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0.1 Introductory Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Counsels employed by Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Oﬃce repeatedly failed and/ or refused to communicate with me, and refused to withdraw representation where required. 1.1 First contact with Santa Clara County Public Defenders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Counsels refused to communicate with me and to the court on my behalf while l was in San Francisco County custody. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Counsels failed to inform me of 2 signiﬁcant developments in my case during my incarceration in San Francisco County Jail #2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . First, counsel failed to inform me of my bench warrant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second, counsels failed to and/ or refused to inform me of change of counsel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Failure and/ or refusal of San Francisco Public Defender to act as liaison to Santa Clara Public Defender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . San Francisco County Public Defenders repeatedly assured me that they can contact Santa Clara County Public Defenders for me. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . During the week of 02/13/2012-02/17/2012, San Francisco Public Defender failed to and/ or refused to inform me of the imminent change of counsel for my case in Santa Clara the following Monday (03/05.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Santa Clara counsels did not accept any of my phone calls from San Francisco County Jail, nor did they acknowledge other forms of communication l initiated toward them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l had no access to the information on the pre-recorded voicemail greeting, nor did l speak with any Santa Clara County Public Defender because employees of the oﬃce never accepted my collect calls from San Francisco County Jail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l communicated with the court in Santa Clara County only through my own eﬀorts. . . . . . . . . . . l had independently ﬁled a 1381 demand for trial through Jail Legal Services the week of 02/13-02/17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . At my request, my case manager in San Francisco County Jail #2 called the Santa Clara County Public Defender the week of 03/11-03/17. l signed a release for the call to be made on my behalf, thus documenting my independent eﬀort to contact the oﬃce. . . . . Public Defenders prevented me from communicating with the court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Counsel(s) failed to and/ or refused to communicate with me after l was transported on 04/05/2012 into Santa Clara County’s custody. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 Public Defender Goodman not only omitted the topic/ purpose of the hearing - my bench warrant from our verbal interaction, he attempted to make me change my plea by harassing me, purposefully obfuscated the purpose of the hearing and avoided discussing the bench warrant . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 Goodman deliberately avoided discussing the bench warrant directly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 Goodman refused to communicate with me for the purpose of persecution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.4 The counsel assigned to my case, deputy Public Defender Williams, communicated with me for the ﬁrst time at my 04/13 court date; she began representing me on 03/05. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Deputy Public Defender assigned to my case, Williams, refused to withdraw as counsel on 04/25, when l returned to Department 84 in Palo Alto Courthouse for preliminary examination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Counsels’ repeated unprofessional conduct prompted me to motion to dismiss the Public Defender on 04/25, which was summarily denied. 2.1 Williams’s retort displayed blatant prejudice toward me and conﬂict of interest in representation. . . . . . . 2.2 Williams evaded answering to her lack of communication to me while l was in San Francisco County custody. 2.2.1 Williams justiﬁed her lack of communication with me through discrediting me as mentally incapable to stand trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 l was not diagnosed with any psychiatric conditions after being evaluated by 4 diﬀerent psychiatric professionals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 l pointed out to the court that repeatedly ordering psychiatric evaluations and/ or treatment despite of the lack of diagnoses by ignoring the results is defamatory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The judge, Thang Nguyen Barrett, displayed prejudice and/ or conﬂict of interest toward me by denying my well-supported motion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Court itself denied my access to it by condoning Public Defenders to speak for me against my expressed interests. 3.1 Counsels from the Santa Clara County Public Defenders’ Oﬃce continued to act against my interest with court’s sanction after the Marsden Motion was summarily denied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Immediately after my Marsden Motion was denied, Williams accepted on my behalf that the district attorney charge me on information where grand jury indictment was required. . . . . . . . . . . . . . l was unable to contest ’complaint deemed information’ for the following reasons: . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Counsel(s) took evasive actions after violating my rights with the support of counsel’s ﬁrm (Public Defender’s Oﬃce) and the court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Performing under the guise of acting on behalf of another Public Defender is common practice among Santa Clara County Public Defenders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Judge took evasive action after violating my rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 Public Defender failed to challenge sentence that imposed prolonged restraint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.5 Public Defender insisted on motioning for assignment of appellate counsel despite of my expressed wish to ﬁle pro per. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9
Public Defenders failed to and/ or refused to perform duties consistent with rules of professional conduct set forth by the California State Bar. l motioned to the court for counsel dismissal based on the violation of my fundamental right to counsel, requesting court to appoint counsel from another ﬁrm as remedy, which the court summarily denied. By doing so, the court itself denied my right to counsel, the consequence of which was denial of my access to the court.
Counsels employed by Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Oﬃce repeatedly failed and/ or refused to communicate with me, and refused to withdraw representation where required.
First contact with Santa Clara County Public Defenders.
This caused signiﬁcant harm to me in the form of incarceration and infamy.
