laying of military cable qn West German territory would in any case be discovered by agents of the military district.TI:.r". They will kill their own wounded _ the prisoners are taken. his choices were near important bridges. Let us examine one case study which underlines both the importance and effectiveness of operational intelligence. An agent who had been recruited by the second department of the intelligence directorate of i ... wrestlers.. Everything depends on the tasks set to th. in of Spetsnaz.use in attacks against " given targets. numbers.. then it may deslroy a rocket launcher in another own ways. irnarmed government and senior military comrnanders... [n the opinion of the signals officers. and the suggestion was put forward that they were laying a cable for military communications.y. When collecting of information and. Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles (AFV$ belonging to the enemy are ofspecial interest for saboteurs. He photographed these locations and made diagrams. the saboteurs-kno* no in their methods of interrogation. is cloaked in the very strictest . many officers and sergeanti of Spersnaz brigades do not even suspect the existence of such companie-s in their Onr**.urr" speed of results is paramount. nor can it let him fall into the hands of the enemy. Copies were also sent to the third and fourth departments of the Byelorussian iil" r l Military District intelligence directorate. tne $petsnaz detachments which. . And if a rocket launcher or an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons is ready for action. The soldiers were doing something at a kind of metal hatchway on the side of the road. even sports teams of the military district. A group may collect informatiln -on enemy troop movements in a certain region and transmit the information to its staff.i. boxers.e. group and the initiative of the group commander. an officer noticed a group of American soldiers lr*r. The greaiest interest for the staff of military districts. His photographs were transported by courier into East Germany to one of the intelligence points of the Byelorussian Military District. L". the camying out of sabotage acts.

hundreds of metres fr-om the object which they were supposed to destroy in case of war. At t1il. new methods of employing their troops and ways and means of surmounting strong radioactive fallout caused by thi underground exploiions. This qlone did not permit a final conctusion to Le .. the information service of the GRU h1{. map.r" on a confirming the conclusions of the information service."".. puiiorward.tanU minei which in peacetime where Soviet sabotage units might 3re nrgna-red be active in the event of war? This suggestion greatly alanried the GRU leadership. Europe. A month later. Further analysis showed that the mine-shafts were very deep. and sometimes placed at some. the Ministry of Defence and the Central Committee would now have to find new ways of attack. 9r1*n about the significance of the hatchways. The photographic interpreters were interested to see that the thiikness-of the hatchw"y. whose purpose was not to counter a parachute residents in West Germany. . The p-ossibility of nuclear land mines being used com. oper- ational methods and strategic plans would have to be changed. one of the 6Rti resiAencies on attack . but of a nuclear yarietl. Simultaneously.198 Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence 199 the The photographs were immediately dispatched to the GRU information service. where a new suggestion *u. .of qroups ot $aigrs working at metallic hatchways. Every hatchway that had been disc&ered was marked fint GRU directorate gave similar orders to all its it. damg railway stations and crossroads. It was this which finally convinced the speciaiists that it was not a case of ordinary land mines.. pletely disrupted all Soviet plans for a blitzkrieg attack on West German territory acquired documentary evideqce but to halt all Soviet troops in case they began an attack on Europe. The fifth direct-Jrate immediately gave gders to all intelligence directorates running agents iri West uermany to pay particular attention to the activities of small goups of soldiers in the neighbourhood of important bridges. The general staff. and the GRU had a series of enlargements taken from a distance of not more than one metre. butihe locks would have been the envy of any bank. in a word. . no greater than that of the wall of a good safe. Could these not be anti_personiit.at its disposal thousands of photographs. all tactics. All this was thanks to the fact that the new NATO t'actics had become known to the general staff in good time. This led to the opinion that the land mines were of a more complicated design.

Among its tasks are intercepting and deciphering radio conversations of the enemy. Tactical Reconnaissance There is yet another level to the practice of military intelli_ cal units and formations of divisional strength and below. Artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments are not included as their reconnaissance detachments are not active in the enemy's rear. either with or without their jeeps. The Electronic Reconnaissance Companies have eighty men and thirty vehicles with electronic equipment. The word . A divisional independent reconnaissance battalion consists of a headquarters. On discovering an enemy rocket installation. There are twenty-seven men in the company including six officers and an ensign. the group must attack it.a rare occurreice. Each genoe. a deep reconnaissance company. and monitoring the extent to which its owrr side observes radio security regulations. the group will not kill its wounded unliss the action is on foot . The deep reconnaissance company may be called upon to kidnap staff officers and to hunt for their staffs. Should the rocket be ready for launching. to depths of from thirty to 100 kilometres. and five reconnaissance groups of four men. 8 Tactical Reconnaissance nl . The Reconnaissance Companies of the Batnlion have exactly similar organization. Reconnaissance companies are controlled by the regimental reconnaissance chiefs. more accurately the fint group of the Army Intelligence Department. motorized*ifle and tank division has on its strength an unlike the Spetsnaz groups. Deep reconnaissance groups are deployed in the enemy's rear by helicopter. .are under the full control of operational inte[igence. So all tactical reconnaissance organs have. each with an officer at its head. two reconnaissance companies. The chief of regimental reconnaissance is subordinate to the regimental chief of staff and the chief of divisional reconnaissanL. a company electronic reconnais_ sance and auxiliary services. seven reconnaissance vehicles and ten motorcycles. Intelligence organs and detachments subject to tacti- Deep Reconnabsance The deep reconnaissance company is the smallest but the best of all the companies and batteries of the division. independent reconnaissance battalion. There is a total of six jeeps.. come under the heading of tactical reconnaissance. the group immediately reports it to the itaff. each group having one and one for the commander. a twofoid subordi_ nation.iniepen_ dent' shows that the battalion does not form part ol the regiment but is directly subject to the divisional staff. but only in cases where the commander of a division is certain that there are no enemy nuclear facilities in his divisional sector. which facilitate their military operations. The company's task is to discover and destroy enemy rocket launchers in its divisional sector. taking bearings on radio stations and radio locators. Each of the four motorized-rifle and tank regiments on the strength of a division has a reconnaissance company. [n each company there are three tanks. The company operates only from its own territory. in exactty the same way as operational intelligence organs. Their activities. The head of reconnaissance of a division is subordi_ nated to the chief of army intelligence. It has a small headquarters of the commander and a sergeant-major. which of course comes under the control of the GRU central apparatus. However.

in the case of reconnaissance detachments. T". engineering and artillery reconnais_ sance companies independent of these. the Military i Institute of Foreign Languages.oyirt aflny has approximately 1g0 motor_rifle and tank divisions.the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Naval Academy. we are talking many thousands of first-class specialists who go into military intelligence every year. This list gives an impression of the extent of the training of specialists for the GRU system. the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Kiev Higher Military Command School. All the higher military schools give instruction at university level to their students. . using gaps :-. :. others have only one faculty. the Sfeunaz Facuity of the Ryazan Higher Parachute School.i1"^.. of up to fifty kilometres. are under strength. The minimum age is seventeen. There is about the same number are. Candidates must have finished secondary education anb be of normal mental and physical . and the Special Faculty of the Second Kharkov Higher Military Aviation These are the educational institutions which take part in the training of personnel for Soviet military irrtelligence: the InI telligence Faculty at the General Staff Academy.202 Soviet Mililary Intelligence information prisoners..S. the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. Many of these. the Training Centre of lllegals.. 'Undeimanning is never allowed.orpffi operation to'eighty kiloinetres. All these companiei pen_ under their o*n po*e. The best of these subsequently enter the academies which provide a second university education. the Military-Diplomatic Academy. in any case. and there are also abiut 700 regimental reconnaissance companies.1_. . However. maximum twenty-four. the I I i ! i ' . the Cherepovetski Higher ..1I lelit:ry m me enemy's defence: The basic meihod of ouialiing sance company. Some of these educational establishments are devoted exclusively to this work. of and Engineering School. We havl not includeJ in this number the strength of chemical. In other words there tactical reconnaissance. especiafly those deployed in the rear.. of of independent reconnaissance battalions. Students entering the Soviet Army's higher military training establishments undergo a period of instruction which lasts for four to five years. Military Engineering School for Communications.as againit the baitatio.Regimental companies operate Each motor-rifle and tank regiment has its own reconnaisat a depth The Training and Privileges of Personnel is the capture and cruel interrogation. the i Special Faculty of the Military Signals Academy.about 95.000 men direiUy under GRU command in Special Faculty of the Higher Military Naval School of 1 n"Oio Electronics. lowever.

The General Staff Academy is the highest dream of the most eager careerists. He cases. . The colonel or general continues to serve and never suspects that he may buddenly receive from the Central Committee an invitation to attend yet a third spell of university education. Graduates -. Any higher commander may hold up the appli. To enter it there is no competition .2U Soviet Military Intelligence : The Traintng and Privileges of Personnel 205 choice. and speeds up progress on the promotion i"OaL. or too clever.. the officer may serve on until majoi or lie-utenant_colonel level at the most. the officer is posted to a unit 6n tfie instructions of the General Staff. higher echelons of the Army. beginning with his immediate Let us examine the progress of an intelligence officer on the promotion ladder. . The point is thaithere is no the educational establishment they have chosen. The General Staff Academy is the passport to the very highest levels of Soviet military leadership. but for most officers military academies in the ''one he gets into. and finds himself in strategic inteiligence. Without passing through the acadelny. and the nexi command. As a graduate of the intelligence 'faculty of the Kiev Higher Command School. he must still pass examinations and undergo a rigorous lies is three years. The important thing is to get into one of them. Soviet A*y. In some of the school givei a reasonably exact idea the subjects studied. the name development with a suitable ideological background. the Cherepovltski schoot. selects one of them. . To secure further promotion. every level academy begins. the officer must now enter the reconnaissance faculty of the Frunze military academy. The period of study at all the academ- generals up to and including colonel-general.stupid.l detachment of a regiment or division. They sit an entrance examination and are iiterviewed by a medical commission. from platoon commander to company commander to commander of regimental reconnaissance and deputy commander of reconnaissance battalions. he may be surprised to find himself learning about strategic missile troops. for example. The ipplication is confirmed at of higher mititary enginiering . too.ive the rank of engineer lieutenant and an engineering Oiptoma. tf his commanders decide that an officer is suitable. attei graduation. and they are all similar bar one..ho. The officer may submit his first application to tfre acalemy after three years of service. in it. the General Staff Academy. In which case the officJi will put off his application until the next year .. too old. This same faculty is also open to graduates of the Spetszaz facalty of the Ryazan . Success in thi academy opens wide Pdrol. say.. he will be posted to the command of a reconnaissance . nor are there applications for entry.i 9f Tank Command School leaves little to the imagination. they then take a competitive examination.f . Here begins the officer's gradual upward movement on the service ladder.-But what does a name like the Serpukhovski Higher Command Engineering School tell us? If a candidate chooses it. The Ulyanov Guards ffigh. cation under any pretext: that the officer is too young. and so on possibly for all his twenty-five years of "' There are more than fifteen it does not matter which . of superior. Signals schools are largely tfre same _ the candidate has little idea of exactly what subjects are studied there. The vast majority of them have no idei of the true character of year.rnd tto examinations. Candidates are selected by the Central Committee from the number of the most successful and dedicated colonels and entrance competition. The ac-ademy is the paisport to th. who have completed their study at one of the military already academies. and from the first day of his service his fight with his fellow officers for the rigtlt of entry to the Qlndrralss of higher commantl schools receive the rank of lleutenant and a university diploma on graduating.

