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The Naval Review Vol. 65 No.1 January 1977

The Naval Review Vol. 65 No.1 January 1977

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Published by David Bober
To promote the advancement and spreading within the service of knowledge relevant to the higher aspects of the naval profession.
To promote the advancement and spreading within the service of knowledge relevant to the higher aspects of the naval profession.

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Published by: David Bober on Jan 30, 2013
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Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had formed a Naval Society: Captain H. W. Richmond R.N. Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N. Commander the Hon. R. A. E. Plunkett R.N. Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N. Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N. Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N. Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A. Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor) It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind that the fullest capacity can, as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognise that the best specialist can be produced only after a long training in general learning. The grasp of principle which makes detail easy can only come when innate capacity has been evoked and moulded by high training. Lord Haldane Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance with the Regulations printed herein, which should be carefully studied. Copyright under Act of 1911

Vol. 65

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Sartor Resartus



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Silver Jubilee Review The announcement that Her Majesty the Queen will review her Fleet on Tuesday 28 June will have delighted Members of The Naval Review. Memories of earlier Jubilee Reviews, and of Coronation Reviews, will have been stirred in the minds and hearts of the more senior; and for the less so the prospect of taking part in a rare and splendid naval occasion must surely quicken the pulse. The habit of man as member of a community to mark the passage of years may not be easy to explain. But the effect of doing so, with due ceremony followed by the pipe 'Hands to dance and skylark! ', is to promote fellow feeling between 'all sorts and conditions of men'; to draw inspiration from latent loyalty to Queen and Country; and to enhance the lives of individuals. The value of an Index The Editorial Note at the beginning of Volume 1 of The Naval Review sets down the object of the publication as: . . . to encourage thought and discussion on such subjects as strategy, tactics, naval operations, staff work, administration, organisation, command, discipline, education, naval history, and any other topic affecting the fighting efficiency of the Navy, but excluding the material aspects of the technical sciences; it is hoped that it will help to build up that body of sound doctrine which is so essential to success in war, and to provide a means of expression and discussion within the Service. Those fortunate enough to possess, or have access to, all or most of the first sixty-four volumes of The Naval Review would probably agree that, whilst random browsing in them is a fascinating pastime, when a particular subject, for example the respective roles and functions of seaman and engineer officers, happens to be under discussion (e.g. '1156 and All That' in this issue) it is too time-consuming to plough through all the volumes to find out what has been written about the subject in the past. I t so happens that Vol. 1 (1913) contains several articles and letters on that subject. Under NOTICES will be found details of the Index of The Naval Review which has now been prepared in typescript, with some initial thoughts on the next step. I t is hoped that Members will respond, either personally to the Editor or in the Correspondence columns.

Annual General Meeting 1976 The AGM was held on Monday 27 September in the Naval Club, Hill Street, London, by courtesy of the Committee and Members, to whom we are most grateful. Rear Admiral P. W. Brock C.B., D.S.O. took the chair and warmly welcomed the Members, nearly a score, who were present. The Secretary-Treasurer reported total membership at 31 December 1975 as 1875, the number enrolled during the year (apart from Prize Members) being seventy-three. This compares with a total of 1839 at the end of 1971, on the same basis. Despite the recent increase in subscription, therefore, the membership was keeping up. Nevertheless,



continual and well directed effort would be required to recruit new members, with the target of about one in every five active service officers (the present level is one in nine), without losing the loyal support of existing members, many of whom are no longer serving. In presenting the Annual Accounts for 1975, published in the July 1976 issue, the Secretary-Treasurer drew attention to the excess of expenditure over income, which amounted to £1,731, but forecast that on figures to date the present year should end all square. There was even the possibility of a small credit balance. Regrettably, about one-third of Members had failed so far to pay their increased subscriptions. By contrast and the Chairman expressed his keen appreciation of the public spirit of those concerned - a large proportion of Covenanting Members have increased their Covenants rather than enjoy an 'uncovenanted' advantage. The Editor was able to report a healthy flow of contributions, including many from serving officers. He then presented the newly-compiled Index (see below) and the Chairman congratulated its author, Mr. B. H. Tripp, expressing on behalf of The Naval Review our grateful thanks for his excellent work, in recognition of which it had been decided to confer upon him Honorary Life Membership. Mr. Tripp was happy to accept this distinction, although, he said, the completion of the task had been itself an adequate reward. Some Members proposed that The Naval Review should assume the more political role in naval affairs formerly played by the Navy League. It was the Editor's view that naval officers were certainly entitled, professionally, to express opinions on Defence in general, as well as upon the Navy's part in it. Provided that the political content was not too narrowly partisan he would publish any contribution which in other respects merited it.

A new Index for The Naval Review Two cumulative Indexes to The Naval Review have been published previously. The first was a subject Index to Vols. 1-9 inclusive compiled by Lieut-Colonel G. P. Orde, R.M.L.I. The second was an Index of headings only, covering Vols 1-20 inclusive, compiled by Mr. R. F. Franklin O.B.E., Secretary of The Naval Review from 1928 to 1934. The Index now prepared by Mr. Tripp covers Vols. 1-63 (1913-75) inclusive. It is in three parts: Articles, Correspondence and Book Reviews. At present it is in typescript only. To make a single photostat copy would cost about £20, but that could be reduced considerably with a larger number of copies e.g. 100 copies could be produced for about £6 each. Members (and particularly librarians) who might be prepared to buy copies of the Index a t £6.00 or less are requested to inform the Editor, so that an idea of the 'market' for the Index may be gained. Pending the production and distribution of copies of the Index, the Editor will do his best to extract from it any references for which Members ask him in connection with contributions to The Naval Review, provided they supply a s.a.e. and have patience. Enclosed with this issue of The Naval Review is the Index for Vol. 64 (1976), prepared in similar form to the main Index. I t is intended that this, and subsequent annual Indexes, will provide a handy continuation of it. Prize Essays I t has been decided to award the £20.00 Prize for the best article by a member of lieutenant's rank or junior submitted for publication during 1976 to Lieutenant R. T. R. Phillips Royal Navy for 'Patrol Tasks in Expanded British Waters' (published in April). The Prize Essay Competition is open, once again, to members of lieutenant's rank or junior, for the best article submitted for publication in 1977.

Like the hind-legged performances of Dr. Johnson's famous walking dog, the main point that struck me about Sailor, the series of ten BBC television programmes about life in Ark Royal, was not that it was good or bad, but that it was done at all. Not so long ago, very few television producers could have found it emotionally possible to make any programme even remotely sympathetic to any of the armed forces, and certainly no BBC-TV producer worth his subscription to the New Statesman would have been seen dead near one of your actual sailor suits. An undertaking such as Sailor would have been about as likely as a ten-part series on The Wit of Adolf Hitler. In recent years we have become accustomed to the BBC taking a fairly rigid, well-defined attitude to the services in general and to the Navy in particular. Sailors are made to say why they go on using such big, bad weapons when the BBC interviewer knows that such weapons are immoral. Submarine captains are pinned against their own periscopes whilst they dare to try and justify Polaris, which everybody knows, because the BBC has told them, is 'obscene'. Even Warship, launched so promisingly and entertainingly, was allowed to lose the relevance to modern life in the Navy which gave it its early impetus. I t slowly solidified into a wardroom-centred, male-orientated cliche - H.M.S. Crossroads, without any of the women. So, with such recent experience to warn us, many of us must have awaited the coming of Sailor with suspicion and dread. But in fact there was a lot to be grateful for in it. Of course there must have been cutting. Hours of film must have been shot and then edited out. But still, the impression came across of a production team who kept their eyes peeled, their ears cocked, and their cameras trained, and when anything happened they just filmed it. Above all, there was no opinionated interviewer. Ark Royal's people spoke for themselves. or let the camera do it for them. There certainly were some good moments. For example, the growing tension in Flyco when a pilot making his first deck landing bolted seven times on the trot. Marvellous range of expressions flitting across Commander (Air)'s face. Outwardly calm, reassuring everybody in all directions, radiating extreme confidence in the outcome, but smiling broadly through gritted teeth, and plainly thinking inwardly, 'Cor stone the crows, why can't he get his cab down on the deck like a good Christian should?' There was a Master-at-Arms who looked rather like George Robey, with the same control of the deadly throwaway line. There was another striking facial expression - that of the steward watching the Second Sea Lord struggling to get out of his tight flying overalls. There were one or two familiar personalities - notably a leading hand, with many years in the Andrew, killick of the mess, perhaps a bit of a sea-lawyer, but still with a curious humility, conscious that he was oniy one man on a messdeck full of his peers. There were some new phrases - notably the PMO talking of an American nuclear submarine sailor with a ruptured appendix being in 'bacterial shock': immediate mental image of squads of helmeted bugs charging out into the patient's blood stream. That episode contained the tremendously dramatic moment, shot from the helicopter, of the patient bcing suddenly swept into the sea, stretcher and all. I t was good to know that the helicopter crewman later got the Queen's Award for Bravery.



The producer made use of some nice counter-point, cutting from scenes in an aircraft to scenes on deck, scenes on board to scenes at home, and on one occasion, crossing very effectively from a concert on the fiight deck to a party working below on defective machinery. The ship's dummy Little Wilf gave me the creeps, and must rank as one of the unfunniest turns of this or any other commission. Still, one must make allowances for 'in' jokes and situations only really intelligible to those on board. It was reassuring to find that a ship's sense of humour has not really changed. The jokes Jolly Jack enjoys most are still against the wardroom, although the Captain's part in a fearsome troika, rendering 'Three Little Girls From School', must have disarmed many a lower deck comedian. The programme also left some intriguing ends to be picked up some day. There was, for instance, the graduate officer under training who would have liked to debate matters more, but discipline prevented him. His frustration was real, and should be noted. He also s a ~ x was bored when he was shown he round compartments such as the main switchboard. The camera picked him up, being shown round the main switchboard, and whether by accident or not, momentarily went out of focus, as though its eye was glazing over in sympathy with his! The reactions of viewers ashore varied a great deal. I cannot believe it commanded quite the viewing figures the BBC claimed. I t was a popular pro-

gramme, and people watched it i they f were in, but it was by no means compulsory viewing. One lady I met at a dinner party said she thought all the officers in the first episode were actors, and very bad actors at that. But, she said, 'they got better as they went along'. Many people were struck by the first episode - not the sailors watching strippers, because after all one hardly expects sailors to be seen singing hymns on their last night ashore - but by the Captain's harrowing time getting Ark down the Hamoaze with one shaft locked and some of his instruments reading wrongly, or actually backwards. I must say I myself wondered why these defects were not bowled out during basin trials, or even earlier that morning, while testing steering gear and telegraphs, and turning main engines. At the end of the series I felt it had all been going on a long time, although the ship was only away five months (to judge by her homecoming reception one would have thought it was five years). But looking back, it was extraordinarily refreshing to watch a programme which did not strike attitudes. It was neither anti-Navy, nor pro. It might help recruiting. It might just as likely not. Some people in Ark and ashore will like the way their personalities came across. Others will remember it all with mixed feelings. But it was an honest attempt to show how one specialised naval community lived and got on with each other and we ought to be very grateful for that.

Farewell Wasp! Welcome Lynx!
The characters (Form 264a) Naval Airman Wasp has been in this job for a long time now. He is generally popular with his department but sometimes is not understood and is therefore mistrusted by his other shipmates. It is unlikely that Wasp is capable of absorbing any more tasks and sometimes he gives the distinct impression of strain, probably caused by putting on a bit of weight. Generally he is reliable and hardworking even in unfavourable conditions; however he has caused concern on odd occasions by falling into the sea. His pride usually ensures a smart appearance but recently he has been down on some important parts of his kit. It is thought that his job will be better suited to his relief, Leading Airman Lynx.
can mix in today's technology and, having garnished the dish with common sense, hopefully point the way to successful single helicopter operations in the 1980s.

The shaking achievement of the last ten years In the last ten years the Royal Navy has not only proved the operational feasibility of the small ship's helicopter flight, but has also shown that helicopter operations can be carried out from small decks with a very good degree of safety. Another major step that has been proved is the concept of the Senior Maintenance Rating (SMR) whose responsibilities in a ship are both great and widespread. Also, availability of helicopters has generally been good and therefore scepticism of relying on a one-shot system has been kept at bay. An introduction to the fluttering phenomenon In proving this system the Navy has In writing about operating helicopters benefited from several important spinfrom small ships in the Royal Navy, one offs. One is the increased understanding is committed to using a few well-known and awareness between the ships and characters. Although this may lead to a aviators of the Fleet, which is to everydanger of prejudice and criticism accord- one's advantage. For the flight coming to one's own experience, this should mander it means that not only will the in no way detract from the overriding ship understand his problems of weather, fact that the concept of these operations control. availabilitv etc.. but also that has been proved entirely successful. the aircraft will be tasked correctly as a This established fact has resulted in the ship's weapon. The captain also benefits development of a second generation aircraft to continue the concept, as well by having his own aviation specialist who as other navies paying us the compliment on occasions should be able to offer him of following our lead: success, however, gems of advice. Possibly the greatest advantage to the is a relative term and can be far removed from perfection. It is within these Navy of operating flights, after proving parameters therefore that constructive the concept, has been the gathering and criticism and observations should be consolidating of information and expermade to improve the system by our ience. For example, in the last ten years experience. Lessons not learnt must also over two hundred pilots have run Wasp be examined under the same proviso and flights. Inevitably the system has become not with the emotions of the short- better documented and administered and sighted critic. Finally, as a result of our the large number of people that have achievements, failures and omissions we had connections with flights now make

up an understanding audience for the associated problems. The last noteworthy achievement was the hurried introduction of a mediocre first generation missile fitted to the Wasp in the late 1960s. Although not a perfectionist's solution to the missilecarrying FPB threat, this had great value as it added the attack role to the small ship helicopter. This is more significant than appears a t first sight as it changes the helicopter from purely a weapon carrier into an aggressive unit. The importance of this will hopefully be shown when the Skua missile enters the Fleet in the 1980s. Stretching and squeezing the helicopter I t would be unrealistic to think that we will ever learn the lesson of not stretching our resources beyond their capabilities and the fact that the British have become expert in this does not justify it as a satisfactory way of doing business, especially when applied to aircraft. The result of this policy with the Wasp has produced an aircraft that just flies in many different roles but only for a short time and with very small power margins. Severe financial constraints are the cause of this dangerous circle of compromise which turns politicans' priorities into the Service's restrictions. The keen naval officer, seeking success in the Service, is therefore left with no way out except to perfect yet another compromise. This has now become a way of life and the original aircraft will always end up containing at least one and a half times what it was designed to hold. The catch with this policy is that it has to be balanced against the performance margins and consequently payload, endurance and safety are sacrificed. Penalties in training also become evident, as illustrated by a simple aircraft like the Wasp being flown by experienced aircrew. Despite this, the narrow margins of payload and endurance have produced

too many scares and the potential for incidents such as running out of fuel is high; the jackpot on this example is probably well overdue. Squeezing the helicopter into a frigate as an integrated weapon system has now had time to influence the shape of our new ships and this creditable fact is a lesson well learnt. The horrors of a Tribal frigate's hangar with its lift covers, coupled with trying to persuade sailors to carry AS 12 missiles through half the passageways in the ship, are thankfully not with us in new construction ships. The battles between the ship's weapon systems fouling the aircraft and vice versa are almost a thing of the past which is a healthy recognition of the helicopter as an established part of the ship. The importance of having a good flight deck, and a well-equipped hangar with convenient weapon stowages and maintenance facilities, marks the fundamental difference between a ship having a helicopter as a weapon system and one merely able to operate an aircraft at sea. The first can be looked upon as an operating base while the second, which also has considerable value, must be regarded as an operating deck. The economies of basing two helicopters in an escort, such as the Type 22 or the Canadian Iroquois class, are enormous as the only extra space required is virtually a wider hangar while the stores and manpower are by no means doubled. Aircrew and maintainers' standards The present system for selecting pilots and maintainers works well. The majority of pilots find the accuracy required in their flying, particularly on instruments, is greater partly because of the simplicity of the aircraft and partly because of the flying task. Operating an independent unit is certainly the main satisfaction of the job and care must be taken that too many outsiders do not trespass on the Flight Commander's territory. In this respect there is a danger

of over-inspection caused by the number of agencies concerned with a flight. The introduction of a second pilot has become necessary and, providing that the selection is right, they provide a useful appointing margin as they can be moved around for situations such as Belize and the Cod War without breaking the continuity of the flight commander. In addition, the dependence of the Fleet on ships' flights requires spare pilots to cover for sickness etc. I t must also be appreciated that expecting twice as much use from a double-manned flight is not entirely a practical proposition because there are no extra flight ratings. The maintainers' standards in a flight generally prove successful but are greatly influenced by the standards set by the Senior Maintainance Rating (SMR). The diversification of the normal trade jobs to include such areas as air weapons requires a large training effort but has proved effective and will always be a requirement of a small flight. The award of the Flight Charge Certificate to the SMR should be changed to give him more status as few Chief Petty Officers are suitable for this added responsibility. A senior rating with a Charge Certificate would then be recognised as a man with a very worthwhile extra qualification. To balance this additional significance the withdrawal of the certificate should not indicate that the man is incapable of working in his first class rate. There will always be the inevitable tendency for flights to be slightly top heavy with senior and leading Rates. The problems this causes will increase in the new construction ships where the flight ends up tending a larger area of the ship. The usual practice of all the flight helping with the scrubbing and painting is acceptable on certain occasions but is unsatisfactory as a routine. The temporary measure of drafting or loaning a handler to the ship gives the flight commander a merciful relief from

this conflict and this arrangement should be made permanent.
Operating and controlling the rotating machine The deck operating capability of the Wasp has always been its forte and this simple fact has probably done more than anything else in making the concept successful. The ability of a Wasp to swivel into the relative wind and the evolution of wide operating envelopes have given the Royal Navy much greater flexibility than other navies a fact not always appreciated in the Fleet. Of course once airborne the situation deteriorates as the aircraft is totally reliant on ship control. There have been numerous lessons learnt about helicopter controllers (HCs) but generally the situation is improving with the possible exception of the dealings with dipping helicopters. Here the HC, who may be a fairly inexperienced controller, is on the same net as the observers who are running their own show like the PWO in a frigate. The difference in knowledge and experience is not a good foundation for efficient co-operation. The complete inadequacy of the PTR 170 radio with its twelve fixed crystallized channels is a desperate lesson that no one could have failed to learn. The thoughtful fitting of the Very pistol and cartridges, although helpful, is not really the answer. It is a sad fact that poor radios, particularly before the introduction of the Bendix VHF, have probably been the cause of more bad airmanship by the Royal Navy than anything else; this is especially so on overland transits. Night operations tend to be completely dependent on good control and recovery procedures and these are only perfected by training. The operational approach with the ship's off-set radar works well and provides the Wasp with a fairly wide operating envelope. The most dangerous stage of the a ~ p r o a c hi s the period of

cross reference to, and interpretation of, the visual aids in the ship. Although helped by these aids, disorientation is still possible - which has been learnt the hard way. The answer to recovery problems is progressive training, starting in dusk conditions and working up; once a good standard is achieved practice and continuity are essential. The glide path indicator (GPI) is sometimes accused of inefficiency but in fact is a reasonably good aid providing its limitations are known and appreciated. The ability of radar fitted helicopters to approach a ship on their own is a great help, especially when operating from miscellaneous ships without HCs. This also reduces radio chatter but if practised too often does have the danger of not giving the HCs the continual practice they need. Finally the X-Band Transponder gives helicopters a good paint on radar, the system having been designed to counter the bad radar characteristics of helicopters. Tactics and weapons There are numerous lessons that have been learnt about the weapons associated with ships' flights, in particular the airdropped torpedo, which has been greatly improved by the introduction of the Mk 46. The limitations of the AS 12 are numerous, the main one being that it depends on the skill of one man to aim it and secondly it places the helicopter in a dangerous position. However, it is a useful stop gap and it has won the small helicopter the role of an attacker. One of its uses at the start of any hostilities, in addltion to attacking FPBs, is the destruction of AGIs and associated shadowing merchant ships. This would allow the frigates to spend more time on their escort duties. Loading weapons is definitely an area where improvements can be extracted from our experience. The main offending equipment is that infamous horror of the Fleet known as a torpedo trolley.

The modification of this four-wheeled committee-designed joke has apparently defeated all known experts. Apart from the shortcomings of the trolley, the system is a fiddly and inexact evolution which uses too many men. Loading torpedoes on the side of the Lynx with its self-levelling undercarriage should greatly improve the situation, but this should not be used as an excuse for not modifying the present equipment. The AS 12 loading is basically sound but the system has suffered from its quick introduction into the Service with respect to missile stowages. The need for constant practice has shown that the introduction of drill missiles and torpedoes must be planned in parallel with any weapon and not as a hasty afterthought. Experience has shown that one of the major roles for helicopters is going to be identification of surface targets. This is a vital task which will become even more significant as bolt-on weapons can be carried by a host of miscellaneous craft. This lesson has sparked off interest in night viszn aids such as Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) and Low Light TV (LLTV). Unless positive identification from aircraft is available to a naval commander, especially if he has no EW information, he may be needlessly committed to endangering his forces or at the best being distracted from his primary tasks.
The flapping of hands One area where the Royal Navy has gained much experience is in the job of the Flight Deck Officer (FDO). Although advice on selecting the FDO is laid out in the Work Up Guide, this is still a touchy subject as the job becomes an 'overload' task for the two or three officers selected. Despite the controversial feelings this has caused in a few ships, the problem has never really come to the surface as the system has worked. The crux of the matter lies in the

question of who is capable of doing this job; at present selected senior rates can be FDO but in practice a suitable leading rate, such as a Leading Aircraft Handler (LAH) could do the job. The LAH could be drafted to the ship and, in cases where the flight is single manned, he would cope with all the flying commitments with a back-up in case of sickness etc. Undoubtedly the concept of a LAH as FDO would bring cries of horror from some quarters on the grounds of whether he could be given the required responsibility and could also have the authority to advise the bridge or command. On the first point, he could be trained to a standard where the pilot could trust him to the same extent that he has to trust the judgement of his crewman, who may only be an able rate; also the action of waving his hands at the right time and generally running the flight deck should cause him no problem as this is in common with his background. The argument that he would not be able to advise or hold his own when dealing with the bridge is a sad reflection on a ship; the captain, officers of the watch and PWOs all rely on vital information in their jobs which often comes from Leading Rates such as the HCO, who also has responsibility for the helicopter's safety. The LAH would only be made an FDO if he was considered proficient and this one fact should give him credibility; to compromise and have a POAH would only increase the accommodation problem on board and should be avoided.
Engineer's corner The result of operating helicopters in a salt-laden atmosphere caused by sea aerosols, salt mists and spray have been well demonstrated, particularly on the magnesium alloy of the Wessex. The Wasp suffers particularly through having no engine cover and often having to operate without its cabin doors. Engines

are harmed internally from the presence of salt on their turbine blades which causes 'hot corrosion' on these superalloys. Counter measures such as compressor washing, fresh water washing and the generous use of WD 40 have all figured strongly in this battle. The repeated aircraft inspections and the building of good husbandry bays have also helped to keep the situation under control but at the cost of a large number of man hours and expense. The successful operation of the flights is also dependent on good support and in general the R.N. does this well. The stores held in ships are comprehensive and in addition the priority demand system usually gives a good service. There are exceptions such as the recent critical shortages of Wasp tail rotors and gear boxes, etc. which will hopefully serve as a lesson to illustrate how vulnerable a weapon system can be if the support is not correct. Farsighted planning in all aspects of support is even more important as lead times increase. One example of constructive support has been the introduction of the Spectromatic Oil Analysis Programme (SOAP) which has saved many accidents by continually monitoring the health of engines and gearboxes while they are in use.
The NATO one step It is a shame that of the countries that operate helicopters from small warships only the Dutch are in step with us. This situation is not surprising, however, considering that the WASP Match System represented a startling departure from established methods when first introduced. The competitors were the American DASH, which failed, and the various breeds of rocket-delivered weapons such as ASROC. The later development of missile systems such as IKARA could replace the role of the Wasp as a weapon carrier for submarine contacts gained by the ship, but it will

not provide the answer for long range contacts where the position has to be defined by a secondary method before attack. Similar trends in America have resulted in the development of the LAMPS helicopter which, like the Lynx, will be attacking submarines beyond the range of ship-fired weapons. The lack of standardization of this kind of helicopter in NATO carries the normal penalties of small production runs as well as producing a lack of understanding between the Navies. The first step in improving the situation is to standardize the procedures and this will be helped by the introduction of a publication called HOSTAC (APP2) which will be a directory of all NATO helicopter decks and the associated procedures. The preaching of our experience and belief in single ship helicopter operations to our NATO partners must continue vigorously as this is an extremely practical way of giving our decreasing number of ships more presence and influence. These helicopters can now be fitted with viable weapons but their effectiveness is still directly proportional to the number deployed.

the burden of manpower on the ship was to waive the requirement to have two firesuitmen dressed at flying stations. The greatest advance is to come with the Lynx as it will not require lashing numbers because of its 'harpoon' deck hold-down. This will probably do more to boost its reputation in the Fleet than anything else. The identification of a flight with a particular ship is a most important practice and great gains are made from the personal contacts that arise between the ship and the flight. The lessons learnt and experience gained in small ship helicopter operations in the last ten years place the Royal Navy in a very advantageous position which must not be belittled by our customary British modesty. The 1980s will see the operation of our second generation helicopter, namely the Lynx, which has the advantage, due to its predecessor, of being introduced into a receptive and appreciative service. Although the Wasp and the Wessex 3 will continue in some ships their roles will not change, so only the roles of the Lynx will be considered.

The love that blossoms between ship and flight More nonsense has been talked about the shiplflight relationship than most other burning topics on board; the only relevant factor is the personalities involved and it is only in a small minority of cases that these produce friction. Areas of conflict in the past have been over such tasks as the provision of lashing numbers, the preparation of air-dropped weapons and assistance for the flight with their ship's husbandry responsibilities. These have not been helped by contradictory references in numerous publications which have been written without sufficient cross-reference to the interested parties; most of these are now amended. One advance to ease

ASW role This role is split into two tasks, firstly that of a weapon carrier and secondly that of detection or localization of a submarine contact. The weapon-carrying role is in principle much the same as with present helicopters but with the great advantage of a larger payload and longer endurance together with far more advanced avionics. In contrast, the job of detecting and localizing the submarine is vastly different. Active dipping sonar is planned for the French naval Lynx but not, thankfully, for the R.N. version. Dipping helicopters mainly use ducted sonar and at best can only expect detections at medium ranges, with a maximum in good conditions of roughly 20,000 yards; these ranges cannot be guaranteed or improved as they are dependent on physical laws affecting the

sonar beam. The area swept is therefore relatively small and even several large dipping helicopters will not be able to counter the threat of a cruise missile being fired at 'beyond-the-horizon' range from a submarine. The future must lie with systems that can cover a vastly increased area from that which we have become used to from helicopters and ships fitted with ducted sonar. As far as the helicopter is concerned, the only way it is going to achieve this change is by borrowing systems developed for the long range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMP) and basing its detection on passive sonobuoys. The LRMP has numerous advantages in this job, the most important being its speed for 'sowing' the buoys, its endurance and its payload. It is inevitably a much larger and more roomy aircraft and does not suffer from the vibration which is inherent in helicopters. The LRMP is the best method of providing the outer area of defence against a submarine and this task is essential. Conversely, the inner area defence, which will be worked by the helicopter, can be considered a highly desirable addition. The crunch comes when, because of range, enemy activity, or other priorities, the ships are deprived of their LRMPs. The helicopter then has to become the only extended range, and therefore credible, antisubmarine unit. The proper helicopter for this task will always be the large aircraft such as the Sea King or its replacement, but the Lynx might well be used as a weapon carrier, in its support. The ships, however, must also change their principles for detecting submarines so that greater and more realistic ranges are possible. The underlying reason for improviG range detection is, naturally, to enable submarine contacts to be attacked. The various long range detection methods all have a common failing in that the position of the contact

has to be refined before it is accurate enough to drop a weapon on it. The order of events from the initial contact has therefore got to be to localize, classify, plot and attack and this must be done for the most part passively and as quickly as possible in order to pre-empt the submarine's attack. These four tasks could be done with the Lynx providing it has the correct equipment and the necessary payload. The localizing equipment would probably best come from a lightweight passive sonar system which would be operated by the observer who is already a member of the crew. Alternatively, an effective magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) could be fitted but ranges on this equipment a t present are far too short. Whatever system is fitted inevitably carries a weight penalty, particularly as weapons must also be carried but microminiaturization can now keep this to a realistic figure. It is imperative though that the Royal Navy ends up with the Mk 4 L ~ ~ Iwith an all up weight (AUW) X of 10,500 lbs. as opposed to the Mk 2's AUW of 9,500 Ibs. as otherwise the concept of attacking submarines a t the maximum ship's detection range will be severely handicapped. The importance of this heavier aircraft is also painfully obvious in the other roles, which are covered later, as well as being a critical point in exporting the aircraft. There are two dangers in discussing the roles of the Lynx in anti-submarine warfare; firstly, it must not be likened to the Wasp as it is a far more potent and sophisticated aircraft that requires minimal ship control and could, with localizing equipment, hunt and kill submarines at significant ranges from its parent ship. Secondly it must be appreciated that even the Mk 4 is a small aircraft and is not going to replace, or even be in competition with, larger aircraft such as the Sea King. If it is fitted with sonobuoys these will only be used with discretion in areas of a

equate to the 'Woolworth Carrier' concept. These operations would certainly take place in wartime and their success would depend upon gaining Attack role (ASV) The surface attack role of the Lynx experience in peacetime. The problems in the 1980s is based on the Sea Skua of support, deck strength, fittings, ship missile. The greatest advantage of this movement and weapon stowages are all system is that the aircraft is an independ- very real and highlight the requirement ent weapon system and does not need to to practise helicopter deployments of rely on information from the ship and this kind without delay. If this avenue is therefore completely autonomous. is not explored, the helicopter's prime This role is integrated with the recce advantage of flexibility would be foolishsensors of the Sea Spray radar and the ly ignored. ESM equipment as well as relying on the The flying FPB. The Lynx with Skua former to illuminate the target for the can be considered in many cases a semi-active homing missile. The advan- superior alternative to the missile firing tages the all weather Skua has over the FPB. Development of the Flight Control AS 12 are that it does not rely on the System coupled with the radar would human skill of an airner, it has a enable the aircraft to be flown at very reasonable range and, being a sea low levels over the water in most skimmer, it is a difficult target for the weathers. This tactic would be a development of the fair weather Wasp practice enemy's defences. 'Macship' operations. The Lynx could of attacking from low level in a cohave a useful advantage of being able to ordinated split section; the main deploy as a weapon system to units other advantages of the Lynx used like this than warships. The significance of this over the FPB are its speed, independence is enormous and will continue to in- of sea state when airborne, improved crease as the number of warships radar picture and a better chance of decreases. Advances in intelligence visual identification. An example of the gathering and tracking surface forces by area searched by a Lynx with two Skuas satellites, electronic support measures with an endurance of two hours detect(ESM), airborne early warning (AEW) ing an FPB target at twenty-five miles is and submarines have the effect of 12,000 square miles (the endurance, on shrinking the oceans and thereby making weapon load would increase with the our forces more difficult to hide. In 10,5001b. AUW of the Mk 4.). Assuming periods of tension the Lynx can counter a twelve mile detection range of a this by operating from miscellaneous similar target from the FPB, the search ships which would greatly increase the area for a comparable time at forty tracking problems and threat that an knots is 2,000 square miles. Operating enemy could hope to pose. In hostilities in this role from ashore or afloat, the overriding advantage would be the particularly in areas such as the Baltic increase in firepower and recce provided or Norwegian coast, would prove to be by these helo-carrying ships which would very cost-effective when compared with then join the convoy or main force in the FPB. order to ease command and control problems. This principle would be the Reconnaissance role modern equivalent of the 'Macship' Naming the radar contacts. This role whereas the operation of larger A/S is becoming increasingly important as helicopters from suitable additional the range of guided weapons increases decks such as container ships would beyond the ranges where visual identi-

possible submarine contact and not as a routine screening method.

fication is feasible. Positive identification or recognition of a target is invariably featured in a commander's rules of engagement and the only ways round this, without closing the range and endangering own ship, are electronic support measures (ESM) or visual identification from an aircraft. Inevitably the compiling of a surface picture, without help from an aircraft, takes ships away for long periods and so leaves the command with the unenviable choice of compromising his primary task while he investigates and identifies each surface contact, or accepting the risks inherent in not doing

Leanders of all weapon systems except for a bofors type gun, their surface radar and communications and fit a Lynx on them.
Utility roles The utility roles of the helicopter at sea must not be forgotten. These important tasks have not changed dramatically in name but the Fleet now accepts that the most practical method of doing these jobs is by 'chopper'. These miscellaneous roles include: - ferrying tasks - SAR - loadlifting and storing ship (VERTREP) - casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) - boarding parties - showing the flag In all these the Lynx will operate far more effectively than its predecessor. In practice this will result in the aircraft being required to do a great deal more work in addition to its primary role. Communications and electronic warfare The quantity and vulnerability of present ship-to-helicopter communications call for firm measures of improvement. The amount of traffic will certainly be less from the Lynx as the observer should always know the exact position of both the ship and the aircraft, and it should not be necessary for the ship to take charge of the instrument recoveries. The problem, however, is only solved when tactical information can be passed quickly, securely and, so far as practicable, discreetly. The ultimate answer lies with directional data links coupled with a comprehensive set of operating frequencies but until this is achieved great improvements are still possible by tightening up procedures. The service life of a helicopter such as the Lynx will be about twenty years and therefore it is most important that it should be possible to up-date equipment, particularly electronics, to keep

The Lynx is very well suited to the recce role with its Sea Spray radar, ESM outfit and its reasonable speed of 145 knots. It is important also to have electro-optical aids so that this task may be carried out at night, rather than using the unsatisfactory methods of dropping flares. An integral part of the aircraft in this role is the TANS navigational computer which could enable the aircraft to build up and report a surface picture to a ship keeping radio silence. Patrolling our patch o f ocean. Recce tasks may well end up by employing the aircraft for more time than the ASW or ASV roles. One typical job which undoubtedly will be dealt out to the Lynx will be helping to patrol the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This is another instance where our small number of ships must rely on helicopters to provide the large area of influence necessary if any service is to be effective. The Lynx with its sensors would be capable of giving the ship information so that it would steam direct to any incident that might require investigation. If this task is to be done convincingly, purpose-built ships, which are capable of carrying helicopters, should be ordered. An alternative would be to strip old frigates, such as the Rothesays or early

pace with the technological advances as well as the changing requirements for the aircraft. The diversity of roles is a feature common to nearly all aircraft. With fixed wing this is often done by fitting specialised 'pods' externally because of the limited space available inside and the need for quick role changes. Normally the helicopter tends t o have all its specialized equipment internally but there would be an advantage in having some podded equipment in common with the fixed wing. This is especially so in the case of aircraft tasked in the Electronic Warfare role where they might carry equipment such as jammers, chaff dispensers or decoys.