In October 2011, l appeared in Santa Clara County Palo Alto Courthouse for the ﬁrst time regarding the case in question. The court assigned deputy Public Defender Barbara Muller to my case. At this time, she conveyed a plea deal to me which l turned down. When l told Muller that l wanted to turn down the oﬀer, Muller, aware that l had a case pending in San Francisco (case #11016366) asked that l call my Public Defender in San Francisco for his opinion for the case she and l were discussing. l advised Muller to call him herself, which she did that morning before my matter was called in court. After they spoke, Muller informed me that my Public Defender in San Francisco (JP Visaya,) was ’OK with me pleading’ what l wished to plead. That l would require the approval of my attorney in San Francisco to plead what l wished to was somewhat puzzling to me. l reiterated to Muller that l wished to plead ’not guilty.’ Muller then told me that the decision was ’not very smart’ and that she will order a psychiatric evaluation for me. At this time, l told Muller that l resided in San Francisco and it would be more convenient for me if the evaluation took place in San Francisco instead of Santa Clara County. She acknowledged this and called me after the court date stating that a Dr. Chamberlain from UCSF will call me to schedule an appointment. l was remanded by Judge Allen of San Francisco Superior Court into San Francisco County Jail #2 on 01/04/2012 awaiting trial for case #11016366, resultant of a bench warrant issued during the week of December 11-17, when l missed my second day of trial due to illness. l had a scheduled appearance in Santa Clara County, City of Palo Alto Courthouse on January 10, 2012. l instructed Visaya to contact Muller, ensuring that she knew my whereabouts such that she may contact me. He assured me that, as part of his duties as a Public Defender, that he can act as liaison between the Santa Clara County Public Defender and myself. l also conveyed to Visaya my desire to appear for my court date in Palo Alto despite of my incarceration, and my concerns about the repercussions of non-appearance. l explicitly requested that he communicate these concerns to Muller. l never heard back from Muller; further, l will not have heard from any Santa Clara County Public Defender until 04/09/2012 at the Palo Alto Courthouse.
Counsels refused to communicate with me and to the court on my behalf while l was in San Francisco County custody.
Counsels failed to and/ or refused to inform the court of my incarceration. Muller sent a letter to my home notifying me of the possible issuance of a bench warrant because of my missed appearance on 01/10 and a new court date for 01/17 regarding the missed appearance. This letter was postmarked 01/12 and dated 01/10/2012. Instead of contacting me at San Francisco County Jail #2, she notiﬁed me by mail.
Counsels failed to inform me of 2 signiﬁcant developments in my case during my incarceration in San Francisco County Jail #2.
First, counsel failed to inform me of my bench warrant. On January 17th, a bench warrant was issued
because l had not appeared in Department 84 on this date. Muller sent another letter regarding the issuance of the bench warrant postmarked 01/18 and dated 01/17/2012. Knowing that l was in San Francisco custody, at no point did counsels inform me of this bench warrant, even at the hearing regarding the bench warrant in question on 04/09/2012 as l will describe later in this ground for relief. l had jury trial for case #11016366 in San Francisco Superior Court on 01/30-01/31/2012; l was found guilty and sentenced to serve 90 days (from 01/04/2012) in San Francisco County Jail #2. The week following the trial, a San Francisco Sheriﬀ Deputy visited me in custody to inform me of my release date (04/01.) At this time, the deputy also informed me of my outstanding bench warrant in Palo Alto, which was issued because of my failure to appear. This is how l found out about my bench warrant, not from Muller.
l did not know about the letters Muller had sent until after my release from Santa Clara County custody on 06/30/2012.
Second, counsels failed to and/ or refused to inform me of change of counsel. Muller left the Palo Alto Public Defender’s Oﬃce on 03/05/2012. Counsels from both Santa Clara and San Francisco Counties never informed me of this signiﬁcant development in my case. Without the assistance of counsels, l found out about the change of counsel during the week of 03/11-03/17 relying on my own resources while incarcerated. Counsel(s) were required to inform me of this signiﬁcant development in my case, but failed and/ or refused to do so. Prior to her departure, she had recorded a voicemail greeting stating this, and that her cases there will be handled by another Public Defender (Darby Williams.) l was unable to hear this voicemail greeting because l was indigent for the entire duration of my incarceration in San Francisco County Jail 2, as such, unable to purchase a calling card. Muller’s phone number does/ did not allow collect calls, nor is there a toll free direct dialing option in San Francisco County Jail’s phone system for Santa Clara County Public Defender’s oﬃce. However, the phone system does have an option for establishing a pre-paid account for the party receiving the phone call. Neither Muller nor Williams established such an account. When l called this phone number, the phone system mutes the party receiving the call while the phone system plays pre-recorded instructions to both parties for establishing the pre-paid account; because of this, l was not able to hear the voicemail greeting. The only way l could have heard the greeting, leave a message directly, or speak with Muller should she answer the phone when l called was using a calling card; l did not have this option due to my indigence. l noted that other inmates in a similar position as myself would have the same diﬃculty with contacting Muller or other Public Defenders by phone. Muller failed to inform me of counsel change resulting from her departure from the Palo Alto Public Defender’s Oﬃce. Unless Visaya had failed to communicate with Muller, she had full knowledge of my whereabouts, at least some idea of (if not full awareness of) the accompanying obstacles for me to contact her being in custody in another county as an indigent, exactly how to contact me (through my San Francisco Public Defender,) and knowledge of my desire to access the court regarding my appearance scheduled in January. Between 01/04 (the date l was remanded) and Muller’s last day assigned to my case (03/05,) there were 60 days for her to reach me; she never did so. 1.2.2 Failure and/ or refusal of San Francisco Public Defender to act as liaison to Santa Clara Public Defender
After learning of the bench warrant from the San Francsico Sheriﬀ deputy who visited me, l assessed my situation. Not hearing from/ being able to contact Muller or any other Santa Clara County Public Defender, l sent a letter to Visaya to request contact with Santa Clara County through him.
San Francisco County Public Defenders repeatedly assured me that they can contact Santa Clara County Public Defenders for me. Since October 2011, when Visaya ﬁrst spoke with Muller at my ﬁrst
court date in Palo Alto, he has repeatedly assured me that he can act as liaison between me and the Santa Clara County Public Defender. l have also contacted Visaya’s supervisor Elizabeth Hilton, who also assured me that employees at the oﬃce can help me communicate with my representative(s) in Santa Clara County. During the week of 02/13-02/17, San Francisco Deputy Public Defender Darya Larizadeh had taken over my case from Visaya. l requested over telephone for her to inquire about the bench warrant, and to give me Muller’s direct phone number since l did not have this information with me in custody. Additionally, l requested from Larizadeh the name and phone number of Muller’s supervisor, and the mailing address of Muller and her supervisor since l had considerable trouble with phone contact and believed that Muller was acting in good faith at this time.
