Rules and Regulations

Rules and Regulations
Page 3

Certification of DP Operators
Page 13

645) appeared in June 1994. Redundancy is described thus. Dynamic Positioning by David Bray FNI: The IMO Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems This document (MSC/Circ. and is intended to apply to st all vessels constructed on or after 1 July 1994. The larger the number the greater the amount of redundanc7 provision. Redundancy can be achieved for instance by installation of multiple components. The level of redundancy should allow uninterrupted functioning of the DP capability of the vessel after the loss of any single system or component within the DP system. Again. when a single failure has occurred. “Redundancy means ability of a component or system to maintain or restore its function. and 3. Within the guidelines. systems or alternative means of performing a function”. This introduces the concept of the “single point failure” mode. 2. The full content of the guidelines is contained in an appendix to this book.RULES AND REGULATIONS This is an extract from Oilfield Seamanship. Classes 1.1 . It is an internationally-accepted set of guidance relating to the redundancy levels in DP vessels. The guidelines base the level of redundancy on three equipment Classes. quoting from the guidelines: Page 5. but some descriptive comments is made here.

with full risk analysis of the hazards associated. Else. the Administration or coastal State may decide the equipment class for the particular operation”.Dynamic Positioning By David Bray Rules & Regulations Basic Operator Course “The equipment classes are defined by their worst case failure modes as follows: For equipment class 1. Upgrading Page 5. etc. Evidence of the standard of redundancy provision in a particular vessel is given in her FSVAD (Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document) which states which equipment class she is in compliance with. Equipment Class 1 refers to non-redundant vessels. Normally static components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated. Obviously the more dangerous the task the higher should be the level of redundancy. The more severe these consequences. When built. and any normally static component is assumed to fail. For equipment class 3. A very relevant question relates to the choice of an appropriate equipment class for any particular project. and reliability is to the satisfaction of the Administration. For equipment class 2. Mooring lines were always deployed. Often tug assistance would be used where mooring lines could not be effectively deployed. Further indication of the level of redundancy available in any vessel is given in the vessel’s Classification Society DP Class notation. This paragraph within the guidelines also gives the authorities of the coastal state powers to override the decision of the client/shipowner if it is intended to use a vessel of inappropriate equipment class. Full reliance was not placed in the DP capability due to the extreme consequences of a run-off. The guidelines state: “The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be agreed between the owner of the vessel and the customer based upon a risk analysis of the consequence of a loss of position. For example. Offshore Safety Division) has the power to suspend any operation which it deems unsafe. the greater the level of redundancy needed. this vessel complied with standards equivalent to the modern Class 2. The results of the risk analysis will indicate the possible consequences of a loss of position keeping capability by the vessel. Class 2 relates to vessels with full redundancy of systems and equipment. and equipment class of the vessel hired in. a number of precautions were always taken when undertaking heavy lifts s(jackets. All components in any one fire sub-division. All components in any one watertight compartment. in the UK sector. A practical illustration relating to the level of redundancy available relates to the cranebarge “DB 102”. the HSE OSD (Health and Safety Executive. The above places the onus upon the vessel owner and the client to design the operation around a safety case.2 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training May 02 Rev. from fire or flooding. either in tension or kept slack.) using DP for all or part of the positioning solution. from fire or flooding…” In basic terms. topsides. a loss of position is not to occur in the event of a single fault in any active component or system. while vessels built or fitted to Equipment Class 3 are able to withstand the loss of all systems in any one compartment from the effects of fire or flooding. Although full redundancy was available. 02 . a single failure includes: Items listed above for class 2. loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault.