Conclusions Operation of helicopters from R.N. ships has progressively improved with experience which, when combined with modern technology, results in the Navy being well placed to use the Lynx to maximum advantage. The ground for its introduction has been successfully prepared by its predecessors particularly with respect to deck operations, maintenance and support. The additional roles that the helicopters have taken on have also greatly increased their importance to their ships; there is, however, a dangerous path here leading to a mediocre service because of over commitment. The main significant addition has been the introduction of the attack role to the Wasp which, when

developed for the Lynx, will give both large and small navies the capability to threaten a sophisticated enemy ship. The Lynx ASW role must be complementary to IKARA by being capable of relocating and attacking long range contacts; this will be a very different system to that currently used, and present tactics must be rethought accordingly. Additional knowledge will be required by the aircrew and maintainers which will increase the already long and expensive training but standards must remain high to justify the reliance placed on the helicopter by the ship. In achieving this the temptation of having a flight top-heavy with senior ratings must be avoided and responsibility must continue to be delegated throughout the flight and associated ship departments. The small ship helicopter must be integrated with the role of the surface ship and this reliance will become more apparent as the number of hulls decreases while the total area of commitment remains static. This influence is possible if the helicopter's main gifts of flexibility of operating platforms and roles is used, and if the Mk 4 Lynx is introduced so that it is allowed to start its life with a realistic endurance. The future for the Lynx is bright and the Wasp, being the father of the revolution, must be respected for its great part in the conception of a significant fleet weapon. C . J. de MOWBRAY

Ready, Aye Ready!
At the time of the Munich Crisis, in 1938, it was generally accepted that, while neither the Army nor the Air Force was ready for war, the Navy was. But, was it? At that time I was enjoying a Senior Officers War Course at Greenwich when I received an immediate appointment to H.M.S. Broke as Captain (D) of the 14th (Minelaying) Flotilla, and so to Portsmouth. There I found the flotilla was to consist of a dozen destroyers whose only quality was that they were fitted to lay mines. Two were from the Home Fleet and therefore entirely reliable, but the remainder were 'S', 'V' and 'W' class ships from Home Port local flotillas or the Reserve Fleet. These were manned by officers and ratings from courses at the Home Ports, as there had then been no mobilisation. This ad hoc arrangement caused considerable chaos in the drafting offices when mobilisation was ordered a week or so later. Meanwhile I learnt that my Leader had been paid off into 'C. and M.' for a very long refit at Devonport. I therefore requested the Admiralty to allocate to me one of the several Leaders which were in Reserve and ready for service. My request was not granted so I sent the junior C.O. to Devonport to take over my command while I had the top of Vortigern's funnel painted black and conducted my business from her. In a day or so the after guns and torpedo tubes had been removed from all the ships and the mine rails rigged, but there was no sign of any mines. These were, I learnt, 'H' type, left over from World War I and stored at Manningtree near Harwich. The plan was that the first outfit of seventy-two mines per destroyer should be sent to the mining depot at Bedenham (near Portsmouth) while further outfits were to be sent to our operational base which was to be Dover. Here the mines were to be stored in the old Channel Tunnel workings, but nothing went according to plan. To begin with, some party of 'safety firsters' decided that mines were very dangerous and instead of the train loads of mines coming to Portsmouth, they were being sent to Wales where they were to be lowered down disused coalmines; however, the trains were rerouted to Portsmouth, where they eventually arrived. But not so good a t Dover. It had been decreed that there was to be no interference with business, commerce or industry and the planners were apparently not aware that the Channel Tunnel Workings had been leased to a firm of champagne importers. Other storage had therefore to be found. Accordingly, the Superintendent a t Bedenham sent his No. 2 to Kent to look for some old quarries or coal mines where the mines could be stored and was infuriated when after three days he had received no report and had no contact with his man. I t seems that the somewhat furtive movements of No. 2 had aroused the suspicions of the then 'Dad's Army', who had arrested him. Rather naturally they declined to believe his story or to communicate with Bedenham until they had represented the whole case to their Headquarters, and that took time. I then went to Chatham to report t o the C-in-C Nore as I was expecting to operate from Dover which was in his command. H e was 'Antarctic Evans' and he quickly disillusioned me about Dover. The harbour had been allowed to silt up since World War I and the only deep water passage was through the Western Entrance to the cross channel steamer piers. At the best only one or two destroyers could anchor in the main harbour so that I, with my twelve destroyers and two surveying ships would




have to operate from Sheerness. The C-in-C then shewed me a large scale chart of the Eastern Approaches to the Straits of Dover, spread out on his billiard table. This shewed four lines of mines between the French coast and the Ruytigen Bank, lettered A, B, C, D, and I was told that they were to be laid in that order. As line A was the western one and nearest to Dover I at once protested that that was back to front as any attack would come from the east and, if we had already laid one or more lines, we would have to withdraw over our own minefield. I added, however, that that would not worry me over much as I doubted if World War I mines would explode however hard they were bumped. The C-in-C entirely agreed that the laying plan was back to front; he had already rung up someone in the Admiralty about it, only to be told that the plan had received 'Board Approval' and therefore could not be changed. So I returned to Portsmouth to find the Flotilla fully loaded with mines and ready for sea. I then realised that no one in the flotilla had ever seen a mine laid. Worse still, the Mining Department of Vernon could not produce any 'Child's Guide to Minelaying'. So we made our own plans and went to sea on the next two days to exercise them and to fire our few remaining guns. When we returned to harbour and berthed in three groups of four at North Corner I found there was much interest being worked up over A.R.P. so the next day I went to call on the Captain of Vernon to ask if he thought it was in order for twelve destroyers each with seventy-two primed mines on deck to be bunched together at North Corner. He did not know the answer for sure so sent for his Commander (M) who was equally uncertain so a civilian 'boffin' was called in. When told of the situation, he had no hesitation in saying that one bomb among the destroyers would undoubtedly touch off all the mines and the

resultant blast would put the dockyard out of action for quite a long time. When this information was passed to the C-in-C there was an immediate reaction and the flotilla was ordered to proceed with all despatch and anchor at Spithead. However, a day or two later Neville Chamberlain w a v e d his 'magic umbrella'; the crisis subsided, and I was told to resume my course at Greenwich, leaving the flotilla to return gear. A few days later a meeting was arranged at Greenwich, attended by the S.O.W.C., the Staff College, and various planners and operators from the Admiralty. The object was to discuss mobilisation and readiness for war and those involved were told to tell the plain unvarnished truth. So when my turn came, I did, and recounted my experience as recorded above. This was obviously very badly received by the planners and operators so to cheer them up, I told how the Coxswain of H.M.S. Rosemary had reported to the Chief Staff Officer, Reserve Fleet: 'H.M.S. Rosemary ready for sea in all respects except that there are no officers.' The odd lay-out of the minefield was discussed without any satisfactory explanation being found or given until a week or so later when Dickie Mountbatten, who was one of the War Course, asked to be allowed to make a statement about the minefield. With his usual thoroughness and energy, he had gone into the whole matter and found it started from an Admiralty planner who, over-imbued with the need for secrecy, rang up the Captain of Vernon and asked for a plan of a minefield for the Eastern Approaches to the Straits of Dover, for use in a War Game at Greenwich. The Captain passed the job to the Commander (M) who delegated it to one of his Officers who passed it on to an Able Seaman Writer. There being no one he could pass it on to, he did the job - and it was given 'Board Approval'. H. B. CRANE

The Atlantic Treaty Association
22nd Annual Assembly, Copenhagen, 3-6 September 1976

He who commands the sea has command o f everything. - Themistocles 500 B.C.

Summary of Discussion
The North Atlantic Treaty was aptly named after the one ocean of the world upon which our survival depends. The importance of sea power, however, is in danger of being forgotten by Treaty members, but not, it appears, by the Soviet Union. The Twenty Second Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, held at Copenhagen from 3 until 6 September 1976 was of great naval interest because particular attention was focussed on the rapidly growing Soviet world wide maritime challenge. Other important issues were the Communist political infiltration, particularly in France and Italy, the confused situation in the Iberian peninsula, and the continuing disputes between Greece and Turkey. The theme of the Assembly was 'The Threats to Freedom; The Atlantic Response'. First a word about the Atlantic Treaty Association. It is an international nongovernmental body composed of voluntary organisations from the fifteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and Malta. It has a four-fold aim: public relations; research; maintenance of strength, unity and friendship between members; and the eventual development of permanent relationships and co-operation within the Atlantic Community. The U.K. organisation is The British Atlantic Committee.* 'Ihe Assembly was addressed by Mr. M ~ l l e r ,the Danish Minister of Defence and Justice; Mr. Luns, the Secretary General of the Alliance: Vice Admiral *Applications for membership to: The Director, British Atlantic Committee, 36 Craven Street, London W.C.2 (01-930-0555/6). Jungius, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; Lord Chalfont; Mr. Polmar, a U.S. expert on maritime affairs, and General Lind on the problems of the Baltic. Professor Rostow, the retiring President of the Association, wound up the Assembly with an address entitled 'No Ground for Despair'. Members of The Naval Review are under no illusion about the menace of Soviet maritime expansion, added t o the already preponderant land and air forces of the Warsaw Pact. But the Soviet Union and its friends in other countries (such as our own) never cease to sow the seeds of dissenion and despair within the peoples of the NATO Alliance. They seek to bemuse public opinion, and hence to paralyse the will of popularly elected governments to keep up their defences. The technique is simple. The warnings of NATO's military leaders are denounced as militarism, until the moment is judged to have arrived when an overwhelming preponderance of Soviet military power can suddenly be disclosed and acknowledged with maximum publicity. Then the cry will be 'What hope have we of resisting the march of destiny - the triumph of communism, victory in the class struggle against the forces of reaction is assured.' Professor Rostow may not talk the language of NATO's military leaders, but his words and tone are such as to carry conviction with NATO's politicians, who alone can create and sustain the will of our peoples to stand fast, and to forego enough of what is socially desirable t o ensure the provision of what is militarily



essential. I t is for this reason that Professor Rostow's address is reproduced here, as Appendix 1. These Assemblies normally conclude with an agreed resolution which is forwarded to the NATO and national authorities, and to interested individuals and organisations. The military part of this resolution is included, verbatim, as Appendix 2 in this paper. What follows are some personal observations based on the various addresses and discussions. N o ddtente at sea I n spite of the Final Act at Helsinki i t is already clear that ditente means something quite different to the Soviet Union to what it does in the West, and the word has now been omitted from the American political vocabulary. The Soviet Union regard it as an opportunity to intensify the political, economic and ideological struggle, whilst avoiding nuclear war. Every opportunity must be taken for internal subversion, support of 'liberation movements' and carrying out outflanking operations. The exploitation of religious, national, racial and class divisions are all part of the same process. The flexibility of maritime power lends itself to backing up these activities, and the following remarks concentrate on this particular aspect of the much wider problem. The scale and rapidity of the Soviet maritime build-up and its extension world-wide has been one of the phenomena of the last decade. The Soviet war machine is now far larger than is required for the defence of the homeland, and is well adapted to all types of offensive operations. A t the same time other maritime powers have been reducing their forces with the result that the Soviet Union has the most modern and probably the largest maritime forces in the world. The argument that what is lost in quantity is made up for in quality is not valid at sea, although quality is obviously

important. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, when asked by a visiting ambassador what he required most replied 'numbers'. Warships and aircraft can only be in one place at any one time and their visual presence has great psychological value quite apart from their military potential. The same applies to the merchant, research and fishing fleets. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union, having already appreciated the value of 'showing the flag' all round the world and sending smart contingents of sailors ashore, are now applying the lesson to good effect. The U.S.A. loses decisive sea superiority over U.S.S.R. I n 1974 the U.S. Navy completed a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the relative capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet Navies. Fifteen different fields were studied: Amphibious Lift; A.A.; Anti-Shipping Missile Defence; Anti-Surface; Anti-Submarine; Combat Direction; Command, Control and Communications; Electronics; Mine Countermeasures; Offensive Mining; Logistics; Naval Gunfire Support; Protection Against Submarines; Strike Warfare; Surveillance. I n only five areas was the U.S. Navy superior. Unique developments in the Soviet Navy include the Delta I1 class SSBNs of 16,000 tons, each carrying 16 megaton-headed ballistic missiles with a range of 4,800 miles, probably torpedoes, and with an underwater speed of 25 knots. The Kara class cruisers are exceptional ships by any standards but, like all surface ships in the age of 'precision guided missiles', very vulnerable to attack. The Kiev and her two sister ships will enable the Soviet Navy to operate outside the range of shore based aircraft and to provide air cover for their very considerable amphibious capability. Soviet maritime aircraft operating from bases in the Soviet Union have penetrated as far as the Azores and



have a strike as well as a reconnaissance role. The Soviet Research Fleet is another remarkable development and is now larger than all the other research fleets in the world. Its duties include intelligence, oceanography, meteorology, space research and communications. Its largest vessel is the Kosmonaut Yuri Gagarin of 45,000 tons equipped for space research. Two maritime satellite surveillance systems are already in operation. I t might be added that the very large Soviet fishing fleet concentrates on fishing and any intelligence gathering is purely incidental. Naval strategy and deployments A glance at the world map shows Western Europe as a comparatively small peninsula jutting out from the vast Eurasian continent bounded by the Baltic, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and Black Seas. It is hardly necessary to emphasise the dependence of Western Europe in general and Great Britain in particular on the sea for food, oil, raw materials, exports and troop movements. Enough to say that about 7,000 NATO merchant ships are a t sea or in harbour on any one day. Only the Baltic and Atlantic were discussed at the Assembly although the growing importance of the threat in the Mediterranean and Middle East, not forgetting Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, was fully appreciated. Warsaw Pact activity has also built up considerably in the Baltic over the last decade. The island of Zealand is frequently circumnavigated; permanent patrols have been established south of Sweden; large amphibious exercises are carried out close to the Danish frontier and squadrons of bombers fly within ten miles of the Danish coast. Moving out into the Atlantic one can see that the recent 'Cod War' with Iceland, the activities of the IRA in Ireland, the troubles in Portugal, the

Soviet base a t Conakry and finally the Russo/Cuban occupation of Angola are all part of a process of encircling Western Europe and isolating it from North America. In addition to Conakry, Soviet bases have already been established at Berbera, Aden, Hodeida and Umm Quasr. Interest is also being shown in bases in Sri Lanka, India and Singapore. The strategic importance of Southern Africa can hardly be over-emphasised. Our moral duty for the protection and welfare of the people, both black and white, in Rhodesia and South Africa; base facilities; investments; raw materials, are all supremely important issues besides the protection of the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope. The West abandons this part of the world at its peril. The world's main merchant fleets Merchant navy numbers and tonnage are also of great interest and are shown in the following table:
Nation Numbers Tonnage in millions)

L~beria Japan U.K. Norway Greece U.S.S.R. U.S.A. Panama

1958 975 2,413 5,417 2,624 397 1.390 4,301 602

1974 2,332 9,974 3,603 2.689 2,651 7.342 4.086 1,962

1958 1974 10 55 5 38 20 3 1 9 24 2 2 1 3 18 26 14 11 4

These figures speak for themselves and it can be seen that about half the merchant ships now a t sea are flying Japanese or Soviet flags. The Soviet merchant marine is of particular interest because many of the ships can be used in an amphibious role and are fitted with heavy-lift cranes and roll on-roll off facilities. They are also closely integrated into the Soviet Navy and both are centrally controlled from Moscow. U.S.S.R. military manpower The Soviet Union have some considerable manpower advantages over the west. Their conscription is for three years in the navy and two years in the other services. Thus there is a large



pool of trained manpower. The service any rational calculation we should be pay is far less than in the west and the hard pressed to win. The key papers to 'differentials' much greater. Finally a which our dialogue has been addressed much higher proportion of the Soviet contend that we are once again in the defence budget is spent on equipment quandary we faced during the Thirties, than on personnel. The reverse is true in when Hitler and his allies threatened the West. war, and prepared for war, but we did Admiral Gorshkov who has been not believe him, and remained paralyzed Commander-in-Chief for twenty years until it was too late to do anything but and is the main architect of the modern fight. Soviet navy has been compared with A large part of western public opinion Admiral Jacky Fisher who did much the still resists the hypothesis which has been same for the Royal Navy before the put before us, in the name of decency and First World War. One of the latter's good will, just as decent and well meanaphorisms could well provide inspiration ing democratic opinion resisted the comfor the western response to the Soviet parable hypothesis forty years ago. Our challenge: 'Think in oceans, sink at esteemed friend, and our new president, sight!' The former point has been Dr. Karl Mommer, who has so honourignored for far too long. The latter may ably shared the agony and triumph of sound a bit drastic in times of so called the human spirit in our time, summed peace but the message is clear enough: up the central issue perfectly on Friday, That which thy fathers have bequeath- when he expressed the prevailing ed to thee, earn it anew i f thou wouldst scepticism, to say the least, about possess it'. HUGHMULLENEUX whether the leaders of the Soviet Union were really capable of conceiving and carrying out so evil a policy. If what THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION Lord Chalfont says is true, Dr. Mommer Appendix 1 argued, the Soviet regime is as bad as N o ground for despair Hitler's. 'Can this really be the case?' Address by Eugene V. Rostow he asked. retiring President of the Atlantic I suggest that we seek an answer to Treaty Association (1973-1976) Dr. Mommer's primordial question in In this brief valedictory, I shall confine Sigmund Freud's great book, Civilization myself to one theme which emerged and its Discontents. History, Freud said, with great force during the discussion of is dominated by the struggle between both items on the agenda of this two forces within every human being, Assembly: is the menace of Soviet policy and every culture: The force of aggresto western civilisation as grim as the sion, of hatred, of destruction for its statistics make it seem? If one looks to own sake, of death, on the one hand; the future through columns of figures and on the other, the force of what about tacks, warships, and missiles, one Freud, following St. Paul, called love, cannot resist the formidable hypothesis Eros, and life - the human instinct for proposed by Lord Chalfont, Admiral order, justice and creation; the instinct Jungius and Mr. Polmar: the hypothesis which produces gardens, libraries, and that is, that we are rapidly losing our cities as beautiful as this one. Freud capacity to deter Soviet aggression, and argued that the discontents of civilizatherefore that we face an imminent tion arise from the fact that civilization choice, according to the mandarins of must restrain the instinct for aggression nuclear logic - between capitulation and the death-wish in order to give scope and a war or series of wars which on to the instinct for life.



Lord Chalfont described this dilemma as the eternal problem of finding an appropriate balance between freedom and order. It is a problem every society confronts, and one which each society must resolve in ways which satisfy its own particular history, its habits, and its code of values. With the bias of my own profession, I should describe this dilemma as the perennial and perpetual problem of law. As someone once remarked, 'There have been many cultures in the past which reached the level of civilization without benefit of law'. The Russian culture, like every other, has elements from both of Freud's categories: Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great; Stalin and the men of 1905; Bolsheviks and Mensheviks; prophets of tyranny and some of the finest and most heroic of modern voices from the chorus of humanity: Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Siniavsky, Akhmatova and the others. Out of the crucible of their experience, these Russian writers have become the natural leaders of the libertarian movement which may, and I hope, will achieve the renaissance of western civilization. I should answer Dr. Mommer's question, therefore, in this way: Russian history contains both the men of the Gulag Archipelago and those of the tradition of Tolstoy, Turgenev and Checkhov, just as German history contains both Hitler and Schiller, Lessing, Goethe, Heine, Thomas Mann, and Heinrich Boll. In Russia, for the moment at least, the men of the Gulag Archipelago are in charge. They are as bad as Hitler, and their foreign policy, like Hitler's, is one of naked imperialism, comparable in every way to their internal policy of suppressing freedom by sending men and women of moral independence to the Gulag Archipelago and to mental hospitals. It is now clear beyond doubt that they will continue to expand their infiuence until they are

stopped by the confrontation of unacceptable risk. Does that fact make our task hopeless? Should we yield to the wave of the future, become hewers of wood and drawers of water for the overlords of totalitarianism, and wait in silence for a better day? Certainly not. While many in the West are uncertain of our course, hesitant and confused; while the West has retreated during the last few years, and lost a few forts along the frontier, there is no objective need for us to feel weak, to act weak, and to retreat. Our position is good, better in fact than it has been in a long time, because China has turned to the West for protection against the Soviet Union, an event of profound significance for the structure of world politics, and the possibility of peace. Our weakness is in our minds, not in the stars, or the reality of world affairs. Only we can cure ourselves, and we must do so soon, by facing the facts without illusion, and basing our policies on those facts. Building enough warships, tanks, and missiles to maintain deterrence at every level will be the easiest part of the task of preserving our freedom, once our political leaders talk to our people exactly as Mr. Luns, Lord Chalfont, Admiral Jungius, and Mr. Polmar talked to us at this Assembly. There is still time - not much time, but enough - to protect the safety of the Atlantic nations through peaceful deterrence and well conceived diplomacy rather than through war. Until that is done - by the Atlantic Allies in the areas affecting the security of Europe, and by the United States and its Pacific Allies in the areas affecting their security in Asia - until, that is, the coalitions and alliances of the free nations can once more effectively deter or defeat aggressions against our vital interests, no other goal of our foreign policy is within reach. Until world power is stabilized.



politically and militarily, we cannot hope to restore an integrated, progressive, and non-inflationary world economy, on which our own prosperity depends. And until that primary goal is achieved, we and the other industrialized democracies will be unable to achieve just systems of economic cooperation with the developing nations and those of the communist world. In his statement of welcome on Friday, our distinguished host here, Per Markussen, the President of the Danish Atlantic Association, recalled the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty as a response to the weakness of the United Nations as an institution capable of enforcing the provisions of the United Nations Charter. As he stressed, NATO is not an alternative to the United Nations, but a regional defence arrangement under the Charter, and a recognized and rightful method for enforcing it regionally when the Security Council is unable or unwilling to do so. For the reasons I offered in my address a t The Hague two years ago, I believe that Mr. Markussen's view is the heart of our problem. For the men and women who lived through the collapse of the League of Nations in the Thirties and the Second World War which followed; for the delegates who drafted and ratified the Charter in 1945 and the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949; for those who authorized and fought in Korea between 1950 and 1954, it was self-evident that peace is indivisible, in Litinov's phrase, and that man's best hope for peace and progress lay in the enforcement of the Charter as a new system of world politics ordered by law. They were completely convinced that the Second World War would never have taken place if the democratic nations and the Soviet Union had upheld the Covenant of the League, and stood firm against aggression during the thirties in Manchuria, Ethiopia and Spain, and particularly in the Rhineland

and Czechoslovakia. Their minds were dominated by the searing memory of the Emperor of Ethiopia asking the League for protection against aggression, and being heard in silence. I n the aftermath of Korea and Vietnam, this view of world politics has been gravely weakened. Western public opinion is no longer convinced that peace is indivisible. And it no longer believes that collective enforcement of the Charter - that is, collective security against aggression - is the best way to protect its interests in world politics. But no alternative policy has been accepted to replace it, and indeed n o alternative policy has been suggested t o achieve peace in our small, turbulent, and dangerous world. Meanwhile, uncertain of our course, we continue in the older pattern, but without conviction, flexibility, energy, or imagination, adrift and divided. The effort to impose generally accepted rules of restraint with regard to the international use of force in world politics goes back to the Congress of Vienna and the volcanic experience of war which preceded it. For a century, the Concert of Europe was generally successful in maintaining a system of peace and minimizing the use of force within it. The process of peace suffered a setback in 1914. It was resumed after the First World War through the Covenant of the League of Nations. It failed again in the Thirties and was taken up once more in the Charter of the United Nations. The rules of the Charter are clear, and have been interpreted and restated (though not enforced) with surprising consistency by the Security Council and other international authorities for more than thirty years. Save in cases of individual or collective self-defence, or enforcement action by the Security Council, the Charter prohibits the international use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-



dence of all States, whether members of the U.N. or not. Equally, it imposes upon them absolute responsibility for the use of force from their territories by irregular forces, guerillas, mercenaries, or armed bands. The principles of international law which made Great Britain responsible to the United States for failing to prevent the Confederate cruiser Alabama from putting to sea retain their vitality. The Charter prohibits the Brezhnev Doctrine and so-called wars of national liberation as categorically as it prohibits all other forms of aggression. Even in the heyday of the Truman Doctrine, exceptions to the apparent universality of the Charter were tacitly recognized. The United States and its European allies made no serious attempt to invoke the Charter with regard to Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe; the area was recognized in fact, though not in form, as a Soviet sphere of influence. Similarly, neither the United States nor any other power sought to apply the rules of the Charter to the process of African decolonization. In recent years, the exceptions to the rules of the Charter have begun to loom larger than the rules themselves. The number, scale and importance of international aggressions have increased dramatically - aggressions supported in each case by the Soviet Union. That fact challenges the possibility of the political system posited by the United Nation's Charter - a system of world politics ordered by law: a system more just than the Imperial system of the past, and more progressive; a system which sought to develop peaceful procedures for vindicating human rights and the self determination of peoples; but above all, a system of international peace. The process of aggression is cumulative and self-reinforcing. Its momentum is increasing, and becomes more difficult to contain. The restraints of civilization about which Freud wrote are

dissolving before our eyes. We are close to the point of witnessing the disappearance of the Charter of the United Nations as an influence in world politics, just as we saw the Covenant of the League vanish a generation ago. Unless this process is promptly arrested; unless the world soon returns to the principles of the Charter, the spread of aggression will threaten the minimal goals of our foreign policy the achievement of equilibrium in world power, the foundation of our own survival, and of all our efforts to fulfil the broader economic, social, and political goals of our diplomacy. The lesson of the last few years, written in every day's newspapers, is that peace is indeed indivisible. The time has come, I believe, for the North Atlantic allies to examine these trends carefully and at length, and to reach a common and concerted position with regard to them. The slide towards anarchy in international politics must be stopped, and reversed, before it overwhelms the possibility of peace. If the Atlantic allies act together as partners in this effort; if the United States and its Pacific allies do likewise; and if China, whose interests parallel our own, acts in concert with us, our combined influence is surely enough to help restore the vitality of the Charter, which states our deepest aspiration, and our most fundamental interest in world politics. Obviously, the allies will have to rearm to restore our deterrent strength, both nuclear and conventional. I t is equally obvious that we shall have to restore and revitalize the processes of political consultation on which alliance solidarity depends. While these indispensable steps are being taken, I believe we must make one central and imperative point unmistakably clear, and that we must do so as soon as possible. We can no longer accept a situation in which we live by



remain essential to its capacity for deterrence and defence. The Assembly reviewed the rapid increase in the U.S.S.R.'s naval strength, and the development of Soviet activity in areas outside the Treaty area as well as in the North Atlantic. It is noted that while these developments cannot be justified by considerations of Soviet defence, the security of the Atlantic and other vital sea routes is absolutely essential to the security of the Alliance, both in peace and in war. The Assembly noted in particular the accelerated growth of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact naval activity in the Baltic area and the continuous full-scale exercises of naval vessels, including landing-craf t, supported by aircraft, up to the limits of Danish territorial waters, all to an extent which is beyond defence requirements for the area, and prejudices the balance of naval power to a degree placing considerable added strain on the Alliance. In the opinion of the Assembly, the security of the Alliance has also been adversely affected by recent events outside the North Atlantic area. The THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION new ability of the Soviet Union to Appendix 2 intervene world-wide, as in Angola, is A.T.A. 22nd Annual Assembly, 1976, perhaps the most momentous developFinal Resolution (Part Il Military) ment in recent years. The Assembly considers that while the While the steady growth of Soviet superiority on land has been threatening Treaty area should remain unchanged, Europe for a long time, the recent it is essential that the security of our spectacular increase in Soviet naval trade routes carrying vital supplies to capabilities and their rate of growth the West should not be placed in have established a new threat to the jeopardy by the absence of effective Alliance's vital lines of communication deterrent naval power in regions beyond in the North Atlantic, the South the Treaty area. The Assembly therefore urgently Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. It was therefore decided to concentrate this reiterates the recommendations of its year on the implications of these 1974 and 1975 resolutions to the effect developments for the security of the that consultations, planning, and possibly Alliance. The defence of Europe and the exercises connected with such problems control of the seas are the vital and should be studied by the North Atlantic interdependent problems of the Alliance. Council, and that interested members of Balanced strength and force planning the Alliance should undertake approfor all services within the Alliance priate consultation and action, as

the rules of the Charter governing the international use of force, while the Soviet Union and its proxies, satellites, and allies violate those rules on a scale which becomes larger, more pervasive, and more dangerous with every passing year. The tacit exceptions to the Charter which have been acknowledged in state practice in the past - the failure to apply the principles of the Charter in Eastern Europe, or in the process of decolonization in Africa - now threaten to swallow the rules, and to destroy them. Unless we insist on mutual and reciprocal respect for the rules of the Charter, those rules will surely disappear, as the rules of the Covenant of the League disappeared a generation ago. Then, too late, men will realize again the role of law in human society, and face once more the tragic task of bringing order out of anarchy and chaos. Lord Chalfont quoted a famous comment by Edmund Burke, and I conclude by following his example: 'For evil to prevail, it is only necessary that good men do nothing.'




envisaged by the Harmel Resolution adopted in 1967. In this context, the Assembly recommends: that the members of the Alliance should study the possibility of obtaining more supplementary services and organized co-operation for their navies from their merchant fleets; that the submarine and anti-submarine capabilities be improved; that the Alliance should make greater efforts to assess Soviet capabilities and intentions outside the Treaty area, and that an appraisal by the Alliance of tactical nuclear weapons at sea be considered an urgent need. In order to restore the deterrent balance, it is indispensable to increase Alliance land and air forces as well as naval forces. To this end, the Assembly urges Alliance governments:

1) to undertake active information

programmes to inform their publics of the increasing Soviet military threat and to elicit public support for the real improvements in defence effectiveness which are required; 2) to undertake co-operative defence measures which will permit the military forces of the Alliance to operate more effectively with each other; 3) and, to this end, to harmonize military doctrine, procedures and equipment. In this regard, the Assembly noted that the proposed tank standardization agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany might well serve as a model in related areas.