During the week of 02/13/2012-02/17/2012, San Francisco Public Defender failed to and/ or refused to inform me of the imminent change of counsel for my case in Santa Clara the following Monday (03/05.) On Thursday, 03/01, Larizadeh visited and told me that she had spoken to Muller,
but she did not tell me what they had discussed. Instead, she gave me Muller’s ﬁrst and last names (which l already knew,) and her phone number only. The proximity of the date of Muller’s departure to this visit renders it reasonable to assume that Muller would inform Larizadeh of this important development in my case (counsel change) had they actually spoken. There was also a pre-recorded voicemail message detailing her departure. This suggests that Larizadeh not only did not speak to Muller, but never actually made a call to that number. Else, she was willfully withholding that information from me.
Santa Clara counsels did not accept any of my phone calls from San Francisco County Jail, nor did they acknowledge other forms of communication l initiated toward them.
l had no access to the information on the pre-recorded voicemail greeting, nor did l speak with any Santa Clara County Public Defender because employees of the oﬃce never accepted my collect calls from San Francisco County Jail. l called the phone number associated to Muller the entire
week just prior to Muller’s departure. Neither Muller nor any other Santa Clara County Public Defender accepted any of my collect calls from jail.
l communicated with the court in Santa Clara County only through my own eﬀorts. 3
l had independently ﬁled a 1381 demand for trial through Jail Legal Services the week of 02/13-02/17. l was aware that the 1381 demand for trial required that l be transported to Santa Clara County to
answer to the bench warrant in order to ensure that l am not a fugitive at any point. l intended to display clearly that l fully intended to appear in Santa Clara for the matter and to take the matter to jury trial despite of the contradicting actions/ lack of action of my representative Public Defenders indicating my wishes were otherwise.
At my request, my case manager in San Francisco County Jail #2 called the Santa Clara County Public Defender the week of 03/11-03/17. l signed a release for the call to be made on my behalf, thus documenting my independent eﬀort to contact the oﬃce. My case manager,
Sandy, made the following requests and inquiries on my behalf: 1. Not to transport me prior to appellate attorney assignment, which l was expecting to occur some time in April. 2. Ask the court to retract the bench warrant in light of the circumstances under which it was issued. 3. Muller’s and her supervisor’s mailing address. 4. Has a 1381 been ﬁled? The programming in question was administered by Walden House, a substance abuse recovery organization in San Francisco. As a non-user, my participation in the program to being housed in the programming pod (dorm) of the jail, and that l did not refuse to program. The program assigned a case manager to all participants, whom participants saw each weekday and was able to make requests to. Sandy was the person from whom l learned that there had been change of counsel, not from any Public Defender who was representing me in either San Francisco or Santa Clara Counties. Sandy did not speak to either Muller or Williams, she had learned this information from the voicemail greeting on the phone number formerly associated with Muller, but was associated with Williams after 03/05. Later, during one of our interactions, Williams will claim to never have received the message from Sandy. l had signed release paperwork for Sandy to make the call for me, which is on ﬁle with the Walden House Sisters Program – there is written proof that the call was made.
Public Defenders prevented me from communicating with the court. This has been shown by:
1. counsels not accepting my phone calls; 2. counsels not taking the necessary steps to ensure that l have access to information important and relevent to my case; 3. counsels not acknowledging other forms of communication l initiated toward them, (namely, having programming staﬀ at San Francisco County Jail call on my behalf;) 4. that l was able to contact the court through ﬁling a 1381 on my own.
Counsel(s) failed to and/ or refused to communicate with me after l was transported on 04/05/2012 into Santa Clara County’s custody.
l arrived at Santa Clara County Department of Correction Elmwood Complex (’Elmwood’) the next morning (04/06.) From Elmwood, l called Williams, my representing Public Defender, the same day using the toll free dialing option of the facility’s phone system. She did not answer; l left a message. The following Monday, 04/09, l appeared in Department 88 of Santa Clara County Palo Alto Courthouse, presided by Kurt E. Kumli. On this date, l still do not speak to or meet Williams. Deputy Public Defender G. Goodman was on duty as my proxy to the court. Prior to proceedings, Goodman approached me by telling me that he was aware that l had said, ’l’m a pirate,’ to the lost prevention personnel who detained me. This denoted to me that he had read my ﬁle, and l expressed my acknowledgement of his awareness to him. He then told me that l was currently in this county’ s custody because l had ﬁled the 1381. At the time, l noted that he had identiﬁed the cause for my incarceration in this county as the 1381, when the actual cause was the enforcement of the bench warrant issued on 01/10. He then asked that l accept a plea oﬀer from the D.A.: receive credit for time served under court probation to be released that day. l told him that l did not wish to plead ’guilty’ or ’no contest,’ and explained to him that l wished to maintain my right to jury trial. He did not, at any point, tell me the purpose of the hearing.
Public Defender Goodman not only omitted the topic/ purpose of the hearing - my bench warrant - from our verbal interaction, he attempted to make me change my plea by harassing me, purposefully obfuscated the purpose of the hearing and avoided discussing the bench warrant
by doing the following: 1. He never told me the topic of the hearing. 2. During the 45 minutes l was in the courtroom, l was not informed of the purpose of the hearing at any point. l was also unable to identify the matter as being called in open court. l learned the purpose of the hearing from the paperwork l received after my appearance.
