Viktor Suvorov is in his mid-thirties and now lives in the and West with his family. He was a Soviet army officer' the Soviet served in the GRU; he tann the world outside was Union for the first time in 1968 when Czechoslovakia to protect his invaded. He writes under a pseudonym

relations and friends who remain in the Soviet Union' He is the author of. The Liberators, described by Vladimir go[ou.Ly 'brilliant . . . this unique document' and by

Edward Crankshaw as 'unique and invaluable'' His book iirii, tn Soviet Army has alio been published iri paperback

I ;;

'This important book reveals the system by which "the tttiting force of world revolution'? is organized ' ' ' a dire
warning to the West'
Publishers WeeklY


that Soviet 'Worrying for the West, particularly his message graduated nuclear deterrence' io not believe in


ffid very Pertinent reading'
lrlsh Times


'Much useful information'
Edward Crankshaw

rA revealing anatomy of the Sovigt army'
Elrmingham Post

By the same author
The Liberators Inside the Soviet Army


Soviet MilitatY


A Division of the Collins Publishing Group


No part of this publication may be reproduced. re-sold. photocopying. or transmitted. be lent. Glasgow SetinTimes AII rights reserved. hired out or otherwise circulated without. stored in a retrieval system. or by any meins.To the memory of Oleg Vladimirovich Grafton Books A Division of the Collins publishing Group 8 Grafton Street. London W1X3LA Published by Grafton Books 19g6 PenkovskY Reprinted 1986 fint pub-lishedin Great Britain by Hamish Hamilton Ltd 1984 @ 1984 by Copyright Viktor Suvorov ISBN 0-58ffi5962 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Collins. by way of trade or otherwise. without the prior permission of the publishers This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not.- . electronic.the publisher's priorconsent in any form of bindingorcovei other.than that in which it is published and without a similar conditior including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. recordinc or otherwise. in any form. mechanical.

8 9 The Triumvirate 17 History The PYramid The GnU anO the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) But WhY Is Nothing Known About It? The GRU and the 'Younger Brothers' The GRU and the KGB The Centre The Procurement Organs N 51 56 60 63 ffi 73 . t Illegals t 2 The Undercover ResidencY 3 Agents 4 Agent Recruiting 5 Agent Communications 6 The Practice of Agent Work 7 OPerational Intelligence 8 TacticalReconnaissance 9 The Training and Privileges of Personnel 101 111 131 139 155 167 t77 2N 203 ftu.Contents Introduction PART ONE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 .78 83 85 10 Fleet Intelligence '11 The GRU Processing 12 Support Services PART TWO organs 94 .

ilt"""b.A in the book many details of technical .ase (and the desire to understand I .f.t.a to record thai the organs of enforcement of December State were not created until the nineteenth igii. S. was written in order to confirm this simple facl' rr conceived as an instructional manual for a --ilitL*t *"::"gyi liii' its pathology as well as its symptoms' For one of their very first chosen myths..'Ji*"ut.-.1 der to inderstind a Oi.e excision li'fi *tiJt-i" :ili . nothing ..i"..d. u *i0"..of the monstrous secret organization without pi"*J"r. Subsequently public'. mit falsehood was circulated in order to prove that mri.iuitr.long..ough I may apologize.GRU Officers Only Appendix A: kaders of Soviet Military lntelligence Appendix B: The GRU High Command and Leading GRU Officers 223 225 237 242 247 Introduction Appendix C: Some Case Histories of GRU Activities Index the world There is but one opinion as to which country in service' Withpossesses the most powerful secret intelligence lrirfi" slightest doubt that country is the Soviet Union' and the name.'. implies a desire to fight against i0' one must know of the General Staff. of certain definitions and technical . is also the Soviet Union''and the oiiunirution itself iJcalled the Chief Intelligence Directorate At first it was by r clrclg of sPEutauDrs' euurwYsv'rrJ it was revised :tiiit naffOw .rge as ii may seem' the country to which this .d. in the history of mankind is the KGB' But on the as to which country possesses.Even a"TllHl i''... the second most q.d: fYi:io' il. ihe opinions of specialists 'OnLi. to be done' In 'i . .iJ" or Conclusion Contents 217 For. the communists of the new O". which may sometimes make for difficult reading. in the first forty'one days of its existence' rl ffi . there-is.r..iil wtrictr woutd be of little interest'.utui". powerful secret organization. ii"t"-t"...t power.iO.

.*porlO. days which shook the. But we are not talking here just about Ministers and First Secretaries.10 Introduction Security but in O.n men have le-a-!-ershin. of production of children's toys. mass executions exisred-frgf dictatorship in its history. joint resolution on raising the quality and widening the range- Stalin. later publicly admitted). Why does the most powerful .rtioyinf *iote flocks of the 1. At all lower levels the same procedure is to be observed.r9: "j most influential State Security officers? furrr. If one visits any iegional committee of the Party and then the Regional Executive Committee one i5 struck by the fact that two separate organizations having almost identical structures and Each system of governing the State is duplicated and AeaAing idintical problems nevertheless take completely contradictory decisions. and ever since the communists have continued faithfully to carry out the instructions of the great founder of the first proletarian state. At these levels of course.nunugJ-to write into the history. Oigun.rim'i. or the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Executive Committee.h. I have in front of me as I write the last .i.uf them so unceremoniously.nol going to guess about the futures of three still [. is valid.' Council of Ministen.ppoirred its leaders. but the principle remains that no separate and ffi . lies the secret of this limitless power of the politburo? .world. in order to rule.' comrade The paradox of this endless bloody orgy . we will find that any one g{them.ail-powlrfur peilonalities and the organizations headed by them? How ii it ttrat ttre politburo has practically no difficulties in displacinfnot onty Comrade Rikov was later shot.*in .is Pry.of this Soviet po*"r. It boils down to the principle: 'divide and rule'.'papers for those ffr. and subsequent th" fi. s'ecreuy destroyed by members of the Soviet government f^ *u. If we look at the really important decisions of i the Soviet h. ieuaers to be torn to pieces? How is the politburi aUte to J. to take an independent decision on such an important matter. Seven comradei were stot oi hanged. Rikov. the first infantile wail. It is sufficient Introduction tl tl:].. In the organization in the world so easily and friely give up ii. The fare of tne Aeputy neaos nas violent. O. The falsehood is easily . but not before he irad . death oi . 'I t:: )' such crucial problems as the quality of children's toys are not decided. NKVO. I. For example. The method is an old one and has been used successfully for thousands of years. Neither the Council of Ministers of the gigantic State structure nor the Central Committee of the ruling Party is able. clearly not experiencing the slightest fear these seemingty.. the first minute. Soviet power itself is duplicated.. have occupie{ 1::1i yT been equally the post. would seem to be this.. Lenin divided everything in Russia that was capable of being divided. even after the People's Commissariat for Internal affairs wtrich sounds less innocuous in its abbreviation.. rit.*. "ily^:l {1" ioint sessions of the Central Committee of the Party and the f'... could dispense with the mass executions so familiar to other revolutions. are. fi. ffrut first night.would oeen appomted to the post of Head of the Organg of which three were hounded out of the Soviei-government with ignominy. reduplicated. since neither has the power and authority. Among tnem was comrade A. This same system exists at all stages and at all levels of the ri Government. those which are published in the ii. Neither one of these organizations rhas the authority-to decide anything independently.. One died at his post. and tortured with great refinement before their officiaipr"irf.'pup"r". the head of the laving announced to the world the to look at the editions of the Boishe.of the Organs certain bloodt p6. which the Soviet prefer to forget iuir?. the most blood_ 'The answer is very simple.r"ri. I. only a joint decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party *itt Pf*: State individual of a republic and the Council of Ministers of the same republic.

addition to the goveming organs which give orders and see that they'are carried out.let's have another on a similar scare Izvestia.igence directorate of the General Staff of the .ffi.s commissariat the frontiers and the Bolshevik leaders were forced create yet another parallel organization to the Tcheka' intelligence service.... an external was created under the meaning. completely . and rcnin suggested the creation of yet another independelt i. Peasants' " bt i...the whole of the civil war these two bloody organizations existed independently. but as an organization -Bolshevik '1 6lite and...simply for duplication. independent of of the .ir deathbed.. The basic one of these is of course the KGB.i i.e Politburo are able to live a quieter f. the Politburo was able'to neutralize any .tt.-u.t i*r ii. and this ii why duplication exists.organto-. DupliJation in everything is the prime principle and reason Ue'trina the terrifying flashes in good time informs whoever he jhould inform of but. The thinking goes: we have a newspaper independent decisions can be taken. there also exist central control Organs which are independent to the local authority. and also known by its military classification as thisrole. In this way the comradei in tl.ontrol of the ruling l. lii . j.ion . *"rr' and peasants' Inspectorate was not created as an organ ioi the whole population. from the managernent of diplomatic missions abroad to iunatic asylums. and thus it has always been' tt" creation of a. to activities. the Ministry of the Interior is also active and this is subordinated niither to the KGB nor to Control. . Neither lcapable of counter-balancing its external nor the Rabkrin was able to fulfil ir. of any deviation from the established norm.ri Rabkrin. an organization called into existence to counter-balance the already growing powers of It is also the of the regime' In for the unprecedented stability itre People's Commissariat {or Internal Affairs'. froil the construction of sewers to atomic ice-breakers. ln addition to the People's Control. it" . The Rabkrin or..f" of the Registered Directorate time itWorkers' and is called the Army.i. and as rivals. fn the meantime the tentacles of the Tcheka had spread srior. above all' .. a visit of which to a factory or workshop iuur.r .' Affairs.. the Tcheka. of each . the socialist fraud squad. On the initiative of Lenin. duplicating the Organs. Soviet A*y.critical mind. Their influence grew to immense proportions. the Worii. Rabkrin was-Lenin's love'child. system of parallel institutions began with the creation of itri tcnefa.f Inte.12 Introduction ' Introduction stagnation of all walks of life in Soviet society' rru-Son of inspiration.opre. ApN. as a counter-balance to it.D"d:. any effort to look at what is going on from the lydqoilt of a heatthy.oorr" lr.r' .. I f : ' r. hardly less anger than a visit of the bBHSS.' i. This organ. a secret police organization subordinated to a politburo member who exercises almost as much influence as the Chief of the KGB. Soviet power is everywhere duplicated.tyoutthetaskofcontrolandretribution'the '. There is also the Central Organ of the press.onthepersonalorderoftheindefatigableLeninon . At the present Red . more formally. from the planning oi -the I*!"j oflaunchings into space to the organizatiln for burial Soviet citizens. : .1... In.. To control everybody and everything is absolutely impossible. itre f. Not for competition by the existence of another no less powerful bureaucratic organization. Tass created.U"ka and thg People's Commissariat for Internal . but independently of the KGB other powerful organs are also aitive: the innocent:sounding People's Contiol for example.t 1918. In shape and form. known today as the People's Conti'ol' The is still waiting forlomebody to research into its history' remembered by him even i. it was seen as essential that each powerful organ or organization which is capable of taking independent decisions bi counter-baranced lii i ). iTO..g l: ...*it by thJm to raise the standard of revolt against their creators. Everybody jealously pursues his rival and any Pravda.

the Wehrmacht Divisions and the Divisions of the SS. all existed under the same duplication principle.14 Intoducrion 'unit 44388'.obvious of these is of course Hitler's Gerniany. and. history largely independent from the KGB. i-n addition. Part I multiplication of institutions . so that one can can only be explained the ruling class to guarantee the stability of inipite of the . the'Gestapo and the Abwehr. The SS and the SA and. The most . many ordeals it has been subjected to. as did the two Intelligence Services. In history there is a number of examples of similar organizations within repressive regimes. on lhe front.This desire of by the its regime. the reason why thisorganization has remained throughout Soviet It is important to clarily this. understand the role of soviet miritary intefiigence in Soviet society and in the international areni.

the Army has never played the leading roli in the trio. bloody skirmishes. . the Soviet Union.. a constant underlying struggle between these three forces. .. with attacks and retreats. liolds aUsotute power' They are " have to share power with their rivals' intirAepenAent and There ' that'this crocodile does not need either the Party or the KGB. All other institutions and to organizations. l' ..i . occupy a subordinate all single one oi tt it t..t'supplementary. Thus the.orrnonist fanaticism and the deception of the the triulmvirate system the Army is the most powerful '' element but it is also the most deprived as regards its rights' Unlike the Party and the KCB. including those which appear officially position' But no wi-etd State power. aie strivini for'undivided rule..oi.Partv and the KGB in mind each .the triumvirate *hi. victordefeats. ensuring two. secret alliances and permanent ii . enjoying the the people. The Party cannot exist without a continuous represslon 9f fr. in other words without the KGB' The KGB in turn cannoi exist without a continuous fanning of the flames people' in ' oi.Eachofthetwoconsidersits lown function to be the important one and the function of its . Its natural state is a free life in a swamp.:1. armistices. the KGB and the Army form. Should this ever happen' the irrty unaine KGB would be swiftly destroyed' The fact. but with this to kill off its rival' Too possible 'understand's that it is not .. which plays the a quiet life for the other of a periorming crocodile.ti" Jl..t . muctr depends on the continued existence of that rival' Both part the Party and the KGB need the Army.t The Triumvirate The Party.

it "yi supervisedthe general ":l.ticallv independEnt of external control' Why this "[ g be is expl a..ryytlngnt. the Party has invariably hllowed the crocLdile to take lhe Army has attacked the KGB. that of the KbB the ment crocodile never gobbled up its trainers? . Both the party and the. as happened after the death of Stalin. the party has gone into action against it. t"a to thlnk along Party lines' The'Tttl . which has happened several times. The party leasli is called Special gobble up whatever it wishes.:it"tt*-p-h3l:. and mititary intelligence is itseyes and ears' The . Although the crocodile is-firmly tied. the part which concentrates the most interesting 'unlfinr..The Party and the KGB hold the crocodile firmly in check !V qeans of two strong leashes. Every organ of the Army is penetrated by the Political Department of the party and thi Special Oepart_ different acts and collect money from the terrified spectators.6pcodile. beginning with the military opposition of the twenties. as it is said .ti. They supply food to the trainers and the crocodile. in fact it is that part which analyses what the eyes una the ears hear.experience and Yt?". and the Tchekists insisted strongly $e of the Party.i[t.rruunoof every minute directive lr€r€ral staff compietely lost the ability to think indepen:iently. the Party ::-tr-: "::T":':S:. . And at times when the KGB his been plotting agiinst the has attacked the party.":lir-:T. in other words incapable of fighting' from this sad.. the Tchekists of the KGB have iome into action and quickly gained control over dissident elements in the Army. ).tw KGB. of its sharp ears and ceased piercing eyes.the brain...nart o1 fe.iO tiains its ears to hear with precision every frrg"tt night. After such incidents the situation has retumed to normal * the crocodile's trainers have manipulated their reashes in such a Party. Thus it is not possible for the Army to be left out of the triumvirate. the aimy ii sufficiently strong sometimes to pull its two trainers aftei it. in the role of trainers of the performing crocodile. for purely practical reasons. its speed of reaction take independent decisions' . i". They have even been able to give the crocodile a few kicks anA. ol. to direct it to another side. put on their make-up for the show. Its dependent situation notwithstanding. tearnl :Yt :t. The general staff of the Soviet Army is the brain of the way and from differen-t sides that it is impossible for any quarrel to have a conclusion. None of the remaining inhabitants of the Soviet Union has any. announce the a bite at the Tchekists. delPlte its enormous sze' .ll staff . They fulfil an auxiliary role. WUen of the KGB. So why has the . The Party '' ttr" v bec-ame pru.even if this nt"ruflv.edee-:f.-kcg preferred. .Jr"t" wittr ttre work of its brain. that the 1.rrf. it necessary.against any aggressor. thi *ar.i" fn the workirrg of the crocodile's brain.d .11.*rpitt"fy lost its presence of mind.."f. i-he general staff and the integral GRU "rithe i'. On those occasions whin the Army . on . would be its first victims should the crocodile ever be set at liberty.and any capability to think and rfif tnii brought ihe system to the. Io-.18 1bili_tyj9 Soviet Mititary Intelligence The Triumvitate 19 the Political Department.independent part to play in the concert.:t'i[.6iU it a part of the the Jii i. but not a bite to the eyes of the crocodile onto the rustle a. to keep I ontv the body of the crocodile under control and not to in.: I .iiit" I i. As a result the crocodile..Y:i.KGB are perfectly well aware that they.. .

'reconnaissance'.intelligence' . corps and sometimes iiniriont. The history of Soviet " . The agent network for the Eastern Front organizations of fr"t iot . collect information on enemy porition.uriun.t 6uu. to take prisoners especialiy staff officers .. and activities and to undermine and sometimes ihvsicallv destroy the enemy's command structure' The . '""'*U. for example. At the same time the superior echelons of intelligence exercised control and direction of the lower echelons. Each divisional intelligence chief. These intelligence chiefs are an integral part Soviet military intelligencer and iis superior organ. all activitj governint South-Eastern. the GRU.Hisary 2 2l . of information about actual 6r"potentiai spring of 1918. And so on down the scale. intelligence units at all levels were subordinated to. On the same day there was created a'registrational' gence) department in the Eastern Front' The depal' f. besides the agent. divisions.Eastern Front.. indeiendent and separate was . the advances o-f the in the Uials and in Siberia.razvedka _ has wider-significance and includes everything we rlnderstand by the terms .th€ coresponding staffs. Subsequent to the formation of the . The intelligence set-up for each front was organized were io tt" same way ui thut for the Eastern Front'.i*- collection and processing enemtcs. Turkistan Formed from the best cavalrymen in the Army' they ir dressed in the uniform of the enemy and were used to carry out deep raids in the enemy's rear. basis of underground were five armies and the volga military History . Ukrainian. small intelligence groups were formed within these detachments quietly and oftLn without any order from above. had ftrs own intelligence unit at the same time as directing the activities of the intelligence chiefs of the brigades which formed his division. North-Eastern and i.'F. brigades. aerial and other t"ryit"-lTl . most important. As the regular army developed into of the Army. and were called the 'cavalry of special assignoi"no'. armies.'-:In tt" iiLt". newly-formed regiments.. in his turn. This front received the name of the Eastern Front' in it ttr. had his own personal intelligence unii and in addition directed the chiefs of intelligenie of the divisions which formed a part of his army corps.. new fronts were added to the Red Army: and' later' tfre Southern. The chief of intelligence of an army corp.. agent groups and organizations intervened in the rear of the enemy P:J":: 1l: limiin forces attacked. for the first time in the composition of the Red fThe Russian version of the English .a on ih.rt"-. the Party and the KGB.t tt tn"t" diversionaiy units and their numerical .ad ttre inielligence chiefs of all five armies and the of the front r reporting to iI. From the moment of the creation of the first detachment of the Red Army. an agent norbet of aircraft for aerial reconnaissance. the diversionuty detachments reported to the Thfse diversionary iot"ttin n".. army cbrps and armiesfso these intelligence organs developed wiih it. types of intelligence services.h.zupported them' Sub' ilqr"nUy the network grew arf: d]lng..There anrlies which did not *rn.g.. . chiefs of fronts. On 13 June 191g a front was formed.fitstrevifs and other parties which. intelligence can therefore only be surveyed in ihe ligtrt ot the history of the development of the Army and consequently in the light of the continuous struggle bitween the Army. from the outset. W.surveiltaice'and 'intelligence'.iime cavatry squadrons and.

an Trotsky' placed out raids. destroying those who were dissatisfied with the communist order.*. tn spite of this.tlt:] Naturally while the agent network.special assignments' which carried .service or let with his Tchekists recorded of the Tchekists trying to take over organs of T!.miiilt"* .iJ.:::t':. there was a separate cavalry brigade foi 'special assignments' with a strength of more i ll'ihan . then the brain becomes nothing if the blind the brain of a blind and deaf man' Even essential information from one source or frptJ. not in the enemy's rear.tion. If the army inielligence service is separated more the army staff. from regimental staff level up .". Muravev. A. the absence of a superior intelli- li "ft"irr.'urrlhi*..iire aemano that he ihould create such a superior mititary .tr n.iirorr"ri"riindispensable to its work at second-.. "'.: :Jl *:')T?"fiI the Republic. which had been in existence for only twenty-seven days..::l::Ti:.-"--io*. The Tcheka had its own.22 Soviet Military Intelligence History 23 several regiments and separate squadrons.-':i[:. This of course brought iomotit" defeat. All these units . During the civil war the Tcheka strove to unite all speqial a'ssignment units under anyone else was operating similar secret networks. and these {lt. They could only request information in a very tactful way.:l_Yi."[..of .. together with the entire staff of the front and the commander himself.. I. 1": staff of 1t". A.ii.. The Tcheka also had units of . Leon Trotsky ieveral times approached Lenin-with .p irilituty intilligence wentthe present day'efforts up to continue on a reduced scale military 1.tffig"n. The Tchekists jealously guarded their right to have secret agents and could not resign themselves to the idea that than two thousand cavalrymen. The whole of the agent system of miiitary intelligence passed into the contror or the but this brought the front to the very edge of catastrophe. now given to all special forces of the GRU.a the Fietd staff.T. the 1""p.were dregsed in Polish uniform. From its inception. ln 1920.:Y:I. M. later the General Staff).. who had been trying to intervene in favour of his intelligence department.T::'"1'H':"L:iJ:: services.":fT.. arid this was on top of strength comtantly increased. but much iater. and his chief of staff had no intelligence service of their own.. Military intelligence had acquired " au.-il. The leader of the Red Army.t ordered Dzerzhinsky not to interfere in matters of imitituw intelligence.ines t". on the polish Front.d *.n ry 1* the Red Army (at that ''J*i..8 prramid siructure. being well awire of tne Tcheka's attitude to those it disiikea.atas the end of 1918 the organization of . but the top of i ft Ct i"f of the Army and in charge of all military proI . Vatsetis. One such atiempt occumed on-10 July 1918 when the Tcheka shot the whoie staff of the Eastern Front intelligence department.t its capabilities were extremely one'sided' He . The new commander.. I. Several cases are knew what the Tcheka was capable of but he also irt. military intelligence suffered the greatest possible antagonism from the Tchekists.ifuence the py'?ry.was[" * .) its own control...n.central agent network and an agent network in local areas.iir"i-"t. and were unable to ask for the necessary information.tiir. (As regards Vatsetis the Tchekists did indeed shoot him.]..anothe'. on the staff of the Soviet forces.T:^l:1"". Much later these divenion_ ary units received the name Spetsnaz. For this lrlffason the general staff remained blind and deaf' obtaining ''.the given priority' and any rf the Tcheka.rnjt119' i'.tfili.dition to this. but in its bwn rear..y intelligence.rmv '-1"'"i" .1119'il. lio.d beeri virtually completed' There to the level of remained I [m" . its own work was i*k1ti it by'the Army Command w-ere given very low the forces very near to fiiiority.":1i1:.Tq?. the Tcheka's attempts on.u* before Lenin: either give me an independent Dzerzhinsky lead the .l..

quite separate impoRantly... by mas executions. g. the position of the cori"munists worsened sharply. nurb. firstly.. eqorp it with a safeiy device by the name oJ Simon lvanovich i'" Atalov. Certainly the founding rules are fully each own ipplicaUte [o i:iappllcaole to our uw time. fiistly.. fifthly and most mrrsl !e. rnem.hi...i^L lof Siaff-J. rnititury districts and groups of forces and i 'l*trt once. intellig. Lenin was careful to o:-^. liiiituty staff must have its own independent intelligence set- of . manifestation became more acute. far worse.^-^. Having entrusted this i .G.. at this time it was called 'R egistuupf . oeruices.ii : The GRU. Understanding the necessity for the creation of such an organ. the provincial and town committees ttre iignt to take part in recovered. Une threat replaced ty Republic.. Lenii and repeatedty reifused Trotsky.composition of thl generil staff intelligence network azd . Lenin. In Tver and Toruhok the Tchekists. released from its restraints and drunk with blood..ugg.. i. In order to save the regime the communists decided on.rformations.not guilty if two memb". The Soulet state was saved. On becoming chief the registrational directorate. the intelligence set-up of subordinate staffs is ti U" futty under the command of the intelligence of superior Thirdly.p. each one of these rules has been broken'at the level of armies and flotillas. including those . (In peace+ime this means military up. fuel and mean intelligence organ.onopliy secret activity. Lenin diiected his -oi Without restricting the terror.s proposal and on 21 October 191g signed a decree. The newly created directorate did not increase or decreaie the importance of the front and army the Registrationat DirectoratJ of the Field attention to the annulment of the icheka. the minisffi.t. The fcneta. to be called court cases against arrested communists.u" lp !o !h9 Peopleh Commissariats (i.t.s .i*rhere the front networks already had active agents' The iorsanization created in 1918 has."pon to Trotsky and the A*y.that tbf . military intelligence hom ttre organs of enforcement and their intelligence ser' troups of iorces.rti. It must be found on front or also at flpet level.h *. survived to discontent among the inhabitants. if not more often. Secondly.. production. io control it.T'lr" creation of the GRU2 was not only an act of self- . who came irom the V. but realizirig that this would a political crises present day.s its tristory. in the cise of the slighte"si inevitably strengthening of the position of Trotsky. in principle. t lvices. but invariably the mistake has been summarily corrected. Since 1918. "these hostages would be shot. Then another problem arose. the agent network must be part of the..a desperate measure. This step was taken i1 *. But at this time the directorate Lrm tne creation of a new network of agents which would active in countries all over the world. immediately resumed day+o-day another. There was an-attempt on the life of Lenin himself..Razucdupf ' in ior our pt"sent putpos"s the nam€ GRU will be used consistently' 2 . has been through several name chqnge.. oart'of the composition of the front and fleet intelligence districts and . organ of Soviet military intelligence *i.) Fourthly.. In eich town and village they would take hostages and. Secondly.24 Soviet Military Intelligence History merelv co-ordinated them. r"''preservation on Lenin's part from the ravages of the Tcheka. got outoi control. together with destroyed communist teaders whJdispleaseJ ll:1"rpg.s ..-. not yet completely to the stability of the state had been l"ad. And.i. These are.. he took . creatini r'. He finally accepted Trotsky. of .d At the oeginning of autumn. diversionary intelligence is subiiOiury to agent intelligence. Aralov formally remained a i'i member of the collegium of the Tcheka. The most important of his decisions were. Armed uprisings were taking place against the communists. latgr '. A-communist woutd be 1:]:T".e.. 1 but ul* a concession to Trotsky. like the KGB. of in" purty Commit_ tee testified in his favour.

26 Soviet Military Intelligence History 27 gui:kfy.o*"nt of the session Aralov spoke critically of tfie military opporiiior. and srrict neu_ trality.iL. the delegates of the military frol tle..ifitr. wourd dare to trust Aralov.f"'u. but the Party has always been able to correct its mistake in time' The agent network of the GRU was reinforced at almost lightninispeed' There are several reasons for this' Firstly' iisiAe iusiia after the Revolution. 4lry. a" unitea group Army delegates... there were more than four million foreigners: Ger' former p-riton"tt of war. t' with the Army. GPU.t. :lld: lnylossibility Tchekist. l9^p?rty conferences. i I Tat"ku'. The overwhelming majority mans. but at tfris point the delegates officials of the Tcheka secret police (historically known as the V. too.victory. At tiye it was still permitted .":i" widespread abstentions rcneKa tound themselves in a minority at their own " unJ tf. at the eighth congress of the prirry in tvtarcti tgi6. OGPU. he had not been .'no*ing the h. Austrians.. and that this would inevitably lead to a confront tio.. NKGB. fr{ifitaiy intelligence naturaily objected .sharply to the :intettigence on 13 May 1919 of the staff of military I conference. The hurniliation of the Army inevitably with a victory for the Party' The military 'ooposition crumbled and many of its members never agam toof any action against the Party.. *fl:. Czechs. and even up to the present day has confused many researchers. In thJcase of any ugr.tists in the 7th Army who had displeased them' .o"tt"A and shot._ of Aralov Ueing exptoited as a trusted this was not all. Hungarians.. and more than tOO^Oelegates'out oi 269 declaredthemselves in favour of tt struggle against the party and the Tcheka. had to become ii".ra.rri"r. MVD and KGB and unofficially as 'the Organs')' This rule has also been broken several". Poles. tt.were . More than three hundred thousand of thernvoluntarily enlisted in the Red Army' There was no need to recruit such people. 11 the spring of 1919 the reinforceO army under Tro5Lf's leadership gnen]f out ag. f."Koreans. the so-called . The GRUwould be u purt of it Army but the Army would not be able to.. never count on the sossion cfoieO affected military intelligence too. Bulgars. MGB.' Emboldened by Army' l. maintained an icy . not one of the Armyt . and executed members il. . fn the strulgle against the Party." oiit. GRU must be appointed only from among the senior thr T. with one . after which inteifigell Only a few votes were necessary to secure the complete and legal victory of the. a of the support of the military intelligence service.on. Serbs.. The number of supporters clear defeat' The i r."r. Anothei unwritten rule was established in the organization of the GRU. Aralov."r. and from that i. Then at the most dramatic . [. *t in the interests of subterfuge. taking-the law into its own hands. but itJchief was the personal enemy of both the Army and the Tcheka."-that it would be impossible for Aralov to avoid Uaify sfrirmishes with the Tchekists on the most mundan"* to-r.rrilitary opposition shrank to ninety'five. " CnU i. the Tcheka renewed its penetration of the ' Many unrepentant members of the military opposition. o"r.military intelligerrce service. hand of Aralov. Remaining formally within the Tcheka. The Army had learnt a i". in her central provinces alone.'time on it was ils sworn enemy. This had " entered into ieninis calculations. Croats and others' Most of them were r"*i.y programme. pJrsonat opinions llal "*p.Army. trom tne nrsi Jay of his work in ir'foice supported the Party.t *oufO pi. Lenin's calculations proved themselves sound i. NKVD. But remarkably military intelligence. Tcheka.on*"qu"ntiy enemy of the Tchekists.oi -came meddling in the affairi of.enin was delighted' Military intelligence henceforth was an inseparable part-of the Army. which was that the chief of th. Slovaks.nst the p*y.n ded de facto independence of the Army f-. p"rty influences..military Oplosition.f ." party and the .

.es' countries... The Soviet Union will never admit the people it sends out belong to Soviet intelligence' -_r[it iarge-scale attack wai highly successful' Out of the . fanatical communist doctrines. Military difficulty whatsoever. thousands of communists spread into off to their own countries as llelli8ence trKU agents. After from Russia. and in this manifesto it was helped from all sides. discovered' Let them get out 9f that lhe . 'ot Litt oania. Ts{fl E. to tie a necktie.of these example.' failures in the . External circumstances favoured communism too.g"". It was an astute calculation' to be ug.. the Finnish communist Otto the Hungarian Sandor Rado. td-.. Soviet intelligen-ce skilfully exploited the situation which was unfolding. like the German communists |ictlaf Sorge and Karl owner of a safe. which at the time were i"A"r.. destruction-of capitalism.O to be a fugitive Russian officer. m.i[it. T1r"r" were many elementary errors and early field officers who had no experience ' .frurpfy towards to country without attracting the slightest suspicion..... In one of the early GRU instruction . The First Woria Wir also.tiesoithe. its If one it would go tbr quantiiy. | there is the following advice: 'If you-need a facilities ilt*il foreign i'the needs of esPionage. .k.. eny SoviJt intjflig"n..t *iJ"ir. :1. France and China. activists states worldwide under the contror of the'soviet int"ttig"nz" became the Mecca of Secondly.ho::: :t-.. then that was enough' Nobody was worried apieared. agents were unmasked-in these three small if. people who had lost their hopes and ideals.. some of these."""#Ti?i'J ii..many Embittered and depresed.ilffi I The Communist Interr '#Hlx.fl:Tfl worldwide commuiist revolution'.. lnrrdty." officer who had undergone the most elementary linguistic training could move about freely from country to tutfir P::i* after the Revolution the wil of Soviet interrig"n.. after the Revolution Moscow communists. fhe GRU was unPerturbed by these philosophy being tirat if it could not have quality io*lu.l:ou:ty millions of 6migr6s point) find a tall handsome man who has lost a leg .n."J"r.28 Soviet Military Intelligence simp_ly sent them History 29 of them were convinced. are now well known Iu. The Comintern openly declared . For . The heat of the conflagration was f. but thousands more remained unknown.i *ho *"r.".an torty GRU failur...ili.. their recruitment presented no the First World War the world veereJ . and after the foundation of the comintern. by this method alone' 'do.. Latvia and Estonia.t.d gi". the Tcheka and the GRU in particutar developing their espionage activities.history. states' simply told any suspicious person who or ..tor. and his natural talent made up for his about eJucation. on the orders of the uomtntern.hgent (a radio il. pa.the world h. Tt they could. or engineer more In 1920. communists from a[ countries flocked to Moscow. all over the world. to.left behind a legacy of "despair in"u hundred ient abroad showed himself lack of ifi"nt"a.luiti.In Germany and Hungary there were communist revolutions. Communist parties were strong and united. the counter'intelligence officers whatsoever..

After Lenin's announcement their authority finally fell.result of the negligence'of the intelligence service'' But the GRU was a compGtety unknown entity.*:9 for agents. even before this.noiey . the "ut"gotically hurope it i..rrcr. 'We have suffered this defeat as a . pqrt"J iri..SubsequeJi fr.p of communists l?-ig atso begin.'was used by the .30 thousands Soviet Military Inrclligence success History these undertakincs quickly to Germany where he organized a small shop anj thin a small factory.*1.basis Marxism had very precisely of Marxist doctrine' But foretold that there would be a world'u'ar in iinO rirnperialist war would develop into a worldwide revolution' which a golden age wbuld begin' Yet the war had 'after had finisheO two yein befori and no worldwide revolution reported that there were no :9":. The partv.lougr.i.. The security of ti."".on.J . into .ritair. profits of tens of rr. au. ih...o to the rank'and'file Party members' All eyes turned towards the Tchekists.t.ringr. *"i" gr.r.. buying up new who by . Inielligence i:this'revolution coming about. .r In order to calm the Tchekists and to .."rr. money which had never been on SovietieniffianO b:.or"t to bring the revolution about' They decided I to trigger off a revolution in Europe. Dzetzhinsky caused a scandaf in the Kremlin and demanded explanations from the Politburo' support his own . operution. Lenin announced to the .. 'the network of commerci"f millions Mrachkovski of pounds. Their unpopularity among the people. . installing one " or two of his own people and .91 happenea. and much ..rf[Oj...f". ih"y jobs and after some months received the most laudatory references and went off into other countries *fr"r" place' This went on untir the ug"ni"ur'uire to stand on his own two feet.# country to countrv. and naturally the l.. On" tdit" first outstandins successes was the. starting with Poland' out in the spring of 1920.J. as did his successors.ur".. they found help and support from the Mrachkovski network.te fiiO before them 'grey' and unevaluated: they would then on the '&aw their orun .. so both Lenin and Trotsky l. .t would be the last war of mankind' The s..t*or['*. as it was officially.ilririi Enterprises" or.. GRU documents..6r. several factories-in France.ilig"i.. widely used for the legalization of newly.o*V. perfectty tegal and hisht [rrlii"" ricences :!:aiyng T*.lotions and analyse the material $ *lonF. Creat ti.adveniure ended in complete failure..1. beginning ro be better traiied.was striving to"innaie the hostiliry between the GRU ..* .ril .y began to creep rnto the work of the GRU. .or"y put was sent unOJJffirl'. ru. was evident.e assessments were ignored.. Mrachkovski himself trav.i. either compelled to admit that Marxism Yt. Both Lenin and Trotsky red themseives outstanding thinkers.i."_.-. fou_"ying-r.lradr.ri"rt. and Relations with the Tchekists were gradually stretched to their limit. the United States and_fin"ly Ctir" iil."to t"k" .lrf qr"ri.tng #... The next conflict seueral years..lled alt oue. Naturally neither noi th" other took any notice of evaluated intelligence' y both demanded thai the intelligence material should of this. creation of the . .na tn." om. Lenin made a o.lo te]r. men of deep knowledge a1 regards irv affairs and international relations. it"-'. Both the organizers ''immediately started to hunt for a scapegoat' The only possible explanation for the scandal was that the intelligence service had done its work badly.'.oonconsequently to obtaining l"_rld money the Mrachkovski undertaking. theoreticians practical men. GRU as its chief source of . tt *orld. even to some of the hi{hest represeniativei of the Soviet bureaucracy.oU Mrachkov_ ski (his brother was a mernber of thetentral Committee) of intefligence agents sent abroad..o tight that no undertaking ever suspected tne exisilnce of another. ir"* rank and file of the Party.. patents. some dozen began to give posi'live .o1 '. in fictitious names. .tnt"nlfen. that is.

"f.f. which aimed (as all subsequent five-year plans have) eiclusively at the growth of the military potential of the The internat military districts rr. aviation and artillery industries' The Soviet Union set itself the target of creating the most powerful army in the world... indffii.bystem has prevailed in all respects.-.. any essential A"purtriri'*".ih.. The first bloody purge took place in November 'drdr". This may be exptained by the facr that organs of tn" CfrU **"'pr".. Up to this time there had been no need to account for the GRU's activities.t. Lenin permitted the Tchekists to purge the GRU.'ini"ffig"r. 'ihe plan stipulated the creation and speedy growth of the tank.Soviet Military Intelligence version of the storv.rily ir". o:rv.. some party members.. the GRU did lEach internal military district also has its_tasks in wartime.rriuJnltu.. The lists included equipment for bombers and All GRU residents received bookJength lists . N"ither Lenin nor Trotsky had any idea of . at the same time the internal district. irnd its intelligence work is based around these tasks' The ion of activities of a frontier district is very precisely .. pictures by Rembrandt and Nicholas II's stamp int. was that its agent inteltigence no salutary effect on others ..1?' becarrse not take long to recover from the 1920 purge.'.. - Gnil. We are richer now than we were then.into .k"ry districts was also left untouched at tf.lfter 1977 Soviet military intelligence began to blossom' l'. $:-Y::".tl ig2O purge there were fifteen mititary'distri."il. A tidy sum of money was realized..iJ.""r*I. for the bd.enin's gr. but now information was made available to. ."[ig"n.[hry the time oi . This t u. independent circumstances.ritit*y "na oili. in the Red Army... the fronts were transformed.9r* il.""ouery of the GRU nefu.[ However.rous. At Western auctions the Soviet authorities sold off Russian corn and wood. on L." oi-iie civil have become more nume. Lithuirnia 1at that time still independent) and Finland' This '. Uo. in 1920 agents of the Moscow ..'. but also that Soviet armaments must be the best in the world' Monumental sums of money were spent to attain this aim: practically the whole of Russia's gold reserves was thrown into the task.ooting iii. *ouia nur" "#rt"il This was the year in which the first five-year plan was drawn up.registration^' qui. The other reason. They a[ ..oUoAy-*ould hear about*t thiir deaths of... and this f<ir eminentry sound ."rr. rcO1or" specialists to the 'mistaken conctusion that the exist untit this time. Conseently its agent network in peacetime operates in different too. 32 History 33 "". ." .militarv district operated on the territoriei of Poland.-.f. . of command in the new districts A .uoild out..ttig"r.i 1920. strength :-!ung_.r.ii. as alsci has money :"ivailable for intelligence.. ug". thloygseSs untouched. may operate in different directions." *ort-*'.iiion.r intelligence centres were moved out to the irontiers and it was from there that the direction oi agent intelligence work of a very activities in any future war..i oY"T"1'. . For example.i." .. except that-the districts iahd each orher. peacetime to carry on agent where the district *oura of the staff of each district aiJnt..r. of forefgn military technology which they would have to steal in the near future. not even the many members of tlie i"nrrul Committee. The Soviet leadeiship made haste and demanded from its designero not only the creation oi new kinds of weaponry and military technology. but also rnnocent.g..-r. continued in country..rrded on the but the chain iar"i.ra . officers who had allegedly faited to situation corectly were shot.r*.ficers I.". ahip-building. i".t ffi. *s undertaken.

trilr. u_. of torpedoes in Italy.i'tt.. and firrit th"'..i*.of Ind Soviet'#upied parties.ry. of the te30s.. communications of illegals from GRU residencies with the . seek to enter opportunists who feared losing their helping Soviet period: that of ii".r. targer than the overseas budget or trrJ ocit_1.. manufactured in the sirorterrp"riiUi" .l. posing as Soviet diplo:mats.was concentrated il.y seriously the efforts of the Soviet i-inion t. attained unprecedentea heigtrts territory the GRU had practicjly "f . Military district intelligence always operated independently of the GRU illegals true today." beginning of the 1930s the GRUbuag"t. conformed to the highest international .". wirhin Soviet influence.uJin!-uy'fliorertak"nteadthe political intelligence work of ..r. o.ur" time in Jf a"y ii-if. .. . from different countries and then .rrpl". f. that is. This was a very serious mistake' With the were closed or blockning of the war when the embassies adJd.. GRU officers posted abroad undercover .aio valves and tank engines.Inagentorganizationssubordinatedtomilitary-districts the and fleeti the recruitment of agents was carried out from officers rarely did certain . . ..e activities of illegals.t"rtilrOr. . and for this reason at the beginning of the war it was practically unharmed. into the poriticar riie of ctean eqpionage the thousands of fu.34 Soviet Military Inteliigence History 35 tradition first saw tle. by the idea of it.r"r"- our..reat depression threw into the arms ot soui"i wirld 6r". trade representatives. and few countries went to ereat pains to hide tfr"i.. howitzers and mortars..r*ni.ii"-?gjAi.'ncies. Germany and Grear Britain.#iil. Soviet inteflisenle. the ing position in the wo1ld. Centre were frequently accomplished through the Soviet beginembassies. emphasis. recogniilon of the Soviet Union.riitr"nt. at the beginning of .and anti_tank guns. ..or_ pedo.r.i. not.rpilr. but after its".f.ion remains GRU-.iui . anti-aircraft. yet another GRU fighters.f tr" *rs on the side of Soviet military intelligence.t.. Nobody toof . ttrritoty of the Soviet Union.. the Unlted fr.ij. Only .. dCp'u. intelligence directorates of districts travel abroad iOf i'with forged d6cuments for short periods' Before diplomatic '].r"ayirg best.. inijtg"r& mistake was subsequently rectified.Sometimes Soviet copien selected the best assemUlies ani*rpon"nts and constructed out of them a new type which often turned out to be the. Faced with wartime conditions the military district intelligence services began to recruit and run their agents only from Soviet territory.. . had.ire. .i. the communication with illegals was disrupted' The . correspondents and so The system in use today of recruitment and running of of the 1920s' Bnts h. In the international sohere it did "" iJiiL.h" soui". in the fierd... France.. The GRU illegals and undercover residencies acted I independently from eich other but in the Pf-wa1p"":i 1l' .. the technolopl for th" p.. th" sph.".tighl stealing analogous kinds-of of atuminium and-equipment for boring out gun barrels. workshops or l[*:.t.r. .. plun. Soviet resiaenJs were able to throw their monev round. The recruitment of new ag-ents was carried out either on Soviet territory or on the teiritory of neighbouring countries by me4ns of agents who had been recruited earlier...on. submarines and torpedo Uouti. underI couer residencies were idded to the numerous illegal residel.on tf.-iirir'..very best in the world.on Communists the .and running of agents was in the hands of tllegals'. rwitti torgea documents and offices. Gradually a tendency became noticeable in the operations of military district intelligence services to limit the use of Soviet officers even for shirt trips abroad.iori"r.o select the Soviet military intelligence succeeded-in I"""1i"g.. Ir was hardty . .d aheady fully developed by the end to the GRU the agent organizations directly subordinated . Lr. b] the d.

