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U.P.

College of Law

LOCAL GOVERNME NT

S.Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.

2|Local

Government

(Guanzon)

S.Y.

08-09:

2nd

Sem.

SYLLABUS PART 1: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; CREATION, MERGER, ABOLITION AND POWERS. Creation of Local Government Units: Patricio Tan et al. v. COMELEC Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating Province of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelec from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regarding the requirements in land area and estimated annual income. Petitioners also contend that a number of voters were excluded since the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental.. Comelec contends that the law is not unconstitutional. They claim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with. They submit that the case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of the new province while only 30,400 were against it. Issue: WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement Held: No

Paredes vs Executive Secretary (same issue but concerns barangay). Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary. Issue: WON the new Province of Negros complied with the requirements as to land area Held: No del Norte

Ratio: The more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. It can be plainly seen that the constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. The court reversed the ruling in

Ratio: The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expressly declared that the new province contained an area of 285,656 ha. More or less. However, when Parliamentary bill was enacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of the provincial treasurer also indicates that there the province comprised of a lesser area. Although the certification stated that the land area of the municipality of Don Salvador was not available, it appeared that such is only 80.2 kilometers. This area if added to 2,685.2 square kilometers will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC 1 (requirements) is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent."Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute. Therefore, in the context of the
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SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.

3|Local

Government

(Guanzon)

S.Y.

08-09:

2nd

Sem.

sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" ---- the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters, It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature. The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction. The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored. Teehankee, concurring: The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does not look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction or restraining order' which they have reason to believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of its officials.

Torralba v. Mun. of Sibagat (1987) Facts: BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution 2. Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality. According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void. Issue: Held: WON BP 56 is invalid No

Ratio: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government.The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan
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"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. First. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in 29 October 2006 plebiscite. adopted the COMELEC’s Law Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant to Resolution No. "Any province that may hereafter be created. Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Province of Shariff Kabunsuan Bai Sema v. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat. or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x. Sinsuat. under the Local Government Code.” Meanwhile. the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. However. 7902 (subject of these cases). the COMELEC issued Resolution No. city. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code. as amended by RA 9054. And lastly. (Option Votes: In favor for creation 285. Datu Odin Sinsuat. cities. Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. For the same reason. or each province. or a city with a population of 250. Buldon. Kabuntalan. the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction.Y. Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. resulting to total of 11. "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces.802) The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and formed the new province. is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its inclusion in November 1989 plebiscite). Third. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays. the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10.000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250. 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9. On 28 August 2006. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case. as part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district. Article X of the Constitution. amending Resolution No. However. enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. Datu Blah T. shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. and city and municipal councils. such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.must comply with three conditions. on the other hand. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Thus. Under Section 19. Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution. Sultan Mastura. Thus. a city with a population of 250. was enacted in the normal course of legislation. However. there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. the ARMM Regional Assembly. Article X of the Constitution is followed. Second. Upi) Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. All of them were from the first legislative district of Maguindanao. Article VI of RA 9054. Article VI of the Constitution provides. cities or municipalities. the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces. the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. constituting Shariff Kabunsuan. Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district during the Philippine general election. case. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. The province was the first to be created under Republic Act No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). under its plenary legislative powers. Matanog. municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. Parang. requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No.000. municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. cities. RA 6734. provided Section 10. requires also the power to create a legislative district. In fact. the ARMM’s legislature. the power to create a province. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district. as well as in past Constitutions. 07-0407. municipality or barangay . On 10 May 2007. 885. Comelec (2008) Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for Maguindanao. 7727. 2007. Article VI of RA 9054. exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19. Similarly. Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. Congress has delegated to provincial boards. Against the creation 8.4|Local Government (Guanzon) S. Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units . Later.372. the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3). Cotabato City. created under its Organic Act. In the present case. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Barira. Section 5 (3).” Resolution No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.000 or more. On 6 February 2007. and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law. Didagen Dilangalen.000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250. "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg.province. Sultan Kudarat. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides." Clearly. and to . a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3). 3999.