3. He attempted to make me change my plea by harassing me. Throughout the time l was physically in the courtroom that day, Goodman will have asked me if l accept this plea deal 4 separate times despite of my very clear and consistent answer each time. Repeated questioning in itself is harassment. In this case, Goodman deliberately harassed me beyond repeated questioning. On one occasion when Goodman asked me if l accept the plea deal, he invited other inmates present in the courtroom to participate in our discussion. Since l was transported to the courtroom from custody, l was shackled and grouped with other inmates in the courtroom. He asked a male inmate if the oﬀer sounded like a good one, to which the inmate replied that it sounded good to him and that he would take it. While the presence of other people in the courtroom may not have been avoidable, Goodman’s active involvement of others into conversation about my case was willful, and is another example of harassment. 4. He obfuscated the purpose of the hearing and attempted to create further confusion through exploiting my incarcerated state and through patent intimidation. Not only was Goodman harassing me into accepting the plea bargain, the focus of his communication to me, along with his purposefully not informing me that the hearing was about my bench warrant, combined to deliberately suggest to me that the topic of the hearing was about whether l was guilty of the charges, which it was not. Acceptance of the plea bargain is equivalent to pleading guilty.
Goodman deliberately avoided discussing the bench warrant directly
in the following manner: 1. Goodman avoided using the words ’guilty’ and ’no contest’/ ’nolo contendre’ completely. 2. As discussed, he said that my incarceration was result of my 1381. 3. He exploited my position as not having been informed, already traumatized in the process of incarceration and being shackled in the courtroom. He knew l was probably scared and instinctively preoccupied with getting out of a threatening situation when he conveyed the oﬀer for release that day with informal probation. While l knew that this was not my trial, and was concerned about my bench warrant, because of Goodman’s behaviour, l had doubt as to the purpose of the hearing. In other words, he created confusion in my understanding of the purpose of the hearing. Goodman blatantly harassed me and asserted my guilt without trial with such conﬁdence that, if l was less informed of my rights, and given my restrained state, would have suggested to me through his demeanor that this behaviour was within the scope of a Public Defender’s vested power. That he had not addressed my concerns at any point would have suggested to me that he was my prosecutor if l was less informed of the supposed function of his role as my representative attorney. The above is a show of conﬂict of interest. 4. He minimized my opportunities to discuss my bench warrant and other concerns l had. As described, l ﬁled a 1381 because there was a bench warrant issued for me in Santa Clara County. l was concerned that the court would categorize me as a fugitive; ﬁling the ’demand for trial’ assured that l must be transported to Santa Clara County directly from San Francisco County custody. Even as l was uncertain of the purpose of the hearing, l was concerned about the bench warrant. Goodman must have been aware of this and would have expected me to bring this up in our discussion had l the opportunity. In order to minimize my opportunities to discuss my concerns, Goodman either walked away or began speaking to other inmates each time after he asked if l accept the plea bargain. Details of his strategies to avert addressing my concerns and restrict discussion to his goals have been discussed in above points 1-3.
Goodman refused to communicate with me for the purpose of persecution.
Acting in place of Williams, Goodman was there to represent me only for the bench warrant hearing, but he never discussed the bench warrant itself with me. Instead he discussed the 1381 l had ﬁled, framing it as the cause of my incarcerated state at the hearing, and details of my case other than the bench warrant. He never even used the words âĂŸbench warrant.âĂŹ He attempted to create confusion for me in order that l would take the logical leap to conclude that admission of guilt was equivalent to resolving the matter of my incarceration. He did so by obscuring the issues of the bench warrant even though it was the purpose for this hearing. The court did not call the matter to be discussed in open court in a way that was accessible to me. Neither my name nor my case was called in open court. This further obfuscated the purpose of the hearing from me until after l left the courtroom. Goodman demonstrated that he had clear goals in his interaction with me, that is, to elicit a guilty or nolo contendre plea. Further, he stymied me from contesting my incarceration. That the Public Defender assigned to my case (Williams) was not present, and the Public Defender acting as my attorney (Goodman) was harassing me to plead guilty pointed to the intentional nature of the above named counsels’ actions. G. Goodman clearly showed conﬂict of interest. His interest in interacting with me was to elicit a guilty plea when l repeatedly refused to . The above ﬁts the deﬁnition of persecution.
The counsel assigned to my case, deputy Public Defender Williams, communicated with me for the ﬁrst time at my 04/13 court date; she began representing me on 03/05. 5
She initiated our meeting prior to proceedings asking, ’What is this about?’