.. and the natural questions arose: 'Were you ever members of the communist party? Why did you leave it?' The fanatics told exactly what had really happened but were damned out of their own mouths.f"'.and the Central Committee threw out their application. O"i..r. Hitler had become Stalin's best friend and the communists likewise friends df the fascists. the political situation had changed sharply. sometimes hundreds of communists became Soviet secret -Ciii agents. France to Spain where Ito Switzerland anO finally through the civil war was going on. the Germans were working very productively and nobody wanted to offend them. But foreigners -onty bE accepted in the CPSU through the Central Ian Committee.. was "r. c"Tlny. concerning their earnings together wirh their p.*.urembers of the group managed to escape into Austria. Aftir ail.UO. til . they began to hand over to tieir .fusion. being in no way desirous that its agents should fall into the hands of the NKVD' So the ex-agents ended up in the GRU cellars.. There ensued 'an exchange of gifts * the most up-to'date German military aeropla-nes foiStalin (including the top secret MEl09. T^r]!I: rne Jovlet communist than that.o"r ttui trr"ir demands had b:"T r. congratitated i.-the first ihing the agents did was to declare a hunger strike and demand a meeting with the higher leadership of the GRU. the GRU did not want to reiuse..aor..r.. that the General Secretary of the party trimsett.j. *rrt. but Moicow. an employee of the Soviet embassy in Berlin.r...iy 11 on condition that it was accepted into the Corrunisi furt! of the Soviet group agreed to the GRU.J.. through the candidacv s1aqe. party_ The vast'majority accepted this holds. The meeting took place and the GRU leadership did all in its power to help the Germans join the party.1^"::.ty cards. From Spain they were brought to Moscow. It was supposed to receive a certainium of money for its work.lt_. d.order to pay trreir memuership fees the group members refused to productivity Theirparty'cardr ----' to be kept in the Ceniral Lommittee. Some time later.'but the GRU intervened. The Comintern simply made a decision unA jr'r"Aiutely scores. ferriUle disippointments awaited them in the capital of the proletariat of all the world. or i prbli. to oarty.. the Gestapo got on their trail. had p3rty cards.The demand . recruitment little time.ui.on. naturally. after going through the candidate stage. In the interests of successful agent ii" always demanded from them that theysiiould from the communist. punctually they handed over to *i This took up a $eat deal of time during tfre ageii meetings. inl. Some_ times however.lfptions.r-.pional case.frs enemy. a Bolshevik manoeuwe to help defeat .36 Soy iet Mititary Intelligence History : 37 XY_r:lrhe uerman communists . there were communists who were unwilling. JU87. .oring members of the CPSU and informed tnlm.. . sums of in. it. had been accepted without goin! r"... the not difficult for the GRU to write out u O'or.. but all the then il.-.rtyGU. At a routine meeting the GRU case officer.orruO" Stalin. camouflage. . informed the group'jr". There is an interesting story to be told about the recruitment of agents at this time."u.ri_"y. Inlhe meantimi..fully. the chief of which was that nobody had at any time written out their party cards.n.. The Germans again declared a hunger strike and demanded a meeting with Stalin in person' At this point the NKVD offered its help to the Central Committee. one. a* . bui tni3.o . naturally ' :*. Howevet' on their arrival in .news the group's acceptih.. whose moral In the pre-war period. .. for it is without demur. To burn one's party card is a cardinal sin .. More their case officers all' and as the new agent group was working .As un . accepted them into the Soviet communist party' The GRU officials had of course assumed that the agents would never set foot in the Soviet Union and that therefore it would be very easy to dupe them.

ntified each of the people to be execut. deat for starin too." soui. . was not a member of the able to DO2|T..prepared.. Before. irJ-iii. Today we have irrefutable proof that the 'Great Terror' was carefully planned and ii.d. #p. it was carried out secretly and without public trials.o to the Far East with special powers and a group of trusted helpers. [t is interesting to note that the then head of NKVD.s calculation was very simpre. then. The Soviet side-.i. l1{: For almost two years the Special Commission prepared of mankind. the appointment of ." uroig the huge coal bunkers of the Kashierski ff.f. as long ago as 13 May 1935. Til" In . iarrived face to face with the ultimate necessity of subjugating all layers of Soviet society and utterly eradicating dissension.."r.. but suggJsted they .. the NKVD organs. [n other words.HBlll and even the M8110) the surender of all Germ-an .ii n.rhe Gestapo burnt the bodies in the turnaces of the power station. JU88. chief.i. Malenkov and i ' Voyshinski. l itaken the decision to create a special security commission r. ""'.l.. tt. embassy in Moscow was informeJ iiiey Spain and had never got as far as Moscow. Shkiriatov..toia-I iiey uetieveO too quickty in the promises of tne .iJ.ourd shoot them in situ. purge the surgical instrument itself. Secret orders appointUritski as chief of the ing one I. Afterwards. cRtf.*iT.. and they forgot iomebody puts a high enough price on the head of an however good he may be.i"i 6.!geni.. However..y kroyns anything..y were in Moscow and proposea u . joint a.ii.res. The execurion1o9k pfu.* the but he would It was a fruitful German commuto the cestapo ithat ii .".rilidl. Its members . without hesitation.orprorise. Yagoda.r.o too relinquish his post. .. Naturally it was the GRU which was entrusted with the task of purging the NKVD overseas organs."y shot them att.r. on the GRU's fulfilling its promises. under cover ofprotracted whistling of fJ"oinoii""r.. In 1935 Yan Karlovich Berzin. decided their fate.i under the leadership of Stalin. which took travelled . Before carrying out its massive bloodJetting of the whole of society.ighten anybody."-i*"H#."t"gether with the editors of the communist newspap. Unshlikht and later S.. 1r3.rourJl.. :rr.e most bloody page in the history were Stalin. S. GRU were issued.rril..!."r*riiro in exchange for who had taken political asylum in the Soviet"u. The Germans. it. In the short time uetore war broke out.h.the GRU's lrplace in 1937 to 1938. there were C-entral Committee and the p"fitUrr"..:for carrying out mass repressions in the country. the Party took pains to ..un u9 able in exchange for the Uest-Cerman-. H9 was uor"iiit'r..h.t . The decision was taken by the Party to purge the whole country of potential dissidents. The purge began secretly as early as 1935 and at that stage ioncerned only the organs and the overseas residencies of the Zhdanov.fir"J nrrn. th. were not taken to Germany. the GRU will sell him In the meantime the Party. the a. was former agents.nowidmitted to ..i'r. On the testimony of A. mistake .bject.38 Soviet Military Intelligence History 39 have the heads Russians woutd not.t. The fascists could shoot their victims in tr. in the Moscow area. TIr.. r. i. ' going again declared a hunger strike. as far as the former GRU agents were one more 1gt aircraft at the same pn1 Unfortunui.irion had been taken not to hand them over. po*""r't. and this was a sensible move.rrion. Avtorhanov the Central 'Committee of the Party had.ung pirorogr. without tarking to them.-ice nists and now he wo.. But no order was issued for Benin to t tnrirt.about tfre Uaffiing that on.pi. In order not to fr.'Ciru. Gestapo men had p"rrorufiy ru. addition to the ordinary members. but the Gestapo t"rJ'ii.r. to. The fascists did o. of his potiticat *pt. They inew too-rr. the Centrat Committee of the Soviet "iii.

.t .r..note that yagoda's death followed an open trial.imsetf. all military " Cnu now exchanged roles. by a special effort of the Comintern particularly in Spain with JLe--h:lp. Yagoda.*"d-ii Spain. commanders and The blow delivered automatically meant a blow to all orjanizations subordinate to the GRU.".40 Soviet Mititary Intelligence History 4t in. .t" . t[. literally destroying .'*iliiurt attach6. was dismissed fr-o1 pil. firsUy.r" . losing its entire.and he no lglegr rIqrir"J GRU.London he had i as an been oeputy chief of the GRU' His execution served purge in for the NKVD to carry out a special f ."r" fo. i'- *"i" ir. In all probabilitytlutski was aware that Berzin and the GRU had . fiquidarion of the generat staff.. fr. And finally. Among those militarv leaders nrrt ..GRY:199* also those intelligence officers of the GRU and NKVD who had refused to return io ifr" So'itt Union and certain' destruction.i rhe GRU. and after him all the . CJn*rent along lines favourable to Moscow.and tfie c6mpJte of the GRU.etorn"dlo its stbrmy activities.r.. way as his illegal residents had b"-"n "*"cui"A-pi"rio*fy. a post in which he was extremely active.#. liquidated the leading illegals of the NKVD.iiiiury d'istricts iire inielligence directorates had extended the existing reserves of underground armies in case of the the tr. the tary attacne in Lond-on.h. Berzin.url runf. Uritski' " rest' The NKVD Lrr"rt"dund shot. .ngt.r "*.f appointed purge of the ll1!:l By the autumn of 1937.. . but Slutski was murdeied secretly.-. E. on Ezhov.the GRU had somewhat recovered iir ttt. Hatred which had been collecting for po*ttt 'and i i I went around the world destroying L":1.i. tt pors" first the acting head of the GRU. arso personafly supervising-itre activities of ail his iverseas agents.000 Tchekists . It is interestmg to. l.he. . the secretary of the Crntral Committee of^the Li.even down to the lavatory attendants to reand cooks on its payroll... had create the GRU from scratch.*.ir. More than 3. the intelligence chief of the. with his assistants.. in the areas of western . he did not forget his most irpiJunt task.utJ together with Marshal Tukhachevs[i were army yakir In the Far East Berzin and his assistani. At the end of September 1936 the NKVb chiei.s including yagoda and Stutski ttremsefres.:":. The head 9f"-. But in the summer of 1938' in the course of a iecond wave of terror.orn. i. that is to the inteligence directorates of the military districts' Here the dea-h-dealing whirlwind came twice. purged the NKVD. was among the . A lear later Soviet military intelligence had Spain.ruoy V"rrs at last came out into the open Il t|:.Ilower.Foreign Directorate of the NfiVO. After the l11{. was also in spain.strength' This time Berzin -tll: d. in-tle followin g year Berzin.. was Uritskirvas simply a cover_up for the long absence iaitu.'nnaing himself increasingly -subject to the chief of soviei military intelri_ gence.t of the GRU. and coerc$ Iniernationaiftig"'d. it Soviet miliUboreevich and Corps Commander Putna. Secondly. . party. His official job was Chief Advisor to the Siunirt Coulrnment. o ttre same time.*" "1 was . jo rhe person of Ezhov "rO '*. but Putni.NKvD-r"u. p"iroruUy ran from Spain the whole of the are GRU officers.i. Slutski. As might-be e-xpected.r..iif...iion witfr the mysteri_ ous disappearance of NKVD ilregars. . with til. This porg" b"gu..pp. arry -tra! to be dealt with. Until his ippointment to.. fre endeavoured to direct the activities of ihe Spani.ecretly of Berzin.was not simply 1 . iuring the pre-war yean. Evidence has been preserved which shows that Slutski and Berzin had clashes practically every day.f. Ezhov himself began a . NKVD men with special .-iie help of the C\U.his place."rt NKVD .everything.L-. In the course of the 1937 purge the GRU was completely destroyed . the GRU was alain destroyed.. back from Spain. one of the cleverest and most successful leaders victims' GRU has had.

""tion that Golikov could give.. The implication was clear: monopoly of secret activity had -a begun...:d poor intellig-ence are the reaions always given. were shot or perished in prisons and. " In the winter{ on to become *.i rt 6"riunt*.i of rr.0U men.. For his visits did not use faked documents' He United States tre naturally head of an official came.*ta"red. It is probable that at that time there was nobody lt'ii". 30 July. rlr ttre itrier of the GRU and his colleagues After the Finnish scandal.i. o*i military delegation to obtuin American and British the urrurn"ntt.ih" new head of the GRU..ett abroa-d and revive and renew the cut off immediately. With his customary precision anO OetiUeratioi he realized that his control of S&ift int"lfi!*ce was stipping away and the same day.iilplans for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union " two after him' i&.y This historical visit was the beginning of intense i"ifuii.1"6..ii'. with a numerous antouttgt. and the staff becau-se Hitler-Stalin Jt.tbrgets to specify that from 1937 to 1939 Slvi-et military intelligence was practically non-existent.tle . and military inOustryltoo. day.mtlr. instead oi the usual two.:l his .. as the agent to been that Stalin spared Golikov in order He was certainly told to testing assignment' *i*ort hitl.. whose strength at the moment of the attack was more than four milliori men.concentration camps. Thousandsand destr6yed on their airfields serviceable aircraft were their own parks' . The Red A*y.s removal and execution. had made a fataimistake in fking Berzin's place when he was executed on 29 July 193g.p... uri i. 1939t40 there occurred an improbable scandal. the head of the NKVD.e cold. Reasons for this wire quickly fouiOOf course there was th. :. fartf. He went first which had been give him io B"gf*O and then to the United States and' to succeeded in carrying out his work in this time he to Great Britain and the an exemplary manner. a.i GRU t im. tn lon" Lg4dGeneral Filipp Golikov was appointed i"f of .. h*e wish. the Army had been bled white. ready to meet the enemy.nd tens of thousands of trained partisans and.. And not only military intelligence. Stalin received only one report on both GRU and NKVD activities. Secret depots and stores of weapons and explosives hia been established.rr...*". In i-he first 'Soni.rL .. radio sets had been secretei and refuges for partisans and intelligence officers had been set up.'gui Ezhov.iit a iuf.igih was only 27. }:-y..i-s... he set ii train tt &Lnti which would lead to Ezhov. at tte :ily wirh th_e permission of ttre iropiganAa Oeiart- -i.l.t to thequestion must-lie in G-olikov's '"il. saboteurs. Under Golikov the GRU was reborn I"iiigry qrickty into an effective intelligence force' There hiG..ry-n:Iday. In all Soviet historical works (which may be-pub- occupation of these areas by an enemy.t gi* f. A'rry.f and"Marshal of the Soviet Union' The political il."r'.hi may not take the right decision' -eveL. Stalin did not order a purge of were opened -the ooom or secret factories and laboratories intelligence had been trying for decades pi".'thousands of tanks burned in Proskurov's disagreement with him over GRU. in tt" terror.d unanimously denied. Military intelligence ceased to exist.'The ::t9 Party.42 Soviet Military Intelligence History 43 [S.""A"J in securing a strategic initiative'.irch sieculation about this period' D^td !h:. and Stalin now had no *ay'to balance the power of the NKVD. the . ment of_the Party Central Committee).r:right'.. aU this was destroyed.t" GRU.. (The Germa..i.* S"viet ".) The second reason was the intelligence service.." still ordered I11:""'Y1i9o :t:::'. yet he went . leaders before him andStalin's D:. was unable to crush the resistance of the Finnish A*y..91: . claim the same reason for its defeat in the winter of l94l was pd. even t"o tt i. whose . ihe hand that for the The war had begun with a catastrophic defeat few hours the German Army Union. but it will not bite feeds it.

....rd ru-b. The consequences of this were tt ut. the term 'strategic intelligencet was introduced for the first time and applied to the GRU of the Supreme Command. In the hands.r't"ginning of GRU penetration of the German general statr from many different quarters.i. Churchill bears witness to the fact that $.th this task severat of the former .rfightened as to the plans of its allies.n..a ana giitain. the Americani .. "U"giriin. In the autumn of.hd"yad points as to the contents of British ... and the new title of 'operational intelligence' was given to the Intelligence Directorate of Fronts and the GRU of the general staff which controlled these directorates' Both the strategic and operational intelligence services of the Red Army conducted themselves with great distinction in the course of the war. the United trate all its attention on carrying out intelligence operations ir against German forces' In order to distinguish between the . plans. oitt" German High C"ommand were known io Soviei front_line generals before they were known to the cermr.. succeeded in returning to "rr'ru ""-rhe help of the rhe a.q"iitJ . Oper' aiional intelligence meanwhile developed activities unparal' leled in scale.iil.L. even top secret being able . a very large role ..anders.rerated several *.. 45 of Americ.. ttre G'RU was divided into two.s intentions in t94t and the b"gr. ikov's career was on the up and up.-"*her exceptionatty successrJ Jilir. The finest achievements of the strategic agent network were of course the penetration of the German general staff through Switzerland (via the illegal residency 'Dora') and the theft of American atomic secrets by way of Canada (through the residency 'Zaria').* ll. Union severat million people who were practically all shot on arrival. and he eventually In the autumn of 1941.lll-. he was relieved of the command of the GRU commander of the 10th Anny. but he stayed alive.op he attributes such enlightenr"ni ro Sr-u'firi . *u. At the same time as'. two GRUs.tuurirr. industries History the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.Soviet mititary teadership temporarily. penetration by Soviet military intelligence of the armaments -6. u" himself again credit and. with $talingrad..utions with ". Besides its agent intelligence.ry of the Council of People's Commissars on euestion. ffii. in ilrruni. could" f1! -Sreat GRU.iif iltegals who weie tunctionint oi iJrrirory occupied by Germany.rd"p. starin gave Gorikov yet another chance to his guilt with regard to the sudden-G"rrun :*plu(" attack.iGRU in the Europe were assigned to him. il. of ii"'n.patriation of Soviet Citizens. ing the tuture. Iater. ...... H.of this organization was coicentrated the agent network controlled by illegals and liindercover residencies of the GRU in a small number of . ot course. in 1944.44 1ll. is why Statin Jrt .. In October he was aoooi-nted pf"ripolrti. though On fg O"t"i"..Sbviet embassies. but this_also signail#tf.d. _."grrO to Hitter.:turn.r. The on-ry thing thai did not display a simitai.nim in foresee- t94t coilko. expect to keep his post. and even kept his General's "..:l :lty GRU Soviet Military Intulligence atso succeeded..q.iil. after Golikov had relinquished his bost. And the The 'other' GRU was subordinated to . One of the newlyiieated organizations was directly answerable to Stalin and tntitled the Chief lntelligence Directorate of the Supreme High Command.

.tty of State Security and the Army' AAer long struggles u"frinOifr" Beria' scenes Abakumov.uttr.? direct leadership of the Organs of State because his title of minister was taken away.lnielligence from both the Army and Sgle Seguriry. a pupil and favourite of became Chief of the Committee of Information' ah" Party made to improve the effectiveness of the u stroke.e. Then their former officers in oider to try to make the Committee oiintorrution collapse from inside' The Central Committee . Stalin immediately opinion' the r. analogous group.ottully . whichlnO"prrO"nliy strove their own former organizations.o .ting power over this -endanger the Party' There was only one *ouiJ . Both sets of officers Information' io r"Uot"g" the actiiities of the Committee^of Ift. they exerted pressure on 'informition at second hand.the Army and the Ministry After the-war. Stalin deci-ded . Groups of guardminelayers were fornned in the intelli-gence units of the fronts of the GRU. Between these two. and this was the activisi'of politburo. were in action at the rear of the Girman forces.1. 9f rn one organization called the KI: the committee of"Infor_ carried out strategic intelligence and directed oierationj and tacticar inte[igence.military intelligence to the Security' But the coup was and political intelligence to State il.i "itortt io.. both of which had strengthened thef positions during the war to such an extent -that they had'stopped acknowledging the civil leadership. It would obviously not be a simpte . acting in . The intelligence wtro f9rryf r.groups the traditional enmity fostered br.M Soviet Military Intelligence History rnot suit the Army or the Ministry of State Security' and they the first time united against the Party' the Committee of [nformation was an elements and armies whose basic purpose ias to hunt down the German military staff.Security an! lhe GRU. All inteliigence work would henceforth be subordinaie to the rurtysi. iontinued."rou. Irless than a year four chiefs one were appointed and dismissed. headed by Zhukov.ri..f S. b"t.h . and this Tchekists t. iniormed the Centrai Committee that they could .s:ic'"^"1-. The man closest to Stalin was appointed to lead this organization. by .*"unr to return from under the control of the Party to ii" . of one intelligence service. to expel him. Within tne fiamework of the programme for weakening.-To get round the problem' the Party .ii"iriw of State.mitte" of Information. must sooner or later lead organization.f*Aini".. sitiation: immediately to liquidate the *"V "ri"t of Information and divide the intelligence service C#mittee - et Army' into two hostile camps . for the reason that not strqngth of tle of them was able to counter the unified frfmi.u. Uui in fact this Jep..-u ritruiionJii mation." CI" a mistake irad been made' In his it was under even if . .iiy were deprived of ihtelligence.. stroveback all iii.i". T\e GRU and the organs iipoliticat intelliMinistry sjale sgcurif were joined rogether .red from tI.. parailet wittr ihese Oiversionary was allocated to diversiondry intelligence. 4rry and Beria was-alio deprived of the leadership of the Tchekists. i.u. work effectively since they were receiving their Frgm its'inception officers of Utteriy inefective organization. to the ifre feuO"tsfrip of the Pirty. fne ieaAing commanders.jof the committee of Information.. Ai this time the party and Starin took care to weaken. This plan was put into effect in 1947. the Army and the Ministry oi State Security. so Stalin technically-promoted tini.. GRU General Staff.try of State Security and the Army.r"rti". all the intelligence services passed !9 t!' control of the ivtinistry of Stati Security. tne farty.irda' hi.r. of NKVD men the Molotov.h.:aoiruSon. Thus the Army and Ministry of Stut" S". lecurity. *"i" Oi.. military_intelligence was once again fused into one organization. not naturally found support from the Army which had easy one. uppoiniir! his deputy to succeed him.

i" "pp"ini Shtemyenko to the his demotion' dnU.-bil. For his distinguished services.". became Mini't"t of Defence' with the fall of the Ministry..#.9f q::f . the Committee of Information finally abolished. Stalin immediately appointld General shtemyenko as chief of the generar stafr.blind general stafiP.. all happy with State Security's monopoly of the intelligence service."y_{tT"! proved the existenie of a plot in rhe ranks of the GRU. a plenum of the Central soo"n no doubt againsi the Army' There was absolutely ot power' since thl Party. Beria *as arreited at a joint ..-i. The united strength of Army and party was automati_ control of Abakumov and given to the Army.. This time it was the turn of the GRU and all the geyyl lrfjo be purged. Zhukov's next stef.t Stalin.. he was therefore not exercise any restraint on Zhukov and post of Chief of the .ihe senior curator of the GRU. dangerous pretender to the throne was..of committed a itre situation..L."ty the Armv wluld u:-1ot: the only master. return i"d Ministry of State Security could them to key positiont. there ensued a fierce squabble among his disciples and comrades at arms for the diJtribution of trie inheritance."il".rk il". exill under Stalin' After a slort lqrg Zl:T'. The Ministry of State Security presented documents which tl. of course. influence ei*y. thg beginning of 1953. The action continued against the general staff and the GRU..".i to stop Political Directorate of the soviet Army and at the same interfering any more in Army affairs' i*"liqrii"eo all ttre special d"Puttt"ntt of State Security i" the Army...l"^ ot statJSecurity lost its status as a ministry and". Shtemyenko'was demoted to Lt_ General and expelled from the general him as a full general-after dependent om the The GRU became an organization solely. beginning of 1954 more weight wllhin Security. 1952was a year of struggle between the politburo and Stalin. but the Politburo insisted.uiion of the brgans of State.against Partyand Party political workers On his od"tt all et He also ordered "v' commissars were expelled from in" Amy' i. was-a blow.t ft e . AJter this there began the usual p"r. r:. Abakumov was immediately shot.ri il P. But Ministry of State Slcurity did not forgive the -the general staff and the GRU for having taken such liberties. and even against Stalin himself who was removed as general secretary of the Communist Party later that year.*: iolitburo' He quicklv effected the "t1ii" T tiil-:1 of all the exiled generals and marstrals h" ilil. t i il. incriminating documents were cally against him.. il.neously and many oi Yt:-tlg "fi.i. On the instructions of Stalin.y History 49 llny una Army leaders and immediately done away with... . The crocodile was clearly throwing off ".u. General Shtemyenko.[ur 7t uto". made a report to the politburo on the subject of the .'" lffi. the first deputy of the chief of the general staff.. and the usual purge carried out in the ranks of State Security.. But in (ictober 1957 Zhukov to Yugoslavia and in his !iur" "rror."n. presented documents about the existence of an agreement among subordinates of Abak- F. rni'Russian Bonaparte" having returned .ffistry li was transformed into a committee' "li*oit. He went on a visit Committee of the Party ib.otity torture was carried out in the ihe i'itilitui-il.iiiJ. immediately after the death of ^ +.-t"i:nLo.. During secret trials."sioo of umov. seeking' to please Stalin.. after which the GRU was removed from the GRU concerning the leaders of its leaders the 'Iif ' on Gogol Boulevard' At the '.alone was clearly secretly removed from was hurriedly convened' Zhukov was . Stalin was opposed to the move.48 Soviet Militory Intelligence nroduced from the thiffit.". After two yeirs Shtemyenko and the GRU. the Army acquired more and Marof ihe iiut".l sessions Zhukov openlv contradicted Khruschev and PubliclY abused him' -in deprivfarty understood how rashly it had behaved id A. 3. rcg l""t"*"r.

. Serov's successor as _chief-oi1il'6iu was ColonelGeneral of the KGB. who had been from 1951 to rg5i. succeeded Golikov a. rn 1-slnrlthe control the Armv in..*y"iijnirt.:'ff:ffi. a we approach the term GRU in a formal way in order to 'explain everything that is covered by those three letters.s . elec' tronic. automatically turned into "u. (Some survive vicissitudes better ttran oifieis:*unoq Brezhnev.i"i.""ijrg.rf. a person was eminently suitable is far as th.. in addition to carrying out intelligence work in the interests of the general staff. On its strength there are I rnore than five thousand senior officers and generals who have specialist academic qualifications in intelligence matters. we picture but one that is far ... Serov.f: but it was intercenred by the Ket Ai. the former crriet oiJrre seror. arch_rival and enemy of the KGB.."u".v returned .. The GRU has its illegal representatives in every country I of the world.. ready to serve anybody who Oeiireo tris services a report only the data which woutd ptease su. military attach6s.l. . T#t.. axe governments and kill statesmen. the GRU is also the superior crocodile was . ifri"ryenko followed him. order to General Golikov.'i. Golikov was . General The Pyramid torate of the Soviet Security.. i:. learne atery seni a int"rotr-of-rt""funy. in addition to all this. ilr-.. since he had been a general of the KGp.i.If "i ii" cnu.e political Direc"tie of StatC The GRU may formally be described as an immensely powerful intelligence organization forming part of the general staff and acting in the interests of the higher military : command of the Soviet Union. under the direction of the GRU steal top-secret documents.ierat yepishev.Ii'"i?r. [n addition.fip] p.. . tn u . *.il ail.lry_Arry .ij th"i...r...i from Yugoslavia straisht into-renewed e*if r..riir.J. I Shtemyenko was again . fut Iv_an meSnber Now once more the post of chief of the GRU was held bv of the KGb.'vrur tG.i ."*dir.-C. on his :r]9_.r. concerned.50 Soviet Military Inklligence the Politburo and also from his duties as Minister of Defence because of . To look at the GRU in isolation from its 'from subordinaie organizations is to look at Gengis Khan without his innumerable hordes. But we have not mentioned the most important point yet. . The central apparatus of the GRU processes espionage information coming from a thousand secret agents and it also carries out cosmic. and was not in the last interested in the fusion of these two organizations. What is more important is that. officers of the GRU operate under cover in every country of the world as diplomats. who then.9: appomtment. again reduled to the rank ["#.j.irrt."u.k. Both the illegals ' and the undercover officers independently from each other carry out the recruitment of agents.r-general. shill get a very impressive iomplete..s again firmly on the leash.h. Up to now we are talking about Gengis Khan but not his hordes.ouflnot exploit him party and the rCs. . according to Lenin. air and sea intelligence on a global scale.-petr fr. 1*y.rk*.bonanarti*.y.#ffi xl tlrxri.. Shtemyenko... trade representatives and so on.d chief of the Politicat Directorate of the SovLt a former Tchekist and potiticai.nora.

the to ordinary agents providini riiritary district and group of . addition .network.i. fo-u1. With all the forces at their disposal. the Soviet Army consists of sixteen the second fust being the ordinary espionage. ieudal state --the GRU.t - sum"i"it porn. and so forth.the Northern. On the strength J"putt*"nt. *:::::::r :o.rate' The intelligence agent department (RO) of an irmy or flotilla does run an of each intelligence neiwork of iis own. Pacific.pffi .rilo uy the intelligence department's wide choice of Llectronic. "u"-t. ipu. ::[. But each satellite also has its vassals . Lio"tin. there is a Spetsnaz gomplny' This company' . inte[it. group 9r of forces oi fleet has its own two independent secret ug".forces consists of armies. . On the staff of each department (RO)-which is in effect a it.ii*gtt of one intelligence directorate. a. the intelligence directora'tes recruit spef cial agent-terrorists destined io murder statesmen or senior military officers and to carry out general terror in tfre counifi group of countries. Brack sea and Bartic fleets..trii" tte territory of a contiguous r1. nuttut of thJ superior intelligence directorate and . group and fleet there are inte[igence directorates. on the staff strengths of each district. without assistance.t and io on.intelligence directorates . and there are in the Soviet armed forces at La'rt and each of these in its turn has its own army' and L"" at that. When we speak of an intelligence directorate of a district. group or fleet as a mini-GRU.oups of forces. secret information. which are the diversionary f*-1p-r_":]::: are in the sphere of interest of th-e given district. they gather information on the enemy.gch intelligence.uting into the enemy's territory to murder b6. "i1!-i fi::t: ' states' the -*y:There are twenty-four lesser satellitethe head of (RU).+errorisinetwork ialled Soyn11' suffrcient to iiii" . instead of this. GRU in miniature. In all. up bridges.t" i.g. ro disrupt life in any *'nti!uous-country or group of countries. dams' oil ..tiff top"tiot chief intelligence diiecto.iuting of inaepenaentry countries whicir These stePs need to be examined' -'8. and this is cosmic o. At the same time. subordinated to . Each flLet consists of flotillas which are equivalent army to ifr. these directorates f9ll. There is only one form"of intelligence possesserl by the GRU which possess.iOO ptot"tsional cut'throats continually in readiness state and go to the pun. The-only difference as regards *iit "t*i. "'tit*g of"from has his own aimy and his own vassals' also "..l"lr$lTe of ln me territories But each of these twenty-four intelligence directorates -agents wartime.. in effect. Thus each district.. ut*i.52 Soviet Military Intelligence The Pyramid 53 direcling organ of the gigantic formation cailed Soviet miritary intelligence.4i". an intelligence the iuil.t to be able. air and other types of intelligence .n.. be abte to recruit countries or groups is best iiragine Soviet military intelligence in the of u powerful.. and fi. electric pgwer stations. they have a imporrant means."fri.s of the land forces. th. 1g lnteilrgence. In Jpetsnaz units.O. form of subordination is that Soviet military ttrir pyt"rii vassal intelliiience does not operate on the nnn{npltrat'the fully and without oiry"uu*d is not my vassal'. And these Spetsnaz units are supillr". Hungary and czechoirovakia .t.. Poland." to* '. .hi.g..f. this does not in the leasi mean that the intelligence directorate is small or weak.irUers 115 saboieurs and cut-throats.rganizationally.directorate pdr"sre.and four fleets . F.t n.. We only mean that the intelligence directorates (RU) of staffs are smaller than the chief directorate of the general staff. group o.nt r"t*orks. is capable of and kidnap n"nrt. it is ierne*Ui that each one clontrols ah entire Spe*naz brigade: to i. both in peacetime and military districts.. Each of these mini-GRUs utilizes its own facilities.i. The GRU authority tontrols every step of the pyramid' assistance of the agent-terrorists. _ in Germany... 6"s1.:fl': l--d.-.y are all subject to the GRU and numbertwenty-a are.


Soviet Military Intelligence

The Pyramid



,nilr: Atl the-spetsnaz brigades and companies of the milrtary drstricts and armies, all the reconnaissance battalions

tank and electronic reconnaissAnce, has a sabotage co*pury which is also staffed with cut-throats capable of successful operations in the enemy's rear. In the interests of accuracy it is_necessary to add that not ail of the rg0 tank and motorized rifle divisions.have a full complsrirent of personneil;;;".* time; many of them have a complete tecirnical staff and full offiyg1_slreneth, but only a pa.iiat complement of soldiers and NCOs. However, this ruie does not apply to reconnais_

the heads of regimental reconnaissance and their troops. The reconnaissance battalion of each division, apart fr6m

each division there is a chief reconnaissarice officer. He has his own lroops, a reconnaissance battalion, and ht.

,{1 army in the Soviet Union consists of from four to six In peacetime there are in the soviet armed forces about 180 tank and motorized divisions. In the interests of simplification we can omit the eight divisions of airborne forces (VDV), the brigades of maine infantry belonging to the fleets and still many more branches of tne Souieiaimy IIg! h-*l inteltigence units subordinated directty ro it l GR-U-{ the general staff. On the strength of the staff of

vassals who carry out the orders of the GRU as y and with as much jealous zeal as do the intelligence Ltes of military districts, the intelligence departments

armies and the chief reconnaissance oifrcers of divisions regiments. These are the military intelligence services of

a, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary'
in the full meaning of the word ls of the Soviet Union. Their secret police forces are r the complete control of the Soviet KGB and take the of a miniature copy of the KGB. Their armies are in to the Soviet Army and their military intelligence ices are full vassals of the GRU, with all their gg!1 ls, rlili!4ryj!!g![, LaFotase agents' .s and so on. But of these later.
ies are satellites and

ia, Mongolia and a number of other countries' These




qompanies (more than 700), are always kept at full strength and staffed by 6lite officers and NCOs.

of the divisions, a[ the regimentJ


all. In addition to its ;fficial

twenty-four separate espionage organizations, each 1""rk:9 or wnrch ls as powerful as the intelligence service of one certral European country. He will havl overlooked 100,000 €lite troop_s_possessing as many fighting vehicles as a wellequipped Western European c-our-try. [ut .r.n that is not

Everything that we have listed comes under the indivisible control_of the GRU, although none of it is called by this name. The researcher who studies the GRU but does not take into consideration the GRU,s vassals will have

the GRU also


The GRU and the Military Industrial Commission



4 The GRU and the Military Industrial

The price of the ship is paid to the Ministry of

Commission (VpK)

the bouncil of Ministers under the debit item 'shipbuilding industry'. This Ministry, by the way, has never constructed any non-military vessels. Non'military vessels are, without

to the Soviet Army we must have in mind not orl"y tne frainistry oi Defence, but also the twelve other ministries whose

When we use the term ,army, with regard


to it. For example, an {rcraft carrier is under construciion in the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Defence does not U"r, .nyoi the cost of this.

receives the armaments neceisary

billion roubles a year. This nineteen billion, however, is the budget of the Ministry of Defence alone. The budgets of the remaining twelve ,irl.tri., produce armaments are kept secret. The Soviet system"trich is conitructed rn sucn a way that the Ministry of Defence does not buy; it

in the interests of defence, the irp.oU.Lfy small sum of nineteen

rovler unton itself. Theoretically the Soviet Uni6n spends,

own. The economic and financial might of the military industrial can onty be corpui"d with the might of the ::iit.,.,,_".1

collegium of the military- industrial commission are: one of thi first deputies of tlie ctrairman of the council of ministers, thirteen ministers, and the chief of the general staff and the chief of the GRU. The military industrial commission is the-Army and the arry i, tt" ,ifitury industrial commission. When we ,uft of-u ,iruggle between the Army and the party and the KGB *. frur" in mind the struggle of the whole military industrial .o.rirrior,;;;; fortunes, wax and wane in perfect fr.-ory ,"ith the A;/;


weapons una rilit"ry technology. rogemer alt these ministries form the high_powered monoilth



by the military industriat lorimission
in the


exieption, bought for the Soviet Union in Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark - it is difficult indeed to list all of them' It is probably true that only Switzerland is an exception to this list. The same thing is true of aircraft, tanks, rockets, nuclear bombs, military electronics, every item of hardware' Nobody in the Soviet Union knows exactly how much the military industrial commission swallows up, but in any case it is an astronomical figure. At the heart of any Soviet five'year plan for economic

. development

- not the propaganda plan which appears,in all the newspapers, but the genuine, secret plan - will be found the military industrial commission's plan. For all the other branches of the Soviet economy, metallurgy, machine tool

construction, energy, transport, agriculture, have no inde' pendent significance but only provide for the activities of the military industrial commission. Soviet science is another

- nary compact, imall-engined car? The Sotiet Union has had to buy all its technology for the production of small cars from ltaly. What are Soviet scientists up to if the Soviet Union has first-class military poisons but has to buy fertilizor technology from the United States? What are the sixty billion roubles spent on if the USSR constructs gigantic trans-horizontal radar, ultra'high frequency transmitters for

organ providing for the military industrial commission.' Officially it is allocated about sixty billion roubles a year' three times more than defence. But what sort of science is it, if the Soviet Union can produce the first automatic satellite destroyer in the world but cannot produce an ordi'

communications with submarines whose undergtound aerials amount to thousands of kilometres in length but has to


is yet

Soviet Military Intelligence

bly rF technology for the production of ordinary household television sets from France? Sixty bilion roubrei on science

TheGRl]andtheMititaryIndwtriatCommission(vPK)59 industries and science' In the course of
Soviet armament maior GRU operation, such


the theft of all the technologi

GRU, it has a vast apparatus within ttre coiitry and its political influence is colossal. So why is the financial might of the GRU many times greater tlian that of the KG-B? (Some specialists consider it to be several tens of times greater.) The business may be explained as follows. The fGB_!t_ its budget, which is without doubt enormous, and the GRU also has a moderate budget. Both form a part of State expenses and naturally the Slate tries to limii these expenses. But in its ,clean'budget the GRU has colossal orders from themilitary industriafcommission and from Soviet science which provides for the military com_ mission. These orders are incalculably greater than thi actual 'clean' budget of the GRU. For example, on receiving an order from the military industrial commission to steal a tank engine, the GRU receives money allocated as a debit item to''science' or 'industry'. With this money the GRU will recruit an agent without spending a single cent of its own money, industry and science will receive the engine they want and save enormous expense, and finally ttri CnUt 'free' agent will continue to work on its behaif for the rest of his life. All twelve ministries of the. military industrial commission, plus all of military science, are ready to place money with the GRU if only they can obtain the tichnology which is essential to them. Designers and factory directois receive medals and prizes for copying foreign iamples of armaments in the same way as they would ii they worked ou! their own examples. The KGB depends oniy on its actual budget, but the pRU draws on the buOgit of all

another means of camouflaging Soviet military expendi_ ture and the true might of the military industrial commission. What has the GRU to do with itris? The connection is this.: the ludget of the GRU is many times greater than the budget of the KGB. But the KGB is muchiigger than the

;;ru";tii-erfiion tot the American nuclear submarine e;r;;;-,irtiinston (which enabled the Soviet Union to the GRU build a perfect copy - nicknamed'Small George')' Other




*i..ii" ;n"o Eye' and the Anglo'French Concorde'
many others.

a single dollar of its. own- budget' American examples were the copying of the

itilffi;;; i,

the armaments Why does the KGB not carry out orders for very simple' The chairmen of the Council inJrrttyf This is Soviet of frfinitt"tt and Gosplanr are responsible for the whom Trrey ptan hiw much money to allocate' to the Council of and for what purpose. To the chairman of f"flriri"" .r. *boiOinated both the armaments industry and *r. Uinirt", of Defence with the general staff and the GRU' of the The KGB, alas, is not answerable to the chairman the GRU C""*il of Mini.t"t . Having given money tothe Council to of interesting]tile chairman of oU,uin something com' chriirmariof the military industrial



;ii ;;;.; the goods. The Kdg is not usuallv il *uth-:1-1I1X'tff: The ' ilei;;u.- u."n handsomely and generously paid'. to right and arrogant courtier, having the

mission may bang on the table and demand 1!'1*d:li'"Y. they op. eutit they give money to the KGB then deliver wait quietiv-until the KGB is readv to


KGB is a vain pocket' .r.uf. u, the King's.oun.Il, but without a sou in his -CnU ready to is an-ugly hunchback: a moneylender' h. r.rr.-uniUody ani'making millions in the pro99s::..Tle would kill the courtier hates the moneylen'-der' The courtier ;;;ft;"t were it noi fot the fact that he serves the King
I Thc State Planning committee'

Firslly having established their UfooJy dictatorship. Traditions live.r. He was therefore silent in this regard and did not mention the i! pleased with the piople executions of millions. Consequently in dark. given that it certainly exists and cgrtainly po.d. but never the GRU' 1 Tniraty. but simply lih: either it [r [i nobody is frightened "known of the animal. . underpeople's consciousRess everything tlqis ground and secret is connected with the KGB but not at all GRLI.rerted in showing up the crimes of the Organs within the country and he did show up several of them. y|-t comes all espionage information... He demonstrated the role of the NKVD but completely forgot the role of the communist party as the main. of the proletariat which was permitted to deal in whatever from that moment the whole world unreservedly saw the leadership of the KGB in all spheres of secret criminal activity. a thousands of colonels simply consider that . but. so let us discuss the most important ones. Moreover.i.. g"orgra end with thi tetters 'ciiu.i. nobody had given it this function. Later Lenin's succ€ssors informed people of all the changes in the names of the Organs. leading and directing force. way quite a few reasons. a branch of the fCf "rfi. the main function of the Organs is to exert pressure on the people themselves.r". in his struggle for power..." to the people the existence of an .i.extraordinary' orgun oiih" dicih. again-perhaps it does not exist. KGB officials who guard Soviet embassies overseas but are not members of -the inteffitence organization consider.But Why ls Nothing Known About It7 ..y no idea at all about it. but only ihat which at a given moment might bring him undoubted political capital. that there is residency in the embassy.r*ring Lenin when he informed the people about the birth of the V. il M3gg. blt-decidedly Nevertheless. underlining that it was only the nomenclature that changed. The effect was so strattering that part in the struggle against the people. in many cases. and it is still forbidden to complain about the Organs. rr. of which the GRU is part.uo. that of tt icCg. He mentioned the destruction of the comrpunist leaders in 1937 but omitted the destruction of the peasants in 1930. Even in the general staff.r.[i. The essence remained as before. Not because it was iott of humanity and love for its fatherland. power? can so little be about the GRU. He poirtted to the mass executions in Stalin's time but forgot to mention the mass executions in Lenin's time. in tire Soviet Union except to a small circle of enlightened ones. Khruschev *as int.. or the... the communisis had t6 unroun.r. Secondly. In practical terms the GRU did not take iitt tt.military d"purtr"nt coincidence goes unnoticed by almost inril. Tcheka. colossal ::t. Jhe its existlnce. Naturally people il'remember the kGB (on any pretext). . Revelations of crimes iommitted overseas did not enter into Khruschev's plans. . for the GRU is unknown "r"rybody. Khruschev made known to a siunned world some of the crimes of his predecesors and honourable Tchekists. Sorne berieve. His attitude is analogous to his rlurr. how There are exists.61 5 But Why Is Nothing Known About It? In the Soviet Union the registration plates of certain cars fr9r. The GRU did not need such publiciiy and therefore nothing official was-given out about the police. there have been photographs puUtlstreA of it. b. i.the ordinary Western man in thel street h. others do attitude-to the mythical animal from a Scottish " Much is known about the GRU by Western specialists. khruschev by no means revealed everything. They could not bring him any political advantage. _ including the mass ffrey aid this through the mouth of .