Pipelay Vessels. Crane Vessels. is no longer the worst case.g. where the centre unit is capable of being powered from either switchboard. revised edition 1995. May 02 Rev.Basic Operator Course Training Manual Rules & Regulations Dynamic Positioning by David Bray the vessel of full Class3 allowed the vessel to operate effectively and safely using DP alone for positioning.e. Further sections detail guidance relating to specific vessel types. mainly acknowledging the references to Equipment Classes made in the IMO guidelines already referred to. For a monohull vessel the thruster arrangement should provide a balanced athwartship capability (although this may conflict with passage speed requirements) in the intact and worst case failure conditions. Floating Production Units. provided that interlocks are installed to prevent the transfer of a faulty unit. as far as is practicable. The following examples are to provide minimum standards and information on the current practice of some of the most recent DSVs. fire or flood would not result in the loss of more than one thruster. cable routes and control power so that a power fault. and Survey and Support Vessels. More s0pecific guidance is found in the sections relating to individual vessel types. engine rooms. It is important that cables are routed such that the designed worst case failure mode. Cross over capabilities of thrusters may be manual. machinery spaces etc. e. The following extract from these guidelines relates to Diving Support Vessel redundancy. 02 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training Page 5. Drilling Vessels. as far as practicable. The IMCA Guidelines Originally produced under the auspices of the DPVOA (the DP Vessel Owners Association). viz. be independent in location. Thruster Units The arrangement of thrust units should be such as to provide. The guidelines are applicable to all DP vessels. a switchboard fault. boiler rooms. Redundancy Redundancy to reduce the effect of failure modes and improve safe working limits is encouraged on all DP DSVs. a circular capability plot for intact and worst case failure situations if the vessel is not to be heading limited. Some general remarks are made on the subject of redundancy in the introductory section. The thruster should.3 . e. This has been achieved on some vessels with three thrusters fore and aft. and contain an introductory section relating to all DP vessel types. Shuttle Tankers. where a fire in a machinery space could fail more thrust units than a switchboard fault because of common cable routing. Accommodation Vessels. original issue dated 1991. The full title of the document is “Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels”. Diving Support Vessels. This is unlikely to be totally achievable but the risk of fire and flood is negligible in some spaces and known to be present in others. and is reproduced with the permission of IMCA. this body has merged with the AODC to become the International Marine Contractor’s Association (IMCA). i.g. but automatic transfer is faster and superior. The amount of redundancy is a matter for owners and designers to optimise to achieve practical and economically viable safe working limits.

each capable of supplying the total DP system power requirement. The power management need only operate for the normal DP mode of operation.g.4 and the following sub section. Position Control For diving work using dynamic positioning. by starting all units and making them available. Designers should ensure that there is a clear interface between the control exercised by the DP computers and that exercised by the power management. for example between fire detection and halon release. fully redundant control systems providing. every year) so that they split the bus before any tripping of generators has taken place on the healthy side of the bus. a smooth transfer to the other which would be unnoticed by the divers working near the diving bell. have a lower risk of position loss and should therefore have higher allowable safe working limits. 02 . failures of this communication must also be considered when determining safe working limits. It is essential that smoke from a fire in one engine room cannot be drawn into the other engine room. Power Distribution The power distribution arrangement should be set up. with a common switchboard (bus tie closed) provided this meets with the requirements of 1. the speed of response to a power demand. without inter-communication between the systems that is capable of creating a common failure mode.Dynamic Positioning By David Bray Rules & Regulations Basic Operator Course Power Generation The sudden unexpected failure of one diesel engine must always be a design and operational consideration. i. so that a fault on any switchboard section separated by bus ties should not cause the loss of the whole switchboard. It has also to be redundant itself or fail safe. Vessels with independent engine rooms. for example. for diving work on dynamic positioning. If the vessel is designed to operate with the bus ties open while diving. on loss of one. Communications between the two is not essential for control. that is relevant on some vessels in the determination of safe working limits. power generation and thruster systems with cross over capability has to be automatic and comprehensive.1. It is this time. the minimum control requirement is for two automatic. but if this is a feature to improve. The latter failure however will normally involve a period of time during which some action can be taken. redundant. then a power management system will be needed for each side of the switchboard. If fire or flood is a realistic failure mode within the DP control location then consideration should be given to a separate DP control location independent of the main system. In addition there should be a joystick facility for manoeuvring which can be separate or an integral part of the DP control system. e. It is unreasonable to consider a whole engine room and the power it generates to be instantly lost from a fire. Such a fire Page 5. redundancy is not necessary.g. as must a fire in one engine room. If its failure modes do not result in loss of power until a change of status takes place. This must be so for any working combination of generators and thrusters.e. Power Management The power management for complicated.4 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training May 02 Rev. To achieve this requirement the bus ties must be set and tested at regular intervals (e. The power management system should be redundant as far as its failure directly affects position keeping.

