Mind Association

Aristotle on Action Author(s): John L. Ackrill Reviewed work(s): Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 87, No. 348 (Oct., 1978), pp. 595-601 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253695 . Accessed: 29/01/2013 07:43
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on Aristotle Action
JOHN L. ACKRILL

about action and choice seem to involve serious Aristotle'sstatements inconsistencies-and on topics centralto ethics and to his Ethics.Here are some samples.' (a) Aristotleholds that when we choose to do somethingwe always choose with a view to some end, forthe sake of something;but he also insiststhat a man who does a virtuousact is not doing it virtuvirtue-unless he has chosenit 'foritself'. ously-is not displaying (b) Actions are done forthe sake of otherthings,and thingswe can do are not themselvesthe ends with a view to which we do them; yet to according Aristotle, (poiesis), from production action(praxis)differs because it is its own end. precisely (c) In recommendingthe theoreticallife Aristotlesays that whereas 'aims at no end beyond itself'fineactions do 'aim at contemplation some end and are not desirablefor theirown sake'; but in recommendingthe life of action he says that doing noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake, and that 'those activitiesare desirable in themselvesfromwhich nothingis sought beyond the activity'. Passages likethesesuggesttwoproblems.First,how can actionbe good Secondly,how can an in itselfif it is valued as a means to eudaimonia? action be somethingdone to bring about an outcome and yet be distinguishedfroma productionbecause done for its own sake? The first and its foundaview of morality probleminvitesdiscussionof Aristotle's else? tion: is it valuable in itselfor only because it promotessomething The second-with which the present note is concerned-calls for an examinationof Aristotle'sconcept of an action, and of his distinction betweenpraxis and poiesis.2 discussingthis distinctionoften fail to face the real Commentators that difficulty, actions oftenor always are productionsand productions oftenor always are actions. (The idea that some periods of the day are would occupied by action-episodesand others by production-episodes only to the exercise obviouslybe absurd even if 'production' referred of special techniques or skills, since a period of such exercise could for certainlybe a period during which an action, of promise-keeping example, was being performed.In fact however Aristotle'snotion of
a
I

NicomacheanEthics I. I; II. 4; III. 3; VI. 2, 4, 5, I2; X. 6, 7. In October 1974 I delivered at the Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy a paper entitled 'Aristotleon Action'. The firstpart discussed the place and it expressedviews similarto those in 'Aristotle of action in eudaimonia, It is the of on Eudaimonia', Proceedings the British Academy, lx (I974). second part of that paper that is here published, more or less as it was given. A number of workersin the Aristotelianvineyardhave suggested that it would be usefulto have it in print,in spite of its evidentlimitations. 595

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JOHN L. ACKRILL:

production is not limited either to technical performances to the or makingof materialobjects.) The brave man's action is fighting uphill to relievethe garrison, thejust man is payingoff debt bymending and his his neighbour'sfence. How then is one to understandthe thesis that paying offa debt is an action but mendinga fence is a production?I propose to examine one or two passages in which Aristotle'speaksof choosing to do something'for itself' or of doing somethinghekousiJs (intentionally), order to see if theythrowany lighton the problem. in For Aristotleclosely connectsthe concept of praxis with choice; and a man's actions,properly speaking, whichhe can be praised or blamed, for are confined what he does if not fromchoice at least hekousios. to In Nicomachean a Ethics II. 4 Aristotle confronts puzzle: how can he say-as he has said-that men become just by doing just things,when remarks surelymen who do just thingsare already,eo ipso,just? He first that even in the case of skills correctperformance to does not suffice prove the performer's possession of the relevantskill. He goes on to make further points speciallyrelevantto virtuesas opposed to skills. It is not enough thatthe thingdone should itselfhave a certaincharacter, sayjustice,in orderto justify inference the thatit is done justlyand that the agent is a just man; it is necessarythat he should do it knowingly, choosingto do it foritself, and froma settleddisposition. Actual things done (pragmata)are called just if theyare such as a just man would do. But it is not he who does themthatis just, but he who does themin the way in whichjust men do. Aristotlethus draws a strongcontrastbetween what is done-which mighthave been done fromvarious motivesor inadvertently-andwhy it is done. If inferences the character the agentare to be made from to of the character the thingdone, it must have been done 'foritself'.This of last,however, seems to be an unhappyformulation. the 'actual thing For done' must be some performance-such as mending a neighbour's fence-which is in fact (in the circumstances) just, thoughit mightbe done by someone ignorant or indifferent its justice. But when it is of to asked whetherthe doer chose to do it foritself question is of course the whetherhe chose to do it because it was just, not whetherhe chose to do it because it was mendinga neighbour'sfence.How can doing somethingbecause it is sbbe doing it foritselfor forits own sake unless the thing done is specifiedpreciselyas sb?Only if the action is designated not as mendinga fence but as the b act does the expression'for itself' as getthenecessary grip.Yet the sbact is some such performance mending a fence,and it does not seem naturalto say in such a case thatthe agent has done two things at the same time. It is easy to understandhow Aristotle,not having addressed himselfto this theoreticaldifficulty, should have said of an action both thatit is done foritselfand thatit is done for the sake of somethingelse: the sb act is done for itself,the mendingof a fenceis notdone forits own sake but forits sbness. It may be thought thatto take mendinga fenceas one's exampleof an the 'actual thingdone' is to make it unnecessarily difficult interpret to that the just agent should choose to do what he does 'for requirement in itself'.Mendinga fenceis all too obviously something itself unattractive,

