P. 1
Gilles Deleuze

Gilles Deleuze

|Views: 70|Likes:
Published by Davorin Ćuti
Kant´s Critical Philosopy
The Doctrine of the Faculties
Kant´s Critical Philosopy
The Doctrine of the Faculties

More info:

Published by: Davorin Ćuti on Feb 03, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less





It is true that all the above (the interest of the beautiful, the
genesis of the feeling of the beautiful, the relationship of the
beautiful and the good) concerns only the beauty of nature.
Everything rests, indeed, on the notion that nature has produced
beauty (CJ para. 42). This is why the beautiful in art appears to
have no relationship to the good, and why the sense of the
beautiful in art seems to be incapable of having been engendered
by a principle which destines us to morality. Whence the
Kantian dictum: he who leaves a museum to turn towards the
beauties of nature deserves respect.
Unless art too, in its own way, is amenable to a material and a
rule provided by nature. But nature could proceed here only
through an innate disposition of the subject. Genius is precisely
this innate disposition by means of which nature gives art a
synthetic rule and rich material. Kant defines genius as the
faculty of aesthetic Ideas (CJ para. 57, 'Remark I'). At first sight
an aesthetic Idea is the opposite of a rational Idea. The latter is a
concept to which no intuition is adequate; the former an intuition
to which no concept is adequate. But it is worth asking whether
this inverse relationship is adequate to describe the aesthetic
Idea. The Idea of reason goes beyond experience, either because
there is no object which corresponds to it in nature (for example,
invisible beings) or because it makes a simple phenomenon of
nature into a spiritual event (death, love . . . ). The Idea of
reason thus contains something inexpressible. But the aesthetic
Idea goes beyond all concepts because it creates the intuition of
a nature other than that which is given to us: another nature
whose phenomena would be true spiritual events, and whose


Critique of Judgement

events of the spirit, immediate natural determinations (CJ para.
49). It 'gives food for thought', it forces one to think. The
aesthetic Idea is really the same thing as the rational Idea: it
expresses what is inexpressible in the latter. This is why it
appears as a 'secondary' representation, a second expression. In
this respect it is very close to symoblism (the genius himself also
proceeds by the extension of the understanding and the libera-
tion of the imagination) (CJ para. 49). But instead of indirectly
presenting the Idea in nature it expresses it secondarily, in the
imaginative creation of another nature.
Genius is not taste, but it animatesjasie in art by giving it a
soul or a content. There are works which are perfect as regards
taste, but which lack soul, that is to say they lack genius (CJ
para. 49). This is because taste itself is only the formal accord of
a free imagination and an enlarged understanding. It remains
dull and lifeless, and merely assumed, if it does not refer to a
higher authority, as a content capable precisely of enlarging the
understanding and freeing the imagination. In the arts, the
accord of imagination and understanding is brought to life only
by genius, and without it would remain incommunicable7
Genius is a summons sent out to another genius; but taste
becomes a sort of medium between the two, allowing a waiting
period if the other genius is not yet born (CJ para. 49). Genius
expresses th« snpras<»nsihl<» unity pf ^11 the faculties, and ex-
presses it as a living unity. It therefore provides the rule
whereby the conclusions of the beautiful in nature may be
extended to the beautiful in art. Therefore, the beautiful in
naturels not the only symbol of the good; so is the beautiful in
art by virtue of the synthetic and genetic rule of genius itself2

Rant thus adds to the formal aesthetic of taste a material
meta-aesthetic, whose two main constituents are the interest of
the beautiful and genius, and which bears witness to a Kantian
romanticism. In particular, Kant adds to the aesthetic of line
and composition - that is, of form - a meta-aesthetic of contents,
colours and sounds. In the Critique of Judgement mature classi-
cism and nascent romanticism are in a complex equilibrium.
We should not confuse the various ways in which, according


Kant's Critical Philosophy

to Kant, the Ideas of reason can be presented in sensible nature.
In the sublime the presentation is direct but negative, and done
by projection; in natural sumbolism or in the interest of the
beautiful the presentation is positive but indirect, and is
achieved by reflection; in genius or in artistic symbolism the
presentation is positive but secondary, and is achieved through
the creation of another nature. We will see later that the Idea is
capable of a fourth mode of presentation, the most perfect, in
nature conceived as a system of ends.

You're Reading a Free Preview

/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->