not the regional assemblies. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act. there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. 08-09: 2nd Sem. 4695 (RA 4695). The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body. from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160. there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House. among others. Nothing in Section 20. and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections. and minimum contiguous territory of 2. Indeed. as mandated in Section 10. there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners.000. beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise). The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. an increase that only Congress can decide. in creating Shariff Kabunsuan. through the creation of a province — for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives. and (3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.Y. it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. without a reapportionment. is a national official. Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act. the House of Representatives. (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250. and its occupant." The Court answered in the negative. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts.000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250. the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. On the other hand. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district. The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. Article VI of the Constitution provides that Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. This violates Section 20.000. Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy. Only Congress can enact such a law. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House. and it can never create a national office. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives. expressly or impliedly. Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x. Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions. Section 5." refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The issue in Felwa. even before Congress can create new provinces.Article VI of RA 9054." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself. and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act. created by a superior legislative body. Ifugao. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. Under Section 19. Article X of the Constitution. Incidentally. but by operation of the Constitution.000. comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment. a Member of the House of Representatives. was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. reapportion legislative districts. This is deducible. Indeed. Thus. Pursuant to this Section. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. as amended.000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250. "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. is vested exclusively in Congress. An inferior legislative body. x x x. Second. recognized the exclusive nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives. was whether Republic Act No. creating the provinces of Benguet. the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law. in the present 14th Congress. a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly. not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted. to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.5|Local Government (Guanzon) S. and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces. provides. First. but. cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. Section 3. the corresponding representative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160. under the first method.[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054. "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member. the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office. respectively. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts. namely: minimum annual income of P20. or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. when a province is created by statute. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices. much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation . Mountain Province.000. envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tribranch system of government under our Constitution. also. The creation of the ARMM. Clearly.

With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad. on the ground. decided to meet with the GRP.[3] In response. there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the nonsigning of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions. The following year. then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13. in March 2000. were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts. however. according to a leading MILF member. Malaysia on August 5-7. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24.Y." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya.[2] Early on. which was signed on May 7. eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form. they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27. a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000. 2001. On July 18. Article X of the Constitution. 7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently. initially responded with deep reservation. Government (2008) Facts: On August 5. Moreover.[6] In 2005. then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. In summary. is void. Lanao del Norte. the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD. under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim. Libya from June 20-22. Moreover. Article VI of RA 9054. protect and respect human rights. negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict. of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table. the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations. eventually. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. Meanwhile. insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli. of legislative districts. the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. Resolution No. 2002 at Putrajaya. the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and. preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City. 1998. enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect. Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. we rule that Section 19. Nonetheless. among others. 2008. 2001. 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.O. is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution. who represents respondents. we rule that MMA Act 201. the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the . The MILF. is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution. Of North Cotabato et al v. petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. 3. however. 7902. it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Malaysia. Rehabilitation Aspect. which. the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF. several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur. with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government. and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996. 2008.[1] The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize. as mentioned. No. and Ancestral Domain Aspect. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained. the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and. The Solicitor General. Macapagal-Arroyo. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance. among others. the Court grants the petitioners. Malaysia. we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. 1997. for upon motion of petitioners. The Prov. the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when. was set to be signed last August 5. it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.6|Local Government (Guanzon) S. 08-09: 2nd Sem. it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari. the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20. Thus. this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. Pasay. Jr. divided. by itself.O. municipality. it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information. the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. v. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended. addressed to the government peace panel. "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved. for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Republic Act No. itself. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information. and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. or barrio may be created. as mandated by E. Quezon. among other things. city. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. Three. respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is. and amounts to a whimsical. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. No. or its boundary substantially altered. (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest. except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. 7160. the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality. jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. and Republic Act No. abolished. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is. 28. Republic Act No.O. the bar. was enacted to establish and administer program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila. E. however. subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. In sum. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. Metro Manila shall be administered by the Commission. is implemented therein. Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. which resulted to the ever-increasing inability of the separate local governments to cope with the ensuing serious problems. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority. No. or the people themselves through the process of initiative." The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a right to consultation is untenable. They rely on this provision: "No province. Comelec (1985) Facts: PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Manila. One. (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench. This is in response to the sharp growth in the population of Manila and the proliferation of commercial firms and industries. the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. are unconstitutional . finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people. Hence. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. and the public. arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. 8371. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law. In fact. the same does not cure its defect. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Two. as the clause is worded. which entails. comments. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. 3. the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1. namely. respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. In any event. 7. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.7|Local Government (Guanzon) S. a Constitutional Convention. 2001. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. capricious. Notably. and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 824. Republic Act No. Article II of the Constitution. Metro Manila Commission: Gemiliano Lopez. Moreover. oppressive. and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. The Court. which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. . merged. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. advice. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Hon. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain.Y.