This indicated to me that she was aware of my ’not guilty’ plea at the 04/09 hearing, and that she, like Goodman, was expressing preparation prior to speaking with me, as well as trouble with understanding the situation. l noted that the attorneys had communicated with each other but were both failing and/ or refusing to communicate with me. l told Williams that l wished to maintain my right to jury trial. Williams then said to me that there is a video showing that l had shoplifted, and that l had stolen. l had seen this video previously on 01/31/12 during my jury trial in San Francisco, where it was shown as evidence in support of the charges in case 11016366; hence, l was aware of its contents. l noted that Williams had concluded that l was guilty of theft and was instigating that l verbally agree with her. l further explained to Williams that l have, for more than 22 months prior to our meeting, been engaged in a prolonged and sustained protest of the fashion industry. (The protest is part of an ongoing performance art narrative piece that l began in February 2007 which features published and documented works.) l told her my motive for maintaining my right to jury trial was that ’l simply refused to sit at the back of the bus.’ (References to the art piece are listed infra at the end of Ground 1.a.) At this point, Williams told me ’this has nothing to do with civil rights’ and reiterated her conclusion that l had stolen (committed theft.) She then tells me that she was an attorney (a fact of which l was aware,) and that what l said to her was not a legal defense. She further tells me about another client she had in the past whom she characterized as ’delusional.’ After she stated the above, she asked me if l have ever been treated by or received diagnosis from a psychiatrist. l replied that l had a prior court order to visit a San Francisco County employed psychiatrist for 20 hours. That psychiatrist and another psychiatrist employed at the same facility (Richmond Area Multi Services or ’RAMS’) were both unable to diagnose me with a disorder, even after an in-depth evaluation. Additionally, l was evaluated by 2 more psychiatrists while incarcerated at San Francisco County Jail #2 and again, neither diagnosed me with a disorder. l told Williams that, with all due respect, she was/ is not a psychiatrist, therefore, unqualiﬁed to assess my mental health. At this point, l asked Williams if l was allowed to plead ’not guilty’. She replied that l ’can absolutely plead not guilty.’ Counsel entered the plea of ’not guilty’ on my behalf on 04/13 after she was unsuccessful in pressuring me to plead guilty or no contest to the charges of the case in question. On this day, at no point during our interaction did Williams explain to me that the hearing was for my plea. This was not clear to me at the time, being a layman with limited experience with the criminal justice system. Williams, like Goodman, failed to inform me of the purpose of the hearing prior to and during the hearing. l found out the purpose of the appearance upon the matter being called and addressed in open court. Thereafter, l addressed the court requesting for OR release which l will discuss under Ground 2 of this petition.
The Deputy Public Defender assigned to my case, Williams, refused to withdraw as counsel on 04/25, when l returned to Department 84 in Palo Alto Courthouse for preliminary examination.
Prior to the proceedings, l spoke with Williams in the courtroom where bailiﬀ and clerk were present. Williams began our interaction by stating that those present aside from she and l were ’not interested’ in our conversation. l noted that when she and l last spoke on 04/13, there were others present in the courtroom, but Williams did not make a similar statement prognosticating the interest of those present. Williams then asked me if l wanted to ’truncate’ the process of the trial by consenting to her motioning to send the case to a ’behavioural court’ in San Jose. l reiterated my wish to maintain my right to jury trial and declined her proposal. Williams then told me that she will order Dr. Chamberlain to evaluate me at Elmwood. Williams’s predecessor, Muller chose Dr. Chamberlain to evaluate me because of the proximity of his place of practice to my residence. Visiting me in Santa Clara County requires that he commute at least 45 minutes from his place of business at the UCSF Parnassus Campus. Since there are many qualiﬁed psychiatrists who practice in Santa Clara County, there was no reason why another psychiatrist cannot conduct the evaluation. This showed that Williams was not aware of the context under which and reasons for which decisions were made by her predecessor. Further, on 04/13, Williams asked if l had ever been evaluated by a psychiatrist; she did not discuss the order to see Dr. Chamberlain until 04/25; this showed that she was most likely not aware of the evaluation ordered by Muller until after 04/13. Williams clearly displayed failure to investigate. At this point, l asked Williams if she would like to withdraw as my counsel. Counsel refused to withdraw, stating that she could not resign because she was court appointed. THis statement was not accurate; Williams could voluntarily withdraw possibly at the cost of her employment and/ or reputation. Withdrawal was in conﬂict with counsel’s interest to maintain her employment and career as a licensed attorney, but would prevent counsel from further performing inconsistently with the California State Bar rules of professional conduct. Here, l was giving counsel the opportunity to voluntarily withdraw, whereupon she failed to do so.
Counsels’ repeated unprofessional conduct prompted me to motion to dismiss the Public Defender on 04/25, which was summarily denied.
1. Counsel has failed to and/ or refused to communicate with me; (as described.)
The grounds for my Marsden Motion were:
2. Counsel has failed and / or refused to perform and/ or to have performed investigation(s) critical and necessary to the defense; (as described.) 3. Counsel has failed and/ or refused to declare prejudice and/ or conﬂict against me, and due to said failure, has taken on the role of surrogate prosecutor against my interest. Both Santa Clara County Public Defender assigned to my case associated my ’not guilty’ plea with psychiatric issues. They did so despite of their respective lack of expertise and qualiﬁcations in the psychiatric ﬁeld, while ignoring the lack of diagnosis by multiple psychiatric professionals. Williams has shown that she was not even aware of her predecessor’s assessment until 04/25. This displayed expressed prejudice by not individual employees, but the culture of Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Oﬃce. Based on these grounds, l requested for the court to appoint counsel who was not employed by the Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Oﬃce.
Williams’s retort displayed blatant prejudice toward me and conﬂict of interest in representation.
The presiding judge, Thang Nguyen Barrett, asked Williams to respond to my allegations regarding lack of communication and investigation. Williams made multiple statements indicating prejudice and conﬂict of interest in her response. They are as follows:
Williams evaded answering to her lack of communication to me while l was in San Francisco County custody.
Instead, Williams addressed the period between the plea hearing (04/13) and this court date (04/25) only. She said that she felt it was unnecessary to speak with me. She did not respond in any way to the fact that she did not speak with me during my incarceration in San Francisco. l pointed out that counsel clearly had questions for me. By this, l meant that counsel had displayed either lack of understanding for what l tell her directly, or she had refused to comprehend it. The reason for counsel’s inability to comprehend direct communication was unclear to me, l can only make educated guesses based on my experience with her. From what counsel had said to me, she failed to understand either because of entrenched prejudice and/ or overwhelming preoccupation with mental illness as a result of her work experience and/ or some other factor that impaired her comprehension such as trauma suﬀered as a result of exposure to psychological violence on the job, or some other psychiatric issue. Regardless of why counsel did so, the fact of her not speaking with me when she was required to seek information from me is self evident.