Military Intelligence

as Tchekists, and this at a time when iiRU inteiiigence ofihcers hated the fchglists many times more than thJy did the Gestapo. The GRU did not object to this. It preferreJ to maintain silence, not only about its crimes and .but . mistakes, also about its successei. The spying breed of animal ketip,s itself in the depths; muddy darkness are more to its liking than publicity.

advertising the 'attainments' of the Tchekists. In this connection all intelligence officers, KGB or GRU, were categorized

the KGB- Lastly, havingtmadJ rivers of blood from the people, the KGB strove to whitewash itself at all costs

greater attention. Fifthly, any unpleasant things which happen to foreigners in the Soviet Union are first and foremost connected witf, tne KGB and this gives rise to a corresponding flow of information about

to the KGB

organs of mass information in general. They certainly devote

overseas brimes of the KGB and, of course, those of the GRU. Fourthly, the struggles against dissent, emigration, and western radio stationJbroadJasting to the SovieiUnion are the-.sole responsibility of the fGE Uut not the GRU. Naturally the most talented representatives of liberation movements and immigration address their best efforts to enlightening the KGB itself. It is the same as regards radio station b-roadcasting to the Scviet Union and the Western


The GRU and the'Younger Brothers'


The state structure of any communist country strikingly if it finds resembles the structure of ihe Soviet Union' Even Union or has been able to itself in conflict with the Soviet character' escape frorn its influence, it is much the same in general rule for all co-mmunist ffr"Lft of personality is a countries, .nd ury 'big brother' needs an all'powerful secret potio otgunization to-counter'balance ihe power of the first

It is usually military intelligence which fulfils this cottnterbalancing roie, the more solince all communist countries'

of the kind of'communism they adopt, are warlike there an? aggressive. In a number of communist countries secret police organization' but *ouHlppear to be only one in these'cases closer inspection will clearly show a minimum


Sooner or later the his secret service into two dictator will be forced to split parts. In the countries within the orbit of the Soviet Union itrat separation has already been carried-out, for all of them

of two mutually hostiie groupings'

have bien created in the image of the elder brother'

The military intelligence sirvices of the satellite countrips show great activity ii the collection of espionage multl3!' GRU' unA ufT such material obtained is sent directly to the

The fact is that the intelligence services of the satellite of countries are even legally inswerable to the Ministry The military intelligence serDefence of the Soviet Union. vice of each Warsaw Pact country is subordinate to its chief of the general staff, but the chief of staff is in his turn subordiiate to the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact' Theor' may etically a general from any country of the Warsaw Pact



Mititary Intulligence

is all very welll some sceptics will object, but after .This yhal hpnened in 1939, f&" iuO'l i"r.. dislike for the Soviet communists, and their "u"ry iri"[ig";.; services would hardly work their best in tf," int"i"ri, ";'rl" GRU, would they? After 1953 the Easr Germanri;ily;i;;"d the feelings of the potes. In 1956 Hungary dr.; ttreir,*ano in 1968 the Czechs and Slovaks. Surefi ,fi" i"r.ifig"r."'re*i.e, of these countries would not wor[ hard i, ,[" irr"i.sts of Soviet military intertigence? unfortunater,,hr, ;;"rusion which has gained too wide an accentrr,.l;::::. contiadicts rt. rt,, u rult thrall to the Soviet Union hare th;-$;;;t"communists; but

all the forces of staffs of the .fraternri".r"ri"r,, including, of course' the military inteiligence s"r"i.", oiito." .ouni?"r, and we are not talking of-aor" .*op.ruLr, but of direct subordination in the legal sense. -r--Er'v

of defence in one of those states. There ir-J;;;.;;;;y for you. The USSR Minister of Defence-, through f,i, ?'.prty, directs

ever been Soviet favg or" of them is already well known to us: the former .fri"t of the GRU, Generat Shtemyenko. After tf," faiiof iiirscheu, Brezhnev, trying to ptease the Army, Airgru."d general from exile and reinstated irim as a fuli-general. As chief of staff of the Warsaw pact, his Air".i.up"ii-or High Commander of the Unitei-irr.O was (and is) the Forces of the member-countries. To this post i, t u, u-ioiuy. been a Soviet marshal who has been appointed. FirsriJ was Konyev, then Grechko, after him yat<ubovst<i .ra ir"fi, Xulikov. But the ,offcial titte of all rhese the time they commanded the united- forces was .firsi Oeputy of the Minister of Defence the USSR _ CorrurO"r_in_Chief _of of the United Armed Forces ot ir," ,;;;;;'.ountries of the Wdrsaw pact,. In other words, the armies are the armies of several states subordinated to a deputy

be appointed to this position. In practice of course there only

s;;r;;;;inr"a. ,"*[rt ri,



'The solution to ihe tiddle is this. By means of harsh economic treaties the Soviet Union hai enchained all its 'younger brothers'. For Soviet oil and coal, electric energy and gas ' they all have to pay very heavily. The Soviet Urrion propGes to its satellites that 'you may pay by means of your orvn wares or you may pay by providing the secrets of other, people'. This alternative offer is a very tempting one,.to wtrictr ttre general secretaries have unanimously responded by orderin-g their intelligence officers- to-- redouble their .ifortt. So the intelligence services of all countries tied economically to the Soviet Union make the g[eatest possible efforts. By itealing Western secrets and transmitting them to Soviet military or political intelligence they reduce their countries' indebtldneis and raise their peoples' standards of living. Wistem states have been surprised by the extent of the intelligence interests of communist states' Why should Mongolian intelligence be interested in atomic reactors, or Cuban intelligenci in high'powered rocket engines? These questions arJeasily answered as soon as one realizes that t'h.y .t. all part oi on" gigantic formation. [n the ranks of

none the less their intelligence services work to the full extent of their powers in the interests of the elder brother'

officiats of Sbviet state institutions overseas it is almost imposible to find one 'clean'one. All Soviet citizens' from ambassadors to cleaning staff, in one way or another co' operate with the KGB or the GRU. The same thing is true oi the official institutions of the 'fraternal countries'' There it is also diffficult to find a single 'clean' official' All of them are to some extent co-oPerating with the Soviet KGB or GRU - even though frequently they themselves do not realize it.


The GRIJ and the




but these are all either a part of the main function or not of

The GR(l and the'KGB

prime importance. ' The function of the GRU may also be stated


parallel, but quite different phrase: to prevent the collapse

The working methods of the GRU and the KGB are absol_ utety identicat. h is imposriUfe ioie[ ,igr.trr"s apart. Bur their funcrions differessentially;il;;, the orher. The basic functiqn of the fCA may Ue':_pr..*O in one guiding phrase:


of (liion from an extemal blow. ln the opinion of

the general staff luch a blc


UniJn in peacetime, even in the course of routine Soviet in Asia, Africa or Europe' This, -the military


may be struck at the Sovict





lhe protection oi communist VIps; the suppression of any clashis o, Jir."* .rong rhe popu_ jont rhe. carrying oit o1 oisinformation; ll prohibition the of any-contact betwein tte p"opl" and the outside world - including tt. i*t.iion'oi'ior"ign visitors _ and the cutting off of an-y .orr..i, .ii.Jdi established with and

some of those functions:

ailow cgttapse Union from specific function ir"rJr.o, In*;r. To enumerate




"d".ntutes most important function of the GRU, is undertaken on four fg!s. On the ryi!'mrv i@!, literally everything is of interest importance, of course, are the and deployment of the armed forces composition, quantiiy of ail countriei of the world; the plahs and thinking of the military leadership and staffs; mobilization plans in case of

tffi" GRU.tTt;;e

the guarding

parties wirh rhe aim of nippini i" "orrunist *,. Lrj .nl rreresy which might emerge from trlm;-the of all. Sovier -t-hemr"tres; citizens abroad, including fCg ;m;"; th. seeking our and destructio-n of tfre mosi altir" oppon.nt, or the communisr regime. The KGc funoions,

Soviet population ; observing tr,"

'wirhin rhe srare or iorkers religious organizations which

in the-same way" u*ggi. *irt emigration and efforts to diminish iis influence oni't internal life of the Soviet Union; the srruggle with " Wesiein radio stations broadcasring ro the SovietUrr, urj'J,r,ir'r"un, of mass information which pive a correct picture of the situation

Ij,.l.,t::1,..r i actrvttres rotate around the same main axis _ to prevent the collapqe of the ussR from within. can be divided


,i rr*tL^ d;;;r. ren disrricts of Kct ;i;;'or.o..s but ts

war; the type and direction of military training of forces;the organization of forces; the means of supply; morale and so onl Ot prime importance on the llilllgy'+oliticgl,fiont Le the relaiions between the different oountries of the world: overt and covert disagreements; possible changes in political



and military leadership of military and economic blgcs; new alliances; any, eren the slightest, change in the political and

military orientation of armies, governments, countries and
whole 6locs and alliances. On the @lary'Echnologicdftmtthe GRU handles intelligence related t0 the devebPment or new kinds of armaments and military technique in the countries of a probable enemy; the carrying out of trials and




tte srruggte with innu.n.. on the

tests; new tecirnological processes which might be utilized



for military ends. And the @ry-rgrykfront presents exceptional interest for theTF[l]Fl6t and foremost it is fascinated by the capacity of such and Such a state or grouP of states to produce modem types of weapons, but it is also extremely klen to learn about industrial potential, energy' transpori, agriculture, the presence of strategic reserves, vutnirable areas of economy, and energy. The general staff considers that if the GRU can give accurate information in

rirt itt" CnU is under the control ih.rritt. . the Soviet Union by means of a blow from outside. ln lnott.i.-p". appears to be the mostdangeroui opponent "i"w possible..i"i of tire GRU i.rity ot President Carter fror ArJrr.sent day.r.l[:iIfftili]: fl:"j'. because his human rights poticies 8 weipon which coulj T-e the Soviet ril il'.Vt the efforts i"ner otJ". The GRU and the to deitroy each other' Between them exist . their approa. For example.nted the GRU from actively opposing io it". an object of the greatest posible interest to the preserved in the past.- the Soviet population will not Ue in ttre least interested in from China or Korea or yugosravia j :rtTil::ii:lil"d9ey that not rr rs aso qurte convinced one defector fipm the Soviet Union will ever seek refuge in Cnli. Soviet Union has an embassy..different. - joining the GRU The second argument is that everybody aPPears has to be vetied by the KGB' This argument i1 that each new .. Ano good time from every country in the world on these four then it can count it impossible to Jestroy !1o1ts. Some specialisis d. the GRU exceptionat interesr in the . be the fint lu..f. China is.iigrrtry on his colleague from.Ty out a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union.*6.hekists: he would be like a cowed laqdo-g for the between his legp.y'.ing only at first glance' The fact the of"the ientral Coirmittee is under the control of Central Commit"in."t".se. eiu .t until he becories a Central Committee official or of the KGB and possibly I.ffi an.. [kJ the 'clean' diplomats in all Soviet officers of the GRU do not do this' They t *iti.".t.[V .il.i. for example in the GRU select for themselves the people necessary and in this connection consult the KGB' for any io .. vlce-versa:..i. superficial possible examination of the presid"nt.h"* mutual relitions which perfectly suit the Party' the GRU and i. fo'r exarnple. inl pr"*n.i. for Union from within. "r.ees of their ind€Pendence-. ii. The same mutual relations have been KGB are readv at .68 Soviet Military Intelligence The GRII and the KGB 69 ::I: yly.. In examining mutuar ieiaiions between the GRU and the .y and mutual hatred between ..[o* it.lot is a branch of the KGB' Both the iCg ie" .s of personnel lirptlfa in the Chinese politicat and military feaOerriip.f. particular problem would differ in esse:ce. Urt tir.o*runir.o .. usually adducing in -defence of ttris opinion two arguments' Fintln ihey say. not even daring to bark tour".. almost an empty ptace. Even in those fieldJ where the GRU and the KGB have what would seem to u" iit. il i.r ll! is ahiays a former KGB has been the ..t to the police of every country where the t"*l!l . fCg may tlave some unfavourable information on a *.. b"ginning vith Aralov' and .. a demonstration of €migrds is of absolurely no{nterest ro the Iussran o:.tou.and to consider the are inclined from ihe KGB.'which the independence of the GRU' If the fate or career of a GRU resident were to depe4 would .f*.re diametrically..ror. and it is pycisell lhh provides proor ol noticeable even to'unarmed eyes. the KGB. But invulnerability il"" lr.i"r*ffl "i.i. and even sometimes on the order p"tty striking the Tchekists sudden and heavy blgl!: oi .{" *rrf" . The KGB very well knows that afte-r siity yean or.'idB it. But that same man.l.In.many instances_the interests of the'KGB and the GRU a.h. . iCg lo jiili"r"" no interesr dependence on the KGB_ In the'chafter on history we endeavouied to show the character of th'ese mutual relations KGB we have to return to the question of .i . KGB.--tlre KGB' he or brawl quarrel never iniisiife dare to diffei with. .9"t 9: general' but this ..on"in.m posed practica[y no iri...r.t a branch of ft. irom the poiit oi of the KGB.ii ily. prrron"iity the GRU infallibly decided thar he *ouH-i"r. military exercises are of any interest to rhe KGB residents. of great interest to GRU residents. still less wilh T. For the KGB qu":j.

1-^ . . would you be very kind and give me just one little film? You know yourself that I have to make a report to the Politburo but I have no material..".in tfre GRU. But at seven.ili Ceitrat Committie irrlO"'ii" jt *ll Li'. At nine o'clock in the morning the Politburo sesion was to begin. :. The CRII and the KGB 7l the command point that the aircraft from Paris had landed at the centrat iirport and taxied up to the GRU building' The day before. U"our"'it.[riil!. there is something I want to talk to you about. The duty shift of operators is always in readiness to prompt their chief with a .:t'..:y :r!ilrj .ilnri.on.t forces.' All service telephone calls to the GRU chief are relayed through the GRU command point.Jiilffi'ii-G.p". To illustrate the any unwantea-omciar inside the The KGB *. at I-e Bourget airport. The whole bf the paris residency had been at the show and the majority had had cin€ cameras.111. The guard :Jik..70 Soviet Military lwelligence discred. bnu is assured Dy . This day began fbr tnejnU felO-JJnin at the unusualty early hour of 3. comrade Andropov?' 'Peter lvanovitch.onr. given person. These shows are not of great interest to my chaps and unfortunately not one of them was there with a cin€ camera. may refuse enrry to an engineer *ho. .i:T.. the minister of aviation production.from "?[:j:ft f f..o.r.ig[t to engineer's safe. *t"n rj::3l* .{ tam-. ". that if the KGB were to orsanize its own i$anment.. Now the operational the Kci.. and always rts own has been.. direc' tors of subsidiary concerns. flil'j' j::If ..i. I guard ar rhe gate or. T... Have you forgotten my name? Peter lvanovitch. at which they would hear evidencc from Tupolev.' Peter lvanovitch said nothing..30 in the morning..from the opinions or tne CnU ciiii.. keen thar this should continue.i. 'Peter lvano' vitch.i. 'Well. don't be so . the director of the Voronesh aviation factory. but he has no. The KGB in rhis case plays the part of a filter.l. ffi . at the time head of the'r. the telephone rang and it was Andropov.:lil r#:f GRU.". I need the film about the catastrophe. . The moment of catastrophe had been photographed from different points by different officers. There exists still another irrefutable indicator of the independence of the GRU. How are you. 'Peter lvano' vitch. a similar dloartment would swiftly be introduced into the Politburo.11_:il"J.RU or rhe Centrat The securiiy GRU there is department'..ryucg and the paradox of the fleet pendenr.. this il i-ra ud.nts of that i{{fi . how are you?' Peter Ivanovitch lvashutin (present chief of the GRU) did not hasten to match the friendly tone... his deputies. xi'tr. and I hear you have got some films showing the catastrophe.l I*"ff ?.'il'#:.."r.irurion..rgotten his pass at home. Help me to get out of this mess.J-::Ti:lo.".r.Hrffi . If it so Jesires. jil. "*"r-inJrn. CnU had at its disposal no fewer than twenty films showing the same moment.*..*iii..'f. ffr.:f-.. test pilots and of course the GRU and the KGB.ny..1. the Soviet supersonic passenger aircraft Tupolev TU144 had^^. of @urre..xT:l i[ Jas informed by :.:ffiI technological inititute of the GRU would develop them *::t.ray. The films had not been developed in PariJbut brought straight to Moscow.. ffi il:r" ji':: jl.

too' on the fourth .n. Only I will showihem at nine o. *fii.:t ?arty and Soviet Leader. The aerodrome is surrounded offices of three restricted buildings. and the roar ii. barbed wire.. a covered'op t"ti"g" of a fighter aeroplane taken oui of a hangar. un it'pty field in the centre or civil aircraft frf"*"" p". The parades finish.i. Sometimes another transport-aircraft lands' tank or rocket' io . . with more dogs little..clock in-the Politburo. because an5/ attack from Andropov could easily have upset the fragite party-Army balance'with unpredict:able consequences for Andiopov himself. wtrictr everything becomes peaceful again' out for the months of the ye"t irepatations are carried B.*9r'.nJ i. A concerted roar of laughter shook the walls of the underground command point. of the KGB and ex-deputy chairman of Finally.ll rwenty.J. 1. Their help was not called foiat all.t. Very. choking with laighter. it is in Moscow.rmp.72 necessary figure Soviet Military Intelligence in colonel-general the The GRU chief remained silent for some time. Ivashutin stilt surviviJ as GRU chief.. t ut what would be the decision of the GRU chief. or to help him over a mistake 8 The Centre Andropov. I.Jirg ""ioion . but the guarded of! .) slammed down the leceiver.. is by no means-easy to find' Itis airpgrt' the old enctosed from three sides by the central Ill.. The senior operator. behind one loses count.t head office does not rise in the centre of of the GRU' on-io *ort crowded square' The head office . and at ten oUock I'il send my chaps over to the Andropov angrily advertise itself' Unlike the KGB. life as if half-asleep.KGB? Central Cornmittee to give you all tne ntms. in friendly."CnU building and unloadi a foreign For two afte. from three sides it is impossible ltt" cnu.ilrilrte of tank engines can srandiose military paradei.r..r. the GRU does not try to the capital . No. among which are the drms and 6ne rocket construction firm' and i.iit*gr. loaded onto a transPort steppe for . t.r. only of them .. the KGB ::.ll give py.nJ.n.. is rhe lnstitute of cosmic Biology.ury aviation academy and the aviation institute' [n cames on the centre bf thes" secret institutes the aerodrome in the middh *iitt i. an ei_ conversation.rotLa Uy watchdogp' Not one the watch' i .i Jisturbs tire quiet oi Khodinka.n. or fact. very rarely' aircraft is of the night.nrpotted somewhere into the trans-Volga goes uP i"rting.are J"g.ffi. ({frcl Andropov became Generat Secretary of the Com- on all sides by Xt oOinfu field. The duty operators were quite certain that in a similar situation."r at night liki wolves' How many rhe-re? . At this point the entire duty shift was frozen to the spot. entered the conversation in the log book. From the fourth side.:l9Jid"rbredty refuse if the GRU asked for its rreip.ins guarded. i. even tones he answered ..l-' 'Yuri Vladimirovich.ra. give you one film. A narrow which lane leads through is the 'Aquarium'' a hlind wall ten metres high..

fr .r.f. not even the Minister of Defence or General Secretary.r..n. Under him are a first deputy tn ttre case where the deputy has several directorates under his command. acquisition and processing of information there "i.the building is surroundei Uy trnostorey structure...p*t treaO *i[.. stilt tess a Urilfcasel Th"r" metallic object on."i.t!.-. are used by the service for official p. from the tele-cameras and narrolted continuousty . if. The military rank of a officer is colonel.irporir.i:-. an/ of the little old "ririA"li lir" tLi. however..t"o uno th. The lfte1. Nobody may bring in'so much as . The rank-and-file members of opef' sections'are called senior operational officers and senior operational ational officers.futi"s are colonels..organizational uniti ionrtituting t['e GRU .your person.ii O.f. ir. of the flats. ih.s for example the personnel directorate' Directions and . does not at all mean it ri tft..* mt..pp""r"n. officer's lhoulder."r.h big.6rr*o he holds' directorates: most of them In total the GRU has sixteen do have a number from one to twelve' Certain numbers is simply called by its name' not e*itt and the directorate .tiont.. ryr. there utguld be apprehended immediately. centimetre by centimetre.i. fy men seated on benches (minimum t*"nty years.-. the iions. directions. deputy ^l-"39t-:j diiections and departments. the windows of w-hich " give onto the centrar -*indo*. .Lo"ry people . Seniority is judged not byrhe pips [n. but by the position is subordinate to the chief of the general staff and is his deputy.'otr. or a senior lieutenant on . This..fio".-rnilrre1. not even a bert-buckre . Buieven if it *. a cigare.'fi unJ .r heads of directorates. heads of directions and"t departments are maior'generals' The. the The chief of the GRU . The external walts have no at all.r. a completely normal .the UtsU recommends" rigr. of an operational officer lieutenantcolonel.-. ftoygver. lilie an Many families of GRU officers :1" c!U. Ttre military rank of the chief of the GRU is and deputies' nity C. directorates.n.n.lro belongs to deputy chief and a grouP of advise."' The.ffing has.-ltthough ilis. fat faces. Iriunits which are not directly concerned ..t.. courtyard. The head office of the GRU is a nine_storey extended rectangle.fter'ttrey rrave ouet*t elming number of GRU officers hold the mili' tuiy trnt of colone-!. fountain pens: The GRU gives been checked.ig. of course.-en are ro be iound inside.tte tighter." ur*u .O to bring if a ordinary block of flats.y b. If he onty has one directorate. point. One is oiiy uomitted after !.. are used for livini purp"*r. itrf.y are equal amongst each other' Between the colonel the duties of i senior operational officer and the "i"irihri of a direction who ii also a colonel there is a J.tq Soviet Military Intelligence The Centre 75 In order to penetrate into the inner fortress of the GRU one must negotiate either the area of the secret aerodrome or the area of the top secret institute. bil.ituated externar wa[s.t"di. NoUoO/ is . gassine through a speciat inspection and s-ifnisticated elec- car into the GRU's inngr area. ile Jtrole of rhe area..oi tiur] a strange. All necessities for work and life tronic equipment.n"ral. the heads of sections and tr.s19reV building adjacent to tf.!q untoward. .undercur". his miliiary rank will be colonel' g.rn aaoptio by the soviet Army permits this' n captain may be an icting"d-r. is.f. Directly subordinate to the chief of rhe GRU are the bRU. service in the GRU) would immediarely inform .op. divisions of dirictorates.-onry a certain nuru.iit.. departments and sec' . ..h. acting colonel.. The high service ranks existing in the GRU do or not pieclude the appointment of a very young captain operational officer' senior lieutenant to the post of senior . On all sides.. lieutenant-genelal' Lni"t of directorates are lieutenant-generals' The depu.

general). (lieutenant-general) EE v The Chief of the Electronic Intelligence Directorate i TB x! [] I EI Et !8 E! c o C a I .F E 6E 'The chief of Information (colonel-general) in charge of all the processing organs of the. I o I*tr1 " vi itre Chief of Fleet intelligence (vice'admiral)' vii The Chief of the Cosmic Intelligence Directorate (lieutenant-general)' -of the soviet Army Academy (colonelviii ihe Head iIi tri i* "tt. The hierarchy iJl-rrpl" oftheGRUhasonefirstdeputyandsevendeputies beneath him. rie E section he The Illegals Section' With the help of this illegals and agents about p./ / ti .E 6 -I ol oa b .. -t \.riei. He controls: i ' & : : i E.r*g f.o. t5 JC l€ t. ii" r.. n6Uody knows' He also directs his own first deputY.The Centre have numbers' departments forming parts of a directorate 'at piriciion' means the first direction of not the fourtir directorate' Directions and departments with single i.i €95 Chief of the GRU (colonel'general)' organs which beneath whom are all the Procurement provide information' !s I.*nufly directs effective i"f.ri ot a directorate have a the firstnumber department for example.GRU' iv The chief of ttre pilitiJal section (lieurenant-general). iii tt" GnU is as follows' The chief GRU. -'r.pury iii . I iifi . E (. EEI Fi5 E ii F*i b. (. GRU added. (lieutenantHead of the personnel Directorate general).

Aeroflot..r'. the Merchant Navy.ft.ii ' activities oi unaligned movements' iiliri.[ #' f Tffi i ffi Hf .ilr.-!)tSe gpC-dirgBge with an analogous organizatron carrying out agent intelligence in Americi..' are ve rv. In-addition some GRU officers. continue to work in their covering organization and not in the head i':J li[:xdli rhe.o'lte' -Yli ^. and about 300 All units of the GRU are divided in their designations into procurement.#:l oi fiie directorates but are answerable to the first deputy chief..iirJ{. Each of .'rha directnrete or direction .!r. T::*::". hilh-quaritv me gars' "i'-oi'.The Procurement Organs 9 The Procurement Organs *ffi:.nt principle in running its The GRU adhere.[l*{.^!-^-. which carries out agenr dir€ctorate contains about 300 high-ranking officers in the Moscow centre..organi."se.'il. #1i' tii'n ..e.. controlled by the fint deputy chief of the GRU. on their return from overseas. the Academy of Sciences and representatives fit their young officers into T .i. or entire continents'. and The fourth from countries. processing and support.'i. .direction ::ffi ".'...oi" ittt iilegals andof group' of tefrtories under cover at the same-timt .oi ::A:T ffiTffi: 1!. They in. .the^ Pird djricto=late..X. there are also four directions which undertake the sanie duties. [".putvmavuJi:'::*::""-H:fl ::ffn*. Ttresejir:ffiot form pu. geiides these four"*"* i"l service ."""iffi:Lll' ".ilJ 9! 1: no ttpitutt unit for directing Drocurement organs ii"it it such a unit neces' Iiffio:'.. .:".The his iGgals for canyllg iglq .n.fua.1"n.tl6nu J*s not considerand several of the : sary.#k"ffi{[ .'1" . European territory.:: residencies ii:'*:"'..ffi ill and..P1..ouniti.t'" inteuigence to direct and the endeavours .:"rifr".iffi f^T. bottiNorth which cariies out agent inteiligence on and consists of five directionsJeach of which-carries out agent intelligence on the territories of several countries (each direcr:on consists of sections which direct undercover residencies in one of the countries con_ $" &t !t*StSfet". are . stors tn tne tnsfitution serving as cover and guarantee their smooth progress in their future activities.nrsto. The greai majority of the prgcurement the pioviders of information.folh:. Among its :nregars rrom the p."d 5:' *' head may at Siiei6ffil institutions used by the GRU as cover: rhe Ministry of Foreign Affain. iitltttttt t'"tat direction heads have'ii"i-1ntit . the Ministry of External Trade.t.J.

.ni. Prgqure and partly process information.80 Soviet Mititary Intelligence is a.y 8j9u. ttre latie'.t.. the number of all the agents controlled by the first four a€€nts ultimately controlled by the nftr. fleets and groups offorces. The numbelo{ secrer agent.. T[ffii'ectorffiTffi of vassals. These directorates procurement directorates and are not ".n.".ror.-""J oir"^i#. gfoups of forces and ffeet inl[i"gence.. . but they do not go I pu. its functions differ from those of the four directorates and four directions listed above.n. so they are not considered i1-for directorates and four J! may secretly-check on the aciivities of his drrectorate. The fifth directorate does In addition to the proliferation of units outtined above..r. or indeed the chief himself. there are two nlore GRU directorates which are concerned with the procurement of information: the sixth directorate and the cosmic intelligence directorate.BI d S$Ictl'controller Krno o[ ar"..g 4ifctp-tgtg.. having in its turn four more fleet inteltgJnce directorates beneath it. fgryeq. This arrangement works in reverse too: with the help of agents of the first fouf directorates and four directions he can check the activities of the . which is atso concerned .te exceeds dir.Jhere wrn procurement and controlled by the first deputy. Directly under its control are tyentf intelligence directorates_ belonging td the military districts.jy -r r--l l. Wth their help the first deputy.. gr*4pets. The chiefs of both rhese direcrorates answer to the chief of the GRU and are his deputies.. underJover residencies and agents of the above-mentionid directorates and departments operate. but not first deputies. operate on all the same territories where ilegars.g. However. aeent intelligence.l i 1 IJ iilI ItB It?i ti:j tE_i I .l. W ffik M /sll t-ir EI .. subordinate to the firsi deputy chief of the GRU."i districts.fi_tth*Gj. .

with the exception of those who undertake onty It has ifffff-cosmodromes.e other through the cosmic intelligence airJoitt"' . The electronic espionage services of each military district.and the ne* Lsmic activities he is under information service. For this purpose its officers are posted to undercover residencies in the capitals of foreign itates and there form groupc which intercept and deciphir transmissions on governmental and military networks.. The Soviet Union has sent into orbit more than 2.factgn'. the electroniccompanies of divisions.N'nttern' intelligence.i.i. aircraft and helicopters for electronic es-pionage..' in mind the tasks to be reasonably .. "t'O Pacific' Black Sea and directorates of naval ti.'it" t"JO"l* niets co-ordinated by an four intelligence directorates organization known tt..t."t' fulfilled. operate in widely tull information on the each ship .yhich directorates i"tignificant.Iltt'soviet High Command quite chief of fleet intelligii.. this directorate contrors the electronic intelligence services of the miritary districts. The vast majority of Soviet fu|. special ships. and thJse in their turn contror those of the divisions. caused bv rnaritime.. work for half their time in space in the interesrs of the GRU.onuiiootti--1"* comes under the GRU enemy. And so it goes on.directorate and Baltic .82 Soviet Military Intelligence demonstration flights."iu!ence "io"^ "tthe similar to directorates have a structure There are small tifi'"ty districts' that of the directorattt for our pur' 't .ff.ii itrt"tt-under the heading of 'oper- ational Intelligence" two indeoendent cosmic The GRU chief has at his disposal 5nt'l-Ut"tl"tn him dirictly-' the 91U intelligence and th. are'as of ttre chief as a deputy. The GRU cosmic irtdligg1*jit_g_ql_9gr-lejs no tess power- aquired from intelligerice.. ii iir o"y-..tti"iiv o"6n"a tpr'"1" of responsibility of ttt" four Soviet fleets time of war. whereat'itt" tt'ip world's oceans and intelligence' Fleet intelligence gro-up of u"ou'"'JJtn-*iritlty district and if in gr*f. . regiments oi military distri. There are also many regiments of electronic inteiligence on the territories of thi Eastern bloc and Soviet Union..' was introduced forces has a very . groups of forces and fleets which in their turn havi their own regiments.o military districts will be ll?iiiio'ii' a. Furthermore. four intelligence *"J. All the information 10 Fleet Intelligence twenty intelligence direc' The GRU fifth directorate directs of fott"t directly' and torates of military oi. is iollected in thl sixih directorate and analysed there.0fi) cosmic objects for different purposcs."ii". The chief of fleet intllligence co-ntrols the.onrio"'Jitt"i' u""ting i'tn" itJ own cosmic intelligence r. cocmonauts. a co-ordinating computer centre and huge resources.nO of forces and spy shipa of the fleet.. and the fleet intelligence J"r"t "t ffi*i.ging . group and fleet correspondingty control similar services in the armies and .. the fleet' 'utt exclude the GRU chief service.fu -iiil. and these are integralparts of the sixth directorate.. This of t". and one in three of them Detongs to the GRU. electronic battalions of armies.*i. The KGB lies far behind the GRU in this respect. a number of research institutes.. .nu. It works out the technical details for spy satellitis inde-pendentty and prepares them in its own works. iott not .o-daf GRU fifth directorate' it" it "'il".t.

il'i" .i"i-.i"*[igence sumirary' destined for members . of all publishes a top it .-cnu'.source rasr arty Considering that not only the GRU cosmic intelligence' -details ffiin iesiile?itl@ETrtrlllegal' give information.. listed bclow . :"'"T"T1 ryii: days off' without holidays' It works without breaks.84 Soviet Military Intelligence satellites put into orbit by the Soviet Union.. we may say'that out of all the controlling his own cosmic intelligence service with the help 11 The GRIJ Processing Organs The GRU processing organs are sometimes simply'informition'' The mation service or ro'"-t"q'ently of colonel-general and is a chief of information material coming from ug.P*i: to from the intelltgence has full Poweli:.. but alio that of the fleets has its own spy satellites.:::'-::l 3iffiai#. i" v the information sernG of intelligence if.-Ltg"nir"tiont u:t miiitary intelligence whichareconcernedwithiheprocesingofsecret material acquired' Theinformationcommandpointissecondonlytothe GRUcentralcommandpoint.up6 t *.rUri.iiiii.. the material atr preriminaiy procissing. ii six information directorates.#i' Th" rollowing are under his i the information command Point. of the other and vice-versa. without pt"tlte -"f !:--t:*L* i"ttttiq:i:: . about half are directly or indirectly subordinated to the GRU..t.. directorates of .!r gp.i' rl'e' inrormatio".O. eactr morning at-six o'clock of the . rank control: called the infor- ." info*ation services of fleet intelligence.a *.*rf{n lnItfact any. 'ot" iliffiffiil' *"u.i militarY districts and grouPa. iii the institute of information.

rJrpiiLtes the activity of its neighbour directorates' prevents a one-"g nations began.-ggIieq^ il..anv .ge of such a set'uP is-that it . .to forces and economies.ontrolled by opposed.nt.ffi-. by agent' elec' exclusively on secret documents obtained ov:l and cosmic intelligence..n.Or. or appioach to problems' Director' *.-r ..'"iitt .. The many Th. Many reports from the. one brief sentence' to this other report on the information command point has no enioence to supPort it' The rePort would .r"tii"" of strategic 1uclel forces in anv ..the SALT iiE-u.r. to wreck the 'locomotive of capitalism' it was not neoessary sna$ the engine...#*:'i. and in the morning all material which has come to hand during the previous twenty-four hours is transmitted to the inform-ation directorates of the GRU for detailed criffiliy*warching duction and technological developments.i. I.tor. forces of all countries who possess such capaliliiiei. It is very tightly conneced with rhe Sovief ilsign omces and with the armarnents industry as a whole. that a case officer belonging from an residency receives a short verbal report un'a'. a suggeslion in the 'Locomotive Report'of 1954. AnU are analyzed simultaneously by several Let us "i in'^if unitt of the information at the same time' to an example.p".procurement even or ir.. the institute--sludjes outside . only to deprive it of a crucial ingrcdient. each of which consists of sections..icfffi*iqn ii'stitute functions independently the chief of information of tf. strategic reiurces and points.iil. qn{ stratggic .t n.i. there are six directorates plus the information institute on the strength of the information service.iilIt ii . Happily this stunning idea of the tenth directorate has not as yet been pui into practioe.A carries responsibility for the study of individual tren& or aspects or' NATO"tty of each information directorate in *.e_s strate-gic *1." .ar.. '!g!y1tiq!.nripttJt"a telegram. It is the only link between the Soviet armaments factories copyrng foreign weapons and the residents of Soviet intelligence who obtain the necessary secrets.rlrr.d yet been made' Immediately after the announcement has as .""ii. . In all.++!gglg!-gf Politburo and the higher military command. nugle. bpeciat attention is paid to questions of folitical structure.rpS.i" oir.:.-. iir". wortowii-{ [fi spediv.. - rithli ftr[ ril"a '-o::1' ltiuth dilg-cjgt$e -qtsdr* ntlitery lgglrnqlgey.i. The nlTFIng begins of course with the seventh directglqlg directorate carefully may in the future possess them' This activity' any change in oi-inttttt"o . Each department and each section ..lre eleh1!^gggdg:llg.o.r.* jet fighter is -states and no offrcial in ttre united "?"f. .o"r"tes.olnruna point.86 Soviet Military Intelligence The GRIJ Processing Organs 87 rysgggqd *!ichdrrectorate witb a q$y. The tenth dlr"9g-!oqq!g studies military econori. and special imphasis is put on a study of the personal activities of statesmen and miiitary leaders...'.s-osotries of wheiEittraiEunifi beffi6 td NAto oinot. !o Immediately after this the Soviet penetration of the Arab . studying thi walls of the GRU' As which base their analyses of the situation .'.i'i". in the Proceq the effect ih..tions nof at ptoblt't in narrow' parochial question but giving their opinions not on the whole e unified opinion is worked out bv the head irt" nlp of his best exPerts and the organs .rtl ...'gr"u".i"" arid a subjective i .pf-tHlgi" anffiffi lhe consists of six departments.i"P...rrg...":uglgVj4p-.l. The idea of an oil embargo first saw -vulnerable the light of day in this directorate a.*1rJ . in itre form officen ot ilffi". when it was pointeO out that.ruone it Soviet on the information Unfortunately we do noipo*it reliable directorate' activities of the twelfth --'ifr" any signi -activities gig.r.Ttre delegations tttis directorate talks' to. Thepteve4t[__q1!rIli. an with the agint the case officer would send Moscow' But .

who would be likely to win and who to lose. the shoes of NATO leaders. their ."d.' 1"" il:ii# ffiii. on the basis of an analysis of military orders.. the report. field of piloted cosmic flights leading Soviet specraiisit-in tf't every ste? of the Americans' and..i. how it would affect the balance of power in Europe and in the utorld. simply on the evidence of existing carriers of atomic weapons. which aviation companies might be drawn into the development of the '4fuuaft by tendering for the contract.. tp"atntt technology' or atoniic energy' rnittoUiotogy or computerSuch a rigltt relations' strategic planning "i'in"rnttffrral the geniralPmmittee on the was accorded to trre bnU ui it i..[. The ninth directorate. amongst i"iai"ft confirmed.ffi sroups or rnititttv disiricis' flelts a1! armv activity to increase their would receiv. 'iitit'' '*' programme 'onitored .ns canied orbitatflight' the first multi.i..-.i..i. .'nttion fimmand intelligence oi itt" rvas ct . tne f. on the basii of an analysis of the latest American achievements in the sphere of engine building..p''u have some bearing poini' end all resi' ooinion to the into.. At the and quantity of nuclear weapons reolacement in service. with ... would endeavour to calcutate same time 'unchecked and unconfirmed report'. The question of which country of the United States' allies would be likely to buy such an aircraft would also be studied. Ouriig unceremoniously co'opted the o}'tne..In conformity with dramatic moments of the this the GRU. aviation trre mosi moJern achievements of thc United about know .. The tenth directorate would uneningly tell... u""titoi the Soviet union to b€ in the frg-cosmic rescarch has the right to .. aerodynamics..:il::'ifir.out ir" .l what present and future value this fighter would have for NATO wfiich aviation companies would actually be involved and to what extent. The seventh directorate.p*.. Japan' Germany than lic of France and the Federal Repub' its own' present its own ::##.r"l similar reports already of "ii Summary'.'gt' brothers" *thc-ied at the command of all the branches . The eleventh directorate would study the problem from the angle of the aircraftis potential use as a carrier of nuclear weapons.ruaii'fit" first into outer sPace weht to the seater spacestrip. t.e' in.t. It would be able to draw conclusions without knowing very much about the new aircraft.' ii it . Units of the seventh directorate would immediately start searching their archives for information on what NATO leaders have said about the future development of avillign. questions of training special' The GRU lays great stress on professional informati* littJotti"s' Alongpide ists for the bts snecill$s from a wide' intelligence officers industrial fields' The GRU range of scientific.i. Simultaneously with this tha eighth directorate responsible for individual countries including US studies wbuH thoroughly research the question as to who insisted on the dccision to develop a new aircraft. the eiir'" same time' the inrormation publications which might problem..uiotnt that every Soviet days or even but launched based on an American model' out theirs' As a result mirnths before th. might be able to foretell the basic technical parameters of ihe"Jt'tlv operating asents' an with regard to trre queJiion' S*t' By the evening rePorts received by the 'you.and.. states. tttiiitti-tnO .'u.pp'op'itte orders order would also be r"I. what forces in the country might oome out against such a decision.. trying to put itseif i. 'Intelligence u" ptint.rst entry ..tiJi"in.88 Soviet Mitinry Intelligence The GRIJ Processing Organs 89 be published in the 'tntelligence Summary'under the heading all branches of information would be studying . fi. The next morning all memben of the Politburo and the higher military commlnd would receive the volume printed during the night. military budgets and the budgets of the country's main corporations.a ttrai night in the routine pl. if it were really to be taken into service.

or information service can convince it equipment American the supreme ildoe.rt" cnij adopted ft: own opinion'. found the solution.imJuna .the leadership a "tiis metres from t*toscow. and iiut then no have an inconect view of thingp' crushing influence *pt. that much of the intelligence material was reported to the higher command in a 'grey' unprocessed state. considers that the technical equipment of the processing organs of the GRU is vastly superior to that of comparable units within the CIA ..lT 1'--:t::5: opmron . If the GRU information service is truly less effective than it should be.. although one may complain that they belong to past history and not the present.tly:[ ol senllal secretarv position spite of the fact that some Western specialists have said that the GRU information service is not as effective as it should be.d.. serviies. the answer lies in the communist system itsetf. Thus it was under Lenin it will be in the future' Should the and Brezhnev. It is impossible to deny either of these facts. So what more was Golikov to do? Thirteen years later.Ld.l1n" recourse to " such cunning. he had twice liquidated the whole staff of Soviet milit'ary intelligence from the chief of the CRU downwards. the new chief of the GRU.trlr'*i.r""* The information directorates of the GRU have at their disposal the highest quality etectronic equipment produced by the best American firms. is no organ dependent on its superio'. which would include 'grey'.y""' t'tt ieen-well+ried Soviet Union' and this is why ' *mouflages his fi:.J.' (This stroke of genius on the part of the GRU was immediately adopted by the KGB too. very Uest specialists' fault' In cases where in1iiig.or*tJ is fran[ty deluded' . h...a the intelligence services' on all branch"s of socieiy. They base this on two facts: that in 1941 the GRU had all the data on the forthcoming German invasion but was unable to evaluate correctly the information it had.ilil...90 Soviet Military lntelligence The GRU Processing Organs 91 Soviet Union. . In.tu as a kind which can . He ordered the publication of an intelligence summary each night. The GRU chief and the head of information would only give their own opinion twenty-four hours later in the next isue of the summary. and secondty. tnd'thtte superior' This is the very its defend it from the caprices of si:4h#. not without reason.:#.. -t"nnot possibly know what opinion in o." ."roping tituo'ion to. General Shtemyenko.n. .. it is the opinion of my residents'.. and the GRU teadenhip. tlme he is able rno"i'i and at the sume of tightning conductor' il. Two yean before.*. but Stalin was not of a mind to believe them. iiIJ . General Golikov did possess detailed German plans for the invasion. Nor does first'clas It is not the fault'of the it"tp. not dare. their rulers hold at which can be directly forced to give simply oUfioi* material wav can the the higher lommand' onlv in this t gi"tn momeni' They are-'h:ffot't . Tnu". including the supreme li.t the right to bbittt to' or contradict' Khruschev and Stalin and command. This state of affairs continued right up to the time when the adventurism of the Soviet programme produced a series of tragic accidents. rcaaerirrip exert anv.*.. tfi"ittn'tttting subordinates' The his shoulders to ttre:s-i"fJt" separated by thousands of kilo' overseas intelligence o'gu*.i"' the Party at a given it is necesary to.mand otherwise..J all responsibility from most obiective way.". of Soviet intelligence kaders up to the The . :ff '".b.hl:ffi .. it is the systeT: as Stalin was in .this way the gallant general implied that 'this is not my opinion. unprocessed information and unsubstantiated data..stei when the latter do not wish to listen to any which contradicts their own' "l But the totalitariai system still exerts.l" P....

but not one of Lct us consider one example. had such a large amount of silver been spent for the needs of rgsearch. the totalitarian system is not a brake but an accelerator. then the ratter's effectiveness grows many times greater. The specialist *"i" surprised that arf unexpectedly large amounf of silver was allocated 'for scientific research'. Never before. fire "u"n " GRU has canied out its most briltiant operations a-t exactly such moments. The dictator does not care at all for moral sides of a question. frirther anatysis showed that all publications dealing with atomic physics irad them required the expenditure of so much silver. Tfiere was a war going on and the specialists reasonably supposed that the research was military. when the opinions of the dictator and thi intelligence service coincided. and he is able to supply his intelligence service with any amount of money. but its contents left no room of the deductions it made' Stalin was about the correctness delighted with the report: the rest is well known' . either in {mgrica. However. The second reasonable assumption by the GRU was that it was some new field of research concerning the creation of a new type of weapon. fugitives from occupied Europe. intelligence has absolutely no chance of influencing him and its effectiveness at that moment is nil. He is not at all answerable before society for his aciions. Every information unit was brought to Ueaion of pecious metals in the United States. And the information service 1941.".t urLonnrm"O fact. tf the desires of the dictator and his inte[igence service coincide. moment when the country is suffering from hlnger. it is not atways like that.i report A week later the GRU presented to Stalin a detailed a.pott doubt for "tti. had at the same time disappeared without trace from tht scientific horizon.[prents in the USA of atomic weaPons' It was a one "i had been compiled ol Pe basis of only i. the study of this strange phenomenon. The GRU information anatysed all the fields of military research known to it.or in any other country. . he fean no opposition or discussion. tn this case.tlrt"gr. resources) wT slgdyrng the trends in the exchange has played a first-ctass rote on these occasions.92 Soviet Military Intelligence The GRIJ Processing Organs 93 been suppressed in the United Siates and that ail aromic scientists. During the Second World War a section of the tenth dircctorate (economics and .