The DP control should be able to identify a faulty unit and warn operators before a position change takes place. if the temperature is expected to rise significantly above ambient. as. Vessel sensors should be physically separated so that the redundant unit is unlikely to suffer from the same fire. DP control computers located remotely from the DP control console require fire. Vessel Sensors At least two vertical reference sensors are necessary for comparison. Similarly at least two gyro compasses. Environmental Sensors At least two wind sensors in different locations. which is in excess of that given in the IMCA document. It is prudent to provide independent supplies for each computer. The above extract gives guidance relating to good practice in DSVs. May 02 Rev. Shallow water. The three position references selected for use must reflect the circumstances such as deep water. and damage to a volume 1m x 1m be considered a possible event. and reject the suspect sensors. It is also prudent to provide a third gyro compass so that in the event of a slow loss of heading the correct gyro can be identified by the operator. before detecting and extinguishing can be carried out. 02 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training Page 5. Such an arrangement does not increase safe working limits. Position References For diving work at least three references should be on line and at least two should be of a different type. especially if it is continually manned when working. heat and water damage protection by means of a suitable fire or smoke detection system. flood or mechanical damage event”. air conditioning. in the Norwegian sector. The DP control should be able to identify a faulty unit and warn operators before position degradation takes place. with separate supplies and cable routes.5 . Power supplies to position references should not be common and cable routes should be separated. but it can decrease the risk of a fault causing loss of the redundant DP control. It may happen that more stringent requirements are necessary. open water. and by careful routing of pipework. there is a requirement for three gyros. for example. are necessary for reliability. One computer must be uninterrupted by the worst power loss fault possible and be able to continue operating with associated equipment for at least 30 mins. Replumbing a taut wire which is one of the three position references does not constitute a violation of the above if such action is completed as quickly as is safe and sensible. where some diving operations will be Class 3 working. with independent battery back up and no cross connection. furthermore no single factor should affect more than one reference so as to cause a common failure mode…. warn operators. with separate supplies and cable routes. The location of equipment within the DP control space should consider fire both above the deck and to cables below the deck. Redundant control units in a manned space should be physically separated as far as is practicable. close to a fixed or moving (moored) installation… The DP control should be able to identify a fault in a position reference. are necessary for comparison.Basic Operator Course Training Manual Rules & Regulations Dynamic Positioning by David Bray risk is unlikely to come from within the DP control space. Here.

or damage with large economic consequences. cause significant damage3 or cause more than minimal pollution. rules and regulations are more prescriptive. The Norwegian interpretation of the IMO equipment classes is worded in a very similar manner: Class 1 DP units with equipment class 1 should be used during operations where loss of position is not considered to endanger human lives.Dynamic Positioning By David Bray Rules & Regulations Basic Operator Course The Norwegian Sector Within the Norwegian sector. or cause damage. 1994 The NPD Guidelines relating to the Specification and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Diving Support Vessels. reference is made to four “Consequence Classes”. The Norwegian authorities specify criteria which should be referred to when specifying equipment. that guidance is superseded by rules and regulations which are more stringent in many areas. 23. For the consequence classes. pollution. 28 enclosure A. The NMD Guidelines and Notes No. the provisions of enclosure A refer. 1983.6 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training May 02 Rev. or severe pollution or damage with major economic consequences. In these guidelines. the higher the number the greater the level of redundancy. Class 2 DP units with equipment class 2 should be used dur ing operations where loss of position could cause personnel injury. and 3. enclosure B is a verbatim transcription of the IMO guidelines referred to earlier. Class 1 Operations where loss of position keeping capability may cause damage or pollution of small consequence. Class 2 Operations where loss of position keeping capability may cause personnel injury. 02 . 1987 The NMD Guidelines and Notes No. 1. numbered 0. 1993 The NMD Guidelines and Notes No. however for vessels built prior to June 1994. 28. Class 3 Operations where loss of position keeping capability may cause fatal accidents. Although the IMO guidance referred to above applies. the criteria are as follows: Class 0 Operations where loss of position keeping capability is not considered to endanger human lives. 1994 enclosure B. pollution or damage with great economic consequences. As with equipment classes. Page 5. The authorities concerned are: NMD NPD The Norwegian Maritime Directorate The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate The relevant rules and regulations are: The NMD Regulations for Mobile Offshore Units. 2. or consequence class.