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ARISTOTLE

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nor is it by any means alwaysthe just thingto do. However,Aristotle's positionwould hardlybe easier if an example like repayinga debt were used. It is not alwaysjust to repay a debt either.In any case, even if such thatany such act would what is done could be given a description too. have othercharacteristics be just, yet such an act would inevitably What 'foritself'points to will be clear only if the act is brought,before e.g. us preciselyas having the relevantcharacteristic, as the just act: it have it. is not enoughthatit should actuallyor even necessarily two ways One way of bringingout the point at issue is to distinguish that is O'. It may mean the of understanding expression'do something knows or supposes that what he does is sb.Or it may mean necessarily where it is implied that the doer knows or 'do something-that-is-sb, or supposes it to be sb(whether not he does it becauseit is sb,'foritself'). in Ethics Aristotlecomes close to this kind of formulation Nicomachean the characterof what is done with the V. 8. Here, before contrasting characterof the agent (along the same lines as II. 4), he raises a preliminaryquestion: before asking whethersomeone did a just act 'for itself' (or forulteriormotives)we must ask whetherhe did a just act at speaking. all, properly Aristotlefirstdistinguishesbetween 'doing a thing that is in fact a (adikein, singleword). To do-wrongis to do wrong'and 'doing-wrong' If and intentionally. one does what is as a wrongknowingly something matterof factwrongbut does not know thatwhat one is doing is wrong one cannotbe said to do-wrong(save per accidens)(V. 8. i). Later in the chapter(v. 8.4) Aristotleapplies the same principleto expressionslike 'doing what is right'and 'doing thingsthatare wrong'. A man who has to or been compelled returna deposit cannot be said to have done-right save per accidens.So it seems thatwhat even to have donewhatis right, withoutqualification, per not a man can be said to have done strictly, is accidens, what he has done unforcedand knowingly. properlyspeaking,and only The contrastbetween doing something, fromthe earliercontrastbetween per accidens,differs doing something for motive.But here doing something itselfand doing it foran ulterior again what is involvedis a contextthatdoes not permitfreesubstitution of In of alternative descriptions the agent's performance. the strictuse a man 'does -' only if he 'does - knowingly'. An action of his, then, he is not somethingsome of whose featuresor circumstances may be by ignorantof. Rather it must be defined featureshe is aware of, since and it is onlyas so definedthathe can be said to have done it knowingly speaking). hence to have doneit at all (strictly can Aristotleimplies then that nothing a man does unknowingly count as an action of his. Does he recognisethat,since thereare on any occasion a greatnumberof factsan agentknowsabout what he is doing, what he therewill be a greatnumbe' of different ways of characterising Does he see that what is done may be subject to is doing knowingly? or and blame underanother, may constitute praiseunderone description one under one description and a different under another,or one offence and technicalappraisal may invitemoralappraisalunder one description under another?