Williams justiﬁed her lack of communication with me through discrediting me as mentally incapable to stand trial.
Here, based on her expressed presumption that l was mentally incapable, (despite of her own empirical experience of my competence, as well as overwhelming professional opinion contrary to her own layperson’s opinion,) Williams justiﬁed her making statements and acting on my behalf in lieu of my own wishes and without my consent. This clearly displays conﬂict of interest. Responding to the lack of investigation, Williams simply said she ’knew nothing’ about previous psychiatric diagnoses l had received, but that she was requesting one from Dr. Chamberlain and was awaiting his report. Here, Williams admitted to not having investigated my psychiatric treatment/ diagnosis history, which was critical to my defense.
l was not diagnosed with any psychiatric conditions after being evaluated by 4 different psychiatric professionals.
At this point, l informed the court of the lack of diagnosis by 4 diﬀerent psychiatrists over the course of approximately 12 months, the last evaluation being as recent as less than 2 months from 04.25. l informed the court of the circumstances of those evaluations: the ﬁrst 2 were conducted at RAMS as part of a court order and the other 2 at San Francisco County Jail #2 during my incarceration in 2012. Williams then incorrectly asserted that l was ordered by a ’behavioural court’ to see a psychiatrist as support for her ordering further psychiatric evaluations. l corrected her, and reiterated that a criminal court ordered those visits as part of my sentence after jury trial conviction. This, again, displayed both counsel’s prejudice about my mental condition as well as lack of investigation. Her inaccurate knowledge of my criminal record, her ignorance of the prior order for psychiatric evaluation for this case, along with her unawareness and/ or refusal to acknowledge the prior lack of diagnoses by 4 diﬀerent psychiatrists, (the result of which she could have ordered the discovery of,) plainly exhibited that Williams had failed and/ or refused to perform and/ or to have performed investigation(s) critical and necessary to the defens.erandmo
l pointed out to the court that repeatedly ordering psychiatric evaluations and/ or treatment despite of the lack of diagnoses by ignoring the results is defamatory.
Williams cited the fact that repeated evaluations were ordered by legal professionals as support for her own ’feeling’ that l had a psychiatric issue. The results of all of those evaluations, conducted by psychiatric professionals over the course of less than 1 calendar year, all returned no diagnosable issue. Asserting that an additional evaluation is necessary because of previously ordered evaluation is circular logic. Williams’s argument did not support her assertion that
additional evaluations were necessary. Rather, the argument displayed her prejudice, which she attempted to support by highlighting other Public Defenders’ prejudice toward me in her interest to establish me as mentally incompetent to stand trial.
The judge, Thang Nguyen Barrett, displayed prejudice and/ or conﬂict of interest toward me by denying my well-supported motion.
The court may give a defendant instructions so that s/he may adhere to the norms of procedure. Knowing this, l asked the court for such instruction during the Marsden hearing, inquiring if l needed to cite points and authorities in support of my motion, as l was aware that a written motion would include points and authorities and declaration in support of the motion. To this, Barrett told me that he was aware of the points and authorities. Barrett’s answer to my request for instructions not only displayed refusal to instruct, it also expressed his assumption that my goal of asking for instruction was other than seeking to adhere to the norms and procedures of the court. He displayed prejudice that l was mockingly assuming that l knew the laws where he did not, when citing points and authorities in support of motions is the norm of the legal profession. His refusal to instruct me showed that he was treating me as possibly unruly as well as seeking to establish me as unruly despite of my actual behaviour within the courtroom, which was respectful, composed, and seeking to adhere to legal norms by asking for instructions from the court. By choosing not to instruct me, the judge displayed that he was interested in doing something other than the function of the court, thereby displaying expressed conﬂict of interest. Barrett summarily denied the Marsden Motion, stating that my reasons for dismissing counsel were ’not legal reasons.’ Contrary to Barrett’s assertion, my reasons for dismissing counsel were legitimate grounds. My motion was wellsupported by both documentation and counsel’s own statements in court, based on unambiguous violations of California State Bar rules of professional conduct. Again, Barrett acted outside of statutory provisions. In contrast, counsel’s defense for her actions was feeble, evasive, and self-contradictory. She based her arguments on prejudice despite of overwhelming professional opinion (diagnoses by psychiatric professionals.) She herself described her own assessment of me as based on subjective ’feeling.’ She had further freely admitted to lack of investigating facts critical to my defense in open court. Nonetheless, Barrett summarily denied my motion. By doing so, court acted on its prejudice and conﬂict toward me. By denying my Marsden Motion, court expressly denied my right to access it by supporting counselsâĂŹ failure and/ or refusal to assist me. Recall the 3 points enumerated in the Marsden Motion. The consequence of point 1 (failure and/ or refusal to communicate by counsel[s],) was denial of my access to the court. The court summarily denied all enumerated points as legal reasons for dismissal, thereby expressly denying my right to access the court and demonstrating its own conﬂict of interest toward me by supporting denial of my right to access it. My pre-trial conﬁnement was caused by enforcement of my bench warrant, which was issued becasue l was denied access to the court through the failure and/ or refusal of counsels to communicate with me, which the court itself supported. After counsel(s) had refused to communicate with me, court continued to demonstrate unwillingness to allow me access by condoning her feeble rationale for doing so – subjective conjecture that l was mentally unﬁt to stand trial – at the cost of defaming me. l was and am currently rendered vulnerable (restrained) as a result of this defamation. Exploitation of this vulnerability has been demonstrated by Williams herself in her argument supporting her ordering of another psychiatric evaluation or diverting my case to a behavioural court in lieu of jury trial guaranteed to me by the Constitution of the United States, which the court had no jurisdiction to do given my mental ﬁtness. Consequently, l was, in fact, subjected to the prejudice of the court as discussed supra. As well, if l was actually diagnosed with a mental health issue, l would be deprived of my right to jury trial as well as the ability to serve on a jury or hold public oﬃce, thus constituting infamy. The above was done without examination by any jury.