Y. Amendments to the Constitution. having manifested their will. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February. It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and thirteen municipalities that the membership be identical with those of other cities or municipalities. Presidential Decree No. Ordinance) Control of the President. the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government functions.” It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous communities has brought into being a large area that calls for development both simultaneous and unified. that construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. classification is not forbidden. At that time there was no interim Batasang Pambansa. Where. The point is not well-taken. The January 27. 1975 wherein the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government. There is. Presidential Decree No." All such elements are present. That provision clearly recognizes the existence of the Metropolitan Manila. It was the President who was entrusted with such responsibility. That is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national character. Article VIII. The classification. There is necessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functions to be planned. the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President. it must not be limited to existing conditions only. Succinctly put. however." 15 The foregoing constitutes the justification for and the objective of such Presidential Decree. The last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present constitutional provision regarding the Batasang Pambansa. It is quite obvious that under the conditions then existing . the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. Accordingly. Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity. The point has been raised. administered. His power over local governments does not go that far. But classification on a reasonable basis. 2. There is ample justification for such a distinction Basis in the Constitution. integration and unified management of such local government services or functions" therein. the General and the Commissioners. however. Executive Secretary. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human Settlements. As thus construed. 1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. It is undeniable that the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any constitutional objection. however. These doubts. I submit that a grant of power must be definite to be valid. did not satisfy the prohibition contained in Art. however. Such express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls for the dismissal of these petitions. According to PD 824: "The Commission. The government was called upon to act. The legality of the law making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law was already established in Aquino vs Comelec. creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission. with the continued growth of population. there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan.what was done was a response to a great public need. where I dissented. XI. and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. now composing Metropolitan Manila. It extends no further than general supervision. amendment to the Constitution providing for representation in the Batasang Pambansa and which allocates representatives to "districts in Metropolitan . Nor was it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of Metropolitan Manila. There can be no valid objection to such exercise of authority. the power of the President is confined to general supervision. 1984. Presidential Authority to Issue the PD. There is no need to set forth anew the compelling reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. the referendum did not include all of the peoples of Bulacan and Rizal to ascertain if they were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. In Paredes vs Executive Secretary. there being no legal justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. attended with more complexity . and operated [based on] the highest professional technical standards. and must apply equally to each member of the class. For one thing the provision speaks of "the criteria established in the local government code. Finally. . the presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character. a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President over the Commission. to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real differences. . The referendum suffers from the same infirmity present in the case of Paredes vs. amend or modify any ordinance. It is clear that under the equal protection clause. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen municipalities. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree. then there is a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. cited in the main opinion. Justification as to PD 824. do not suffice to nullify such a provision. PD 824 was the result.still present and." There was then no local government code so there were no criteria. 824 be construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities. the President shall have the power to revoke." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27. To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of every statute." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the President. Sec. In PD 824. Application of Paredes vs Executive Secretary. dissenting. 824. it must not be nebulous and uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total abdication thereof. Also the grant of power to restructure the 4 cities and 13 municipalities in the Greater Manila area "under such terms and conditions as the President may decide" was so broad that it was in fact not an intelligent decision on the part of the people. 1. Sangguniang Bayan. there was no Local Government Code. however. the Court did came to the conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite. . that unless Presidential Decree No. reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27. That control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries. 1975. Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila.8|Local Government (Guanzon) S. It "is vital to the survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and effective system be established for the coordination. 824. (Election Code of 1978. 08-09: 2nd Sem. 1975. it must be germane to the purposes of the law. The referendum of February 27. resolution or act of the Commission. Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacted prior to the creation of a local government code Held: No Ratio: The challenge does not suffice to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Abad Santos.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.000. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 8817. 824 for the simple reason that the issue before the people when the amendment was submitted for ratification was not the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission. 8817. the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January 18. its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations". 1994. taking into consideration that the house bill was identical to the senate bill. to classify the same as a special fund or transfer. since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government. 1994. since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. the vesting of duty. After deducting the IRA. Meanwhile. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue. responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243. to be an imperium in imperio. if any. Article VI. 8817. Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. Presumption of constitutionality: Alvarez v. 1994. Understandably. Manila" cannot be construed to constitutionally validate P. or on February 23. nil is there a basis.109. land and equal sharing. IRAs are a regular. For purposes of budget preparation. 08-09: 2nd Sem. 1993. it must. for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.560. too. 1243 was filed on May 19. RA 2770 can be sait to have originated in the House of Representatives Held: Yes Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. The filing of HB No. 7720. 1994. a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed on May 19. petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a component city. the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate. After the third reading. 1243. Thus. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city. authority. was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. Also. 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28. entail more expenses.9|Local Government (Guanzon) S. Apparently. is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. increase or decrease. This is as it should be. On February 23. 1993 while SB No. from the House of Representatives.000 for its conversion into a city. recurring item of income. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Furthermore. within its territorial boundaries. among others. have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. The committee recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment. by constitutional prescription.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. No. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. was passed in the Senate. and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth. originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. SB No. Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243. already approved on the Third Reading. HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. 1243. 8817 was filed on April 18. the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers. its own version of HB 8817. Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. 11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. HB No. however. depending on factors like population. among others. (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes. the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. To reiterate. in turn. does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities. Clearly. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. responsibilities and resources. 1993. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit. No violation of Section 24. More extensive operations. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17. RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18. HB No. such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs). Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an independent component city Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of P20. a little less than a month thereafter. 1993. ti appears that the average annual income arrived at would only be P13. 1243 until it received HB No. The law was challenged mainly because the act did not allegedly originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24. . but not intended. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817 should.D. Guingona (1996) Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the municipality of Santiago Isabela into an independent component city to be known as the city of Santiago.Y. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House.

