Fire and Explosion Hazard Management UK Offshore model

Presentation to the Dutch Seveso Inspectorate by Graham Dalzell (TBS)3

Risk Management Model :ISO 18001
Policy

Review

Leadership
Understanding

Planning

Communication
Monitor

Implement

(TBS)3

Leadership = Attitude
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Careful, courageous or reckless Investing or cost cutting Short term profit or long term stability and security Keeping going or prepared to stop No room for error Managing rules and compliance or managing hazards. Appeasing the regulator or matching their requirements to your own aims Understanding or ignorance Owning hazards and risks – or employing consultants Reactive audit culture or proactive hazard management

Is it Safe? Society demands the answer: Yes Is this what the managers of your major hazard sites ask? .

so the risk has gone away. hasn’t it? Should we just deliver recommendations or Should we deliver risk and hazard knowledge . and we implement them.We do risk assessments and we make recommendations.

The Good News Culture LESSONS FROM LONGFORD The Esso Gas Plant Explosion Professor Andrew Hopkins Australian National University ISBN 1-86468-422-4 .

Hazard Understanding We will all know what is dangerous. How can we manage if we don’t understand? (TBS)3 . why it is dangerous and what each of us must do to keep us all safe.

Most common comments during accident investigations I didn’t know that was important No-one told me that could happen I didn’t know it would be like that .

So what’s this and what caused it? .

(TBS)3 . process. operation. maintains. assembly or component    Everyone who supports design and operation. Everyone who operates. design department or contract. inspects or audits a plant Everyone who designs a facility.Who are WE?  Everyone who manages a company.

Director Manager Supervisor Individual Operations Maintenance Engineering Contracts Design .

Communication :We have a finite capacity for information • in our memory • in an aide memoir • accessible as a detailed reference But do our risk analyses look like this? .

technicians critical are critical. why measures Operators. patterns of risk by Business and regional facility hazard and personnel. hazard strategy. operating limits Hazard characteristics. the underlying risk drivers Facility risk levels. future risks. critical measures.Distilling the information: Who needs to know what Senior management Corporate risk levels. demands managers on business processes and others Plant and project managers Facility hazards. patterns of risk by business type and location. their relative risks and characteristics. performance and designers standards and limitations .

managers Deciding how risks should be managed Plant and project managers Operating the plant within its limits. maintain their Operators. managing the hazards and activities. providing the resources to reduce risk Operating within corporate risk levels. ensuring critical measures are suitable Comply with procedures. Business and regional providing the supporting infrastructure. technicians competence and the plant to the and designers performance standards .Assigning the responsibilities: Who carries the can – and who says stop? Senior management Setting the tolerable risk levels and deciding how close to operate.

Developing the knowledge Facilities Analysis Facilities Analysis Facilities Analysis Corporate Risk Level Regional/business Regional/business Regional/business Risk profile Risk profile Risk profile Hazard Registers Hazard Registers Hazard Registers Critical Measures Performance stds Critical Measures Performance stds .

accountability and tolerable risk levels Level 2 – Risk management. operations. maintenance. design. contracts Level 4 – Competencies. resourcing. procedures.Policy: - What do we want?: Policies must be structured and integrated: Level 1 – Leadership. operating limits and plant (TBS)3 . and relationships Level 3 – Processes.

Typical Corporate HSE management system Leadership and Accountability Design and Construction Operations and Maintenance Management Of Change Information and Documentation Customers and Products Community and Stakeholder Awareness Risk Assessment And Management Crisis and Emergency Management Incident Analysis and Prevention Assessment Assurance and Improvement People Behaviours and Competence Working with Contractors and others .

         Default set of rules? Discrete and unrelated elements? Audit and compliance culture? Different owners? No coordination? Generic requirements rather than matching hazards No risk based investment and infrastructure? Importance based on perception not risk Cyclical emphasis on elements and hazards? HSEMS .

A SAFETY CASE IS NOT A HAZARD AND RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM But many companies think that it is .

Typical Corporate HSE management system People Behaviours and Competence Leadership and Accountability Design and Construction Operations and Maintenance Information and Documentation Community and Stakeholder Awareness Working with Contractors and others Crisis and Emergency Management Risk Assessment And Management Incident Analysis and Prevention Assessment Assurance and Improvement Customers And Products Management of Change .

what do we need. what can we provide.Bringing all the parts of hazard management together Inputs WHAT WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE COMPANY • Minimum default standards for people and plant • Actual condition and provision • History and knowledge WHAT THE RISK ASSESSMENT SHOULD DELIVER • Hazard an risk knowledge • Extra requirements above the default provision • Critical plant. how do we live with it? . processes and procedures Outputs What have we got.

what and who we need to manage the hazards •Set performance standards and operating limits •Evaluate the risks •Identify the improvements •Determine the resources needed to implement hazard management (TBS)3 .Planning:- What do we need to do? •Understand the hazards •Reduce risks at source •Decide how.

IMPROVE or CHANGE IS IT GOOD ENOUGH? YES: PROCEED COMMUNICATE .HAZID HAZARD UNDERSTANDING Cause Severity Consequence Escalation MINIMISE at SOURCE RISK ELIMINATE STRATEGY PREVENT CONTROL MITIGATE EVACUATE SYSTEM PASSIVE ACTIVE OPERATIONS EXTERNAL STANDARDS ROLE and SUCCESS RATE NO: .

lower overpressures Design out people – the make mistakes and they die. hole size) • Reducing consequence – fewer people. .ELIMINATE  Inherently safer design and operation • Designing out hazards – simpler plant • Eliminating or minimising causes • Reducing the severity pressure. better layout. inventory.

STRATEGY  What is the “design case” • Is it practical to contain the effects?  Rigorous source. consequence and escalation analysis – effective control and mitigation • Is it practical to make sure that extreme events do not occur  Rigorous causation analysis and effective prevention .

SYSTEMS     Passive – no moving parts –highly reliable Active –breaks down and requires maintenance and intervention – predictable reliability Operational – needs competent people and judgement – subject to error External – relying on others outside your control – needs clear definition of expectations .

Availability  External • Duty.Performance standards  Active • Functionality. Survivability  Operational • Numbers. Availability. Competence . Resource . Availability. Reliability. Inspection Frequency. Role. Survivability  Passive • Functionality.

Risk Assessment: Is it good enough? How do we manage the judgement of adequacy? .

UKOOA Risk based decision making framework Extreme consequence uncertain hazards Well understood risk specific major accident hazards Company Values Societal Values QRA Qualitative Risk Assessment Well understood lower risk hazards Engineering Judgement Codes and Standards Good Practice .

“As Low as Reasonably Practical” .

procedures. performance standards • Implement the improvements (TBS)3 .Implementation:- Making it work • Share the hazard and risk knowledge • Establish the business processes • Assign the responsibilities • Provide the resources • Embed or confirm the requirements: . competencies.

The Reality – Badly Maintained? .

The Reality – Badly Operated? .

Monitoring:- Is it working? • Advanced safety auditing (ASA) .Confirm hazard understanding .Is the process complete and is it working? • Competence assurance • Adequacy and compliance with procedures • Plant integrity verification • Adequacy of resources (TBS)3 .

strategy. procedures (TBS)3 .people.business rationalisation/closure Infrastructure and resource enhancement. . facility improvement Hazard management improvement.Review:- How and where do we improve? 4 levels of improvement • • • Strategic corporate risk reduction . system selection • Performance improvement . plant.

Proactive Hazard Management not Retrospective Risk Assessment (TBS)3 .

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