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The article is dedicated to the memory o f Surgeon Lieutenant Maurice John Hood, Medical Oficer o f H.M. Destroyer Obdurate. He was blown up in the vicinity o f Bear Island in the Arctic Ocean, while on board an American liberty ship in the convoy carrying ammunition to North Russia. He was transferred at sea during daylight hours in response to a call to save the life o f one of the crew members suffering from acute appendicitis. He, his patient, and all hands were lost when a German submarine torpedoed the merchant ship shortly before midnight. There were no survivors, and Surgeon Lieutenant Hood was the only officer holding His Majesty's commission who lost his life during the passage o f that particular convoy. Be not the slave of words: is not the distant, the dead, while I love it, and long for it, and mourn for it, here, in the genuine sense, as truly as the floor I stand on? Thomas Carlyle

A motley crew
Over the first fifty years of this century, the early schooling of professional officers in the Royal Navy fitted them to a common standard which finds expression in the granting to them, in their early twenties, of Her Majesty's Commission. The avenues leading to this juncture have varied from public, private, direct-

grant and grammar school education to scholarship awards of various types, selection from the dower-deck for some sort of subordinlate officer training, and variations on sub-specialist skills developed over a wide range of disciplines. Medical s&wl graduation, for instance, demanded a minimum of further training before the uniform of a commissioned


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officer of (the Armed Forces of the Crown set the seal of the 'young doctor' at home in the wardroom. An esprit de corps, or elitism, has generally been generated among the young men concerned, with its source often a school, such as Dartmouth, public school, Keyham or Manadon, or some years of submarine and flying training, laced with early operational experience. Reverting from the general to the particular, there is still, within the senior ranks of the Royal Navy, the war experienced officer who holds dear his alma mater be it Darttmouth in its pre-war guise, or the submariner who finds it at Fort Blockhouse, presided over by a portrait of Lieutenant Commander Wanklyn V.C., sufficient to stir the loyalties of even the youngest 'third hand'. Ad valorem Similarly, at Yeovilton, the atmosphere can mirror, to a whole generation of jet-age aviators, the Image of Lieutenant Commander Esmonde V.C., pressing home his torpedo attack against impossible odds. His ancient 'stringbag' broke through the grey overcast of the English Channel, twisting through the serried layers of Messerschmidt 109 fighter patrols unscathed to the point where he dropped his torpedo under the bows of the breakaway Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, on, into their flak-barrage which signalled his certain death. No Malrin-Baker 'bang-seat' for him and his observer, as their Swordfish was, literally, blown from the sky. At So~thwick Park the 'Maproom' with its D-Day 1944 connotations, and General Eisenhower connections, recalls the 'invade Europe' decision and fuses the proud, aggressive spirit of the past with the professionalism of today. Whale Island for $thegunnery specialist, Vernon for the TAS and old torpedomen, CoNingwood for the weapon electronics man, these are only the first of a string

of stone frigates who have known a brief spdl as the alma mater for those whose business is truly in, on, or over the distant oceans. Pre-war destroyer captains and first lieutenants would claim just as strong a bond or professional elitism, although tbeir alma mater was non-existent (other than in their own minds) or, jocularly, within the walls of a certain distillery not too far from Plymouth. Make no mistake over this latter breed, though. They took almost alone on their young shoulders the whole burden of sustaining the war against fthe victorious Germany of 1939140. They exhausted themselves as the ready spearhead of our generally unready forces in those years. Because they were ready, their hallmark was an amused contempt for any shorebound bureaucracy, and an independence of spirit maltched only by their burning loyalty to their Captain (D). Written rules had precious little for them, except possibly the one Article of War which, paraphrased, directs captains to 'engage the enemy more closely'. Service ashore was virtually unknown to them, and since they had no well-oiled publicity machine to 'puff' them as a breed, hardly anyone now remembers, or is aware of what they did, and endured, from tlhe Arctic to the Atlantic and Mediterranean. I wonder how many people canvassed in the street now would remember the name of Warburton-Lee, or the significance of the First Battle of Narvik? 'Far called our nav'ies melt away, on dune and headland sinks the fire' wrote the long-sighted Rudyard Kipling in his 'Recessional', composed towards the end of Queen Victoria's reign. Though the lines of battleships he knew have melted away, just as the heavy bomber squadrons of the last war and heavy tank regiments of the army, and in due time no doubt the latest guided missiles, will join the dusty relics in the museums, so, the proud spirit of service to an ideal

Sartor Resartus greater than self, must not, and will not, die. The note of nostalgia for the past, evident so far in this article is not, therefore, *he reason for the paper: un'like the poet who wrote of the deat5 of Sir John Moore at Corunna: And we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead And we birterly thought of the morrow. . . . the act of gazing, figuratively, at the dead of my generation makes me want to look at the morrow with hope, not bitterness, because bitterness, mate, never got nobody nowhere. Fortunately for us, the ultimate sdfllessness of a young Carpenter on Calvary Hill 1975 years ago, who chose the final sacrifice, for all of us, endorses that hope with certain faith.


of their own. A University is what the Navy needs all right, bat as the intensity of the technological training increases, so does the need increase for a balancing training of the mind, especially in the unshackled disciplines of art, nature and the classics. Education is not a process thgt begins at a certain age, and stops at another; nor is it merely a production line for the induction of certain techniques. I t is a continuing process of broadening of the whole man in his search for truth, and the more he specialises in one particular discipline, the greater the danger of him becoming an intellectual cripple in the complementary disciplines. Should an officer be earmarked for the higher ranks, it is vital that he make the effort (and be given the opportunity) to develop his latent talents and questioning initiatives. Reveille For 'the younger, active service reader Science, the arts and the creative who i s still with me, please do not give up humanities, in equilibrium, are the mark here, after enduring so long. Ante- of the mature mind, and are the essential deluvian though the tenor (and the qualities for successful leadership. author) of this treatise must seem, take Combined, of course, with self-discipline. courage, because the impact aimed for Such a harmonious combination is is towards the future. Before being unlikely to develop, in my experience of specific, perhaps I should set out its mature men, withoult the kindling of underlying purpose. On the very day on some awareness of the power-outsideh i c h I embarked on this work, my the-individual, which, according to our Ootdber 1975 number of The Naval various religious convictions we talk of Review arrived. It featured an excellently as the Ultimate Reality - or simply as descriptive and light-hearted article God. The hub, in fact, on which the called H.M.S. Dryland by John W~inton. wheel turns. The School of Maritime Operations is A true university must endow its the vogue name, so one would under- under-graduates with the opportunity of stand, for the stone frigate where every- questioning the conventional wisdom. one who is anybody goes nowadays, or This implies original thinking, not soon will, to learn the serious business of criticism for criticisms sake, and a good sea-fighting. In effect it is becoming a practical rule for a beginner is to refrain sort of University of Sea Warfare, pre- from public criticism of a dogma or a paring sailors for war, and much closer theory unless and until you have thought to the real thing than the short courses through, and propounded, an alternative held at Greenwich and attended by of your own. By this test no service certain ranks for brief periods with the establishment comes anywhere near the accent on schooling them in 'the definition of a true university, since a Wilderness of Whitehall' and similar 'failed p.s.c.' is the more likely outcome bureaucracies commanding a mystique of any serious attempt by a student to


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army training areas and dockyards, lowflying areas, bombing artillery and tank ranges, before one even starts to list the barracks, training establishments and schooIs with their associated married quarters, welfare and ancillary services. I want bigger, not fewer, armed forces, but how can one seriously argue such a proposition when our quarter of a million or so uniformed men are swallowed up in such a multip!licity of bricks and mortar and sheer acreage? Much of the acxage will surely have to go before long, and it is thus much in the service interest that such shore establishments which must, demonstrably, remain over the next fifty years or so, should be able to absorb and conserve all that was worth while in the output of 'the past fifty years of training. H.M.S. Dryland could be held by some to fit into this category, and it would appear that there is ample acreage for Southwick to absorb more if needs be. No reason either, so far as the outsider can see, why its expensive simulator equipment should not be run on a three-shift basis, like a ship at sea in fact, say for seventytwo hours, and the (traineesthen be given more scope t study and develop their o extra-mural interests, once they have made up on sleep, on the other days. The key t o one such interest, is, in fact, held by the Chaplain of that establishment, and since he has more than enough on his hands in catering for the spititual needs of his evanescent flock (at St. James-without-the-Priory usually), The Naval Review may be a good place to publicise a Quest: a modern day search for the Holy Grail as some might see it. The Great 3eal of Southwick Priory is of the same order of venerable antiquity as that of Canterbury Cathedral, the mother Church of all Christendom. The old priory foundations are still extant in the park grounds, and archaeology relates how the Augustine Canons of S t . Mary, at nearby Porchester Castle,

inject new thinking into the curiiculum of (say) the Staff Colleges nowadays. The Naval Review in h o t is the only avenue open t the young dissenter to o air his views, and it is only the discretion of a series of loyal editors, coupled with a singularly successful discretion in the private circulation membership rule, that has allowed it to survive so long. May it continue for many years to come, and, at least, until we have formed a finite University of the Navy. Bell, book and candle Our forefathers, founding Oxford, Cambridge and similar institutions, had no doubts about the necessity for true education being, and being seen to be, God-centred. Trinity, Christ Church, Corpus Christi were the names they gave their centres of learning, and they almost invariably built the accommodation, libraries and refectories in cohesion with a church or chapel. Their uncluttered minds appreciated that body, mind and spirit were all involved in the self-educating process of inquiry, so different from the 'knowledge-inculcating' process attempted in the schaols. Greenwich, of course, meets the physical requirements of a university, in that it is almost purpose-built, has a beautiful chapel and painted hall, and accommodation of sorts. Can it really be considered a university, though, when one remembers the 'inculcating' level of its various courses. It takes half the staff course nowadays to implant in mid-rank officers the mystique of 'clerking' required to shuffle papers successfully in the mys'tical jargon of the NATO and Whitehall bureaucracies. How much original thought is generated $here? I simply cannot believe, as a Itaxpayer, that the country can afford the proliferation of shore establishments now operated by the Armed Forces. Think of them all - the I.D.C., Latimer, Bracknell, Cambefley, Greenwich, aerodromes, stores and maintenance units,

Sartor Resartus
were moved there lock, stock and barrel by order of King Henry I in 1153 A.D. Many readers will be familiar with the roots of the Chiistian Tradition in this country, and in particular how the South Saxons founded small churches in the first few centuries A.D., which combined a brand of worship featuring hearsayhsed Christianity with their ancient superstitions and folklore. This was enough for Pope Gregory in Rome to decide that it was time that the Angles, Jutes, Brutes and Saxon natives of these islands should receive a sharp dose of the Authentic Faith, Roman Catholic version, and no nonsense. Accordingly he despatched Augustine to liaise with the Frankish kings at a convenient moment h e n there was a marital bond between them and King Ethelbert of Kent's dynasty, and in 597 A.D. the crossing of the Channel was accomplished. He established the Bridgehead of the Faith in a chapel near Thanet, and adjacent to the city of Durovernum. St. Augustine's Abbey became Canterbury Cathedral in due course, was granted its own Great Seal, and as each new Abbey was consecrated Westward and Northward, their seals were bestowed as the symbols of divine and secular authority. Rochester, Londinium, Verulamium (St. Albans), Silchester, Colchester, Winchester and Chichester, and 'all stations to Crew.' The Matrix, or iron press, which forms the Great Seal of Southwick was, until recently, in the possession of the Bonham-Carter family, having sojourned with successive Lords of the Manor of Southwicke for centuries. Whether it is still in private hands or whether it has found its way to the British Museum by now, I am unsure. I do know however, that it is high time it found its way back eo H.M.S. Dryland - just as soon as that stone frigate has found its soul, and ereded a su3table building (nearly said cathedral) or centre, worthy of housing it. No, I'm sorry but the Dryad Club


would not do, nor the medical or dental centre, nor the tactical trainer; better it remain without-the-priory unltil first things are put first there, even though that take a decade or two.

St. Patrick's breastplate There d l 1 be those amongst us who will see little relevance in symbols or gestures, and many more who have not the time to equate the symbols, or the deeds they recall, with anflhing more than a dead past. A few will appreciate the idea of an ecumenical building, enshridng the lives and brave actions of their forebears who gave their all in world wars fought to prevent mental and physical slavery from engulfing us all . . . as Europe was engulfed only thirty .odd years ago and as Czechoslovakia - one hour's flight from Heathrow - was engulfed less than ten years ago. Warburton-Lee and Walker, Wanklyn and Esmonde, Dunbar-Nasmith and Gordon-Campbell, K e n n e d y and Cunningham and Luce . . . They were not found wanting when confronted with the supreme challenge to their fives or to their honour, and neither shall their successors fail when their turn comes; d only those successors be bred in the authentic tradition of Serve God, Honour the King, and Self-interest a poor third. King George VI gave voice to this authentic tradition, not only by his own example in his life, but also when he selected these words in his Christmas broadcast to 'the nation in the early pears of the last war (and when the odds on our survival were virtually nil): And I said to the man who stood at the gate of {the year: 'Give me a light that I may tread safely into the unknown.' And he replied: 'Go out into the darkness and put your hand into the hand d God. That shall be to you better than light and safer than a known way.'


Sartor Resartus

Let us ensure that the nursling Royal Navy of the future produces men of this cafiibre, because however it may disguise itself, on, in, under or above the seas, in international or national clcithes and paintwork, or locked in new vehicles and systems, it is by its individual, creative, spirits that it will stand or fall in the end. I t is the individual that matters, his

self-respect, his unbroken spirit, his free and fearless character. The State, whether it be .its bureaucracy or its training apparatchik, exists only to protect and foster him. To put that Christian lesson into practice, and to teach it to all mankind, is our historic and worthwhile function. Let us return to it. OBDURATE

Thoughts on the Military Profession
At the height of the October 1973 Middle East crisis, a civilian friend said to me, 'This war makes you military types respectable again.' Even making allowances for friendly flippancy, this statement by a liberal intellectual indicates at least some awareness of the role of armed forces in the modern world. Unfortunately, it was more an expression of an emotional response than the product of reflection and thought. Serious questioning which leads to a re-examination of the role of armed forces in the world today is good. Technology has given man the means of destroying the world with nuclear weapons, as well as working extensive hardship and suffering upon combatants and non-combatants alike, with nonnuclear or conventional weapons. Men are now seriously questioning the legitimacy of force to settle pressing political and social problems. This does not mean that universal peace, along with sweetness and light are apt to break out in the near future. However, it does mean that today more than ever before, the professional military officer, along with his civilian colleagues, must study war and the use of force in order to avoid making wrong decisions which could prove to be disastrous for mankind. Even though the legitimacy of the use of force, and in particular the employment of armed forces by one state against another, is subject to more rigorous questioning than ever before, the possibility of war continues to exist. This is because each nation reserves to itself the right to fight or not to fight for the protection, preservation or extension of its national interests. So long as there is no authority superior to each state which has both the competence and the power to resolve in a definitive manner differences between states, each state will remain the ultimate arbiter of its fate. This includes the capacity to make the decision when to fight or not to fight. It is true there are treaties regulating relations among states, but even under the Charter of the United Nations each state reserves to itself the inherent right of self-defense. Certainly recent experience in the Middle East, in South Asia, in Eastern Europe and in Vietnam amply demonstrates the inability of the United Nations or any other international body to prevent states from going to war with one another, or even from using military force in a less violent, but coercive



Armed forces an instrument of the State Because the possibility of war exists, armed forces are thus created to serve as an instrument of the state. National defense is the common justification for the large expenditures required to establish and to maintain standing armies and navies. In some of the developing countries the armed forces play an important role in the internal stability of their respective nations. By and large, states find it necessary to maintain armed forces to some extent because they perceive a hostile or a potentially hostile environment. Professional military officers are charged with creating and maintaining armed forces capable of conducting combat operations in accordance with national policy. This is their basic task and it means they must understand national policy and they must tailor the military force structure so that it can, if needed, support with force that national policy. The clear implication here is that the civilian leadership must dominate the military establishment. In the United States the principle of civilian control or dominance over the military establishment has been sanctified by the Constitution and it is generally accepted as political dogma. The constitutional and political justifications are sound enough. However, these justifications rest on the realization that when employed, armed forces are the instruments by which specific objectives can be achieved. In other words, once a war breaks out it cannot be divorced from the situation that gave rise to it. War cannot be allowed to run its own independent course. Wars are not fought as athletic contests. They arise out of specific political situations and they derive their scope, intensity and original objectives from the antecedent political situation. Of course, as a war progresses the original objectives can be modified considerably for an almost infinite variety of reasons. In

Korea, for example, the United Nations forces first sought to repel the initial North Korean aggression and then they sought to unify the entire peninsula, before finally agreeing to a ceasefire a t approximately the 38th parallel.

The civil-military relationship I t is not sufficient to say simply that there should be civilian control or dominance over the military leadership. The relationship between the civilian and military sides is more complicated. I t is essentially a reciprocal relationship, in which the dominance of the civilian leadership is unquestioned, but in which the advice and any other inputs of the military leadership must be taken seriously. The decision to go to war is probably the most serious and most irreversible decision national leadership can make. Once a nation goes to war, if it perceives its entry into the war was an error, it may well be impossible to correct it. For example, on 11 December 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Hitler gratuitously declared war on the United States, although from his standpoint there was little or no need to do so. However, even if he had realized his error, it would have been extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for him to have returned to his previous position. For this reason, the military leadership must understand what the civilian leadership seeks, and the civilian leadership must understand the capabilities and the limitations of the military means a t their disposal. The conclusion is obvious: objections of the military leadership cannot be lightly dismissed. Thus, the relationship must be reciprocal. Few will deny that professional military officers have the exclusive responsibility of organizing and training military forces capable of combat operations. In the United States the Congress is the source of legislative



authority to create and to support the armed forces and it must provide the necessary funds for discharging this responsibility. However, the professional military officers have an equally important function, which is to plan for and to employ those armed forces in order to achieve the objectives established by the civilian leadership. It is clear these objectives must be reasonably capable of achievement by the military forces when they are employed in any given situation. Whether these objectives are in fact reasonable and bear some relation to reality depends upon the vitality of the reciprocal relationship between the civilian and the military leadership. It is all to the well and good for a military officer to recognize that there does in fact exist a reciprocal relationship between him and the civilian leadership. Yet, he still must hold up his end of it by relating the organization and the forces under his command and direction, and their combat capabilities to the achievement of the objectives established by higher authority. How does he or should he go about it? This is the crux of the problem for the professional military officer. At first glance it would seem that what he needs is a how-to formula, or a prescription for discharging his duties. The real world today is far too complex for one hundred per cent guaranteed prescriptions. I t probably always has been. The catastrophe of the First World War in which the German Army had only one plan which was to attack France through neutral Belgium (thus threatening England and ensuring her entry into the war), when the real quarrel was with Russia, should be adequate warning for all time against inflexible and unrealistic plans, no matter how brilliantly conceived. This lesson is obvious: both the civilian and the professional military officer must correctly evaluate and anticipate real and potential threats. The consequences of failure to do so can be

enormous, as the Kaiser found out. But, when nuclear powers are involved, they can be cataclysmic.

War must be studied The seeker of the infallible check-off list will be disappointed, for there is no universal formula for success. The real world is too complicated for panaceas. Even what are carelessly referred to as the principles of war are no more than maxims of good advice, to be used sparingly and with caution. War is far too complex and unpredictable to give rise to any theory or prescription which will guarantee success. Indeed, a favorite exercise for some military historians is to produce examples and instances where one technique worked and others where it failed. War, including other uses of military force, must be studied, not for lessons which can be learned from one set of circumstances and then applied to another as a guarantee of success. Rather, war should be studied for its own self; that is, to understand this enormously complex phenomenon and the titanic forces associated with it. The student of the phenomenon of war will be rewarded for his labours, just as the student of seamanship will be rewarded for his labours, in the latter case with a knowledge of weather, water and other forces affecting his ship. But he will not be a competent shiphandler by a long shot. He must go to sea for that. So, too, the student of war will not be a competent military commander, but he will be able to understand situations and their critical elements as well as to order and to arrange data in some rational manner. Both the student of seamanship and the student of war will have gained an understanding of the elements with which they must deal. The student of war must also be a student of strategy, as distinct from military history. In other words, he must have a conceptual



example, decisions must be made as to what that country would like to see happen in the world, who can best bring it about and, then, by what means can it be brought about. These decisions imply a previous identification and A definition of strategy In studying war and the use of military determination of national interests and forces, a definition or conception of any actual and possible threats to those strategy is necessary because it helps to interests. It is by no means an underidentify and to place in perspective the statement to say that these are important elements, as well as to enormously difficult decisions and relegate the unimportant aspects to determinations. They cannot be lightly their proper place. The best definition or easily made, if they are ever made of strategy is 'the comprehensive at all. No matter how great the direction of power to establish control difficulties may be, the civilian leadership is in no way excused from fulfilling its for the accomplishment of objectives.' Strategy is comprehensive in nature, part of the reciprocal relationship with because it must take into consideration the professional military leadership. counter-moves and reactions by an In short, the civilians must clearly tell opponent. Strategy involves at least two the military (1) what kind of wars they actors, and sometimes more. Also, may expect to fight, (2) what are the strategy in its broadest sense implies a ultimate and immediate objectives, and concert of the employment of the (3) what constitutes their achievement. various elements of national power: Equally important, the military leadermilitary, diplomatic, economic and so ship must insist that the civilians uphold on. At root strategy is concerned with their part of the reciprocal relationship the use of power for a purpose. by providing the requisite guidance. Strategy, even when military forces Only if this guidance is given can valid are involved, does not necessarily seek strategic planning be conducted. Such the destruction of the enemy as the guidance is fundamental to making ultimate goal. Rather, it seeks to sound military decisions. In those establish some sort of control over instances where the civilian leadership someone or something. If that control is unable or unwilling to provide the can be established without destruction, military leadership with the necessary so much the better. Destruction should guidance and information, the military be limited to the extent necessary to leaders are placed in a well-nigh inestablish control. The important thing tolerable position in which they are is that control is to be established for damned if they do and they are equally the purpose of producing a desired effect. damned if they do not. However, by The essence of strategy, therefore, is their professional nature and training control, but it is control for a desired they are likely to assume the guidance effect, which in turn is expressed in if it is not forthcoming from the political leadership. terms of specific objectives. The role of the professional military officer is to organize and to train armed Flexibility, not vacillation Nevertheless, it is unreasonable for forces capable of conducting combat operations pursuant to a specific strategic the professional military officer to expect concept. But before he can do this, the guidance from his civilian leaders to be civilian leadership must first make some so precise and definite that the war can fundamental political decisions. For be turned over to him for prosecution

framework to which he can relate various bits and pieces, order knowledge and tame data. Indeed, this is the function of any theory or concept.



with further or additional reference back to them. The real world is not that simple. Both the civilian and military officers must have a grasp of what each seeks to accomplish and what each reasonably can expect to accomplish. This mutual understanding requires flexibility and constant consultation and feedback from one to the other. Objectives must be modified as circumstances and practicality dictate. Both the civilian and the military leaders must be flexible, but they must not cross the sometimes faint and indistinguishable line to vacillation. Clearly historians and even the wizards of hindsight can spot errors far more easily than can the participants in specific events at the time. It is a risk that must be taken. However, it can be minimized by an understanding of both the necessity of the reciprocal relationship and how it must work. Even so, the responsibility of the professional military officer is to make sound military decisions. After all, this is his area of expertise. Before he can pretend to exercise his professional judgment, he must understand the phenomenon of war. H e must understand how a particular war relates to the antecedent political situation which gave rise to the war. H e must understand the dynamics of war and how the conduct of war modifies o r affects the political relationships among the belligerents, both his enemies and his allies. The history of warfare since man first became civilized enough to wage it provides an abundant variety of examples and instances for his study and edification. In peacetime, or at least in the absence of a shooting war, he must also make sound military decisions. The armed forces must still be maintained and organized. Their training and planning functions must be related to some concept of employment. But ancillary to this discharge of the professional functions of the military

officers is that of the civilian leadership who must tell their military commanders what kinds of war they can expect, or at the very least the uses to which the armed forces will be put. I t would be relatively simple if the statesmen, and the generals, could predict with accuracy what the next war will be like. The record for this kind of prediction is notably poor. In 1914 everyone thought the war would be short and decisive. In 1939 the French, ensconced in the Maginot Line, thought the war would be long. Prior to the Korean War, air force enthusiasts repeatedly told us the next war would be fought with nuclear weapons and heavy bombers exclusively.

Pity the poor politician? In this respect, the civilian leadership are neither crystal ball gazers, nor are they omniscient, any more so than the military leadership. The civilians are politicians and administrators of sorts. Some may even be statesmen of the first rank. They are concerned with domestic political pressures and problems, as well as with international politics. This reason, and that of human fallibility, may well be the best explanation of any lapses of judgment or failure to execute the civilian side of the necessary reciprocal relationship with the military leadership by telling them precisely what kind of war to prepare for. In one very real sense, identification of the enemy and a determination of the kind of war we will have to fight is a relatively new problem for us. After all, in the Cold War the existence of what we saw as the 'atheistic Communist monolith' provided us with international villains. If it was Red, it was bad. Before that, the experience of World War I1 left no doubt in anyone's mind that Hitler and the Japanese militarists were enemies with whom compromise was impossible. Uncondi-



tional surrender made life much more simple. The events of the last few years have proved unsettling and confusing. We find ourselves cooperating with the Soviets in the SALT talks and even to some extent in the Middle East. The President has been to Peking and has met Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese Communists have displaced the Nationalists on the United Nations Security Council. They have even been received at the White House. To make matters even less clear, we have had a highly unpopular war in Southeast Asia, about which the American people have been confused as to just what were our objectives. Whatever these objectives were, they never seemed to be achieved by our military forces. The point of the matter is that a determination of who are our enemies and who are our friends in which situation and to what extent are political decisions of the most fundamental kind. Needless to say, they are extraordinarily difficult to make. These decisions are the responsibility of the civilian leadership, which must deliberately and consciously either make them or decline to make them. However, they cannot be ignored. It is true that the civilian leadership frequently consults appropriate professional military officers who can and do influence decisions of this sort. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision and responsibility rests with the civilian leadership. Sound military advice So far much has been said of what is required of the civilian leadership to discharge their part of the reciprocal relationship with the military leadership. The professional military officer has much to contribute to this reciprocal relationship. His responsibility is to give professional military advice. He must ensure that it is just that. He must be prepared to tell his civilian leaders things

they may not wish to hear, and the civilian leaders must be prepared to receive disagreeable advice. This reason alone is sufficient justification for prohibiting partisan political activity by professional military officers. Professional military advice and sound military decisions are related, but they are not necessarily synonymous. They both require an understanding of the interests and of the overall objectives the nation seeks and their relationship to the use or to the non-use of military power. The end product is strategic realism. In any given situation, before either professional military advice can be rendered or a sound military decision made, all relevant assumptions must be identified. In this sense an assumption is something so vital to the success or failure of whatever is planned or proposed that if it is not true, failure will result. After they are identified, they must be challenged, without regard to sentimentality, cherished beliefs or entrenched positions and interests. If found to be invalid, they must be discarded, modified or replaced by valid assumptions. Next, the stated objectives, whatever they may be, must be analyzed. This requires more than their simple enumeration. It requires the very closest analysis of what precisely are the immediate, the intermediate and the long range objectives. It also requires an understanding of what specifically constitutes their accomplishment. Finally, expectations must be appraised. That is to say, a determination must be made as to what can reasonably be expected from a given set of circumstances. Wishful thinking, naivete and other forms of self-delusion must be abandoned for some hard-headed analysis and projection. The rendering of professional military advice, as well as making sound military decisions requires a high degree of



intellectual rigour, intellectual honesty and moral integrity, which, unfortunately, are all in far too short a supply. Nevertheless, the professional military officer can make a positive contribution to his country and to

civilization by being true to himself and to his profession. It is not easy, but we have no other choice.
B. M. SIMPSON 111, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.

The Medium Maritime Power-IV

In the general theory that emerged in the previous article, I said that the medium maritime power must be prepared, in conflicts where its vital interests are concerned, to sustain autonomous operations up to the transition to the higher level, and for long enough after that point to give the probability of decisive intervention by a superpower ally. In this way it should, given rational opponents, exercise enough deterrence to safeguard its vital interests without recourse to war. In this final article I shall discuss the operational and material implications of the general theory. They will of course be subject to all sorts of local variables, most notably those concerned with the nature of vital interests and the kind of alliance that is necessary. Some of these special applications will also be discussed. Finally, I hope to draw together the series in a brief set of conclusions that may serve as a trampoline for subsequent argument. I hope.

off this treadmill. But it is necessary to say that, in fact, this is not so. Often one can get off, and that without losing. Indeed, one can sometimes say one has won; look at the Indonesian confrontation, or at another level, Brazil's defence of its spiny lobsters against the French. While deterrence is the optimum result, there is nothing reprehensible about seeking a winning solution at a fairly low level of conflict once deterrence has broken down1.