Court itself denied my access to it by condoning Public Defenders to speak for me against my expressed interests.
Counsels from the Santa Clara County Public Defenders’ Oﬃce continued to act against my interest with court’s sanction after the Marsden Motion was summarily denied.
Immediately after my Marsden Motion was denied, Williams accepted on my behalf that the district attorney charge me on information where grand jury indictment was required.
Immediately after the Marsden hearing, preliminary examination was held, at which Williams accepted on my behalf that the district attorney charge me on information described in section A (and which l shall discuss further under Ground 3 of this petition,) the crime l was charged with is infamous, as such, required grand jury indictment. Counsel failed to challenge the district attorney’s fallacious assertion that because/ in light of my demand for trial, complaint should be deemed information. Demand for speedy trial does not preclude the necessity for grand jury examination where required.
l was unable to contest ’complaint deemed information’ for the following reasons:
1. Counsel spoke for me against my interest 2. Counsel expressly defamed me as mentally incompetent for trial, which court expressly condoned through summarily denying my Marsden Motion. Therefore, it has been shown that court will ignore what l say for myself. 3. More than one Public Defender had blatantly and repeatedly behaved unprofessionally with the court’s expressed support; as such, l discerned that the court will not act at my lawful requests. 4. Court may have ordered further physical restraint or that physical harm be visited upon me if l insisted on speaking for myself. l was not aware of the constitutional requirement for me to be indicted by a grand jury due to counsel’s refusal to assist me and/ or willful obfuscation of my rights during the trial process. Counsel failed to acknowledge that my charges were infamous and explain my rights to me, so l did not have knowledge of my rights.
Counsel(s) took evasive actions after violating my rights with the support of counsel’s ﬁrm (Public Defender’s Oﬃce) and the court.
On 05/11/12, l appeared in Department 84, presided over by Thang Nguyen Barrett, for the ﬁnal time prior to trial. The purpose of the appearance was ’trial readiness calendar’ and ’arraignment on information,’ topiucs which l found out from the paperwork the court gave me after the appearance, not from counsel before or during the appearance. ’Arraignment on information’ was penned in by the clerk. As described (in sections [A] and [B] above; and under Ground 3 infra,) my charges were infamous, thus requiring grand jury indictment. Prior to proceedings, Williams approached and informed me that this was her ﬁnal day working at the Palo Alto branch of the Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Oﬃce, and that upon her transfer to the San Jose Oﬃce, Krista Henneman will take over as my trial attorney as of this date. Both Henneman and Williams were present; Henneman introduced herself to me, then left the courtroom before proceedings began. Williams then represented me for Henneman during the proceedings. At this time, l took the opportunity to ask Williams for the results of my psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Chamberlain had visited me on 05/09 at Elmwood and conducted an in-depth evaluation. She replied that l was ’not diagnosable, just like you said.’ Counsel could have simply stated the fact that the doctor was unable to diagnose me with a disorder but showed apprehension in her reply. During the proceedings on this day, Williams, under the pretense of acting on behalf of another attorney at her ﬁrm, had accepted arraignment on information on my behalf where grand jury indictment was required. Back on 04/09, Goodman, like Williams on this day, performed under the guise of acting on behalf of another Public Defender. While it is not uncommon for a Public Defender on duty in a particular courtroom to represent a client who is assigned to another Public Defender, it is irregular and illegal for an attorney (or anyone) to either coerce a defendant into changing his/ her plea, plead for defendant against his/ her will, or perform any other actions that obscures the legal process for the purpose of aﬀecting defendant’s plea.
Performing under the guise of acting on behalf of another Public Defender is common practice among Santa Clara County Public Defenders. On both days, (04/09 and 05/11,) counsels did
not inform me that a Public Defender other than the one assigned to my case would act in place of the assigned P.D. on 05/11 until moments before proceedings began. On 04/09, Williams’s name was not recorded on the court paperwork from the bench warrant hearing even though she was responsible for my case. Goodman took aggressive actions in attempting to coerce me into pleading guilty, eﬀectively ending the legal proceedings and surrendering my right to appeal and review. Upon his failure, l do not hear from or see him again. He performed the actions described above under the pretense of acting as Williams’s proxy. On 05/11, Williams accepted arraignment on information where grand jury indictment was required under the guise of acting for Henneman. Again, her name was not recorded on the paperwork l received. The Public Defender’s oﬃce must approve its employees’ tranfers between branches of the oﬃce. Williams, like her predecessor Muller, transferred to the Public Defender’s San Jose oﬃce from Palo Alto while l was incarcerated. Williams transferred during a critical time of my trial process, that is, just prior to trial. Even if counsels’ evasive actions were committed without the Public Defender’s Oﬃce’s prior knowledge or aid, respective counsels’ superiors should have taken some notice upon various counsels repeatedly taking similar actions compromising the integrity of a trial’s process. Else, if the Public Defender’s Oﬃce was aware of the violations its employees committed, or has directed, recommended, or simply allowed the reassignment of counsels, then it has explicitly supported counsels’ actions. Various Public Defenders performed illegal actions, then transferred to a diﬀerent branch of the Public Defender’s Oﬃce, pointing to such evasive actions being common within the Public Defender’s Oﬃce. The court’s approval is required for counsel change. Barrett had summarily denied my well-supported Marsden Motion on 04/25. Only about 2 weeks earlier, when the Public Defender initiates counsel change at a critical time of the trial process, he approved it in my absence not based on my motion. This, like the act of denying the Marsden Motion, displayed the court’s indulgence of counsel’s actions as outlined in that motion, as well as awareness of the violations committed by both counsel and himself in his summary denial of the motion in question. Both the Public Defender’s Oﬃce and the court supported, if not directed, the departures of county employees Muller, Goodman, and Williams.