Secondly. However. but the GRU devotes its attentions largely to the proletarian ten per c€nt. sons of colonels and majors. nor will it admit children of GRU officers whatever post they occupy. So far all this is straightforward. That is to say. They. conditions of acceptance are naturally graded according to rank: for the children of colonel-generals and higher. the children of lieutenant-generals undergo a very cursory examination.s superiors co-operate in signing the necessary documents. The ihe privilege of being able to send not only their sons to the Institute. he then proceeds with his training as he would in a normal military academy. But one insititute. is rather peculiar. the Institute every year accepts a ten per cent intake of . in fact. tf. This principle of the GRU's has to a very great extent eradicated corruption in the the military aristocracy are spared the rigours of genuine military service as well as the cruel competition between officers for the right of entry to a military academy. The Institute exists on the same basis as the Military higher command. For two principal reasons the GRU has had a long-standing rule that it will not admit the sons of high-placed parents into its organization. who constitute a special little group. but to the highest ranks of the KGB too. But there is'a deeply-entrenched set of privileges too. and the children of major-generals undergo the most rigorous examination. first selection is carried out by the KGB and the GRU according to the principle of 'one for you.ere are no examinations. provided that the offficer. This is a privilegeJ establisir_ Higher Parachute School. these scions of ment for the children of the highest echelons of th6 Soviet Army. For the sons of lieutenant-generals. AII officers study there together and then return to their own units. in order to soften this clear class distinction.non_ aristocrats'. sometimes even of workers and kolkhoznilcs. interested organizations carry out their selection of the graduates. together with everybody else. The student receives edu_ cation to the level of that of the military school and the rank of lieutenant. the special entran'ce provides . There is no friction. there is no father who really wants to risk his own career by linking it with that of a son who is on agent work and to whom anything could happen. that a candidate's father has only to worry about placing his little son on the first rung of the military ladder and the ladder itself will move upwards. The reasoning goes that if a son is refused something the father may refuse the same thing to all his subordinates. the Military Institute instruciing in foreign languages. he is speedily expelled from the Institute in disgrace. Every_ thing proceeds automatically. and 'colonel-generals even more so. The girls are given instruction in French for the sake of prestige and in English for obvious commercial reasons. there exists The period of study in the institute is from five to seven After the Institute's final examinations. The Institute is not only a stepping-stone to the highest Army ranks. one for me'. Should any stqdent commit the slightest offence. For colonel-generals and abgve. years depending on the faculty. The .206 Soviet Military Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 207 Agad9ly. receive officer's rank.for the appointment of individual tutors and the taking of examinations privately at home. although young people enter it according to the rules laid down for military schools. Only after a father retires from the GRU can his son be considered for admission. This means. They will find their way into the Ministry of Defence. firstly because the system has been laid down for many years and secondlylecause GRU and KGB have different interests. The KGB is quite happy to choose the sons of highranking. but also their daughters. only ihis time with a Discipline and competition are fearsome. serving KGB officers. so that the candidate does not get nervous.

in which case retribution is equally swift. and a return to the grindstone of life as an ordinary Soviet officer. should he decide to share his secrets with anybody else. This is justified by the false notion of handing down traditions from father to son. Everywhere within it are the children of Tchekists. and GRU offrcers are envious !j. Its top secret designation is the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army. At the outset this is all they will entrust to him. opposed principles. an indication that within those rooms there is work on . to sign a document about the divulging of In this document are described alt the unpleasant things which await him. Before making this proposal to an officer. he receives the answer that the work is very interesting. The Soviet Army Academy is located in Moscow on Academy understand this rule and obey Narodnogo Opolchenia Street. perhaps fifteen. the ofificer will of course have been very carefully checked out by. The second means an end to privilege and the sweet life within the GRU. immedi- the central organs of the GRU in Moscow. Regardless of the abundance of names. To his question as to what sort of studies he will undergo. who must not only be certain that he will agree but will also have obliged him military secrets. If somebody wanted to convey an idea of its activities by means of a name. From the outside there is little to indicate that it is secret. flats or hotels. Its secret designation is the Soviet Army Academy. For the GRU officer who completes the Academy. Only sometimes on the upper storeys and in certain windows'-can one see grilles and casements covered in cord nets. they do not tell him branches are scattered all over the place disguised as innocent offices. For spreading a secret like the existence of the Soviet Army Academy the sentence is ten years in prison. perhaps even the 'ultimate sanction'. il r. He may either be deprived of overseas work and be sent instead to work in The unclassified narne of the institution is .208 Soviet Military Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 2W selection of officers. are regarded as harsh in the extreme' The first means the end of overseas life.) any secrets. There are no name plates or number plates on the building. The area wallows in greenery so that nothing can be seen. Very few people inside the Soviet Union know of the ' existence of this academy. All of these punishments. not only the last. Around it are several large buildings. but many of its secret it enthusiastically. However. and write an application to enter it. The third is only marginally worse. and the conditions of life are vastly better than those of any other organization known to him. The GRU seeks out candidates for the Academy and secretly suggests to officers that they should enter. then that name would most probably be something like the Military Academy of Agent Intelligence. he may be shot. and should any officer ever hear a rumour about it. and finally. success is assured . (The KGB has adopted diametrically_. Those connected with even of dustmen overseas. One may rest assured that a cplprit would be found and put in phson for spreading government secrets.unless he makes a mistake. frequently under the direct supervision of their fathers.military unit 35576'. he may be deprived of work in the GRU and sent back to the Army. There will be no soldiers and no hierarchy of rank. lr ill the ate enquiries would be made to establish the source of the information.the GRU. and the whole is surrounded by a very high iron lattice-work fence. The GRU holds nobody against his will and is perfectly frank about future privileges. none gives any idea of what is studied there. They simply tell him that there exists a certain academy which is keen to welcome him as a student. The central building reminds one of an elegant museum with its Greek colonnade and richly carved ornamentation. although corruption flourishes in other GRU fields of activity.

The chief of the-Academy has the military rank of colonel-generuiiid't 3 O9n{f head of the GRU. But we Elust again remember that Soviet military ar\d sggglg faqlties prepire their students for the. tg[$I. including collections of secret and top secret literature. They face the same tasks and use the same -methods as all other officers of the GRU. since the academy is after all designated as a military-diplomatic academy. The political derollis responsible for the state of political ariaEness affi'-ile morale. top secret documents being carried out. But fate can be cruel. only half . is not located on the . and finally. to segregate the students for security reasons (a defector will not know all his fellow students. sirategic and oferational cover.first deputy head.ifoggpgg. the GRU will post them under whatever cover they consider suitable. central GRU apparatuslFfowever. history of international relatiois ana diplomatic practice. the first faculty is called the Special servii:es Faculty and the second the tvtititary-Diplomatic Faculty. He will be going abroad but the despised third faculty student will recruit agents from Soviet or satellite territory only. The adryrinistrative_ tecltcat OE *y is responsible for the-personfiffi[iiffiii an<l the security department (with the commandani. 9*: 9f fikely enemies). These sub-faculties are strategic agent inteilige. "sf administrativtlffiir Th: Lrs! deprtty is in charge of the graduate school.and. identical. Under him there are also the libraries. T}e him the academic sub-facutties leputy for the generals. they are sent to operational agent intelligence. four faculties and academic courses. it seems wise that not all its faculties should bear names connected with espionage.fice and a corirpany of security guards) together with the finance. when students have completed their studies. foreign linguages and study of countries-. Marxist-Leninist philosophy. in their place are taken the best of the officen graduating from the third faculty. ft ifr.and kind.dep&s wtro are lieutenant-generats beneath him. however newly arrived. There exists a deep enmity between officers of the first two faculties and officers of the third. not of cours". like the first.with this in mind the first faculty is isolated from the central block of the academy buildings). Many of the officers who have studied in the fint faculty will find themselves working in military organizations and vice-versa.210 Soviet Military Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 2ll by draughts. to simplify control over individual students. Furthermore. and it is officially considered tha.of all officers of the Academy. An officei of one of the two strategic faculties. The chief of the Academy has tgg. merchant navy. The artificial distinction exists in order to . in whichever of the two faculties that might be. fi nally.ce. operational agent intelligence and Speinaz\aeafng wi'ttr the wTiffiif6Ei apaclggqic secllg has under by major- armed trade-craft of the Soviet Army. The AgEggy is an integrat part of the GRU. stores and transport departments. When the worst (usually the most arrogant) officers have graduated from the strategic faculties. trade representations _ while the second faculty prepares its students for military fr"j5! attach6s are the same GRU officers as those who work under civil cover. ft. the first faculty prepares officers for civilian cover _ embas_ sies. preparing officers for intelligence directorates of military districts. The string nets are so that no pieces of paper can be blown out of thJwindows and the deputies for the poriticar. The third facully deals with operational agent intelligence and Sfitsnaz intelligence.s of. For this reason the instructional programme in both faculties is absolutely . civil airlines. further the following aims: to confuse Western intelligence ' services and to create the illusion that there is some differense between military attachds and other GRU ofificers. feels the very deepest contempt for all those studying in the third faculty.