severe pollution or damage with major economic consequences. 02 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training Page 5. or Statement on Verification and Acceptance for her equipment class. non-Norwegian) vessel wishing for approval may apply to the NMD for a Letter of Compliance leading to the issue of a NMD – SVA. May 02 Rev. the equivalent document is the GAD (Government Acceptance Document).Basic Operator Course Training Manual Rules & Regulations Dynamic Positioning by David Bray Class 3 DP units with equipment class 3 should be used during operations where loss of position could cause fatal accidents. where the IMO guidelines leave the decision up to the client and shipowner based upon a risk assessment. The difference between the Norwegian approach and the IMO approach is the NMD have stated specific criteria for the choice of equipment/consequence class. A foreign (i. A formal risk assessment is necessary within the Norwegian scheme also.e. If the vessel is approved by the NMD and approval was prior to 1994. as the criteria listed above are very subjective and subject to wide differences in interpretation. Evidence of the standard of redundancy provision in a particular vessel is given in her FSVAD (Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document) which states which equipment class she is in compliance with.7 .

in separate compartments 2 + 1 in alternative control station yes with auto heading yes 3. control station 2 2 3 2 (1 of which in alternative control station).Dynamic Positioning By David Bray Rules & Regulations Basic Operator Course Equipment Requirements A brief summary of the requirements for DP equipment. Class notations Power system Generators and Prime movers Main Switchboard Bus Tie Breaker Distribution system Power management Thrusters Arrangement of thrusters 0 non-redundant no non-redundant 1 redundant compartments yes redundant Control Auto control: no.ref. systems and sub-systems relating to the different class notations is given below: Subsystem or component Minimum requirements for group designation IMO Equipment Class DNV LR ABS 1 AUT DP(AM) DPS-1 nonRedundant 1 2 AUTR DP(AA) DPS-2 redundant 1 with bus tie 3 AUTRO DP(AAA) DPS-30 redundant. 1 in alternat. 02 .of control computers Manual control: joystick Single levers for each thruster 1 yes yes 2 2 yes yes 3 Sensors Pos. separate compartments 2 with normally open bus-ties in separate compartments 2 redundant. systems External Sensors Wind VRS Gyro other 1 1 1 1 1 No 2 2 2 2 1 No UPS Alternate control station for back-up unit 1+1 in separate compartment Yes Page 5. separate yes redundant. inc.8 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training May 02 Rev.

Basic Operator Course Training Manual Rules & Regulations Dynamic Positioning by David Bray NORSOK The NORSOK (Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon) Standards are a set of requirements drawn up by the NORSOK standardisation workgroup and agreed by the Norwegian industry for the widest possible national and international application. Manned subsea operations. and replace the many company standards recently in force. Several oil companies working on the Norwegian continental shelf have adopted the NORSOK package. For diving in open water When the light craft is attached to the support vessel Inside hot template Accommodation Vessel with gangway 3 connection to Installation Accommodation Vessel outside 500 m 2 safety zone Well stimulation. listing NMD Consequence classes appropriate. This guideline tabulation is given below: OPERATION EQUIPMENT CLASS NOTES Drilling Production of hydrocarbons Subsea well workover Wireline operations on subsea wells Well stimulation Manned subsea operations.9 . outside 500 m safety zone 2 2 1 May 02 Rev. 02 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training Page 5. The NORSOK standards represent the common requirements of the Norwegian oil industry. Unmanned subsea intervention with ROT 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 Applies to all drilling in hot zones Workover operations entailing hydrocarbons on deck With subsea lubricator For diving inside structures etc. They are the only accepted standards which tabulate guidelines for types of operation together with locations. inside 500 m safety zone. Support of diving from light craft. and the standards have thus been made a contractual requirement in connection with current projects. Construction activities in general. platform wells Construction activities in general.