Judge took evasive action after violating my rights.
Further, on 05/11, Williams informed me that Barrett ’was pulled’ at the last minute for a ’more important’ trial. Jury trial was originally calendared to take place starting 05/21, but it was delayed by 1 day and was to take place on 05/2205/24/2012 in Deparment 87, presided by yet another judge, Rodney J. Staﬀord. The court showed awareness and evasive actions of its own, (discussed further infra under Ground ##.)
Public Defender failed to challenge sentence that imposed prolonged restraint.
l was found guilty at jury trial; subsequently, sentencing took place on 06/18. Recall that l was incarcerated in San Francisco from 01/04 to 04/05/2012, during which l had ﬁled a 1381. The 1381 not only functions as demand for trial, but also demand for sentencing, which allows for a court to impose concurrent sentencing at its discretion. Back on 04/09, l had refused a plea deal conveyed to me by Deputy Public Defender G. Goodman for ’court probation and credit for time served.’ Since l had served only 4 days in Santa Clara County Jail and 5 days while San Francisco County Jail 2 detained me in wait for transportation, l can only construe that the time credits also referred to the time l had just ﬁnished serving in San Francisco County where l had ﬁled the 1381. The court acknowledged that time credits for 90 days in SF applied to concurrent sentencing. At sentencing, the District Attorney recommended, against the recommendation of Santa Clara County Probation Department, that the sentence for the oﬀense, which is 1 year in county jail, be stayed and that a jail sentence of 180 days and 2 years of probation with a search condition be imposed. With nearly 90 days of time credits from my incarceration in San Francisco, and the time l had served in Santa Clara County, imposition of the one year sentence will mean that l serve only another 2 weeks in county jail after the sentencing date. Instead, the District Attorney had recommended the imposition of 2 years of restraint in the form of probation with a search condition. The execution of the maximum sentence would have been satisﬁed with existing time credits if the court, indeed, deems that l am eligible for a ’lower’ sentence as is implied by Staﬀord at sentencing. The language Staﬀord used implied that the sentence itself is that of probation, when the imposition of probation is in lieu of the maximum statutory provision of 1 year in county jail; and that the imposition of 2 years of probation beyond incarceration for 180 days in county jail beginning 04/01 is ’lower’ than that of the statutory provision of not exceeding 1 year in county jail, of which l had already served the bulk. Counsel failed to challenge this blatant red herring by the judge. The judge had substantively waived consideration of recommendations by the probation department since they had recommended that probation not be imposed. While adherence to the recommendation of probation is not compulsory and court has the right to exercise discretion, the judge completely ignored the recommendations of probation and use diversionary language at sentencing instead of addressing why the written recommendations were ignored. These actions by the court were outside of statutory provisions, and should have prompted counsel to protest such actions on my behalf. Counsel did not do so. At sentencing, counsel motioned for reduction of sentence to misdemeanor sentencing as well as argued against imposition of probation based on my already being on probation in San Francisco, but she had completely failed to bring to the court’s attention: 1. the court’s failure to acknowledge the 1381, and the implication of concurrent sentencing to the duration of my restraint, that is, prolonged restraint would not be imposed and 2. the lack of written stipulation or oral stipulation waiving court’s consideration of recommendations by a probation oﬃcer. On 06/27, l contacted Henneman via telephone at Elmwood regarding requesting that the court impose maximum sentencing. On 06/29, l received communication from Henneman that the maximum sentence ’is actually 3 years,’ and that l ’cannot ask the judge to max (me) out since he wants (me) on probation.’ The above 2 points were both erroneous. Here, counsel displayed that she lacked familiarity with statutes pertaining to my charges. Also, by asserting that l cannot contend with the imposition of probation, she defended the court’s interests in imposing probation against sentencing provisions l am entitled to, of which l am informed, and expressly asked for, thereby displaying again her conﬂict of interest.
Public Defender insisted on motioning for assignment of appellate counsel despite of my expressed wish to ﬁle pro per.
At sentencing, l motioned for a copy of the transcript in anticipation of ﬁling for appeals without an appellate attorney (pro per.) l had prepared a written notice of motion/ motion, declaration, and points and authorities, which Henneman submitted to the clerk prior to proceedings. The court addressed the motion only upon my repeated oral requests while l was in the courtroom. Staﬀord deferred the motion for the transcript. Henneman explained to me that the court deferred to the appellate court’s process for me to obtain a copy of the transcript, and that if the appellate court fails to do so, then this court will give me a copy of the full transcript. l then told Henneman that l will ﬁle pro per. She only replied that ﬁling pro per is within my rights and that she will do the paperwork. On 06/19, l contacted Henneman via written inmate requests at Elmwood, expositing that since l will ﬁle for my appeal for this case pro per, l requested that: 1. When she ﬁlls out the notice/ forms, to not motion for counsel appointment for indigent or otherwise. 2. Since l will require a copy of the transcript in order to prepare for the appeal, she should ask court to add my motion for transcript to the calendar. Counsel failed to convey to the court that l was going to ﬁle pro per.