Winning In this article we shall tend to move up the ladder of conflict from normal conditions to low-intensity operations to the higher level to general war. Inevitably, when one reels off operations and requirements in this sequential way, a feeling of inevitability creeps in; all escalations are marked, there is no way

Normal conditions It is enough to describe normal, or peacetime, conditions; equilibrium, the correct operation of deterrence, and so on. But it is not easy to define the optimum force required for such conditions, since by definition their chief job is to deter war by possessing a potential for moving effectively to higher levels of conflict. Thus our discussion under this heading will concern only specialised sorts of maritime unit, and certain characteristics that are desirable in all maritime units for the best performance of peacetime tasks. These tasks do not fall tidily into categories, but one can define certain objectives: Regulation o f offshorewaters, in support
'See James Cable's work on 'definitive force' in Gunboat Diplomacy, p. 23 ff.



of municipal legislation enacted in accordance with international law; Gathering intelligence, as a prerequisite for operations at higher levels and as a contribution to alliances; Influencing friends, by participation in joint training and by visiting friendly waters and ports; Influencing potential enemies, by demonstrating readiness and b y maintaining access in waters that may become subjects of dispute. It can easily be seen how particular operations, exercises or visits can work towards more than one of these objectives. Some sort of harmony between them must then be sought in the choice of units that carry them out. This will not necessarily override operational considerations - ballistic missile submarines very seldom make foreign visits - but it will increase effectiveness for a given cost if this harmony can be achieved. For example, units whose intelligencegathering task in peacetime is of high utility will be making an even greater contribution if they are also trainable, and training, for operations at higher levels. The long-range maritime patrol aircraft is an excellent example of this kind of unit. Shipborne aircraft, even helicopters, do not - because of their mode of operation and need for a possibly provocative or vulnerable seaborne platform - find it so easy to achieve the exact harmony between surveillance and training that is desirable, but still have valuable capacity for intelligence gathering in normal conditions. When one comes to waterborne units, the lack of harmony can be quite marked. For example, I think the very best sort of vessel for port visits is probably a big sail training ship: pretty, evocative, clean and full of bachelors. But as a means of deterring the enemy it lacks utility. Somewhere, perhaps, some concessions in warship design need

to be made towards the business of winning or keeping friends; in the nature of things they cannot be great, particularly for a medium power in search of value for money, but they should not be neglected entirely. Some units, particularly those designed for high potency in war, find it difficult to take any share in the quasi-playtimes of naval life. The ballistic missile submarine has been quoted; but all submarines carry a certain sinister connotation and up to now have seldom been welcome in any but the friendliest of foreign countries. However, one can detect a certain easing of opinions on this subject, due perhaps to the Russian habit of sending submarines on port visits; and naturally, submarines can play their full part in surveillance and the more operational aspects of the 'influence' tasks. The influence of the international law of the sea will be far from negligible in these matters. As was pointed out earlier in this series, the character of the 200-mile Economic Zone will be crucial. If it is residually high seas, then presumably the right to exercise, submerge and overfly will be retained by all. Some coastal states will undoubtedly dispute such rights anyhow; and if by chance the zone is a hybrid, or is residually national water, ocean training areas will be much curtailed, to the particular disadvantage of submarines and LRMP aircraft. Finally, the offshore regulation task - alone among those I have mentioned under this heading - generates its own requirement for relatively short-range, shore - dependent, short - mission - time, sturdy, speedy, seaworthy, speakable ships and aircraft. Because they are such a distinct breed, with their own fulltime task, the medium power may well consider their coming under an entirely different organisation, like a Coastguard Service. But it will have carefully to consider the likely duplications -



particularly in command, control and communications - if it goes for this option. Probably the crucial questions will be: how much do I have at stake offshore? How much does my offshore environment differ from my other likely areas of operation? What organisation have I at present and how traumatic will it be to change it? If the answers to the first two questions are 'Not Much' or if the answer to the third is 'A helluva lot', then probably a separate Coastguard Service is a mistake. Low intensity operations If normal conditions tend to generate few specific requirements for maritime forces, low intensity operations appear at first sight to require an almost impossible number of qualities. For look: by definition, low intensity operations are limited in aim, scope and area; they are subject to the international law of self-defence, with its stringent rules about the first use of force; they may be far distant from bases, particularly the range of bases that a medium maritime power can afford. And these characteristics can, if one allows them to, produce requirements of great diversity and expense. For instance, limitation of aim, scope and area tends to mean a tailoring of forces to the task in hand. No one could possibly say Leander class frigates were ideal, or even suitable, instruments for the Cod War: they were too big (a propaganda minus), not manoeuvrable enough (an operational minus), too thin-skinned (a morale minus) and their ASW armament was redundant (a financial minus). Very well, let us not discount their good points such as flexible communications, the helicopter, and weatherliness; still they surely were not custom-made for the job. In the same way, I very much doubt if the Russians felt the Kynda class with their rather crude over-thehorizon missiles were ideal marking units against American carriers. So,

indeed, they built the Kresta 2. But they are a superpower. Again, the international law of selfdefence, with its insistence on action only 'if an armed attack occurs' and even then subject to a need for 'proportionality', seems to presuppose a quite tremendous range of defences and armaments. For if you are going to make forces, particularly surface forces, survivable against the initial assault of some villainous fellow who hasn't heard about international law, you need very strong and quick-reacting self-protection systems; and if you are going in for proportionality, you need offensive weapon systems covering a gamut of gamuts: range, warhead weight, even accuracy (guns are good because you can shoot to miss). Finally, the need to play away from home (if a nation perceives that need) presupposes a whole further range of qualities such as endurance, habitability, and ease of replenishment - and British naval officers should not underestimate the expense of that last, accustomed as they are to a fleet train of far more scope than most medium powers achieve. Somehow, the medium maritime power must shake down all these bricks into a pattern that will be appropriate to all its more likely needs without prohibitive cost and without too much risk. Risk. That is the word that whispers round all the corners of this subject. For the medium power, low intensity operations will always involve an assessment and an acceptance of risk. The inevitable unsuitability of forces for some parts of operation is one risk. The acceptance of the possibility of an initial casualty, as postulated by Hill2and O'Conne113, is another. The chance of running out of certain sorts of ammuni*J. R. Hill, Maritime Forces in Confrontation', Brassey's 1972, p. 32. 'D. P. O'Connell, The Influence o f Law on
Sea Power, p. 83.



tion is a third. The list is endless. But if a nation is going to regard itself as a medium maritime power, it must by definition be able to sustain low intensity operations; and therefore must be prepared to accept the risks, having done its best to minimise them. Minimised they can be. For example, the choice of surface craft for such operations is no matter of chance. They must have good communications, seakeeping, structural strength, discriminating offensive weapons in some variety, good data gathering and processing. Some of them a t least must have good defensive weapon systems. But whether these last will be cast as H.M.S. Initial Casualty is rather a function of the ruthlessness of the medium power's high command. And it is worth questioning whether ships optimised for this sort of warfare need over-the-horizon weapons.' And, hold your breath, do they need any anti-submarine capacity beyond a quickbang counter-attack? For what is the utility of the submarine in low intensity conflict a t sea? The difficulties of positive identification from a submarine are notorious; and as submarines rely more and more on acoustics for information, these difficulties will not decrease. The torpedo has a bad record as a ready weapon. And the submarine is still bad public relations, though not quite so sinister in the public mind as it was. Chant i t again: we know of only one warshot fired by a submarine since 1946. And then, what of the fixed-wing combat aircraft? How sure will the politicians - who very much want to minimise the political risk in low intensity operations - be of these units' ability to identify the right target and then hit it with appropriate force in the right places? If they are shipborne aircraft, how high will be the risk to their platform? The utility of such aircraft in operations confined to the sea since 1946 has not been very impressive.

For shore bombardment, of course, in Korea and Vietnam, they were indispensable; but those operations were at the higher level. The aircraft of the low intensity phase tend far more often to be those ubiquitous longrange maritime patrol machines and the humble helicopters; and their function, overwhelmingly, surveillance and reconnaissance. For those who do in low intensity operations are, predominantly, surface ships. They are more controllable, their weapons more discriminating and flexible, their public impact better. Certainly they are more vulnerable; but politically this may not be a total disadvantage. Thus a medium maritime power may look a t its requirements purely for low intensity operations in the following way: Surface Units: divided into simple, sturdy ships with a range of offensive surface weapons but minimal selfdefence or ASW; and more sophisticated ships with, additionally, defensive and ASW systems that can be called in aid if the situation escalates5. Aircraft: LRMP and shipborne helicopters, mainly for surveillance, though a light air-to-surface strike capability is helpful to increase opponents' problems. Submarines: for surveillance only a t this level. Fleet train: if the Navy's task includes playing away from home, a comprehensive fuelling-at-sea facility, and limited provisioning, storing and ammunitioning. 40'Connell, op. cit., p. 89. 5See Rear-Admiral J. H. F. Eberle on 'First and Second Elevens' in Adelohi Paner No. 123, p. 30. I take issue with J . H . F . E . ' ~how ~ to achieve a Second Eleven; he says it should be the Old Ming; but I think Old Ming is dreadfully expensive in manpower. Thus I believe a medium power should acquire, from scratch, some simple ships that employ say half the men the more complex ones do.



The transition to the higher level Readers may think there is nothing coincidental in the mystic nature of that sub-heading. Are we not, perhaps, becoming a little over-theoretical, a little other-worldly in discussing for planning purposes a point in confrontation a t sea that, probably, only becomes apparent when each conflict is subsequently analysed? No, sir. For, as O'Connell in his discussion of 'Initial Casualty' and Gorshkov in his stress on the 'First Salvo'' have emphasised in their different ways, this point of transition is of high importance in maritime conflict. It may well be crucial to the subsequent fighting when it occurs; and in cases where it does not occur, the factors deterring both sides from embarking on it will be well worth analysis - particularly for the medium power, for whom underinsurance is likely to negate much of its planning effort and over-insurance cause much nugatory expense. I n fact the number of transitions to the higher level in purely o r very largely maritime conflicts during the past thirty years is not very great. The Battle of the Paracels, the taking of the Pueblo, the recapture of the Mayaguez, the sinking of the Eilat and the Gulf of Tonkin incident are a fairly small muster; I except the Indonesian Confrontation, and the Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistan wars because their main operations were on land. Now the most obvious similarity between the examples quoted is that in each case the side initiating the transition thought it could exploit a local advantage; in other words, it thought it could conduct an operation of 'definitive force' in Cable's term. I n the Gulf of Tonkin (always assuming that we accept the official U.S. account of what happened) the North Vietnamese miscalculated; in the other four, the initiatives were successful and there was n o further escalation. There is comfort here for the medium

power. I t looks as though a stance of moderate strength, giving a reasonable chance of survival by a proportion of the forces in confrontation, is enough to deter all but the boldest spirits on the other side. But the balance may be shifting. Beyond the mid-1970s, there may be a n increasing tendency on the part of some nations - particularly those who wish to establish claims in offsore waters - to resort to force. And the structure of at least one superpower navy as a delivery vehicle for a definitive 'first salvo' is disquieting particularly for Western medium powers. What then is to be done? A medium power away from home will be hard put to it to achieve a sufficiency of force at each point of interest in a low-intensity conflict. I t must try to minimise the number of such points, therefore, and ensure that if any are particularly weakly guarded there is cover not too far away. This is not to discount either the concept of Initial Casualty (which is a function of the law of self-defence rather than an operational precept - no one wants to lose a ship and careful disposition may ensure that an opponent never tries it on) nor of second-eleven ships (which is a function of numbers versus cost constraint as well as of suitability for low-intensity tasks). But as well as the survivability of the forces on the spot, offensive cover is of the first importance in deterring the transition to the higher level. There are many ways of putting on the frighteners: a nuclear-powered or even a conventional submarine or two, an aircapable ship with something other than helicopters, over-the-horizon missiles, an offensive minelaying effort, and anything capable of throwing a nuclear warhead. Of course these are all higher-level systems, but their existence, or even better their presence near the scene of
'S. G. Gorshkov, 'Navies in War and Peace', Morskoi Sbornik No. 2, 1973.



operations, is of the utmost value in deterring a shift to that level. And the more diversity there is in them, the more the opponent's problems and uncertainties and the greater the deterrence. In its assessments of what is needed, and the risks involved, the medium power must constantly keep in mind the need not to expose all its forces, and particularly all its cover, to a first strike. This is not a fleet-in-being philosophy per se; it is essentially deterrent. Once again, its chief purpose is to increase the opponent's problems. It is at this point of transition that the problems of a medium power bent on protecting only its own offshore interests are seen to be so much less acute. The possession of a quite small force of conventional submarines or shore-based strike aircraft trained in maritime operations, or missile-armed surface craft in numbers, and certainly a combination of these, is enough to deter most opposing medium powers from initiating higher level operations in such waters. This may not be so if the opposition is a superpower; but a medium power's ability to sustain conflict at the higher level is so much greater in its own backyard that even superpowers will think many times before trying the transition.
The higher level It is implicit in the general theory of medium maritime power that at some stage in higher level operations there must be a probability of superpower help. If a superpower is involved on the other side, that help had better come quickly. It seems to me that the best way to convince a superpower ally that it must intervene is to ensure that a variety of operations, if possible widespread in area as well as in scope, is imposed on the enemy. This inevitably means offensive (or, if something 'presentationally correct' is de rigeur, counter-offensive) operations

and the best instruments for these are submarines and fixed-wing aircraft. It is not necessary, for the limited span of operations we are considering, for submarines to be nuclear-powered nor (if the geographical conditions are right) for the aircraft to be ship-based. At the same time, survivability of one's own surface forces must not be neglected, and, because it is very expensive, it is to this that we now turn. The defence of surface units in a hostile air and missile environment was one of those problems that we identified in Part I1 as a real big spender. With, inevitably, gaps in its armoury the medium maritime power must choose the right balance between concentration and dispersion. If it can afford one concentrated, high value force with a good chance of survival in such an environment it will do well; the remainder of surface forces engaged will do better to stay dispersed in a war of manoeuvre and deception, mosquitoes perhaps but serving to widen the conflict. Much the same can be said for antisubmarine warfare. We have already noted that LRMP aircraft are valuable at low levels of conflict; they are equally so at the higher level, and no medium power should fail to maximise their use for ASW. But there are limits to what they can do. An autonomous area offensive against enemy submarines, unless the geographical conditions are exceptionally favourable, will be beyond the means of medium powers. They will need some sort of focus for their activities, and this is most likely to be a protected surface force. But for the defence of a force bent on preserving the use of the sea, some diversity of ASW in shipborne units is necessary, partly indeed because LRMP aircraft operate best in the deep field at some distance from such forces. Therefore the ASW helicopter ship and, to a degree, the ship with highquality hull-mounted sonar. The idea of sea-use was mentioned



in the previous paragraph, and perhaps it is time we returned to the ideas of sea-use and sea-denial that occurred in Part 1 1 For though once higher level 1. operations are initiated, the medium maritime power will be looking for ways of involving allies and therefore is almost bound to use some sea-denial tactics, i t must - if its initial object was sea-use - continue to conduct operations to this end, if only to convince allies that its aims are consistent. This is unfortunate because sea-use a t the higher level inevitably uses more resources than sea-denial. Consequently the medium power dare not, in its planning and force structures, concentrate too much on the provision of forces for sea use a t the higher level.

diminishes their offensive power. As we have seen, a medium power can go only some way down the road. This tendency can 'be seen clearly in nuclear matters. The very existence of the non-proliferation agreement is a strong pointer to this attempted diminution of offensive power. But, so far as the sea affair is concerned, medium powers probably do not need to worry. For maritime, or mainly maritime conflicts, the nuclear weapon is highly desirable, but, in the general theory we have suggested, not essential. If an opponent reaches the stage of using nuclears and the alliance is not triggered, the medium maritime power had better think of giving in anyhow. And if the opponent holds back on his nuclear weapons, will the medium power ever General war dare to initiate their use at sea? The I n general war, by definition, allies parallel with the absolute need, in are engaged and the war is of a tactical terms, to use nuclear weapons comprehensive nature. I want therefore at a n early stage in a European land to discuss only two aspects of particular battle is false. Sea fighting moves more slowly and is more fragmented. interest to the medium maritime power: So finally we arrive a t the question of forces required specifically for allied strategic nuclear weapons. It is probably operations, and nuclear weapons. We observed earlier that the price of correct to regard the purpose of these alliance might be the provision of forces weapons as n o part of the sea affair; yet specifically for the alliance, so long as there is a just parallel to be drawn this did not distort the autonomous between the general theory of medium balance of medium-power forces. What maritime power, with its emphasis on is a n alliance likely to demand? First, it the eventual involvement of superpower is most unlikely to demand any addi- allies, and the medium nuclear powers' tional technological development from implied concept (the only rational one, a medium power. I t is however likely to surely) of using national strategic demand a n increase in reach; for nuclear weapons as a potential trigger to example, if a medium power has only a involve superpowers in a more compreshort-haul amphibious capability - hensive conflict. Also, of course, the fact perhaps for a Paracel-type operation that strategic nuclears tend at the aimed a t securing offshore resources - moment to be sea-based is highly the alliance may demand an extension relevant. There is no doubt that a seaof reach to ensure that it can be used to based nuclear deterrent can considerably support other countries. I t is also likely distort the logical balance of medium to demand the use of a medium power's maritime power forces; it may, for own territory for bases and suchlike. If example, make nuclear power plants for a superpower ally seeks to distort other units more easily obtainable; it medium-power maritime forces generally, may produce spinoff in the underwater it will tend to do so in a way that technologies that increase submarine



utility; it will certainly alter shipyard and dockyard priorities and patterns. Above all, it is certain to change the pattern of resource expenditure. But it will not be a short cut to the exercise of mediumpower deterrence a t sea; for there is no evidence to suggest that strategic nuclear weapons would ever be called in aid to trigger alliances in sea-based conflicts. Finally, one may perhaps point out that counters to sea-based strategic deterrent systems of other powers must, in the nature of technology and geography, be far beyond the scope of a medium power. This at least is one area where costs can, straight away, be written off as prohibitive. Even the superpowers balk at them.

A critical difference In this rather long tour of the mechanisms of medium maritime power, it has no doubt become apparent that the range of power comprehended by the term can be quite wide. I t is possible to detect one point a t which the difference is particularly sharp and which tends to divide medium maritime powers into two kinds. This point is the decision whether to equip one's forces to play away from home. If their sole purpose is to support the national interest in adjacent waters - say, for want of a better definition, in a 200-mile Economic Zone - then many requirements disappear altogether. Ship-based fixed-wing air is not necessary (though over-sea training for maritime aircraft is), nuclear-powered submarines are almost certainly a waste of resources, and long-range, long-mission-time surface ships and fleet trains are generally superfluous. Resources can then be used for a sea surveillance and regulation capacity of considerable scope; seaborne, airborne and submarine-borne weaponry of considerable diversity both offensive and defensive; mine clearance; and communication and h e a d q u a r t e r s

systems giving good control of forces. If a nuclear capability is desired, it had far better go into bombs than propulsion. This is the pattern of what we may call local medium maritime power. The task of a power that plays away from home - we may call this extended medium maritime power - is much more technically difficult. I t must (unless its extended-waters coverage is to consist only of sea-denial units, which is scarcely logical) provide a t least one force capable of sea use a t the higher level in distant waters. This is almost bound to mean shipborne helicopters and some shipborne fixed-wing air; highquality ASW both shipborne and LRMP; and afloat support. There must, too, be enough reserves to survive a 'first salvo' or re-enter the conflict; enough weapon diversity and sea-denial power to complicate the opponent's problems. I n these circumstances, local maritime power is likely to suffer; and nuclear resources will tend to go into propulsion, not weapons. Lucky the power, therefore, that need look no further than a 200-mile limit for its maritime interests. But aspirations and horizons widen; and many nations which now accept such a limitation will find that in ten or twenty years it no longer holds good. Japan is already in an unrealistic position; Brazil, India and many others are expanding their distantwater interests, but a t least they already have what may already be called regional navies of considerable reach.

Summary Medium maritime powers are those which, without being superpowers, have considerable interests a t sea and aspire to significant autonomy. This, the turbulent future - political, social and legal - that lies before us, will be threatened a t sea. Medium powers cannot hope, in the face of superpower threat, to fight beyond a certain level, or deter, on their own and reach a success-



ful conclusion. They will need allies; but they must not think in turn merely of 'contribution' to alliances. Such a philosophy robs them of independence and reduces them to dependent status. What they can, and should, aspire to is an operational autonomy that enables them to conduct maritime operations in support of their interests up to the point where a superpower ally is likely to intervene decisively on their behalf. This point is likely to be beyond the point of transition to the higher level of operations, where shooting has become general within a limited but widening area and when rules of engagement have been relaxed. Thus, medium maritime power forces must include some means of regulating coastal waters in peacetime; a capacity for conducting low-intensity operations in all areas of interest, with all that that implies in terms of weapon flexibility and diversity, seakeeping, surveillance, communications, command and control; a capacity for surviving (though not without casualties) transition to the higher level of operations even if initiated by an opponent; and enough capacity to sustain, and if necessary re-enter or widen, operations at the higher level for a time, with all that that implies in terms of at least some offensive power, and of survivability in submarine and missile environments. Medium maritime powers' force structures will be critically dependent on the decision whether to seek autonomy in local waters only or to seek extended medium maritime power. The latter will involve a whole extra range of capabilities including much larger surface ships, shipborne air, longer-range shorebased air, and afloat support. I t will also change the direction in which available nuclear technology is deployed - towards propulsion rather than weapons. Inevitably, local autonomy is likely to suffer. Medium maritime power therefore

necessarily involves a good deal of expense. There are however several areas of resource expenditure which are not necessary components of medium maritime power. First, there is no need for a large research and development base, much less a comprehensive one. The autonomy required is operational, not in development7.Second, there is no need for strategic nuclear deterrence, nor for a counter to others' sea-based deterrents. Third, there is no absolute need for any effort in space reconnaissance, desirable though this might be. Fourth, there is no requirement for long-reach amphibious forces. And finally, there is an overall limitation that falls into line with all that has gone before: a conscious decision not to push too far into the frontiers of technology, to stay on the steeper gradients of the performance/effort exponential. Only so is a medium maritime power likely to achieve the diversity so necessary to compound its opponents' problems. Where very high quality is sought, it must be sought in a limited number of units with the specific object of imposing a really special effort, or a really special fear, on the opponent - or, dare one say it, on allies. All these, then, are areas where the medium maritime power is not impelled by its fundamental strategy to spend money. One is of course bound to say that there may be many factors alliance requirements, a home-based armaments industry and so on - that tend to make it stay in these fields. But its operational philosophy should not. Conclusion It has all through this series been an open question whether, at the end, one would attempt an application of the theories to Britain specifically. But, after
'A country having so few friends that it cannot buy higher-level equipment to the extent required will not in any case be able to operate a medium-power strategy.



all these words, it seems not to be necessary. My views on the Why and the How have all been stated above; it is to be presumed that, with our widespread interests, we aspire to extended medium maritime power. And for that our fleet as at present planned certainly looks on the right lines, even if there are one or two areas where hindsight shows it might have been done more economically. It is for others, I think, to suggest how many of the capacities that have been earmarked above as superfluous should, in our special circumstances, be

'added back' in the fashionable phrase. Above all, though, it would be foolish to think of ourselves as in decline, or as on the way down while other medium powers are on the way up. That is the sort of nostalgic folie de grandeur that is neither desirable nor in accordance with the facts. Many of oui fellow medium powers must feel as the poor man said to the rich man whose RollsRoyce had broken down: 'Morrie,' he said, 'I wish I had your problems.' (concluded) MARLOWE

Leadership for Young Officers
First experience For most of us, memories of early days in the Service will include struggles with Leadership. This probably started at our Interview Board where we attempted to convince the stoical team of observers, unobtrusively Noting Down Points, of the excellence of our own leadership potential. We watched and listened as each candidate in turn donned the mantle of Team Leader. The aim was usually to effect the safe passage of the oil drum from one end of the gym to the other across the chalked-in chasm, supported by two poles, a length of rope and lots of hope. Who can fail to remember the 'born leader' who infuriated us so much by criticising everybody else's plans and suggesting another way of solving the problem just after we had got our own scheme over to the team? We probably labelled him as 'nauseating' and if, as so often happened, the task failed to be achieved and chaos prevailed when he was officially in charge - we secretly rejoiced. Sometimes of course, the nauseating one performed faultlessly and under his auspices we caused the drum to speed swiftly and safely across the chasm with effortless ease, and all well within the prescribed time limit. After a demonstration such as this, our inner contempt would be modified to that of grudging respect - for after all he had shown us (and his performance had not gone un-noticed by the seated Board) that he was a Leader, because he had organised us well, sorted out the problem and achieved success. Of course we still categorised him as nauseating because he had done better than us, and we were after all in cut throat competition with him. I realise now that these first glimpses of the unsuccessful and successful leader were valuable to me as yardsticks for my own behaviour, both as examples of what not to do and of how others can achieve an aim. But it would have been as great a mistake to slavishly copy the actions of the nauseating paragon as it would have been to eschew all actions of the nauseating failure. The best path for most people to follow nearly always

lies somewhere extremes.





Early lessons Following our adventures a t the Admiralty Interview Board, where we must have been relatively successful, we duly arrived at Dartmouth. Here was Leadership indeed, all around us and in many hues of various flavours. From the Parade Instructor a t one extreme exceptionally well-endowed with confidence, power of command and decision - to the quiet Engineer Instructor a t the other who knew his subject inside out and although accurately perceiving our meagre powers of comprehension, nevertheless steadily persevered in a quiet voice with kindness and tact until we understood thoroughly. We met the nauseating paragon again and also several examples of the nauseating failure. As time went by the paragon became more human (more like the rest of us) and we ceased to regard him as ten feet tall. Nauseating failures improved too, became more normal and even stopped being architects of disasters. What was happening in reality, albeit unknown to us, was that we ourselves were improving too both by practice and experience. Looking back on those days I can recall incidents and personalities which illustrated good leadership and also some which indicated a total lack of it. I remember with great affection the forceful and uncompromising character of our Divisional Gunner - how smart and purposeful he was, and how capable and confident. And yet, off duty, how human and amusing he became! His accomplishments staggered me. As well as being able to impart parade drill and all that that entailed to us, he could also sail a boat in the roughest weather, play hockey for the College, splice a steel wire rope, sing a good song in the pub that no-one had heard before and, finally, appeared totally unaffected by an

enormous intake of alcohol. Comparing myself with him, I felt extremely inadequate and wondered whether I should ever be able to accomplish half the things that he could. Quite apart from his example of all-round excellence, this worthy officer taught me a basic principle of Naval Life that has been proved true time and time again. He maintained that you can do anything with sailors - provided you tell them what is going on, tell them what they themselves have to do and above all do not flannel them. This simple criterion seems all too obvious now, but I can think of many occasions when it has not been followed and nearly always the end result has been the poorer for it. In those early days we were governed strictly by a rigid timetable, whether we were ashore a t the College or afloat with the Training Squadron. If a gap appeared unexpectedly in the programme, we felt somehow lacking in direction, and immediately looked ahead to the next scheduled event. It was almost a relief to realise that the break was finite and of only temporary duration. With hindsight, I don't believe that this uneasiness a t a lapse of activity pointed either to any shortcomings of personality or to an overbearing organization - which left us helpless once it was withdrawn. There were always examinations in the offing and most of us were keen to do as well as possible. Reasons for this varied from a confident desire to demonstrate how superior we were, to a stark fear of being kicked out into the unknown jungle of civilian life. I vividly recall that my motivation lay close to the latter extreme. As examinations were so important the training programme was geared towards passing them. When the programme paused therefore, immediately there arose a dilemma as to what one should personally do to fill the time profitably - or could one afford to take time off and do nothing? Lack of direction from authority on the subject



usually left a feeling of guilt - we should have done something; if we did do something we ought to have done it better; or perhaps we ought to have done something quite different. The ratings that I met in those days taught me a great deal about life and about the Navy. Some were happy, some were unhappy, some were quiet and some possessed razor-sharp wits. But all of them, or very nearly all, were keen to talk about themselves and about the Navy. Their experiences often made my hair curl until I learnt to take tall stories with a pinch of salt. It took some time for me to realise what made sailors tick because I had wrongly assumed that they were motivated along the same lines as we were at Dartmouth, and that therefore their approach to Naval organization was the same as ours. I was to learn that although the sailors' motivation was not a jot less worthy than ours, the way in which they wished to be organized and the climate in which they gave of their best, was very different to the ruthless routine we had come to expect.

The modern approach At Dartmouth we did not lack for direction in Leadership. It was all round us happening before our very eyes, and sometimes not happening when it was our own turn to lead in some project. Formal lectures in Leadership were rare but I do remember one evening talk by an eminent officer on the subject. Taking Nelson as his example, he developed a definition of ultimate leadership as the achievement of a state of mind in ones subordinates when they came to 'love their leader'. Of course, the language here is outdated in this century and the lecturer stressed this. But he went on to persuade us that the general idea was as valid as ever. Some twenty years later however, I feel that the World has moved on and that now the idea of men feeling an emotion of even a fraction of a degree along these lines is no longer apposite.

I t seems to me that ratings are so much more critical and alive to issues in general that the feeling they wish to have about their superior is that he is giving the best, most sensible and correct leadership. In other words that what they are being asked to do is necessary, economical in time and effort and yet the easiest and most effective way of doing it. If all these factors are met in the sailor's mind he will go happily about the task and do it to the best of his abilty, for he also needs job satisfaction for complete fulfilment. If he does not react favourably, then something is wrong. The best way of finding out the trouble is simply to ask the man. This may seem obvious now but it took me quite a long time to get around to the direct approach. Sometimes the answer was garbled or inaccurate, but this in turn often meant that a garbled briefing had been given, so that the sailor was not really aware of what he was supposed to be doing, and perhaps unsure as to how he was supposed to be doing it. In these modern times it is quite normal for anyone to query the performance of anyone else, and by no means unusual for politicians, businessmen, union leaders and even senior policemen to find themselves called upon to justify their actions in the glare of the most searching publicity. This is quite often followed by a debate on the subject by others on television, with millions drawn in. Was the action taken correct under the circumstances? Was it fair and within the rules? Were the rules correct, even? The hapless victim may well feel that he is the subject of an inquisition when after all he was only doing what he thought best at the time. We in the Services have largely escaped this form of persecution, but Northern Ireland and the Cod War have given us a taste of it. The best way of keeping ourselves prepared to cope with such a situation is surely to be ready to justify our actions and orders a t all times,



whether we are expecting to be called to account or not. If we can do this, we shall also be able to explain ourselves to our men, who may ask the same questions as might the press. This solution may be idealistic and may not always be possible, or indeed appropriate, but as a concept I have found it a useful tool to discipline the mind, and it has often helped when events have taken an unexpected turn for the worse. I do not wish to postulate a situation where every order is liable to be questioned and discussed by our subordinates, but rather to suggest that by being prepared to cope with such an examination we shall stand a better chance of a correct approach to a situation and a t the same time of avoiding being misunderstood in our instructions and orders.
Dealing with younger men So much for the attitude of mind of the leader, but what about his relationship with his subordinates? I be!ieve that there are many pitfalls into which it is possible for the inexperienced young officer to fall and which can be avoided by adherence to a few simple guidelines. The first point to keep in mind is that the men entrusted t o your care and control are almost without exception sensible and mature persons who expect and deserve that you treat them as such. In rare cases where you find that an individual does not have these qualities, then he will require special attention from you as the situation demands. The vast majority of junior ratings, often correctly referred to as 'the greatest single factor of the Navy', are young men who have opted to join a fighting service which serves a t sea. No matter what he says now, a man must have been attracted by some aspect of Naval life when he volunteered. I t is only right therefore, in my view, that he should enjoy satisfaction of the variety that he sought if at all possible. I t is not a bad opener on interviewing your young men

for the first time to ask them why they did join the Navy. From their answers you can often discover their likes and dislikes, their present attitude of mind and real state of morale, all things you should know about your men anyway. As I have indicated earlier, most young ratings like to talk about the Service and their part in it and conversation such as this may give you the opportunity to uncover a few bottled-up grievances or to correct misunderstandings. If a man is married ask about his family. You may start a long conversation here so make sure that you have enough time to spare. I t suggests insincerity if you ask a man about his home life and then suddenly remember that you have to dash off just as he starts to tell you. If a man is in serious family difficulties and needs help, do not hesitate to rally more qualified assistance if your personal experience does not measure up to the situation. It is seldom helpful, for example, for a young bachelor officer to give advice to a rating on family difficulties - much better to bring in a married officer who usually has a better understanding of such problems. Later, of course, you may have to enlist the aid of the Family Welfare organization. Young ratings on these occasions are often a t their wits end and will thus be very appreciative of any help you can give or get for them. If you can assist in this way, it will take a load off the man's mind and he will become happier and probably more efficient. I t may happen that you find you are quite unable to sympathise with a man in his attitude to life o r to the Service, in which case you must be prepared to tell him so and why. I t never pays to appear to sympathise with a man if you do not actually feel that way, honesty is always the best policy and insincerity will always rebound on you.
Dealing with older men As the seniority of your men increases,



so must your approach to them alter. A Leading Rate is quite a different man to an Able or Ordinary Rate, or a t least he should be. It is often said that the Leading Rate's position is the most difficult one in the Service. Whether this is true or not, it is certain that these men can be a tower of strength or a great source of weakness in any organization. The Leading Rate requires your support, both openly and in private. Being a relatively inexperienced leader, he may also need your advice on Leadership and Management. You must be ready to give this, so make sure that you get to know his problems and have sincere and wellconsidered answers prepared. The Petty Officer is different again. His experience and seniority command greater consideration. Always prefix his surname with 'Petty Officer' when addressing him or referring to him, never use his surname alone for this puts him back down with the most junior ratings and is thus inaccurate and discourteous. You must establish a mutually respectful rapport with your senior ratings as many of them will be older and wiser than you. Nevertheless, you are the one in charge and you cannot abdicate this responsibility. You must therefore use their experience and wisdom in the execution of your plans. Get these men on your side, not by currying favour but by honest, straightforward consultation and respect. Seek out their opinion and advice; they will often know a great deal more about most subjects concerning men than you will to start with. The Chief Petty Officer is not merely a senior Petty Officer. He is a big step ahead of the Petty Officer on the ladder and deserves appropriate treatment as such. He should be addressed as 'Chief Petty Officer' normally, although 'Chief' may be used on certain occasions. Chief Petty Officers are the Consultants of the Lower Deck on both technical and personnel matters. They should be included in the planning stage of any

undertaking that you are about to embark on. They will usually have valuable contributions to make and should always be listened to. I will not dwell on the Fleet Chief Petty Officer except to emphasise that he is in all respects a Warrant Officer and has been promoted on merit for his leadership and ability. H e should therefore prove a great source of support and knowledge for you and it behoves you to cultivate his co-operation and respect.
Preserving your own qualities I t is very important for the young leader to maintain his own personality and qualities, in other words - to be himself. There are many eminent leaders for us all to admire and respect and to learn from, but they should provide a source of inspiration for us rather than a mould into which we unimaginatively try to fit ourselves. Study these great men therefore but apply the lessons learnt to your own self and thereby enrich your personal brand of Leadership. I t just does not work to give orders in a Nelson-like way, unless you are Nelson. I have mentioned Sincerity several times and I believe that this is an allimportant personal quality that you can never afford to relax. Once you are seen to be insincere, you will never regain the respect of your men, and this is a terrible price to pay for carelessness or laziness. Quite apart from being as good as you can professionally, I suggest that as a junior officer your leadership will be more effective and satisfying if you develop four particular qualities in yourself: Honesty, Reliability, Loyalty and a Sense of Humour. You must be honest with your superiors, with your subordinates and with yourself; any deceit will eventually rebound and however well intentioned your white lie may have been you will be exposed as a liar. Being reliable means being consistent both in your work performance and in your



treatment of others. Never allow yourself to be trapped into favouritism; it is bad for morale, loses respect and is grossly unfair. Always be loyal. Stick up for the Service, your ship, your seniors and your men. Avoid developing an 'Us and Them' complex. The maxim 'All of One Company' is as valid now as it was in Nelson's day. My last quality, a Sense of Humour, is often the most difficult one to maintain. Although a well developed sense of humour is a priceless asset it should always be used with circumspection. It should be closely allied with Tact. Always keep in mind the fact that your men joined the Navy to enjoy satisfaction and variety, wellplaced humour can increase enjoyment and improve relationships. It reveals you as human and can relax barriers to prove a great tool of leadership.