simulating the loss of one bus. The Consequence Analysis will run configurations for Class 2 operations. Additional information may indicate whether the situation is thrust-critical or power-critical. it is reported to the operator via the DP alarm system. 02 . When the analysis indicates that the situation is no longer critical. A typical response would be a warning message “Consequence Analysis Warning On”. generators and thrusters are the critical ones. for all buses. If one of these simulated breakdowns results in a driftoff. Typical worst case single failures are: • • • failure in the most critical thruster failure in one thruster group failure in one power bus section If the consequence of the predefined failure is a loss of position. the message is replaced by “Consequence Analysis Warning off” which is an “information” rather than a “warning” message. the warning is activated. one at a time. The analysis function runs every minute. or for Class 3 operations. worst case failure during operation. together with an indication of which bus.Dynamic Positioning By David Bray Rules & Regulations Basic Operator Course Consequence Analysis One of the requirements of the IMO Class 2 and 3 guidelines. The associated description reads: “Single worst case failure will cause drift-off”. Page 5. is a system of Online Consequence Analysis to be incorporated in the DP system. This function continually performs an analysis of the vessel’s ability to maintain its position and heading after a predefined. Possible consequences are based on the actual weather conditions.10 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training May 02 Rev. enable thrusters and power plant status.

It is sufficient with one certified DP-operator at each shift. Certificates issued by The Nautical Institute (UK) are accepted as equivalent.1 . Other DP-operators should at least hold the basic course.6 02 – ANCHORING/POSITIONING CERTIFICATION OF DP-OPERATORS Operators of dynamic positioning systems (DP-systems) with the NMD’s DP Consequence Class 2 or 3. shall be certified by the NMD. § 6 section 5. Page 5.93 and refers to Regulations of 4 September 1987 concerning anchoring/positioning systems on mobile offshore units.06. ref.CERTIFICATION OF DP OPERATORS The following is an extract from Norwegian Maritime Directorate. 23: This note is dated 15. item 1 below. Guidelines and Notes no.

however. It is. normally carried out in stated sequence: Certificate (DP Consequence Class 2 and 3) 1. 4 and 5 given above. 2 and 3 above. If the experience is from units/vessels which spend less than 50% of their operational time on DP (e. 2.Certification of DP Operators Rules & Regulations Basic Operator Course Training Manual The training program for certification by the NMD shall contain the following elements. 2 months’ practice on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 2 or 3 is required in addition. 5. Page 5. Validity of DP-certificates DP-operators shall keep a log of their DP-practice in an approved log book. The platform manager/captain on the Consequence Class 2 or 3 unit/vessel shall give written confirmation that the operator has the necessary practical experience. Documented practical DP-experience on DP-units/ships (irrespective of consequence class) for a minimum of 30 days. the items 3. One of the following requirements shall be met: a) 6 months’ documented practical experience in the use of DP-systems on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 2 or 3. and that he assumes him qualified as a DP-operator. provided that the DP-operator meets the requirements specified in 1. b) 12 months’ documented practical experience in the use of DP-systems on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 0 or 1.g. If this experience is from units/vessels. If the last documented period of DP-practice on Consequence Class 2 or 3 units/ships is older than 5 years. To renew an invalid DP-certificate. Advanced course at an approved training institution. have to be carried out once more. the DP-certificate ceases to be valid. which spend more than 50% of their operational time on DP. The course shall provide training in the use of DP-systems including simulator exercises and emergency operations. 4. Basic course at an approved training institution (see next page).2 © Kongsberg Simrad AS Training May 00 Rev. Limited Certificate (DP Consequence Class 0 and 1) After request from the industry. The course shall provide an introduction to the functions and use of DP-systems. 3. shuttle tankers or supply ships). 01 . 1 months’ practice on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 2 or 3 is required in addition. the NMD has decided to allow the issue of a LIMITED CERTIFICATE for DP-operators working on units/vessels with the NMD’s DP Consequence Class 0 and 1.