excepting the 'liberation' of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the 'defence of socialism in eastern Europe'. This is the riost secret part of Soviet intelligence after-illegals. family . many of them will study for y. having already receiuei genuine diplomatic diplomas. aip[. Onfy a handful of people will know what is hidden under this tific penonnel for the GRU and also instructors for the academy itself. normal military academy concerned with tant " or artifleiy studies.i"r."fy prrti.i :l tl. a a one. After a first assignment abroad these may.not to provide a complete trating. the soviet trainees in ttre acaoJmy must not have even the slightest contact with their . and has been abroad on agent work and shown good results. Czechs. Master of Military Science..for example. not oni of these trai ever set foot in the academy buildings and has no idea where the academy is located. ouir_ seas trade academy where they completed a'full murse of study. Moreover. The resulting qualification is scientific degree. special personal cover story will have been worked out. He must have strong and reliable family connections. before spending their three to four y. Naturally.-. for example. The academic courses are something different. the academy receives specialists from other fields whom the GRU invites to work in technical services or on information work. For each of these students in the Soviet Army academy. He must have a wife and children of complete ideological and racial purity. enter the academy in one of the strategic faculties. The candidate who hopes to please the GRU must fulfil the following conditions: racial purity . U"t . consider them their own kind ana ao not suspect their intelligence connections.there must be no Jewish blood as far back as the fourth generation (the KGB has no such restriction). There must be no compromising material on the files of any of their relatives. equally naturafly.. The academic courses are arso attended by graduates of the Military Foreign Languages spare time and receive-the sami diplomas as the-graduates e. frongols urj Institute who have been chosen by the GRU for work abroad. Cubans. who 1n!t the period of study is only onl y"ar. Bulgars. sexual promiscuity. Hungarians. These are designed. i. is accepted by the post-graduate school for a period of instruction of two to three years during which he must prepare and defend a scientific dissertation on subject chosen by himself. which prepares scien- name.rmans. t*9 strategic faculties. fhiy ur" were chosen Who is eligible? this is a very complex problem. membership of the communist party."i.a.ntry to strategic facultiei of the u.ry Uut tf. Their diplomas -I. And there must be no signs whatsoever of alcoholism. The fourth faculty trains foreigners _ poles."n for transferred by the GRU into the diplomatic (civit) o. They are considered on a par with the other civil students and carry out their specialized training in their attended -principally by the most experienced officers and those with the greatest future prospects. Frequently.aae*y.212 Soviet Milinry Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 213 academy premises.:Ts on secret premises. a le. the absence of any contact with overseas. its individual courses and S9upu are separated among themselves in conditions of the strictest secrecy. on his own side and his wife's. foi even genuine. The GRU uses them in residencies mainly for duties with technical and technical-operational services. provided they have served successfully. lloT. nor on Soviet territory under the temporary occupation of German forces. And these students do not receive diplomas from the Soviet Army Academy. ideological stability and purity.brothersi.l. There is a post-graduate school too.... the Tank Warfaie a. An officer who has completed one of the strategic faculties.. None of his relatives may have been either prisoners of war in Germany. Lastly.

but it is divided. but you are branded from birth if you were born in the country.ng is not acceptable to the GRU. without queueing' The ordinary Soviet citizen. receiues foreign currency and can buy everything he needs both while he is abroad and at home in the Soviet Union in the special foreign curency shops.214 Soviet Milinry Intelligence The Training and Plivileges of Personnel 215 problems. because they are .for theii own good. It is as if you had moved onto a higher sphere. still less abroad. Society may be classless. . but also an apartment.hotels. One of the most difficult things in selecting candidates is to find people who understand the political situition in the wqrld and can clearly see possible future developments without being secret free-thinkers. All people are friends. is the first privilege of a GRU officer. This is good news for not only you. who will all have Moscow residence permits and will legally reside in Moscow. an ordinary general staff officer is unable to buy a car during the whole of his life unless of course he steals or is sent their ambitions without let or hindrance. for the good of the people. you must stay there and so must your children and grandchildren . restaurants which Russians may not enter. comrption and so on. you cannot rnove to the city. nor must the officer have any prominent distinguishing features or speech defects. there is always the danger that secret doubts wiil begin to penetrate his head. Of coune.*"nt that: 'Nobody of French nationality is allowed to enter this shop. everybody is equal and life is therefore happy and free. ho*"uet. Unless unless you do something like become a GRU officer. accorded appropriate honours. France perhaps. where he canbuy anything he wants. You may rightly say thtt you would prefer to live in the city. because in Moscow the' officer spends money which is to all practical purposes incapabli of buying anything except food of rather inferior quality and equally inferior clothes. in-the country. this question sensibly. very sharply distinguished from all those who do not have it. without the permission of the-Central Commiitee. Immediately. with a permanent ro. of course. all right. Drawing another distinction. but if a man is modirateiy intelligent. In possessing - foreign currency a GRU officer becomes a man of completely diffeient class..you have the right to live in the city or you have not. A GRU officer may in three years buy not only a car. logically. There are others.and brothers and nobody will try to do his neighbour down. In a classless society. It is impossible to unr*". Naturally. you should draw your family tree on the wall of your apartment so that future generations of your family will knowwho it was who Iifted them up to the heights. causi. whereeverybody is naturally out for each otirer's blood. you will find yourself in Moscow. if ybu five thi capital Moscow. lmagine any country. people move around chaotically. putting up outside shops the urrorn. For example. into parts . including the general staff officer or even the: GRU officer who does not serve abroad. Only those on the list of the Central Committee of the Communist Party are admitted'' But in the Soviet Union there are everywhere shops. So Soviet society is as racial as it can possibly be. people may pursue untold social problems. Obviously anyone who is politically inepi In capitalist societies. Special shops and r€staurants are open to him. These could all be eradicated with the introduction of residence permits on the Soviet model' The Moscow residence permit. when this rare creature is found he is instantly made to sit meaningless examinations and. He who is sent abroad. only race is not determined by the colour of your skin but by whether you have the right to travel abroad or not. as if you and your relations had suddenly been ennobled.sidence permit. may not even enter these shoPs. from the very first day. but your children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren and grcat-great-grandchildren down to the fortieth generation. it is often asked how much more a GRU officer abroad earns in comparison with the same officer in Moscow.

This is why he defends himself against any revelation about his own person. No matter how many secrets you manage to acquire it will never be enough. where serious work is impossible . This might appear strange. Life for a GRU ofifrcei possessing foreign currency is on an infinitely wider scale than for the 270 million who are deprived of the right to hold foreign currency. So what awaits you? Exhausting stressful work. Your . Its infernal counterpart . while the work force has rather different aims. And once Conclusion - or return early to Moscow. For a GRU officer. obviously without having recruited any agents. . no one will call you lazyior a coward. After five years your return home. humid. This is ytry he is capable of any dirty trick upon anybody]including his own comrades. subtropical abroad. There are also countries in which he would rather not work. there are countries in which he dreams of working. Both you and the GRU top brass know that there are no laws against spying there. This "rei he tries tolide is why he has bgcome a representative of the upper class. Chit-chat with colleagues from other embassies. when what is at staki is whether hE should remain another year in a hot. you will no! have your epaulettes torn off. travel Russian.'flaring anything the loss of the privilege which allows him to "bor.'fifteen to seventeen hours a day. Everyone understands that you-have been in hell. with no rest days and no feast days. that conditions for spying are ideal. . gossip about the state of health of the Chinese leaders and the Ambassador's wife. against uny. Imagine that you are lucky and are posted to China. But nobody will bawl you out for it.Tokyo.216 Soviet Military Intelligence posting frgm his superiors even the smallest shoitcomings. splendid embassy behind high walls. And now imagine that you are an unlucky spy and the GRU post you to Tokyo. he becomes inordinately jealous of his right. Peking hell. the most insignifi_ cant. because for the top brass of the GRU quite the reverse is true: Tokyo is heaven. The top brass desire high productivity. The dream city for a GRU officer is Peking. and cities he sees in nightmares. No matter how many agents you recruit it will never be enough. What awaits you? A vast. There are cities he dreams of. But the interests of a GRU officer are directly opposed to the interests of the top brass. contacts with the police.

This is not easy. he has been very active and. By grant him entry. He breaks no laws. He is easy to identify. He bears on his shoulders the immense pressure of the gigantic GRU establishment. Finally a small country with a soft. He has already served abroad for twelve to fifteen years. All of them had to be taken care of and hdlped. which of course included the names and addresses of the members of the network run by the 'residentura'. where the police was weak and Soviet diploiats the entire operation. Then a West German one . but I have had to country Ilt i. The GRU gave the resident his final briefing. how successful our own work was. calculating and fearless. but should communications be intemrpted the signaller is sent to a penal battalion forthwith. pounding the table with his Moscow addressed to the resident saying: . does not speed up and down the motorways day and night. Usually the local police know who he is. carries no stolen secrets in his car. successful. abrass. AJting as a supply base for agent network operationi is rathei like serving in a signals unit during a war: as long as communication lines are maintained nobody .emembers you. so be Who should be expelled first? The answer is obvious: the resident. [t was refused. like a spider.hell. There is a deep-seated and erroneous belief that known residents should not be allowed into the country.. Without any doubt the Security Services in the West knew him well. He was promoted to major-general at the age of thirty-six. He needs one. The differenci between us and the signals boys lay in the fact that no matter how well we maintained supplies. we were living in 'paradise'. !9 will fight for the kind of productivity that"nor*-ou. Clearly it is against him that all forces must be mobilized. in a senior diplomatic post. This is a mistake. pnd as a result he remained a majorgeneral. As . But he is more dangerous than all his bfficers put together. perfidious. Sometimes they aren'!.refused again. A weak police system in that country meant that the other residents continually used it as an intermediate base for their opera_ tions-and it was a busy crossing point for GRU illegals. by the GRU top Understandably. I'd like to beg all who are responsible for the security of _ the West: be human.paradise. After all. for us it wis . which was considered . were never expelled. but sitting there motionless. no matter how aggressive and successful it is. They asked for a French one . be achieved through merciless competition. Do expel Soviet spies occasionally. He was a man of unflinching will and powerful intellect. The expulsion of the resident is equivalent to clearing the King off the chess-board: it spells checkmate to the 'residentura'. also had to recruit agents. I will try to explain.again refused. using my own resident as an example.you have seventy operational officers! Where's your productivity? What you managed to get yesterday we have already received from will be snowed under with cipher cables from and he has no excuse for any lapses. 219 can only Irt. A spy is a human being. and hardly ever leaving the embassy. charged with the failure of expelling one you enable othen to reduce their fiantil activity. Hong Kong! From Berlin! From illegalsl Where are the secrets!!!???' You may rest assured that this question is put by the GRU daily to the resident * who will in turn ask you the same question. a true ace of spies: gareful.218 paradise Soviet Military Intelligence Conclusion human. and he had a brilliant career in front of him in the upper echelons of the GRU. friendly government agreed to not up_ Ii your output is to scratch you will simply be sent home and your career broken. Prior to one of his postings abroad the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked for a Belgian visa for him. too. sometimes they are simply not granted entry visas. judging by the signs. Now here he is serving abroad again. we Penonally I have never been to Tokyo. But all he wanted was to be a resident.