The reward I have tried to set down some simple guidelines for Leadership drawn from my own experience. If there is such a person as a 'born leader' then this offering is not for him. But for most of us each new increase in responsibility brings fresh demands of Leadership. To get the answer right is very rewarding, satisfying and even exciting, but to get it wrong can be disappointing, humiliating and even dangerous. There are many published works on Leadership and all of them are worth studying if you can. When all is said and done though, you can not go far wrong with your leadership if you simply 'Do Your Best'. Good Luck!.

The Fast Patrol Ship
A warship for all seasons (and pockets) A glance at Jane's Fighting Ships or Combat Fleets of the World is enough to reveal the confusion, not to say anarchy, which currently prevails in the designation of warship types. The reasons for this state of affairs deserve analysis, which might yield a useful insight regarding the nature _and utility of navies in 'the modern world. The present purpose, however, is too urgent to await the completi~n such a study. Instead, it is of proposed t o add yet another warship type-name t o the existing plethora - one based, unlike so many, upon current, rather than outdated operational and tactical concepts. 'Yes, but what is it for?' is the layman's question, the answer t o which, particularly in liberal democracies, must be both simple and convincing. Even a naval
man, who by definition accepts the need for naval forces, may have to be persuaded that a new element must be incorporated in the 'shape and size' calculus in response to new conditions, political, strategic, economic and technological. What are these new conditions? 'Strategy', as Fisher tersely put it, 'governs ships - weapons govern tactics'. So that we shall know what we are talking about, I take leave t o use Professor Michael Howard's definitions, with ~ i c I believe Fisher would have h been con,tent. Strategy: The mobi'lisation and deployment of available resources (primarily military) to achieve a given objective. Tactics: The use of armed forces to defeat other armed forces. The convention now established in



Bfitish Defence White Papers, (of separating the Nuclear Strategic Force (Polaris) from Navy General Purpose Combat Forces, does not invalidate our definitions. A concept of operations, from which the 'shape and size' of the general purpose combat forces of the navy may be derived, involves considerations both of strategy and tactics. For any naval power, large, medium or small, the naval objective turns upon the maxim of striving to ensure the use of the sea for one's own purposes whilst denying its use t o an adversary for his. In the absence of hostilities the calculations of governments, in regard to national policy, will be affected by their estimate of the relative power, in a possible conflict, of their own and allied naval tincluding shore-based air, where appropriate) force and that of a possible adversary and his allies together, of course, with an estimate of (the degree of advantage or disadvantage to be expected from a favourable outcome, or the reverse, of any conflict at sea. Furthermore, in so far as general purpose combat forces are concerned, the implication is that actual fighting might take place, over a period of time. That is to say, if the deterrenlt effect should fail, because a potential adversary chooses to believe that his naval forces would prevail if put t (the test, the concept of operao tions must include provision for the exercise of full, effective and continuous control over every aspect of sea-use which might come within the orbit of hostilities: the organisation and movement of essential hipping; the keeping open of ports and harbours; loading and unloading; the continuation o fishing; f the production and transport of oil and natural gas; shipbuqlding and repair. The list is far from complete and must include the provision of local defence. We are thus faced with the proposition that the naval (task involves two distinct, though overlapping and complementary functions. One of these consists of

seeking out and destroying hostile forces, and destroying or neutralising his seaborne war-making and war-sustaining s capability; the other 5 the management of the day-to-day business of using the sea, under war conditions, to the extent and in {the manner necessary t o sustain one's own war-making capabi'!ity.
The combat task The combat task was in former times undertaken, primarily, by 'ships of the line', although the great sea-batltles did not invariably arise from 'seeking out and destroying' operations, but indirectly from the use of major forces to escort a convoy; or t o enforce a blockade; or to cover a landing o troops. Until the f advent of ocean-going submarines and effective aircraft the 'great ships', culminating in the dreadnought battleships', were units of absolute naval power. The only way to be certain of defeating them was to oppose a superior number of equivalent ships. The addition of batlecruisers, cruisers and flotillas of torpedo-craft to the battle-fleet, in the ultimate concentration, left us with a number of warship-types of which the pnimary raison d'etre disappeared with the battleship. The aircraft-carher did not inherit precisely the same potency, in strategic terms, as the battleship had enjoyed. Not only did the carrier first appear as an auxiliary of the battleship, but as time went on its vulnerability to overwhelming air attack, and [to submarine attack, could only be redressed by the certain presence of anti-submarine and anti-air escorts, thus 'putting into commission' amongst a mixed group of warship-types the unique and for a period virtually absolute fighting power of the battleship. The role of $he cruiser, evolved from that of the frigate, arose from two separate requirements. First, the need for scouting forces to work with the ba$tleships; and secondly, the extension of naval power and influence world-wide,



from which the second characteristic of the cruiser emerged, namely, to provide a unit of independent naval power (as opposed to the 'absolute' power of the line-of-battleship). The cruiser, before the advent of submarines and aircraft, was fast enough to avoid action with any hostile unit which was deemed too powerful for her to engage successfully - such as a battleship or heavier cruiser. To the extent, therefore, that the achievement of a given naval objective today might call for the concentration of a major naval force - that is to say, the strategic factor - it is necessary to consider, at the same time, what the nature of that concentration should be if the hostile force is to be defeated in combat - the tactical factor. Whereas formerly, as we have seen, first the battleships with *heir scouting cruisers and their attacking flotillas; then the carrier task forces of which A/S and A/A screens formed an organic part, provided the structure of a naval concentration; the advance of weapon, sensor and communication technology has brought us to a turning point. It is surely more precise, now, to think of a naval concentration primarily in terms of an assembly of weapon, sensor and communications equipment in the optimum proportions, airborne, surface and undersea, and only as a secondary factor to determine the warship-types and aircraft-types and numbers appropriate t o the deployment and operation in combat of the optimum mix of baittle-kit. A further tactical consideration is the probable effect of the lack o protective f armour - 'the general absence of damage-sustaining capacity o even the f largest modern warships, in comparison with that of the battleships (not battlecruisers) when slugging iit out with each other. I t appears that the optimum mix of fighting equipment referred to above must be modified by the consideration that numbers and duplication must to

some extent provide the sustained battlepower formerly attributable to We capacity of major units to withstand damage. This being so, the effect upon the fighting power of a major naval force of reducing the number of units even by one is likely to be far more serious than, say, the detachment of a division of destroyers from the flotilla or screen element of the main fleet would have been in the past. In any case, the notion of 'perimeter defence' of heavy units or a convoy of merchant ships has been invalidated by the advent of stand-off weapons with well-beyond-the-horizon range. This emphasises the organic nature of the modern naval force, of which each unit, with the exception of the principal command and control ship, makes approximately an equal contribution to the total fighting power. The optimum disposition for an engagement of the various elements of battleequipment presents much difficulty, evert with the use of cybernetics. The 'absolute' role of the battleship, and the 'independent' role of the cruiser have disappeared. In their place we have the prospect of complex concentrations aimed at achieving temporary and limited conltrol of vital sea a r a s when required for the movement of troops, war material or supplies. Battle would result from the challenge of such control by the enemy. Sea-use control The question arises, where are the vital sea areas? Do these nwt include indeed begin with - the approaches to one's own main ports and bases, together with one's own and allied coastal waters? If so, are these not areas over which the achievement of full and continuous rather than limited and temporary control must be the primary naval aim? Here the organic, self-sufficient ideal of the ocean-going main naval force must give way, in terms of economy of force, and rap5dity of response, to a mix of



shore-based and sea-borne elements. Around the U.K., for example, the d r defence of the home territory extends well out to sea; while the comparatively shallow water over the continental shelf tends t inhibit fast submarine operao tions. The warships needed for operations in coastal waters and the short seas do not have <tobe configured, therefore, to be able to form part of the balanced assembly of battle-equipment which we have postulated for a main, ocean-going naval force. Nor, as we have seen, wcyuld the loss of fighting-power in the main force by the detachment of even a single unit of it be acceptable. I t is deduced that sea-use management, an indispensable naval task in peace and war, requires the provision of an adequate number of warships of appropriate design. Here iit should be noted that the use of the term 'frigate' as a warship-type, during World War 11, was aberrant. The naval establishment of Great Britain 'between the wars', in a period of acute stringency, had not included provision for the large number of purpose-built convoy escorts which had to be ordered as soon as war came. But whereas, in the days of sail, the speed of merchant ships and warships did not differ greatly, so that a frigate could be on convoy escort duty one day and acting as 'the eyes and ears of the fleet' the next, by 1939 convoy speed was less than half fleet speed, and fleet screening vessels required several knots margin over that. What the ocean convoy escort needed, above all, was long endurance and the best possible A/S armament. Hence the frigate became, for an epoch, a highly specialised trade protection ship, and not the general purpose fleet unit which for centuries it was, and once again has become.

The evolution of warship-types To sum up, the evolution of warship types has rendered a good deal of the existing categorisation not only confusing but misleading. The modern equivalent

to Vhe battlefleet is the carrier-group, an organic assembly of combat power which, though lacking, in strategic terms, the absolute quality of the battlefleet in its heyday, nevertheless represents the most formidable concentration of naval force. The independent role of the cruiser has been assumed by the cruiser-group, an organic assembly of combat power capable (by virtue of modern survei'llance and reconnaissance) of avoiding action with the only superior force it could encounter, namely a carrier-group. The warship-types forming these two categories of naval force resolve into: Carriers and cruisers : to provide aircraft of various types; a platform for missile armament; and facilities for primary command and control of the force. Frigates: for providing A/S, A/A and anti-surface fighting power in combination with that of the carrier or cruiser. Fleet (nuclear) submarines : for augmenting in depth (both laterally and verticallly) the A/S and antisurface fighting power of the group. The independent role of submarines in seeking out and destroying enemy surface forces and submarines in waters wholly o r partially under enemy surfiace and air control remains, as a form of continuing strategic support for the opera'tions of carrier- and cruiser-groups. Sad to say, the warship-type which finds no place in the modern fleet is the destroyer - hero and maid-of-all-work of two world wars. Now that the frigate has resumed its proper place with the fleet, and more than ever forms an organic part of it, whether it be a carrieror a cruiser-group, what warships would be available in war, or are available in peace, to do the sea-use support task for which, as we have seen, 'an adequate number of ships of appropriate design' is essential? At this poinlt it may be objected that



the essence of deterrence resides, at the general purpose conbat level, in the manifest abilty to deploy battle-worbhy naval concentrations, and that therefore all available resources must be utilised for this purpose. Bat experience, which we ignore at our peril, insists that failure to deal effectively d t h minor and specific emergencies prejudicial to national security in its broadest sense (inltegrity of the home territory and its territorial seas and contiguous zones; preservation of economic strength, and the maintainance of political stab$lity) tends to increase the risk of major and general conflict. Quite apart from considerations of national securilty per se, !@he accepbance by a government of the benefits of an international regime of @hesea, however imperfect, imposes the obligation to support such a regime, by force if necessary. Indeed, even if the existing state of international conflict, actual and potential, at super-power, regional and national level, were to be transformed, by some miracle, into one of harmony and stability, the need would remain to support the law at sea. The nature of this task is such that aircraft alone cannot perform it. What, therefore, are the c~haracteristics of the warship required t o control sea-use, in peace and war, and how may they best be combined? The fast patrol ship It has been argued so far, on the assumption that military forces are deterrent, that the naval task is two-fold; it is to provide a potential counter to hostile naval forces, and it is to evidence a capability, both in peace and war, of controlling sea-use in all its aspects. Given that the operational life of warships is of the order of twenty years, not only the capital cost, but the 'through life' cost of meeting the requirements of these two main tasks, both in manpower and materiel, should be comidered, when deciding upon the proportion of total

resources allocated to each. Such factors as crew dze, reliability, case of maintainance, availability and fuel costs will weigh more heavily in regard to the seause control ship, the fast patrol ship, than in the case of fleet units for which battle-worthiness second to none must be the over-riding criterion. With this in mind, let us look at the main features of such a ship: size, speed, endurance, armament, equipmenlt and crew. Size: muah has (been beard of 'the 200 mile E.E.Z.; of the extension o terrif torial seas; of E.E.C. fishery limits and national fishing rights; of the protection of sea-based oil and natural gas rigs; of the recovery of minerals from the sea-bed; of the need to control the movements of shipping; of pollution of the seas and ocean; of major disasters at sea, (through collision, explosion or fire; and of 'terrorist' threats. In considering the size of the fast patrol ship needed to act in support of whatever reGme, national or inlternational, or a combination of both, may be imposed upon the seas around us, two facts stand odt. First, the support task will require the presence of surveillance and enforcemenlt ships (and, of course, aircraft) 365 days per year. Secondly, distances out to 200 miles from the coast imply oceanic, rather than coastal weather conditions. Seaworthiness alone, therefore, would call for a ship somewhere between a minimum of 200 feet in length, as for example the Scottish fishery protection ship Jura, land a maximum of 378 feet, which the latest U.S. Coastguard 'high endurance cuuer' of the Hamilton class measures. Speed: iafiter size, speed is probably the most contentious feature d a warship. High maximum speed is not only extremely costly, but tends to constrain quite seriously other essential requirements, such as endurance, habitability, armament and equipment. Ft is necessary, therefore, to be absolutely certain that the maximum speed a s k d for is the in-



dispensable minimum consistent with the primary function of the warship. I n the case of the fast patrol ship, what should we mean by fast? Let us divide the problem into three: patrol speed (economic); deployment speed (maximum sustainable in virtually all weathers); and emergency full speed (interception of fast contact). A sea-kindly and easily-driven hull ought to achieve, say, fourteen knots and twenty knots respectively, for the first two situations. Modern weapon systems call for a steady, rather than a highly mobile platform, for effective operation in combat. The fast patrol ship, therefore, will need its maximum speed for intercepting, and keeping contact with, three sorts of contact. Surface ships, either combatant or non-combatant; and submarines. I t is reasonable to assume that combatant ships of unknown identity sailing within 200 miles of our shores will be loclated, tracked and covered by major naval/air forces, although, provided they are not proceeding at or near full speed i't might be helpful to use one or more fast patrol ships in the operation. As to noncombatants, although many, such as container ships, can do twenty-eight knots or more, failure on their part to respond to the instructions of a fast patrdl ship, and the use of speed to draw away, would, again, attract the atten$ion of major naval/air forces. In the case of submerged submarines (their surflace speed seldom exceeds twenty knots or so), it is true that many now are capable of thirty knots or more. However, in the comparatively shallow seas over the continental shelf, submarines are inhibjted from making the best use of !high speed, and certainly would expose themselves to detection, location and tracking by passive means were they to proceed at more than about twenty knots when submerged. For the fast patrol ship, therefore, a maximum speed of about twenty-five knots would be acceptable. Endurance: not only fuel, but stores and

habitability in all weathers must be considered. Given the need for maximum availability on station, ability to carry out fourteen-day patrols would be satisfactory. Armament: in peacetime, a small but highly accurate and controllable gun would be needed, for the exercise of minimum force, and the covering of boardling parties. I n war, the X t available point defence surface-to-air missile system would be essential; even in an emergency short of war this armament should be fitted. The necessary radar and fire control, as well as launchers, should therefore always be installed. Topweight and space allowance should also be provided for the fitting of a surface-to-surface missile. Helicopter: la heliwpter, such as the Lynx for example, would be essential, with hangar stowage, and this might well govern the size of the ship. B d h air-tosurface missiles and A/S torpedoes would be carried. Equipment : radar for navigation, and surface and local air surveillance must be installed, together with mediumperformance hull-mounted sonar; a specially-tailored communications fit, and electronic support measures to a high standard. Fire and oil pollution fighting equipment, and a decompression chamber should be carried. Command and control: whilst not expected to take paft in fleet operations, as a general rule, the fast patrol ship should be able to provide a satisfactory headquarters for the conduct of a major disaster control operation. Crew and accommodation : if the peacet m crew could be kept, say, to seventy ie officers and men, exclusive of the helicopter crew and support team, this would be satisfactory. Accommodation should be provided in addition, however, for extra communica~tion and plotting numbers, and for six or so civilian officials. At various times these may be fishery control experts or other scientists;



civilian police or Customs officials. In emergency it should be possible to accommodate a party of Royal Marines. Hull strength : the ltask of the fast patrol ship requires that she be of tougher construction than, currently, is the case with (the smaller warships. Furthermore, damage limitation and contxwl measures should be designed with the normal marine risks of fire and collision primarily in mind (including, possibly, damage from striking ice), rather than 'the violence of the enemy'. Availability: long periods a vt,rather d than long periods in harbour, must be achieved, and this should be reflected in the through-costing, in terms of average number d days at sea over the ship's life. This figure ought to be about one third again as great as that for modern frigates. Reliability: some extra capital cost would be justified in order to ensure exceptionailly Mgh reliability of hull, equipment and all machinery. Maintainance: as with reliability, extra initial cost, if unavoidable, would be

justified in order to render maintainance uncomplicated. Cost: the capital cost ought t be cono sidered 'in two parts: hull and machinery, with basic navigational equipment; and the 'military' additions. Only a feasibility study could provide the batis for an order of costs, both initial and running. Conclusion I t h believed that a case has been made for the addition to most modern navies of a new type of warship, for the purpose of sea-use control in peace and war. The type-name proposed is the Fast Patrol Ship. I t would be about 300 feet in length; of roughly 1500 tons standard dlisplacement; capable of cruising at fourteen knots in all weathers; deploying at twenty knots; and achieving a maximum of twenty-five knots in an emergency. Its other main features have already been described. Having established the functional characteristics of the F.P.S., shall we just call it a corvette?

Twice a Wren
When war was declared on Germany in August 1914 I had just returned home to Southsea from a holiday in the Isle of Wight. I felt that I must do something to help the war effort but never having been trained to earn a living, had no idea of what I could do. I discussed the problem with my old school friend whose husband, a draughtsman and designer in H.M. Dockyard, offered to teach me Tracing. I had never even heard of this before but went to their home and took 'evening classes'. I found that I loved the work! At about this time I saw an advertisement in the evening paper asking for lady tracers to apply to H.M.S. Vernon bringing with them a specimen of their work. I dashed off a small piece and went along. I did not see anybody naval but was interviewed by the head of the civilian staff. He engaged me on a week's trial. I found that I was the first female to work in the drawing office but in the following weeks more and more girls were engaged until we numbered sixty-eight. We worked in the main drawing office, overlooking Portsmouth Harbour, with about two dozen male designers and draughts-



men. We girls were given two rows of drawing boards down the centre of the large office whilst the men had the windows and the view. Still we saw many warships moving in and out of the harbour and after the Battle of Jutland saw some of the damaged ships limping back to the Dockyard. But this was something we were not allowed to discuss. Our chief work was on the drawings of mines and sinkers: some of these were very fine indeed and gave us tracers some anxious moments. I remember one job that was so intricate and gigantic that it took me nearly three weeks to complete but I had the satisfaction of being complimented by the Admiralty for the job. The W.R.N.S. established I think it was in 1916 that the W.R.N.S. was first introduced. We office staff of females were interviewed by an officer who explained about the new Service and asked if we would join. No difference was to be made to our hours or pay, which was thirty-five shillings a week. Joining would merely mean getting into uniform for the duration! We all willingly took off our War Service Badges and became Wrens. (These War Service Badges were heavy triangular brass brooches, inscribed 'On War Service' which we wore to show that we were doing our bit - I still treasure mine). Our uniform, when it came, was issued to us by a Wren officer who was, herself, in plain clothes. We were issued with a navy blue serge dress having a small taped collar, two huge patch pockets and a belt; the hem of the dress had to be eight inches from the ground. The hat was of soft gingham which closely fitted the head, including the hair (hiding it entirely) and displaying an H.M.S. cap ribbon. One blessing of this hat was that it fitted so well that it would never blow off, even in the highest wind. The shoes

were of heavy box calf, very well made and surprisingly comfortable to wear. These uniforms, which would now look old fashioned and frumpy, were in fact quite fashionable a t that time when it was customary to wear long skirts. We were not given mackintoshes but were issued with very heavy cloth overcoats, the same length as the dress and very warm and comforting in winter. We, in the Drawing Office, were given badges of crossed hammers to be sewn onto the sleeves of both dress and coat. We had no Wrennery or mess in the Mining School and had to have all our meals a t home. I t was very difficult to buy the right food; a t one time we did not see a potato for over three months and could only buy turnips, swedes or parsnips in the shops. One day my mother found what she thought were a few onions in the garden and these she included in a stew that she was making. After eating it the whole family were very sick indeed - the onions were daffodil bulbs!

War was grim

A t work we often got 'rush jobs' and had to stay on at night to finish them. One night, after working until after eight o'clock, we were asked by a naval Petty Officer if we would like a cup of coffee. We all said that we would and thoroughly enjoyed the hot, strong, drink when it came along. Then we all became sleepy and could hardly keep our eyes open. Later the Petty Officer explained that he had laced the coffee with rum as he thought that we deserved it! Although I was a local girl, lived within a short distance of H.M.S. Victory, and saw her nearly every day, I had never been over her. One day I was detailed off to take a party of twenty-four Wrens over her! I t was a real treat for us all. So was the day that we went to sea - a trip in one of Vernon's tenders round the Harbour and




then past Haslar Wall to Stokes Bay Pier where we were landed to find our own way back to Portsmouth. I t was a very hot summer's day and I led my party of girls to a well known hotel in Alverstoke where we intended to have a cup of tea before going home. I was mortified when, having led my party into the hotel, we were asked to leave because only officers were served! I remember we had a concert one night given by our own people for the whole of the ship's company. I sang a duet with one of the Wrens - she was a very strong contralto and very nearly drowned my weak little mezzo-soprano. I then changed into a childish outfit, showing my knees, to sing a song called 'The Birthday Party'. The chorus went: We had a game called 'Animals' Where each one took his pick. They said to me What will you be? I said - 'Please I'll be sick! ' Next morning there was a mysterious cartoon circulating round the office. I t showed me sitting in a bath tub scrubbing my knees to get ready for the show. We sometimes got visitors to see over the office and all the most hush-hush jobs were quickly hidden. I was once embarrassed by being asked by a very high rated lady, who had stopped to admire my work, 'Do a bit will you?' This in the hearing of the whole office staff. There was one rather conceited designer in the office whom the majority of the Wrens disliked for his sarcasm and snooping. He had to be taught a lesson. He used to walk very quietly up to one's drawing board and then speak sharply in a nasty tone. One day I pretended not to see him coming and put my foot out just as he was passing. He tripped and fell and I was most popular with the rest of the girls.

. . . . and sometimes gay

At last, after I had spent two years as a civilian and two years as a Wren in the same office, the war came to an end. On the afternoon of Armistice Day we were given a 'Make and Mend' and a party of us made our way to the Square outside Portsmouth Town Hall and joined the crowd of hundreds who had gathered there. I t all seemed rather tame to us so someone suggested that we go into the railway station buffet and have a glass of port. Women never went into 'pubs' in those days. We each had some port and as we were hungry we quickly felt quite muzzy and giggly. Waiting for a tram to take us home 1 was leaning against one of the stationary ones when it started off. I rolled round and round with it until my friend rescued me. Finally the Wrens were disbanded. We, in H.M.S. Vernon, received a farewell address from Captain W. R. Napier, R.N. He paid us all some pretty compliments on our work and behaviour and ended by saying that owing to the accident of his initials he would not forget us in a hurry.

Second time round When the Second World War started I was happily married, living in Alverstoke and with a family of two children, an eighteen year old daughter at home and a thirteen year old boy a t boarding school. My next door neighbour had just been commissioned in the re-formed Wrens and told me of the Immobile Section which it was then possible to join. In this section one joined for service at a specific station and lived at home - at first one had to take a11 meals a t home too. This suited me as I would be able to combine service in the Wrens with my housewifely cares. So, within a week of the beginning of the war I was, for the second time, a Wren. I had joined for service at the RoyaI Naval Air Station, Lee-on-Solent, about four miles from my home and had chosen, since in the new Wrens my old



category did not exist, to be a writer. I was put straight to work keeping a n enormous ledger in which were recorded all the details from which were worked out the fortnightly pay of about five hundred members of the ship's company. I soon learnt the difference between 'G', 'T', and 'U.A.'. My hours of duty were, I found, practically the same as in the First War. So was my pay! The only difference was that now I was given my pay once a fortnight instead of once a week. No uniform was available for a few weeks so I went to work in a plain dark navy blue costume with a white blouse. When the uniform was issued it differed considerably from that of the First World War. This time I was issued with a neat navy blue coat and skirt in serge, three white shirt blouses, black stockings and box calf shoes. Instead of the heavy overcoat there was a very nice gaberdine raincoat. The hat was a schoolgirlish pudding basin hat with the familiar, to me, H.M.S. cap ribbon. (This hat was never popular and soon it was replaced by a 'real sailor's cap'.) I was very lucky and was the first Wren a t Lee to receive my uniform. As a result I was made to pose many times by my own officers for other senior officers to admire.

Immobile? I used to cycle out to Lee in the mornings, home to lunch, back to work for the afternoon and home again in the evenings, a total of sixteen miles a day. However, when the air raids came this sometimes became impossible and the rules were changed to allow us Immobiles to have, and pay for, a lunch in the Wrennery. We never knew whether we should get through our meal or have to leave it on the table and run for the very inadequate 'dug-outs' which had been quickly made for us. (We sat on a very rough earthen seat with water running down our backs and our feet in

a miniature lake). Later some very up-to-date surface shelters were built and then we were very comfortable and dry. I t was a nuisance having to take shelter, for the time in the shelter had to be made up and the normal day's work finished after the 'all clear' had sounded. I did not like being late home from work! On one occasion, after a n air raid warning had sounded I was told to get all the girls out of the office and into the shelters; this took a little time and as I was walking to the shelter a German plane flew close overhead and started to spray the area with machine gun bullets. Some of the naval men from the next shelter told me in n o polite terms to run and get under cover - their language was quite unprintable. Another time I was just going out to have my lunch when a low flying plane came over. Startled I looked up to see what was happening - it was a German plane and the gunner in the back had his fingers t c his nose cocking a snook a t me. We did not always escape unscathed. During one sneak raid by German bombers a bomb fell on the Wrens dining hall during dinner. Eight of the Wrens were killed and many others were wounded. The dead were given a full naval funeral and are buried in a communal grave in the Naval Cemetery by Haslar.

Advancement After a time I was advanced to Leading Wren and was given a job change. I became a member of the Regulating staff and now spent my time writing out railway warrants, ration cards and travel documents under the direction of a fatherly old Master-at-Arms. Actually he was very busy with other duties; I saw little of him except when he wanted a cup of tea and I was left very much to get on with things in my own way. The road from my house to the Air Station ran along the sea front and was



very exposed. Some of the winters were really shocking and in the end I found that I was getting very tired and run down. I reported to the Sick Bay at Lee, hoping for a tonic. Instead I was referred to the naval hospital at Haslar. There I was given a complete check up. The specialist who saw me said that he

thought that I had had enough and had me invalided out of the Wrens. Two wars, six years service, a Leading Wren with one Good Conduct Badge. That was my record and I am still proud of it. J.A.H.