the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial. their petition must fail. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasidelict. The defendants filed a third party complaint against petitioner and Bislig. agents. However. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity. the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Province of Ilocos Norte. and also when the State files a complaint. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity. they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. Issue: WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of nonsuability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.Y. arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. acting in behalf of the municipality. Petitioner filed an MR which was dismissed for having been filed out of time. prescription and negligence of the owner and driver of the jeepney. that the defendant is liable. therefore. their acts are political and governmental." Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee. it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver. The dismissal of this petition is. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Fontanilla). the District Engineer. it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove. The owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Every law. not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private. According to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC). the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets. so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision he held the municipality liable for the quasidelict committed by its regular employee. a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras. they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House. vs. Governmental powers/ functions: Municipality of San Fernando v.We already stressed in the case of Palafox. are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service. and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities. Private respondents instituted an action against Nieveras and Balagot before the CFI. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts. The judge did not commit GAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. In the case at bar. the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. on the other hand. who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. non suability of the State. Consequently. and as such they are officers. Nevertheless. 3083. Firme (1991) Facts: Petitioner is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. At about 7 am of December 16. However. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration. and their functions are twofold. We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Their officers and agents in such capacity. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be . Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. inevitable. 1965. and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto. and not for the state or sovereign power. proprietary or corporate right. municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity. et. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable. Section 3 of the Consti." It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. for RA No. proceeded with the trial and then rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver." Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent. the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. though elected or appointed by them. the judge failed to resolve such defense. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued. liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The complaint was then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig. Nevertheless. 7720. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physical injuries. Petitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action. thus opening itself to a counterclaim. including RA No. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. if it can. a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the petitioner and driven by Alfredo Bislig. 7720. Hence. is performing governmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Hence. al. otherwise." After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence.10 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 7720 to be nullified. in other words. Held: Yes Ratio: In the case at bar. and servants of the state. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. Tolentino v.has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.

even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their deceased dearly beloved. series of 1975 dated March 6. promenades. the squares.Y. and in its proper corporate name. 1971 to June 6. The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law. and corporate. the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads. Fontanilla. It may sue and be sued. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega. there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989) Facts: Vivencio Sto. Furthermore.11 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu. governmental or political on the one hand. (Torio v. municipal streets. the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. Held: Proprietary municipalities. or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. cities or . Proprietary powers/ functions: City of Manila v. Fontanilla). fountains. imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6. and Joseph Helmuth. 1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Therefore. Issue: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental. were prematurely removed from the disputed lot. 5. it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. no other document embodied such lease over the lot. ( Under the doctrine of respondent superior. Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Aggrieved. 159. Domingo. With the acts of dominion. four (4) months and eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25. however from the receipt. Issue: WON the city is liable for damages Held: Yes Ratio: All things considered. the opening of graves. there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. When subject lot was certified on January 25. public and political. the order and police of the cemetery. As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. Domingo for the period from June 6. it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity. the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city government for a period of forty-three (43) years. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer. 1971 to June 6. Domingo. petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. public waters. Hence. Believing that the lease was only for five years. niches. 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed. and contract and be contracted with. private and proprietary on the other. During the next all souls day. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease. it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis. 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. Block No. Thus in Torio v. the exhuming of remains. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder. Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office. and private or proprietary capacity. 1978 as ready for exhumation. Its powers are twofold in character-public. city streets. judicial. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law. The lot was also leased to another lessee. a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila. the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. private and corporate. officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery. Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances. Domingo. and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function. On the basis of the certification. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Sergio Mallari. Apart. 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6. the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect. there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. Domingo Sr. Sr. and public works for public service paid for by said provisions. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423). Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. Sr. or tombs. obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. 2021.

Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.12 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. .

That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal. If they are not followed. or regulation is in question. We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. In the exercise of this jurisdiction. to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if. no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. 08-09: 2nd Sem. is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional. the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided. the tax or fee levied was unjust. further. international or executive agreement. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. to with. hence. Mandatory Public Hearings. order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing. To doubt is to sustain. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed. or charge levied therein: Provided. no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. excessive. Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and. and M-3. POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 5. That power was never questioned before this Court but. instruction. he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. In fact. of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. of the tax measure. law. Issue: Held: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional Yes Ratio: BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. M-1. Moreover. on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined 3 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. He has no discretion on this matter. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure. lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection. no minutes of public hearing. Article X. he may.13 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. not the wisdom or reasonableness. the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. however. in his opinion.Y. but he himself does not lay down such rules. excessive. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. presidential decree. it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided.) Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC Held: Yes 3 by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. if warranted. proclamation. Supervision does not cover such authority. These grounds affected the legality. finally. Section 5(2). As we see it. with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. fee. order. no posting. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. it is unjust.. That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax. oppressive or confiscatory. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance. including this Court. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds. that is. no publication of the ordinance. That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof. without the right to declare that. Significantly. nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. SYLLABUS PART 2: DECENTRALIZATION. Lim (1994) Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code . The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed. Provided. LOCAL AUTONOMY. but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. M-2. that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws. in his opinion. ordinance. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code. at any rate. Local Government Units vis a vis National Government: Power of general supervision: Drilon v. What he found only was that it was illegal. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the . oppressive or confiscatory. but reinstated it anyway. It is also emphasized that every court. in his discretion. the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

by the decree itself. to prevent bigamy. At any rate. authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. Metopolitan Manila Authority (1991) Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command. These requisites are. impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. Solicitor General v. However. Thus. ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses. According to Elliot. however. which has the force and effect of a statute. the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation. to minimize carnapping. In fact. the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. 2) must not be unfair or oppressive. but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. to forestall fraud. which does not permit. including those here questioned. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. but the means. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission." that is. Gonong. Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC Held: No Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures. even if the end be valid. the validation of parts." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila. Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. He made no mention. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed. The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. and so impliedly prohibits. we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. Dir General Cesar P. and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.14 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. would be ultra vires. Hon. respectively. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. 08-09: 2nd Sem. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. 3) must not be partial or discriminatory. The list is endless. the exercise of freedom of speech. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity. 5) must not be unreasonable. In the case before us. 11. regardless of their merits. the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Notably. the execution of contracts. the registration of vehicles. Hence. of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. promulgation of resolutions). cannot prevail against the decree. . a municipal ordinance. considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3." The Court issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. At the same time. As delegates of the Congress. Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies. which are merely local in origin. it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. worse. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R. 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. In so doing. 5. 4. Necessarily. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. West Traffic District vs. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.A. the driver's license shall not be confiscated. specifically PD 1605. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but. they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. to reduce disorder. 1993. and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. and so on. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. to deter imposture. the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. the enactments in question. it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. Arsenio M. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. No. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us. the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. 1993 issue of Balita. 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated. The pertinent law is PD 1605. Later.Y.