to the proposals of the Soviet intelligence service. For the following three to four years. Time will be needed for the successor's visa application and more time to brief the new resident. The noisy expulsion is a slap in the face for the GRU. [n return he agreed to 'find' some money. Should you. . Here is another example encountered during my work. In the interim the residency will remain inactive. authoritative. barring a resident from a country does not mean rendering his network ineffective (see Appen- dix C). Having to leave the country suddenly. We remained good friends . on the day for a meeting. against all the countries which had refused him entry. Further well-tried steps were planned which would have pushed him deeper in each time. an insignificant local paper published an item stating that fifty per cent of the Soviet Embassy staff were spies. the resident will leave his army without a commanding officer. West Germany or France. To expel a Soviet spy is of course a victory. as at that time not fifty but eighty per cent of the Embassy staff were spies. but nothing more. in this case Belgium. against Belgium. . So at our meeting. until it was working successfully against the USA. I am glad for your sake. . for the KGB. once in. The resident will have had time to disrupt the existing system of work in the residency but not to UuitA up a nei system.-had issued the visa. it is an action directed against all their spies. experienced. Now imagine another set of circumstances. demanding and merciless resident serving in a neutral country with ten officers under his command can sometimes harm the West more than two 3. In other words. . However. the results of this would be threefold: 1. let into all the 'residentura'secrets. three to four months later. against thousands of unstable people preparod to 2. persistence and mad risk. and it was the opinion held by my first resident. it is also the opinion held by Moscow Centre. and would arrive in the country. on returning to Moscow. The resident would be briefed. visa applications cannot be sent for him either to France or West Germany or any other country that Belgium will have notified as an ally. How should one go about the business of expulsion? The short answer is: as noisily as possible. who taught me unforgettable lessons in concentration on target. I am sincerely sorry that he has stayed the other sidebf the barricade . I managed to convince the young man. in spite of the fact that at the time I felt my failure deeply. However if. my greetings to you. instead of never have been able losing the money I had with me and finding his passport. against France.220 Soviet Mititary Intelligence Conchuion 221 soon as he arrived in the country he started extending the network speedily and vigorously. But what can a poor GRU spy do in a situation when the powerful free Western press publishes such items at the least suitable moment? Finally the question arises as to how many Soviet spies should be expelled. The only answer is all. But to expel him noisily means that you are making as much capital out of the victory as you can. This was the first step towards the morass. This is not only a matter of my opinion. Great Britain. I had a reasonably good relationship with a young man who agreed to 'lose' his passport. Belgium found some reason or other to expel him. The silent expulsion of a Soviet spy is an action directed against one man. young man. What do you need them for? Why keep them in your country? They are hundred very active GRU officers working in the USA. He did not take the crucial step. 'One . be reading my book. he would listen scheduled to get out. will be completely neutralized. The experienced resident. And it really was a barefaced lie. Supposing the _ first country approached. I had to spend the time proving to him that the news item was a lie.

then I am ready to lake my punishment. which is not a whit easier than the first. Grain was its most irlportant export. But every expelled spy represents a nightmare to the new ones. the easier it will be to watch them. But to that there is an antidote _ you - millions of the best Russian farmers. It is an agonizing way. who fear deeply being appointed asleplacements. as then a new ore will be sent in and we will not know whom to keep under surveillance. If you have the evidence to prove that thly are pies .s . or I could escape to the West. and if.ollege of the Supreme Court according to article 64a. I guarintee that your diplomats will be greatly respected. Canada expelled thirteen the riply: two. My crime . the Soviet Union will retaliate and expel our innoJent diplomats from Moscow. expiain my disagreement with the communists and then commit suicide. and ihat the Soviet leadership will look for opportuniiies to improve its rerations with you. The more inexperienced spies you have in your country the more mistakes will be made. green one. then. but by the desire to hold 9n to their power. But the Soviet Union respects the sovereignty only of those nations who respect their own sovereignty and defend it. Those who are guilty of that should be tried. still plead not guilty as charged. country. and one experienced spy is a hundred times more dangerous than a yourg. There was no comeback. runs the argument. The Soviet leadership understands and acknowl_ edges strength.the Soviet reply: two. it.betrayal of the homeland. The betrayers of the homeland are those who shot I . Those who have made of Russia an importer of grain . I chose the second way. Russia has always grown wheat. Look -Union. But if you increase the number to five the Soviet riply will be five or fewer-. But only strength and nothing else. Those in the Kremlin who have brought my people to complete moral and physical degredation .expel them. The Soviet Union can respect the sovireignty of any country. These people are driving my comrades to their deaths in Afghanistan. demanding the deaths of innocent people they at some future time should be judged and given their just deserts. but only after they have taken theirs. my country then considered me to be a traitor also for deserting If - they are the criminals. no matter how small it looks on the map. The betrayers of the homeland are those who are now in the -Kremlin. If any GRU . Turkey expelled one . That is professionals specially selected and trained to destroy your For GRU Officers Only I was condennned to death by the Military C. On the . France expelled forty-seven . They should be tried in a court of law. at these statistics: Holland expelled one if __But we expel people. If you take similar action against Soviet spies I guarantee that your diplomats in Moscow will be safe.eve of war the communist leaders shot the best marshals and generals. my people paid the price of tens of millions of lives.the reply: nil. intelligence experience is much more valuable than any amount of education. Great Britain simultaneously expelled 105 (the entire staff of the GRU and KGB residencies). That is so. Sometimes the theory is put forwarj that it is better to unearth a spy and keep him under surveillance than to expel him. They were motivated not by the interests of the homeland. correct.222 Soviet Military Intelligence ' Secondly. When I was in the GRU I could see two ways to protest: either I could commit suicide. must expel large groups of diplomats simultaneously.they are the traitors. For the deaths of the marshals and generals.the reply: two.they are the betrayers who should be sentenced under article 64.

W. would always be_ donl go.. only {ague outlines of a continent shrouded in the mists. and then regained ground A RA commanding intelligence of the S. Rapidly promoted. You will dream of Mothe-r Rusiia every night. In 1905 he joined the Tsar's army and serveil in WWI as a major in military intelligence.itren tnJ. if you arelhen ready to stand before the people and await their decision on youifute _ then you must go. If you think that in tlre-West it is good.don't go. I soon - !o. ln 1937 . Latvia and Lithuania as undercover ambassador and later was responsible for setting up residencies in the United States. If he is thinking of fleeing to the West. A participant in the October Revolution he was one of the creators of the Tcheka. dismissed from all posts.'and at home in Russia bad. you can bring nearer the momeni. Germany and Japan.I*u-rious motorcars _ don't go. and an agonizing death. He shouldn.I advise him to think over his decision a hundred times. If you don't feel yourselfa traitor by going _ go. it is not worth it for the Jate of a car. If.then you should If you are prep_ared to risk your life for one minute of ireedom _ then go.t d"o it.orru_ Only realized that a history of the GRU would be a very fraught undertaking. I 880 .traitor. by going. Simon Iv anovich : I 8. maybe even on the frontier itserr.. theirs are rially no better than orrrs. then you are mistaken _ ours is a beautiful-muntry. if you consider your leaders as criminals. In January 1918 he became chief of the Operational Department of the Moscow military district.. and then again. front. The i picture may be made clearer by studying the destiny of those tindividuals who have held the highest power in Soviet military intelligence. as will the ihameful epithet .224 Soviet Military Intelligence and wonders. Don't go foi the sake of foreign beauties stay Appendix A Leaders of Soviet Military Intelligence happy. After 1921 he was a deputy of the chief of military intblligence. The history written in this book consists only of isolated details. If you iant an easy life .then my advice to him is _ don. in October 1918 he became the first chief of military intelligence until July l92f.t go until such time as he is certain why hJ is going. he was employed as a deputy director of the Literature Museum. working in Turkey. if you yourself do not wish to be a criminal. Arrested in 1938. In their destinies the whole history of the organization is reflected. rvry advjce. [t is clear that the very shortest history iof the GRU would fill several massive tomes and could only be written after the fall of communist power. but go for the sake of her future and I promise you that you wilt be if you know there is no other way for you. If you like long. If you are attracted to Western wolel .don't go. LOV. nists are judge! by the people of our country.ln1920he moved down to chief of intelligence. he speht three years under interrogation. Hewas born in Moscowto rich merchantparents and educated to follow his father's profession. In 1941 he was serving as a private in a penal . 5. 12th Army. article 64 will be waiting for him. if you can help your people. 12. officer now finds himself in the same dilemma _ to go or to .22. I %9.

from his first days in military intelligence. he was one of - 29. On returning from Spain he continued to lead military intelligence. On 13 May 1938 he was arrested and gence officers on 29 July he was shot. One of the main organizers of the 'Red Terror'. industrious and iuccessful heads of intelligence. Aino Kuusinen. Lev Manevich. arrested ll 191.226 Appendix A Appendix A 22V battalion. It remains uncertain whether this was his real name or simply Born in Latvia. He personally recruited and rah the most outstanding intelli- took over from him or from another. He was one of the most talented. In 1919 he became chieiof intblligence of. dc facto. I a party pseudonym like Lenin. he was. Konstantin Efremov. he spent ten years in a concentration camp.3g. He was also a fervent supporter of the establishment of a communist dictatorship in Latvia and one of the organizers and leaders SitCCe. Trotski. but it is not known whether Beruin NIKONOV. In 1936 Berzin transferred the Soviet military intelligence command post from Moscow to Madrid. Zinoviev and others. a diputy of t[J chief of military intelligence and immediately moved as an illegal into polan{ Head of Intelligence Directorate (GRU) but. Sandor Rado. but lived quietly until his death. 2nd Grade Army Commissar BERZIN.-the Western front. when he was shot. its head. officially designated as chief military adviser to the Republican Government. Richard Sorge. [n order to sustain this cover story his deputies Uritski and Unshlikht carried out his duties in Moscow. He engaged in suppressing counter-revolutisnaries in Moscow and became a private boAyguara of Lenin. the creator of the most powerful and successful intelligence organizations in existence anywhere.1938. and a leader of th6 Red Latvian $!emen. October 1918 he was. he served in WWI and became a communist after the Revolution. In central apparatus of the NKVD and in the NKVD in Latvia. and in August 1920 became chief of military-intelligence.M. Ruth and Rolf Werner. In 1957 he was agiin dismissed inthe Zhukov/ Shtemyenko purge. Four years later. Then. he was a colonel.3g. Reduced to deputy status after 1922. and when the war was over he was taken back into the GRU. he travelled extensivery as an ilegar to cieate new networks until his recall to Moscow in 193g.7 . . (subsequently the 15th He was head of a special department of this army and played a part in the suppression of the Russian sailors' mutiny at Kronstadt. 12. yan Karlovich (real name Kyuzis Peteris) : I 3. (Nikonson): ? -29. He was conscripted into the army in the First World War but deserted and went underground. chief of military intelligence. . Berzin joined the Social-Democratic party in 1904. Moshe Milstein (Mikhail M). On his liberation he was immeiliately appointed deputy tothe chief of the GRU. He took part in the October Revolution and afterwards he worked in the L l&gg - 29.38.7. His date of birth is unknown. he initiated the hostages system. Karl Ramm.187 9 An hereditary Polish nobleman and an active member of the Polish (left-wing) Social-Democratic Party. With effect from March 1924 he became its head legally as well. UN SH L I KH T. A. He particularly distinguished himself in the course of the pursuit and liquidation of captured sailors. Born in Latvia. He was giief of military intelligence after Stigga.7.Yakov Mrachkovski (Gorev). Ignati Reis and the most eminent intelligence officer of the 20th century.2g. so far unidentified. I o s if Stanis lav ovich : 19 .Stalin. where he carried out his most notable recruitments while he was working under cover.7. He too was executed in the great teror of 1938. From April l92l he was Deputy A*y). Oskar Arcovich: lg94 .. of the Latvian Red Army Lithuania and Latvia.