'do something (thatis

is that where there no implication the doer n)',

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EthicsV. 8, betweenthe sectionsalreadysummarised, In Nicomachean 'whateverof the thingsin Aristotleexplains what counts as hekousion: his power a man does in knowledge and not ignorance of either the or person, the instrument, the result-e.g. whom he strikes,what he strikeswith, and with what result-and <knowing> each of them not you per accidens'.' This last requirementis explained by an exarmple: a may knowthatyou are striking man but not knowthatthe man is your father; so, Aristotleimplies, you do not know whomyou are striking he (your father)save per accidens.Similarly, adds, as regardsthe result and the whole action. Here, then, Aristotletouches on some of the various factorsor cirhe cumstancesof any practicalsituation-whose number and diversity per of often, course,stresses;and he uses the notionof knowing accidens, connectedwiththe idea thatfreesubstitution a notionthatis essentially equivalent expressionsis not always permissible.Yet of extensionally failsto remarkthatthoughon his account you do not he conspicuously you do strikea man hekousios;or that, in strikeyour fatherhekousios, known factorsin a given situation,a man may be virtue of different Aristotle's offences. diverseexcuses for-different accused of-and offer for mind is clearlyon giving conditionsfor ascribingresponsibility an act as already specifiedin the accusation: 'he struckhis fathera fatal blow witha sword'. We must,however,examine Aristotle'sfulleraccount of actions and term, EthicsIII. i. He startswiththe privative excuses in Nicomachean done-claim that for akousion:a man can deny responsibility something it was akousion-if he can plead forceor ignorance.By 'force' is meant real physicalforce,where it would in factbe misleadingto say that the principle] is outside man had done anything-'the arche [originating by and nothingis contributed the person who acts or ratheris acted on'. By 'ignorance' is meant ignorance of facts, circumstances,and consequences,not ignoranceof 'the universal',of whatis good or lawful. to Corresponding these negativetests forakousion-not due to an arche is in the person,not known-is the positiveformula:the hekousion 'that he principleis in the agenthimself, being aware of the whose originating of circumstances the action'. -particular of Various questions arise as to the interpretation the ignorancetest, discussessome of them. But the point of concernto us he and Aristotle does not bringout, and indeed his way of speakingservesto conceal it. I give someone a drinknot knowingit to be poison-I think it will but in fact it will kill. Ignorance makes my act akousion.What refresh not ignorancewas to poison my friend, act? Clearlywhat I did through is thatmakesmyact akousion ignorance The ignorance to givehima drink. of a featurethat goes to definethat act and not ignoranceof a feature that simply characterisesit. Now some of Aristotle's formulations could perhapsbe construedin such a way as to accommodatethispoint. to When, afterreferring the various circumstancesof action, he says
I

The flow of the sentence is in favour of understanding'knowing' rather than 'doing' before 'each of them'. (For 'knowing per accidens' see for Analytics76a I, 93a 25, 93b 25.) example Posterior

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ARISTOTLE

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that 'the man ignorantof any of these acts akousios' (III. I.I5), we to mighttake him to mean that corresponding ignoranceof any factor And therewill be some act the man can be said to have done akousids. which a man does in knowledgeof when he says that that is hekousion and result(V. 8.3), we mighttake him to be using person,instrument, in only by way of example a case where the performance question is specifiedas the bringingabout of a certain result by using a certain with his on instrument a certainperson. This would then be consistent which a man does in knowledgeof allowing that that is also hekousion (but in ignoranceof result): he struckhis father person and instrument a (thoughhe struckhis father fatalblow akousids). hekousios Aristotle's These would, however,be veryforcedways of interpreting goingthrough words.His own approachis indicatedby the factthat,after he a numberofthingsofwhichone mightbe ignorant, saysthatone who was ignorantof any of these is thoughtto have acted akousios-and points (III. i.I8). especiallyif he was ignoranton the most important It is clear that Aristotleis not associatingknowledgeor ignorance of this,that, involving this,that,or the otherwithvariousact-descriptions or the other,with respect to each of which the question 'did he do it could be asked. Rather he is asking simplywhethera man hekousios?' on 'acted hekousios' some occasion, and sayingthat he did so only if he circumstances. knew all the important should have spoken as he does. whyAristotle It is easy to understand cases. We all In a simple expositionhe considers simple and striking know what Oedipus did, and we are quite willingto say simplythat he a his of 'acted akousios'.The enormity the chargeof striking father fatal of blow pushes aside any minorinfelicities whichhe may simultaneously have been guilty,and even submergesthe quite serious charge (which he mightwell findit harderto evade) of havingstrucka man. In such a or dramaticcase one can ask simplywhethera man 'acted hekousios', theointoor even noticing entering without he whether 'did it hekousios', of reticalquestionsabout the identification actions. however,to see how closer considerationcould have It is difficult, he withhis way of speaking.For whether identified satisfied leftAristotle the thingdone ('it') with the person's bodily movementM or with the total package M (a, b, c . .. )-where the lettersin bracketsstand for various circumstancesetc.-he would find it impossible to raise the questionsthatwe (and the courts)want to raise. But if he treatedM(a), about offences), things done (perhaps different M(b), etc. as different each of which separatelythe question whetherit was done hekousios could be asked, he could not say that the knowledge required for an factors answerwas knowledgeof all or of the mostimportant affirmative answerto the The knowledgerequiredforan affirmative in the situation. question about M(a) would be simplythe knowledgethat M would be M(a). occasion It mightbe said that,thoughwhata man does on a particular mustbe (as it were) takenapartin thisway-the questionabout intention or 'voluntariness'being directed not at the whole package but at the on elementsin it, M(a), M(b), etc.-, yet what a man does hekousios a

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L.