" individuaf businessmen' statesmen and some- it is lfir. "na gffi ol ptt" curency middlei"t.. of the GRU. wi t'i" io Jo'inionundertakingp'scientific On the research institute tJ tp"tftfized direclorate PrePares orders of the procu. but it has no right to interfere in intelligence work.. in ffeet inttirig". a ieutenanr-gene ra l.t. The military rank of the head of the political department is lieutenant-general and again he is a deputy to the GRU chief... fot the acquisition of 'clean' curency' te..important'GRU bclonging to the for the gr8*rh or resoonsible oittttotate commission and the rniiitttv industrial resources of users. It is not possible for us to examine all of these...ffi. il."ti"t out secret Possessed of colossal curency .:1'.'-inteiligence r"ili"ty hritr". especially as regards staff movements.i"#.. it controls scveral and its overscas . .. ?taio appliances' io name but a few' Its .'^and countnes' intelliience services of Eastern bloc also in the "'iir....ffii."nt''capitalNo ress. As opposed to any other political departments the GRU political department is made up not of party officials but of professional intelligence There are also several other differences. fhg pollggl&el4ue[E is concemed with the ideological monitoring of all GRU personnel. tt .. i"....i.i to work at domestic Postincs' influence bgth The personnel direct'8iate has exceptional th" tnon"*tnts of all in the GRU and outsiie'-it ditects sidered-as support services. in common with C bi rectora t tte nil]fr6"fiiilfof tiie is also a deputy to the chief ...i'#mm'*PJflx:1"J1l}.ontiort all the curency speculative operations the GRU and also .j. is subordinated directly to the Central Committee administrative department.-il.. tr. armaments and poisons' he is not classed head is a lieutenant."nt organs. The Personnel DirectoB.*ational market' secret uses them in order to exert "" is the lu":r"'# il... All political directorates and departments of the Soviet Army are subordinated to the chief political directorate of the Soviet Army.. not only intiJt'trtl Onu' directorates of satellites.t-q is directly beneath the chief of "*i "ti'i'ui"'!r'esyears and then return a period of several ...i:%fii unit*-N...d micYphotography' officially as a dePutY' departments." is with -concerned itt espionage equipment the development ano. Overseas the residents are personally responsible for the ideological monitoring of their officers. It exerts practically no influence on the activities of overseas branches of the GRU. The political department of thd GRU has considerable weight in Moscow.iri..the several equipment for secret - kinds of dead-letter il*...A"ttt""? fail several . which is at the same time one of the Centrat Committee organs which are not directly concerned with the provision or processing of intelligence material are con- All GRU but in a number of officers. but we will simply take briefly the most important of them..ilil altirough eavesdropprng ffi.-ii-it"qu"ntty .Support Services 95 L2 processing organs' the polili' officers of the procurement and of tfie gRU' regularrv Support Services"ss to say.i. The GRU political department. The directorate is staffed only by intelligence officers who.

ideniity short time. passes. It is here that the enciphering . in every file there is an unwritten novel' TheE$l*GjU*P'ep"egt.and visa regulations of that country.t). and submarines.gs__9_q. In every file lies the fate of an inAiriaoU."ilt and files on illegals.. railway. it can forge'the passport of and deciphering of all incoming and outgoing documents ii carried out.d. The department can at any moment say what documents are required at any given control point in the world. In its cellars are millions'of officers' undercover . but should the need arise to secure special channels of personal of all the departments.. the finantid department deals onty with powerful reception and transmision centres of its own.ruf on. communication. hiving at its disposal hundreds of thousands of blanks for new passports. what sort of questions and what stamps are to be put on the passports "rj "ik. any oountry to conform with the latest changes in the qassport. domestic i"riJ"n.p-q*gg3l is possibty the mosr intere5ting me Ei&&g--BU-Dspaflrqerlis the most secrer of an the top secret units of the GRU. ll . police documents. In ihii punuii bt tris esoterii duiy it has the greatest collection in the world of passports. then it can maki use of the services of the cosmic intelligence directorate.}6 Soviet Military Inrelligence SuPPort Services 97 Soviet money. driving licences. the preparation of tha papers which will preserve one's true identiiy can be Aone in a very cards. air and sea tickets. ro"["t. and other documents. successful relruitment of foreigners (and unsuc' and . tlre"fi olgd{PSeel1-41gl[ untike the administrative/tech_ nical directorate. The financial department carries out regar financial operations in the soviet Union. Thl depariment keep maps of many thousands of frontier posts. not with foreign currency. military documents.. identity cards and driving licences for every couniry in the *gll9. Within a few houn. for example. customs and police posts. in case of a worsening of operational con_ ditions.. and so on. The Afgliv. material on everyone from statesmen and designers of io prostitutes and homosexuals ily. The eighth department possesses all the GRU's secrets.(p-assport)studiespassport regulations".y experience."r-. communicating with illegals and agents by means of GRU satellites.

Part II .

i. but these are completely prepares' tn" ott.Illegals of strategic intelligence We can define an illegal as an officer of a on .."riiiy *t " has beerr ieJruited bVtillegal-1o1ks and foremost is first of.ra utilizes. "iitt" centre as athe territory ry1 foreigner Uyt who passes himself off foreisn state. tn the KGB ti'"t?it in a training In the GRU] tli iff"g"h are trained activities."...uit u"different confused The crucial :ffi#.r:-iil".i an inhahitant of-a foreign fhings' t'i'ntelf off as a foreigner' S:ry^tli:."il.. Each organization selects' trains' the same it sees fit' In i"pf"V.ifr*t ot t'rre go*eu"t.r. ntter ttreir iiuining.: deserving agents recelve some of the most valuable and and are awarded the rank Soviet citizenship as un inttntiu" so' Gnu or . Lieutenani-General V' T' centre unde.'.the KGB' but.'.i in the two runnmt illegals is entirelvdifferent directorate of illegal a special services."-..J itiails of the illegal Jv-stem separatelv' Th. tfre ttuO""t'ip oi the illegals are put at the Gurvenko..i. intelligence and for Soviet foreigner has been t"trui*d by name and or ottrer chang"''t'it appearance or some reason then he is dbcuments' continues his activitiet--*iit' /alse called an illegal agent' their own illegal Both the GRU and the KGB have independent one from networks.r""f"t .i. whereas an a Soviet officer pus'ing "t" to'i'pft1"fy .'.1h" 's"nt in the interest 1d .ot of the four geographical ffi.t. r. fis illegals as principles' methods of wav each orgu.*otit oot ffik ffi .. but these with frequentlv . Soviet intelligence.."..". asents.'u"on.even casean agenta when in the occlsioyl .ilffi it" tu.g"nt.i.r.. directorates ..:fi.iri.' ..f .

in the case of even greater success. to that of the head of the GRU himself. The - the next step .. i. req'uirements' In basic on the basis of future i..". tt .t in higher education' minithe itquagtint'.iourn h.him completely .J"il'ii" "i'cun very'tJt"i"ffy all the-time' His wife held . not-on'e ioniet The name is called the General Guryenko's o. .". of course...t* r.". It is all the same to them whether they are in Paris or in Pnom Penh. and there is a cream who are under the personal supervision of the head of the GRU...r*t'.t. Recall to the Soviet Union is a particularly effective measure against any Soviet citizen serving abroad... qoi"t tr'?av ior training' In addition to the terr'i'toiy candidate and his *t.r. to go to the target country and 'fine-tune' and help the activities of the illegal networks.t.' doti"ti'*t in" cnu will select who have mainly those activities young Sou'ei citizens' Higher il.102 Soviet Military Intelligence lllegals 103 and are controlled personally by them. If he is demoted to direction head level . seen walking in upt"u*ntt tf . If a young illegal begins to acquire really interesting information he is transferred from the control of the head of a directorate to that of the first deputy or. f"tliy. ot .ufa even on promotion.are not asked' but on the streets . This is..nO uni"t"ttary b.h. intelligencl or in the information in education i...iupt il.has'T"be dachw area where tfrere are greut numbets well concealed among other ifftluft are for the training where outsiders are not to be seen questions.i..ffi..iilrs worked . In certain cases his grade may fall below that which is supervised by the head of a directorate and he will be supervised only by the head of a direction. regarded by all intelligence personnel as the direst form of punishment.. a very high honour.and he it is' been able to say exactly-where to riflect the existence of one Training Centre tt"t' ti'pty o".uo nor..1.iliBunoingl.. Thus both one and the other have small groups consisting of the most experienced and successful illegals who have returned from abroad and who exercise supervision over the daily running of the illegals... or a secluded in the Moscow individual irainee' normally . 1"". i#.i Academv *9 *::1v- are used of the so'iet ermv and Nalv Il"^1' expen- processtng for illegal i#"r*""..-. Thus each directorate head supervises a number of directions and separately a group of illegals. t"guta"a as the tragedv of a lifetime' is carried.'riilirrr-r. This is a very critical stage for the illegal.. although he may not even be able to guess that it has happened.-i.i.ut lives and will be is also in two or three instructors also live and immelse .s of the ht"tr"riri.i. Directorate heads themselves frequently travel abroad for the same reasonS. A number of the more important ille'gals are directly controlled by the first deputy head of the GRU...r. . not informed about this could well be a recall to the Soviet Union.out by each of The selection ot pottitiuiiiregalt candidates i. ilLgal who has defected 'Training Centre'. Union. In order to help him. .'t'iliir.Ji"ttach of' dac. un "t'"t'ii-J mum age at which u nothing about the GIY s:T'times "GRU u" used' those who have com3m. of course.rganization those who return information of a very high calibre unprecedented or highly classified material which produces an intelligence breakthrough.d'ringirirti. the directorate head can call on a small group of advisers consisting in the main of former illegals (though not 'blown' ones) who are ready at any moment. granted only to not be in the Soviet only important thing is that they 1!o.w are selected .ur oii"tio'utJt independentlv' . Equally an illegal may be demoted for failing to produce the goods.upiti *iitt'on" task' Either the organization tittle place is is constantly on the *o". using false papers. ideally isolated the dacha suoervise him is.pottinf avenues' HI dacha provides an T\e irit. and transfer to ttre soviet union.'.therefore tJiff begin his training is?l to23 '"t'uii '"Ii.

and goes abroad' Usually his a number of intercountry is effited through a.*. character and the tasks which he will be called upon to perform in the future. while he is occupying the dacha."""iiy *t.. for the most part former illegals.t. he deiroys Jocuments new documentation entered the country and gols on under For example. hostages are that much more effective..oi. :*_often. t . The posting of a husband and wife together. the eventually as hostages.the dacha are prepared very thoroughly and carefully. subjected to a detailed individual debriefing on all life abroad' If the husband and wife have . The internal fittings The instructional programme is tailormade for each trainee.t.. t tt"m the Soviet Union to Fiungary to Yugoslavia stage' .to time' married.1 months . the weather forecasts and everything that is going i iilothffi 1jl93Ts!tP1:a9'n he goes on to P.served "t dlcuments U. She scrutinizes his behaviour and or *urn tt GRU about his excessive interest in women Union' husband and alcohol. Perhaps more surprisingly. llus Prr o y"u'i and the shortthe basis of the experiefiffifi-as gained' light inihe training'.. In this connection he wears the clothes and shoes.i.J. In each room a tape recorder is installed which runs twenty-fsu1 hours a day.-.tlie illegal comings which have of training for a and his instructors work out a programme ffifi aft:u+rslircrtjr+q+Hi':3 . Attention is obviously paid to theJllCy_gl_lhe lansuage of the rarget . leaving their children behind as hostages. On their return to the Soviet *it" ut.en prepared-for him. giving due consideration to his or four years of intensive training' top GRU and Central the illegal passes a state commission of journey personnel. to. th.104 Soviet Military Intelligence Itlegals " 105 future illegal knows by heart the composition of ivery football team.rd. the wife also acts as a control for the GRU on her years. He sees many films and descriptions on video tapes of television broadcasts.Jrlieir the GRU' their decided to keep something secret from stories will eventuallY differ' -Afi.g"i ."rntries. ryq5llng methods and to a cove. ttreTiE[eTfwi6iho she as a rule works as the radio operator.At each he has with which .nJ"''o"'orrnelleqSSW qt in a re.slply.. It is quite obvious that after a number of years of such training.-i.ii".il i".'itd to he is to work' The first thing he does is have been born' gone rti" city where he is supposed. and eats the food. fuwait."i. even smokes cigarettes and uses razor blades procured from overseas. either by. The instructors. *"riJi" *i..r. Hong Kong and Hawaii'. in country where he has never been in his From the first day the candidate becomes accustomed to the circumstances in which he will be living and working probably for rnany long sometimes may husband..for^a Denoo aDroas. is a very frequent occurrence. the hours of work of every restaurant and on in the realm of gossip as well as current affairs. It is considered that mateinal feelings are much the stronger and. These tape recorders continuously broadcast news from the radio programmes of his target und?iffiffiG .t as much u. ." Cypii. He gets a job and works. a-journey to the USA il. . From the first day of his training he is supplied with the majority of papers and magazines.i oi tter.c!!MlU. read the same papers and listen to the same radio programmes and spend their time asking their pupil the most difficult quesiions imaginable with regard to what has been read.r.ili...other:tt:gl} :1 fficfiTtage !9te! nightclub. with the wife posted.

credit cards' membershipdocumentsofclubsandassociationsareavital element in ilegalizing' the status of an illegal' A vital role in the lives of illegals is played by cover stories.. in other words concocted life stories' The-basic or sround cover storv is created on the basis of r66i-ffiiilfi only changing a few details. This age suits the GRU very well for a number of reasons. he may well be able to avoid being called up for the army which would mean the breaking-off of relations and an end to his active working life. For operational purposes (though not for instructional purposes) much use is made of Finland as a window to the Wesi. After this he again undergoes state examinatioru.p. she will then be given a genuine it replaced futtport.preparation. conse*utive approach to life. to go to work.a real one on the production of his wife's genuine document. In the course of the . the illegal's stay in one of the period which lasts another one or two years. birth but of course changes the place of his the date of his birth. then Austria and Germany before Iungu. on average about forty. In the course of his operational journey. Both would consolidate their nationality every step of the way.^6j-tl" Utl@rs of the GRU on genuine blant passports' At the same he is extremely vulnerable if he is not registered with the police or the tax departments. and so they are ideal hostages' ln the event of mobilization in the target country. A man of forty has a balanced. but usually he is older. this would mean period-s of residencl in to_begin with. His children are sufficiently old to be ablJ to live without their parents in the complete care of the GRU. at which the head of the GRU or his first deputy have to be present.ry he arrives finally in America. Then the enough to live independently.. An eventual Frenc'h illegal wodd be likely to make the journey via Armenia and kbanon. especially if he ever suffers tn" aif"*mu'of whether to continue working or to go to the police. The ideal solution is for him to the police department under some nJ* documen6tion from pretext or another. unA n.ornpuny lists as he can and to acquire character references obtain signeO by real people.the illelal endeavours to acquire as many frienis as possible.inclined to take ill-considered To take the case of an illegal whose target destination is Washington: hemight pretglA to bp a refug-ee from Hungary escaped in 1956..emto"a-p. dates of weddings and other details' The illegal is thus not telling an out-and'out lie but only a half'truth' He will not bat'in eyelid when he tells you that his fathe-r served all his life in t-he army.intermediate legalization. The acquisition of a driving licence.intermediate legalization'. This stage goes by the name of the . The minimum age of an illegal clearly cannot be less than twenty-seven to twenty-nine. to get hold of genuineiapers and character and work referencis. -his obje-qting'lhil!!9g3!-sJts about basic On his arrival at r"eX#ffi ffi:riit"Efffi fr-. He keeps irraiml. illegal is placed at thd diiposal of one of the heads of directorates again commences the operation for his -and roundabout journey to the target country. which is the last . but not old harm as possible. The stormy passions of youth have disappeared and he is less . At the of these'years of "ia . The dates of birth of his parents and relatives are also accurately recorded. usually along with the professions of his parenis. There is also the emergency cover story. he at lasf appears in the country where he is to spend so many more yJars endeavouring to Ao it as much intermediate couRtries may continire for several years. Often he will marry another agent (wlto tiite may already be his wife). The only thing is that he will not tell you in which army he served. 106 Soviet Military Intelligence Illegals And 107 decisions. Any check may give jobs him away and for this reason he endeavours to change to get his name onto as many and places of work often . will 'loie' his false one to have wittr.

one illegal was arrested by the police while he was trying to obtain a new driving licence because a mistake had been found in his old one.. W tturry yoDr f-r".'criminal'.i.""io . if the police had only thought to invite a real Polish immigrant for a tenminute chat with his supposed fellow countryman."unrr. or he stands at the window and day ballerinas and Thousands of peopte-pass him every - ."tt1*mediatelv' Thirdlv' for such bTfe lL Secondly. But for the police it was sufficient that he spoke their language and did not object to being handed over to the Polish Consul. he . It would have been easy to break the emergency cover story..108 Soviet Miliiary I ntelligence Illegals inconspicuous 'man 109 line of defence of the illegal on having been arrested by the police.. ryi GRU.if .om unother' Butattempts to is wo*i1s have talks and all his in vet anothe. a"pu.-.t a role is neitheifeasible nor a great deal of use' ir fr L piice e_ilFefi ffifrE"paganda paints @a.o[ir. ..b"Yiit""fl. The Poles published photographs of the criminal lffiffiF':'*it'i*l::li...pfortunitv to with If a colonel on the general staff consorted il . Then he went over to his emergency cover story and inforrhed the police that he was a Polish criminal who had escaped from prison and bought a passport on the black market."". He was subjected to questioning..ffiil:. As its name suggests. If he gets muny tt'oosunds -of a colonel in the enemy general informed the Polish authorities about the . Firstly..i"r"galizationwouldhareto.ftiffi &ffi Jil hours' he would be exposed within forty-eight the requirements of Finally.?:]Ill:t:T" ..r."ittt great rapidity' Today they general of the department ested in documents trori-a certain he would not have known more than ten words of the language. During this time the in the street' such as millions would hurry past without the police believed the story and handed him over to the Polish Consul...*. However strange it may seem... this cover story is only to be used as a last resort when the illegal perceives that the police no longer believe his basic cover story.. Designed to be used only when the illegal is in the hands of the police department. Such a cover is unacceptable to an illegal for a number of reasons.liil#. not having received from the illegal his routine and applied to a number of countries for his extradition. i*iri t.rorrow f.0"*i' the general statt he a tr.t ing" .. il.-c'riu . he mwt keep himself away from counter-intelligence and the police. it is ooncocted in such a way that the details it gives should be impossible to check.i. of the intelligence officer playing the role of grave pictrire a No less important than the cover story is the cover or the l**til{* ["ti. our illegal .Iifr&-*er'he staff and himself his cover' [tour"'' tt is part-of example' He hires his for There are wants and for as long as takes the money' . ri. He must be a grey.?-.t'n"ni been met with have . weapon workers' If professional titters anOitren wiih atomic months' there is no he doesn't want to work for three dollars through the oroblem. Of course sommunications. I ffiio. go.. For example. as a result of which his basic cover story was found to be inaccurate. and perhaps *otiiiponantly' are inter' it.ildepartmentskind of cover offered coto susiicion' No' the a blank wall or ."uttJ' no e ge!ag9-q"ner.J.have and academies where't'e it supposed which he has served' and his acquaintances Fourthlv' an illegal needs plentv 'taff'meet whoever he wants to meet' il."rtuinf ue asked about the military schools the been' 1o .i. But this is pure disinformation.

be considered in the up to 40 Per cent tou"t does not prevent the 'clean' category' Ghil . To one he gives money and instructions written in secret writing.ylivesasecludedand than It tonoint significantly fewer employees colonies Normally in Soviet either of the other offiizuiiont' people may.more enlightened 'savages'.basic forms of -ifie The undercover residency is one GRU abroad' (It should be intelligence . -r-lng a mlnlmum of two wireless" a them.riO. but to recruit agents for this purpose. For the basic task of the illegal is not himself to penetrate secret targets. one of whom may become his assistant. - and colonels of the general 2 The Undercover ResidencY of the.riJ. More illegals may be sent out to the resideni.ff.. who continuallvcolony' and distant uttuirc ot tuti'' person in the . uio ir'" bRU ana cail them The..ittre rcij. Soviet cotony--i' invisibly divided into three seas genuine diplomats the 'clean ones" thaf is th€ "rg""ir. Thus tr. "g""... The GRU considers it counter-productive to have large residencies.fiLt. This is his raison d'Atre. as a result of recruiting new agents. ttre mercfrant .J..".f"il "i . In cases where the recruitment of new agents has gone well the GRU prudently divides the residenry in twJ parts.[il. civil airlines. .*y without agents... the davtut" uutolutelv no il9l::t at all in .. but usually the residencies are much smaller than this.110 Soviet Military Intelligence artists. Five illegals and eight to ten agents are considered the maximum. unO tt undercover residency distinction " often."'. We i at least one) r. from another he receives reports. iersonnel rn?I: Very 'o both dirty' between the KGB GRU.' In every country completelv separate entities') exists there is a GRU where official Soviet 'Jpt"l"ntu'ion i" parallel with' and is analundercover . the residency may increase in size.'y' every overKGB undercover residency'.and the illegal remembered that the unOt"ontt An illegal residency is an intelligence organization compris-! .o.iite otttre soviet colonv (the GRU)' isolated life.t" 'tf" .ri"*: it"i representatives of external "* il"-ittt it. and correspondents.i.vy' and Intourist' headed . Forthecnuono". Gradually. Thereafter any contact between the two new residencies is of course forbidden. tr'"-onJo*ner iesidencv of the of the KGB'. ""J trade.'Vikings' t"'n"ighboors'' . so that if one residency is discovered the other does not suffer. are not able to obtain anything.J. .. senior diplomats for example the imbassador' his understand the difference and the more observant people' dividing them up I clgse between the two o'guii'"tions' meddle in the dav: .ruaoi. senators and scientists staff."urp tresidency.""n.

."t. which in its turn has an interest in fanning the ffames of discord between the has the right to three organizations..the Minister of Foreign Affairs.t. operational group. in rare cases up to 25 per cent. not offend the 'clean-ones'' They also must have for the dark sufficient complement to serve as a screen activities of the two residencies' represenThis is why Soviet embassies. the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. are diplomats. each has its own boss in Moscow .."ff iot *irt if.t officers increases. consulates' trade As the tations and so on grow and multiply and swell' deputies-. tt". Theoretically the Soviet colony in a very small co-untry may consist of six people.. that is with the collection of compromising material on Soviet residency grows.the resident and a combined radio/cipher officer. and theiiown colleagues'in ihe KGB who have contact with foreigners and freqiently with officers of the GRU. from cooperation with both the KGB and the GRU. ih" on" he had at firsi' The number of radio/ engaged intelfigence. thJ resident acquires several . such a theoretical minimum exists arso for the other organizations. fnit is a difficult task. are working againsf foreigners.clean. The minimum number of staff for any GRU undercover residency is two . The GRU.f iipt. The Central Committee and this same Central . The. diuid. Eqrally. it becomes clear why the most outstanding operations of Soviet intelligence have been mounted not by the KGB but by the GRU. ior often with foreigners at all' . a tech-ops grolP. on the other hand.) Up-to 40 or 45 per cent are officers of the KGB and only li to 20 per cent. such as that may be from seventy to eightyofficers' Mediumcontain between sized residencies like that in Rome would residency it irty una forty officers' All officers on the staff of a yoit .the KGB or the head of the GRU. people including the ambassador. In the officers' To the residents.riv in recruiting and running in New u. vastly in excess of that of the KGB. directs its intire potei_ tial against foreigners. . to a greater or lesser extent.i.. larger part of the KGB personnel is occupied with questions of security. Supreme arbitration between them can only be carried out in the Central Committee.neiworks of the police and counterioJng".operational staff' .V Uigg."V ambassador or resident slots' and Committee has to decide questions as to which each of the three organizaho* as the Committee on the shadowing offend the KGB on questions of security' the GRU' of its own diplomats above all. The number of operational officers agents increases' In the Jit".1I2 Soviet Military Intelligence The (Jnderc:over ResidencY 113 majority of them. qu"fity of the'soviet Army would remain static' Finally a ii . nor must it offend present-day technology ou. bur they are not to be considered as professional intelligence offiiers. Only a smali proportion..rfy concerned with and responsible contact with of intjligence. cases half of the KGB personnel. techniur. three of residen-cies of the GRU. in opiiru.d inio three categories .6"a1staff and te.hnical staff' The operational staff with recruiting are tirose officers who are directly concerned operational staff are included and running agents. ihe ambassaOor and two residents. When one adds to this the unequalled financial power of the GRU. a radio moni. the chairman of .ruiion on the. tire acquisition of data on [. but who do not have personal These are radio/ agents. Each of the three branches of the Soviet colony has its own enciphering machine and completely independent channel of communication with Moscow. This does not however mein that the intelligence potential of the GRU apparatus is less than that of the KGB. should be accorded to must not iiont. deputy residents and operational officers who are technical-opeiations staff belong tho$e for the production ait.. and the other three radio/ cipher officers. are officeis of the GRU. A technical services groupis organJ!J.

documents and'.on the their productivity..r". younger' less experiofficers and the deputy residents the iesidencies.r. This does not mean that a lieutenant-colonel cannot be appointed"p-ry resident may be a lieutenant-colonel points . ug"nJ*no nu'Jpteviously and increase fyiit-pt"O"... even in front of the head of the GRU and the Central Committee.".1".ori. on instructions . An identical burden is he is fulfilling the deputy resident at the same time as small or a o"puiv' Thil svs19m is applied in. both as regards the work of each of his individual officers and recruited agents.'he *ill be A resident in a large . but then.. tirI. He is the boss of all GRU officers and out of the country immediately. To the technical staff belong chauffeurs. oft"n having to take tharge ..iilt take a direct interest in recruitment or not as he Officer are exempted wishes.. if he copes successfully.adio monitoring post.all resident him"iiigJti"* tn *"diu'-tized risidencies' the .y"si["n. including his own deputies. studying conditions and clarifying in dead-letter --iie efie ot is full colonel' military rank of an! deputy resident or even ffr. In this case he dols not even have to justify his decision.i..J-it" . He undertakes full colonel's or residency will hold the military rank of major-general. in medium and small residencies that of colonel.r" been recruited other two "g. ....i". Sometimes the resident himself supervises the most experienced operational officers." . He is not afterwards permitted to return to a post ordinarily filled by a lieutenant-colonel.senior representative of the GRU in any given place. The residents of very large residencies from Personal recruitment' ."". and also enced officers. and answerable only to the head of the GRU inl tt " Central Committee. to five years as the deputy major-general's salary and.. . recruiting work the duties given to him by the resident and carries on in the same way as all other operational working in one or another specialized field. from thl administrative and financial apply to residents' same time the same rules appty as a ri"* he is a full colonel with full rights' operational officer and three resident before his appointment. The resident is completely responsible for security.ooliiy is obliged of one or as well .s assistant and assumes his responsibilities when he is absent.rntinually gives them help and support' nllin's Loxes' emptying dead' money and passports i"*i'uo*"r^ foi the undercover resl' certain important questions' Very often dency is used to rescue illegals' them.-u*.... In some very large on the part o{ G}U sometimes where there it gttut uttliuity illegals' The is a post callJd deputy resident for The Resident He is the.ll4 Soviet Military Intelligence The tJndercover ResidencY 115 cipher officers. and the security of the residency as a whole."r. The deputy resident serves as the resident. illegals. there residency are completely undercover residency una tn" illegal risidencv has no idea how ona"ttover they work' At the many illegals there are. according to the GRU system. officers of the technical services and operational technical services and the operators of the .. will have to fill posts commensurate with the higher rank.urf. of weaponry and military secret from the moment of technology' Every operational officer to recruit a minimum of his arrival in tr.ver. He must keep these ag€nts placed-.I". guards and accountants. Frequently a deputy resident heads teams of officers The Operational the recruitment of This is a GRU omcei who carries out or acquires the runs them and through them receives "g. He is chosen from among the most experienced officers and as a rule must have a minimum of three to five years of successful work as an has the right to send any of them. or where-or low from the Centre' the undercover .

ecruited .t . even if he has achieved outstanding success in colilcting the most inleresting intelligence material.g. is consiaereO to be idle."" the privilege because the ciphei officer is the only man in the iesidericy who is entitled to communicate with Moscow *itt oot the Lnowledge of the resident' He can send a cable the containing an adversi report about the resident of which will know nothing. officer is the seiond most important person in . where there is only one radio/cipher officer.-*.s ori'ril..r. the operational officer thc acquisitio.uAioLipt "t He is not only responsible for cipher Tatte. and again t". and it."n abroad for three years and not r... also the storage and use of ciphers and cipher machines.inL he decipirers communications from Moscow than the resident' Nobody' knows the news even earlier time including the ambassador and the KGB resident. of technical operational staff. He ::Ti::::ll the his military rank is not usually higher than that of major' If he does not manase. and he pays for "*" op"rrtiJnJotdcer is rieurenanta major (as I accordingio ttre lenlitr of offiters.r. It is the duty of the. an ordinary senior lieutenant or capiain anO officer possesses he .is known as zero.i.r. only the resident may replace him should he become incapacitated for any reason. a bearing on his work' Only the resident may airy control 6ver the cipher officer. resident fiimsetf of cipher officer . or irliii!"niJ mate.... addition to certain other coiloquiaf *orJsl. or even a senior lieuten"ri. ig.exercise silent watch over the behaviour if there is any shortcoming he must report thi resident.. For this reason an operationuf omi.nO . iirr.116 Soviet lrlilitary Intelligence The I|ndercover ResidencY tl1 Alongside his recruitment work.r iiil. It is natural .*f0.. and "".i.. te is deprived of all his colonel..-o-riuna than the resident of the undercover residency. The RadiolCipher Officer Although he ls an offi.. time served.. but of enciphered cables and for the tr-ansmission and reception The the storage of all secret documentation in the residency' all the secrets of the residency radio-cipf. is successful in his recruitmeni work tre_-. at any the right of access to his room' or undei any pretext has ftty Oo noi"r"n have the right to know-the number and typo of cipher machines installed there' These restrictions utio uppty'to GRU deputy residents' Even during periods *hen ihe-resident is away-and the deputy resident is acting for him he does not have the right to go into the radio/ cipher operator's room or to ask lim^aly specific questions *' the residency.iar uy arr possible means. and it cails it number onl 1i. According to the standards of the OnU. major-generat having many fewer p"-opr" una. however mportant . as automatic promotion .e also applicable fbr . One may be added to zero ifa '."" h. was) or captain..o1. In small residencies..irgf. with the sole -illegal difference that the iltegat reiideri.military rank of.'eil other work _ ga $9 performing of operations for others. which is clearly tne UJsi nlmber to be. but only in order to inform the GRU in a very therefore that great care is taken of cipher way.o . t t us sat for three years doing absolutely nothing " anO tfreieflre tarafy me.r" for pro_ motion in the ordinary way.y..oi". If both the resident and the ciphlr officer should become incapacitated at the same time tten the deputy resident and the whole residency will remain ccimpletely cui off from the Centre' Naturally the ambassador'i and the KGB's channels of communication can be general used. in which case he becomes a '10. *r..r-is not granted to unsuccessful The military ranks prescribed for undercover residencies ar.riit ury ug..tays on ffifu tevel receiving automatic promotion colonel or colonel but in practi:: ant part of an officer's'agent manages to recruit u for"i!r.iis considerarion for anoiher my'm ::ltT " The..

aiional conditions are made "p.. technical servicei They are concerned with electronic intelligence from the premises of official Soviet premises.i. and so on. ffiil.television . he is forbidden all leave.. By monitoring radio transmissions.k.k. embasJies.oniruOi. for they hive learnt with their mother's milk the rule that ore.Iil.ii. He and his family must have a diplomatic escert on their journey out from the Soviet Union and on their return. Rqdio Monitoring Station Officers Neither the officer nor his wife is allowed near places wheie foreigners are to be found... Even if these foreigners are Bulgarians or Mongolians and are on guarded territory belonging to a Soviet embassy. independent of each -resident' The difference between ...rying to obtain state secrets' but the monitoring to in the interests of the residency trying .h .p.'b"*t".""fi"*g tt e radio networks of the police and security .1a1111:: most ffi." .r"il.i . Basic targets are the telecommunications appar_ atus of the government..".o other' different groups.i .. no matter where Cilcutta. Shaighai or Beirut.. They are only allowed to live in official Soviet territory independently or unaccompanied."ri1:":i to a small newspaper reported a police _plan t. It is easy to see wh-y cipher officers are not posted abroad for longer than two years. the technical services and the radio monitoring . D-raconian living conditions are imposed on all ciphir officers.tinction to TS officers. consulates. (TS) Officer in .them.p". the restriction remains in force. these are .t*.. u""g.nt ano ttu..'r"t-.. and military channels of communication. They aie at all times led by an officer who enjoys diplomatic immunity.'oniv a.r. .*-11l1officers and be sent out on independent who continually sgql4l !9c41l9ry These are small groups to oPtaq..$"Per the numbirs o{ notice'. anO those who have'been abroad will give their right arms to get another posting abroad...*p".tt]^ :T-f:":t*:: [.seaj life is always better than in the Soviet Union. any climati.t and oolice activities. Neither the cipher officer nor his wife is allowed to leave the guarded but also cover groups not only obtain interesting information subordination the system of governmental comhunications' the military of the different components of the state and structure.l. corresponding the GRU to become tnterested and to take . The cipher officer is not allowed in the same room with.was enough irig-rrrv p"prlated parts of the city.118 Soviet Military Intelligence The lJndercover ResidencY 119 gfficers (this is just as true of the KGB as the GRU).iil.. In one *T. diplomatic wireless communications. secret and cipher.r.t"lled by the services work in the interests of them is that the technical i't.a results.. Of course those cipher officers who have served their whole lives on the territory of the Soviet Union deeply envy those who have had postings me?n:. ..even though he may be silent and in the company of his resident. During the time of his assignment abroad.^ i.-. any restrictions on their family lives.' . "qdgrygqllg . --Til . r^ are malor rnitituty ranks of technical services officers concerned with and lieutenant-colonel."l-tl:. embassy accommodation guarded around the clock. Technical Service:."i*i"" where at in the city police activity is at its highest mounted *t'"'e ffi.*:: juniot officers who will eventually become operatlonat recruitmen'. not beoperations may be for the mounted' Groups and where they should ."d".t.n"tist 6n . Sometimes -v1!1t1 o"l:. no matter wtrir!.nJi.... una o"t!.rpre. They will agree to any conditions.n.urnltut in order to survey the for this.

.-Ylo are resPonsible for ' l2l police system of control by television and this enabled the whole residency successfully to avoid traps laid for them for several years. These officers continually monitor television programmes and collect useful items on video tape.""ri"i. worse' Some provide uettei possiuilities' some bv the KGB' Let us tnot" cRu. signals organization..t be saii that any official. is in tt'ot" explanations to operational officers and to instruct them on the use of this or that instrument or method.120 Saviet Military Intelligence The [Jndercover ResidencY measures.. However.e tv.. the carrying out of counter-surveillance.with the officers of the group for the study of operational conditions. s.. The military ranks of officers of these groups are senior lieutenant and captain.The military rank of a driver is an ensign. ililexternal prote'uon"If it't UoilAing' The GRU internal the .. for who would pay attention to a driver? i look at the basic ones' -A.n ol iepuligs " tions..k or major.. in itre. sometimes an operational officer is to be found in the guise of a driver and he..the vast majoritv or miruffi :::: irit6ffigegc.t. However.*utnin" its to'"t' the official duties we have used by ""*tAtr'i" their secret activities' KGB and GRU officers to tu*ounuge .t. heads of 'j:il"'ru H:r1'ffi. in an effort to be indistinguishable from other diplomats..7-ffi : ...ffi .sry i. The Operational Technical Group [".. rank. has a much superior .ffimffiilesses.t-. SW (secret writing) materials. us"o to an equal extent 'o*" Some residencies. Without exaggeration auiofo . dispense with the services of drivers. . ."uv.. together residents.duty . many generals.. Technical Personnel Only the very largest residencies contain technical personnel. are widely used for the security of agent operations.t.. Both residents tnJ tt"it tht'ry information which would expose ot ."..*:'J sl"gqi.ffii"iitr**'i't'' intelligenc" *:i^! Sttupi"a in l'#.ont.itu..t onry *a.D-::. especially those in countries where blfoth organiza' are in possestig.ti oi vii"ssp't'i*orficers in the rank internal -U"-9q"1^"ijlth" security of lieutenant or sen'o=r iiuiEnint' Therequest of consist guards of the reside"gV '1v attempts to penetrate the resident in countrres where KG-B guards the GRU get out dead-letter box operations and so on. of course. ln our examination of the undercover-residency' .'trb...:id.sti:En' .l10aP3l* 3ffi. radio transmission stations...ffi. Within a month the GRU resident was able to say with conviction that he was fully informed with regard to the be excluded. . photocopying equipment and the like...guatat. or his deqrty' answer directly to the resident employed only Th" internal security Naturally they the disposal of the group there are dead-letter boxes of all types.."i Y*::::i:: T::. giving to Moscow material it could not get from any other source. The officers of this group are always on hand to give the necessary ittiO"ncies where the normal dollars' In other cases monthly budget exceeds one million of one of the deputy the financial afairs are the concern ""i An t"f" part in agent handling operations' oi captain accountant.. The officers ofthe group.. This is concerned with the repair and maintenance of photographic apparatus. have a staff of attacks on the embassy cannot x'ci.. At "i. This is a widespread method of deception. citizens "r Driven are only allocated to residents who hold the rank of general. microphotography and micropantography.

they work officially in the embassies. Every aspect of immigration and of flight and defection has some connection with consular * E E:FSE EiEg! EEiEE J !gEE!- llo' affairs. They all prefer to concern themselves with technological . The KGB only agrees to this on the grounds of practical considerations. lubricants. perfectly justifiable meetings with representatives of firms producing aviation o o I >:--'Kiffi o i o electronics.E .!!gQBIl. they are rarely found in cultural sections. those officers whom the GRU selects at advanced . Other officers of both organizations give themselves out as embassy diplomats too.r22 Soviet Military Intelligence . This is because all exit and entry from and to the Soviet Union is in the hands of the KGB. high-tension materials. and the frontier forces of the KGB then control them later on. So i"Y *!tye 9. and there is huge scope for any Aeroflot employee to inform himself about the progress of the West: international exhibitions. Usually the firms which produce civil aircraft also produce military aircraft and rockets._!his can be explaineil 6y thtfact that aviation of extreme interest to the Soviet armaments industry. You will almost never find officers of the GRU there and only very rarely genuine diplomats. are bearers of diplomatic passports.s it follows that the percentage of KGB officers in consulates is unusually high. and usually their deputies too. which therefore rank extremely high in the KGB. oils. even by Soviet standards.9[_qE o{. For this reason the KGB resident and his colleague from the GRU. The consulate is entirely KGB. and questions of transport and communications.e g B and scientific questions. KGB officers in the consulate issue visas. that .is. fuels. and in this field lie the GRU's richest pickings. heat isolators and aero-engines.) sphere of interest.9 to an unacceptably high risk of arrest. (There do exist very rare instances of GRU officers working in consulates. and so that it should not appear to be too one-sided an organization. Happily. meetings with representatives of the leading aviation and space corporations.

t. This is not his first time abroad' of successful atready chalkedup a significant number I irli lrrlil recruits.t" during tris briefings will-frequentlyseen by the the life as military attach6s .. f. Press matters are very carefully kept in the Central Committee's own hands. Even the KGB in this field has very narrow powers.".. This does not mean of course that their secret activities suffer in any way."i"r*"n. . your guard' for a note of anguish.i. nor KGB. Representation in Tass. and one assumes that this has spread to one's Soviet colleagues.l bggd!*-so much so that it is not jdFt arlorgefiffition strongly influenced by the KGB. this organization provides exceptional access to business people whom both strive to exploit for their own ends.his for those same .residents insignificant posts eve to cover havb occupied completely et thl same time the resident remains i^linr" Within the ii."" p..."rchv....l'i"tiO.".y . .." th.".tiO.u' ti' and'be'careful like an old hand He is experienceO anO cunning ..*t*** work become single forei-g'ner.even ttrotigtr in... tyrannical' ...o serve in this hospitable country and .the West one is accustomed to see in these people not spies but military diplomats. ies all. Whenever you talk to a Soviet military attach6. Anything to do with the military attach6s is staffed exclusively by officers of the GRU.his other a "i GRU in consular affairs. KGB officers are only rarely employed at Aeroflot.playthe officer in the important rol is ttre actual job of role.^i[ . -life Internal relations . h^ rt and that means be. The seconi mosi . The one rule wNch admits of no exceptions. and his authority is unshakeable' frequently wilful remains ir" tttiti. and then for the same reasons as the very least-an operational always that before you stands at the is faced with the officer of an undercovei residency wiro does not recruiting foreigners 31q *T' if he . that is the organ of the I. Literally swarming with KGB and GRU officers.ffnd.124 Soviet Military Intelligence The llnd'ercover ResidencY 125 aviation institutes for work in Aeroflot do not need lengthy spOcialist una ask him if in his answer iu. and under general . The merchant navy is almost identical. oi yoo a deputy resident or the GRU of him' He is resident himself. The naval. Intourist is in the KGBj. 'rr. Sometimes Soviet military and civil aircraft have identical parts.t. This deep misapprehension is fully exploited by the GRU.there with an have been cases wirere.-it Ministry of External Trade.-."". therefore KGB officers and officers of the GRU do not occupy key posts in these organizations.. tt attack il.." il[rifical ina uil t[ t'opet of ashining career crash to the how much longer he ..tiJJ r"oito t" plays the parl of doorman the deputy important person' attach6s. . An organization of exceptional importance to both services is the Trade Representation.. the only difference being that the officers there are selected to study cruisers and submarines and not strategic aviation.*y.l rifA .over residency have no bearing an insignificart . APN. remember ..-"fficial ranks' uitituty ranks. but an he has life and his eyes express pleasure' This means there Possibly recruited one of yooi f"ltot"'countrymen' even stands in front dangerous.-. military and air attach6s are regarded by the GRU as its particular brand of cover..i. Here there are no genuine diplomats.. GRU wishes to show us' whatsoever on i. ln. has his place in thein oaitv structure of the is onlv the whit we see .k into tri.. then be on he is happy with you if tre cin' But perhaps. Pravda and Izvestia are almost forbidden ground for the GRU. residency' whatever Every GRU officer in an undercover whatever cover he his official duties may be.'. cover Uefuty Trade all working in the Trade ."ilrt if[gat).' uio" u. and a lieutenant who has shot down ten aircraft may patronisingly slap on the shoulder a major who has not shot down a single aircraft.n'd"p.... is in contact with one agent' one ofishis three agents' Another in officers runs an agent $oup of third officer has one agent' contact with two ug.tun deputy residents. off duty.. residencY..butwhenheiscarryingoutoperationsinthe .. His situation is analogous to that of the Sicilian waiter who. this deputy work in the whole i".. rank or official duties.remainder nate to him have one agent each' to two including . Their seniority in the residency. and has given him full powers dispose of them and order them about. is senior in rank to the restaurant owner within the Mafia hierarchy. deputy.' The only exception to this attitude is the radio/cipher officer... a lieutenant-cotonel.. may only be a lieutenant-colonel with operational officers who are colonels but this does not prevent him from talking to them as he would to captains or lieutenants.i-. Their criterion of respect for a man is the number of enemy aircraft he has shot down.dent from each other and from the Embassy' entering the three military However. vears.. An operational officer may assume the official duty of assistant to a military attach6 or military attach6 himself.i. The deputy resident in no way suffers from this..p"tiatty valuable agent-sources)' and . all officers the three attach€' and a yet noagents' The remaining officers have as He C.. cover First Secretary' no agent and O.*ir"" 6iaU om". Their relations with each other in the residency might be compared with the relationships existing between fighter pilots in time of war. is established by the resident exclusively on the basis of the quantity and quality of their recruitments. The attitude of the operational staff engaged in recruitment work to other officers may be summed up by comparison with the attitude of the fliers and the ground staff at a fighter base: '[ fly in the sky and you shovel shit. are beneath one d"p"il. is better than them. regardless of age. All operational officers are legal equals. because he knows much more about intelligence matters concerning the residency than the deputy resident.. They also..ipt"t officers. in their own circle. however...". full colonels though they may be. . to as.r..i"ffr. three an agent group' and two runs ."i"*-ttlponsiure for i-nformation *ho u" to be recruited within one In addition to his Embassy (deputy resi' Colonel D.ry. Embassy' Directly beneath him verv experienced opera.. five in the Merchani No*ry military . This dtputy "tid"nt-ltthas no officers He work' does not carry out recruiiment beneathhim. from senior lieuten4nts to full colonels.departmelts-oJ All three of the the Military.i. They are only operational officers. pay little attention to length of service or military rank.nt. Twelve other operaiional officers have The. but still have the deputy resident as his own personal driver. agent-running work. co'er-Assistant to thi Naval Attach6' Lt-Colonel two of whom t*'r-V-"perational otfrcers beneath him' Representation. to whom all show the greatest respect..?n example and Let us take a typically large residency The resident is a Majorexamine it.. while the GRU has decreed that he. Everything is tlctuat' (relativqly unimportant)' is General A and tris omcial cover are a group fir."i..ra".fr..t".. Recruitment work is the sole criterion for all GRU officers. TheY are: Representative' He has Colonel B.. Naval u"a Xt Attach6s' be a diplornatic departments are considered to Aeroflot. Official cover again plays absolutely no part.resident it it::1T' assistant military aualne' The subordi.iS.on- t'i'' work in. in this case. e'Lutty and ten in"^ (one of whom four . three in il....t26 Soviet Military Intelligence The lJndercover ResidencY ln resident.