Red Teiror'. there are grounds for thinking it could have been on 4 June 1940. he was buried alive dt the NKVD sanatorium at Sukhanovo. From 1923 he was deputy head of the registration directorate (GRU). A ferveni suppo. He travelled abroad several times with false the leaders of the October Revolution. a post he occupied from the end of 1938 to July 19. 'of the GRU and Ezhov was the shortest serving Chief suffered the most painful death. l!27 Ezhov was in Stalin's personal secretariat. In 1937-8 he served as a Soviet Military Adviser in Spain. 229 documents to organize illegal work in poland.nB Appendix A Appendix . In 1936 he became Peoples' Commissar for Jnternal Affairs and Commissar-General for State Security. Nikolai Ivanovich: 1895-190. In 1937-g there began under his leadership the . but from Commissar-General of cerandfi ghterpilot. Lieut-General of Aviation PROSKUROV.CI. In the interests of cover he constantly filled responsible posts in the Soviet Government and the Red Army. He took part in air battles and shot down several enemy aircraft. He was shot with Berzin in the celtar of the'Hotel Metropole'in Moscow. a future chief of the GRU.sovietintelligenceoffi 1895-1937 was chief of the GRU during Berzin's absence. . However. Solomon petovich: -^J"'"l"lr{. On his return from Spain he became chief of the GRU. In October he was removed from his post. From l92l:3 he was deputy chairman of thi All-Russian Tcheka and one of the fathers of the . A petty official who only joined the Bolsheviks when it became clear that they had won. and at one time he was considered by Soviet historians is the 'first founder of the Tcheka' at the same time as Dzerzhinsky was considered the 'chief founder of the Tcheka'. having liquidated in 1920 the whole of the leadership and the operational stpff. He began the policy of state terror before Dzerzhinsky. played a perscinal part in Ezhov's death. In 1935-6 during Berzin. he occupied iirsignifiihnt party posts in the provinces. He was arrested in January 1939 and liquidated after atrocious torture. The date of his death has not been established with'certainty. At the same time he carried out a series of first-class recruitments amongst internationalists of many countries and assured a regular flow of military and military-technical intelligence. thus establishlng a monopoly of secret activities in the state. From this moment on it would be impossible for the activities of the GRU and NKVD to be subject to reciprocal checking. There are also grounds for believing that Ivan Serov. Ivan losifuvich: ? Corps Commandcr IIRITSKI. the monopoly alarmed Stalin and 29 July saw the beginning of Ezhov's downfall. He was shot in the first wave of the Terror.A.s absence he carried out the duties of chief of the GRU although he remained in fact only deputy to Berzin.rter of the establishment of communism in poland. On 29 July 1938 there was a repeat purge of the GRU and. he was a member of the . Immediately after the revolution he became a member of the NKVD college. According to unconfirmed data. he took over its control. the party and the entLe country . In 1930 he of the Central Committee personnel Department and in 1935 Party Secretary. Lithuania and Germany. the army. and the following day shot without trial. One of the bloodiest careers in the history of mankind. controller of NKVD work. he combined both these professions simultaneously. He openly came out against the pact with Hitler.polish Revolutionary Government'."oing. On the 4 July 1940 he was arrested.great purge' whictl started as a purge of the NKVD and was then extended to was in charge State Security EZHOV.

ur. and.1%A Appendix A Appendix was also shot. He entered the Red Army as a volunteer in 191g and took an active part in the suppression of anti-communist peasant riots on the staff of the 3rd Army Special punitive Biigades. In May 1962 he was removed from office without much rumpus oi scandal.'[s there any great difference?' . In September 1939 he iought in piland as commander of the 6th Army. 1904 - 1979. From April 1943 he was deputy to Stalin for Red Army cadres. at the height of the posr-war purges Stalin appointed Kuznetsov supreme Party Controller of the Army . When it was over he himself was remoued from all his posts. and in the heat of the great purge he showed exceptional cruelty. In 1945 he played an active part in the preparations and implementation of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences and also penonally directed operations to steal American atomic technology. he was Academy Chief. mercilessly purging the . then a front. and from 1943 he was chief of the GRU.2. he quickly was Chief From July 1941 to htly 1942 Aleksei pavlovich PANFILOV of the GRU. bri'gade. Kuznetsov at work demonstrateA tmt there was no great difference between the cruel. Golikov di facto directed the forcible repatriation and destruction of more than a million people who did not want to return to the USSR. In 196i he was made Marshal of the Soviet Union. joined the Party worker. however. He Colonel-General KII ZN ETSOV. at the same time. He spent two years in prison. whose duty it was to implement those plans. but by 1950 he was ate of the Soviet Army and. Kuznetsov's reply . simultaneously. von Manstein.6. In October l94l he returned to the USSR. In 1948. From 1958 he was head of the Chief political Directoi_ Yyr:W of the Soviet Union GOLIKOV. GRU command point from Moscow to London under the guise of the Soviet military mission. Golikov agreed to be Army Controller on the side of the party. After Hitler's invasion and the loss of contact with the most important agent network he transferred the .has become proverbial.In 1942_3 the and embarked on an meteoric career.19ffi. from 1956. A 231 29. Kuznetsov had a special role to play in the organization and carrying out of the great powen' conference in Teheran and. He held this post right up to the time of Stalin's death. He was an active . In 1940 he became the chief of the GRU.230 16. Filipp lvanovich: - GRU leadership was held by Ivan lvanovich ILICHEV. On his appointment Stalin asked him whether he could be as good an intelligence officer as he had been earlier Party Controller of the Army. bloody struggle within the party and intelligence work. In 1943 he received the plans of operation 'Citadel' (the German attack near Kursk) before GeneralField Marshal E. Fedor Fedotovich: 6. After the civil war he commanded a regiment. 1nd liquidation of. Director of a Party Central Committee Department. commanding another army and.7. participant in the army purge which included the GRU. By 1937 he was lst Secretary of the Proletarski district of Moscow.l f9r.Head of the Chief Political Directorate. the leaders and those taking part in the Russian anti-communist opposition. In 1938 he was called up into the Army and appointed deputy head of the Chief Political Directorate. division and corps. assessed A country boy who came to Moscow and became a factory the situation. He was shot in I94Z. as a reward for his success in this. He was one of the cruellest but also one of the most successful chiefs of the GRU. Golikov may be said to have had the most distinguished career in the whole Soviet Army. He commanded an army. Golikov directed the post-war purge of the Army. received the rank of Colonel-General. from 1944 directed operations against the Russian Liberation Army and the r.

73. Vladimir Vasilievich: A Shtemyenko joined the Red Army as a volunteer. Sergei Matveevich: 7. Marshal of the Soviet Union ZAKHAROV.3 1.s demand.1976. In 1956. General of the Army KURASOV. erudite and merciless of all GRU chiefs. Russian Army officer who went over to the side of the communists after the revolution. He . During the war he was Chief of Staff of 7. By 1936 he had worked himself up to the command of a regiment. and from 1940 was on the General Staff. Head of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces. finally.It has been said that. and later a front. he was made chief of the GRU in February 1949. I 898 . he was returned to Moscow. joined the Red Guard in April 1917 and stormed the Winter Palace. He became chief of the GRU from April 1946. and. He is considered to have been the most energetic. and from 192[0 was deputy head of the General Staff Operations Directorate. having accepted the GRU post and learning of the fate of all his predecessors Kurasov. stripped of all his posts. His career ran smoothly. at Marshal Zhukov. He then took part in the suppression of anti-communist manifestations and held unimportant posts in the Red Army. He served on various staffs. from May 1938. Once again he was stripped of his offices. the first time at the age of forty-one. on a specious pretext.7. after the war. General of the Army SHTEMYENKO. From 195ffi1 he was Deputy Chief of the General of the Army and Chief of the General Staff from November 1948. Mawei Vasilievich: 5. demoted to Lieut-General and despatched to command the Volga military district staff. demoted to Lieut-General and sent off to command a military district staff. and in July 1937 Zakharov was Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District. and. he came out on Zhukov's side. He completed military training and two academy courses.. He retired in 1969. His rise was swift. 1972.4. In l943he was head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and one of the principal Soviet military planners and the closest to Stalin.1907 -23. During the war he was Chief of Staff of the 9th Army and later front. Promoted General of the Army. first to the post of Head of the Chief personnel Directorate at the Ministry of Defence. In June 1962 he was Chief of Staff for Land Forces. restored and he was appointed First Deputy Chief of the General Staff . He came out actively against the war. This story is corroborated by several independent sources.1897 -29. He accompanied Stalin to the Teheran conference. In October 1957 during the conspiracy against Zhukov.11. Head of the General Staff Academy. In June 1952. 8. but he Zakharov was in Petrograd in the First World War and avoided being conscripted into the Army. Shtemyenko's career was feverish as rryell as resilient. then Academy Head and. 1. In 1968 his rank of General of the Army was General Staff. the 4th Shock Army. After the war he was Commander-in-Chief of the Central group of forces in Austria. He was still in favour when he died. at the time of the squabble between Stalin and the Politburo he came out on Stalin's side and was. declined the office and transferred to a less hazardous post.2. After Stalin's death a slow decline set in. In the same year he was removed from this office and appointed Chief of the General Staff Academy. He was put forward three times for the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The great purge opened up many vacancies.232 Appendix A Appendix A 233 Soviet Army of dissidents. reinstated in his rank of General of the Army and re-appointed chief of the GRU. by Politburo decree. Deputy Chief of the General Staff.Chief of Staff of the Warsaw pact. never received the honour.