1/56 and All That
The Editor mentioned my name at the end of the Article by SNIPE in the October issue of The Naval Review. As a result of some correspondence between us and because I was one of the four part-time Assessors on the Mansergh Committee (whose work resulted in A.F.O. 1/56), as well as Staff Officer to Lord Murray's Committee which put more flesh on the A.F.O. 1/56 skeleton; and as I had also, just after the war, found myself as the 'herald' proclaiming to the Public Schools the second coming of the electrical branch (the first having fallen at the last fence in the midtwenties when the Board cancelled the A.F.O. just as it was to be issued); the Editor has asked me to comment on SNIPE'S article and the letter from SETREAL which follows it. LAERTES was the son of ULYSSES. hope there is no I wooden horse lurking in the background. Unhappily only ten days remain as I start this, before the Editor's inevitable zero hour, and this is not time enough to refresh my memory and put down some of the fascinating and perplexing problems which form the backdrop to the Navy's never ending hunt for a Utopian officer structure. A hunt which has been proceeding for several hundred years. With the Editor's indulgence and subject to my duties as naval correspondent to the Army Quarterly I shall try and do something about recording this saga in the ensuing months. No-one, I believe, should embark on a study of this subject without reading Professor Michael Lewis's England's Sea Oficers. The problems and irritations between those who fought the ships and those who made them go are not entirely new and to understand the history of this struggle, as well as the problems created by what were known as the 'civilians' (the Bursar, the Schoolmaster and others), as well as the term 'military' and 'executive', and how these terms came to be applied, is an essential prerequisite to any constructive proposals. In this rather hastily written article I can cover a lot of ground by quoting just one paragraph from Michael Lewis's book: The whole service had grown up without him (the engineer). It had developed in its confused English way yet, ultimately, it had crystallised along very different lines. The original amalgamation of Seamen and Fighters was, apparently, accomplished for good and all. The nest was safely built; the men who fought and the men who made the ship go had engaged their respective niches in it; members of many other leading professions had hopped in too and snuggled comfort-

ably down therein, each in his appointed place. As far as general functions were concerned everybody knew where he stood; all was serenity and peace, and all were engaged in healthy and common growth. But then there suddenly dropped out of the blue, right into the heart of the nest, an egg - an uncompromisingly large egg which, before anyone had time to realise it, incontinently hatched out into a vigorous and highly intelligent fowl; one, moreover, whose growth was phenomenally rapid, for a very large percentage of the food poured into the nest (in the shape of work to be done) was absorbed by him. The story starts then in 1442, when an Ordinance of the Commons for the Safeguard of the Sea required that 'every grete shippe shall have a Capytayne within borde' and further that 'the King our Sovereign Lord Choose such of them as him liketh to be the Chief Capytayne'. All Capytaynes, also, 'are to be Knights or worthy Squires', and thus was established the difference between the squirearchy and the old ship officers, the Master and Boatswain. Professor Lewis records how the breach was slowly healed and it is possible, though somewhat arbitrary, to divide the officer structure problems into 'eras' as follows: Late Nineteenth Century First Fisher Era (Early Twentieth Century) Battenberg Era Second Fisher Era (World War 1) The Jellicoe Era The Twenties (This era was known to many engineers as 'The Great Betrayal') The Invergordon Mutiny The AlexanderIChatfield Era The Navy has always been conservative and, as a generality, has too often failed to understand that tradition is of enormous value provided that it is treated as

something to be lived up to and not just a diet on which to vegetate. The great ones Fisher, Battenberg, Jellicoe, Chatfield - these men stand out, in their views on officer problems, like giants; and there were many round them who fed them with ideas; and far too many others who resisted change. What I find so absorbing, having been more or less weaned on the Invergordon Mutiny, is the extraordinary series of changes which have occurred since 1932 whether triggered by the mutiny or not, in the whole personnel structure and discipline of the Navy; changes, I would judge, all irreversibly for the better. A lunch party I shall never forget took place a t the home of Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, in the early Sixties. In between puffs from the oxygen bottle, towed from room to room, with which he so bravely kept himself going, he told me how, after the war, when the First Lord offered him the Nore Command, he wrote to the Board refusing the offer because he was worn out and suggesting that 'the Board should tear out the first page of the Navy List so that younger men could take over, and the appalling stodginess of the Twenties be prevented'. In the event I think his fears were unfounded. Since 1946 the Board has made many mistakes, as, of course, we all have. But when one surveys the last thirty years of unparalleled and rapid change in society, in technology, in Parliament, and in methods of naval warfare, the wonder seems to me not that mistakes have been made, but that the Board seems to have 'kept just ahead of the game' the whole time. And, for what it is worth, I believe that much of this success stems from the amazingly far sighted decision, taken at a time when the Navy was de-mobilising after World War I1 with one hand and re-mobilising for the Korean war with the other to




establish the Mansergh Committee and further, to give the Chairmanship to someone with the vision of Admiral Sir Aubrey Mansergh. There were plenty who rejected the whole thesis from which A.F.O. 1/56 stemmed not only in the Executive camp, but amongst Engineers of both sorts and even (though I think much fewer) from amongst the Paymasters. The then Second Sea Lord, Admiral the Hon. Sir Guy Russell, used to say, waving a huge file of protest letters, that he was apparently 'the most unsatisfactory Second Sea Lord ever'. The Board is not very open hearted to would be historians like me and so it will not be until many of us have departed this earthly paradise that details of the Board's staunch determination are revealed to the public gaze. More is the pity. But the Board was equally firm in the aftermath, when they established the Murray Committee. Due to a whole series of events and some very bad advice the entry standard for naval officers (always traditionally higher than for the other services and in the pre-war years very high indeed) was reduced to 3 0-Levels (which could be taken separately). The result was not a n increase in entry numbers as had been expected but rather the reverse as schoolmasters could see little future for their bright pupils (nor could the pupils) in a fighting service which apparently equated its officers' intellectual requirements with o r even below, the very lowest grade in the Civil Service. Further it became apparent that even this rather mediocre standard was not being achieved until the average candidate was nearly nineteen. It was the Engineers and particularly the 'Electricals' who quickly persuaded a very worried Board that the new entry scheme, so recently introduced (despite despairing cries by its advocates 'not to pull up a new plant by the roots') was iqimical not only to the advances so recently achieved by

A.F.O. 1/56 but, much more important, to the whole future of the Royal Navy itself. The Murray Committee did its work fast and within six months of Lord Murray's first meeting the Board had hoisted the entry standard to University level, where I believe, it rightly remains. Entry standards are one thing; naval training is another. Perhaps we should let Lord Moran speak here: The Senior Service has long occupied in the hearts of Englishmen the place reserved in Germany for their army. Where so much is slipshod and even humiliating, here, against a background of the rough sea, is a breed of men, doing a man's job about as well as it could be done. And it would not be amiss, perhaps, also to remind ourselves of the words of the old seamanship manual used in the Britannia: Remember that your vocation deliberately chosen is war. War as a means of peace, but still war. And in singleness of purpose for the Empire's fame, prepare for the time when the honour and welfare of that Empire may come to be in your keeping. That by your skill and valour when that time arrives and fortune comes your way, you may revive the spirit. . . . Training and education In my view there have always been three main objectives in the training of naval officers. First and most importantly of all naval training must seek to develop qualities of leadership, example and duty, known generally as officer-like-qualities; and further, a land animal has to be turned into a sea animal. Whatever the future holds these needs remain. Many people much more clever than I am have written of how to do this. I have held tight, all my service life, to Lord Jellicoe's 'Principles of




Discipline' which he wrote into his Report to the Government of Canada. The best part of it, for those who are interested, occurs on pages 511 et seq. in Bacon's Life o f John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe (Cassell & Co.). I am sorry to go on quoting but in this materialistic age when a naval officer's duties, inevitably, require more and more understanding of technology, I am sure that the qualities of leadership, so far as we lesser mortals may achieve them, as set out by John Buchan in the context of Montrose, are increasingly important: First there must be fortitude, the power of enduring when hope is gone, the power of taking upon oneself a desperate responsibility and daring all. There must be selfforgetfulness, a willingness to let worldly interests and even reputation and honour perish, if only the task be accomplished. The man who is concerned with his own repute will never move mountains. There must be patience, supreme patience, under misunderstandings and setbacks and the muddles and interferences of others. There must be resilience in defeat, a manly optimism which looks at all the facts in all their bleakness and yet dares to hope. There must be a sense of the eternal continuity of a great cause so that failure will not seem the end; and a man see himself as only a part in a predestined purpose. Leadership, then, depends primarily on moral endowments. For the rest (it seems to me) there are only two clear pointers. The level of education, both general and vocational is continually rising amongst sailors while changes in society continue to erode the traditional authority of officers. Consequent upon this, in the Navy of

the future, the ability to lead is likely to require, in addition to personality, an altogether higher level of technological knowledge. Training therefore seems to have two further tasks, namely, to establish, through academic studies, a wide general background consistent with the status of an officer, and a sound knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals governing the operation and employment of naval equipment; and to ensure through professional training an easy familiarity with the technicalities and uses of the various naval installations and equipments. My own view has always been that all officers should undergo, as the Americans and the Canadians and the Russians undergo, what we might term a course of liberal engineering studies; and from the little I now know of things I believe we are moving towards this. I think some seamen officers and most 'S' officers are against this. The latter because they feel they do not need it for the proper performance of their 'Supply' duties (as they probably do not), though I have often thought that their superlative work in Board offices might be enhanced by a little more technical expertise. To those who decry the need for all officers to have a fair measure of technological know-how I have, in the past, drawn their attention to the comments of an American educationalist quoted some years ago by Professor Garner in his Redwood Lecture, when he said: 'The standards of comparison which have been derived from Greece and the Middle Ages have long been followed in Western Europe and have conspicuously failed to solve the problems the modern world has had deposited on its doorstep'. However a good Arts man can quickly assimilate the necessary knowledge because it is the quality of mind that matters.

condescended to stay in the Navy rather 'All of the company' In reading the two pieces by SNIPE than 'Bowler themselves' after A.F.O. and SETREAL must confess to more 1/56. I doubt if the Board would ever I sympathy with the latter despite his see things in quite that light. rather too constant usage of the terms I said earlier that I had some symand 'plumbers' and 'pussers'. (I constantly pathy with SETREAL so I have beuse these terms myself but, I suspect, in cause I faced the same dilemma myself a slightly more affectionate way). I think some years ago as, I suspect, he has SNIPE on shaky ground with statistics. faced. From the age of four I had no is At one time when Admiral Turner was other ambition in life other than to join on the Board there were also, I seem to the Navy and (rather later) to become a recall, four Vice-Admiral (engineering navigator. I t was therefore a blow specialists) out of a total of twelve Vice when, having got as far along the road Admirals in the Navy List. This as to win the navigation prize, one of conglomeration was not achieved, as has my eyes developed (very slight) short been suggested, because years ago sight and I was faced with an Admiralty Admiral Turner captained the Keyham letter suggesting a transfer to (E) or (S), cricket eleven, and when he reached the or to the Army (R.M.A. or Sandhurst), Board managed so to arrange things that or, if I wished to leave altogether the his fast and slow bowlers, his wicket Services, telling me I should be excused keeper and his opening bat should all Responsions at Oxford. And all this as reach Vice Admiral's rank together. One my contemporaries were just about to reason without doubt is that nearly half do their Subs Courses and after I had our contemporaries were killed in the 'commanded' nothing bigger than H.M. war; we were the lucky ones. But I Drifter Horizon. It may be senility speaking but I do suspect there are other reasons which I hold the view that since the war, the shall try to explore later. I do not know if SETREAL has any Board has taken the Navy a very long experience of the workings of the naval way towards being 'all of one company'. reporting and promotion system. Here In the event some people have gone to again I believe the Board has moved very the wall; on others of us much fortune fast indeed and in the right direction. has smiled. It is true (and this should Having had, in the last five years, please SNIPE)that the first captain of considerable experience of the three the U.S.S. Enterprise was an engineer Services and Civil Service systems I have and fighter pilot who had never comthe strong impression that the Navy is manded any ship, except an oiler for a ahead of all of them in the way it looks very short period. But he had the brains after individual officers and ensures that and background to do a year's nuclear they get a share of the good jobs course first, and then took over comcommensurate with their observed mand. After another year or two he was performance; and that their capabilities promoted to admiral and flew his flag are objectively assessed. There will in the same ship. Further the new always be anomalies but I do not see the President-elect is a naval engineer so (if, Board, with the true interests of the SNIPE as I suspect, he is an engineer) Navy at heart, ever indicating precisely should take hope. which post should go to which category of officers except where an exceptional 'Small is beautiful'? need can be fully sustained. SETREAL No one has a greater admiration and talks of a bargain between the Board affection for the U.S. Navy than I have and those who (he seems to imply) and few would deny the mighty power

and efficiency of its four great fleets and its submarine force. Yet a Chinese said to me last year, 'We know you have a very small navy now. We wish you had a bigger one. But you still have the most experienced navy in the world.' One of the great preoccupations of the Board, as the gross mis-management of our national economic affair proceeds, must surely be to preserve that experience and, if possible, enhance it. Sadly, in this endeavour, some good people may go to the wall and possibly justifiable aspirations will be disappointed. But surely the aim is right and I doubt if it would best be served by a more rigid determination of promotion slots, as SNIPE and SETREAL seem to suggest. SNIPE speaks of a mythical A.F.O. 1/02. I hope to show in the future (if any of us have one) that there is in fact a direct link between the Selborne-Fisher scheme and A.F.O. 1/56. There were more than a few (E) 'seed potatoes' of the scheme who, in their hearts, never really accepted that Beatty's 'Great Betrayal' was the end of the matter. They sustained the vision of the Navy that Fisher tried to create and some of them, in the decade before World War 11, managed to pass on this vision to younger officers. It was not a vision of power for the sake of power but a vision of a Navy that, by engineering skill, could keep at sea, ready for battle, for far longer than was ever dreamed of. And when the war came it was they, with the second and third generation 'seeds' they had taught, who did just that. So it was that when it all ended, the original 'seeds' and some of their term mates and near contemporaries, now captains of ships and admirals of squadrons, or sewing in the Admiralty, wrought together to produce the climate in which, first Mansergh and then AFO 1/56 were born. I do not find it easy to understand SNIPE'Spara. 2, Col. 2 on page 354, for he seems to take the opposite view in

the last para of the next column. My own view is that we shall need the Roopes, the Sherbrookes, the Wanklyns, just as much as we have ever done; and I am equally sure that they are there, by the score. The Navy, thanks often to 'prods' like SNIPE and SETREAL, the friendships to forged in war between officers of all Branches, to the Fisher 'seed potatoes' (also of all branches) and certainly not least to a series of consistently strong and far sighted Boards (such as the Navy rarely enjoyed 'between the wars') has come a long way very fast; and from the little I know that speed of advance is not reducing either in the fields of personnel, technology or tactical skill. I have just one small reservation. Young Army officers fully understand the horrors of Marxist-Leninist doctrines which threaten us like a tidal wave. They learn it at Sandhurst; they see the Border and the Berlin Wall and the pitiful refugees flying to the West. They know, very well, what Ireland is really all about. The R.A.F., too, know this, though perhaps less well. But, with a few brilliant exceptions, naval officers seem to me to take a far too simplistic view of what we face. They seem to hold that 'Its the Baddies with a big Navy that is the threat. Give us a big Navy too and we'll sort things out'. I wish it was so easy. Historically, it is now clear that World War I11 started with the Communist mutiny in the Greek ships in Alexandra harbour in 1944. I t has been rolling on ever since though most people have been too blind to see it; and the crunch is coming very soon; sooner than we dare to think; and it may well be that it will come, first, at sea.

It is the Fleet that matters So, as we old men sit ashore biting will our nails, SNIPEand SETREAL be at sea keeping open NATO's North Atlantic life line. It may not be a shooting war to begin with; it may never be. I t may

be just a question of whose nerve breaks first; that of our Western statesmen or that of the Politbureau. I believe the Chinese are right. Our Navy, though too small, is, otherwise, well fitted to its task. When the crunch comes, as soon it will, Western statesmen must be assured that the NATO navies can, and still do, dominate the North Atlantic; if not, the statesmen's nerve will break and they will back down; and then the long night will fall.

Of course its right to worry about 'Higher Management' and 'Promotion Factors', but not too much, as the twilight falls. It is the Fleet that matters. Every man, every machine, every weapon, every ship has to be brought to, and maintained at, the highest state of readiness, for what very well may be the Royal Navy's last, but which will certainly be its greatest, battle.

Coal Ship
There cannot be many officers serving in the Royal Navy today who have ever had to coal ship and so this brief description may be of some interest. In the early part of the first war when, except for destroyers, a small number of light cruisers and one squadron of battleships, all the ships of the Navy were coal burners, coaling was necessarily a frequent operation. I t was always carried out immediately on return to harbour, when anything up to 1,500 tons might be taken in; and also at regular intervals while in harbour for amounts of about 300 tons to keep bunkers topped up. During the eight months immediately preceding the Battle of Jutland we coaled no less than thirty times. The Indomitable, in which I was serving as a midshipman from 1915-1917, was far and away the best coaling ship in the Fleet. Admittedly the long flush deck extending from the forecastle to the after super-structure was a great advantage as it enabled us to use the collier's derricks at all four holds, a much faster method than using the ship's derricks and the slower electric bollards. However, even in competition with the other battle cruisers which enjoyed the same advantages, we were always the first ship to finish and often our collier was shoving off when other ships were only half way to completion. We seldom averaged less than 400 tons an hour and on one occasion, according to my diary, we took in 500 tons in just over an hour at an average rate of 474 tons per hour.
The rig of the day When calling at Rosyth we always had the same collier, the Rotherhill, and @his resulted in a great saving of time as the Master knew exactly where to place his ship alongside (always on our starboard side) and the ship's company were familiar with all the gear and could quickly get the derricks rigged and everything ready for an immediate start. Coal ship mornings provided a strange variety of dress. We midshipmen wore an overall suit over an old pair of trousers or football shorts, a rugger vest and, in the winter, probably a seaman's jersey for extra warmth; a cap cover on our heads; a scarf round our necks; an old pair of shoes or gymshoes and leather engine room gloves. Wardroom officers generally wore in addition a very old monkey jacket with possibly some tattered



remnants of stripes still adhering to the sleeves and a very old cap. The sailors looked like a lot of pirates in all sorts of fancy rigs, some in coloured football jerseys and shorts, some in old serge trousers and flannels with silks or coloured handkerchiefs tied round their heads. The Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers were generally dressed in overall suits, old caps and coats. But ranks and ratings were not easily distinguishable and as the work proceeded even faces became unrecognisable. Preparation for coaling was made while entering harbour. The deck plates covering the coal chutes were removed and canvas chutes were rigged between decks. 'Q' turret was trained across the deck with guns at maximum elevation and bags, barrows, strops and shovels were brought up on deck. Organisation Each part of the ship was assigned to one of the collier's four holds and was organised into five or six gangs about ten strong spaced out round the hold for digging the coal and filling the bags. A P.O. or Leading Hand worked the hook, with a midshipman on each winch and other midshipmen and boys for throwing empty bags back into the hold. The Officer of Division with one of his P.0.s was in general charge of the hold, watching every operation and keeping an eye on the standing and running rigging. Inboard, at each dump, was a party of about ten, mostly Chief and Petty Officer daymen, for dealing with the hoists as they arrived, getting the full bags away quickly on the barrows (which were worked by the marines) and seeing that the deck was clear before the next hoist came swinging in. The full bags were rushed away to the top of the chutes by the barrowmen under the watchful eye of the Captain of Marines who was traffic controller and the empties then brought back and returned t o the hold. A selected number of bags had to be

weighed so that an accurate estimate of the amount of coal coming in could be made. Stokers were stationed at the top of the chutes and below in the bunkers trimming the coal as it came down. Chutes could easily become jammed and it was very important to keep them clear and so ensure that coal did not pile up on deck and cause blockages and delays. A careful count of the number of bags coming in was kept a t each dump and it was the Chaplain's coal ship duty to act as one of these tallymen. Finally there was t!he band. In the Zndomitable at that time we had a Maltese band and I can see them now on a cold windy day huddled on top of the turret or in the superstructure, covered in coal dust, looking thoroughly miserable but blowing away manfully on their instruments and somehow managing to make themselves heard above the general noise and racket going on all around. High speed coaling needed great spirit and enthusiasm to sustain the proloaged and exhausting physical effort particularly in the collier's holds. Good organisation and a high degree of training was also essential and this together with the determination to beat all the other ships was the key to our success in the Indomitable. Evolution begins As soon as the collier was secured alongside the hold parties swarmed on board. Bags, shovels and strops were passed down and the gangs distributing themselves around the hold started at once to dig and fill up the bags. I n the meantime others were topping up and positioning the derricks with one plumbing the centre of the hold and one over the dump. Topping lifts were then belayed, all guys and preventer guys set up and the ends of the inhaul and whip were shackled to the big coaling hook. The midshipmen on the winches opened up the cylinder drain cocks and ran the engines in both directions with a great



hissing of steam and clanking of pistons judgment. When high enough the whip to clear the cylinders of water and then winch is stopped and the inhaul winch looked to see that the wire on the winch heaves at full speed. The two wires tauten drums was clear of riding turns and free out quickly and the hoist is pulled out towards the ship. Now is the moment; to run. As the first hoist swung inboard the the midshipman on the whip winch takes 'Advance' was sounded by the bugler, his foot off the brake, slams his lever the band struck up, the time was noted over, opens up the throttle and walks and coaling had started. With the rattle back full speed. The hoist comes inboard and clank of eight steam winches working with a tremendous swing and when over flat out, the rumble of the barrows the dump the inhaul winch is 'let go' and trundling the bags away on deck and the the bags fall with a crash on deck. The dump party quickly get round the swish and bang as the hoists of fifteen to twenty bags came slamming down on hoist and unhook one end of the strop, deck, the noise was terrific. Coal dust the winches heave in again, the strop blew thicker and thicker over everything unreeves through the beckets then strop and everyone, getting into eyes and down and hook come swinging back over the throats. The smell of coal was every- hold to be lowered again into the hookwhere, and the taste of coal in everyone's worker's hand. By this time the next gang have their hoist stropped up and mouth. ready for lifting, and the whole process The midshipman on the whip is repeated over again. There was an ordered sequence of The hook must never be kept waiting events which was repeated over and over in the hold and as each hoist arrives the again in each hold and on deck. The dump party must work like mad to get hook man standing on a pinnacle of coal the bags barrowed away and the deck in the middle of the hold waited for the clear to receive the next hoist which must hook to be lowered and then seizing it he on no account be delayed. The whole operation was carried out plunged down with it into the gloom of the hold towards the gang whose turn it at top speed and everyone had to be alert was, and who had just stropped up a and active if they were to avoid danger. hoist of some fifteen two cwt. bags. The An error on the part of the winchman two ends of the strop were slipped over the and the hoist might swing wildly and hook and a blast on the whistle told the dangerously across the hold or land too midshipman on the whip that all was far inboard and if at the shout of 'stand ready below. With his lever to 'heave-in' clear!' you didn't move quickly you were he now cracks open the steam valve to for it. An empty bag might have been tauten the whip and take the weight. carried up across one of the wires to be 'Right away' comes the shout from below flung high in the air as the wire suddenly and giving the winch a bit more steam tautened and woe betide anyone who the hoist is slowly pulled from the side didn't jump clear. The iron beckets on or corner of the hold up the slope of coal the bag could easily cut a man's head until it is directly under the derrick head. open. A large knob of coal could suddenNow the steam valve is opened wide, the ly be jerked from an overfull bag as the winch heaves in a t full speed, and the hoist swung inboard. 'Stand from under!' hoist rises up out of the hold. Meanwhile everyone shouted and those in danger the inhaul winch is taking up the slacli dived for cover. Like all evolutions at sea it is practice and as the hoist clears the hold the inhaul wire tautens. This is where the winch and training which enable men to carry workers have to exercise some nice out difficult operations at high speed and



at the same time with safety. Thanks to good drill, good judgment and quick reactions to danger it was seldom that any serious accident occurred during 'Coal Ship'.

Evolution completed The end of coaling was announced by the 'Cease Fire' on the bugle and this was always greeted by a tremendous cheer from the holds of the collier. The exhausted gangs would fling down their shovels and start to climb up out of the dust and dirt, emerging completely black from head to foot. All full bags were hoisted in and then shovels and empties were stropped up and this made up the last hoist. Derricks were then replaced, everybody came inboard and the collier shoved off. There was keen rivalry between the parts of ship with the Main Top Division nearly always coming out on top. This was hardly surprising however as they had the widest part of the deck for their dump and could therefore

swing the hoists in and get the bags cleared away more quickly. As soon as the collier shoved off the cleaning up started and the sailors would be busy with hoses, brooms and paintwork cloths for another hour a t least. The officers, however, all repaired to the Ward Room where the win9 steward handed round trays of soda water cocktails. I can still remember the taste of those drinks which as a young midshipman I thought quite revolting but of course I swallowed them down pretending to enjoy them. After that off to the Gun Room bathroom where with soap and hot water in our little hip baths we eventually scrubbed ourselves clean except for a black rim of coal dust round our eyes. This had to be removed later on in the chest flat with a handerchief and a good application of vaseline. By dinner time the ship and everyone in it was clean, a make and mend was piped and another coal ship was over. A.F.C.L.

P U Y S A FIYNB 7 7 2 Sir,-I am not sure that S. W. Haines's remarks on the Physical Fitness Test (October 1976) will provoke much argument, since, in the medium-sized shore establishment to which I am not appointed, interest was not conspicuous. The scheme originated, I believe, in the office of the Director of Naval Physical Training and Sport. A Ministry of Defence letter was sent to Commanders-in-Chief, who in turn invited Commanding Officers to implement a voluntary scheme. The aim of the scheme appeared to be to improve the standard of physical fitness of naval personnel, and the aim
was t be achieved by encouraxement o and by some form of simple guidance. The basic premise, with which few will quibble, is that any man will do his job better, and for longer, if fit, than he would unfit: and it was stated that the standards of physical fitness which obtain in civilian life (and in many cases in shore-going service life) have fallen. I t was concluded that the system of encouraging voluntary participation in activities which promote physical fitness, though already yielding very worthwhile results, would be much strengthened by the existence of simple and easily interpreted target levels. Commanding Officers were therefore to be invited to



bring some attached tables to the notice of all under their command, and to encourage them to achieve and maintain the standards of endurance which those tables reflect. In promulgating this letter, my C-in-C specifically directed that the tests should not be attempted until personnel were physically fit. The tests consisted of running or swimming, with walking as an alternative only for those over forty-five. The targets to be aimed for in the one and a half mile run varied from under fourteen minutes for those in the forty-five to forty-nine age bracket, to under twelve minutes for the under thirties. Various levels were set for each age group, but those were the maxima to qualify as 'fit'. If the aim was limited to laying down targets against which an individual's fitness could be judged, then the scheme is adequate. But, without stating a specific aim, it was implied that personnel should be tested against that aim at six-monthly intervals. The question 'What do we do about those who are not sufficiently fit' was left hanging in the air although Commanding Officers were invited to forward their views. Nor was any scheme set out for trial whereby a man on draft from one ship to another took his 'fitness record' with him which is surely necessary if we are to keep this up. I t appears to me that if a set standard of physical fitness is to be a requirement for all of us, then we must exercise (in the operational rather than the physical sense) to achieve it. To maintain the Fleet's gunnery standards, we do not do exercises on a voluntary basis. It follows that some form of physical exercise should be compulsory if standards are to be maintained e em ember taking PT at morning divisions, or evening quarters?) To take S. W. Haines's points one by one:

1. I t will be seen that C-in-C was aware of the danger to unfit personnel (I use that word because the Wrens were included in this scheme), and specifically warned against it. In my establishment the PT Staff were careful to vet, however subjectively, all participants. 2. Commander-in-Chief's letter, which contained all the points I have set out above, was sent to all Commanding Officers in this Command. There was no lack of information to stop COs explaining exactly what the aims were. However, I rather agree that a formal work up programme would better achieve the aim. (I had to work myself up to achieve the standard). 3. Of course the test will not improve efficiency of itself. The aim was to set men a recognisable standard, and to leave it up to individuals to attain and keep that standard. In my establishment, all the testing was done out of working hours, with no cost in money, nor, I believe, in morale. 4. The scheme was emphatically voluntary, and in this establishment was run in such a manner as to discourage the undesirable competitive element. However, as officers we were enjoined to encourage men to achieve the target, and the reported death of one senior rating from causes which could be attributed to participation was wholly regrettable. On the whole, what happened was that those who were fit proved that they were, while the unfit stayed unfit. Despite the bally-hoo which introduced the scheme (Commodore of the Barracks appearing on television, and breathless Wrens with heaving bosoms), it has been something of a nine-days wonder. In this establishment, so far as I am aware, after the first burst, when



some 280 Officers and ratings achieved of surface vessels of large tonnage. He the standard out of some 900 in the did not actually make the point that the establishment, no more tests have been number of funnels is a factor in impresscarried out. Nor has there been any ing the natives, but references to the encouragement to keep men fit, other Bukit Timah and Marsa Club clearly show his experience to have been than what has always been done. To summarise, I consider the aim gathered in other and more ample wholly admirable, but suggest that the decades. Such historical recollections have, Sir, execution was muddled, and unlikely to achieve what seems to be the long-term traditionally formed a substantial and aim. Obviously I cannot speak for the attractive part of The Naval Review, but staff officers responsible for introducing it is appropriate for them to be tempered the scheme, but I do not imagine that by modern realities. they intended the scheme to be a fully Your correspondent TARTARUS, devoted working model: the whole tone of the as I imagine him to be to his daily round introductory letter was that it was as Churchwarden and Secretary of the experimental, and that views were Meon Valley Rose Show, may not fully sought. My view is that if we regard have grasped that the major vessels in voluntary sport as being insufficient to Her Majesty's Fleet are now submarines. In this light, the whole subject is sadly achieve the aim, then compulsory exercise and testing is the only logical minirnised in its significance by the answer. scarcity of any Port Visits at all. The Finally, with tongue in cheek, how natives of many of these ports, soothed many desk men in MOD (Navy) went as they used to be by the arrival of the out and ran round Horse Guards Parade Royal Navy with guns, awnings and multiple funnels, have not yet adjusted to qualify? CURSOR to the nuclear machinery now powering our capital ships. Hence it is not an infrequent occurrence now for a subA THEORY OF PORT VISITS Sir,-The scholarly study that has but marine to tour the Mediterranean for a recently appeared in these pages is to be month and return home not having praised. I t is a pity that this balanced touched port. However, in the spirit of TARTARUS and and unsensational attempt to distil some general principles from past experience the advancement of learning let us take has gained the wrong kind of attention, the Group Deployment he referred to, even notoriety. This apparent levity is and examine the relation of theory to no doubt unwelcome to yourself, Sir, but practice. The Aim, highlighted in often penetrating if at times is sometimes the fate of academics who TARTARUS'S seek only to promote earnest discussion. purely historical study, remains valid. Appreciating however that the author Some authorities maintain that subwas striving towards the eventual pro- mariners are different (claiming that you duction of coherent guidance in this can always tell a submariner but you can't tell him much) but they are not field, may I venture a comment? The article, as evident from its title, that different. dealt only with the theory of Port Visits. One to Three Day Visits can be disDue attention must now be paid to regarded. The submarine having a slower practice. The author, whom I assume surface speed than her consorts would to have retired to his Hampshire cottage arrive Irate4 and of course bas to be in full of years and honours, understand- her area on Monday for the Departure ably phrases his reminiscences in terms Exercise. It is not therefore worthwhile



for her to enter harbour, and she remains at sea providing services to Allied air forces. Four to Six Day Visits have been known. The submarine may be fortunate enough to be berthed at the Old Coaling Dock, only two miles from the frigates at Front Street, but is as likely to be at a buoy. Achievement of the Aim is prejudiced. The boat taking officers from the submarine to the Official CTP may be late. When it arrives, long whites normally stowed under the port torpedo rack may not satisfy TARTARUS'S rather baleful Executive Officer, with the result that some of the aspirants may not make it up the gangway. Those who do will find the dishy Margharita already trapped by Flags. One of the sounder elements of the 'Theory of Port Visits' was the recognition of the Senior Engineer's experience. Readers will recall that by attention to detail and a properly paced approach he achieved the aim with a minimum of fuss. I t is a noteworthy merit of the Study that, whilst often rooted in the past, it can yet illuminate some of the enduring principles. Unfortunately the submarine's reactor must remain critical whilst at a buoy, and so on the night of the Official CTP the Senior Engineer will be keeping watch in Manoeuvring. This deprives the Seaman aspirants of the opportunity to profit from his technique. Engineering aspirants will of course be in the Engine Room lower level, systems notebooks in hand, preparing for next week's Qualification Board. The submarine aspirant does have one advantage. The 'Theory of Port Visits' contains stern warnings against attempts to achieve the Aim under the White Ensign. Detection is postulated by officials described as Fresh Water Tanky, HQ 1 Patrol, or the Bosun's Mate. Submarine aspirants are happily free from these risks, as Security Standing Orders may well prevent

Aimworthy civilians from coming on board. These few points in no way invalidate TARTARUS'S excellent Study, but demonstrate its limited and historical nature. Perhaps when he has considered the necessary amendments we may be treated to some further development of the theme from his talented pen. Achievement of the Aim at Faslane will have to be considered, perhaps in a scenario of deer stalking and foul weather rig. Although it is outside the scope of these few academic remarks, it may occur to perceptive readers that submarines these days are rather long on work and short on incentives. No doubt, Sir, someone is thinking about it. HELIOS THE ART OF COURSE COMPUTING Sir,-I read with interest the article in the October edition of The Naval Review, 'The Art of Course Computing'. The problems outlined are of course not new. In fact they may be simpler than in days gone by. Individual equipments have a much wider fitting than was often the case twenty years ago. Perhaps the reason why the fleet in 196213 had a higher availability than at any time this century is because there was a Virginian in the background. We all know that TRAMPISwould not have lasted long without the Virginian to come and rescue him. I only hope that Collingwood's Trampis has a similar guardian angel. On a more serious note The Naval Review has had a number of contributions on Training, Recruitment, and Welfare. These would indicate a real concern on the personnel side of the Service. At the present time the Army is over subscribed for graduate officers. The R.A.F. requirement for 1,000 graduates has been met. The Navy is still scratching around. At one university



a letter to all final year engineering biography (published by William Blackstudents failed to get a single response wood & Sons as long ago as 1896) was from 300 letters. A comment was made written by the late Mrs. Fred Egerton, in the university that there was not even the second daughter of its subject. Her a single rude reply! The point I wish to husband was in due time to attain Flag make is that thirty years since the Navy Rank. first made regular use of the universities, W. M. PHIPPSHORNBY. it is deplorable that such a situation as I have butlined above should exist. FLEET EXERCISES 'BETWEEN THE The Army and the R.A.F. back up WARS' their trawl in the university by a Sir,-There has been an encouraging Presence - T.A. Units; Air Squadrons. response to my letter in the October The Navy relies on a 'nearby' R.N.R. N.R. referring to the collection of Division. This is clearly not good enough. information about ~~~i~~~ Fleet whether the B.B'C' TV Exercises. Members say that the best It is series will have more than a temporary source lies in the journals of midshipeffect on recruitment, A university men. Two examples received show that liaison officer sitting in London is no a valuable amount of research material substitute for a man on the spot. At would result if all the CF Exercises present the Navy depends far too much for its divisional problems at the between 1920 and 1939 could be covered university on ex-Service men who are by journal extracts. members of the university. They have a Other than journal extracts the real concern for the Service but in requirements separate into Objectives, reality are outsiders. Perhaps the old Forces, Narrative, Results and 'Other U.N.D. should be revived. Information'. There is a place for every J. A. HOWARD contribution. 'Other Information' is of great interest, especially to a layman. Such items as a N.E. gale preventing the THE MAHAN WHO CAME TO use of Pollensa (1926); the speed of the DINNER? Sir,-In the issue of The Naval Review F l l l F Spotter exceeding that of the for October 1976, at p.365 you publish Flycatcher fighter (1928); boredom in a contribution under the heading: turrets and on destroyer bridges; social activities, Venetia not sailing because of Letters and Papers o f mumps (1922) - these bring the subject Alfred Thayer Mahan (3 Vols) It has occurred to me that what follows to life. I t will be useful to have informmight be of anyhow passing interest to ation regarding biographies, newspapers, some of your readers: items in The Naval Review, for Sir Geoffrey sat next at dinner to reference. The point has been made that Captain Mahan, whose two books, other exercises may be of significance; The Influence o f Sea Power on details of them are welcome for History and The Influence o f Sea inclusion. Power on the French Revolution had Assuming that sufficient information impressed him very much. is forthcoming, it is proposed to make up The 'Sir Geoffrey' mentioned was. my file copies. These can be offered to the grandfather, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Naval Historical Library, the National Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, who seems to Maritime Museum and interested have been widely regarded as the out- members. standing naval officer of his day. His May I ask, therefore, for another look



through the family archives? It seems a worthy cause. JAMES DIXON (Esq.), C.Eng., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.1nst.F. 10 Banbury Drive, Tirnperley, Altrincham, Cheshire WA14 5BD.

sympathetic, though not uncritical, account of British military institutions. It is, after all, the job of the historian to challenge accepted versions of people and events; to be critical and sceptical. I t is not his job to create or perpetuate congenial legends. CORRELLI BARNETT

MR. CORRELLI BARNETT MR. JOHN TERRAINE Sir,-I have just seen the review in your Sir,-While grateful to your reviewer, July issue of Dr. Paul Kennedy's book 'M', for some kind words about my The Rise and Fall o f British Naval book, Trafalgar, may I register a mild Power, by Sir Peter Gretton, in which protest as being described as 'par he refers to me as 'the supreme excellence, an audio-visual entrepreneur'? denigrator'. I would like to suggest to I like to think that: the Admiral that one does not dispose of Mons: The Retreat T o Victory, a historical argument by making harsh Batsford, 1961, personal comments about its author. I t Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, may be that the Admiral's knowledge of Hutchinson, 1963. naval history is greater than his knowThe Western Front, Hutchinson, 1964, ledge of industrial, economic and educaG e n e r a1 Jack's Diary, Eyre & tional history, for I can assure him that Spottiswoode, 1964, historians in these fields are virtually The Great War, 1914-1918, Macmillan unanimous in thinking that British (New York) 1965, industrial backwardness dates back at Impacts o f War, I914 and 1918, least to the 1860s, and that one of its Hutchinson, 1970. primary causes has been the nature and entitle me to be called a military ethos of British education, both state historian, with Trafalgar a stimulating and public-school. Moreover, the (for me) foray into naval matters. Admiral may have noticed the current JOHNTERRAINE lively debate on this very topic of the adequacy of our education, and on the 'K-P' - A CORRECTION still-prevailing bias in favour of the arts Sir,-May I correct an error I made in and pure sciences over technology. It is not a question of how good the my short monograph on Admiral Sir colonial governors produced by our Charles Kennedy-Purvis, published in public-school were; it is a question of the April 1976 issue of The Naval whether or not we made a national Review? On page 101 I stated that Admiral mistake in producing colonial or public recalled 'by servants i-ather than an industrial e'lite, Kennedy-Purvis was Admiral Cunningham in 1942' (to bewhether indeed the entire imperial idea was an aberration which diverted our come Deputy First Sea Lord). The date is correct but Admiral Pound was First attention from our decay at home. More generally, however, I wish to Sea Lord at that time, his appointment deny the charge of being a professional having extended from 12 June 1939 to denigrator. If the Admiral cares to read 15 October 1943. GODFREY FRENCH Britain and Her Army, it might be that he would agree with most reviewers of (Admiral Cunningham did, o f course, that book that it provides a highly when he was D.C.N.S., in 1939, send for



'K-P', then Admiral President o f the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, to 'take the routine work as D.C.N.S.' o f f his hand.7, The First Sea Lord, Back-

house, having become gravely ill. See Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 200 - Editor)


This French periodical is published monthly by L'Institut de la Mer which is under the patronage of the French Navy, the Merchant Navy, the National Centre for the exploitation of the Oceans (Centre Nationale pour l'exploitation des oceans - C.N.E.X.O.), the Committee of Ship Constructors and Marine Engineering (La Chambre Syndicale des Constructeurs de Navires et de Machines Marines) the Central Committee of French Shipowners and the Union of Independent Ports (L'Union des Ports Autonomes). The declared aim of L'Institut de la Mer is to make French opinion aware of the sea in all its spheres of activity, notably the scientific, technical, cultural and commercial. It aims to achieve its objectives by means of information and 'orientation' with research and also development studies. Activities are coordinated with those of all French organisations of a maritime nature. In its normal format the Review has a very broad maritime outlook. There is a range of aspects from naval defence policy, through history, technical and commercial developments and medical matters current and historical. There are occasional autobiographical items of interest. Regular feature sections include yachting, book reviews and correspondence on matters ranging from some of great learning to current comment.