consisting of two men but independent and self- contained. Apart from the security angle. there is also an undercover residency of the GRU' In many cases there is also an undercover residency of the KGB' But while the residencies of the GRU are organized in any official mission . The KGB hffilwayi6E. smaller residlncy. In Marseilles. of whom. For this it has to observe two basic conditions: the presence of official Soviet diplomatic representation _ an embassy.128 r Sovict Mititary Intellilence The Undercover ResidencY 129 interests of illegals. Such possibilities are open to Soviet intelligence in many countriei.!-Ihese 4{eg". For example. Wherever there is official Soviet diplomatic representation with radio group of operational technique I (two officers). as for example the Soviet observation mission in West Germany. iiCg. one group for the study of operationaicon_ I ditions-^(four officers)_.* in elpionage activities . twenty operational forget to mention another category of people participating ai.s driver. Their performance is vastly enhanced by the fierce competition between them.are clearly civil. this practice also ensures parallelism. military communications mission or a permanent UN mission.those of the KGB are not. In this case any failure in one of the residencies does not reflect on the activities of the other. military attach6.ifizens-ebroud wt o - go-opted pgrsonn=e. where the In all there are sixty-seven officers in the residency. Amsterdam. Everywhere it is possible-. as the GRU can control one resident by means Lf another. In addition. o$."^ -ollllefuml a nurnbei of test-. In West Germany the GRU has been able to create five residencies. functions in another city permanently detached from the basic forces of the main residency. under the command of one of the deputy residents. Lt-Colonel E. even the very smallest possible. In speaking about the undercover residency we must not direct contact with Moscow.s department. from studigs ofjbr ioreignelllgrroundins him to clearins dead-letter boxes. One operational officer is subordi_ I nale to_ him. Geneva and Montreal the Soviet missions . and I this officer runs an agent independent residencies. in Paris there is one of the moit expansionist undercover residencies of the GRU' Independeni of it in Maneilles there is another. But where the mission is clearly military.civil..e[t by lhese. Such an arrangement technological staff and six technical staff. for example. five officers of the internal security guards for the residency. The residency has th-irty-six agents. of Holland. the radio monitoring staiion (three officers). of whom twenty-five work independlntly of each other. disguised as the military attach6.*aet. this deputy resident controls the following: one technical service gioui I I (six officers). complicates work to a considerable degree but in the ipinion of the GRU it is better to have two imall residenciei than one big one. cover Second Secretary. This also applies to the numerous missions of Soviet military advisers in developing countries. and the presence of an officially registered radio station in uldercover-residency is located in The Hague but part of the residency is in Amsterdam. Embassy. He is in t I contact with one agent. and in all these cities there are undercover residencies of both KGB and GRU. the GRU endeavours to organize new. This is true. Where these two conditions obtain. New York. and one accounts officer.llg! . uut may be of anY rank offirson to ambassador and he carries out very differriffi?66ffian ent tasks. I residencies can be quickly organized. he can make use of any of the best officen of the first and second groups. military or mixed . the KGB may not have a residency. consulate.forty-one are operational staff. In some cases part of the undercover residency. The KGB presence there is only for the maintenance of security among the genuine military advisers.

of'. in Soviet official institutions. In the sJpflglg$ggglggp are wireless agent"Hasiggroups: the basic agent andthe sopplementary into four categories: they are residents or group in. the head agent must . Its guiding principle is: 'don't trust even your best friend with your motor car. diff".. The GRU is not so keen.130 Soviet Military Intelligence opted person are monetary ones which. In this and ofher emergencies organhnancial independence' In cases where the . are not subject to tax."O . Either they are complete idiots. [n other words. unlike the basic salary.rnt iz"ation entrusted iil-iil . The rewards for a co- 3 Agents In term present-day Soviet intelligence terminology the is a foreigner 'ug. telephones and radio transmission Head Agents ehouses' ii.i""n yrurc are the leaders of agent groups and agent most experresidenti."*ice fn"y are invested with wide powers and possess Slnin..rr' fras only one meaning' An agent tasks r"iruir"a by Soviet intelligencelnd carrying out secret group or section on its behaif.ision to do away with unwanted people who he can threat to it.nce between the group leader and the agent a whole range of resident is that the group leadei may take the group entrusted to him' irronun. out of every ten 'clean' offieials.ri.a-' recruiting . theY are Pro' videri of information. using co-opted persons only in exceptional cases. seven are co-opted onto the KGB staff. it is a very. girlfriend . Head agents are selected from the who have had long ienced agents available. L'g"iiringagents]d6ffi-entalistsJtreownersof saf points' udir"ssei. men and women and have given proof of their devotion to 'ouiy. or the sons of members of the Central Committee whom wild horses could not force to have anything to do with intelligence. i-rrespective of the to *hi. are divided into two of the GRU ' :. yery tricky matter indeed to meet a man who has no connections with intelligence.or agent'. All agents. or they are operators' alents. only the remaining two are clean. following the principle of 'don't stick your own neck out if you can get somebody else to stick it out for you'.h they belong. consulate and trade representation. whose main task is to kill.. decisions-conierning resident has a but he may not recruit agents at all' The agent to thim collapses. one onto the GRU staff. Usually in every embassy.. ut*uyt count on the full support of the GRU' Th.g*r. .. fall they are exeeutive leaders. interested in the exploitation of co-opted persons.

illegals. but the agent resident may only be subordinate to the Centre. Executive Agents These are agents recruited to carry out assassinations.ofofficialpoliceforms.e tast customs and immigrition officials. Sources in cases where they may. and small usually caried out by the central GRU. Frequently agents who have been acting as providers of information are transferred by both the strategic and operational branches of the GRU to the category of Jocuments by makiig the necessary entries in the registration the books and to ensure that the illegal is in possession of necessary documentation. documents or samples of military technology and weaponry. to the illegal. Sometimes even strategic intelligence needs similar specialists. Executive agents are recruited from criminal elements and from that band of naturally brutish characters who. In the history of the GRU quite a few priests carrying have falsified documents and registers of baptism and death the basis of false on !ir. The recruitment of executive agents is not Agent Legalizers t[. it is first and foremost suggests.Incontradistinctionto .necessary documents' Intries. Agent legalizers are subjected to "rnptoy. urJ subsidiary agents.have lost their Agent Recruiters Tf.r. becayle the fate of illegals is "+. When a Soviet illegal arrives in a country "niru.. cipher officers.i=. but in smaller number. of labour.i iitr. access.iuft of the police and passport departments.tir"tknowledge of how and when the GRU is going to no ait. technological and other secrets which is taken into account. diplomatic couriers. urc the most devoted and thoroughly tested agents' As people who either never had access or who have lost it' ih. computer operators. become accustomed to executing any orders thdy are given.f.l"iiffy to them. These are agents who directly obtain secret information. with passing time. It is clearly unnecessary to recruit an officer from the Ministry of Defence if one can recruit his secretary. The most successful will eventually become group leider or sometimes agent resident' their access to political. undercover or agent residency or directly to the Centre. In the recruitment of such people.132 Soviet Military Intelligence Agen* executive agent. With this in mind.*. communications clerks. consular . draughtsmen and other technical personnel. even thousands of i "or. These are recruited by the undercover licences residency and their job is to obtain passports.or.ttthorough vetting. the GRU uses them solely for the recruitment of niw agents. In other words.r[t.ii nu*..n ir*"nse service to illegals who. Although they obtain they have passport-s' hundreds. tens and lJir. The group leader may be subordinate to the residency. the most important being recruitment.the military district departments. military. driving uno'u*pt.. the GRU has contact with people occupying relatively unimportant posts but with possibly greater knowledge than their superiors.. apart from secretaries. but by the local organs of the GRU .. They work in the interests of illegals' illegals and as a rull aie recruited and run only by Caididates for this category of agents are sought among om. diversions or sabotage. have been able to obtain the A simiiar role to that of the legalizing agent is played by the documentation agents.. any the leealizing agents' documentation agents do not have . 133 wider range of interests.t"d of the legalizing agent is to ensure the issue of tf. the people of special interest to the GRU are workers in printing and typing offices which produce secret documents.

. o*n"r. Examples are'known of material obtained in the United States going first to Latin America. the hardest country is Great Britain.. In the opinion of the GRU. . and couriers may sometimes make very long journeys before the material finally arrives in the hands of the GRU. Ireland and Austria among others. the Federal Republic of Germany. the United States. As soft countries the GRU includes Finland. The basic flow of agent material which is not subject to particular suspicion goes from countries with hard regimes into countries with more soft{s. inventory. copious correspondence frorn-abroad. Frequently the GRU uses the passports obtained through the good offices of documentation agents only as a sample for the preparation of similar falsified copies. in a word. in GRU language these types of . Bel- messages He is an agent who receives and transmits secret from among those. then to Africa and only from Africa being conveyed to the Soviet Union. tf...rt*s of airliners. all those places' The term 'safe flat' on"e but several flats or dwelling . who hane obtained information and intelligence tuia . transmit the correspondence to officers of the of recruitment undercover residency. ind de-briefings.h.ri"fi"g. be affected t@long:ar$gre I co m me "9!!. Frequently documentation agents have successfully worked among poor students. an opinion fortified by the experience of many years... Documentation agents may be recruited from among criminal classes who are occupied with the forging and selling of documents on the black market and also from clerks concerned with the production. usuaiiy recruited from among who possess not erges and hotel owners. up recruitairports became stricter.. the GRU virtually gave these at all' it is only for ing . If it uses " trinsporting small-sized non-metallic objects' The Owner of a Safe Howe or Flat of great He is a supplementary agent occupying a position house-owners' concttrust.KK" The Safe Address Owner Couriers These are supplementary agents engaged in transporting agent materials ovcr state frontiers. lar attention to *f. F-"t safe flats the GR0 sometimes where they may want to be able to hide a man to carry out meetings' for a lenith of several months.'134 Soviet Military Intelligence Agents 135 use them.rr"rrJ be understood not only-in its generally accepted garage or meaning but also as a well'equipped cellar' attic' selects quiet secluded places Obviously it is not necessary to employ special couriers to transport the material into the Soviet Union or its satellites.ountties send letters in SW to these addresses and .. storage and issue of passports.urents. followed by France. to lose their passports.ioi"n ao. cfu. for a financial consideration.. the work is normally restricted to inhabitants of 'soft' countries' in 5oor. usually recruited gium and Holland.:. .t"ssors of secret telephones the same rules applied to the teleorinters are recruited by . The owner of a safe house or flat GRU by the abbreviation in ttre cotloquial language of the . is known . the GRU pays particu-1 quE!. tn. One interesting aspect people who would not GRU prefers'middle'aged i. fii-jacking of aircraft became more frequent and controls at rcial trave leFilil-s ai I oJiif Ge'iChint fl Wtre n I I ihe chain of clmmunication is not interrupted' '-fftt and' more recently' fo..cret addre'sses.t . persuading them..ffi.ut by general mobilization in the country' so that tt.". to cha4ge clothes and change and to hidle stolen miterials and-photograph .recruiJilg co_u!. people i"i ir. i. The GRU also makes very wide use'of countries of the Third World for this

'and they will even come to meetings in secure places like the Soviet Embassy. one cannot avoid touching on yet another category. They do everything free. and yet they praise the Soviet Union. led by the children of Brezhnev. 'KTP'. people from the free world who have sold themselves to the GRU. even if only with one eye to look at Mongolia or Cambodia. But suddenly one finds these friends of the Soviet Union. When Soviet people want to say that a thing is outstandingly has to be foreign. later. The recruitment of such people is not recommended by over the material to the owner. The motives of agents are clear .r. We are talking about the numerouS members of Union. An agent who has acquired intelligence will stop and hand where this expression easy life and plenty of money. Oh! to be abroad. In the Soviet Union everybody without exception wishes to be abroad. the agent himself has disappeared long before. A conversation might run as follows: 'Today we've got a friendship evening with shit-eaters'. this must be foreign. This avoids direct contact between the GRU and the agent. To the end of his life the agent will not be able to tear himself away from this servitude . all Soviet representatives regaid thile with touching feelings of friendship.136 Soviet Military Intelligence Agents 137 agent networks and their possessors are known by the abbreviations 'KA'. then no money and no easy life. . The transmitting point is known by the abbreviation'PP'. bui privately they call them 'shit-eaters' ('govnoed'). Increased security might mean the source ageirt using a dead-letter box which the stall holder will it. To mount a surveilldnce operation in the neighbourhood of the dead-letter box is impossible since the transmitting point only acquires its location after it has been filled. is the cry. The contempt felt for them does not prevent the GRU and KGB from using them whenever they can. The GRU will ' announce the dead-letter box's whereabouts to the transmitting point only after it hai been filled. to go absolutely anywhere.' [t does not matter which country it comes from. But the behaviour of the numerous friends of the Soviet Union is utterly incomprehensible to Soviet people.' 'i]li ln examining different kinds of agents. not knowing who has filled instructions. Prepare a suitable menu. Hour. The owners of transmitting points are used for transmitting agent materials within the limits of one city or area. 'KT'. or what its quality or age . Officially one is not allowed to call them agents. stalls or paper stalls. 'Really. even bananas. Gromyko and Andropov. If you take risks and lose. but it is truly the only name they deserve. k is difficult to say parifrilSiies the Central Committee. ii. or 'Today we're having some shit-eaters to is the case in the criminal world.eJlgrq"ir. and so even if the police discover that the GRU has a special interest in the small shop or stall and subsequently establishes that this stall serves as a hansmitting point. Officially. and they are not agents in the full sense of being recruited agents.' Officers of both the GRU and the KGB have very much more respect for their agents than for the shit-eaters. it will still be very difficult to discover the souroe agent. No. perhaps the least appealing of all. A different one will be used for each operation. who enjoy all the fruits of civilization down to Gillette razor blades. GRU officers will visit the stall to collect the material and hand over money for the agents together with new empty. The use of this word has become so firmly entrenched in Soviet embassies that it is impossible to imagine any other name for these people. sq4ll kiosks. sometimes days. who can buy anything they want in the shops. they say. these people are nothing but shit-eaters according to Soviet' . Usually they are. but why bother to recruit them when they bring such advantages without being recruited? .

*.be an exaggeration to say that any citizen of the West.:-.u foreigners without **pti"" *t'' 6) . mlll- th@nment taifS-aiilOesign bureaux and people connected with these ffiJfi. as the owner of a transmitting point will never on his own initiative go to the police. basic importance is attached to the provider of information. long experience has persuaded the GRU that it is essential above . military and technological centres of the enemy In the previous chapter we examined the types of secret agents and also the various differences between them' [t would not. The GRU is convinced that a former sourie who is now working. some for the acquisition of secret documents. head agent or supplementary agent.---+:-i. having been recruited by the GRU. No real problems can be solved without agent penetration in basic government." alfto recruit sources. Nevertheless.138 Soviet Military Intelligence them information abour their neighbouffiEifiifiGiil workers and so on. who have not had firm contacts with them. and some for the transporting of agent materials' No citizen of any age and either sex would be idle for long once he or sni fe1 into the hands of the GRU. and only after the GRU has acquired through these sources all possible material may the sourcg himseif be used for other purposes' as a recruiter.ilffi "?. some for assassinating people. but the same cannot be said of agents who hare neuet provided secrets for the GRU. ----r thF-GRI I includins sovernment instltutlons tor sta[s. for example. They usually ask from 4 Agent Recruiting They are very good Agent recruiting is the most important task of both strategic and operational-intelligence. may be used very effectively for intelligence purposes. in other words not saying what they are used for or how much they benefit from their services. The search for suitable candidates is implemented atthe same time in certain"::iT:l::_q 0 _ scruDulous collection of information on persons of interest !o . Sometimes one tm ls to organize an evening with one or another of his acquainianG$ The GRU usually makes use of the shit-eaters 'in the dark'.

as to how several p.A contact with the undercover residency of the CiU in Canada. which consists in a further definition of motiGs which will be used in the actual recruitment of the .qL9gt4s ual.llo Jesruit by means of which he may be f. for examPle. gns $-!. Y of cultivation. GRU. The GRU may equally want a surveillance on him to collect extra data about his daily life. simultaneously and independently from one another' irta-Utitn.commences. Their subsequent argument was that it was as a mark of protest againsi the bombing of the Japanese cities ifru.opl". . but not with the undercover residency of the KGB in Mexico. . . The cultivation process may be carried out after the establishment of an acquaintanceshipwith the candidate.6p-y. Up to now the person himself does not suspect that the GRU exists and he has had no contact with its-representatives. personal financial problems.rets.rnglives v recruited . or 'love at first sight' in GRU with the has a numbei of irrefutable advantages' Contact future agent takes place only once. They also evaded the question. If an operational officer has a hundred acquain- p*.*Ei After the selection of a candidate for recruitment. if the man experiences financial problems. tt"y. It is desirable that he be sympathetic to communism without being a communist. Subsequently the GRU enters the process . the GRU will endeavour to turn his dispieasure inti hatred. and it is always recommended that agents recruited from communist parties should leave the partys- . when there was no cause for proiest. established contact with Soviet intelligence. for some reason they forgotto add that thiJ contact had been established long before the first experiments with the bomb. jargon' The crash approach. but it already has a considerable wealth 7q of detail on him.g information by word of mouth. of course fo[owing the secret cultivation which has gon.approach and the crash approach' The crash approach ffiffifi""-ffiisbt agCnt woik. There are two principal methods of recruitment'. oi for many months. ttre GRU may authorize the reJident to mount iuch an operation only if the resident of has been able to provide good irgumerlts for the taking such a risk. from the beginning of the search for a candidate to the completion of a cultivation period. instead of at meetings nr. on theii own initiative. This process sometimes gives very gratifying results. Quite a few examples are known of recruitment at the first meeting. It was in this way that many Amirican creators of the first atomic bomb were .rrit"d.r. the task of obtaining all available information about the candidate may well be given to other agents. or. or private motives like a desire for revenge on somebody or secret crimes which he is trying to hide. to communicate secret new agenls.irt . details which may be obtained through reference books.llformation of real use to the n information which will be of interest.1m person.1-ql9!. Details are collected aboui ihe candidate..". The whole process..140 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting and 141 have anv contacts at all with officers of the GRU. telephone directories and the press.r io'1r"fi. *uiy months. If he is displeased with It also tries to exacerbate his weaknesses: for exam' tiilG3i6ne of these must surely be a potential provider of rr A candidate for recruitment must fulfil the following iat is he must 5e fi'.displeasure with the regime or other political the political regime.tqlegail1anceq @ foreigners.There must exist . normally extends for not less than a yeat1' only after ihis does actual recruitment take place. as is the case with the gradual approach' After the first contact the newly recruited agent will himself motives. Communist parties everywhere have been compromised to a certain extent by their contacts with the KGB and the GRU. However. cond v -'in the position to_Jlgvigt . the sec@!r4g . the GRU *ili endeauour to make them worse.

The candidate has as yet not felt the deadly grip of the GRU. has not yet understood what it wants from him. that never there. The fact is that the GRU is not always.142 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting t43 take action on his own security. as the candidate gradually becomes. and also from his own fellow countrymen. but the payment for them grows equally. During this stage the most important thing is that the future agent becomes accustomed to being asked favours and fulfilling them accurately. and naturally he will not hide his good friendship with such charming people. It does not matter what sort of favours or services.Maybe he will be asked to accept at his address and forward to the officer letters ostenpibly from his mistress.f insignificant favour from the man and pay him very generously for it. there was a small acquaintanceshiP will try to make every subsequent meeting as interest' ing and useful as possible for the candidate. the GRU informs him what the affair is all about and there begins a new stage. much to his surprise. In the gradual approach method. and that he is deeply ensnared in espionage work. the operational officer will try to carry out meetings in secluded restaurants. this sort of thing happens very. Perhaps he will be asked to acquire in his name some works of reference which are not on sale and are distributed only on signature. In many cases it is necessary to establish contact and to use each meeting with the candidate to study his motives and to carry out vetting and cultivation. He will never talk to his wife. He will try to avoid the candidate visiting Soviet official institutions and places where Soviet people gather together. After he has become aware of this for hirnself. The tasks become more serious but the payment for them gradually . by apparent mistake or out agent a very valuable for a very innocent and stamp. The only people who should know anything about an agent and therefore about candidates for recruitment are the resident. very often. then the Soviet. (The particular pretexts I used were that my office . the gradual approach method. despite its shortcomings. from friends and acquaintances of the man himself. the deputy resident and of course the cipher officer and the Centre nobody else. bars far from the place where the candidate lives and far from his place of work. or tell her that he has a charming friend in the Soviet military attach6 who is also very interested in stamp collecting. Having estabhshed contact. or he will be asked to talk about and describe his friends who work with him' In many cases the actual recruitment proposal is never made. is frequently used. indeed not even in the majority of agent of the GRU without having fully realized it. The officer may then ask of frGndthip. He still nourishes his illusions. the operational officer tries by every possible method to avoid'blowing'the candidate. He will decline invitations to meet the candidate's family or visit his home. or to buy a complete set of telephone directories and give them to the officpr as if he did not know how or where this could be done' By degrees the tasks become more complicated. so the candidate t After the woutO tell him. However. he tries to hide the connection from the police. the man will one day find that all ways of extricating himself have been cut off. tf they exchange postage stamps. He may consider that he is simply doing his business an<l doing favours for a good friend' Then. able to collect a sufficient amount of material about the candidate without his knowledge to prepare him sufficiently for recruitment. At all costs he will try to avoid the candidate telephoning him either at home or in the embassy. In order that he should'not blow the candidate from - the very first meeting. will give the future is. caf6s.

air shows and so on.carried out by the owner or a director conversation. and equally its complete unacceptability for illegals it does. any one or all of which may be from the security services. The delegation visits the exhibition and looks at the stands of the big corporations only to disguise its real object. The conversation turns to another subject. The experts of course know that at the exhibition there will be demonstrations of models whose sale to the Soviet Union is categorically prohibited.000? Only 25. There exists yet another method of recruitment. nothing criminal. The exhibition is huge. Great pity that it's not for sale'' The delegation on. All expenditure is approved and justified.would give half a million piece cost? 25. how much does it coit?'v - are absent. ii does not matter' Not everything this been lost. It did not ask. they wait their turn. In the meantime the delegation goes on with hundreds of firms' and inspection. just a model. perhaps the most effective and secure. it did not demand' It was merely its interested. but is distinct from the classical 'love at first sight' in that a lengthy search for a candidate. The Soviet lelegation did not propose anything to anybody. vetting and cultivation #*-G. This method was worked out by the GRU in the first decade after the war and seems not to be used by the KGB. It is very similar to the direct approach. The interpreter stays behind for a few seconds' 'It was so nice meeting you. N$yqjo be done' but teli us. In spite of the fact that the method has so many limitations. None the less. It can only be used at exhibitions and only against the owners of small firms which produce military material. The delegation gets into conversation with him and an officer of the. his tracing. Recruitment is accomplished' The delegation continues its inspection' New interpreters are proviied. The exhibition iJtruge. Could we not continue our talk the opening of exhibitions of military etectronics. ttre tist of essential things is too long' Another stand. hundreds ofwhich take place every year. iot invite you to dinr"t this evening in the restaurant?' '[ don't know whether that would be all right' We hardly know each other.local GRU residency acts the part o! interpreter. At each of these stands there are several salesmen and guides. just a short.t Recruiting 145 decreases. The delegation is only really interested in the stands of small firms where the exptanations are . "Before himself. After a few minutes the delegation takes its leave in a friendly way. The examination and construction of such samples as they have been able to obtain in the Soviet Union will occupy much more time and money. This is done on the pretext What can he do? Go on strike? of his own security. At thelame time they manage to let at just such operationaiofficer know that they hare arrived is not a firm as could be of use to them and that the exhibit forbidden.r-"'--4'. 'Is it really Luy such a piece? Oh! What i pity.incidental. ship-building and engine-building conferences. a scientific delegation appears over dinner this evening? No? You're busy? What a pity' Many thanks. the delegation will carry suitcases crammed full of money' with full powers to . The inierpreter stays for a few seconds' 'Could I !T !o". Hundreds of films and the list of equipment wanted by their government is very long' .000? How cheap! We would pay twenty times that much for such a piece! Great pity that it is not for sale. give positive results. Drinking martinis in the bar. but an actual piece. friendly at the GRU residency with a list of everything which is essential for the Soviet military and the armaments industry. It was very nice to make your acquaintance-" And that is all.' All this in a light-hearted way' as if. armaments and military technology.000. spend it as they wish. another firm. the same result. ior that.144 Soviet Military Intelligence Agen. There are still more stands' 'How much does we. The experts pass themselves off as an offlcial the Soviet delegation.' And that is all. including the impossibility of recruiting generals and their secretaries.

receives an agent who will serve it for long years afterwards. J. using antediluvian technology.. a heat sink or some such thing) * exactly the sort of thing that would be produced by a components lnanufacturer. The only thing he has not taken into consideration is the wolf-like greed of the GRU.146 Sovict Military Intelligence Agent Reuuiting 147 The GRU's calculation has shown itself to be unfailing.-s*f9_L&t _S?pdidqQl tnd their tracins and vetting. he thinks to himself: this is a matter of industrial espionage. He hopes to dispose of the products of his firm. Then suddenly in the Soviet Union an aircraft exactly like Concorde appears. and the GRU. e ---------::!-::-L+-J-* the riame of Soviet intellieence. not able to copy the aeroplane properly. an air show . always keen to strengthen his situation. And of course recruitment in small firms does not in any way hinder the GRU's attempts to penetrate large firms. without paying a penny. the owner of a components manufacturing firm. As for QBl]*jlbeat$. Declared persona non i:itri t ilill ll. flr- ffi. despite having all the necessary drawings and documents. in Northern Ireland as an . certainly at a staggering price. Thev alwals assume another attractive because they can be carried out with complete impunity. Far from it. they gradually attract these people to play the part of agents. Having bought the first model or set of documents. is always at great risk. at Le Bourget when the assistant Soviet military attach6 i was detained for endeavouring to carry out just such a lilt lilJ{ recruitment. For its money the armaments industry receives essential documents and samples. The work of illegals of course is made egjgr by the obvjous s:lqrg!!{:lti9rtptlbe.) engine. The only thing which is not clear in all these stories is the attitude of those countries who joyfully accept these supposed 'diplornats'. [n any case. s p g ggl e Ifiiloome-fi t5Ee qEn t cont aa r[nn tne ownerftTInffi-s producing military material. now turned agent. It is equally easy for him to hide the money he has received.y *uy pass themselves off as American industrial spies. even a very successful one. Exhibition recruitments are also r: grata. The money which the delegation brings with it to the exhibition comes out of the budget of the armaments industry which is ready to spend as much money as it has to in profitable business. He is deeply mistaken. Very often Soviet designers are not interested in the whole rocket or the whole aircraft. the GRU will later on lower the prices and finally dictate them. which in several countries is not even considered a criminal offence. must turn his attention to the recruitment of other agents in the big firms to which he supplies his parts. When he receives a proposal to sell his own wares at a price fifteen to twenty times the highest normal price. was simply increased. Only one case of detection is known. After he has been milked. and by means of proposing advantageous deals. They have been facilitated by the fact that in these recruitments the GRU does not spend one rouble of its own money. but only in some small part . The owner of a small firm. they basically use the first two methods. the number of exhibition recruitments by the GRU has steadily From the first moment he knows what is wanted from him and carefully evaluates the step that he decides on. Since they very often play thj part oJ n aIE. a steering system or some particular instrument (in many cases not even an important part but only a membrane. (To blame the GRU for the trials and difficulties of the TUlzl4 Concordski is not justified. supposing that this will be sufficient. but not for long because a military diplomat cannot be held. if he sells his product he can hide the fact from the authorities. atter three years he went to another country in anothei official capacity as a deputy resident. Weak Soviet industry.. There is another verv imoortant factor. but this is not absolutely true. One might object that the really big secrets are all in the hands of the big firms. Illesals hardlv ever recruit in. He was detained.

'If.t p"opi.""r.' Elementary psychological analysis shows that this is perhaps the only way to convince the GRU that they can trust the. This is when a foreigner comes in and says. 'We are reprLsentatives of such and such a liberation army. The sergeant . for that matter) is sure that the caller is not a young reporter anxious to publish a sensational article or somebody purporting to sell secret documents but really only selling some nonsense.' This does not mean that it would not be interesting to have a look at what the caller has brought. We are which he has brought are not forgeries? Who would carry the can if we paid him money for papers which afterwards turned out to be forgeries? No. why does he think that we would deceive him and not return the papers if they wqre of no use to us? And where is the guarantee that the papers There is one last method of recruiting. He might add a note to the effect that 'this is not all the material I have but only a part. bringing with him the block of a cipher machine used in one of the American bases. Be so kind as to leave the building or we will call the police. and leaves. if he is really ready to entrust his life to us.u"ry y. but long experience has shown that the person who really wants to be recruited and really has something to sell does not say very much but simply hands over the riraterial. An American sergeant came to one of the Soviet observation missions in West Germany (each of which is a GRU residency).' That these 'walk-ins' are an extremely unpredictable form of recruitment is perhaps best illustrated by two examples. come into Soviet embassies and the same answer awaits them all. why on earth should he not hand them some papers? By such a gesture he not only draws attention to himself but he gives time for reflection on his proposals and for the necessary checking with higher authorities and checking of the material. not even suspecting the existence of the GRU and its illegals.ffi. Sometimes such recruitments are implemented very quickly and without problems. Indeed if a person has decided to entrust his life and the happiness of his family to such dark and unknown personalities. how can they be sure that the caller is not a police agent who wants to know who in the embassy. this or that red brigade. However.'The candidate is then recruited in the name of an organization fo' d-nscience all his lif@s a revolutionary and defends ideals near to his heart. if you are interested..' However strange it may . we are not interested in such things. he has decided on this step. Can't you help us? If you can't we ask you not to let anybody know about our visit.148 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting 149 countries with dictatorial regimes GRU illegals recruit people in the name of anti-government organizations carrying on the underground struggle against tyranny. [t is only necessary for the illegal to know some of the important political views in order to be able to adopt them for himself and begin recruiting.' The police are usually not called but the embassy stdff chase the would-be agent out quickly. together with instructions as to where he can be found. He is so full of pride that he has been selected for such secret work that he may not even tell those who think likewise about it. 'You have got the wrong address.. in Arab countries as anti-Zionists. after careful consideration.ii-of:*. 'This is a diplomatic representation and not an espionage centre. A Arethod often used by illegals is to pass themselves off as supporters of separatist movements. In not concerned with such things. organization going in for terrorist activities against the English military presence. if the visitor brings papers and documents to the embassy and begins to demand immediate financial reward. both of which occurred at the same residency in West Germany.dr. . this leads one to think. lPlegs--e recruit concerned with secrets? Thus the answer to all is the same. Even if the GRU (and the KGB.

Diplomatic immunity is not to be trifled with. although the major's main proposal was of vastly greater interest.150 Soviet Milinry Intelligence Agent Reouiting 151 announced that for a certain sum he could bring a second part of the machine and added that there could only be a deal on condition that the GRU would not subsequently attempt to recruit him. many highly placed officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Tass were also on alert. The GRU chief joyfully informed the Central Committee of the successful outcome of the operation. The major announced that he would demand a substantial sum for the shell. technology. Later the shell was transported in a diplomatic container under armed guard to the Soviet Union. In fact. in full readiness to come tearing out to the wood and in the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to defend the radio communications which had been intercepted earlier but remained undeciphered. In one was the American major. but they did not have the right to search it nor remove anything from it. A number of the senior officers of the residency were called to Moscow and given a crash course in American atomic atomic equipment. The GRU leadership decided to buy the atomic shell and to pay the price demanded for it by the American. But everything went according to plan.dmerican principles. The operational officers knew beforehand the serial number. A week later. or more of its basic blocks. it was tantamount to being on Soviet territory. The sergeant got his money and an assurince that the GRU would forget all about him immediately after the deal was done. The American and the three Soviets transferred the shell from one car to the other. On the orders of the Central Committee. the specialists of the GRU information service confirmed the genuineness and very great importance of the documents whiih had been acquired. must return it after two months. and a thorough check was carried out. In the event nobody stopped the officers. What about the sergeant? Of immediately recruited. ready to intervene if necessary. Many people did without sleep that The cipher machine which was obtained. The residency immediately accepted both proposals. The Soviet Consul dozed by his telephone. All was as it should be. In proof of his good intentions he handed over free of charge to the residincy detailed plans of the atomic depots and instructions on checking procedures and standing orders for work with great value. Some days later. on a dark rainy night in a clearing in the middle of a forest. On another occasion a couple of years later an American major approached the same Soviet residency proposing to sell an American atomic artillery shell. course he was . the exact weight and the markings which would identify it as a genuine shell. in the other three operational officers. Once the shell was in the Soviet car with diplomatic number plates. by exploiting th! . The Soviets handed over a briefcase full of banknotes to the American and agreed to meet in two months' time for the return of the shell. to create more complete Soviet examples. They also enablid them to study the principles of cipher work in the American Army and in the armies of its allies and. but they were ready to announce to the world that the imperialists had mounted yet another provocation against the Soviet Union. 'Where is the . having studied the she[. These documents by themselves were of military diplomats. and imposed the condition that the Soviet side. enabled the technical services of the GRU to decipher thousands of American accurately two night. . and the car drove peacefully into the courtyard of the Soviet diplomatic mission. The police could stop the car. two motor cars met. There were two niore Soviet cars hidden nearby. the Tass and Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcements were already prepared. the level of radiation. Of course they did not know what was going on or where.

the general staff. He had apparently known of the immlnence of his posting and chosen his moment perfectly. However.After protracted arguments and consultations.but a beautifully executed copy. all the Ministers and departments of State. There was no answer. preliminary work on the shell had already disquieted the Soviet specialists. The first attempts proved unsuccessful. and it would not be so easy to find him there. Steps were taken to find him in the United States. received no decorations but at the same time they were not punished and neither was the GRU in the future even the most trivial mistake wouldlead to dismissdl. there had been no attempt to determine the exact level of radioactivity. nobody had foreseen the possibility that there could be a timed device in the shell and that the Central it was much more radioactive than it should have been. as The shell was taken for the time being to the central aerodrome and a military transport aircraft speedily transported it to Novaya Z*mlya The shell did not explode. It began a search for the American major. so the dismantling was conducted in a special pavilion hurriedly constructed on the atomic testing ground. all the principal design bureaux. After all that had happened the officen who had taken part in the operation. the KGB. but this was not necessary. of course. explode while it was being dismantled and destroy the leading Soviet specialists who were working on it. He had taken a written-off practice shell or. the Politburo. All the same the GRU was not happy about it. the GRU chief received a 'service incompetence note' . as it is called.152 A Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Recruiting 153 bomb?' asked a voice on the telephone. everything which constitutes Soviet power. Of course he'was not able to regulate this to the extent that the level of radiation would conform to the level of radiation of . because everybody and everything is controlled strong warning that flom Moscow. . At the time when it was first checked after having been handed over to the operational officers. . The American major from the depot for atomic armaments had known to the last detail how to do this. a 'standard weight equivalent'. However. [t was established that he had been posted to the USA immediately after the sale of the forgery. The possibility of such an occurrence had only been realized in the Central Committee when the shell was already in Moscow. At the same time there was no guarantee that it would not chief. the shell was dismantled with the greatest possible care. No defence was possible. had painted it as a real shell and put on a Committee.a corresponding marking and number. One shell and the whole system could have gone up. Instead of the 6<pected decoration.''In Moscow!?''Yes. whose as follows: 'And what hhppens if there is a little spring inside this shell and it explodes right in the middle of the Soviet capital and turns Moscow into import was roughly Hiroshima?' The GRU had worked out the whole operation with the maximum number of precautionury *"urures and the plan to acquire the shell had been confirmed by all departments from the chief to the general staff up to the Central Committee. Only then was it found that it was not a shell at all . all the Military Academies.We have it in GRU headquarters. the Central Committee turned down the request .a genuine shell. Inside the shell he had put some radioactive waste which he had obtained. The officers had only been interested to see whether there was radiation or not. the GRU. and at the same time the GRU asked for permission to murder him from the Central Committee. The Special Commission of the General Staff and Central Committee established that the forgery had been very skilfully and thoroughly executed and that there had been little possibility of exposing it at the time of the handover. in a word.' long and largely unprintable tirade ensued. could be instantaneously destroyed.

Whatever the theoreticians say. GRU residents always remember the American major. it is indisputable that after the phenomenon of willing and mass defection to the side of the enemy. Now. agent communications is the most vulnerable sector of Soviet intelligence. something which fortunately happens quite often. Personal contact is the most vulnerable element. however. which was flowing tike a river into the hands of Stalin and his blood' thirsty clique. and to some degree they are right. they say. having seen a great it t. All agent communications are divided into personal and non-personal. Agent Communications t 't I is extremely difficult to find real volunteers is a simple fact. very frequently feels GRU theoreticians officially admit that agent communications that complex of channels for transmitting instructions and material . The Soviet operdtional officer. personal meetings are an inescapable evil with which one has to come to terms. as agents gain experience and involvement .is the weakest link in the chain. Enormous damage was done - the utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to it willingly. do not take into consideration another simple thing. i t tt il li ) deal of the ugly face of communism. 1. It is the fault of communications. I. By this one gesture the whole powerful current of technological intelligence on the production of atomic weapons. But real volunteers. however warmly they may be welcomed. and the volunteer. Nevertheless. They were ordered to forget about the major and stop searching for him. in the first stages. the first thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer. At the same time. It is much. recruitment and vetting. Even amongst those few who still believe in communism. the intelligence officer will make a great distinction befween the agent he has recruited by using a whole arsenal of trickb and traps. especially during cultivation. i' when lgor Gusenko went over to the West. Later on. whenever a 'walk-in' appears at a Soviet embassy and suggests the purchase for an exorbitant price of technical documents of exceptional importance. and preference is always given to non-personal contact. much harder to discover a volunteer than an agent whom the GRU has spent a year and more in That processing. we in the field know that by far the greatest damage to Soviet intelligence is caused by the defection of GRU officers.t54 Soviet Mililary Intelligence on the basis that the major was incredibly cunning and could well outwit the GRU a second time as he had outwitted them earlier. And historians will remember with gratitude the name of the GRU Colonel' Oleg Penkovsky. Thanks to his priceless information the Cuban crisis was not transformed into a last World War. was stopped dead. that there are so many failures. And when a GRU or KGB officer decides to break with his criminal organization. which was clearly absent in the old Russian intelligence service of the pre-rivolutionary period.

In the same way the agent is also given the possibility of communicating danger. and railway and police stations.Tris access is accorded only to the most experienced Iffits. the GRU prefers that they should take place either on its own or on should be unable to get to the meeting we will meet in the same place in a week's time'.in other words all those places where police activitv mav bggrcts:d to be carbon copy of the main meeting for which arrangements are made at the same time as the main meeting: 'If one of us lil:itifriffilmffi This system of alternative meetingp is introduced by GRU officers long before recruitment.' then the officer will come immediately. Frequently they will try to give the impressioh that they are collectors of such items as postage stamps. If I am late. l ir ir rti . Usually the subject is introduced in various quite innocent ways. and at the same time has a hundred reasons why he cannot use the telephone in such a simple case. the officer says. will take place in hotels and camping places. and in some cases even flve years or more. cin tfriiogie'pre$fii-thaiifisfn6ffii-ffitingbetween ordinary people discussing important topics. neutral territory. l. The details for these meetings are worked out previously. especially during the vetting stage of agents. sometimes a year. If the agent says. C!'Vo[g11wl!!t!Jl to avoid city quarters which are known 6-56-ih. Many of the most experienced agents have not had a personal meeting with their case officer for several years. If such meetings are absolutely unavoidable. airports.' [f you have a good friend in the Soviet embassy and he says that sort of thing to you.' then they will reply that he has made a mistake. Routine meetings are organized between agents. and this also applies to other operations involving agents. 'I need John. and those who may communicate information of such outstanding importance that it brooks no delay at all. however. In any case we will rneet again in three days' time. For example an illegal will meet his agent or officers of the undercover residency their agents.156 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications 157 in their work. The agent is told how he should go about calling the officer on stipulated telephones or telegrams or signals.Taunt of criminals or prostitutes.rE!gIIu!$. Experienced agents are often given a programme of meetings for six months ahead. A man who has as yet done nothing for the GRU. isilready being indoctrinated into iecrecy and is already being introduced to the system of agent communications. At the other end of the spectrum there is the eryerggru meetiye. personal contacts gradually give way to nonpersonal ones. be sure that the GRU has a thick file on you and that sooner or later you will receive a proposal of recruitment and notice with astonishment that all ways out seem to be blocked. then don't wait for me more than ten minutes. and there may be up to three or four alternative meetings for each main meeting. Sometimes these meetings take place in cinemas or public conveniences.onger meetings.Et. 'I shall be very pleased to meet you again but I simply don't know whether I shall be able to be on time. For example. A complicated system of alternative meetings is set out for experienced agents. yachts or boats which either are the property of the agent or are hired by him. guarded state military or commercial undertakings . Whoever is the senior man will give instructions to the junior as to where. and in what circumstances they will meet. In all cases. The life of a diplomat contains so many unexpected happenings. when. caravans. postcards or coins and will have these'objects spread out in front of them in the restaurant or cafd where they are meeting. . 'Ring John. if he rings up on the telephone and says. If the agent uses the second variant. who does not even suspect its existence. for example. With so many alternatives it is essential that places and times are changed.

book in right hand. This solves two problems at the same time. They check his punctuality. the agent who had lost contact with his case officer would be obliged to go to a certain place on the 3lst of every month which has thirty-one days. The officer and the agent carry out only without exception . generally imagined as a special portable radio'set which may transmit information directly to the receiving centre on Soviet territory or to a Soviet ship or satellite.eral qlements of W L. In giving the correct reply the agent shows to his new leader that he has not made a mistake and secondly that the agent acknowledges the authority of his new case officer. For example. recognition signals. fheryklg2. The most experienced agents have only one element of personal contact . password and answer . Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications 159 then he is showing the GRU that he has been arrested by the police who are trying to get to the case officer through -Brush contacts are for handing over material. the most junior of those taking part must not suspect that it is not a routine meeting and that he is in fact beirtg checked. A number of GRU officers take up position before the meeting.158 the agent. [f an agent is arrested there is only to be found in his flat a pair of good Japanese receivers.they are given the place. for example. Fifst there is the long-range two-*ay radio link. The secret rendezvous as an element of agent communications is given to all agents rendezvous is essential for re-establishing lost contacts. where he goes after the aborted meeting and what action he takes. at peak hours and when the crowds come out --*- of stadiums. The entry of the agent to the meeting place is checked from a great distance. for example two illegals. and so on). on observation platforms for tourists where there are powerful binoculars and telescopes insta[ed). In the appointed place another person will come towdrds him and will give the previously arranged password to which the agent gives the proper reply. and the means whereby they may be put together to make a long-range two-way set. the GRU officers may observe what he does. The check meeting is carried out in the same conditions as the routine meeting. they observe the presence of any suspicious movement in the area of the meeting place prior to the meeting.llgy. After the agent has realized that nobody is going to come and meet him. On the other hand the transmission of the material must not attract attention especially if one of the participants is under strict surveillance. having previously agreed recognition signals (brief case in left hand. time.theSgg3J-legdggpgl . If nobody comes to the pre-arranged place. they watch for anybody who follows him.because the secret one often confused with the secret house or Yavotchnayi Kvartira. money and so on. At the present time the term 'secret house' is not used in the GRU. his behaviour. This classical element in all spy films is in practice only used in wartime. on full buses. It has been replaced by the term 'secret flat' or KK but the word yavka is used to mean a meeting between two men who'are unknown to each us examine these. a tape recorder . Brush contact must be carried out with great precision otherwise the crowd may separate those taking part. . if in extreme circumstances the whole of the Soviet embassy was declared persona non grata and had to leave the country. or an agent with his new case officer. elements of non-personal contact gradually take the place ofpersonal contact. in places where they can easily observe what is going on (for example. in very populous places. Instead agents and illegals are issued with small written instructions containing several types of ordinary current components which may be bought in any radio shop. As the agent becomes more and more involved in his work. that is seven times a year. the agent is obliged to repeat the process until such time as somebody does appear to re-establish contact.and sev. instructions. in the underground. However.