Serov became Chairman of the KGB. Under Serovls leadership. Subsequently he betrayed his leaders in Smersh and the NKGB. During the war Serov was one of of the Red Army. After Stalin's death Zakharov. He took an active part in the conspiracy against Khruschev and. Stalin objected. Ivashutin came into the Army counter-intelligence from 1931. Ivan Alekseevich. tn 1953 he was deputy chief of the GRU and one of the - *is Colonel-G eneral S HA the GRU from 1951-6 and from November December 1958. and in August 1946 he personally took part in the execution of the command of the Russian Liberation Army under Lieut-General Vlasov.r9W-. Together with Ambassador Andropov he seized the leaders of the Hungarian revolution by deceit and took part in their torture and execution. Mikhail Atelcseevich waschief of 1957 to conspirators against Beria. In October 1957 a struggle broke out between the pbfitburo and Marshal Zhukov.the Units. General of the Army IVASHLITIN. Zakharov was fully on the side of the Politburo and for this he was immediately appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forcei in Germany. In 1963 he was dismissed. During the war he held leading posts in Smersh. ln 1962 he was dismissed and quietly liquidated.s fall continued. LI N. but in May 1953 he was appointed Commander of the Leningrad Military District and was able to hold on to this post. after the successful coup d'etai reappointed Chief of the General Staff where he served up to September lW . He ' deserted Abakumov's group for that of Beria and betrayed him (as did General Ivashutin the present GRU leader). The Chief of the General Staff Shtemyenko. After the fall of Beria. Serov's was the dirtiest career in the history of the GRU. In December 1958 Serov became chief of the GRU. In June 1952 a fierce struggle broke out about convening the 19th party Congress. It was the only period when GRU officers voluntarily made contact with Western services and gave them much more valuable information than they took from them. In 1959 he was made Marshal of the Soviet enion. at the time of the purges 5. going over in time to the camp of the victorious groups. of the GRU in January 1949. peter lvanovitch: An of the GRU he managed not only to survive but also to transfer to work in the NKVD . The years when Serov was chief of the GRU were also the most unproductive in its history. On l2June 1937 he appeared in the capacity of executioner of Marshal Tukhachevski and 9ffic11of military intelligence. He took part in the pursuit and liquidation of the inhabitants of Fstonia. He displayed a high degree of personal sadiim.. The Politburo insisted. Drulu exists as to his personal involvement in the murder of the Polish officers in Katyn.9. In 194/-5 he was chief of Smersh on the 3rd Ukrainian Front and in that capacity waged a ferocious struggle against the Ukrainian insurgent army and played an active role in the establishment of communist order in .practically up to the time of his death. supported Stalin and were dismissed from their posts. General of the Army SEROV. Amongst all.234 became chief Appendix A the leaders Appendix A 235 and Chief of the General Staff in 1960. Latvia and Lithuania in 1940 and in lS!17. of Smenh. A volunteer in the punitive formations of the Special purpose other leading figures protagonists of the terror he distinguished himself as the most fervent exponent of 'scenes or a massive scale. and the Chief of the GRU Zakharov. Even at this time [vashutin had powerful enemies in the NKGB. corruption in GRU attained unbelievable proportions. As an exKGB and Smersh officer he had many enemies in the GRU.

236 Appendk A Bulgaria. However.GRU. Kir Gavrilovich: GRU representative in the Party Central Committee. Col-General PAVLOV. G. Ivashutin deferrded the interests of the Army with more vigour than any of his predecessors and. The first pseudonym is also used in connection with all military intelligence. At Beria's downfall he went over to the Serov faction and was appointed head of the KGB 3rd Chief Directorate. After Andropov. head of the Military Diplomatic Academy. It was at this time that he first met Brezhnev.General LEMZENKO. ties with the KGB. V.: deputy chief of GRU. Col-General IZOTOV. and in all subsequent activities the two men always supported each other. Col-General SIDOROV.: head of GRU Political . Official pseudonyms'Tovarishch Mikhailov'. V. the chairman of the Military Industrial Complex Smirnov as well as Marshals Ustinov and Ogarkov.'Dyadya Petya'.s coming to power Ivashutin held on to his post in view of powerfui support within the Army. Admiral BEKRENEV: deputy chief of GRU. At the end of the war Ivashutin took part in the forcible-repatriation of Soviet citizens who did not want to return to the Soviet Union. Arkady Vasilievich: deputy chief of GRU. enjoyed unlimited support from the first deputy chairman of the Council of Minisiers. He also played a special part in the liquidation of soldiers and officers of the Russian Liberation Army. I. Aleksandr Grigorevich: first deputy chief of GRU. Head of GRU. therefore. Jn this position he had a number of very serious confrontations with the KGB and personally with Andropov. On Brezhnev's recommendation in 1963. Y. After the disbandment of Smersh he managed to outlive its other leaders by a timely transfer out of the Abakumov faction into that of Beria. 'Papa Rimski'. Department. I. He then took part in the arrest and liquidation of Serov. in spite of hi past Appendix B The GRU High Command and Leading GRU Offi.: head of GRU Personnel Directorate. Army General IVASHUTIN.'Yugoslavia and Hungary. S. Col-General ZOTOV.cers The following list gives names of the most prominent senior GRU officers with their official titles where possible. head of lnformation. Col. This is followed by an alphabetical list of some of the known operational officers workirtg under cover around the world. Ivashutin was appointed chief of the. Lieutenant-G enerals and Vice Admirals (ap p roximately 20 ) Lt-General DOLIN. I. Col-General MESHCHERYAKOV. Petr Ivanovich: deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.



Appendix B
Maj -General GONCHAROV, Gennadi Grigorevich.


Lt-General GURENKO, Vyacheslav Tikhonovich: head of the Illegals Training Centre. Lt-General Aviation SHATALOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich: GRU representative at the Cosmonaut Training

Lt-General KOLODYAZHNY, Boris Gavrilovich: GRU
deputy chief for Internal Security.

Lt-General MILSTEIN, Moshe: GRU deputy chief for Dis-

information. A former illegal and author of top secret manual Honourable Service. Codename 'Tovarishch M', 'Mikhail M.'.

Maj-General KHOMYAKOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Rear Admiral KOZLOV, Andrei Nikolaevich. Maj-General MIKHAILOV, Boris Nikolaevich. Maj-General ZIMIN, Valentin Yakovlevich. Maj-General ANDRYANOPV, Y.: Spetsnaz Maj-General Aviation MIKRYUKOV, L. Maj-General GLAZUNOV, N.
Rear Admiral SMIRNOV, M.

Lt-General KOSTIN

P. T.: chief of GRU

Leading GRU Oficers



Lt-General Engineer PALIY




ABRAMOV, Vladimir Mikhailovich BAYLIN, Madimir Ivanovich
BELOUSOV, Mikolai Mikhailovich BELOUSOV, Konstantin Nikolaevich

GRU 6th

Directorate. Lt-General GONTAR: dief of GRU 7th Directorate. Lt-General DRACHEV t. M.

Lt-General KOZLOV
Directorate. Lt-Generdl BERKUTOV,

M-: Chief of GRU 1lth


: Information Service.

Vice Admiral ROZHKO, Gennadi Aleksandrovich. Major-Generals and Rear Admirals (approximately 125) Maj-General. Aviation CHIZHOV, Mikhail Terentyevich. Rear Admiral KALININ, Valeri Petrovich.

BLINOV, Boris Afanasyevich BARCHUGOV BORISOV, Gennadi Alekseevich BORODIN, Viktor Mikhailovich BUDENNY BOROVINSKI, Petr Fedorovich BUBNOV, Nikolai lvanovich BUTAKOV, Ilya Petrovich DEMIN, Mikhail Alekseevich



Maj-General Aviation KUCHUMOV, Aleksandr Mikhailovich.

DORONKIN, Kirill Sergeevich EGOROV, Anatoli Egorovich

Maj-General SHITOV. Rear-Admiral KLYUZOV, Serafim Timofeevich. Maj-Ceneral BARANOV, Aleksandr Vasilievich. Maj-General LYALIN, Mikhail Ammosovich.

Maj-General BEPPAEV S. U.: Chief Group Soviet Forces in Germany.

of Intelligence of

Maj-General Artillery LYUBIMOV, Viktor Andreevich.

ERMAKOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich ERSHOV, Yuri Alekseevich EVDOKIMOV, Sergei Vasilevich FEKLENKO, Vladimir Nikolaevich FILATOV, Anatoli FILIPPOV, Anatoli Vasilevich GENERALOV, Vsevolod Nikolaevich GERASIMOV



Appendix B


KAPALKIN, Sergei Vasilevich KASHEVAROV, Evgeni Mikhailovich KOZYPITSKI, Gleb Sergeevich LOVCHIKOV, Vasili Dmitrievich LAVROV, Valeri Alecseevich LEMEKHOV, Dmitri Aleksandrovich LOBANOV, Vitali Ilich LOGINOV, Igor Konstantinovich MOROZOV, Ivan Yakovlevich MYAKISHEV, Aleksei Nikolaevich NEDOZOROV; Valentin Viktorovich NOSKOV Nikolai Stepanovich
OSIPOV, Oleg Aleksandrovich PAVLENKO, Yuri Kuzmich PETROV, Nikolai Kirillovich PIVOBAROV, Boris Alekseevich ' POPOV, Gennadi Fedorovich POTAPENKO, Leonid Terentyevich POTSELUEV, Evgeni Aleksandrovich

SUVOROV, Georgi Bbrisovich

UMNOV, Valentin Aleksandrovich VETROV, Yuri Pavlovich VILKOV, Boris Nikolaevich VINOGRADOV, Feliks Vasilevich VOLNOV, Vladimir Grigorevich VOLOKITIN, Vladimir Ivanovich VOTRIN, Sergei Ivanovich VYBORNOV, Ivan Yakovlevich YAKUSHEV, Ivan Ivanovich YURASOV, Viktor Vladimirovich ZHELANNOV, Vladimir Mikhailovich ZHEREBTSON, Aleksandr Vasilevich ZHERNOV, l,eonid Andreevich ZHURAWEV, Ivan Mikhailovich ZOT OV, Viktor Nikolaevich

PUfiLIN, Mikhail Semenovich RATNIKOV, Valentin Mikhailovich RADIONOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich
ROMANOV, Anatoli Aleksandrovich

RUBANOV, Aleksandr Nikolaevich SALEKHOV, Yuri Nikolaevich SAVIN, Viktor Grigorevich SELUNSKI, Valentin Ivanovich
SEMENOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich SERGEEV, Yuri Pavlovich SHEPELEV, Viktor Petrovich SHIPOV, Madilen Nikolaevich SOKOLOV, Viktor Aleksandrovich

STRELBITSKI, Vladimir Vasilevich STUDENIKIN, Ivan Yakovlevich SUKHAREV, Georgi Nikolaevich

Aitpendix C


Appendix C Some Case Hislories of GRU Activities

of money for documents from his place of work. He

also sought to find out details about othbr staff at the organization

where the Frenchman worked. Kulik was arrestid at the moment when he was about to receive from the Frenchman
a document about a French weapon.