ACKRILL:

particularoccasion can be treatedas a single action (the action he perin formed)-say, M(a, g, m ... .), wherethe letters bracketsstand forthe etc. known to the agent. Certainly,however much he circumstances however much he regrettedthat disliked some of the circumstances, this doing M(a) would be doing M(g), he did know thatit was precisely package-M(a, g, mi ...) that he was taking,and he took it because on the whole he wantedto do so ratherthannot. stillreasonsforpickingM(a, g, m .. .) apart. There are, nevertheless, courts to meet different Firstly,he may well have to go to different charges in respect of M(a), M(g) etc. In one court M(a) will be the action complained of, and that it was also M(g) will be, perhaps, a circumstance.Secondly, even if our knowledgethat he took mitigating the package because on the whole he wanted to make it superfluousto whether whether M(g) was hekousion, ask separately M(a) was hekousion, etc., we may well want to ask with respectto each whetherhe was glad that or sorry(or indifferent) he was doing that.Was thatwhatmade him but take the whole package, or was it perhaps an elementhe regretted had to accept in orderto get some other?He wanted M(a, g, m .. .) on M(a) thathe reallywanted? the whole. Was it perhapsonly (or precisely) accountofthehekousion This takesus back to thefirst partofAristotle's he principle] is in the agent himself, -'that whose arche [originating being aware of the particularcircumstances'.The arche relevantfor recognises, not every action is no doubt desire,orexis.(For, as Aristotle archeleads to performances classifiable-evengivenknowledgeinternal as hekousia.Many processes of a biological kind are not influencedby our wishes and desires; they are not hekousiaand they are not akousia either.V. 8.3. I I35a 33-b 2.) But ofwhatexactlyis desirethe originating M principle?Is it, to use the above crude symbolism, or M(a) or M(a, g, generalaccountof human and m .. .) or M(a, b, c ... .)? Does Aristotle's throwany lighton this? animal movement of If The centralfeatures thisaccountare familiar. an objectofthought or imagination becomes an object of desire a man's facultyof desire is stimulatedand moves him towards realising or achieving it. Three factors-are mentionedhere: the final cause, 'causes'-or explanatory the object of desire; the efficient cause, the man's actual desire; and the of formalcause, the essence or definition the movementproduced. In a certainway these three 'causes' coincide, as Aristotlesays, for example fromproductivecrafts. in PhysicsB. 3, wherehe takeshis illustrations has been performedIt would appear thenthatwhatactionprecisely what action is genuinelyexplained by the arche in the agent-depends difficulties on what the object of thoughtand desirewas. Unfortunately oftengivesas the object of desire(or of its species, at once arise.Aristotle (like appetiteand wish) a characteristic the pleasant,the noble), and not that could strictly done. When he does speak of what we be something may want to do he is naturallyoften concerned with cases in which is deliberation involved,where one thingis done as a means to another or wherethe pros and cons of a course of actionhave to be weighedup. So an immediatedistinction presentsitselfbetweenwhat one primarily insofaras one thinks wantsto do and what one wantsto do derivatively,

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ARISTOTLE

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it necessaryto achieve one's real aim. Should we then say thatwhat we is reallywant to do, or want to do withoutqualification, only what we comes close to thisin Nicomachean to wantnon-derivatively do? Aristotle EthicsVII. 9.I: 'if a person chooses or pursues this forthe sake of that, per se it is that that he pursues and chooses, but per accidensit is this. we But when we speak withoutqualification mean what is per se'. This of of suggestsa seriesor hierarchy descriptions what a man does because he desires to, each successive descriptioncoming nearer to revealing exactlywhat he aims at. In our simple case, M(a, g. m . . ) comes first, and is followedby M(a): his wantingthe package was derivativefrom that his wanting M(a). But ifit is alwaysforsome desirablecharacteristic a possible line of action appeals, there will be M(?b) afterM(a) in the series. Desire is then the archeof M(a, g, m ... .), M(a), and M(?b)-but of of primarily the last and only derivatively the others. saysaboutdesireas theoriginating thatwhatAristotle It is clear,I think, principleof action does not provide an answerto the sortsof question that were leftunansweredby his about actions and action-descriptions of Moreover his account of the physiology discussionsof responsibility. animal movement, which shows how desire operatesas a physical(nonintentional)process leading to muscular and limb movements (how desireis in a waythearcheofM), givesno clue as to how thephysiological one, or how questions about the storyis connectedto the psychological of are individuation movements relatedto questionsabout the individuation of actions. has I conclude thatwhile Aristotle much to tell us about the responsiof bilityforactions,the motivesof actions,and the physiology actions, he does not direct his gaze steadily upon the questions 'What is an action?' and 'What is an action?'. It is not thatsuch questionswould be beyondhim.He revelsin questionsofthiskind,and he has the conceptual and linguisticequipmentneeded to tackle them. Whateverthe reasons why he did not tacklethese questions head-on, it seems likelythat this failureis itselfthe reason for many of the 'incoherences'and 'contradictions'to be foundin passages such as those I quoted at the beginning.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY

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