The primary criterion threatened by rnany possible happenings: they may be found by children. They have the moct universal application and in addition to communications they may be used for the storage of everything that has to do with a spy's work . but augments the two-way tink.160 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications l6l in the form of previously agreed or numbers in ordinary radio programmes. For this the short-range radio link exists. tike the sort of walkie-talkie sets which can be bought in any shop and which are used for guiding model aeroplanes and ships (one cannot help noticing embassy). by the police. tl 'rl . reliable and secure type of link is inevitably the one by which the'agent receives from the Centre. money. The GRU is continually looking at the market as regards radio sets and components. Oneway radio links are usually broadcast by Soviet radio stations or special ships or polar stations to be received anywhere in the world by ordinary radio receivers. from cracks in gravestones and brickwork to specially devised magnetic'letter boxes' in the form of metal nuts. Instructions to the and other components which can be bought in any shop. Someone may start building on the site. There is therefore no way that he can be . However. One fisherman will transmit signals by means of a rod put in the water and another several kilometres distant from him will receive the signal by using the same method. or as a simple numerical code.1. destined. ald working out new recommendations as to how they should be assembled. special photographic equipment. be used by the GRU for its dark ends. All radio connection with increasing the monitoring of radio exchanges. Satellites are used in conjunction with these sets and this makes it possible to transmit information on a narrow radio beam vertically overhead. Applied to the structure of a bridge among thousands of similar nuts and rivets this device is easily hidden and just as easy to undo. The long-range one-way radio link does not replace. however. The agent who hears such agent are transmitted phrases any criminal activity. for the GRU it is often necessary that the agent himself a . These can very easily be pushed into the ground in any public park. radio sets. Underwater dead-letter boxes are also widely used. A short-range i: special link is an alternative to short-range radio links: In I or a policeman. And secondly the problein of the transportation and secret storage of a radio set of comparatively large proportions is avoided. Equally important is that the dead-letter how many aerials there are on the roof of tlie Soviei In this type of radio exchange the'GRU takes the . transmission is also not exposed to any great risk. l' example. In times of war.'!l. Significirnt research is also going on in the field of electro' optical communications. All lhis must be taken into account. ii' Their selection is always a complicated and responsible is that as far as possible they must not be prone to accidental discovery. or the heat of summer may affect them. for transmits. or even which country. Even if a poiice force should by some means or another guess that the transmission they are hearing is not a coded transmissjon for cosmonauts or they cannot possibly determine for which spy it is rya1hip1. Or water and gas pipes can be used. They are business. There may be floods. The GRU also makes wide use of boxes constructed in the form of a plastic hollow wedge with a lid. ambulance driver. Pg&lgttel!9les-are the favourite GRU means of contact.urpett"d of cover of a fireman. The agent transmits information to the Soviet embassy with the help of small transmitters.documents. fhe most convenient. the GRU frequently undertakes the transmission of signals under water. exploiting technica'i means of radio transmission in seconds or micio-seconds. Thousands of types of dead-letter boxes are known. quick-acting and ultra-quick-acting sets are used. construction worker conversations within the city limits are thoroughly studied by GRU specialists and any of them may. even by archaeologists.

and shot. working in a GRU top secret archive. all that was inside was a few dozen old-fashioned silver. to give an order to one of the GRU residencies in West Germany to find this old unused DLB' Suppose it was still there. The affair was not complicated and a week later the investigation disclosed that the dead-tetter box had belonged to the flamburg illegal residency which in 1937 had been recalled to Moscow lock. and the agent.peitraps something else of interest might be. together with thi document about the unused DLB. remove the documents and with the help of two other'diplomats'copy them in his car which was parked at the Capitol. The GRU chief took two decisions. stock and barrel for 'instructions'.used' and transferred to the archives. about the size of a small suitcase.?.and secondly. and succeeded several"times . which had been buried at the bottom of a lake in a quiet of very little value. Then the new GRU staff was also liquidated. Suddenly his attention was attracted by a sheet of white paper blowing about with the group {U' . in spite of the war. in any case. once discoverid the description of a DLB on which there was no . The DLB had bein stored in the GRU. One day'the case officer was making his way towards the dead-letter box. The second dead-letter box was in the very centre of the American capital.000 American dollars. The officer informed his chief of what he had found and he in his turn informed the GRU chief.after the GRU chief had sanctioned repeated use of the and valuables for the use of the illcgal residency in case of emergency. the rebuilding of the city after the war. was able to walk in the park for a few minutes longer and retrieve his documents. on his return from his lunch break. The niw officers who took the place of those who had been shot were completety inexperienced and started work with new sets of documents-. the fierce bombing of Hamburg. For gleater security it had been covered with an old tombstone which had been sprinkled alt over with sand and silt. to look into the old documents. the agent would go into a park and hide top secret documents in the hollow of a tree.command point and after the completion \t 'i . even by somebody who only knows about it at secondhand.. The copying of the documents in the car did not take more than twenty minutes. It must also be located in a place where it is possible for the case officer to go at any time with a plausible cover story for practice are worth describing. There was no time.. The DLB consisted of a hermetically sealed container. Some random examples from GRU As a general principle of security. each dead-letter box (DLB) may only be used once. pre-war. to nominate a of specially trusted officers for permanent archive ruorf . An ofEcer at a @mmand point. Thi officer carefully inspected the document again. of a DLB operation the document is stamped . All the materials of the residency had been handed in to the archives. then the value of its contents would have increased many times. his presence there. So there were many documents which were completely forgotten and simply collected dust in the archives. If it various currencies to a total sum of 50.used' stamp.dis' covered . In fact the DLB ftad survived. and the enormous expansion in the development of the city. a hundred or so American dollars and a few thousand crisp German Marks of the time of the Third Reich. apparently . but there was nottiing on it to show that the DLB had been emptied. Some minutes later a Soviet 'diplomat' would appear.Soviet Mililary lruelligence Agent Communicatiors 163 box's location must be easy to describe to another person. firstly. who decided on an investigation. At the beginning of his lunch break. The doctment was very old. The operation was an especially daring one. The corytainer was removed to Moscow and opened there. Much to the disappointment of all those present. Documents on all DLBs are selected in 1932 and three years later some material had been put in it .

and nor was it possible to throw things at the box acros the ice to send it to the other side. or he should wait for four d1ys. He looked around. even forgetting to thank his saviour and helper. The agent chose the second option. The magnet was very strong and normally there would have been no risk that the box wbuld come unstuck' Pretending to tie up his shoe-lace. Signals. too. dots.d. and after a few seconds flew out into the river.they had thrown tLem out. he succeeded in retrieving the valuable box. The box slid down the pipe. In the box was a film with instructions fo1 an agent. The officer picked it up and. Within hours. the box would have sunk and that would have been that. By carefulty winding in his line.dig * . The officer ran into a shop and bought a fishing rod. The case officer hunied to meet him. the pieccs of paper had got in their way and. Usually an agent who has worked for some years with the GRU will have as a minimum the following elements of first yellow and red leaves. lipstick' A car parked in a pre-arranged plaee at a pre-arranged time may s€rve as a signal or a doll placed in a window of a house. The ice was too thin to walk on. Of . many of which were torn by the sharp tieth and'claws of tlese lovable little animals. signats are made with chalk.ou*". Had the river not been iced over. Again only hours latei the GRU had carried out a complete forgery of the documents. pencil. There was only one way out. saw the stamp . then. crosses. dead-letter box was in a small drainage pipe on the embankment of a river in northern Europe.. giving out a harmonious ringing secret'. Office pins are used as signals stuck in a predetermined place. an the agent had already appeared on the opposite side th- @. the policemanheld them out to the embanassed case officer. but the GRU's swift action had saved him. Without . But the first frosts had started and the officer had not taken into account the fact that the interior of the pipe was covered with a thin layer of ice.n9.'the " policeman also started to collect the papers. '. He evidently took the Soviei diplomat for one of the lillrite House workin who had had his papers blown out of his hands by the wind. day later they were returned to the agent. for an' hour and'a half. honified. Nevertheless the situation highly critical.!l l {Pi officer with diplomatic rank had made two changes of aircraft of the park.. are a means of exchanging information which is highly favoured by the GRU. suggested two posible ways out: Jither the ageni should tell his department that he had in error torn ufthe papen and thrown them into the waste-paper baskei but then had remembered in time. he casl his hook onto the ice until it was taken by the magnet. mi ofncer . This happened in the heart of one of the Western capitals in broad daylight. as in Europe and arrived in Warsaw where i fast fighter interceptor was waiting for him. immediately set about picking up the pieces. The latter took them and smiled in the most foolish way. paints. AII over the plrk were dozens of similar sheets of paper. the officer. [gggestrfpr m99!!!gS and for . bands. The officer realized that squinels getting ready for winter had taken up residene in the hollowed-out trie. A third. At that dramatic moment a policeman lppearedin the park. There was absolutety no -remained tir^. and a. But instead it skidded on the ice right to the middle of the river. Having gathered a'comiderable number. which was unfortunately also covered with a thin sheet of ice.164 Soviet Military I ntelligence Agent Communicatbns had to lower into the pipe a small metal box with a magnet attached."o. although llth yr strictly forbidden. all this time he had been threatened with eiposure. euickly outlining the situatioi. These are used as qarnlttg:-gf-gqqger. who satuted ana wittrOiew. the officer carefully lowered the little box into the drainage pipe with the magret and took out his hand. to the astonishment of passers'by.i.edlsalion "of hundreds of other intentions. He.

Elements of non-personal communication have been gradually introduced and have gradually super' seded the personal meetings. ililI. So far.gfoue in aqgliqn The Practice of Agent Work ljt tong-range two-way radio . .11 . What happens next is a new stage. .. when the embassies were closed. {t. Attempts by the agent to protest or refuse to work have been succcsfully Suppressed.trf meetings(p9l$nsige$d!lp-t*g"$tIS-be. all contact with the powerful agent network was lost.16 Soviet Mitiury Intelligence A. but also illegals and agents subordinate to illegals. ffi .il4I.r i Up till the . by means r' ' t. The flow of agent information was cut off at the very moment when it would have been of the greatest value. Second \ilorld War not only the agents of undercover residencies.and there hasTeen worked out for him a complicatdd system of including both personal and non' agent @ personal fonns of communication and also the actions to be taken in case of a sudden break of all channels of communication. were tied to the embassies... In these meetings thc agent has handed over photocopies of secret documents and has received in exchange small sums of money. ($. .Holland. Subsequently. The material received from him has been thoroughly compared and checked with analogous material received from other souroes.during long routine So our agent has been |}:f ' -h. the thinking behind which includes the segregation of the agent from the Soviet embassy and from all meetings with official Soviet representatives.n aEent._aten"track). all is going well. fiLi #. The deputy head of rhe GRU was sent into occupied Europe with several radio officen and unlimited powers. With the outbreak of war. Within a short time he had successfully organized a small illegal resident network on the territories of Belgium and.

tested and trained agent must be kept separate from official Soviet institutions abroad. made it imposible for himself to go to the police. This was perhaps the only .ii ffiffi#. The recruited. Nobody had supposed that the advance of the Nazis would be so precipitaii. Another lesson leamt from the arrest of the 'Red Orchestra' is the division of residencies into even smaller independent parts. . and the radio station had notteen_designed to deal with iuch long distances.posible solution at the time and of course ii naA many qisaqvantages. of coutse. the agent group and the agent rovidespeciarry important material. but only on instructions from the Crntre wiifiout having any idea for whom they are working. forbiddin on occupied territgry). Operations are ptanned in such a way that there is no possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions of the undercover residency.168 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practice of Agent Work 169 station by the name of . One of the. illegal residenciei were functioning on the territories of its tire . . The moment the Centre feels that such and such an agent is handing over material of exceptional importance. The ships of the soviei Bartic fleet were brockadei in their own bases and coutd not be used for the reception of agent transmissions.illegal radio operators.f. Referred to by the Germans as 'the Red Orchestra'. The process completely neutralized and gigantic octopus arested. the . in her turn eager for the favours oi a certain German corporal.. centre of organization. Fint of all. which had been established Ffor: the war. as he regularly listened to the radio (which was. All attention is switched from of obtainins informatior to the steD 1 'ii .this organization *hich had penetrated many of Germany's most sensitive secrets. are taken out of residencies very quickly. and the coilapse It Degan of secret rendezvous.].Sever'. provgd useless. their case officers and the illegals found themselves in one gigantic to obtain th6 favours of a girl. cout! . a state of affain which compromised many hundreds of men. especially insofar as this concerns illegals. a[ the agents and-ilegars of this The GRU learnt its lessons very quickly. The separated agent oom€s in three guises: the separated acting agent. the organization was m the most vulnerable place.' I of toa a to transferred i. However. And. the agent radio . he was able to re-establish contact with all the illegal residencies. there is the separation of agents from the embassy which is our present concern.i. wisf. Already. informed him of this fact. that is.ll separating the agent is undertaken only after he has handed over to the GRU a significant quantity of sscret material. This now cast-iron rule ris observed by the GRU everywhere. deep in the nerve this most unprecedently powerful underground of s .gj be tong before it collapsed.pletely separate from the embassies.. Tne girl. not have one crumb of information which is not necessary. the agents. only a few months after what had happened. b-oasted to her that he knew a[ the latest news in the world. Great Britain and Canada which were com. Undercover residencies :support illegals. it will immediately demand that no more information or documents are taken from him.allies'.. Then the GRU organized a riceiving centre on the territory of the Soviet embassy in Swedenl Information from all the illegal residencies came to the illegal rcsidency network and from there was transmitted directly to the Soviet Union. So the most powelful underground intelligence organization in history was discovered . All operations in support of illegals are worked out in such a way that the officers of the GRU undercover residency do .rUnited States. thirdly and significantly.

By various channels the group sends its material directly to Moscow.!!hree-to five m94 r4q-lr.. independent agents. Finally the ontac( with Mosgow becomes permanent and stable and the agent SrouP is entirely separated from the residency.. like the resident himself. an . . ffi goose chase. Agents going into ageht groups do not by any personal contacts with. they aie only canied out in soft countries or secretly in the Soviet Union.receiving these films. whether from a local illegal or__a rransiting illegal. The GRU tolerates personal contacts with group leaders only in exceptional circumstances and where there is favourable in contact with the undercorer residency for a period of time. Sometimes a group consists of agents who for various reasons are known to each other. A group automatically organizes itself. The GRU obviously considen family groups containing the head of the family and his wife and children to be more secure and stable..*. The film will be a dual-purpose one.or from an agent who has been recruitei by that independent agent. the group will be able to continue its activities in the same way as before.170 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practice of Agent Work r7t Thence he will back to his own but as an have to take place. The agent group. Thus to a certain extent the members of agent groups are complctely isolated from Soviet diplomatic representation. then gradually the system of oontact with the residency comes to an end and orders begin to be received directly from Moscow.artist on tour' as they .e agent and he photogmphs genuine secret materiil on it.rticular residency. In each iase. which is designed to leaO the police on a wild out extremely rarely. Let us suppose that one agent recruits two others. Ilntly a pseudo. jill called. nobody outside the Centre will know of the existence of this particular group.. they are carried gi$_gf the deputy head of the GRU or the head The residency which was responsible for the agent.s recruitment may receive the order to empty such and such a numtlered dead-letter box of films. and only he is in contact with Soviet officers. The processing of films (whidh are called schtchl'r: the Russian word foi shield) is carried out only in the Centre. Usually. if personal meetingl valuable_agent. is The GRU tries by all possible means to limit tt e numUeioi type. With gradual changes in penonnel at the residency. The such an agent is thus carried out . In any case. The leader of an agent group is called a gropovod. then the film is given to tf. Usually he will transmit his material by means of dead-letter boxes. Any attempt to develop the film outside the wails of the GRU Technicat operations scientific Research Institute teads to the real se6et text being destroyed and only the pseudo-secret text appearing. of non-personal communications and contacts must be wo$9d out for. or that the embassy is blockaded or closed down. which is why they are taken out of the residencies. Should it happen that operating conditions become difficult. It wili not know from whom it is. agents working-ln one'particular field of espionage are put together in one group. a separate and unrepeatable formula ""iry "nA used.r. The members of such a group may work in completely different fields of espionage.secrer document is photographid on the film by the GRU. the cipher officers and the operational officers with whom there was once direct contact. or even possibly t[ousands. Hundreds. of formulae have been worked out. Other agents recruited by rgsidencies arg gradually organized into agent groups oI-. for each The Scientific Research Institute of the GRU haldone much important work in developing films of the schtchit # .

nfr . by using the system of secret rendezvous. The material acquired by the GRU breaks down into ig&Igq[qg.g. Afterwards they will gradually. This plainly makes life more secure for both Parties. Now they-all form a new illegal residency. The photographing of documents and eavesdropping on conversations are in real life exactly as they are portrayed in spy films.teader to recruit agents the leader) in an agent residency of any sizr automatically transforms ihat resiiency Ao. it takes measures to ensure that it does not lose the agent network which has already been recruited but u: yet separated from the undercover residency. This status was acquirid by one of the American nuclear phpicistq whom the GRU permitted to and the gioupil.. However important the problems of recruiting agents. even if it consists of only two men. But how does the agent contrive to steal secret equipment and remain undetected? Many ways and means exist: we have already examined one of them when we discussed the recruitment of the owners of small private ffiF . begin to establish the systern of contacts with agents and agent gloups which have recently been subordinated to the undercover residency. The Soviet government will register a protest and will for a short time refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomas of the aggressive country.. not guessing at the existence ofother it ottr". Thc formation of new illegal residencies where there were already old ones in action is yet another example of the constant striving for duplication.rn resutts. The new illegals 'never mix and never enter into contact with the old ones who have been working in the country for a long time. . The presenoe ofeven one Soviet iilegaLlfre is of co-urse considered. me agent resident..i 11 ! is.: lr case of war actually breaking out. diamonAs and other valuables which will be of use to them in their illegal activities will have been hidden in secftt hiding-places beforehand. Interestingly this agent resident never made a mistake.il11tffi"il:"::f. 19t With this aim in mind some of the most experienced officen of the undercover residency are in a continual state of readiness so that at all moment. the exchange will take place and the newly fledged illegals will remain behind in safe houses and flats. books.'i' f i]. If the GRU feels that there is likely to be a ctampdown and that operating conditions wil beclme more difficurt at any moment.-They may know the group leader alone. instruments and equipment which the GRU uses for study and copying. examples of military technology.. Specimens o1 samples are self-explanatory: actual weapons.X:i p. Hundreds of examples have proved thii. they may go over-to illegal status and run the work of theirui"ntrl These officers are in possession of previousty prepareO documents and equipment.'D&limiints are not the subjective opinions or observations of agents but offrcial secret papcrs. ui independent organizations continries enatGyl fn" simltar-tg the spread of a fearful iltness."tf: ments and soecimens or samples. fii*Jffi:"tJl1t":'. An agent-group may gradually get bigger as the group leader recruilin g age n t contin uei Io rec. nts agent group. Sometimes the GRU will post one or more illegals to an agent residency. ::T::fT* a group. Then it will capitulate.*. on the order of the Centre.ii ir. training them and organizing agent networks may be. 9g. wiitr the difierence tns case. acquires the status of anEElllgrdeluy.#. nor is it necessary that Tearyj they should. . there is still one overriding objective: the acquisition of secrets belonging to an enemy or a probable enemy. recruit his colleagues at his discretion.. these officers will unobtrusively disappear from their embassies. Information includes com' In ffi6mes-fr4'iaponi. surgical intervention always gives excellent :nar:. and gold.. 172 Soviet Militory liulligence The Practice of Agent Work 173 a|wuyt know each other. drawingp or copies of them.

One agent iugiested to the GRU mat ne should obtain for them a lateral scanning radar for aircraft which permitted the aircraft to carry out i-ntelligence yrxk on the territory of the_enemy while it was actually itt own terrilory. An entry may be made.L: . From that time onwards. !.rioor. of . it crosses all frontiers in sealed packing cases and accompanied by armed diplomatic couriers.:: agents go .*iru -n"ry specimen of an instmment or a gadget and it is aOruntageous for him to sell it to the GRU. because this is the most favourable time for stealing military technology and armaments. This was quite sufficieni for the Soviel4-y to catch up with the United States in that as far as detiberatery oamagng !11!. There is. it mightiake years. It m.ightbe within a day or two. perhaps surprisintly.'a number of to. i..panies producing military . I Another.oro.i. for a very substantial sum. After an item has been acquired. an aeroplane or an atomic reactor? Not only does one have to obtain such an object without its loss. as was made clear in the GRU's (unsuccessful) attempt to acquire a French Mirage III from the Lebanon. the small repair workshop installed the heavy tank engine in the yacht. military dis_ plays or tests. but it also has to be transported to the Soviet Union.these problems. in the gmcilt.f.tion"ip. A special team of fitters literally tore the tank engine out of the yacht in a few minutes.utions onty be used once _ rockets.?i. The theft went unnoticed but the engine weighed more than a ton and there was no way it could be accommodated in diplomatic containen. and a year later it was taken int6 service with the agenr worked in an experimentaf trainiig *:::r. The owner of a written off and then sold..t ii..$i. Any armed conflict or change of government is usually accompanied by intense GRU activity.. of a certain anti-tank rocket *h.174 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practicc of Agent Work 175 small firm has not much difhculiy'in produ. the agent.. The yacht was straight away sent for a refit and.".. . - d.-The grouno. The Soviet consulate then bought an old cruising yacht.. more reliable method of transporting heavy equipment exists. But what aUout really big objects like a tank. The diplomatic mail is the most often-used method of transporting specimens to the Soviet Union. GRU agents were able to steal a written-off tank engine an item of exceptional interest to fact there were only ninety-nine. Very often written-off equipment is aUte io Ue sold because there.being noticed.^rreeuentty equipment so that secret arms and they b. The yacht put to sea several times after this to maintain its cover. was able to steal a broken radar.. in one of the countries which had bought lropard tanks in the Federal Republic of Germany. shelts. The important thing is that the quantity of containers fT1. The main problem is to transport the specimen into the Soviet embassy. GRU officers in the guise of a trade delegation will poach from a firm some completely unnecessary item of quite innocent nature. before being sold. .exist official documents certifying that it has been y"tt:n o-ff o1 destroyed. . jfr i. equipped with the requirei apparatus crashed. torpedoes..O:1. although the agent said that tre Oa not know exactly when he would be ible to acquire the apparatus. Several months latJr the agent obtained the apparatus. Soviet industry. of course. The yacht went to sea on a number of pleasure trips and during one such trip fortuitously met a Soviet trawler. aocounting documents that there were a hundred launchings com. . Samples of oijects which can 1!.on" . cartridges _ are usually stolen during in. The hundredth rocket will nave been quietly sold to the GRU without anybody noticing. in spitC of very strict control. Sometimes the difficult problem arises of a specimen weighing several tons which cannot be accomrnodated in the diplomatic post" This happened when. Wide use is made of countries of the Third World which receive equipment from Western countries. for example. agreed toover the suggestion. The GRU. The GRU agreed to wait. and when an aircraft.

fl addition... It is the Achilles' heel of socialism _ strike at it and stTl"tirq will fall to pieces. the groupc of fotces d. sway in Africa.. i' ri "(r. The head of I intelligence of a military district works exclusively in the corresponding recommbndations 'lr )t.Operational intelligence marks a complete departure from f the mna we have talked about until now. too. f. in conformity with the orden of the chi. a canning factory. The chief of staff directs the. sent to a safe address in one of the Third Woim countries where they can be loaded onto Soviet ships without any trouble.fronts. Sociafism. military districts."li would only be necessary to withhold supplies of'grain for a few months.. Soviet Military Intelligence to the Soviet Union in the form of equipment for. So items of exceptional importance their weight approximate to the packing of the secret O perational Intelligence transported aie L. the Soviet Army consists of sixteen military districts and four groups of forces in Germany. Sometimes.rough customs control. until the Berlin Wall OisappeareA. is not capable of feeding itself..ef of staff and the commandei of the military # . specimen. and the whole edifice of socialism mlght fall equipment. Poland. groups of forces. The GRU Fifth Directorate supervises the activity of the intelligence directorates. fleqts. Lithuanla. In #. [n war. It embraces In general :lntelligence organizations subordinated to operational units L'. 'rf. Organizationally.otillas . the whole structure of communism would have to be changed. military activity. Subsequently the markings on ttri packing cases are changed and they make their way innocintly tf. !s19nia and Latvia. ur. 'r. mllates the work experience of all operational intelligence and issues pieces. foi all its gigantic resourses. terms the GRU leadership is quite confident tlrat_i! is capable of obtaining any technblogical secret from the West provided it has UeJn aitocated a iufficient sum of p9ney. until Soviet firces no loiriei found thernselves in occupied Czechoslovakia. or at the time of preparations for war. "'. . the head of intelligence is subordinated to the chief $l' of the military district staff. All twenty heads of military district intelligence and group of forces are under the command of the head of the GRU Fifth Directorate. to place-an embargo on the supply of bread to the Soviet Union.r' -interests of his military district. This secret is nothing more the means of producing br-e1d. How easy ii iould be. one sometifies thinks. armies. Even if it did obtain it. daily activity of the head of intelligence. .whose job is to aid in the implementation of the .fi6 and. carries out the posting of senior officers of operational intelligence. all invasion. say. nationalization and collectivization will cease. intil such time as the Cubans no longer held. yet this technological secret is of vital importance to the Soviet system. Only one technological secret exists which the GRU is incapable of obtaining. to :i! and instructions. the Soviet system would not be able to copy it since for that. Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The organization of intelligence directorates (RUs) on the staffs of military districts.'j:::1.three all-arms armies. I Razvedyvotelnyi ordcl also forwarded to ihe interrilerrce"Hit the m. and is a component of the High Staff of the Navy of the USSR. inillligence orgrnr. the Northern. groups of forces..Staff Second Directorate.. tlJ... the GRU's own and theNavy's cosmic . other armies. . Soviet Military lntelligence warded collect information from alt heads of intefligence and forward to them information. In its turn naval intelligence comes under the head of the GRU and is controlled by the Fifth Directorate.. in practice sucfi disputes occur extremety rarely. not about a narow sector like the troops of a military directly in the interests of the GRU but tiri. He works ex-clusively in the interert. obeying the orders of the army commander and the army chief of staff."qI section is calhdhOr or Army Staff Second Department. The naval directorates have the same organization as thobe in military districts. . *:::: -8.which among whose memoers rs an . Sometimes.f.l ri:ll works in the interests of the High Commander of the Soviet tl.".. :$ *Jll . the four naval directorates fall under an organization called navai intelligence.A reciprocal arrangement exists whereby the intelligence chief of the military district forwards informarion io his heads of army intelliglnce * i/t7. The role . Each front. group of iorces ind mititary district consists of armies.RU.-His relationship with riis chiefs is based on similar rines. the intelligence directorur. At the same timi. The Soviet Union therefore possesses two independent cosmic intelligence organizations.n" bnU pluy. ff. the same task may be set at the same time to both services and the results arrived at then collated and compared.rmy. The ' thas a staff which includes an intelligence directoratb or Naval th"i6.o1loll": slsmct and the head of the GRU" However. oifri..-. fronts and groups of forces. Should a very serious situation arise.i ll ' co-operation between the two cosmic services is co-ordinated by the chief of the General Staff.. Navy. and front. Naval intelligence was created to co-ordinate naval information from every ocean of the world. head or att--intertigence unis -berow belonging-to a given army.i.1 .. He arso ranks two other officens: the chief of staif of his armi. two to. . mifit.-t..iy disrricrs and the GRU. The Soviet navy consists of four fleets. For this reason the ship need information.' 1.i: intelligence organization.. .n.ri*. Its head is the chief of Naval Intelligence.. but on a much wider scale. The intelligence directorate consists of five departrnents and two groups: ffij' .. T f.l tank army and !r".'i. Normally a front air force.'. is t Operational Intelligence 179 Black Sea and Baltic fleets.ia -' --..itary district. Although naval cosmic intelligence . li. [n addition to its normal powerful apparatus for gathering information. sometimes a corps is "f inciuded . the interigence direciorate Liiie mititary district may. Each of the fleets is the of a military district.e teuA of the ilt intelligence section is the ' iy fri* i. . 'i The difference lies in the fact that while the army directorates t .:h intelligencecorps'r. .tn" chief of intelligence of the military district. group of forces.urr rrc oone onty with the agreement of the military district commander. The chief of the gpneral staff is between thJcommander of trre miliiary :*. The reason for this extra organizational step is that ships of all four ffeets frequently operate in all oceans as combined squadrons. all information from it is handed over to the GRU. all information acquireA and u .i. there is also the naval cosmic intelligence department.two to ttrree At the same time..178 district. fronts and fliets is standardized.. ' ::l' r.". all information obtained is forto the GRU too. Each army consists seven divisions. of *.are subordinated directly to the Fifth Directorate of the G.obtained Uy o*. and ..l{f{r f.

whereas the intelligence points only recruit agents in specific sectors and areas. It directs the collection of information which comes directly from serving surface vessels and submarines at sea.! c I6 6E o: )---)---)-- o (. I C r E . They work independently from one. The centre is concerned with the recruitment of agents in the contiguous state.Operational Intelligence 181 Ithe activities First Department or Department of Reconnaissance directs of the reconnaissance units of the tactical wing.officers for work in the Second Departments and also in centres and points is carried out by the Third Faculty Second Department . o o o E c o !' A o E o 6 o . especially in large ports and naval bases. although they are coordinated by the chief of the Second Department. reconnaissance battalions of divisions and reconnaissance companies of regiments. or Department of Agent Intelligence is concerned with the recruitment of secret agents and the obtaining through them of intelligence information of interest to the staff. An intelligence centre and three or four intelligence points are subordinated to the Second Department which is directly concerned with agent work. The training of . Naval Intelligence is interested in recruiting agents from all territories. another. bearing in mind that what is meant here are normal warships and not special intelligence collecting ships. The officers of First Departments are usually experienced army and navy officers who have considerable experience of service in reconnaissance units. The recruitment of agents and the creation of agent networks is carried out on the territories of contiguous countries where the military district concerned would expect to operate in wartime. that is. In naval terminology this department is called the S&rp Reconnaissance Department. The training of officers of First Departments is carried out in the intelligence faculty of the Frunze Military Academy and the corresponding faculty of the Naval Academy.

whcre the fleet is concerned. the destruction of lines of communication and supply The Inteltigence Directorate Technical Facilities Group is occupied with the interpretation of air photographs. the liquidation of political and military leaden. The officers who work in the Speerzaz intelligence points and those who direct their activities in the Thirdbepartment and the carryrng out of terrorist operations with the aim of undermining the enemy's will to continue fighting. The Intelligence Department of the Armf Staff This may be seen as an intelligence directorate are trained. and this department directs two regiments. . the difference being thal it is'only responsible for the divisions of one army. the Military-Diplomatic Academy.s11in cilled Spetsnaz naval brigades (not to be confused with Naval infantry brigades) and the same .ln Soviet Army). Second Group or Secret lntelligence Group.Informationah Fifth Group which ture.diplomats'direct the activity of all agent-asassins in the fleets. rather incongruously. The training of specialists for such work is carried on at the Second Kharkov Higher Military Aviation and Engineering School.the Intelligence Department likewise has its own interpreters. radio intelligence and radio-technical intelligence . its independent cosmic service. in minia' has very similar organization: Flrst @roup or Reconnaissance Group: analogous to the First Department of an Intelligence Directorate and concerned with directing tactical reconnaissance. the Radio inteiligence Regiment and the Radio-Technical Intefiigence Regi_ ment. Third Group or Spetsnaz Group: responsible for terrorist acts in the area of operations of its army . with this differince: the brigades are S. There is also a Spetsnaz brigade which onsists of l. it trainini takes Thc lounh Deparrment or lnfornution Departmen carries out the collection and collation of all intelligence coming into the intelligence directorate.a specialist comPany of 115 cut-throat soldiers is part of it.f divenionary acts on enemy territory. During the course of a war.30Ocut-throat sotdien. It commands two battalions. and with the interrogation of prisoners of war. Analogous organizations can the Navy. A Spetszaz intelligence point is subordinated to this depaitmeni and The Third Department or Spetsnaz Department is concerned with the preparation and carrying out.Radio_Intelligence carries out the interception of radlo signals and Radio-Technicat Intertigence is concerned witli tracking emissions from the enemy'Jradar. Every intelligence directorate is a kind of GRU in miniature with its electronic facilities. although for the Speinaz in the Third Faculty of brigade and the officers connected with place in the Frunze Academy. Specialists for this group aie prepared at the Military Institute (of Foreign Languages). It would be a mistake to think that operational agent intelligence is a kind of second+lass citizen compared with strategic intelligence. whereas the Firrt Department of an Intelligence Directorate is resporsible for all the divisions of its milithry district. secret agents and even.. The Fifth Departmentis occupied with etectronic intelligence. Foutth Group . Soviet Military lntelligence the OPerational Intelligence 183 of the Military-Diplomatic Academy (the Academy of this canies out the recruitment of agent+errbrists on the tenitory of any possible future enemy. information services. The Interpreters' Group'or 'the Inquisition' deals with the deciphering and translation of documents obtained.

Denmark. Afghan_ istan and China the operationai intelligence agent network by far exceeds strategic inteiligence in sirength.rrit"ory. West Germany. In countries like " Norway.. o Soviet Groups of Forces in Germany. including the central or immediately before war breaks out. Eg si o= \. for example. llt*r. effectiveness and invulnerability.Sweden. Black Sea Fleet covering Turkey and the whole Mediierranean coastline. Pacific Fleet .2 o_f ::n?in Warsaw pact countries.Ll \EI tEt Eq €a oo t gb t"l gEt' =t. In other words the GRU. - it. and its behaviour pleases the Kremlin .dB9E t \t .184 Soviet Military Intelligence a very powerful intelligence conglomerate. Baltic Military District. Spain.nce. althougir this certainly d-oes not preclude deep agent penetration of the whole territory of the country being investigated.IdZG r-r. ?g --. Canada and government organs. has created two agent networks independent of one another and each duplicating the other. There is no doubt thatNorthern Fleet intertigence is mainry restricted to targets on the sea shore or coastline.u.h .or" than that Leningmd Military District . Portugal. 8. rhe Norrhern Group of iHTE .:I cl \ = Ec Ee9 Ff. since this country is well inside the Soviet sphere of influence. i lfrl l. B1lti9 leet _ covering Sweden. Agent intelligence work is not carried out on Finnish t. in n-o way fo1m. Canada and the USA. West Germany. ilfelog in its scope to strategic intelfig. France. Turkey. Sweden.Norway and Sweden. The intelligence directorates taken altogether E ! E.. Romania.covering the USA.a. I I$3iI Ig EI l::1 . the power of an intelligence directorate is immeasurably incrCased by the infiltration in the enemy's rear of thousands af Spitsntaz saboteurs. Great Britain.l L1_j '/ llrt lhl l"El = I -! I tl I [l i:l I all countries of the pacific Basin.covering Norway. Austria. China. Japan. Denmark. in the form of strategic and operational intelli_ gence. This can be confirmed 6y examining the task of the different intelligence directoratesi Northern Fleet .

Iran. as plus five intelligence points belonSllg ro the Speunazgroup. Volga. lt may be thought that opcranonal mtelllgence p"irt.n to twenty separate intelligence centres. il6Elil-o-t have the range and potential of the strategic branch. emerican and French eighte. whose officers mainly work abroad. Austria. operational intelligence seeks and finds other ways . and the Black Sea fleet. Without the possibility of recruiting foreigners in their own countries. five Spetsnaz brigades and up to-fift-. _.s.many is subject to the attentions of: the agent nefirorks of five and the Northern directorate of the Baltic Fteet. fi{een.Afghani-stan. These two examples provide examples. but this is not so. the Berlin direction of the GRU. Sluthey Group of Forces in Hungary_ Austria. trainins and all Dractical work are carried out ofr'-Th-siffitories within the Eastern bloc or from inside its frontiers.. completely independently. Here. Thh network is subordinatcd to the KGB frontier troop6. All operations concerning the identification of suitable cand@.186 Soviet Military Intelligence Republic. and three Soviet*ontrolled missions in British.n intelligence and Central groups oi for. rlp carried out by the intellige# by: the GRU strategic a blueprint for intelligence in many other countries. Odesa. This accounts only for GRU activities. in the Byelorussian Military District. especially those having activity common frontiers with the Soviet Union or its satellites.. (tral and Siberian Military Districu . The KGB agent network also runs several illegal residencies and agent groups and two undercover residencies in Bonn and Cologne.ouffi it.these do not run alent networks in peace. Forces in Poland.. Kiev and Odessa Miliury District -Turkey. Military District . Soviet troops in Cerriany. i. lntral Gloyn of Forca in Czechoslovakia German Federal Republic and Austria. plus 6ve Spetsnaz intelligence points and a corresponding quantity of Spetsnaz brigades.truteg c and operational intelligence networks and likewise the KGB networks: Wesr Germany has becn infiltrated Taking two countries. Operational time. several illegal resideniies and agent grouf. and a KGB operational network. fifteen to twenty intelligence poiltts. Trarc-Baikal and Far Eastern Utttn y Districts_ China. Spetsnaz companies belonging to the same organization which are at full alert to carry out terrorist acts (the total number of cut-throats is up to 8. China. ly1lceynn yid-Aty.coiering Greece and Turkey from Bulgarian territory. let us analyse the strengths and facilities of . Kiev and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts. Military District . agent network. 9*po!y. five undercover residencies-in Bonn and Cologne.0(X) men). West Germany and Turkey. Afghanistan. it is also covered by the GRU operational-agent network. work ir. Trans-Caucashn M ilitary D istrict -furkev. recruitment.:"Military District . In oi-her words West C". 'ihe basic difference in working methods between strategic and operational intelligence in the GRU is that officers of operational intelligence do not in peacetime work on the territories of target countries. Turkey contains a similar proliferation of Soviet espionage: a GRU strategic agent network in the form of an illegal residency and twci undercover residencies in Ankara and Istanbuli a GRU operational network in the form of five intelligence-centres belonging to the Carpathian. Northern Caucasian. the Byelorussian Military District_ ail are concerned with the study of the German Flderal Intelligence 187. The KGB provides a strategic network (one illegal residency and two undercover residencies). Moscow.

delegations..".. officers met him either at customs.:"ffi.un . the Soviet officers of operational intelligence have no chance to defect to the West and expose the activities of the agents recruited by them. The meetingp were carried its quite un. he notified .his case officers in good time by means of*o1re-o his brother who tived not far It*r:"::ry:lti oi at teti gen.1. camouffaged. i W n bee-n eithei on Soviet or rqrry o. i#le. Its officers exploit . and consequently wittf the maximum possible protection.i i ii il-.ii.ol-r3r1ign1ni1 travmg recrulted one foreigner.r. it is extremely difficult to unmask and expose such agents.i f rovrer :. is years. r"p". and cases are known whlre agent. airport.*_t::1"1d llo...crossed . l. to give him short instructions and money. iB diversification.-m.: agents canaiOates.".i.. However. every jtime a journey to eastern Europe was with pre-arranged texts were sent to different addresses in the Eastern bloc and every time the driver. (In strategic intelligence this occurs quite regularly but we have as yet not 'one example of it happening amongst operational intelligence ' officers. The lorry driver only occasionally visited eastern . il. rr"tu".. seeing that the taking place on it. the control of the The absence of contact with agents outside territory under Soviet Union gives GRU operational .rg.*iring?ther candidates without a Soviet officer tak-ing p"rt. Jr.. Even if an officer did succeed in disclosing the .i"ronious in using _is f:Tjy-:11. ffi.iffi.188 of Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence r89 establishing the necessary contacts.J attention is paid to stud€nts undergoing instruction in Soviet n t'iffi [:". ri ffi .1y:l.*i":::'l?^-l :Tli. Firstly. qut in the shortest possible time so that the driver's mate would not suspect anything.. .there was always a driver's mate with him. saitors'l.ll :.:lT officer a1d hlve never lir".pols. and operational intelligencJis equally ..1i.iy.citizens who r[ have relarives in countries of int"rot io ii.intelligence exceptional advantages..-t:5:ITU.i.. and one which gives of operational intelliit exceptional invulnerability. the intelligence directoraie then uses him for selectin{and .. ists vi siti g the I Usj:: unron as members..Europe and rarely had contact with Soriet offrcers because . :*'L:"3. into Soviet-controlled territory. A defecting officer from strategic intelligence can say a lot about the activities of the central spparatus of the GRU.. o*-n tenitor). Post' '.) Yet another important advantage gpnoe.-of .r-"-r1 insti tu tes.rlful Il to study (|l the affairs of Soviet anA Ea"stern bloc ... Each of them is carefully isolated from the others and. dil:i:: ::j::." f Naval intelliience a I iiH. never met f:T*. to a great extent.:havingieturil. ' operationar intefiigence methods of pressurizing. and 'pcrhaps more important. or in the restaurant or evcn the lavatory.ffi.: in.i. Centres and points are mostly found on the premises of military buildings of exceptional importance.and there are more than a hundred of these in the Soviet Army..ii*j ships cauing at tr *fl*:-:_1s1nu pu"t. but an officer of the operational network who did succeed in defecting would be able to reveal only one or trno intelligence points or centres . secondly.n.

Operational intelligence tries to limit its meetings with these agents to exceptional cases. in the activiiies of tn" intelligence directorates there exists a certain freedom wtrictr invalaUiy engenders uscful initiative.a the premises of the p. stress is placed on carrying out acts of sabotage which will have a strong effect on the morale of the inhabitants over a wide area.t *oii shoulO'stof with one agent and that there . they must be able and willing to carry out acts of sabotage upon these targets. Cases _was are known where inteiligence points trav-e Uben located on in military districts check the heads of points and the head of the GRU checks his heads of . a store for niclear weapons or a T. bridges.".rn th. The task of the Spetsnaz agent i9 to carry out terrorist acts. intelligence is the sharpest and most effective weapon in the hands of the heads of intelligence directorates or departments. Its memben are crack .recruited-anothi.i-. the intelligence directorate of a group of forces once recruited an ageit for an important scientific research target. Ol".. oil and gas pipelines.froula-il. and the whole process of recruiting and running agent-saboteurs is identical to the work with ordinary agents of operational intelligence. The agents provided almost "g"nt identical information which was eventually received in Moscow where aytrsed. However. However. Both same lalget: For example.-gr._ else is that he is ifr. of couo.SPtEI4g-?XgIls and Spesnaz-dclac-ilm?nts.g:i:ther group of forces. as we know. naepenOlenipenetration is.. I^:: f:lfll . be used to check the tf.. Great io. the oI* .^ii. The GRU will occasionally interfere. the GRU)." Fiftt GRU Directorate (in turn. it would be almost impossible to determine that in addition there also an intelligence point. For the GRU the most import- ant thing is to render unserviceable power and transport targets.i dir. it was spotted Ui ttre Fifth Directorate which demanded'tt. in cases where two different directorates have recruited ation of the operational networks in no way indicates the absence of coordination.q:lt.*it agents for the prefen not to interfere. Intelligence directorates try to recruit these agents from within the most important economic and transport targets.. their tasks differ in headed UI tf. On receipt of orders.190 Soviet Military lnulligence Operational intelligence and ceritres Intelligence 191 an intelligence point may check his agents and reveal negative aspects in their work in vigilance in the work with the other ag€nt.or tne agenis Degan ro provide false information. fhe head oi practised at all levels in'the GRU. it will always encourage a situation rylrere different intelligence directorates . It is the true heads"of dlite of the Soviet armed forces. Unwittingly ihe intelligen.r*-n. The homeni on". such as the blowing up of a large dam or the burning of oil storage tanks. ei. It cg_qslg!! sf1Wggk[g3ts . although. Spetsnaz agents form the so' called'sleeping'agent network which does no work in peace' time but springs into action the moment hostilities break out. electric power stations. he could only say that it was. for example.! country houses of important generals or the well-guarded premisls of punishment bat- true significance of a particular building. The Spetsnaz detachment is quite different. The GRU central apparatus talions (in other words. tunnels and railway equipment. subject t" t'h" h.e daily running of tne intiffilence directorates provided that they wlrk in a"productive manner and toe the line. Of rs en! course military district intelligence. Spetsnaz agents are requited by an iriielligence point. All these organs anA organizations are inctuded in a rigid pyramid . military prisons). electric power lines.: rne same target.k:t depot. The basic task of the procurement agent is to provide necessary information..