Rather than sprinkling the text with examples t have put together a representative pample of GRU officers uncovered in the course oI operations abroad, as reported in the press. The number of GRU officers caught and expelled and the nature of their activities is indicative of the power and scale . of rhe GRU.
Canada and the United States

In February 1980 the Soviet Consul and No. 2 in Marseilles
was withdrawn. He had been detained by the French authori-

the Bouches du Rhdne contains many installations and
objects of defence interest. Travkov was officially concerned with 'scientific subjects connected with the port and airport,, and these interests enabled him to meet people involvid in the aeronautical field and to visit firms and installations. Travkov obtained copies of files on staff working on defence contracts and used the details thus revealed to build up a

ties between Toulon and Marseilles witli plans of the Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft in his briefcase. They had just been handed to him by an agent. Travkov had arrived in 1977. The area of Marseilles and

In June 1980 the Canadians


that they


jan and the chauffeur Sokolov. The case involved an
unnamed individual employed in a sensitive position in the

requested the withdrawal of three Soviet officials from the Embassy, Captain lgor A. Bardeev, Colonel E. I. Aleksan-

USA, who had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy and
been given the task of obtaining information. Soviet officials

had maintained clandestine contact with the American citizen over a period of some months. France

network of informers. Four Frenchmen were taken into custody at the time of Travkov,s arrest. Travkov had also been interested in the twin-jet Mirage 4000 which used the
same engine as the 2000.

In October 1979 the Naval and Air Attachd of the Soviet Embassy in France, Vladimii Kulik, was expelled from the country. He was an officer of the GRU working in French military circles and had been in contact with firms specializing in military supplies. 1979, at a reception in another emba$sy, he had met by chance a young Frenchman


The Soviet Press Attachd declared the French action a 'provocation by the police' but the documents were, of course, genuine. A few days later Frolov, himself a KGB officer, was required to leave France too. He had been in Marseilles for two years and had earlier had a posting to Paris. His job, like Travkov's had given him opportunitiei to meet all sorts of people and he had made the most of it. Both Travkov and Frolov were personable, charming
individuals who made many friends Great Britain

employed in the armaments department of an important organization who was carrying out studies on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Kulik sought to maintain contact with the Frenchman, and in due course offered him a large sum

Anatoliy Pavlovich Zntov, the Soviet Naval Attach6 in London, was expelled in December l9B2 after trying to set

Vasiliy Fedorin and Vladimir Tertishnikov were accused of trying to obtain information on the supply of US military materials to Spain and on Spanish weapons manufacturen.seller' was a member of the Spanish Secret Services who purported to be a member of a Spanish firm. was arrested in Israel. during the Falklands campaign. He had been an agent of the GRU for some ten years. accused ofespionage for the Soviet Llnion. Yukihisa Miyanaga was arrested in Tokyo in January 1980. Director of Aeroflot in Madrid. He was a GRU agent whose case officer at the time of his arrest was Colonel Yuriy N. from 1fti8 to 1970. The Spanish security authorities themselves claimed that Churanov was a member of the GRU May -1982 the Aeroflot Director in Spain was again expelled for spying. who was not a diplomat.244 Appendix C Appendix C in the north of 245 up a network of agents to gather information about weapons systems and electronic hardware used by the Royal Navy Norway. on one occasion. He was very popular with staff and pilots at Madrid airport where he had shown interest in radio frequencies and the security regulations at the airport./technical nature including material classified as Top Secret. His case was part of another_expulsion of six officials who had already left. He was Military Attach6 at the Embassy in Oslo. Sweden 1979 Stig Bergling. The . Igor Ivanovich Zashchirinsky served in Norway from 1974 to l9l7 as representative at the Soviet Trade Delegation of a number of Soviet import/export organizations. He too was declared persora non grata on28 January (ileg Churanov. Spain lapan A retired Japanese major-general. was arrested in 1970 on suspicion of intelligence activity and finally expelled from Norway for security reasons in September 1970. Churanov was an engineer who had been Aeroflot representative in Canada before coming to Spain. His interests had . In January 1969 he had begun service with the Police Board. Nonuay Valeriy Moiseevich Mesropov served in Norway as an engineer with a Russian firm in Drammen. Koslov. as a representative of Stankoimport.also extended to the Royal Navy's nuclear submarines. Mesropov. including particular ciphers for use with radio. to get a Sphnish pilot to introduce him into the American airport at Tarrejon. Miyanaga had been recruited as an agent in 1974 by one of Koslov's predecessors.- and had visited a military area Norway. Military and Air Attach6 at the Soviet Embassy. a Swedish police inspector and officer. : In June 1983 Lt-Colonel Zagrebnev was expelled from . He was engaged on clandesiine operations to obtain information and products of a scientific. where he had attempted to bribe a Norwegian officer to hand over secret information. He was equipped with and instructed in various means of clandestine communication. reserv_e In In March 1977. It was alleged that Churanov had bought plans of certain aviation electronic equipment. and from 1971-5 was given leave of absence to serve in the Defence Ministry and to do duty with the UN. was arrested in February 1980. He had also tried. this time with another official. Miyanaga and two other offioers of the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force were subsequently sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for passing military secrets to the GRU.

170 emergency meetings 157-8 non-personal 155. becomes first head of GRU 25 establishes GRU opposition to of army and Tcheka}G7 Atomic bomb Soviet intelligence and 93. t76 directs liquidation of NKVD 'illegals'40 . 141 148-54 Agent work in practice 167 acquisition of secrets l7!5 organization of agent groups Beria.47 executed 48 t7t-2 segregation of agents from embassies Berzin.22fr t26-7 illegals' 147-8 problem of 'walk-in' volunteers methods l1rt6. 159 .72 APN 12. He kept in touch with his case officers in a number of countries.16&70 3!40 stealing military hardware. and also made use of micro-dots. He was equipped with radio to receive messages from the GRU. 48 Abwehr Aeroflot training and control of independent agents 170 14 GRU predomi nance in 1224 Agent communications alternative meetings l5G7 brush contacts 158 damaged by 155 transport of heavy equipment 1754 use of diplomatic mail 175 use of scfttcftr'.246 Appendix C Bergling had access to information about security police personnel and counter-espionage organizations. Simon lvanovich 25-6. having been trained in East Berlin. Index Abakumov 47.124 Aralov. Yuri7l. Lavrenti 46. 174. and about defence establishments and Swedish defence plans. 1424 main duty of GRU officers Andropov. films 170 GRU defections dead-letter boxes 161-5. particularly in the Middle East. Yan Karlovich 22G7 ' deceptions as head of GRU 167. 13}41 candidates for recruitment 14041 crash approach 141-2 Amsterdam undercover residencies 128. lZ9 exhibition recruitment 144.7 for operational intetligence 187-9 gradual ap_Droach 141. 69.personal 155-6 Agents agent recruiters 133 couriers 134-5 defined 131 documentation agents 133-4 executive agents 132-3 friends of Soviet Union l3G8 groups of 171-2 head agents 131-2 legalisers 133 safe address owners 135 safe house oi flat owners 135 sources 132 radio 15!61 routine meetings 156 schtchit films l7O secret rendezvous signals l6i{ l5&9 Agent recruiting 35-{.

103 undercover residency 128 Hamburg abandoned dead-letter box in 162 Higher Military Naval School of Radio Electronics 203 Hitler. 230 becomes head of 44 3}. embarrassed over German communist agents 3G7. SWW 167-8. 152. 25. T.242-5 passim general opposition to army and 5&9 t867 Gestapo 14.9. the l0l. 1z16 Council of Ministers 11. 204 rule about appointment of head 27. 8t-9 passim. 83-4. 186 recruitment of US sergeant as' Soviet agent in 149-50 Soviet intelligence infiltration eligibility for 2lll4 enmity for KGB 69-72 relation with military indusrial commission foreign expulsions of officers 221.90. SWW 168 information command point training 20!13 'unit 44388' classification 13-14.lO becomes head ofboth GRU and NKVD 42 . 60 use of American electronics 90 use of specialists 89 Guryenko.79.36-40 passim 69-70. ix. Marshal Filipp Ivanovich KGB2G7 High Command23T-9 history of:. shoots German agents at behest of Gestapo 38. SWW . penetrates German and Allied staffs.222. Wst-1927 tt2-13 plans'Great Terror'of 1930s 39 Cherepovetski Higher Military Engineering School for Communications 203. 9L6. Nikolai lvanovich 22&9 becomes head of GRU . 140 249 military role 67 military+echnological role 67 opposition to recruiting sons of officers 207-8 privileges of officers 21.4 GRU. James 68 Central Committee of CPSU 11. 85 organizational units 75.77 use of independent agents 170 GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of General StafQ 24y4 Deadletter boxes 16l-6. l94l Gosplan 59 4U &7. Dzerzhinsky 23 170 Ezhov.203. late 1930s 4041.205 control of press 124 control of Soviet embassies Geneva undercover residencies 129 General Staff Academy 203. purges NKVD overseas. Igor 155 Hague. 144 agent legalisers 133 .-7 system of recruitment and running of agents established 35 CIA 90 Comintern 28. Lt-Gen. tronid 50. 220 command point 74.54.i Communist Party of SU 36.14 purge of NKVD by.foundation 13. purged by Lenin. forms diversionary elements in SWW '16. t99. V. early 1930s 50. West GRU residencies in 149. 59 Great Britain expulsion of Soviet spies 222.28n.248 purged 41-2 Brezhnev. USS 59 Germany.14-5 restores GRU's foreign subordinate organizations 51-5 support services 9zl-. 91 Canada Index Frunze Military Academy 181.75. late 1930s anonymity of fi-62 8H & purged 42 .69 safety measure of producing 'grey' intelligence 90-91 Scientific Research Institute 170 'shopping list' for secrets. sets up receiving centre in Sweden. 66-7 'Intelligence Summary' 88 interests compared with KGB's 66-8 leading officers 239-41 military attach6s as officers of 124-6 supplies Soviet Union with German planes 37-8 Holland division of undercover residencies in 128 expulsion of Soviet spy 272 expulsion of Soviet spies222. Gusenko.205 George Washington. agents abroad in 1920s 32.l4. 192o 32. 1940 43 made commander of 10th Army organizes return of unwilling Russians after SWW. 32. 242-3 GRU activity in2A-3 brief 25 control of operational intelligence 171. destruction of foreign intelligence network. early failures and successes 2F30. France anti-Semitism in choice of officers 213 'basic function 454.205 deceived by American major over'atomic' shell 150-54 directorates and directions 7&-82. 'strategic' and 'operational' divisions in SWW 45. 82. 151. creation of first agent network 27-8. Pres. ts3. 94. 177 discovers US work on atomic bomb 92-3. GRU activity in24!4 'Great Terror'of 1930s 3942 Grechko. ll9.48.41 recruitment of agents by 36 Committee of Information (KI) network. 172. 137.37. 114. 179 military-economic role 67 military-political role 67 'Illegals' 37 . 105. ls9l cosmic or space intelligence 52.oncorde 59. 89. destroyed by purges. Marshal 64 GRU Centre 73-7. 77 ranks in 52. Adolf . 193F6 39q0.38 Golikov.t-16 processing organs 8!93 procuremcnt organs 7&{2 expulsion of Soviet spies222. 242 '7-aia'residency 45 Carter. 65 blossoming 33-4.49 Political Department 18 role in ruling triumvirate 17-19 C. Index t82. 19.