There is even a small section on records (discs) which is cultural rather than popular. A regular section covers the histories of French warships. Ships recently covered range from the late 19th century onwards and their histories are detailed and obviously deeply researched. The layout of an average edition comprises first a series of up to six individual articles ranging from naval contemporary or historical subjects to commercial and fisheries matters. There is a notable medical content, both historical and current. The regular 'coverages' then follow. The sum is an expression of distinguished views of a naturally French aspect, leavened by some foreign (notably U.S.) contributions. This is followed by a standard digest of world-wide maritime affairs, e.g., naval construction, commercial shipping and ports. In the course of this year, 1976, there has been emphasis on the American bi-Centenary. The October edition of the Review was manifestly devoted to the War of Independence and the important French Naval contribution to its success. The edition dwells on this, the Battle of Chesapeake, a short biography of Admiral de Grasse, and a description of his home with its contemporary museum. The Review has also underlined the naming of the new Spruance Class DDG the U.S.S. Comte de Grasse during the year.



From all issues covering June to October 1976, the most important main article for readers of The Naval Review is that on French naval policy by ViceAmiral d'Escadre Marcel Wolff in his capacity as Major General de la Marine (i.e., V.C.N.S.). This appeared in the June edition and its gist is worth examination even if one cannot do more than attempt to compress a lengthy exposition from a distinguished pen. Admiral Wolff takes his premise from the successful pursuit of a policy of indirect French Naval strategy in support of the American War of Independence. In relating this concept to modern policies he quotes the views of Admiral Gorshkov throughout his article with telling effect. With deference to such a distinguished writer it must suffice to select some of his main points which throw light on wholly French aspects. On national attitudes he states: 'Ignorance of matters of the sea is a characteristic of our people, a surprising characteristic if one considers the length of our maritime frontiers (three sides of the hexagon! ), the importance of what was formerly our colonial Empire and the accelerated development of sailing (navigation de plaisance). The tradition of the sea has only a small place in French thinking and remains very minor'. On French Naval presence abroad Admiral Wolff writes: 'The presence of a warship is not permanent, nor does it oppress the population. On the contrary it constitutes for them a focus of interest and curiosity. Following the statutory terms of military personnel, naval officers and senior rates are both Servicemen and seamen, permanently representing France on the high seas and, if required, in territorial waters. Their mission is to make their interests respected and to protect those under their jurisdiction. This explains why the command of a

warship is only given to a naval officer after the signature of a decree by the President of the Republic. The warship is a form of ambassador whose presence is not only well tolerated, but generally welcomed.' Under the heading of 'Europe upon the Sea' Admiral Wolff continues: 'This final quarter of the Century opens a new era, an era in which France must no longer be overclouded by the Continental reflex which has made her miss so many opportunities in the course of history. A Navy is needed which will fit her for her place in Europe, a Europe which has a vital need for shipping to assure its outlets to the great potentials of Africa, South America and India or indeed Indonesia'. On the Law and Rights of the Sea, in considering the exploitation of the sea's resources, he writes: 'Perhaps the most characteristic phenomenon at the end of this Century is that under the nuclear umbrella there is now a merciless fight between the East and the West for the survival of a certain form of civilisation which is ours (that of us all). We are not at war, but we are not at peace. We are in a time of permanent crisis with a greater or lesser measure of dbtente, a ditente which moreover leads certain western countries to relax their vigilance and give up the effort of adequate defence.' The Admiral finds the picture uncertain, not to say disturbing in a troubled world in which the European balance and international crisis points stem from an indirect strategy. This state of crisis is a form of confrontation which requires, apart from nuclear forces whose existence maintains crisis at crisis level, a military capability. The stake is the status of the country, above all in economic planning in an unpredictable world: 'If in Europe our (French) territorial integrity is covered by our deterrent and our association



with the Atlantic Alliance, it is not comparable with our overseas interests. In the world confrontation which applies to the realms of ideas, techniques, economic exchanges and political influence, the particular interests of France run the risk of being more often than not in opposition to those of the two super powers. France cannot therefore rely on any alliance and if the Government considers that it must rely on military resources, the most effective are those which are best adapted to crisis management, namely warships. On this Admiral Gorshkov wrote: 'The exclusive characteristics of a fleet allows it - which other forces cannot do - to exercise on potential enemies a strong pressure without resort to arms'. Admiral Wolff then outlines the tasks and operations of the French Navy whose creditable details are not widely known in this country and with this he concludes his review of the first component of naval policy. Taking the second component he considers the setting up or establishment of forces. Reckoning from the primary elements which comprise the country's men of about twenty, the material components to be found in industry and the funds which the Government decides to allot to its Navy, there is throughout a process of decisions and actions to establish forces capable of meeting known threats so far as can be foreseen for fifteen to thirty years ahead as at least ten years must be allowed from the concept to the commissioning of a ship, and its life is only a span of twenty to thirty years. On these material policies the three major building programmes from 1950 to 1975 are itemised and the writer concludes with emphasis that 'The sum of the three building plans is quite inadequate to the maintenance o f the Navy at its present level'. The burden of costing is outlined in terms only too familiar to readers of The Naval Review

and it is argued that the Navy concentrates its efforts on nuclear and conventional submarines, feeding the nceds of the SSBNs, their supporting submarines, surface vessels and aircraft. All these play their part in the future manning of the SSBNs (N.B., the French equivalent to SSBN is SNLE i.e. sousmarin lance engins). On personnel policy Admiral Wolff states that the Navy has no difficulties with conscripts who give full satisfaction because their duties are active and interesting. Likewise more than half of the flight deck crew of a carrier is made up from recruited men. Again, when a ship is nominated for an interesting overseas deployment such as the Indian Ocean, West Indies or the Arctic a notable proportion of regulars near the end of their engagement re-engage to complete the deployment. The three main difficulties with regulars are firstly differences in the proportional structures of senior rates between services (i.e. 80% in the Air Force as opposed to 50% in the Navy the Army is not mentioned). Secondly there is the problem of family separation owing to seatime. The third is the 'creaming off for the SSBNISNLE crews who must be volunteers, fit and trained'. The taxing of the Navy's strength by manning these submarines is further explained but the benefit lies in the fact that 'a warship in peacetime and for a major proportion of its activities is employed on real tasks which give its company the sense of usefulness.' On financial policy Admiral Wolff weighs the balance of ship/unit costs. In short, a large number of simple but ageing ships versus a small number of modern sophisticated ships. Where lies the balance? What is the best mix? How can the task be met within this balance when they range from high to low level? What are the priorities to be met by the Fleet? 'The different forms of action for which we prepare are:


- Perhaps to wage war - Probably to direct a military
initiative closely related to the political control of a crisis. - But certainly to ensure the creation and continuing management of military material within strict economic unit. Over thirteen years the Navy has carried out a sustained programme of organisation, reduction of forces, regrouping of schools and the closing of bases and store depots. The Strategic Oceanic Force has been established without increasing manpower. Administration has been refined. That is in brief expression French naval policy followed through conception to the deployment of forces. To summarize Admiral Wolff's conclusion: it can be asked whether the two aspects of naval policy - orientation towards the sea of general policy and the constitution of forces are relatively balanced. In other words do the means equal the tasks? In recent parliamentary debates on military programmes some deputies and senators were unhappy, and rightly so. But their concern has moreover appeared to bear on the maintenance primarily of the present level of naval forces as much as on the justification of this level to meet the tasks. Their concern is at present shared by seafarers, not only by officers but also - a new and recent confirmation - by senior rates. This concern is also greater in that it stems from an analysis of the growing commitments of the Navy. Sailors feel a certain pride in bearing the responsibility of the Seaborne Strategic Force, the major component of French nuclear forces: they appreciate the importance, the interest and the variety of peacetime and crisis missions. They are justly satisfied with having met these missions within strict budget limits. But they feel some disappointment in seeing that this modest share (16% to

18% of the Defence Budget) has diminished some three years after their responsibilities had increased. They consider that they cannot meet them all and fear that future choices can only have serious consequences. Without retaining the means of a direct strategy, that is to say the immediate defence of the (French) hexagon a 'smothering'* would have to be accepted. 'The livelihood of Societies is bound, if not to the command of the air and the sea, at least to the maintenance of freedom in these environments'. Such is a very brief review of several months' editions. It does not give explicit details of important articles. La Revue Maritime is worthy of attention on its specifically national as well as its international merits. C.M.S. *Literal translation.

I1 - RIVISTAMARITTIMA The politico-military background in the Mediterranean and Italian defence policy, naval aspects Looking at the period 1976 to 1986 the Italians foresee a continuing relaxation of tension in East-West relations in the Mediterranean area, notwithstanding the likelihood of further outbreaks of crises and minor conflicts. This appreciation of the situation is supported in their view by the bilateral agreements between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on the following subjects: - Limitation of nuclear armaments - Forestalling of nuclear war - Avoiding incidents at sea - Economic/Commercial agreements In addition, as reasons for their optimistic view, the Italians cite: - The Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) - The Conference on the Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces (MBFR)



- The series of meetings which are European defence solidarity becomes
being held in an attempt to solve the energy crisis. Being a convinced and dedicated member of the European Economic Community, Italy is also convinced that the main hope for Europe is to move forward as quickly as possible to a United Europe. The difficulties and problems in the achievement of a United Europe are fully appreciated by the Italians but they consider a United Europe to be an important factor in world stability. On the political plane it is Italy's view that the Soviets are in favour of detente in order to consolidate the territorial status quo in Europe and to establish her right to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean, It is accepted on the other hand that so far there has been no noticeable reduction in Soviet force levels, in particular in the maritime sector. However, the Italians consider that, in the overall context of detente, the mere fact that a state of relative equilibrium has been reached between the two large power blocs has considerably reduced the risk of large scale conflict. On the other hand it is accepted that this does little, or nothing, to eliminate minor conflicts and local instability. Concentrating now upon the Mediterranean basin, which is of course the focal point of Italy's most direct interests, it is seen as an area which has all the characteristics of potential instability. This assessment is based upon the endemic Middle-Eastern crisis situation, the internal structures of the North African and Middle-Eastern countries and the tension brought about by the oil problem. Defence policy Italy therefore considers that despite the discussions and contacts between the two super powers, it behoves the European nations, until the dream of a United Europe and therefore reality, to maintain an ability to act independently in defence of their national interests. From the foregoing line of reasoning Italy derives her defence policy which broadly stated is as follows: - To contribute to the defence of the West within the framework of the NATO Alliance - To maintain an ability to face up to a local Mediterranean crisis which in itself does not lead to a confrontation between the two super powers. It is perhaps of interest that the recent election manifesto of the large and powerful Italian Communist Party was in agreement with the above policy.
Strategic concept The strategic concept deriving from the defence policy outlined above is a two-pronged one: - To ensure the discharge of the tasks assigned to Italy within the context of NATO integrated defence, by means of the harmonious insertion of the Italian Armed Forces within the general framework of the alliance's defensive structure. - To ensure, at the same time, that the instrument of national defence is in a condition to intervene autonomously in face of particular emergencies in which it is not vossible to count upon direct assistance from allied countries. The current restructuring of the Armed Forces is planned to ensure that the Italian forces are not only suitable for insertion within the Allied defensive system, but also that they have the necessary components to contribute to the maintenance of equilibrium and to safeguard the national interest in the Mediterranean.



Tasks of the Italian Navy Within the framework of the strategic concept outlined above, and in every type of emergency, the prime responsibility of the Navy remains the protection in its offensive and defensive aspects, of the lines of communication upon which the survival of the nation depends. Italy in fact imports by sea 95% of her needs and exports across the Mediterranean 65% of the products she sends abroad. Her total seaborne trade amounts to about 250 million tons of merchandise per year of which 120 million are POL products. The Navy's second principal task is the defence of Italy's 8,000 kilometres of coastline, the inshore shipping routes, the entrances to ports and in particular the control of the Adriatic and the focal zones in the Sicilian and Sardinian Straits. To the foregoing two essentially national tasks must be added, in the event of NATO conflict, the very important task of contributing to the protection of the allied aircraft carriers and their underway replenishment groups. This task involves particularly in the phase of increasing tension the surveillance of surface-to-surface missile fitted ships which constitute a potential threat, with the hope of limiting their first strike capability. Over and above the essentially maritime tasks already touched upon, the Italian Navy, like any other navy, has a number of varied peace-time tasks to perform. In addition to the political instability already referred to, the very large economic interests connected with energy resources, the ever growing possibilities of exploiting the sea-bed and the profound changes affecting the Law of the Sea, all add up to a highly likely source of conflict between the littoral states. The risks of incidents or disputes are growing all the time and it is worth bearing in mind that some 4,200 Italian fishing boats operate in areas close to

the territorial waters of states on the Adriatic and Mediterranean coastline. Apart from any other consideration, these fishing craft make a substantial contribution to the national economy and they therefore merit protection. It is also the Italian view that economic, political, psychological and ideological pressures are finding the sea the ideal field in which to exert themselves in as much as the margins for error are much wider than they are on land. This requires the Navy in time of peace to be able to sustain the national position with as strong a presence as possible within Italy's areas of interest. Size and shape of the navy Deriving from the tasks which it has to perform as already outlined, the Italian Navy sees its requirements for force levels to be capable of: - Maintaining a continuous and credible presence in the Mediterranean basin in peace-time strong enough to compete with incidents and disputes. - Protecting re-supply traffic from the underwater, air, surface and missile threats. - Operating offensively on, above and under the surface of the sea. - Assisting in the direct and indirect protection of the allied naval deterrent. - Carrying out intervention operations with the use of limited amphibious forces, unilaterally or as part of a tri-service or multi-national force. This leads to the requirement for a balanced mix of vessels whose characteristics and armament enable the Navy to carry out its tasks, and to a size of navy of between 110,000 and 160,000 displacement tons. This mix, bearing in mind the operational area, has led to the development of the following types of ship:


- Ships with anti-aircraft, anti-ship
and anti-submarine capabilities suitable for escort duties in a naval formation and for the protection of merchant ships. - Ships with a predominantly antiship capability, suitable for maintaining a naval presence and for shadowing and attacking missile ships. - Conventionally propelled submarines with an anti-submarine and anti-ship capability. Fast light craft, such as hydrofoils, armed with guns and surface-to-surface missiles, ideal for the control of focal areas, small basins and restricted straits. Minehunters and minesweepers. Naval controlled fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft. - Shore based helicopters with an anti-ship and anti-submarine capability. - Embarked helicopters with antiship and anti-submarine capability and the possibility to act in the amphibious role are also seen to be desirable attributes. - An underway replenishment ship. -A salvage vessel specially equipped for submarine search and rescue. - Landing craft for the transport and operational support of the amphibious component. Details of the Italian Navy and its activities will be covered in subsequent articles. M.A.G. 111 - MARINE FORUM and MARINE RUNDSCHAU In this and subsequent similar articles it is intended to give an impression of the two German periodicals which deal with naval matters and to examine ideas and articles which might be of interest to members of The Naval Review. The

two in question are Marine Forum and Marine Rundschau. At first sight any differences between them might seem difficult to define, but on closer examination one particular point becomes clear: Marine Forum is produced by the German Naval Officers' Association and declares itself to be an independent and unbiased magazine formed with the aim of provoking the free interchange of opinions and a critical outlook; its articles are mostly written by serving or ex-naval officers. Marine Rundschau's pedigree is somewhat different; produced by the Seminar for Defence Research it is edited by Professor Doctor Jiirgen Rohwer, at present a professor at Stuttgart University, who is well known for his books and articles on naval affairs. Marine Rundschau's coverage, however, is much the same as that of Marine Forum, dealing with both home and foreign naval news, problems of national security and defence, and developments in the merchant service. The major preoccupation of both publications in the period from August to October 1976 has been the threat posed by the constantly expanding Soviet Navy. In successive numbers of Marine Rundschau this problem has been related to (a) the security of the FGR; (b) the importance of the Cape route to Germany, and (c) the significance of NATO maritime solidarity. In the September edition, Admiral Vohs, the present COMNAVBALTAP, presented the case for a more balanced look at German defence policies in the light of Soviet naval expansion. The traditional national emphasis on land-warfare is in need of revision at a time when the Bundesmarine has an extremely important role to play both in inhibiting Soviet amphibious operations in the Baltic, and in preventing access through the Skagerrak to hostile reinforcements for the 'inevitable' battles of the Atlantic trade routes and of the Norwegian sea. In October's issue Dr. Luns, NATO



Secretary General, put forward his views missile practice opportunities provided on the importance of naval forces in are superior to those at Portland and for combatting the spread of Russian these reasons Portland cannot replace pressure on the alliance, especially in Guantanamo as a base for these ships. relation to the Bundesmarine. He The work-up training provided by FOST analyses the main sea areas in turn, is considered by Martens to be the more pointing out both the strength of NATO balanced of the two methods analysed. represented there and also the obvious The American training is fragmented weaknesses which can be exploited by and tends to deal with the different the Warsaw Pact nations. The tone of departments of the ship entirely separatethe article is one of cautious optimism ly, whereas the evolutions offered by with much emphasis placed on the FOST concentrate more on the wholelamentable lack of weapon standard- ship ideal and mould it more readily into isation within the alliance. a cohesive fighting unit capable of holdThe August copy of Marine Forum ing its own in a tactical engagement. A contains a discussion on the relative comparison of the two descriptions of merits of the two foreign naval training the work-up bases reveals that the centres patronised by the FGN, namely methods do not differ greatly; the jargon Guantanamo in Cuba, and Portland. may be unfamiliar but the difference The United States work-up facility is between the initial 'Training Readiness used to train up the three guided-missile Evaluation' and the Staff Sea Check is destroyers Liitjens, Rommel, and probably academic, and above all the Molders, while the rest of the destroyers beloved check lists prevail in both go to Portland. The discussion is opened systems. with an article by Fregattenkapitan The attitudes and operating proRolf Martens who laments the almost cedures (especially the philosophy on total lack of a logical whole-ship training damage control), of the two navies are organisation in the FGN. The present not however quite so compatible and system of squadron and flotilla training this leads to an unfortunate split in the standards, says the author, is too general FGN between American and British and therefore excludes the possibility of trained units and individuals. Both a balanced assessment of operational Portland and Guantanamo provide trainefficiency. The advances made in the ing facilities based on their own requirefleet modernisation programme have just ments and tactical doctrines, which not been matched by a similar advance means that German ships have to learn in training methods. The situation is to adapt to foreign ways, (incidentally even worse for the fast patrol boat the Americans are judged to be more squadrons who have no equivalent train- helpful than the British in trying to ing bases abroad or at home, although ameliorate this particular problem). the introduction of the AGIS computer This requirement to fit in with an existsystem will allow wide-ranging weapon ing, relatively incompatible training and target simulation. system, together with the ever present This article is followed by two further language problem at lower management assessments, one of Portland, the other level means that neither base really offers of Guantanamo. Guantanamo is an a solution to the FGN's training obvious choice for the American built difficulties. Liitjens class where there is a need to The September/October edition of the maintain close contact with class same journal contains a letter by modifications, weapon system advances, Klaus Jancke who criticises Martens' and spares problems. The surface-to-air article. He asserts that the system which



already exists in the FGN is adequate even if it does not have the inherent advantage of a central impartial training centre. The ideal solution would be to set up a German equivalent to Portland or Guantanamo, but neither the money nor the requisite personnel are at present available or ever likely to be so. In the near future the increased use of simulators will ease the problem, but Jancke states categorically that the

present system produces quite acceptable results, especially in the face of the frequent personnel changes caused by national service. The inclusion of two further articles on training methods in Marine Forum shows quite clearly a widespread concern with the problems of training - problems that are by no means peculiar to the Federal German Navy. P. J.F.E.

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR Grand Strategy I by N. H. Grass (H.M.S.O.) The long delay in the appearance of Volume I of this series, to which it is the introduction, has made it possible, owing to a relaxation of official policy, to assign to individuals by name the views expressed by them in Cabinet and other secret discussions and also to give specific references to sources which in all but the last of the previous volumes were confined to confidential editions. So runs the Editor's Preface. But Ian Colvin, in his Vansittart in Office (1965) is proved to have been prophetic: 'When the inner records at last become available in the Public Record Office,' he wrote, 'they may be found disappointing; for British policy was often decided without Minutes, in the Prime Minister's Gothicstyled office in Parliament, during a walk in St. James' Park, in a West End club or in a country house.' This is not to say that Professor Gibbs's thorough and scholarly work has been in vain. It should be required reading for all who carry, or aspire to, responsibility for the formulation and execution of national


security policy - 'the preservation of the State against internal and external threats to its stability and independence'; for national defence - 'the preservation of the State against external threats to its independence'; or for grand strategy - 'the mobilisation and deployment of national resources, together with the enlistment of those of friendly powers, to achieve the goals of national policy.' These are Professor Michael Howard's definitions. I have no reason to suppose that Professor Gibbs would disagree with them. The overwhelming impression left by a reading of Grand Strategy - I is of the contrast between the capacity of the 'experts', the permanent heads of the Foreign Office and the Treasury, together with the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, who were responsible for advising on grand strategy; and that of Ministers and their confidential and personal advisers, who decided national security and defence policy. As virtually all of these people were representative, in their various ways, of the best that Great Britain could produce at the time (no doubt Great War casualties included many of higher quality); and as the onset of a second

world war might well have been prevented; it is worth while seeking the reason why it was not. The sub-title of this volume is Rearmament Policy. I t is divided into four sections: The Disarmament Years; The Deficiency Programmes 1933-36; Rearmament; Service Programmes, 1936-39; and Strategy for an Alliance. Given the failure of Great Britain to achieve her own security and that of the British Commonwealth and Empire, let alone to ensure the peace of the world, the question must be asked, did the Dictators hold all the cards? Surely not. It is tempting to follow Professor Gibb's acceptance of Lord Swinton's view that Britain's leaders, far from being 'guilty men', in reality 'represented the mood and spirit of the interwar age, nothing more and nothing less.' 'That view, behind the detail of strategic plans and decisions,' he writes, 'is the theme of this volume.' But is it the only tenable judgment? 'I do not know', said Edmund Burke, 'the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people.' And that is what the zeitgeist thesis amounts to. Nor is it convincing to aim the indictmenf, as many recent writers have done, at a particular social class, or the particular educational system which nurtured it. The fact is that not since Palmerston, the keeper of Pax Britannica, has a British statesman understood the use of force (not necessarily war) as an instrument of policy. That war had become 'too serious a matter for the generals alone' was a commonplace. But the corollary, that peace is too fragile an affair for the politicians alone, was not reflected in the attitude of Ministers towards national security and defence policy. The machinery of government, so ably constructed and managed mainly by Hankey, could certainly respond with speed and efficiency when given 'the goals of national policy'; what it could

not do, and was never intended for, was to decide what these goals should be. The rejection of war as an instrument of policy, by a nation that already had almost all the territory, prestige, economic advantages and political stability that it required does not seem, in retrospect, to confer upon Britain's League of Nations supporters, disarmers and pacifists the moral rectitude which they undoubtedly claimed. Furthermore, the adoption of such an attitude gave a curious twist to the basis upon which security (in the sense of confidentiality) was maintained in Whitehall. The major concern of the administration was not to prevent military secrets from falling into the hands of potential enemies of the state; it was to conceal from the opposition in Parliament and in the country the fact that Britain was making any serious preparations to defend herself and the Empire against threats which had long since become apparent to any objective observer of the international scene. Military people are apt to think that they alone, of the professional advisers of government, are strictly subordinated to the political authority; but the Foreign Office, even though on more intimate terms, as a fact, with Cabinet Ministers, cut little ice when attempting to warn its political masters of danger. Even the Treasury, when advising Ministers in what it conceived to be the national interest, could be stalled off. It will not do to blame zeitgeist for what was, in fact, a systematic failure. Between the wars the Whitehall machine was, and it appears still to be, only intermittently and uncertainly clutchedin to Westminster. We have not yet learned to harness political acumen. power and vision consistently to the determination of national goals, as we have succeeded in bringing knowledge, energy and organising skill to their achievement, once decided. Grand Strategy - I is well provided








with source references, helpful appen- successor to Britannia as ruler of the dices, statistical tables and maps; and waves, soon found herself faced with a one would not wish to question the potential challenger. As Donald Mitchell selection, by one of Professor Gibbs's shows, it was the rapid development of authority, of material for this major Soviet industrial and technical power study in his own particular field. One which made possible the creation of a reputation which, high already, is en- strong Navy - 'one of the most hanced by the removal of secrecy is that cherished goals of the Soviet leaders'. of 'A.B.C.'. Vice - Admiral A. B. There can be little doubt that Stalin was Cunningham, as he then was, became deeply impressed by the devastating Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff on effect of the U-boat campaign in the 17 October 1938, and held the appoint- Atlantic, and by the overwhelming ment until 23 May 1939. During that achievement of United States' sea power period the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir in the Pacific. If the nations of the world Roger Backhouse, became mortally ill were to be brought, one by one, into and Cunningham, besides 'looking after the Socialist camp, which Marxistthe shop', during the post-Munich pre- Leninist theory holds to be inevitable, parations for war, provided the Strategic first, it would be necessary to cut off Appreciation Sub-committee of the Western Europe from seaborne supply Committee of Imperial Defence with a and reinforcement from North America; masterly paper on the question of the and, secondly, the Soviet Union would despatch of a fleet to the Far East. This have to be capable of projecting Socialist brought a belated (too late by years), power wherever opportunity offered, recognition of the priority which should world-wide. Russian naval history from the ninth long since have been accorded to the Mediterranean in British grand strategy. century A.D. until the Bolshevik revoluPerhaps a new biography of 'A.B.C.' is tion in the early twentieth, consists overdue. Britain's last great naval almost entirely of riverine and coastal operations. First, in the confused and leader? IANMCGEOCH continuous campaigning which led to the birth of Imperial Russia; then in the wars against the Swedes for mastery of A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND the Baltic; against the Turks for control SOVIET SEA POWER by DONALD MITCHELL W. of the Black Sea, with the Dardanelles (Andre Deutsch-£6.50) and Bosphorus as ultimate but so far As Professor Mitchell points out in this unattained prize. The disastrous conflict authoritative book: 'Since the end of with the Japanese for predominance in World War I1 the Soviet Union has North East Asia; and the largely built more warships than all the other ineffectual operations against the nations of the world combined. More- Germans in World War I, emphasised over it has simultaneously sought to the ineffective and subordinate character produce a navy of optimal quality and of Russian naval power. technical sophistication.' That we must During the October Revolution and rely upon an American account (Donald the Civil War which ensued the Russian Mitchell is head of the political science Navy ceased to be an effective fighting department at Northeast Missouri force. In the 1920s, therefore, the Soviet State University) of the 'story so far' government sought, by the use of a type is not surprising. For the U.S.A., having of diplomacy which has since become emerged from World War I1 the familiar, to achieve certain of the

traditional aims of Russian foreign policy. Thus, in 1925, a dramatic reduction of the (virtually non-existent) Soviet Navy was offered in return for the closure of the Baltic and the Black Sea to the ships of non-riparian states together with the 'disarmament' of the Korean Straits. The offer, made without any warning, was rejected. In 1927: 'the Soviet Union proposed "complete, immediate, universal, and simultaneous disarmament", without going into any details as to how such a step was to be achieved. Again the outcome was rejection, and again the proposal and its defeat were exploited in Soviet propaganda.' Professor Mitchell makes no mention of the inability of Soviet sea power to support the Spanish Republican Government in the Civil War of 1936-39, though there is evidence that this failure made a deep impression upon the Kremlin. Here was the first opportunity to bring succour to a Communist regime in a country not contiguous with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Navy could not do the job in the face of 'fascist/capitalist' opposition. This was a lesson which had to be relearned at Cuba in 1962. The history of World War 11, for the Soviets the 'Great Patriotic War', serves only to emphasise the relative unimportance of the Red navy, in comparison with the Red army, in the defence of the motherland. But the Soviet Navy was not disgraced. Battle experience was gained by officers and men. One of them, Sergei G. Gorshkov, was promoted in his thirties to RearAdmiral. Under his valiant leadership the city of Odessa withstood Rumanian and German siege for seventy-three days, ended by 'a skilful evacuation leaving behind them a thoroughly sabotaged, scorched and booby-trapped port which the Germans were unable to restore to service for several months.' The post-World War I1 growth of the Soviet Navy has been well documented

as far as size, shape and deployments are concerned. Discussion and argument about motives and policies continue. No doubt Professor Mitchell felt justified in bringing his story right up to date. But it is necessary to view with some scepticism a 'history' of sea power, which, after all, is about the use of the sea as a politico-economic-military-social factor in politics, both domestic and international, which is not firmly based upon state papers. The real debate about Soviet naval, no less than all other aspects of policy, takes place 'behind closed doors'. Professor Mitchell's otherwise impressive Bibliography contains nothing to compare with, for example, the list of Command Papers (1930-1939) given by Stephen Roskill in his Naval Policy Between the Wars. Nevertheless, members of The Naval Review may refer with confidence to A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power for the background to the dramatic Soviet naval expansion of the midtwentieth century. For this is a most informative book, well written, well produced, and good value at £6.50. Misprints are few and the maps, diagrams and illustrations usefully complement the text. Chapter notes help to establish the authenticitv of fact and judgment; but it is not clear how the fascinating report of Rear-Admiral Glennon U.S.N.'s success, in Sevastopol on 20 June 1917 (not 29 June), in persuading the revolutionary Executive Committee of Soldiers, Sailors and Workers to restore arms and authority to the officers of the fleet and arrest the agitators, could have been included in the 1916 Annual Report o f the Secretary o f the Navy. As to judgment, Mitchell's evaluation of the story of Catherine the Great sacking John Paul Jones for deflowering a young Russian girl seems to be sound - 'Whether he was guilty or framed remains a moot question'. E.A.B.

JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1976-77 Captain JOHN MOORE R.N. (Editor) (Macdonald & Jane's-£25.00) COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD

JEAN LABAYLE COUHAT (Editor) Translated by Commander James MacDonald U.S.N. (retd) (Arms & Armour Press-£14.50) Like Jane's Fighting Ships, Flottes de Combat was first published in 1897, but only now, and thanks to the U.S. Naval Institute, is it available in the English language. It seems a good opportunity, therefore, to examine the relative merits of these two equally venerable, if rival works of reference. One is immediately struck, on lifting each from the table (neither 'marches well' with the average bookshelf) by the physical differences between the two tomes. Whereas Jane's with a length of 13 inches (325mm), a beam of 9 inches (225mm) and a displacement of 81b (3.6kg) appears to be growing in inverse proportion to the size of the Royal Navy, Flottes, at 265mm (lo+ inches) by 210mm (8+ inches), and displacing a mere 1.7kg (31b 1402) reflects, perhaps, the economical use of scarce resources as a result of which, as the Editor of Jane's himself writes: '. . . there is every chance of this (the French) becoming the main fleet of Western Europe.' An examination of the lists of contents reveals little difference - give a Sharjah and a Virgin Island here, take a Cambodia and a Surinam there. But Jane's does provide, in a separate section, lists of naval aircraft, missiles, radars, torpedoes and sonars, plus a table of national naval strengths. Next, coming to the respective Introductions, M. Couhat confines himself to some crisp comments on naval developments as such, without reference to the why and wherefore; Captain Moore, however, permits himself (indeed, no less is expected of the Editor of Jane's, by

tradition) to range freely over the international scene before coming, as he puts it, to 'the more parochial aspect of naval affairs'. Here, his observations continue to encompass a breadth of interest beyond what is strictly naval: 'Increase in Merchant Fleets'; 'Safety of Sea Routes'; 'Areas of Influence'; 'NATO's dependence on the Sea', and 'Standardisation' all as a preliminary to reporting on the world's navies. First, the 'greats': the United States Navy and the Soviet Navy. The former wracked by debate about size versus shape, against the background of astronomical costs - but about to be saved, perhaps, by the arrival on the scene of the cruise missile, a potentially most cost-effective solution to many weapon-system problems. The Soviet Navy, in contrast, having reached, apparently, a plateau as far as numbers are concerned, continues to improve quality all through, whilst coping with the huge training load imposed on a modern fleet manned mainly by conscripts. Apparently the junior officers of the Soviet Navy have been getting stick from Gorshkov for not doing their stuff - 'too narrow an approach'. Their five years training, primarily in technical matters, does not seem to be delivering the goods. One recalls the day, in the early 1930s, when all the lieutenants in the Mediterranean Fleet were suddenly assembled in the Castille, in Valletta, by order of the Commander-in-Chief. Much figurative placing of blotting-paper in the seats of trousers. What had we done? As it turned out, nothing bad. But not enough good - or not good enough, at any rate, for the great man, 'Sir William Sir Wordsworth' Fisher, 'the Great Agrippa'. 'You', he began, 'are the most important officers in the Fleet'. And he went on to say what was required of us. One wonders whether Gorshkov's writings in Red Star have quite the same effect. Captain Moore goes on to deal, in succession, with 'The Western Navies -

Great Britain'; 'Scandinavia and West Germany'; 'Netherlands and Standardisation'; 'France'; 'The Mediterranean'; 'Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf'; 'South East Asia and the Antipodes'; 'The Pacific'; and 'South America'. In a final paragraph, on 'The Future', he writes: 'The urge to build big, complex and, therefore, very expensive ships sometimes ignores the tasks which those ships are likely to be given in the twenty-or-so years of their life - the result, very often, of a failure to consider the political background which is an essential feature of any study of sea power.' And then he poses many questions about naval shape and size which come to mind as one turns the pages of Jane's Fighting Ships - or, one might add, those of Combat Fleets of the World; for the main content of both books - illustrated descriptions of warships large, medium and small - differs only in detail: Jane's provides many recognition drawings, however, while Combat Fleets uses drawings sparingly, to augment the descriptive text. Jane's, also, is more lavish, providing photographs of many of the ex-major navy warships now under client colours, in addition to the illustrations of the same class of ship still in service in the major navy. It is also more comprehensive, providing space, for example, for Anguilla's solitary 'fighting ship', an unarmed 28 foot Fairey Marine 'Hunter'. Given that the ships, submarines and aircraft, together with their associated weapon-systems and equipment, are, as Mahan put it, but 'the instruments of sea power', perhaps there is something to be said for the somewhat more sinewy - dare one say cost-effective? - style adopted by Combat Fleets. No doubt pressure from advertisers has something to do with it. But perhaps the 'discovery' that 'Belgium, France and the Netherlands have set up a combined planning centre in Paris to provide for a replacement of minehunters needed in

all three countries', which came as 'something of a surprise' to the Editor of Jane's, ought not to have done so. Is there not some contradiction, in fact, between preaching earnestly the gospel of 'standardisation', and filling well over 100 pages with advertisements of competing shipbuilders, weapon-system designers and equipment manufacturers? Flottes de Combat has no advertisements. Does it make a profit without them? If not, who subsidises its production and distribution? IAN MCGEOCH

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO SHIPS & THE SEA PETER KEMP(Ed.) (Oxford University Press-£12.00) Idly turning the pages of this fascinating book I thought 'Ah, now - what about Bluenose? Baltic Exchange? Damage Control? General Drill? Freshen the nip? Handspike? Pusser's Thumb?' No dice! Too bad! But then, a companion is not a dictionary, still less an encyclopaedia. It is, or should be, entertaining rather than didactic; selective rather than comprehensive. For the professional, much of the fun lies in appraising the editor's choice, and in checking his knowledge against that of the contributors. For the layman - and the sea is too wide a calling for those who follow it not to be laymen themselves in some aspects of it - there is the joy of discovery, the serendipity. For instance, who would have thought that Chambers is an old legal term used to describe those areas of sea which lay between headlands but beyond the strict three mile limit? In his Preface Peter Kemp, whom The Naval Review is fortunate to have amongst its members, outlines the scheme which he has followed in assembling the material. Indeed, material is too matter-of-fact a word to describe the contents of this more than informative work; Admiral Boscawen's phrase,

'the flowers of the sea', quoted by Kemp, has the right ring, although it has been pre-empted by Captain Eric Bush, as the title of an anthology published a decade ago. Wisely, the editorial touch has been light, in leaving the various authors (including more members of The Naval Review) to write in their own way, rather than attempt to unify, and no doubt as a result 'dullify', their contributions. But adherence to a strictly alphabetical form has resulted, for example, in the compression, under 'Yachting', of the history of the sport into ten pages - a brilliant effort in itself, but failing, I fear, to recapture the magic of the Water Rat's solemn observation to his young friend Mole: 'Nice? It's the only thing . . there is nothing - absolutely nothing - half so much worth doing as simply messing about in boats. Simply messing As a reference book The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea must rank high, but readers are invited to raise with the Editor supposed errors or possible omissions which might be made good in future editions. Here are three, for a start. First, the S.S. Great Britain was not beached in Port Stanley, but lay afloat there, in service as a hulk, until 1937, when she was beached at Sparrow Bay, nearby. Secondly, it should be established whether All the World's Fighting Ships was first published in 1898 (as noted under Jane, Frederick Thomas), or in 1897 (as given under Jane's Fighting Ships). Thirdly, should not the Royal Naval Division get a mention, if only because it never served at sea? The most perplexing aspect of the Editor's task must surely have been the choice of individuals for mention. One is grateful for (more serendipity): 'Talbot, Mary Anne (1778-1808), . . . the youngest of sixteen illegitimate children of Lord William Talbot, later Earl Talbot, all by the same mother. As a girl Mary Anne was seduced by a captain in


. . . .'.

the army and, disguised in male dress as his footboy, accompanied him under the name of John Taylor to the West Indies . . .'. But perhaps Talbot-Booth, Lieutenant - Commander E.C., R.D.. R.N.R., might have earned a place. British submariners, particularly, were grateful to him, in the Second World War, for providing them with a means of recognising merchant ships, the necessity for which neither the Admiralty nor the Flag Officer Submarines had foreseen. Nor does it seem quite companionable, in 1976, to leave out Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgiyevich, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy since January 1956, yet put in Gosnold, Bartholomew (d. 1607), even if he did command the Concord, which had been chartered by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1602; promote the colonization of North America, and die of swamp fever. Nit-picking apart, The Oxford Companion ot Ships and the Sea is a beautifully produced, sensibly arranged and well-illustrated book which few members of The Naval Review, probably, can afford, but none should be without. IAN MCGEOCH MEN OF GALLIPOLI by PETERLIDDLE (Allen Lane-£6.50) Another book about the Dardanelles? One's first reaction may well be: can there now be anything worthwhile to add to the many existing narratives and discussions about the Gallipoli campaign of sixty years ago? Can any sources of information remain untapped? The short answer is: yes, they can; and the author of this book has made a prodigious effort to tap them. Over the past nine years Peter Liddle has been endeavouring to track down and interview as many as possible of the survivors among the men who served on the peninsula or its surrounding waters. The sheer volume

of his researcn 1s astonishing: apart from the bibliography of published works and archives, which cover twelve pages, his list of unpublished sources contains the names of over six hundred British, Australian, New Zealand, French, Turkish and German survivors. Having acquired such a vast store of first-hand reminiscences the author, faced with the problem of presenting them in readable form, seems to this reviewer to have succeeded splendidly. In his introductory chapter he writes: 'I have tried to emphasize the individual more than his unit and more than his country. I have endeavoured to let those who participated in the campaign speak for themselves.' Into a balanced and objective historical narrative, which starts with the escape of the Goeben and Breslau in August 1914 and ends with the evacuation of Gallipoli at the end of 1915, the author has woven a continuous tapestry of personal recollections which bring the story to life and provide compelling reading. There are glimpses of sublime heroism and astonishing endurance, and also of confusion, panic and worse; examples of brilliant planning and disastrous lack of it. In two final appendices, under the headings 'Political Responsibility' and 'Military Responsibility' the author summarizes the story. Many readers will agree with his opinion that the likely fruits of a victory at the Dardanelles were overestimated and the difficulties too lightly discounted; others will disagree and continue to believe that, by feeble naval and military leadership we threw away a priceless opportunity. But whether the author is right or wrong he has written a book which is well worth reading and worthy to take its place among the authentic histories of this heroic, heartbreaking adventure. C.A.L.M.

JUTLAND 1916 by JOHN COSTELLO TERRY and HUGHES (Weidenfeld & Nicolson-£5.95) Last year (1976), to mark the sixtieth anniversary of Jutland, a German publisher issued a translation of your reviewer's own study of this controversial battle. An English reader, versed in German, would find in it two points of interest. First, its translator has had to add a large number of footnotes to explain such points as, for example, when, and between whom, Trafalgar and Tsushima were fought, because the average German reader knows little naval history. Secondly, and more important, in his very fair commentary, its translator expresses regret that, since all the facts became known in 1940 (when the Admiralty publicly admitted their failure to pass to Jellicoe vital radio intelligence during the night of 31 May-1 June), no German historian has produced an in-depth study of the battle from his country's point of view. In sharp contrast, there is apparently no end to the writing of books on Jutland in English. In addition to several official publications (of which Corbett's Naval Operations, Vol. 111, as revised in 1940, remains a standard work), we had a plethora of accounts between the wars, ranging from the heavily biased by partisans of Jellicoe or Beatty, by way of the ill-judged (Churchill's World Crisis), to the balanced one by the U.S. Navy's Commander Frost. And since World War Two, we have had at least half-adozen objective books, notably by Macintyre and Marder, not to mention one by an author so class-conscious that he attributes Jellicoe's failure to achieve a second Trafalgar to the Admiralty selecting its officers from a too-narrow strata of society (conveniently ignoring the corollary that, if this were so, we should have lost the battles of the Plate and Matapan, and failed to sink the Bismarck and Scharnhorst). Nor is there any indication of a


slackening in demand: it has, for example, justified three reprints, the latest in 1974, of your reviewer's work since it was first published in 1962. So yet another book on Jutland comes as no surprise. What, therefore, are the merits of this one? First, it is good to 'see' the battle afresh through the eyes of two historians (incidentally well known for their T V scripts) who were born after the fog of prejudice, which obscured the judgement of so many of us for so long, had cleared away. Secondly, they have produced, for the general reader rather than the serious student (who could quibble at certain gaps in their bibliography and be irritated by their frequent use of on a ship), a brief, lucid, often stirring account, coloured by apt extracts from contemporary sources, of the German High Seas Fleet, from its inception by von Tirpitz in 1897 to its scuttling at Scapa Flow in 1919, of which Jutland forms the core. Of this they reveal nothing new, nor presume to pass fresh judgements, except in so far as they stress Churchill's refusal to allow a formal enquiry into the battle of the Dogger Bank, for fear that it would lead to the public realizing that this was not the annihilating victory it should have been - an enquiry which would have brought to light such deficiencies as the battlecruisers' inadequate gunnery (especially the Tiger's) and signalling (especially by the Lion), and the want of initiative shown by Beatty's second-incommand; whereby they might have been remedied before they were repeated on 31 May 1916. Thirdly, this text is supported by clear diagrams and, more important, is illustrated by a larger number of photographs, well chosen and presented, drawn from numerous sources, both British and German, than have previously been included in any book on

the battle, which is the chief reason why this one is commended to members of The Naval Review. G.M.B.
CONVOY The battle for convoys SC122 and HX229 by MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK (Allen Lane-£4.95) This is the best book about Atlantic convoys which I have read, and I have missed few. It is written under the advantage of the thirty year rule for British documents and is also based on the use of German and American original sources. The author is an unusual man. He has already produced well reviewed books on the battle of the Somme in World War I and on the bombing of Nuremberg in World War 11, but this is his first essay at a book on naval actions. A Lincolnshire farmer by profession, he has a flair for his hobby which is allied to a phenomenal persistence in tracing reports, persons involved in the story and any other evidence which would help him. The list of persons of many nationalities consulted, both personally and by letter is formidable and as a result, the account of the two main convoys is as complete as is humanly possible. I wish that I was capable of comparing it with that in the book by Dr. J. Rohwer on precisely the same subject which was published in Germany recently. I admire particularly Mr. Middlebrook's skill in tracing the Coastal Command airmen who contributed so much to reducing losses in the convoy towards the end of the battle, as well as so many other participants. The people concerned are made to seem alive and real. The author's lack of naval background or previous research into naval matters is well concealed and only the very occasional slip occurs - a quarter-

master would be at the wheel and not throwing a heaving line for example. He has a certain lack of maritime background evinced by a tendency to be too kind to the German naval record. In the mid-thirties, for instance, the German navy already envisaged an all-out war against shipping and were convinced that some excuse would be found for breaking the rules of international law. Similarly, the author is unaware that a German U-boat captain was convicted by a War Crimes Tribunal of firing on a boatload of survivors from a sunken ship. In his correct efforts to be objective, he perhaps swings too far in his admiration of the U-boat service, though I would agree that their devotion to duty and retention of a high morale in the face of appalling losses was a magnificent achievement. The book starts with three chapters on the Atlantic war up to March, 1943. It is fairly routine stuff but clearly set out and comprehensive. I think that some reference to Tobermory and Gilbert Stephenson would have rounded off the picture. Here, and later in the book, a villain emerges in the form of Admiral King. U.S.N. King's obstinate objections to learning from British experience lost very many ships in 1942 and his refusal to release the long range Liberator aircraft available nearly led to defeat in the Atlantic in the early spring of 1943. The author understands the importance of aircraft in convoy protection and is sound on the 'sweep versus convoy escort' controversy which was only solved by Slessor in early 1943. The story of the two convoys starts in the fourth chapter and the usually rather dull account of the convoys' progress under local escort guidance from New York to the meeting with the ocean escort off Newfoundland is brought to life by many personal accounts from escorters and merchant seamen alike. SC122 sailed first, followed shortly by HX229 and the two

convoys were routed through the same general areas throughout the voyages, though they never approached nearer than seventy miles. The approach to the long battle and gathering of the three U-boat packs involved is clearly described as is the difficulty at U-boat headquarters of sorting out which convoy was which - a difficulty compounded by the existence of a third convoy at sea, HX229A, which was routed far to the north of the other two. HX229A was not attacked by U-boats but was stupidly directed through an icefield which sank one valuable tanker and damaged several other ships and escorts. The massing of the packs - forty-two U-boats were directed onto the convoys though not all gained contact - the paths of the convoys and indeed the battle as a whole is illuminated by a series of excellent maps which show clearly the progress of the struggle. Here is shewn with appalling clarity the success of the German codebreakers in establishing the position, course and sped of each convoy. The slow convoy, SC122, had the strongest escort, together with a rescue ship and it was unfortunate that most of the attacks were directed onto the fast convoy. HX229 had a very weak escort with no rescue ship; the escort commander's ship and one corvette were detained in St. John's N.F. with defects and two other ships were absent for more respectable reasons. As a result, until the worst of the battle was over, command devolved onto a comparatively inexperienced junior officer, who did his best with far too few escorts and who was faced with appalling decisions as to whether to pick up survivors or to retarn escorts on the screen to ward off further attacks. The ships of the group had not worked together before and some misunderstandings and mistakes occurred which an experienced escort commander with a full staff to help him would have

avoided. As a side thought, I have always believed that insufficient tribute has been paid to those escorts who may not have been lucky in sinking U-boats but because of their skilful handling in bad weather and careful maintenance of equipment, never missed a convoy sailing. HX229 lost thirteen ships with heavy loss of life and SC122 lost nine ships with less loss due to the rescue ship. Almost all the attacks took place in the 'air gap' in which, unnecessarily as the V.L.R. aircraft were available, no aircraft operated at that time. Each sinking is graphically described with personal recollections of many of the survivors, interspersed with U-boat narratives and escorts reports. Such was the lack of escorts that there were no prolonged hunts and U-boat losses were small only one boat was sunk by aircraft, at the end of the battle. The description of conditions in the merchant ships is well done and the bravery of the many and the shortcomings of the few are made clear. There is also some general information about the merchant service in the war which I found interesting. I also learned some new facts about the Atlantic struggle. I have long wondered why the Germans did not exploit the fact that communication between escorts, aircraft and the Commodore was conducted by R / T on the same wavelength throughout the war with much plain language being used in emergency. But the Germans were slow to use this weakness and the few boats equipped to listen out on this wave obtained little useful knowledge. There are good chapters on the aftermath of the battle and on an analysis of its results, which include a clear indication of the success of British cryptographers in producing the same sort of information as that so lavishly supplied to Donitz. I wish that an official book could be produced giving the full true story.

The battle against convoys SC122 and HX229 was, in fact, the last great success of the U-boats, although this was, of course, not known at the time. I t provides a most suitable subject for study and the task has been very well carried out. I should add that the appendices are a model of patient research. PETER GRETTON

THE U-BOAT HUNTERS by ANTHONY WATTS (Macdonald and James-£4.95) The author, who has written a number of reference or documentary works on naval subjects, has chosen his foreword - to describe as concisely as possible the development of A/S warfare 1939-45; the changes in strategy and tactics wrought by the introduction of new weapons and ideas; and the integration and co-operation achieved by all branches of the Allied Forces. Some task in 192 pages! I confess my spirits sank as I started into what promised to be a 'digest' type of treatment. However, it turned out differently. Despite his stated aim, it becomes clear that Anthony Watts is mainly interested in the ships, aircraft, equipment and weapons used; and has in effect given us a well assembled, nicely printed, profusely illustrated (150 pictures and drawings) books on the development of material in the anti-submarine war. The beginning of the book does in fact set out to describe the different phases of the A/S struggle, and owes much to Roskill, Morison, Gretton and Macintyre as one might expect. Although derivative, and not on the plane of a staff appreciation, it does have some interest on the build up of the Allied ASW forces, particularly the air. The growth of Coastal Command from 1936, and its roles and directives, are well described and not without relevance now. In July 1936 its strength was 'A ridiculous total of seventy-six aircraft



organised into three squadrons of flying boats, two squadrons of Ansons, and one squadron of antiquated Vickers Vildebeest biplanes.' By January 1945 this had risen to some 450 aircraft. Hands up those who know how many maritime patrol aircraft we operate now. The Nimrod is an excellent vehicle, to to be sure, but even the Nimrod cannot be in two places at once. The book comes into its own in the last 100 pages, with sections on the ships, aircraft, weapons, equipment, and training. Here the level rises sharply. No doubt much of it has been treated exhaustively elsewhere, but I cannot recall reading such a handy summary of ASW material development. Early asdics, radars, attack-teachers, the Hedgehog, the Leigh Light and so on are not only illustrated and described but some account of their genesis and operational use is given. For instance, there is a lovely picture of an early attempt at an ahead throwing weapon, the Fairlie Mortar, fitted to H.M.S. Whitehall in 1941 and known on board as the Five Wide Virgins. This in time became the Hedgehog and then the Squid. I was not aware, either, that Coastal Command made their first request for a sonobuoy as early as 1940. Operational in 1943 and not too successful at the time, it is now a powerful ASW tool with at least two decades of use and development to come. The U-Boat Hunters is recommended as a good short compendium of the physical resources used against the German submarine campaign. I think anyone now working in ASW development or operational requirements might find in it some interest, and even matter for reflection. It makes very apparent the fluid interaction between operational needs, the quick response with new equipment, and the immediate effects on the battle at sea. Those who know the magalithic, ponderous, committee bound structure

of the present Procurement Executive may well doubt our ability to react in such a way again. Not that the procedures of the PE are necessarily unreasonable in view of the multi-million pound projects it has to deal with; but there are now increasing possibilities for inexpensive and potent combinations of commercial electronics and software. In both development and speed of fitting these can be very responsive to the needs at sea, where the learning curve would be very steep in future engagements. Reading The U-Boat Hunters re-inforced my doubts that we are organisationally set up to take advantage of some aspects of modern technology. R.G.H.

AIR POWER AT SEA 1939-1945 by JOHNWINTON (Sidgwick and Jackson-£5.50) In the Second World War the use of aircraft in the struggle at sea really came into its own. The aircraft carrier became the queen of battles, and the long range maritime aircraft played a major role against submarines, and in maritime reconnaissance. John Winton has it all recorded in one beautifully illustrated book. He takes us through every phase of the 1939145 war at sea, and the effectiveness of air power is manifest throughout; air power on both sides, because the Allies suffered greatly at times; the British in Norway, in the Mediterranean and off Singapore; the U.S.A. at Pearl Harbour, after the Japanese had taken note of Taranto. All the lessons to be learned are here, H.M.S. Glorious, her decks cluttered with Hurricanes so brilliantly saved from Norway, caught out because she could not fly her own search or strike aircraft. The constant loss of our own ships when air cover could not be provided, notably in Norway, in the evacuations from Crete and Greece, and in the loss of H.M. ships Prince o f Wales and Repulse. Apart from lessons learned or not

learned the book is full of triumphs, some of which were not accorded the significance they deserved. John Winton gives rare and proper prominence to the sinking of the Konigsberg in April 1940 by 800 and 803 Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm, led by Lieutenant Lucy and Captain Partridge R.M. Apart from this first sinking of a warship, which went almost unnoticed at the time, the achievements of these two officers and the carrier borne Skua squadrons in the Norwegian campaign were remarkable. In the hands of the small, well trained force which was the Fleet Air Arm of that day, that rather bad aeroplane the Skua was very effective both as a fighter and a dive bomber for a short time. Winton's account of the Pacific War is excellent. By 1940 the U.S. Navy had fully appreciated the significance of the aircraft carrier, and had already put several non-aviator senior officers through the flying course at Pensacola, consequently the U.S. Pacific Fleet was air minded and professional. The result was the remarkable recovery from Pearl Harbour, and the superb conduct of the great aircraft carrier battles in the Pacific. It is not likely that a naval aviator will review a book of this sort without coming upon something controversial. Speaking of the loss of H.M.S. Audacity the author writes on page 85, 'Audacity, against Commander Walker's advice, steamed to the starboard'. This reviewer was with Commander Mackendrick on the bridge of H.M.S. Audacity as she sank and has no recollection of a conflict of opinion between his captain and the distinguished escort commander. The book effectively covers a vast subject, and, as might be expected from the author it is highly readable. The illustrations are excellent and often dramatic. For the historian it gives the outline for many another book. It has a good bibliography, adequate maps on the inside covers, and an excellent index.

A wonderful present for a sailor, young or old, at £5.50. D.C.E.F.G.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE by NORMAN DIXON F. (Jonathan Cape-£6.95) Mainly about the shortcomings of British army officers, the book touches naval matters from time to time and its main theme, the inadequate selection and training of officers, covers both services. The author is an ex-Sapper who turned to psychology and the study of sources, both military and psychological is most impressive, though some of his military authors are journalists rather than historians. Reactions to the book have varied from apoplectic fury to considerable interest. Parts, especially the technical ones, are difficult to read for the layman and full of jargon with which he will be unfamiliar, but the most interesting of the contents - firstly the descriptions of past military disasters and secondly the discussion of the traits of individual leaders - is more easy going. The examination of military disasters starts with the Afghan war of 1842 during which a strong British force was annihilated by tribesmen. It then moves to the Crimea and describes in some detail the appalling waste of life and the very great suffering inflicted on the men by incompetent commanders. Up to now, senility had played the main part and lack of training and defects of character a secondary role. When we come to the Boer war, senility is replaced by lack of competence. Buller, the Commander-in-Chief, comes off worst, but the other generals do not do much better. No one had learnt from the past, but the tradition of the frontal assault and the lack of new ideas brought disaster. The Victoria-Camperdown collision is the only naval contribution and the author is right, I think, in blaming the

disaster on the rigidity of authority in the service at the time (Markham was exonerated at his court-martial) and on the lack of a staff to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Tryon, a brilliant man who must have had a mental black out. The carnage on the Western Front in World War I brings accusations of stupidity, over-rigidity of planning, dislike of unwelcome intelligence, disregard for casualties, jealousy and personal ambition. The failure to follow up the tank break through at Cambrai is ascribed to inflexibility in planning and to belief in horsed cavalry. But the most bitter attack comes in the chapter on Kut where the able, cold blooded and ambitious Townsend who surrendered the city is given little shrift. Between the wars, the obsession with the horse and the harsh treatment given to the supporters of armoured mechanised warfare is the main theme, together with a refusal to learn from or even to promulgate the lessons of the Great War. The Navy is reminded of its neglect of the fleet air arm, and its devotion to battleships. The author is less offensive about operations in World War I1 and admits that the army was rejuvenated in 1941. But he criticises leadership in the desert at the time of the fall of Tobruk and the subsequent retreat. In the chapter on Singapore, all three Commanders-inChief are castigated, but the worst abuse is reserved for Percival, who refused, despite the pleadings of his juniors, to erect defences on the north of the island, thus causing the surrender of a vast army. Percival had a good brain, but is accused of being rigid, obstinate and dogmatic. Arnhem is the last example of failure discussed and here the refusal to believe firm intelligence about the presence of strong German forces in the area, together with the impossibility of 30 Corps task in advancing down a single road to Arnhem, are

made the vital elements in the disaster. In part two of the book, the author tries to explain the reason for the incompetence of the senior officers he has discussed (admittedly a minority) in terms of background, training and environment. One characteristic of the military life is its resemblance to the upper class Victorian family where 'absolute obedience was traded for security and dependence'. And the change in the social status of many modem officer candidates receives little encouragement from the author who sees them learning to be gentleme% rather than training to be soldiers. Bv' the greatest scorn for aspects of militar.. (and naval) life is reserved for 'bull', or the endless polishing, cleaning or painting of objects. He admits that order, cleanliness and punctuality make for efficiency, but he abhors bull on many grounds, the most important being that it banishes creative thought. He pours scorn on the exaggerated respect for ability at games and sports in the Services and points out that they are not requirements for leadership. In fact he objects to almost every aspect of the training of officers - without producing alternative methods. Authoritarianism is frowned upon as one of the main reasons for military incompetence, but on the other hand the autocratic leader is given praise. I confess to finding difficulty in distinguishing between the two, but I am not a psychologist. The third part of the book - the most interesting - discusses individual commanders and their merits, of which nonauthoritarianism and a regard for the lives and welfare of their men are deemed the most important. The names include Wolfe, Napoleon, a Zulu leader called Shasta, Wellington, Nelson, Jackie Fisher, T. E. Lawrence, Allenby and Slim. Rommel and Zhukov are also mentioned. Each case is discussed in some detail and the author satisfies himself that all possess the criteria for

great leadership. He is not so sure about well covered and not only the campaign three other commanders, Montgomery, in the Black Sea and Baltic, but also Haig and Kitchener, but after lengthy the North Russian and Pacific expedidiscussion includes them in his list of tions, which are often left out, receive great leaders despite their possession of attention. The operations of the Naval some degree of authoritarianism, Brigade in the Crimea are, deservedly, quite fully described. The activities of particularly in the case of Haig. These short notes will, I hope, gunboats all over the world are also indicate the lines on which the book is included. The main weakness of the book is written. Almost all our most cherished traditions and methods are attacked. The that it tries to cover too much in too weakness is that no alternatives are small a space and this is compounded by suggested. Yet I believe that despite the a last chapter which insists on carrying rage which parts of the book will the story into the Great War, thus generate, it is well worth reading and belying the title of the book and also that in some fields, such as the selection producing some dubious judgements. of officers for promotion, it may be Another weakness is that one is given no idea of the structure of the service, found very useful. PETERGRETTON officers or men; and the many reforms carried out are not mentioned. The technical side is also sketchy and only BEFORE THE DREADNOUGHT The Royal Navy from Nelson to Fisher two pages cover the introduction of the steam engine and of iron hulls into the by RICHARD HUMBLE Navy. Subsequent technical develop(MacDonald and Janes-£5.95) There seems to be a recent increase in ments are dealt with patchily, while the interest in the Royal Navy of the subject of naval administration is nineteenth century and your reviewer is omitted altogether. The author is incorrect in some of his studying approximately the same period as that covered in this book, so he must statements. For example, he does not declare an interest. The book is rather appear to have heard of the Mate light stuff and is written in a slightly Scheme of 1912 and states that the Navy irritating fashion with journalistic did not introduce promotion from the similies. But Mr. Humble has found a lower deck until the thirties. One partinumber of accounts of life in the Navy cularily wild statement of opinion claims of the period which provide some that if the British battlefleet had had to interesting commentaries. These confront the Japanese at the time of accounts were for me the best feature Tsushima in 1905, it would have been of the book. murdered. Accounts of operations, ashore and One concludes that the book is too afloat, cover the greater part and some ambitious, skimming lightly over its of them are of especial interest. The subject, but producing some interesting bombardment of Algiers in 1816 and and entertaining accounts from time to the battle of Navarino of 1827 are time. There are some good photographs. omitted from most histories. The story of the war against Russia in 1854-56 is

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