I In all there are 900 to 1. and 'li. though in the fleets frogmen also take part. On Soviet territory they wear 'uniform of airborne troops. all told. because . During mobilization this number can be increased by four'r. fleets I and armies. . Spetsnaz hardly ever use helicopters.300 soldiers and officers ready to t&. j. The deployment of saboteurs'in the enemy's rear is normally carried out by parachute. a battalion of parachutists and two or three battalions of frogmen.! I o g \. .uory out terrorist operations in the rear of the enemy. forty-one separate companies.t t&l \ I I r-.t the Spesnaz naval brigade is confused with the brigade of the fleet marine infantry.' The airborne forces form a 'only to the Minister of Defence.. containing a headquarters i.gE o=a . iir. Eight divisions of airborne troops are subject to the rlcommander of airborne forces.ffi0 to 30. The Soviet Army includes four naval Spetsnaz brigades (one to each fleet).-r t. exclusively in the interests of the strategic element acting higher command. mainly because naval Spetsnaz ' use the uniform of marine infantry to disguise their soldien in armies and tank armies ' and officers. normally signals units.. Some. r A Spetsnaz brigade consists of a headquarters compaiy. Operational Intelligence 193 the 'soldiers and officers. * three or four airborne battalions and support detachments. sixteen Spe*iaz brigades .operational field and act in the interests of fronts. company. who in his turn is answerable st &Ee IE! 5ii !. z fnrfw-nne cpnarate comnaniesi .000 first-class saboteurs available. a group of midget submarines. )"6Fil \ lgl lil \ L:J rr i I E: iEs \m t-rl L4 J Ol iii dtE -iE: Eii + 6 l .one ii to eactr group of forces and the basic military districts. (Of course they have no connection with airborne troops or 'signals. on satellite territories they are disguised as auxiliary detachments. Spetsnaz companies of three platoons of saboteurs and one communiconsist cations platoon.) Spetsnaz detachments are an organ of the the deployment generally takes place at a considerable .(. A tt Spetsnaz naval brigade is similar. This means that.EI iit i\ \ \ \l . or five-fold by recalling reservists who have previously served 11 in these detachments. there are in peacetime alone 27.

memben of the #. There are 6- kilometres in the rear of the enemy. but by 'ensigns'. at depths of 100 to 500 kilometres.000 kilometres to act in the interests of the frontal forees who will be attacking through areas cleared by atomic action.5fi) to 1. . the Spetsnaz detachments strive to disorganize the internal life'of the State and Army and to sow uncertainty and panic.' .i . but four or five fronts to operate. rocket launchers and launching pads.700 men. . so in the course of an attack at a frontal level . It must be added that. networks and lines of communication.Operational Intelligence 195 r distance from the front line. and the destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of supplying them . each army taking part carries out the dropping . Spetsnaz brigades are dropped at a depth of 500 to 1. there are one brigade and four or five separate companies operating at a depth from 100 to 1.Parehuls brflrfion . . a maximum of fifteen consisting of five or six men each. aerodromes. Simultaneously with the dropping of the front brigade. the leading role is allocated to the staff companies of the Spetsnaz brigades. a Spctsnaz brlgade Organlzatlon of Tlre Spetsnaz detachments have two basiQ duties: the . Simultaneously with these two basic tasks. Small groups of..|: tisually three or four armies and one tank army in each front. i' t 3 a 5 ll of its own Spetsnaz companies. These Spetsnaz staff .attacks on depots and stores of nuclear weaponry and rockets. In other words around 250 groups totalling 1.State leaders of the enemy. on West German territory for example. These are also dropped in small groups. air attacks and sabotage activities. that is the destruction of staff. These companies differ from other detachments of Spetsnaz in that they are not manned by soldiers who are serving their time. preparations are in hand for not one.gotrbrt swhrn r Settifto". At the same time the Spetsnaz agents are activated. command points. In carrying out the first task.Slgnrlg cotrisil Sr[rporUng -llo@monv rin[d l. companies are specially trained for the kidnapping or destruction of . destruction of the system of the State government and its armies.professional .llOga dutniaancom .

nor can it let him fall into the hands of the enemy. tr."."1^. they l"will attack it even if it means the inevitable destruction of the entire group.oo! movements.T-. and after the attack they will disperse and go their task of prisoners in order to obtain information. A group may collect informatiln -on enemy troop movements in a certain region and transmit the information to its staff. in of Spetsnaz.TI:. boxers.. When collecting of information and.use in attacks against " given targets. mine_laying and the seizure All the rema-ining group cannot transport a wounded man. in the course of military operations. His photographs were transported by courier into East Germany to one of the intelligence points of the Byelorussian Military District. then it may deslroy a rocket launcher in another own ways. Everything depends on the tasks set to th. Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles (AFV$ belonging to the enemy are ofspecial interest for saboteurs. Thestaff company ot tle Speysnaz Arigii i.are kept apart from the normal brigade and camouflaged as parachutists. .... irnarmed government and senior military comrnanders. his choices were near important bridges. information: the deployment. urongr. the photographs showed that the soldiersl work was unlikely to be concerned with cables. several groups may take part in an a"ttack on a certain target. numbers. wrestlers.t96 Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence 197 agent-saboteurs civilian clothes or in the military or poli"ce uniform of the companies. There is a constant alternition u. inay establish contact and act together with the combat experts. Let us examine one case study which underlines both the importance and effectiveness of operational intelligence. is cloaked in the very strictest . Copies were also sent to the third and fourth departments of the Byelorussian iil" r l Military District intelligence directorate. and the suggestion was put forward that they were laying a cable for military communications. dams and narrow passes in lakeland areas. tne $petsnaz detachments which.i. And if a rocket launcher or an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons is ready for action. While they were being studied. are aiso thi only or". Their existence -ir"quently.r". [n the opinion of the signals officers.of making sudden attacks on AFVs iitt it aim of stealing them for future. This was scotched by officers of the fifth department who had been invited for consultations and who said categorically that the Americans would not have a cable in that region. The greaiest interest for the staff of military districts.urr" speed of results is paramount. He photographed these locations and made diagrams. The laying of military cable qn West German territory would in any case be discovered by agents of the military district. Obviously. the camying out of sabotage acts. which extends even to theii own memberr." Lnry unii which carries out its tasks not in camoufraged uniform but r not the political situation or technology but pure military . L". the saboteurs-kno* no in their methods of interrogation.. *t o t m been in any way connected with Spetsnaz will deny their brutality. equipment and plans of the troops of a probable enemy in sectors where an attack by Soviet forces is likely. group and the initiative of the group commander. marksmen. An agent who had been recruited by the second department of the intelligence directorate of i .. an officer noticed a group of American soldiers lr*r. units oi the Byelorussian Military District on West German territory selected places for parachute landings by the Spetsnaz groups. nobody area. many officers and sergeanti of Spersnaz brigades do not even suspect the existence of such companie-s in their Onr**.y. The soldiers were doing something at a kind of metal hatchway on the side of the road. then go on to coflect more informution on t. They will kill their own wounded _ the prisoners are taken... .. and ail groups have the saboteurs undertake night"J"n . who kept on appearing in close-up. even sports teams of the military district.. since the prime motive was sabotage.

The general staff. Europe. Every hatchway that had been disc&ered was marked fint GRU directorate gave similar orders to all its it. It was this which finally convinced the speciaiists that it was not a case of ordinary land mines. 9r1*n about the significance of the hatchways. no greater than that of the wall of a good safe. This led to the opinion that the land mines were of a more complicated design. Could these not be anti_personiit. . and the GRU had a series of enlargements taken from a distance of not more than one metre.tanU minei which in peacetime where Soviet sabotage units might 3re nrgna-red be active in the event of war? This suggestion greatly alanried the GRU leadership.hundreds of metres fr-om the object which they were supposed to destroy in case of war. A month later.of qroups ot $aigrs working at metallic hatchways. pletely disrupted all Soviet plans for a blitzkrieg attack on West German territory acquired documentary evideqce but to halt all Soviet troops in case they began an attack on Europe. puiiorward. . butihe locks would have been the envy of any bank. all tactics. but of a nuclear yarietl. the Ministry of Defence and the Central Committee would now have to find new ways of attack. The fifth direct-Jrate immediately gave gders to all intelligence directorates running agents iri West uermany to pay particular attention to the activities of small goups of soldiers in the neighbourhood of important bridges. in a word. map.. damg railway stations and crossroads. All this was thanks to the fact that the new NATO t'actics had become known to the general staff in good time. This qlone did not permit a final conctusion to Le . The photographic interpreters were interested to see that the thiikness-of the hatchw"y.. where a new suggestion *u. and sometimes placed at some. At t1il.198 Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence 199 the The photographs were immediately dispatched to the GRU information service. whose purpose was not to counter a parachute residents in West Germany. oper- ational methods and strategic plans would have to be changed. The p-ossibility of nuclear land mines being used com. new methods of employing their troops and ways and means of surmounting strong radioactive fallout caused by thi underground exploiions.."". .r" on a confirming the conclusions of the information its disposal thousands of photographs. one of the 6Rti resiAencies on attack . Further analysis showed that the mine-shafts were very deep. Simultaneously. the information service of the GRU h1{.

[n each company there are three tanks. Each genoe.are under the full control of operational inte[igence. the group must attack it. and monitoring the extent to which its owrr side observes radio security regulations. The company operates only from its own territory. The company's task is to discover and destroy enemy rocket launchers in its divisional sector. and five reconnaissance groups of four men. A divisional independent reconnaissance battalion consists of a headquarters. 8 Tactical Reconnaissance nl . The head of reconnaissance of a division is subordi_ nated to the chief of army intelligence. but only in cases where the commander of a division is certain that there are no enemy nuclear facilities in his divisional sector. Each of the four motorized-rifle and tank regiments on the strength of a division has a reconnaissance company. two reconnaissance companies. The word . There is a total of six jeeps. taking bearings on radio stations and radio locators.a rare occurreice.iniepen_ dent' shows that the battalion does not form part ol the regiment but is directly subject to the divisional staff. Among its tasks are intercepting and deciphering radio conversations of the enemy. which of course comes under the control of the GRU central apparatus. However. to depths of from thirty to 100 kilometres. a deep reconnaissance company. So all tactical reconnaissance organs have. There are twenty-seven men in the company including six officers and an ensign. a company electronic reconnais_ sance and auxiliary services. The chief of regimental reconnaissance is subordinate to the regimental chief of staff and the chief of divisional reconnaissanL. The deep reconnaissance company may be called upon to kidnap staff officers and to hunt for their staffs. each with an officer at its head. On discovering an enemy rocket installation.. either with or without their jeeps. The Electronic Reconnaissance Companies have eighty men and thirty vehicles with electronic equipment. Should the rocket be ready for launching. in exactty the same way as operational intelligence organs. seven reconnaissance vehicles and ten motorcycles. It has a small headquarters of the commander and a sergeant-major. . the group will not kill its wounded unliss the action is on foot . come under the heading of tactical reconnaissance. independent reconnaissance battalion. the group immediately reports it to the itaff. Deep reconnaissance groups are deployed in the enemy's rear by helicopter. a twofoid subordi_ nation. motorized*ifle and tank division has on its strength an unlike the Spetsnaz groups. Tactical Reconnaissance There is yet another level to the practice of military intelli_ cal units and formations of divisional strength and below. Intelligence organs and detachments subject to tacti- Deep Reconnabsance The deep reconnaissance company is the smallest but the best of all the companies and batteries of the division. The Reconnaissance Companies of the Batnlion have exactly similar organization. Reconnaissance companies are controlled by the regimental reconnaissance chiefs. more accurately the fint group of the Army Intelligence Department. each group having one and one for the commander. Their activities. which facilitate their military operations. Artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments are not included as their reconnaissance detachments are not active in the enemy's rear.

. and the Special Faculty of the Second Kharkov Higher Military Aviation These are the educational institutions which take part in the training of personnel for Soviet military irrtelligence: the InI telligence Faculty at the General Staff Academy.oyirt aflny has approximately 1g0 motor_rifle and tank divisions. are under strength.the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Naval Academy. T". The minimum age is seventeen. the Military i Institute of Foreign Languages.000 men direiUy under GRU command in Special Faculty of the Higher Military Naval School of 1 n"Oio Electronics. :. using gaps :-.orpffi operation to'eighty kiloinetres. Candidates must have finished secondary education anb be of normal mental and physical . we are talking many thousands of first-class specialists who go into military intelligence every year. We havl not includeJ in this number the strength of chemical. the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Kiev Higher Military Command School. Many of these. and there are also abiut 700 regimental reconnaissance companies..Regimental companies operate Each motor-rifle and tank regiment has its own reconnaisat a depth The Training and Privileges of Personnel is the capture and cruel interrogation. the I I i ! i ' . of of independent reconnaissance battalions. All the higher military schools give instruction at university level to their students. lowever. 'Undeimanning is never allowed. This list gives an impression of the extent of the training of specialists for the GRU system.. Some of these educational establishments are devoted exclusively to this work.202 Soviet Mililary Intelligence information prisoners. the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy.1I lelit:ry m me enemy's defence: The basic meihod of ouialiing sance company. The best of these subsequently enter the academies which provide a second university education. There is about the same number are. especiafly those deployed in the rear.. of and Engineering School.i1"^. in the case of reconnaissance detachments. the Cherepovetski Higher . Military Engineering School for Communications.1_. In other words there tactical reconnaissance. engineering and artillery reconnais_ sance companies independent of these.. Students entering the Soviet Army's higher military training establishments undergo a period of instruction which lasts for four to five years. the Sfeunaz Facuity of the Ryazan Higher Parachute School. the i Special Faculty of the Military Signals Academy.. All these companiei pen_ under their o*n po*e. . in any case. However. maximum twenty-four. the Training Centre of lllegals. of up to fifty againit the baitatio.S. others have only one faculty. the Military-Diplomatic Academy.about 95.

too old. Any higher commander may hold up the appli. they then take a competitive examination. in it. attei graduation. nor are there applications for entry. the officer must now enter the reconnaissance faculty of the Frunze military academy. or too clever. The Ulyanov Guards ffigh.f .stupid. beginning with his immediate Let us examine the progress of an intelligence officer on the promotion ladder. .. Success in thi academy opens wide Pdrol. The officer may submit his first application to tfre acalemy after three years of service. every level academy begins. he must still pass examinations and undergo a rigorous lies is three years. he may be surprised to find himself learning about strategic missile troops. To secure further promotion. and speeds up progress on the promotion i"OaL. and finds himself in strategic inteiligence. The General Staff Academy is the highest dream of the most eager careerists. The important thing is to get into one of them. As a graduate of the intelligence 'faculty of the Kiev Higher Command School.. In some of the school givei a reasonably exact idea the subjects studied. but for most officers military academies in the ''one he gets into. the General Staff Academy. too. from platoon commander to company commander to commander of regimental reconnaissance and deputy commander of reconnaissance battalions. The period of study at all the academ- generals up to and including colonel-general. Signals schools are largely tfre same _ the candidate has little idea of exactly what subjects are studied there. They sit an entrance examination and are iiterviewed by a medical commission. who have completed their study at one of the military already academies. the officer is posted to a unit 6n tfie instructions of the General Staff. To enter it there is no competition . cation under any pretext: that the officer is too young.-But what does a name like the Serpukhovski Higher Command Engineering School tell us? If a candidate chooses it. The colonel or general continues to serve and never suspects that he may buddenly receive from the Central Committee an invitation to attend yet a third spell of university education. and from the first day of his service his fight with his fellow officers for the rigtlt of entry to the Qlndrralss of higher commantl schools receive the rank of lleutenant and a university diploma on graduating.ive the rank of engineer lieutenant and an engineering Oiptoma. The General Staff Academy is the passport to the very highest levels of Soviet military leadership. This same faculty is also open to graduates of the Spetszaz facalty of the Ryazan . He cases. In which case the officJi will put off his application until the next year .2U Soviet Military Intelligence : The Traintng and Privileges of Personnel 205 choice. Graduates -. and they are all similar bar one..ho. The vast majority of them have no idei of the true character of year.rnd tto examinations.. say. and so on possibly for all his twenty-five years of "' There are more than fifteen it does not matter which . the officer may serve on until majoi or lie-utenant_colonel level at the most. he will be posted to the command of a reconnaissance . . selects one of them. Candidates are selected by the Central Committee from the number of the most successful and dedicated colonels and entrance competition. Here begins the officer's gradual upward movement on the service ladder. tf his commanders decide that an officer is suitable. higher echelons of the Army. the name development with a suitable ideological background. for example. and the nexi command.l detachment of a regiment or division. of superior. The ac-ademy is the paisport to th. Soviet A*y. The ipplication is confirmed at of higher mititary enginiering . Without passing through the acadelny. . The point is thaithere is no the educational establishment they have chosen.i 9f Tank Command School leaves little to the imagination. the Cherepovltski schoot.

They will find their way into the Ministry of Defence. but also their daughters. provided that the offficer. Every_ thing proceeds automatically. and 'colonel-generals even more so. and the children of major-generals undergo the most rigorous examination. receive officer's rank. sometimes even of workers and kolkhoznilcs. The . The Institute is not only a stepping-stone to the highest Army ranks. Only after a father retires from the GRU can his son be considered for admission. Secondly. serving KGB officers. first selection is carried out by the KGB and the GRU according to the principle of 'one for you.s superiors co-operate in signing the necessary documents. in fact. This means. sons of colonels and majors. But one insititute. the Military Institute instruciing in foreign languages. The ihe privilege of being able to send not only their sons to the Institute.206 Soviet Military Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 207 Agad9ly. The girls are given instruction in French for the sake of prestige and in English for obvious commercial reasons. years depending on the faculty.for the appointment of individual tutors and the taking of examinations privately at home. in order to soften this clear class distinction. these scions of ment for the children of the highest echelons of th6 Soviet Army. together with everybody else. is rather peculiar. tf. The Institute exists on the same basis as the Military higher command. firstly because the system has been laid down for many years and secondlylecause GRU and KGB have different interests. the special entran'ce provides . he is speedily expelled from the Institute in disgrace. so that the candidate does not get nervous. conditions of acceptance are naturally graded according to rank: for the children of colonel-generals and higher. Should any stqdent commit the slightest offence. only ihis time with a Discipline and competition are fearsome. but to the highest ranks of the KGB too. This principle of the GRU's has to a very great extent eradicated corruption in the the military aristocracy are spared the rigours of genuine military service as well as the cruel competition between officers for the right of entry to a military academy. interested organizations carry out their selection of the graduates. that a candidate's father has only to worry about placing his little son on the first rung of the military ladder and the ladder itself will move upwards. there is no father who really wants to risk his own career by linking it with that of a son who is on agent work and to whom anything could happen. he then proceeds with his training as he would in a normal military academy. AII officers study there together and then return to their own units. one for me'. There is no friction. The reasoning goes that if a son is refused something the father may refuse the same thing to all his subordinates. the Institute every year accepts a ten per cent intake of . but the GRU devotes its attentions largely to the proletarian ten per c€nt. there exists The period of study in the institute is from five to seven After the Institute's final examinations. For the sons of lieutenant-generals. who constitute a special little group. The KGB is quite happy to choose the sons of highranking. They. the children of lieutenant-generals undergo a very cursory examination. For two principal reasons the GRU has had a long-standing rule that it will not admit the sons of high-placed parents into its organization. The student receives edu_ cation to the level of that of the military school and the rank of lieutenant.ere are no examinations. However. This is a privilegeJ establisir_ Higher Parachute School. nor will it admit children of GRU officers whatever post they occupy. although young people enter it according to the rules laid down for military schools. For colonel-generals and abgve. That is to say.non_ aristocrats'. But there is'a deeply-entrenched set of privileges too. So far all this is straightforward.

they do not tell him branches are scattered all over the place disguised as innocent offices. (The KGB has adopted diametrically_. then that name would most probably be something like the Military Academy of Agent Intelligence.208 Soviet Military Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 2W selection of officers. At the outset this is all they will entrust to him. perhaps fifteen.military unit 35576'.) any secrets.unless he makes a mistake. Everywhere within it are the children of Tchekists. should he decide to share his secrets with anybody else. The area wallows in greenery so that nothing can be seen. he may be shot. although corruption flourishes in other GRU fields of activity. Very few people inside the Soviet Union know of the ' existence of this academy. For spreading a secret like the existence of the Soviet Army Academy the sentence is ten years in prison. frequently under the direct supervision of their fathers. If somebody wanted to convey an idea of its activities by means of a name. The second means an end to privilege and the sweet life within the GRU. but many of its secret it enthusiastically. il r. The third is only marginally worse. This is justified by the false notion of handing down traditions from father to son. All of these punishments. the ofificer will of course have been very carefully checked out by. he may be deprived of work in the GRU and sent back to the Army. and the whole is surrounded by a very high iron lattice-work fence. an indication that within those rooms there is work on . Regardless of the abundance of names. and the conditions of life are vastly better than those of any other organization known to him. Only sometimes on the upper storeys and in certain windows'-can one see grilles and casements covered in cord nets. immedi- the central organs of the GRU in Moscow. and a return to the grindstone of life as an ordinary Soviet officer. lr ill the ate enquiries would be made to establish the source of the information.the GRU. Its top secret designation is the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army. The GRU holds nobody against his will and is perfectly frank about future privileges. There are no name plates or number plates on the building. he receives the answer that the work is very interesting. to sign a document about the divulging of In this document are described alt the unpleasant things which await him. There will be no soldiers and no hierarchy of rank. and GRU offrcers are envious !j. Its secret designation is the Soviet Army Academy. He may either be deprived of overseas work and be sent instead to work in The unclassified narne of the institution is . Before making this proposal to an officer. opposed principles. From the outside there is little to indicate that it is secret. Around it are several large buildings. success is assured . The central building reminds one of an elegant museum with its Greek colonnade and richly carved ornamentation. The GRU seeks out candidates for the Academy and secretly suggests to officers that they should enter. For the GRU officer who completes the Academy. flats or hotels. are regarded as harsh in the extreme' The first means the end of overseas life. and should any officer ever hear a rumour about it. and finally. who must not only be certain that he will agree but will also have obliged him military secrets. not only the last. One may rest assured that a cplprit would be found and put in phson for spreading government secrets. The Soviet Army Academy is located in Moscow on Academy understand this rule and obey Narodnogo Opolchenia Street. in which case retribution is equally swift. To his question as to what sort of studies he will undergo. none gives any idea of what is studied there. and write an application to enter it. perhaps even the 'ultimate sanction'. Those connected with even of dustmen overseas. They simply tell him that there exists a certain academy which is keen to welcome him as a student. However.

ifoggpgg. Under him there are also the libraries. ft. to segregate the students for security reasons (a defector will not know all his fellow students. history of international relatiois ana diplomatic practice. These sub-faculties are strategic agent inteilige. The artificial distinction exists in order to . since the academy is after all designated as a military-diplomatic academy. it seems wise that not all its faculties should bear names connected with espionage. top secret documents being carried out. when students have completed their studies. and it is officially considered tha. 9*: 9f fikely enemies). identical. Many of the officers who have studied in the fint faculty will find themselves working in military organizations and vice-versa. T}e him the academic sub-facutties leputy for the generals. in their place are taken the best of the officen graduating from the third faculty. tg[$I. preparing officers for intelligence directorates of military districts. The political derollis responsible for the state of political ariaEness affi'-ile morale.210 Soviet Military Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 2ll by draughts.of all officers of the Academy. The AgEggy is an integrat part of the GRU. Marxist-Leninist philosophy. the first faculty is called the Special servii:es Faculty and the second the tvtititary-Diplomatic Faculty. four faculties and academic courses. they are sent to operational agent intelligence. The chief of the-Academy has the military rank of colonel-generuiiid't 3 O9n{f head of the GRU. He will be going abroad but the despised third faculty student will recruit agents from Soviet or satellite territory only. The adryrinistrative_ tecltcat OE *y is responsible for the-personfiffi[iiffiii an<l the security department (with the commandani. fi nally. not of cours". But fate can be cruel. however newly arrived.and kind. the first faculty prepares officers for civilian cover _ embas_ sies. and finally. merchant navy.with this in mind the first faculty is isolated from the central block of the academy buildings). to simplify control over individual students. central GRU apparatuslFfowever.and. The third facully deals with operational agent intelligence and Sfitsnaz intelligence. feels the very deepest contempt for all those studying in the third faculty.fice and a corirpany of security guards) together with the finance. "sf administrativtlffiir Th: Lrs! deprtty is in charge of the graduate school. is not located on the . An officei of one of the two strategic faculties. in whichever of the two faculties that might be. stores and transport departments. like the first. But we Elust again remember that Soviet military ar\d sggglg faqlties prepire their students for the.dep&s wtro are lieutenant-generats beneath him. foreign linguages and study of countries-. The string nets are so that no pieces of paper can be blown out of thJwindows and the deputies for the poriticar. civil airlines. operational agent intelligence and Speinaz\aeafng wi'ttr the wTiffiif6Ei apaclggqic secllg has under by major- armed trade-craft of the Soviet Army.first deputy head.ce. trade representations _ while the second faculty prepares its students for military fr"j5! attach6s are the same GRU officers as those who work under civil cover. The chief of the Academy has tgg. ft ifr. further the following aims: to confuse Western intelligence ' services and to create the illusion that there is some differense between military attachds and other GRU ofificers. only half .s of. They face the same tasks and use the same -methods as all other officers of the GRU. the GRU will post them under whatever cover they consider suitable. Furthermore. There exists a deep enmity between officers of the first two faculties and officers of the third. For this reason the instructional programme in both faculties is absolutely . including collections of secret and top secret literature. sirategic and oferational cover. When the worst (usually the most arrogant) officers have graduated from the strategic faculties.

normal military academy concerned with tant " or artifleiy studies.brothersi. Master of Military Science. its individual courses and S9upu are separated among themselves in conditions of the strictest secrecy. The academic courses are something different. For each of these students in the Soviet Army academy. Onfy a handful of people will know what is hidden under this tific penonnel for the GRU and also instructors for the academy itself. He must have a wife and children of complete ideological and racial purity.aae*y. who 1n!t the period of study is only onl y"ar.rmans.212 Soviet Milinry Intelligence The Training and Privileges of Personnel 213 academy premises. The resulting qualification is scientific degree.. aip[. Moreover. Lastly.not to provide a complete trating. before spending their three to four y. provided they have served successfully. There must be no compromising material on the files of any of their relatives. excepting the 'liberation' of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the 'defence of socialism in eastern Europe'. equally naturafly.. The academic courses are arso attended by graduates of the Military Foreign Languages spare time and receive-the sami diplomas as the-graduates e. Czechs. i. There is a post-graduate school too.i"r. family . An officer who has completed one of the strategic faculties.. Naturally. the soviet trainees in ttre acaoJmy must not have even the slightest contact with their . The GRU uses them in residencies mainly for duties with technical and technical-operational services.:Ts on secret premises. is accepted by the post-graduate school for a period of instruction of two to three years during which he must prepare and defend a scientific dissertation on subject chosen by himself. the academy receives specialists from other fields whom the GRU invites to work in technical services or on information work. And these students do not receive diplomas from the Soviet Army Academy. many of them will study for y.ntry to strategic facultiei of the u. Hungarians. Cubans. This is the riost secret part of Soviet intelligence after-illegals.there must be no Jewish blood as far back as the fourth generation (the KGB has no such restriction). These are designed. The candidate who hopes to please the GRU must fulfil the following conditions: racial purity ."i. fhiy ur" were chosen Who is eligible? this is a very complex problem.. nor on Soviet territory under the temporary occupation of German forces.. for example. the Tank Warfaie a. t*9 strategic faculties. Their diplomas -I. frongols urj Institute who have been chosen by the GRU for work abroad.ry Uut tf. And there must be no signs whatsoever of alcoholism. lloT. on his own side and his wife's.i :l tl. They are considered on a par with the other civil students and carry out their specialized training in their attended -principally by the most experienced officers and those with the greatest future prospects. Frequently."fy prrti.for example. and has been abroad on agent work and shown good results. membership of the communist party.. which prepares scien- name. having already receiuei genuine diplomatic diplomas. Bulgars. a a one. not oni of these trai ever set foot in the academy buildings and has no idea where the academy is located. After a first assignment abroad these may. ideological stability and purity. the absence of any contact with overseas. None of his relatives may have been either prisoners of war in Germany. enter the academy in one of the strategic faculties. foi even genuine. consider them their own kind ana ao not suspect their intelligence connections.a. The fourth faculty trains foreigners _ poles. He must have strong and reliable family connections. a le.l. sexual promiscuity.-. ouir_ seas trade academy where they completed a'full murse of study. special personal cover story will have been worked out. U"t ."n for transferred by the GRU into the diplomatic (civit) o.

restaurants which Russians may not enter. where he canbuy anything he wants. without the permission of the-Central Commiitee. if ybu five thi capital Moscow. accorded appropriate honours. For example. Naturally. causi. you cannot rnove to the city. everybody is equal and life is therefore happy and free. . Special shops and r€staurants are open to him. It is as if you had moved onto a higher sphere. this question sensibly. as if you and your relations had suddenly been ennobled. whereeverybody is naturally out for each otirer's blood. It is impossible to unr*". you should draw your family tree on the wall of your apartment so that future generations of your family will knowwho it was who Iifted them up to the heights. This is good news for not only you. for the good of the people. In possessing - foreign currency a GRU officer becomes a man of completely diffeient class. logically. Only those on the list of the Central Committee of the Communist Party are admitted'' But in the Soviet Union there are everywhere shops. still less abroad. from the very first day. but your children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren and grcat-great-grandchildren down to the fortieth generation. but you are branded from birth if you were born in the country. These could all be eradicated with the introduction of residence permits on the Soviet model' The Moscow residence permit. nor must the officer have any prominent distinguishing features or speech defects. Society may be classless. people move around chaotically. Immediately. of course. So Soviet society is as racial as it can possibly be. may not even enter these shoPs. because they are . you must stay there and so must your children and grandchildren . In a classless society. only race is not determined by the colour of your skin but by whether you have the right to travel abroad or not. One of the most difficult things in selecting candidates is to find people who understand the political situition in the wqrld and can clearly see possible future developments without being secret free-thinkers. A GRU officer may in three years buy not only a car. You may rightly say thtt you would prefer to live in the city. there is always the danger that secret doubts wiil begin to penetrate his head.sidence permit.and brothers and nobody will try to do his neighbour down. with a permanent ro. without queueing' The ordinary Soviet citizen. Unless unless you do something like become a GRU officer. but if a man is modirateiy intelligent. comrption and so is not acceptable to the GRU.for theii own good. when this rare creature is found he is instantly made to sit meaningless examinations and. is the first privilege of a GRU officer. Drawing another distinction. There are others. because in Moscow the' officer spends money which is to all practical purposes incapabli of buying anything except food of rather inferior quality and equally inferior clothes. but also an apartment. in-the country. ho*"uet. including the general staff officer or even the: GRU officer who does not serve abroad. but it is divided.214 Soviet Milinry Intelligence The Training and Plivileges of Personnel 215 problems. into parts . putting up outside shops the urrorn.*"nt that: 'Nobody of French nationality is allowed to enter this people may pursue untold social problems. Obviously anyone who is politically inepi In capitalist societies. Of coune. He who is sent abroad. France perhaps. all have the right to live in the city or you have not. very sharply distinguished from all those who do not have it. who will all have Moscow residence permits and will legally reside in Moscow. All people are friends. you will find yourself in Moscow.. receiues foreign currency and can buy everything he needs both while he is abroad and at home in the Soviet Union in the special foreign curency shops. an ordinary general staff officer is unable to buy a car during the whole of his life unless of course he steals or is sent their ambitions without let or hindrance. lmagine any country. it is often asked how much more a GRU officer abroad earns in comparison with the same officer in Moscow.

because for the top brass of the GRU quite the reverse is true: Tokyo is heaven. . there are countries in which he dreams of working. with no rest days and no feast days. What awaits you? A vast. And now imagine that you are an unlucky spy and the GRU post you to Tokyo.'flaring anything the loss of the privilege which allows him to "bor. when what is at staki is whether hE should remain another year in a hot. This is why he defends himself against any revelation about his own person. Everyone understands that you-have been in hell. where serious work is impossible . Peking hell. Both you and the GRU top brass know that there are no laws against spying there. No matter how many agents you recruit it will never be enough. Life for a GRU ofifrcei possessing foreign currency is on an infinitely wider scale than for the 270 million who are deprived of the right to hold foreign currency. humid. This is ytry he is capable of any dirty trick upon anybody]including his own comrades. travel Russian. obviously without having recruited any agents. For a GRU officer. he becomes inordinately jealous of his right. gossip about the state of health of the Chinese leaders and the Ambassador's wife. This "rei he tries tolide is why he has bgcome a representative of the upper class. contacts with the police. no one will call you lazyior a coward. Imagine that you are lucky and are posted to China.'fifteen to seventeen hours a day.216 Soviet Military Intelligence posting frgm his superiors even the smallest shoitcomings.Tokyo. against uny. . But the interests of a GRU officer are directly opposed to the interests of the top brass. There are also countries in which he would rather not work. splendid embassy behind high walls. After five years your return home. This might appear strange. The top brass desire high productivity. The dream city for a GRU officer is Peking. Chit-chat with colleagues from other embassies. Your . subtropical abroad. But nobody will bawl you out for it. and cities he sees in nightmares. And once Conclusion - or return early to Moscow. There are cities he dreams of. Its infernal counterpart . that conditions for spying are ideal. So what awaits you? Exhausting stressful work. while the work force has rather different aims. No matter how many secrets you manage to acquire it will never be enough. you will no! have your epaulettes torn off. the most insignifi_ cant.

you have seventy operational officers! Where's your productivity? What you managed to get yesterday we have already received from will be snowed under with cipher cables from and he has no excuse for any lapses. This is a mistake. But he is more dangerous than all his bfficers put together. He breaks no laws.hell. but I have had to country Ilt i. AJting as a supply base for agent network operationi is rathei like serving in a signals unit during a war: as long as communication lines are maintained nobody . He needs one. how successful our own work was. and he had a brilliant career in front of him in the upper echelons of the GRU. and hardly ever leaving the embassy. a true ace of spies: gareful. The expulsion of the resident is equivalent to clearing the King off the chess-board: it spells checkmate to the 'residentura'. also had to recruit agents.refused again. Clearly it is against him that all forces must be mobilized. pnd as a result he remained a majorgeneral. Usually the local police know who he is. Do expel Soviet spies occasionally. too. calculating and fearless. As . Then a West German one . He was a man of unflinching will and powerful intellect. A weak police system in that country meant that the other residents continually used it as an intermediate base for their opera_ tions-and it was a busy crossing point for GRU illegals. for us it wis . which was considered . Finally a small country with a soft. he has been very active and. Prior to one of his postings abroad the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked for a Belgian visa for him. After all. successful. They asked for a French one . we Penonally I have never been to Tokyo. perfidious. The GRU gave the resident his final briefing. Hong Kong! From Berlin! From illegalsl Where are the secrets!!!???' You may rest assured that this question is put by the GRU daily to the resident * who will in turn ask you the same question. abrass. pounding the table with his Moscow addressed to the resident saying: . but should communications be intemrpted the signaller is sent to a penal battalion forthwith.emembers you.218 paradise Soviet Military Intelligence Conclusion human. be achieved through merciless competition. 219 can only Irt.again refused. I will try to explain. so be Who should be expelled first? The answer is obvious: the resident. He was promoted to major-general at the age of thirty-six. Without any doubt the Security Services in the West knew him well. There is a deep-seated and erroneous belief that known residents should not be allowed into the country. where the police was weak and Soviet diploiats the entire operation. sometimes they are simply not granted entry visas. does not speed up and down the motorways day and night. carries no stolen secrets in his car.paradise. were never expelled. no matter how aggressive and successful it is.. [t was refused. but sitting there motionless. Sometimes they aren'!. !9 will fight for the kind of productivity that"nor*-ou. which of course included the names and addresses of the members of the network run by the 'residentura'. in a senior diplomatic post. A spy is a human being. using my own resident as an example. This is not easy. By grant him entry. by the GRU top Understandably. But all he wanted was to be a resident. The differenci between us and the signals boys lay in the fact that no matter how well we maintained supplies. Now here he is serving abroad again. charged with the failure of expelling one you enable othen to reduce their fiantil activity. friendly government agreed to not up_ Ii your output is to scratch you will simply be sent home and your career broken. I'd like to beg all who are responsible for the security of _ the West: be human. He is easy to identify. All of them had to be taken care of and hdlped. we were living in 'paradise'. He has already served abroad for twelve to fifteen years. like a spider. He bears on his shoulders the immense pressure of the gigantic GRU establishment. judging by the signs.

. on the day for a meeting. Supposing the _ first country approached. as at that time not fifty but eighty per cent of the Embassy staff were spies. We remained good friends . Having to leave the country suddenly. [n return he agreed to 'find' some money. the results of this would be threefold: 1. against all the countries which had refused him entry. he would listen scheduled to get out. it is an action directed against all their spies. for the KGB. young man. . . How should one go about the business of expulsion? The short answer is: as noisily as possible. The silent expulsion of a Soviet spy is an action directed against one man. demanding and merciless resident serving in a neutral country with ten officers under his command can sometimes harm the West more than two 3. my greetings to you. Here is another example encountered during my work. once in. experienced. I managed to convince the young man. West Germany or France. The experienced resident. visa applications cannot be sent for him either to France or West Germany or any other country that Belgium will have notified as an ally. and it was the opinion held by my first resident. The noisy expulsion is a slap in the face for the GRU. be reading my book. This was the first step towards the morass. instead of never have been able losing the money I had with me and finding his passport. Should you. 'One . but nothing more. The resident will have had time to disrupt the existing system of work in the residency but not to UuitA up a nei system. However. in spite of the fact that at the time I felt my failure deeply. I am sincerely sorry that he has stayed the other sidebf the barricade . But to expel him noisily means that you are making as much capital out of the victory as you can. Time will be needed for the successor's visa application and more time to brief the new resident. on returning to Moscow. So at our meeting. let into all the 'residentura'secrets. Belgium found some reason or other to expel him. against Belgium. against France. To expel a Soviet spy is of course a victory. the resident will leave his army without a commanding officer. to the proposals of the Soviet intelligence service. Great Britain. in this case Belgium. He did not take the crucial step. Further well-tried steps were planned which would have pushed him deeper in each time. three to four months later. However if. This is not only a matter of my opinion. . But what can a poor GRU spy do in a situation when the powerful free Western press publishes such items at the least suitable moment? Finally the question arises as to how many Soviet spies should be expelled. and would arrive in the country. will be completely neutralized. it is also the opinion held by Moscow Centre. The only answer is all. until it was working successfully against the USA. Now imagine another set of circumstances. I had a reasonably good relationship with a young man who agreed to 'lose' his passport. For the following three to four years. What do you need them for? Why keep them in your country? They are hundred very active GRU officers working in the USA. In the interim the residency will remain inactive. persistence and mad risk. an insignificant local paper published an item stating that fifty per cent of the Soviet Embassy staff were spies.-had issued the visa. The resident would be briefed. I had to spend the time proving to him that the news item was a lie. And it really was a barefaced lie. against thousands of unstable people preparod to 2. In other words. barring a resident from a country does not mean rendering his network ineffective (see Appen- dix C). authoritative.220 Soviet Mititary Intelligence Conchuion 221 soon as he arrived in the country he started extending the network speedily and vigorously. I am glad for your sake. who taught me unforgettable lessons in concentration on target.

If you take similar action against Soviet spies I guarantee that your diplomats in Moscow will be safe. France expelled forty-seven . But if you increase the number to five the Soviet riply will be five or fewer-. But the Soviet Union respects the sovereignty only of those nations who respect their own sovereignty and defend it. That is so. Those who are guilty of that should be tried. Canada expelled thirteen the riply: two. These people are driving my comrades to their deaths in Afghanistan. For the deaths of the marshals and generals. then I am ready to lake my punishment. But to that there is an antidote _ you - millions of the best Russian farmers. The Soviet Union can respect the sovireignty of any country. It is an agonizing way. and one experienced spy is a hundred times more dangerous than a yourg. Grain was its most irlportant export.222 Soviet Military Intelligence ' Secondly.they are the betrayers who should be sentenced under article 64. as then a new ore will be sent in and we will not know whom to keep under surveillance. but by the desire to hold 9n to their power. it. I chose the second way. my country then considered me to be a traitor also for deserting If - they are the criminals. The Soviet leadership understands and acknowl_ edges strength. then. Sometimes the theory is put forwarj that it is better to unearth a spy and keep him under surveillance than to expel him. expiain my disagreement with the communists and then commit suicide. runs the argument. On the . My crime . The betrayers of the homeland are those who shot I . That is professionals specially selected and trained to destroy your For GRU Officers Only I was condennned to death by the Military C. The betrayers of the homeland are those who are now in the -Kremlin. Russia has always grown wheat. country. If any GRU . my people paid the price of tens of millions of lives. and if. Those in the Kremlin who have brought my people to complete moral and physical degredation .the Soviet reply: two. They should be tried in a court of law. The more inexperienced spies you have in your country the more mistakes will be made. or I could escape to the West. There was no comeback. green one.eve of war the communist leaders shot the best marshals and generals. I guarintee that your diplomats will be greatly respected. still plead not guilty as charged.s . Those who have made of Russia an importer of grain .expel them. the Soviet Union will retaliate and expel our innoJent diplomats from Moscow. correct.betrayal of the homeland. at these statistics: Holland expelled one if __But we expel people. When I was in the GRU I could see two ways to protest: either I could commit suicide. But every expelled spy represents a nightmare to the new ones. Turkey expelled one .ollege of the Supreme Court according to article 64a. must expel large groups of diplomats simultaneously. which is not a whit easier than the first. demanding the deaths of innocent people they at some future time should be judged and given their just deserts. but only after they have taken theirs. Great Britain simultaneously expelled 105 (the entire staff of the GRU and KGB residencies).they are the traitors. no matter how small it looks on the map. They were motivated not by the interests of the homeland. the easier it will be to watch them.the reply: nil.the reply: two. But only strength and nothing else. who fear deeply being appointed asleplacements. Look -Union. and ihat the Soviet leadership will look for opportuniiies to improve its rerations with you. intelligence experience is much more valuable than any amount of education. If you have the evidence to prove that thly are pies .

ln 1937 . Don't go foi the sake of foreign beauties stay Appendix A Leaders of Soviet Military Intelligence happy. working in Turkey. would always be_ donl go. If he is thinking of fleeing to the West.'and at home in Russia bad. 5. theirs are rially no better than orrrs. In January 1918 he became chief of the Operational Department of the Moscow military district. In 1905 he joined the Tsar's army and serveil in WWI as a major in military intelligence. If you don't feel yourselfa traitor by going _ go.traitor. by going. Hewas born in Moscowto rich merchantparents and educated to follow his father's profession. it is not worth it for the Jate of a car. as will the ihameful epithet . and then regained ground A RA commanding intelligence of the S.don't go. You will dream of Mothe-r Rusiia every night. in October 1918 he became the first chief of military intelligence until July l92f. he speht three years under interrogation. maybe even on the frontier itserr.t d"o it. If you like long. If you think that in tlre-West it is good. then you are mistaken _ ours is a beautiful-muntry. [t is clear that the very shortest history iof the GRU would fill several massive tomes and could only be written after the fall of communist power. A participant in the October Revolution he was one of the creators of the Tcheka.itren tnJ. 12th Army. only {ague outlines of a continent shrouded in the mists. LOV. I soon - !o.don't go. 12.orru_ Only realized that a history of the GRU would be a very fraught undertaking. and an agonizing death. After 1921 he was a deputy of the chief of military intblligence. you can bring nearer the momeni. Rapidly promoted. In their destinies the whole history of the organization is reflected.t go until such time as he is certain why hJ is going. If you are attracted to Western wolel . Simon Iv anovich : I 8.. If.22. but go for the sake of her future and I promise you that you wilt be if you know there is no other way for you. article 64 will be waiting for him..then my advice to him is _ don. officer now finds himself in the same dilemma _ to go or to .I*u-rious motorcars _ don't go. nists are judge! by the people of our country. front.. Germany and Japan. If you iant an easy life . Latvia and Lithuania as undercover ambassador and later was responsible for setting up residencies in the United States.ln1920he moved down to chief of intelligence. rvry advjce. if you yourself do not wish to be a criminal. dismissed from all posts. if you arelhen ready to stand before the people and await their decision on youifute _ then you must go. if you can help your people. Arrested in 1938. he was employed as a deputy director of the Literature Museum. I 880 . The i picture may be made clearer by studying the destiny of those tindividuals who have held the highest power in Soviet military intelligence.I advise him to think over his decision a hundred times.then you should If you are prep_ared to risk your life for one minute of ireedom _ then go. He shouldn.224 Soviet Military Intelligence and wonders. if you consider your leaders as criminals. and then again. The history written in this book consists only of isolated details.W. I %9. In 1941 he was serving as a private in a penal .