2l2 sub-faculties 210 Military district intelligence services GRU. 69-72 faculties 210-l I location 209 organization 210 NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) 10. 186 Ministry of State Security. 91 reveals past Soviet crimes 6l Kulikov. 187 netwoik on W. 88 Naval Academy 181. 13.t6 Montreal 12 Intelligence directorates 52-3.203 Ilichev.61. 199 lFll. 10. Marshal 64 Kruschev. 11. ?. Nikita 49'.l8. Georgi 39 Muravev. 212-13 of. 1920 32 permits 214 Mrachkovslii. 203.2M Military College of Supreme NATO 88. 60. 106 suitable type of employment for 108-10 2M. 89 lll.61 lti3.35 GRU. 103. Gen. I. 184 officers' limited knowledge of organization 189-90 recruiting methods 187-8 Soviet foreign coverage 184-7 tactical reconnaissance contlol 'Aquarium'73 Gogol Boulevard 49 Institute of Cosmic Biology 73 Khodinka field 73 Narodnogo Opolchenia Street 2@ restrictions on residence 2N Panfilov. 87. Marshal 64 training 10}{ Training Centre 101. Sandor 28 Ramm. U.207. Otto 12.203 Pravda 12. 129 enmity for GRU 47-50. Jacob espionage activities 30 Malenkov.24. Germany 186 role in ruling triunrvirate 17-19 safety measure of supplying 'grey' intelligence 9G91 sons of officers welcomed in tu8 post-graduate school 213 secrecy about mF9. 230 Paris undercover residency 129 Peking Intourist as branch 23.124 Japan GRU. 49. I.2s0 ages Index of l(b foreign expulsion of officers 222 Index 'illegal'network 101 251 overseas organs purged by agent recruiting methods 147-8 control of lUL.203 as'military unit 35576' 208 courses 212-13 Soviet information directorate concerned with 86. defined 101 ll0 interests compared with GRU's cover stories 107-8 deputy resident for 114-15 husband and wife 104-5 residencies 35. F. xiii. late Norway 4l destroyed in late 1930s purges 41-2 Military industrial commission 5G9 passim expulsion of Soviet spies 244 GRU activity in2.l4 OBHSS (fraud squad) 12 selection 103 settling abroad 107 stages of journey to foreign Military Institute of Foreign Languages 183. 7&*82. Corps Commander 4l Rabkhin (People's Control) 12.12. secret of power GRU activity in 244 Kashierski Electric Power Station 38 Marseilles undercover residencies 129 Military Academy 205. V. I. 72.65 basic function 66.22 impossibility of recruiting agents in 217 Penkovsky. 110. M.39. A. E8 t2. 86. s9. Karl 28 . Oleg 155 Politburo. 58..124 Proskurov. M.W7 Military Signals Academy 203 exclusivity oil OGPU 34 Soviet'l. 231 Information Institute 85. V. I. army and destroys 32-3. 178 duplication amorig 87 foreign areas covered by 184-{ navy 17&9 support services 94-5 Kurasov.178. 61. 205 Konyev. Petr Ivanovich 71.2M Special Dilartment 18 undercover residencies 129 Kiev Higher Military Command School 203.2t9 l8l-3. l7O. 13 Covt223 Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army 182. Operational intelligence 177 army 177-8. 25 of KGB 124 Ivashutin.31. A.F. 28 Kuznetsov. Col-Gen. r93H 39-40 1930s purges.12. 229 KGB (Ministry of State Security) 9. Gen.32.. 13. P. xii.55.226 37. 172 military Institute for training 2M iretwork in Turkey 186.'233 Kusinien. t4.8*9 passim. Ministry of Defence 56. 62. diversionary elements in SWW 46 Regiment 182 Rado. 199. Gen.43. 184.91 allows formation of GRU 24. 189 navy 179*81. undercover residencies 129 Moscow co-ordination of l9O-91 difficulty of defection. Col. 231-2 Lenin x. 112 control of consulates 122 embassy guards 121 New York undercover residencies Putna. 70. V.2354 becomes head of GRU 50 policy of 'divide and rule' exemplified 11-13 purges Izvestia 12.ocomotive Report' on 86 destination 105. M. 169. 13 Radio Intelligence \egiment 182 Radio-Technical Intelligence Nikonov.30. A. 177 amiy 177.m7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 112. see KGB Ministry of the Interior Molotov. tst.

18H agent intelligence control 181 departments of 53 electronic intelligence control 182 expulsion of Soviet spies 245 Directorate 95 passports and documents 95-6 Personnel Directorate 94-5 GRU activity in 245 Spanish Civil War.l0 International Brigades 41 Spetsnaz units 184 Political Department 94 Sweden GRU activity in?/. 210-tt Stalin.24 . 18.202 reconnaissance companies 200. Josef 10. 20/J. Ivan Alekseevich 23+5 becomes head of GRU 50 Serpukhovski Higher Command Engineering School 2O4 Shalin. 177. A. 169 33-4 post-1945 political manoeuvrings 4G8 press 12. 195248 Stigga. 195.151 Shkiriatov 39 Shtemyenko. Index Index General Staff liquidated. 1919 26-7 post-SWW attempts to weaken army and KGB 4G7 struggle with Politburo. Tank Warfare Academy 212 Tass 12. 54. 193 development 22 directed against Turkey 187 directed against W. 205.6 intelligence 83-4. passim 91. Oskar Ansovich 226 organization 52. 178 role in ruling triumvirate 17-19 state of readiness 54 strength on land 202 Soviet Arm/ Academy. I. 42. late 1930s 32-3 hampered by lack of intelligence in Russo-Finnish post-1927 military development 253 20['2A sabotage companies 54 See abo Tactical reconnaissance 'Red Eye'missile 59 'Red Orchestra' organization 168. Lron 31.91-2 death.205-4 Safe address 135-6 Safe house or flat 135 SALT talks 87 War. 33 'sleeping'agents l9l staffcompanies 195-6 training schools 203. 223 Rikov.l{) Sorge. 96 OperationaUTechnicat Satellite countries military intelligence seryices 55 military subordination to Soviet Union 63-5 Second Kharkov Higher .93 blindness to German invasion first period of2034 getting into Military Academy plans. see : Support services Administrative/Technical Directorate 95 archives 96-7 ciphering 96 Communications Directorate totalitarian misuse of intelligence 90-92 Space programme 9fr Military-Diplomatic in parallel with American 89 Spain finance 70. 182 GRU 48 disgraced 195248 made Chief of Staff of Warsaw Pact 64 survivability 49. 1920 16 concentration on military expenditure 57-8 duplication of government organs I l-14 establishment of organs of enforcement 9-10 gold supplies for espionage 29.1939-40 42 judgement of seniority in 75 'Military Opposition' defeated. 203 Serov. 112.17&-9 Tokyo easy to recruit agents in 217-18 :Irade Representation GRU and KGB officers in 124 Training 203 educational institutions 203-14 Slutski. 2ot. l!). 50 of Army Staff 183 of intelligence directorates 52-3 photographic analysis in 197-8 residency guards 121 sabotage role 193. 21-2 development of fronts 21-2 early intelligence development 20-25 fronts become military districts. 32 tries to restore army intelligence Hitler 38 23. Sergei Matveevich m. 183 Spetsnaz control 182 Technical Facilities Group 183 Soviet merchant navy GRU predominance in 124 Soviet navy and fleets 52 cosmic intelligence department 179 brigades 193. .39.1941 43.44. 54. 10 Russo-Finnish War 1939-40 42 Ryazan Higher Parachute School 203. Military Academy of the Soviet Army Soviet army intelligence directorates 177-8. A.252 Reconnaissance battalions 54. Gen.193 of army intelligence departments 53. Gen. M.-Gen.X2-3 becomes head of t'u6-7. Col. 124. Germany Tactical reconnaissance Z)G2 control of 200 deep reconnaissance 201 electronic reconnaissance companies 201 reconnaissance battalions 54. 109 Soviet Army lcavalry of special assignments' Soviet Union 'clean'diplomats 130 l1l. 178-81 organization 53. 195.43. 1953 48 hands German communists to zm-s Trotsky.124 racialism in 215 restrictions on moving house 214 ruling triumvirate 17-19 shortage of grain 176.234 information control 182 Intelligence Department of Army Staff 183 Interpreters' Group 183 reconnaissance control 181.2A2. l13.S-$ Switzerland 'Dora' residency 45 Aviation and Engineering School 183.195 information collection role 196 naval brigades 182. 196 department controlling 182 detachments l9l. Richard 28.90.

227-8 Uritski.franhar to offi cer ttilt8. Zakharov. den.95 Uboreevich. 40.187 v'.254 Index Unshlikht. Marshal Zhdanov 39 o+ llY20 125. "p. 219-20 security guards 121 staff l 12. 13. 39.y... S. staff.141. Marshal 46 becomes Minister of Defence 49 increased power of army under 49 removed for'bonapartism' 49-50 To order directhom and fill in the order . Tank ZOa 35.'-11.2334 Zhukov.86. 1lO.5. Grevillel4rynne The Man from Odessa f.127 120 J:g:-"L': 1l ilfll.1919 27 KimPhilby My Silent War Nigel ltrect MIS (illustrated) 82. t26. DC dead-letter box exposed by squirrels 163-4 of l2&-9 operational officers 115-16. 126 operationat technicat group 168-9 pint-sww in Allied c-ounthes radiohipher .u"n. 6t. Front intelligence f.?l.ffil. 1.i].^.pj:ili:1-t^t Titlt"ry intelligence units 22 plrges GRU' 1920 3l-2 shoots E.2:so ! Wanaw Pact 63.t: voysnrnsKr Jv 1'^zz lll_l4.l. ulyanov Guards Higher Command Sctrdbl Undercover residencies 4l 121-5 125-6 going'illegal'in emergency 172-3 hierarchy in 125-6 'illegal' 35.T*k-11. Y:fitl"lbc"".169.-l:itt.39.1.172 covei duties of staff deputy residents 11rt-15. example ofl27-B occasional division co-optedpersonnell2g-30 . T.Marshal40 Tupolev TU144 ('Concordski') copies from Concorde 146 crashes at k Bourget 7l Turkey expulsion of Soviet spy 221 The best in true life espionage available Panther Books Richard Iteacon A History of British Seoet Service 62 in USA GRU activity in 242 (illustrated) SZ.l?l:^22 LutTtft'.41 Tukhachevski. 1 radlo monitoring station officers M. 64 Washington.55 :[:llll'ilil."rf.'.l7.14 technical personnel l2O-21 technical services (TS) officer 1l&19 resident in 114-15..SS o tr D soviet intetligen"" in'n1tiifron .28.

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