I a party pseudonym like Lenin. 2nd Grade Army Commissar BERZIN. (Nikonson): ? -29. October 1918 he was. so far unidentified. but it is not known whether Beruin NIKONOV. Born in Latvia. He was also a fervent supporter of the establishment of a communist dictatorship in Latvia and one of the organizers and leaders SitCCe. its head. [n order to sustain this cover story his deputies Uritski and Unshlikht carried out his duties in Moscow. UN SH L I KH T. dc facto. He was conscripted into the army in the First World War but deserted and went underground. a diputy of t[J chief of military intelligence and immediately moved as an illegal into polan{ Head of Intelligence Directorate (GRU) but. Ignati Reis and the most eminent intelligence officer of the 20th century. Reduced to deputy status after 1922. I o s if Stanis lav ovich : 19 . industrious and iuccessful heads of intelligence. . Moshe Milstein (Mikhail M). He was one of the most talented. he was a colonel. and when the war was over he was taken back into the GRU. but lived quietly until his death.Stalin. where he carried out his most notable recruitments while he was working under cover. A. Karl Ramm. On returning from Spain he continued to lead military intelligence. His date of birth is unknown. One of the main organizers of the 'Red Terror'. In 1936 Berzin transferred the Soviet military intelligence command post from Moscow to Madrid. With effect from March 1924 he became its head legally as well. In 1957 he was agiin dismissed inthe Zhukov/ Shtemyenko purge.3g.-the Western front. the creator of the most powerful and successful intelligence organizations in existence anywhere.7. Konstantin Efremov. .M. From April l92l he was Deputy A*y). Zinoviev and others. Ruth and Rolf Werner. Trotski. Four years later. arrested ll 191.7.3g. Richard Sorge. On his liberation he was immeiliately appointed deputy tothe chief of the GRU. It remains uncertain whether this was his real name or simply Born in Latvia. yan Karlovich (real name Kyuzis Peteris) : I 3. Oskar Arcovich: lg94 . Lev Manevich. and in August 1920 became chief of military-intelligence. he initiated the hostages system. In 1919 he became chieiof intblligence of. when he was shot. On 13 May 1938 he was arrested and gence officers on 29 July he was shot.7 . chief of military intelligence.Yakov Mrachkovski (Gorev). He took part in the October Revolution and afterwards he worked in the L l&gg - 29. He was giief of military intelligence after Stigga. Sandor Rado. 12. Aino Kuusinen. He personally recruited and rah the most outstanding intelli- took over from him or from another.7. (subsequently the 15th He was head of a special department of this army and played a part in the suppression of the Russian sailors' mutiny at Kronstadt. He engaged in suppressing counter-revolutisnaries in Moscow and became a private boAyguara of Lenin.2g.38. Then. he spent ten years in a concentration camp.187 9 An hereditary Polish nobleman and an active member of the Polish (left-wing) Social-Democratic Party. he was one of - 29. He particularly distinguished himself in the course of the pursuit and liquidation of captured sailors. he served in WWI and became a communist after the Revolution.226 Appendix A Appendix A 22V battalion. He too was executed in the great teror of 1938. of the Latvian Red Army Lithuania and Latvia. and a leader of th6 Red Latvian $!emen. he travelled extensivery as an ilegar to cieate new networks until his recall to Moscow in 193g. officially designated as chief military adviser to the Republican Government. he was.1938. from his first days in military intelligence.. Berzin joined the Social-Democratic party in 1904. In central apparatus of the NKVD and in the NKVD in Latvia.

Lieut-General of Aviation PROSKUROV.polish Revolutionary Government'. Solomon petovich: -^J"'"l"lr{. On his return from Spain he became chief of the GRU. there are grounds for thinking it could have been on 4 June 1940.s absence he carried out the duties of chief of the GRU although he remained in fact only deputy to Berzin. a future chief of the GRU. In 1937-g there began under his leadership the . played a perscinal part in Ezhov's death. thus establishlng a monopoly of secret activities in the state. he was buried alive dt the NKVD sanatorium at Sukhanovo. and the following day shot without trial.great purge' whictl started as a purge of the NKVD and was then extended to was in charge State Security EZHOV.sovietintelligenceoffi 1895-1937 was chief of the GRU during Berzin's absence. He was shot with Berzin in the celtar of the'Hotel Metropole'in Moscow. In October he was removed from his post. From l92l:3 he was deputy chairman of thi All-Russian Tcheka and one of the fathers of the . and at one time he was considered by Soviet historians is the 'first founder of the Tcheka' at the same time as Dzerzhinsky was considered the 'chief founder of the Tcheka'. He openly came out against the pact with Hitler. A ferveni suppo. the party and the entLe country . From 1923 he was deputy head of the registration directorate (GRU). A petty official who only joined the Bolsheviks when it became clear that they had won.CI. He took part in air battles and shot down several enemy aircraft. In 1930 he of the Central Committee personnel Department and in 1935 Party Secretary. Lithuania and Germany. The date of his death has not been established with'certainty.nB Appendix A Appendix . Nikolai Ivanovich: 1895-190."oing.Red Teiror'. At the same time he carried out a series of first-class recruitments amongst internationalists of many countries and assured a regular flow of military and military-technical intelligence. 229 documents to organize illegal work in poland. In 1936 he became Peoples' Commissar for Jnternal Affairs and Commissar-General for State Security. On 29 July 1938 there was a repeat purge of the GRU and. However. On the 4 July 1940 he was arrested. l!27 Ezhov was in Stalin's personal secretariat. but from Commissar-General of cerandfi ghterpilot. Immediately after the revolution he became a member of the NKVD college. One of the bloodiest careers in the history of mankind. There are also grounds for believing that Ivan Serov. he was a member of the . Ivan losifuvich: ? Corps Commandcr IIRITSKI. He travelled abroad several times with false the leaders of the October Revolution. the army. He began the policy of state terror before Dzerzhinsky. In the interests of cover he constantly filled responsible posts in the Soviet Government and the Red Army. He was shot in the first wave of the Terror. 'of the GRU and Ezhov was the shortest serving Chief suffered the most painful death. he combined both these professions simultaneously. controller of NKVD work. In 1937-8 he served as a Soviet Military Adviser in Spain. . the monopoly alarmed Stalin and 29 July saw the beginning of Ezhov's downfall. he took over its control. According to unconfirmed data. From this moment on it would be impossible for the activities of the GRU and NKVD to be subject to reciprocal checking.rter of the establishment of communism in poland. a post he occupied from the end of 1938 to July 19. In 1935-6 during Berzin. He was arrested in January 1939 and liquidated after atrocious torture. he occupied iirsignifiihnt party posts in the provinces.A. having liquidated in 1920 the whole of the leadership and the operational stpff.

He entered the Red Army as a volunteer in 191g and took an active part in the suppression of anti-communist peasant riots on the staff of the 3rd Army Special punitive Biigades. Golikov may be said to have had the most distinguished career in the whole Soviet Army.Head of the Chief Political Directorate.has become proverbial. Golikov di facto directed the forcible repatriation and destruction of more than a million people who did not want to return to the USSR. After the civil war he commanded a regiment. however. GRU command point from Moscow to London under the guise of the Soviet military mission. In 1943 he received the plans of operation 'Citadel' (the German attack near Kursk) before GeneralField Marshal E. division and corps. joined the Party worker.230 16.1%A Appendix A Appendix was also shot. In September 1939 he iought in piland as commander of the 6th Army. 1904 - 1979. He was one of the cruellest but also one of the most successful chiefs of the GRU.In 1942_3 the and embarked on an meteoric career. the leaders and those taking part in the Russian anti-communist opposition. A 231 29. mercilessly purging the . In 1948. at the same time. He was an active . Fedor Fedotovich: 6. In October l94l he returned to the USSR. When it was over he himself was remoued from all his posts. Kuznetsov had a special role to play in the organization and carrying out of the great powen' conference in Teheran and. After Hitler's invasion and the loss of contact with the most important agent network he transferred the . participant in the army purge which included the GRU. and in the heat of the great purge he showed exceptional cruelty. 1nd liquidation of.7. Golikov agreed to be Army Controller on the side of the party. He Colonel-General KII ZN ETSOV. Kuznetsov's reply . simultaneously. He held this post right up to the time of Stalin's death. but by 1950 he was ate of the Soviet Army and. In 1938 he was called up into the Army and appointed deputy head of the Chief Political Directorate. whose duty it was to implement those plans. He was shot in I94Z. received the rank of Colonel-General. From April 1943 he was deputy to Stalin for Red Army cadres. from 1944 directed operations against the Russian Liberation Army and the r. and.19ffi. he quickly was Chief From July 1941 to htly 1942 Aleksei pavlovich PANFILOV of the GRU. Filipp lvanovich: - GRU leadership was held by Ivan lvanovich ILICHEV. assessed A country boy who came to Moscow and became a factory the situation. bloody struggle within the party and intelligence work. In May 1962 he was removed from office without much rumpus oi scandal.2. from 1956. Kuznetsov at work demonstrateA tmt there was no great difference between the cruel. In 1940 he became the chief of the GRU. He spent two years in prison. He commanded an army. bri'gade. as a reward for his success in this. From 1958 he was head of the Chief political Directoi_ Yyr:W of the Soviet Union GOLIKOV.'[s there any great difference?' . Golikov directed the post-war purge of the Army. In 196i he was made Marshal of the Soviet Union.l f9r. then a front. and from 1943 he was chief of the GRU. Director of a Party Central Committee Department.ur. von Manstein. he was Academy Chief. at the height of the posr-war purges Stalin appointed Kuznetsov supreme Party Controller of the Army . commanding another army and. On his appointment Stalin asked him whether he could be as good an intelligence officer as he had been earlier Party Controller of the Army. In 1945 he played an active part in the preparations and implementation of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences and also penonally directed operations to steal American atomic technology.6. By 1937 he was lst Secretary of the Proletarski district of Moscow.

restored and he was appointed First Deputy Chief of the General Staff . never received the honour. He retired in 1969. He then took part in the suppression of anti-communist manifestations and held unimportant posts in the Red Army. His rise was swift. after the war.. General of the Army KURASOV. He came out actively against the war.1976. erudite and merciless of all GRU chiefs. He served on various staffs. 1972. reinstated in his rank of General of the Army and re-appointed chief of the GRU. Marshal of the Soviet Union ZAKHAROV. In the same year he was removed from this office and appointed Chief of the General Staff Academy.232 Appendix A Appendix A 233 Soviet Army of dissidents. Vladimir Vasilievich: A Shtemyenko joined the Red Army as a volunteer. demoted to Lieut-General and despatched to command the Volga military district staff. and later a front.3 1. at Marshal Zhukov. he came out on Zhukov's side. Head of the General Staff Academy. the first time at the age of forty-one.1907 -23. In 1956. at the time of the squabble between Stalin and the Politburo he came out on Stalin's side and was.It has been said that. His career ran smoothly.Chief of Staff of the Warsaw pact.4. Head of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces. 1. He completed military training and two academy courses. but he Zakharov was in Petrograd in the First World War and avoided being conscripted into the Army. Deputy Chief of the General Staff. During the war he was Chief of Staff of the 9th Army and later front. By 1936 he had worked himself up to the command of a regiment. on a specious pretext. He is considered to have been the most energetic. Mawei Vasilievich: 5. The great purge opened up many vacancies. General of the Army SHTEMYENKO. he was returned to Moscow. having accepted the GRU post and learning of the fate of all his predecessors Kurasov. Shtemyenko's career was feverish as rryell as resilient. After Stalin's death a slow decline set in. He was still in favour when he died. In June 1962 he was Chief of Staff for Land Forces. Russian Army officer who went over to the side of the communists after the revolution. and from 192[0 was deputy head of the General Staff Operations Directorate.7. This story is corroborated by several independent sources.73. From 195ffi1 he was Deputy Chief of the General of the Army and Chief of the General Staff from November 1948. from May 1938.11. He accompanied Stalin to the Teheran conference. and in July 1937 Zakharov was Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District. stripped of all his posts. joined the Red Guard in April 1917 and stormed the Winter Palace. finally.s demand. During the war he was Chief of Staff of 7. I 898 . 8. by Politburo decree.1897 -29. and from 1940 was on the General Staff. declined the office and transferred to a less hazardous post. After the war he was Commander-in-Chief of the Central group of forces in Austria. In l943he was head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and one of the principal Soviet military planners and the closest to Stalin. Sergei Matveevich: 7. and.2. and. He was put forward three times for the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He became chief of the GRU from April 1946. He . In 1968 his rank of General of the Army was General Staff. Promoted General of the Army. demoted to Lieut-General and sent off to command a military district staff. the 4th Shock Army. In June 1952. first to the post of Head of the Chief personnel Directorate at the Ministry of Defence. then Academy Head and. Once again he was stripped of his offices. he was made chief of the GRU in February 1949. In October 1957 during the conspiracy against Zhukov.

corruption in GRU attained unbelievable proportions. He ' deserted Abakumov's group for that of Beria and betrayed him (as did General Ivashutin the present GRU leader).r9W-. General of the Army IVASHLITIN. going over in time to the camp of the victorious groups. Together with Ambassador Andropov he seized the leaders of the Hungarian revolution by deceit and took part in their torture and execution. During the war he held leading posts in Smersh. Subsequently he betrayed his leaders in Smersh and the NKGB. of the GRU in January 1949.9. and the Chief of the GRU Zakharov. LI N. In 194/-5 he was chief of Smersh on the 3rd Ukrainian Front and in that capacity waged a ferocious struggle against the Ukrainian insurgent army and played an active role in the establishment of communist order in . During the war Serov was one of of the Red Army. after the successful coup d'etai reappointed Chief of the General Staff where he served up to September lW . In December 1958 Serov became chief of the GRU. A volunteer in the punitive formations of the Special purpose other leading figures protagonists of the terror he distinguished himself as the most fervent exponent of 'scenes or a massive scale. On l2June 1937 he appeared in the capacity of executioner of Marshal Tukhachevski and 9ffic11of military intelligence. Ivan Alekseevich. General of the Army SEROV. tn 1953 he was deputy chief of the GRU and one of the - *is Colonel-G eneral S HA the GRU from 1951-6 and from November December 1958. peter lvanovitch: An of the GRU he managed not only to survive but also to transfer to work in the NKVD . and in August 1946 he personally took part in the execution of the command of the Russian Liberation Army under Lieut-General Vlasov. Even at this time [vashutin had powerful enemies in the NKGB. The years when Serov was chief of the GRU were also the most unproductive in its history.practically up to the time of his death.the Units. It was the only period when GRU officers voluntarily made contact with Western services and gave them much more valuable information than they took from them. supported Stalin and were dismissed from their posts. Serov became Chairman of the KGB. The Chief of the General Staff Shtemyenko.234 became chief Appendix A the leaders Appendix A 235 and Chief of the General Staff in 1960. Ivashutin came into the Army counter-intelligence from 1931. As an exKGB and Smersh officer he had many enemies in the GRU. Amongst all. The Politburo insisted. ln 1962 he was dismissed and quietly liquidated. Stalin objected. He displayed a high degree of personal sadiim. In 1959 he was made Marshal of the Soviet enion. Serov's was the dirtiest career in the history of the GRU. He took part in the pursuit and liquidation of the inhabitants of Fstonia. He took an active part in the conspiracy against Khruschev and.s fall continued. After the fall of Beria. Drulu exists as to his personal involvement in the murder of the Polish officers in Katyn. but in May 1953 he was appointed Commander of the Leningrad Military District and was able to hold on to this post. Under Serovls leadership. Mikhail Atelcseevich waschief of 1957 to conspirators against Beria. In June 1952 a fierce struggle broke out about convening the 19th party Congress. Zakharov was fully on the side of the Politburo and for this he was immediately appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forcei in Germany. In October 1957 a struggle broke out between the pbfitburo and Marshal Zhukov. of Smenh. In 1963 he was dismissed. Latvia and Lithuania in 1940 and in lS!17. at the time of the purges 5.. After Stalin's death Zakharov.

V. Aleksandr Grigorevich: first deputy chief of GRU. and in all subsequent activities the two men always supported each other. This is followed by an alphabetical list of some of the known operational officers workirtg under cover around the world. enjoyed unlimited support from the first deputy chairman of the Council of Minisiers. However. head of lnformation. V. He also played a special part in the liquidation of soldiers and officers of the Russian Liberation Army. Col-General IZOTOV. I.236 Appendk A Bulgaria. Admiral BEKRENEV: deputy chief of GRU. Official pseudonyms'Tovarishch Mikhailov'.s coming to power Ivashutin held on to his post in view of powerfui support within the Army. The first pseudonym is also used in connection with all military intelligence. Head of GRU. in spite of hi past Appendix B The GRU High Command and Leading GRU Offi. I. At Beria's downfall he went over to the Serov faction and was appointed head of the KGB 3rd Chief Directorate. head of the Military Diplomatic Academy. Lieutenant-G enerals and Vice Admirals (ap p roximately 20 ) Lt-General DOLIN. Col-General PAVLOV. G. therefore.General LEMZENKO. Col-General ZOTOV. Arkady Vasilievich: deputy chief of GRU. Army General IVASHUTIN. Jn this position he had a number of very serious confrontations with the KGB and personally with Andropov. Col-General MESHCHERYAKOV. It was at this time that he first met Brezhnev.cers The following list gives names of the most prominent senior GRU officers with their official titles where possible.'Yugoslavia and Hungary. Ivashutin was appointed chief of the. Petr Ivanovich: deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Col. After the disbandment of Smersh he managed to outlive its other leaders by a timely transfer out of the Abakumov faction into that of Beria. He then took part in the arrest and liquidation of Serov. Col-General SIDOROV. Y. 'Papa Rimski'. At the end of the war Ivashutin took part in the forcible-repatriation of Soviet citizens who did not want to return to the Soviet Union. ties with the KGB. After Andropov.: head of GRU Personnel Directorate. the chairman of the Military Industrial Complex Smirnov as well as Marshals Ustinov and Ogarkov. S. Ivashutin deferrded the interests of the Army with more vigour than any of his predecessors and.'Dyadya Petya'. Kir Gavrilovich: GRU representative in the Party Central Committee. Department. I.GRU.: deputy chief of GRU. On Brezhnev's recommendation in 1963.: head of GRU Political .



Appendix B
Maj -General GONCHAROV, Gennadi Grigorevich.


Lt-General GURENKO, Vyacheslav Tikhonovich: head of the Illegals Training Centre. Lt-General Aviation SHATALOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich: GRU representative at the Cosmonaut Training

Lt-General KOLODYAZHNY, Boris Gavrilovich: GRU
deputy chief for Internal Security.

Lt-General MILSTEIN, Moshe: GRU deputy chief for Dis-

information. A former illegal and author of top secret manual Honourable Service. Codename 'Tovarishch M', 'Mikhail M.'.

Maj-General KHOMYAKOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Rear Admiral KOZLOV, Andrei Nikolaevich. Maj-General MIKHAILOV, Boris Nikolaevich. Maj-General ZIMIN, Valentin Yakovlevich. Maj-General ANDRYANOPV, Y.: Spetsnaz Maj-General Aviation MIKRYUKOV, L. Maj-General GLAZUNOV, N.
Rear Admiral SMIRNOV, M.

Lt-General KOSTIN

P. T.: chief of GRU

Leading GRU Oficers



Lt-General Engineer PALIY




ABRAMOV, Vladimir Mikhailovich BAYLIN, Madimir Ivanovich
BELOUSOV, Mikolai Mikhailovich BELOUSOV, Konstantin Nikolaevich

GRU 6th

Directorate. Lt-General GONTAR: dief of GRU 7th Directorate. Lt-General DRACHEV t. M.

Lt-General KOZLOV
Directorate. Lt-Generdl BERKUTOV,

M-: Chief of GRU 1lth


: Information Service.

Vice Admiral ROZHKO, Gennadi Aleksandrovich. Major-Generals and Rear Admirals (approximately 125) Maj-General. Aviation CHIZHOV, Mikhail Terentyevich. Rear Admiral KALININ, Valeri Petrovich.

BLINOV, Boris Afanasyevich BARCHUGOV BORISOV, Gennadi Alekseevich BORODIN, Viktor Mikhailovich BUDENNY BOROVINSKI, Petr Fedorovich BUBNOV, Nikolai lvanovich BUTAKOV, Ilya Petrovich DEMIN, Mikhail Alekseevich



Maj-General Aviation KUCHUMOV, Aleksandr Mikhailovich.

DORONKIN, Kirill Sergeevich EGOROV, Anatoli Egorovich

Maj-General SHITOV. Rear-Admiral KLYUZOV, Serafim Timofeevich. Maj-Ceneral BARANOV, Aleksandr Vasilievich. Maj-General LYALIN, Mikhail Ammosovich.

Maj-General BEPPAEV S. U.: Chief Group Soviet Forces in Germany.

of Intelligence of

Maj-General Artillery LYUBIMOV, Viktor Andreevich.

ERMAKOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich ERSHOV, Yuri Alekseevich EVDOKIMOV, Sergei Vasilevich FEKLENKO, Vladimir Nikolaevich FILATOV, Anatoli FILIPPOV, Anatoli Vasilevich GENERALOV, Vsevolod Nikolaevich GERASIMOV



Appendix B


KAPALKIN, Sergei Vasilevich KASHEVAROV, Evgeni Mikhailovich KOZYPITSKI, Gleb Sergeevich LOVCHIKOV, Vasili Dmitrievich LAVROV, Valeri Alecseevich LEMEKHOV, Dmitri Aleksandrovich LOBANOV, Vitali Ilich LOGINOV, Igor Konstantinovich MOROZOV, Ivan Yakovlevich MYAKISHEV, Aleksei Nikolaevich NEDOZOROV; Valentin Viktorovich NOSKOV Nikolai Stepanovich
OSIPOV, Oleg Aleksandrovich PAVLENKO, Yuri Kuzmich PETROV, Nikolai Kirillovich PIVOBAROV, Boris Alekseevich ' POPOV, Gennadi Fedorovich POTAPENKO, Leonid Terentyevich POTSELUEV, Evgeni Aleksandrovich

SUVOROV, Georgi Bbrisovich

UMNOV, Valentin Aleksandrovich VETROV, Yuri Pavlovich VILKOV, Boris Nikolaevich VINOGRADOV, Feliks Vasilevich VOLNOV, Vladimir Grigorevich VOLOKITIN, Vladimir Ivanovich VOTRIN, Sergei Ivanovich VYBORNOV, Ivan Yakovlevich YAKUSHEV, Ivan Ivanovich YURASOV, Viktor Vladimirovich ZHELANNOV, Vladimir Mikhailovich ZHEREBTSON, Aleksandr Vasilevich ZHERNOV, l,eonid Andreevich ZHURAWEV, Ivan Mikhailovich ZOT OV, Viktor Nikolaevich

PUfiLIN, Mikhail Semenovich RATNIKOV, Valentin Mikhailovich RADIONOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich
ROMANOV, Anatoli Aleksandrovich

RUBANOV, Aleksandr Nikolaevich SALEKHOV, Yuri Nikolaevich SAVIN, Viktor Grigorevich SELUNSKI, Valentin Ivanovich
SEMENOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich SERGEEV, Yuri Pavlovich SHEPELEV, Viktor Petrovich SHIPOV, Madilen Nikolaevich SOKOLOV, Viktor Aleksandrovich

STRELBITSKI, Vladimir Vasilevich STUDENIKIN, Ivan Yakovlevich SUKHAREV, Georgi Nikolaevich

Aitpendix C


Appendix C Some Case Hislories of GRU Activities

of money for documents from his place of work. He

also sought to find out details about othbr staff at the organization

where the Frenchman worked. Kulik was arrestid at the moment when he was about to receive from the Frenchman
a document about a French weapon.

Rather than sprinkling the text with examples t have put together a representative pample of GRU officers uncovered in the course oI operations abroad, as reported in the press. The number of GRU officers caught and expelled and the nature of their activities is indicative of the power and scale . of rhe GRU.
Canada and the United States

In February 1980 the Soviet Consul and No. 2 in Marseilles
was withdrawn. He had been detained by the French authori-

the Bouches du Rhdne contains many installations and
objects of defence interest. Travkov was officially concerned with 'scientific subjects connected with the port and airport,, and these interests enabled him to meet people involvid in the aeronautical field and to visit firms and installations. Travkov obtained copies of files on staff working on defence contracts and used the details thus revealed to build up a

ties between Toulon and Marseilles witli plans of the Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft in his briefcase. They had just been handed to him by an agent. Travkov had arrived in 1977. The area of Marseilles and

In June 1980 the Canadians


that they


jan and the chauffeur Sokolov. The case involved an
unnamed individual employed in a sensitive position in the

requested the withdrawal of three Soviet officials from the Embassy, Captain lgor A. Bardeev, Colonel E. I. Aleksan-

USA, who had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy and
been given the task of obtaining information. Soviet officials

had maintained clandestine contact with the American citizen over a period of some months. France

network of informers. Four Frenchmen were taken into custody at the time of Travkov,s arrest. Travkov had also been interested in the twin-jet Mirage 4000 which used the
same engine as the 2000.

In October 1979 the Naval and Air Attachd of the Soviet Embassy in France, Vladimii Kulik, was expelled from the country. He was an officer of the GRU working in French military circles and had been in contact with firms specializing in military supplies. 1979, at a reception in another emba$sy, he had met by chance a young Frenchman


The Soviet Press Attachd declared the French action a 'provocation by the police' but the documents were, of course, genuine. A few days later Frolov, himself a KGB officer, was required to leave France too. He had been in Marseilles for two years and had earlier had a posting to Paris. His job, like Travkov's had given him opportunitiei to meet all sorts of people and he had made the most of it. Both Travkov and Frolov were personable, charming
individuals who made many friends Great Britain

employed in the armaments department of an important organization who was carrying out studies on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Kulik sought to maintain contact with the Frenchman, and in due course offered him a large sum

Anatoliy Pavlovich Zntov, the Soviet Naval Attach6 in London, was expelled in December l9B2 after trying to set

He was very popular with staff and pilots at Madrid airport where he had shown interest in radio frequencies and the security regulations at the airport. He had been an agent of the GRU for some ten years. Churanov was an engineer who had been Aeroflot representative in Canada before coming to Spain. Igor Ivanovich Zashchirinsky served in Norway from 1974 to l9l7 as representative at the Soviet Trade Delegation of a number of Soviet import/export organizations./technical nature including material classified as Top Secret. accused ofespionage for the Soviet Llnion.also extended to the Royal Navy's nuclear submarines. Koslov. The Spanish security authorities themselves claimed that Churanov was a member of the GRU May -1982 the Aeroflot Director in Spain was again expelled for spying. Nonuay Valeriy Moiseevich Mesropov served in Norway as an engineer with a Russian firm in Drammen. In January 1969 he had begun service with the Police Board. where he had attempted to bribe a Norwegian officer to hand over secret information. and from 1971-5 was given leave of absence to serve in the Defence Ministry and to do duty with the UN. : In June 1983 Lt-Colonel Zagrebnev was expelled from . Miyanaga had been recruited as an agent in 1974 by one of Koslov's predecessors.- and had visited a military area Norway. Sweden 1979 Stig Bergling.244 Appendix C Appendix C in the north of 245 up a network of agents to gather information about weapons systems and electronic hardware used by the Royal Navy Norway. He was engaged on clandesiine operations to obtain information and products of a scientific. on one occasion. reserv_e In In March 1977. this time with another official. to get a Sphnish pilot to introduce him into the American airport at Tarrejon. from 1fti8 to 1970. He too was declared persora non grata on28 January (ileg Churanov. was arrested in Israel. Vasiliy Fedorin and Vladimir Tertishnikov were accused of trying to obtain information on the supply of US military materials to Spain and on Spanish weapons manufacturen. Director of Aeroflot in Madrid. Mesropov. He was a GRU agent whose case officer at the time of his arrest was Colonel Yuriy N. His case was part of another_expulsion of six officials who had already left. a Swedish police inspector and officer. Military and Air Attach6 at the Soviet Embassy. Spain lapan A retired Japanese major-general. The . He had also tried. including particular ciphers for use with radio.seller' was a member of the Spanish Secret Services who purported to be a member of a Spanish firm. He was equipped with and instructed in various means of clandestine communication. Miyanaga and two other offioers of the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force were subsequently sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for passing military secrets to the GRU. as a representative of Stankoimport. who was not a diplomat. was arrested in 1970 on suspicion of intelligence activity and finally expelled from Norway for security reasons in September 1970. His interests had . was arrested in February 1980. during the Falklands campaign. He was Military Attach6 at the Embassy in Oslo. It was alleged that Churanov had bought plans of certain aviation electronic equipment. Yukihisa Miyanaga was arrested in Tokyo in January 1980.

personal 155-6 Agents agent recruiters 133 couriers 134-5 defined 131 documentation agents 133-4 executive agents 132-3 friends of Soviet Union l3G8 groups of 171-2 head agents 131-2 legalisers 133 safe address owners 135 safe house oi flat owners 135 sources 132 radio 15!61 routine meetings 156 schtchit films l7O secret rendezvous signals l6i{ l5&9 Agent recruiting 35-{. Index Abakumov 47. 174. 1424 main duty of GRU officers Andropov. t76 directs liquidation of NKVD 'illegals'40 .124 Aralov.246 Appendix C Bergling had access to information about security police personnel and counter-espionage organizations. He kept in touch with his case officers in a number of countries. Yuri7l.72 APN 12. 159 . Yan Karlovich 22G7 ' deceptions as head of GRU 167. 141 148-54 Agent work in practice 167 acquisition of secrets l7!5 organization of agent groups Beria. having been trained in East Berlin. 69. and also made use of micro-dots. Simon lvanovich 25-6. lZ9 exhibition recruitment 144.47 executed 48 t7t-2 segregation of agents from embassies Berzin. He was equipped with radio to receive messages from the GRU. particularly in the Middle East.16&70 3!40 stealing military hardware. 48 Abwehr Aeroflot training and control of independent agents 170 14 GRU predomi nance in 1224 Agent communications alternative meetings l5G7 brush contacts 158 damaged by 155 transport of heavy equipment 1754 use of diplomatic mail 175 use of scfttcftr'. films 170 GRU defections dead-letter boxes 161-5.22fr t26-7 illegals' 147-8 problem of 'walk-in' volunteers methods l1rt6. Lavrenti 46. becomes first head of GRU 25 establishes GRU opposition to of army and Tcheka}G7 Atomic bomb Soviet intelligence and 93.7 for operational intetligence 187-9 gradual ap_Droach 141. 170 emergency meetings 157-8 non-personal 155. and about defence establishments and Swedish defence plans. 13}41 candidates for recruitment 14041 crash approach 141-2 Amsterdam undercover residencies 128.

Marshal 64 GRU Centre 73-7. late 1930s anonymity of fi-62 8H & purged 42 . Index t82. 152. 32. 114. SWW 168 information command point training 20!13 'unit 44388' classification 13-14. Lt-Gen. 242-3 GRU activity in2A-3 brief 25 control of operational intelligence 171. Wst-1927 tt2-13 plans'Great Terror'of 1930s 39 Cherepovetski Higher Military Engineering School for Communications 203.79. 77 ranks in 52.54. 82.205 George Washington.222. penetrates German and Allied staffs. 151. 192o 32. 9L6.48. SWW . 85 organizational units 75. 19. 89. the l0l. early failures and successes 2F30. 83-4. 230 becomes head of 44 3}. t99. 242 '7-aia'residency 45 Carter.36-40 passim 69-70. 103 undercover residency 128 Hamburg abandoned dead-letter box in 162 Higher Military Naval School of Radio Electronics 203 13. 1940 43 made commander of 10th Army organizes return of unwilling Russians after SWW. ll9. forms diversionary elements in SWW '16. 179 military-economic role 67 military-political role 67 'Illegals' 37 .205 control of press 124 control of Soviet embassies Geneva undercover residencies 129 General Staff Academy 203.i Communist Party of SU 36. SWW 167-8.l4. Igor 155 Hague. late 1930s 4041. 94. purges NKVD overseas. Nikolai lvanovich 22&9 becomes head of GRU . destroyed by purges. shoots German agents at behest of Gestapo 38. 137. ix.205 deceived by American major over'atomic' shell 150-54 directorates and directions 7&-82. 172. creation of first agent network 27-8. West GRU residencies in 149. 105. 91 Canada Index Frunze Military Academy 181. 65 blossoming 33-4.14 purge of NKVD by. 8t-9 passim.t-16 processing organs 8!93 procuremcnt organs 7&{2 expulsion of Soviet spies222. destruction of foreign intelligence network.248 purged 41-2 Brezhnev. ls9l cosmic or space intelligence 52. purged by Lenin.38 Golikov. GRU activity in24!4 'Great Terror'of 1930s 3942 Grechko.4 GRU. Pres.242-5 passim general opposition to army and 5&9 t867 Gestapo 14. USS 59 Germany.90.oncorde 59. 193F6 39q0. 177 discovers US work on atomic bomb 92-3.69 safety measure of producing 'grey' intelligence 90-91 Scientific Research Institute 170 'shopping list' for secrets. 'strategic' and 'operational' divisions in SWW 45. France anti-Semitism in choice of officers 213 'basic function 454. 1z16 Council of Ministers 11. Dzerzhinsky 23 170 Ezhov.203. V.14-5 restores GRU's foreign subordinate organizations 51-5 support services 9zl-. sets up receiving centre in Sweden.41 recruitment of agents by 36 Committee of Information (KI) network. 186 recruitment of US sergeant as' Soviet agent in 149-50 Soviet intelligence infiltration eligibility for 2lll4 enmity for KGB 69-72 relation with military indusrial commission foreign expulsions of officers 221.-7 system of recruitment and running of agents established 35 CIA 90 Comintern 28.49 Political Department 18 role in ruling triumvirate 17-19 C. 144 agent legalisers 133 . Marshal Filipp Ivanovich KGB2G7 High Command23T-9 history of:. tronid 50. James 68 Central Committee of CPSU 11. 60 use of American electronics 90 use of specialists 89 Guryenko. 140 249 military role 67 military+echnological role 67 opposition to recruiting sons of officers 207-8 privileges of officers 21. Gusenko.37. early 1930s 50. 59 Great Britain expulsion of Soviet spies 222.75. 204 rule about appointment of head 27. Adolf . agents abroad in 1920s 32. 220 command point 74. ts3. l94l Gosplan 59 4U &7. 25. embarrassed over German communist agents 3G7.77 use of independent agents 170 GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of General StafQ 24y4 Deadletter boxes 16l-6. 66-7 'Intelligence Summary' 88 interests compared with KGB's 66-8 leading officers 239-41 military attach6s as officers of 124-6 supplies Soviet Union with German planes 37-8 Holland division of undercover residencies in 128 expulsion of Soviet spy 272 expulsion of Soviet spies222. T.28n.9.lO becomes head ofboth GRU and NKVD 42 .

70. Germany 186 role in ruling triunrvirate 17-19 safety measure of supplying 'grey' intelligence 9G91 sons of officers welcomed in tu8 post-graduate school 213 secrecy about mF9. 178 duplication amorig 87 foreign areas covered by 184-{ navy 17&9 support services 94-5 Kurasov. 205 Konyev.2354 becomes head of GRU 50 policy of 'divide and rule' exemplified 11-13 purges Izvestia 12.43. 103.226 37. Gen.124 Japan GRU.207.35 GRU.2M Special Dilartment 18 undercover residencies 129 Kiev Higher Military Command School 203. I. tst. M. 13 Covt223 Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army 182. see KGB Ministry of the Interior Molotov. I. 231 Information Institute 85. 13 Radio Intelligence \egiment 182 Radio-Technical Intelligence Nikonov. army and destroys 32-3.55. 212-13 of.W7 Military Signals Academy 203 exclusivity oil OGPU 34 Soviet'l. 186 Ministry of State Security. defined 101 ll0 interests compared with GRU's cover stories 107-8 deputy resident for 114-15 husband and wife 104-5 residencies 35. U. 199 lFll. t4. 231-2 Lenin x. 13. 69-72 faculties 210-l I location 209 organization 210 NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) 10.'233 Kusinien. 203.203 as'military unit 35576' 208 courses 212-13 Soviet information directorate concerned with 86.t6 Montreal 12 Intelligence directorates 52-3. 230 Paris undercover residency 129 Peking Intourist as branch 23. 62. Otto 12. V. A. 60. 10.F.12. P. I.39. 49. l7O. 184. r93H 39-40 1930s purges. 129 enmity for GRU 47-50. Karl 28 . 189 navy 179*81. 87.61. xiii. M. A. Corps Commander 4l Rabkhin (People's Control) 12. 106 suitable type of employment for 108-10 2M.2M Military College of Supreme NATO 88. undercover residencies 129 Moscow co-ordination of l9O-91 difficulty of defection. Marshal 64 Kruschev.24. 58.91 allows formation of GRU 24. Georgi 39 Muravev. 89 lll. E8 t2.124 Proskurov. Oleg 155 Politburo.12. secret of power GRU activity in 244 Kashierski Electric Power Station 38 Marseilles undercover residencies 129 Military Academy 205. Col.32.203 Pravda 12. 177 amiy 177. 110. 187 netwoik on W. 11. I. 7&*82. Col-Gen.30..m7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 112..22 impossibility of recruiting agents in 217 Penkovsky. F. 61.178. Petr Ivanovich 71. 72.l8.61 lti3.2t9 l8l-3. 112 control of consulates 122 embassy guards 121 New York undercover residencies Putna. Sandor 28 Ramm.2s0 ages Index of l(b foreign expulsion of officers 222 Index 'illegal'network 101 251 overseas organs purged by agent recruiting methods 147-8 control of lUL. V. 25 of KGB 124 Ivashutin. 172 military Institute for training 2M iretwork in Turkey 186. A. 199.8*9 passim. diversionary elements in SWW 46 Regiment 182 Rado. 91 reveals past Soviet crimes 6l Kulikov. s9. 1920 32 permits 214 Mrachkovslii. Nikita 49'. Gen. ?. 184 officers' limited knowledge of organization 189-90 recruiting methods 187-8 Soviet foreign coverage 184-7 tactical reconnaissance contlol 'Aquarium'73 Gogol Boulevard 49 Institute of Cosmic Biology 73 Khodinka field 73 Narodnogo Opolchenia Street 2@ restrictions on residence 2N Panfilov. V. 86. 28 Kuznetsov. 229 KGB (Ministry of State Security) 9.65 basic function 66.31. Operational intelligence 177 army 177-8.2l2 sub-faculties 210 Military district intelligence services GRU. late Norway 4l destroyed in late 1930s purges 41-2 Military industrial commission 5G9 passim expulsion of Soviet spies 244 GRU activity in2. 13. Ministry of Defence 56. Jacob espionage activities 30 Malenkov. 88 Naval Academy 181. xii.ocomotive Report' on 86 destination 105. Marshal 64 training 10}{ Training Centre 101. Gen. M.l4 OBHSS (fraud squad) 12 selection 103 settling abroad 107 stages of journey to foreign Military Institute of Foreign Languages 183.203 Ilichev. 169.

210-tt Stalin. A. see : Support services Administrative/Technical Directorate 95 archives 96-7 ciphering 96 Communications Directorate totalitarian misuse of intelligence 90-92 Space programme 9fr Military-Diplomatic in parallel with American 89 Spain finance 70. Gen. Oskar Ansovich 226 organization 52.1941 43.205-4 Safe address 135-6 Safe house or flat 135 SALT talks 87 War. I.39.l{) Sorge. l13.234 information control 182 Intelligence Department of Army Staff 183 Interpreters' Group 183 reconnaissance control 181. Ivan Alekseevich 23+5 becomes head of GRU 50 Serpukhovski Higher Command Engineering School 2O4 Shalin. 203 Serov.44. . 169 33-4 post-1945 political manoeuvrings 4G8 press 12. 21-2 development of fronts 21-2 early intelligence development 20-25 fronts become military districts. Col. 18H agent intelligence control 181 departments of 53 electronic intelligence control 182 expulsion of Soviet spies 245 Directorate 95 passports and documents 95-6 Personnel Directorate 94-5 GRU activity in 245 Spanish Civil War.195 information collection role 196 naval brigades 182. 195248 Stigga. 195. Sergei Matveevich m.93 blindness to German invasion first period of2034 getting into Military Academy plans. M.91-2 death.17&-9 Tokyo easy to recruit agents in 217-18 :Irade Representation GRU and KGB officers in 124 Training 203 educational institutions 203-14 Slutski. 42. 178 role in ruling triumvirate 17-19 state of readiness 54 strength on land 202 Soviet Arm/ Academy. 33 'sleeping'agents l9l staffcompanies 195-6 training schools 203. late 1930s 32-3 hampered by lack of intelligence in Russo-Finnish post-1927 military development 253 20['2A sabotage companies 54 See abo Tactical reconnaissance 'Red Eye'missile 59 'Red Orchestra' organization 168. Gen. Josef 10.193 of army intelligence departments 53. 20/J.1939-40 42 judgement of seniority in 75 'Military Opposition' defeated. 32 tries to restore army intelligence Hitler 38 23.252 Reconnaissance battalions 54.90. l!). 54. 195.2A2. 193 development 22 directed against Turkey 187 directed against W.6 intelligence 83-4. 109 Soviet Army lcavalry of special assignments' Soviet Union 'clean'diplomats 130 l1l. 96 OperationaUTechnicat Satellite countries military intelligence seryices 55 military subordination to Soviet Union 63-5 Second Kharkov Higher . 1920 16 concentration on military expenditure 57-8 duplication of government organs I l-14 establishment of organs of enforcement 9-10 gold supplies for espionage 29. 18. Germany Tactical reconnaissance Z)G2 control of 200 deep reconnaissance 201 electronic reconnaissance companies 201 reconnaissance battalions 54. 54.151 Shkiriatov 39 Shtemyenko. 183 Spetsnaz control 182 Technical Facilities Group 183 Soviet merchant navy GRU predominance in 124 Soviet navy and fleets 52 cosmic intelligence department 179 brigades 193.24 . Index Index General Staff liquidated. 1919 26-7 post-SWW attempts to weaken army and KGB 4G7 struggle with Politburo. 182 GRU 48 disgraced 195248 made Chief of Staff of Warsaw Pact 64 survivability 49. 196 department controlling 182 detachments l9l. 10 Russo-Finnish War 1939-40 42 Ryazan Higher Parachute School 203. passim 91.-Gen. Richard 28. A. Military Academy of the Soviet Army Soviet army intelligence directorates 177-8.S-$ Switzerland 'Dora' residency 45 Aviation and Engineering School 183. Lron 31.202 reconnaissance companies 200.124 racialism in 215 restrictions on moving house 214 ruling triumvirate 17-19 shortage of grain 176. 2ot.l0 International Brigades 41 Spetsnaz units 184 Political Department 94 Sweden GRU activity in?/. 112. 205. 223 Rikov. Tank Warfare Academy 212 Tass 12.X2-3 becomes head of t'u6-7. 124. 178-81 organization 53. 177.43. 1953 48 hands German communists to zm-s Trotsky. 50 of Army Staff 183 of intelligence directorates 52-3 photographic analysis in 197-8 residency guards 121 sabotage role 193.

ffil.SS o tr D soviet intetligen"" in'n1tiifron . S. 126 operationat technicat group 168-9 pint-sww in Allied c-ounthes radiohipher . example ofl27-B occasional division co-optedpersonnell2g-30 . 13. ulyanov Guards Higher Command Sctrdbl Undercover residencies 4l 121-5 125-6 going'illegal'in emergency 172-3 hierarchy in 125-6 'illegal' 35.pj:ili:1-t^t Titlt"ry intelligence units 22 plrges GRU' 1920 3l-2 shoots E.^.y. den. Marshal Zhdanov 39 o+ llY20 125.172 covei duties of staff deputy residents 11rt-15. t26.227-8 Uritski. Front intelligence f.41 Tukhachevski.?l. Tank ZOa 35..55 :[:llll'ilil.86.2334 Zhukov.95 Uboreevich.T*k-11..t: voysnrnsKr Jv 1'^zz lll_l4.'. T.254 Index Unshlikht.39. 1lO.187 v'.'-11. Y:fitl"lbc"".1919 27 KimPhilby My Silent War Nigel ltrect MIS (illustrated) 82.franhar to offi cer ttilt8. 64 Washington. 219-20 security guards 121 staff l 12."rf. 1 radlo monitoring station officers M.u"n. Grevillel4rynne The Man from Odessa f. 39.Marshal40 Tupolev TU144 ('Concordski') copies from Concorde 146 crashes at k Bourget 7l Turkey expulsion of Soviet spy 221 The best in true life espionage available Panther Books Richard Iteacon A History of British Seoet Service 62 in USA GRU activity in 242 (illustrated) SZ. 6t.i]. 40. "p.. Zakharov.28.-l:itt.l. 1.1.5. DC dead-letter box exposed by squirrels 163-4 of l2&-9 operational officers 115-16. staff.l7.l?l:^22 LutTtft'.127 120 J:g:-"L': 1l ilfll.14 technical personnel l2O-21 technical services (TS) officer 1l&19 resident in 114-15. Marshal 46 becomes Minister of Defence 49 increased power of army under 49 removed for'bonapartism' 49-50 To order directhom and fill in the order .2:so ! Wanaw Pact 63.141.169.

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