to usher in a regime of federalism. in the constitutional sense. Undaunted. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code. Local governments. It is noteworthy that under the Charter. is subject to the guiding star. filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988. income distribution legislation. PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials. Mayor Ganzon commenced before the CA.15 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.to the local levels. "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing. Amidst the two successive suspensions. as in the federal governments of the USA. It is for Congress to determine. Commissioner Blas Ople would not. in the exercise of its own discretion. as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did. to enhance self-government. Without such action. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. or otherwise." Autonomy. to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy. among other things. of the legislature. in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate. as the President's alter ego. and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. though not control. that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language. 08-09: 2nd Sem. intimidation. and arbitrary detention. either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. and for no other purpose than precisely. albeit paradoxically. Ganzon v. can suspend and or remove local officials. a local tax law. so they contend. Finding probable grounds and reasons. 337 is still in force and effect. to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations. Batas Blg. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the cases. whether or not to impose such sanctions. Presently. preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days. The Constitution did nothing more. Autonomy. which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers. for the sake of local autonomy. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to . Court of Appeals (1991) Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints. by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law. and denied her control. It is a view. to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. the third time in twenty months." The Constitution. 337. As we said. however limited. "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. sub silencio. abuse of authority. Thus: Now. Autonomy does not. intend. the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right . discipline. the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive.Y. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter. disgraceful and immoral conduct. which supposedly excludes the power of investigation.and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government. Batas Blg. and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. under the Constitution. the respondent (Sec of Local Government) issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units. Meanwhile. delegate its exercise to the President. Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers. the respondent issued another order." to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. he instituted an action for prohibition. however. The Constitution did not. however. culpable violation of the Constitution. on various charges. after all. to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive. a petition for prohibition. the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. ten in number. the Constitution contains no prohibition. As the Constitution itself declares. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress. the Constitution is meant. however.but not power . like the power of local legislation. "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. concerning discipline. but subject to. and as the existing Local Government Code has done. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. the passage of a local government code. grave misconduct. As we observed in one case. According to both petitioners. and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively. Issue: Yes Ratio: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President. does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. oppression. as observed by the Court of Appeals. respondent ordered petitioner's second preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. suspend. It is a mistaken impression because legally. decentralization means devolution of national administration . first. It is noteworthy finally. Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC. as we observed. and a national representation law. contemplate making ministates out of local government units. are subject to regulation. among them. albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution . autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. The issue consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution. in particular.or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. In the other case. local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President. in the respondent CA.

agencies and instrumentalities. and nothing less than tyranny. it can not exceed sixty days. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism. the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. 63(3)] that if during. which is effectively. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society. MCIAA v. on the other hand. to assist prosecutors in firming up a case. but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally. (2). and what indeed looms very large. decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. acknowledging in its very nature no limits. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrew the tax exemption granted the GOCCs. by law. As we held. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority. In that case.Y. involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. if warranted under subpar. Ganzon Supplement: Local autonomy. Decentralization of power. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments. Under Section 1: The authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions. broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable. and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have). through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power. the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range. Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. under the Constitution. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. and so also. and instrumentalities. the Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging to petitioner. mandated to "principally undertake the economical. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension. Section 63 of the Local Government Code. to suspend him out of office. agencies. Under the Local Government Code. it may be imposed for no more than sixty days.16 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions. the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. and needless to say. with a grave abuse of discretion. There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions. The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. According to a constitutional author. yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively. the latter may." and "ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges. impose disciplinary action against local officials. a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable. What bothers the Court. Suspension finally is temporary. Marcos (1996) Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA6958. provided: that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault. it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms. The petitioner." [Supra. However. Nevertheless. the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties. or after the expiration of. management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. for the above reasons." since in that event. the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. neglect or request. it did not exempt the Ratio: As a general rule. against an erring local official. involves a mere decentralization of administration." It is a means. (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. not of power. may serve the suspension so far ordered. as we have held. efficient and effective control. and in the manner set forth therein. in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide. the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension. is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. and no more. his preventive suspension. which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient. sec." At the same time. and as the Local Government Code provides. if any. his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again. Issue: WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper Held: No latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy. 08-09: 2nd Sem. The President exercises "general supervision" over them. Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The sole objective of a suspension. the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency. or are the lifeblood of the nation. Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner Held: Yes Ratio: The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. citing section 133 of the LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions. .

the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. viz. but not under any explicit provision of the said section. progress. has been withdrawn. except upon the effectivity of the LGC. An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government. "taxes. the phrase "and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded.A.A. bureau. 34 The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace. fees.17 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the government are exercised through at the Philippines. it could only be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace . however. character. and in the second place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government. all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable." The National Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive. its agencies and instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o). cities. city. This term includes regulatory agencies. provincial. which are real property..but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a). are any one of those enumerated in Section 234. except those granted to local water districts. 6958. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in. not integrated within the department framework. In short. If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in Section 133(o). the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines. the provincial. then it should have restated the wording of the latter." As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons. No. even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons. administering special funds. the scope thereof or its limitations. "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted to a taxable person. its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs. the LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax exemption privileges. but not under Section 133. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated . cooperatives duly registered under R. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of GOCCs. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234. its agencies and instrumentalties. specially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. inter alia. No. which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities". vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. undoubtedly. On the other hand. or a local government or a distinct unit therein. including a department. the legislative and the judicial. On the other hand. whether pertaining to the autonomous reason. city. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o) Taxes. In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government". Most likely. as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments. and enjoying operational autonomy. the petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o). and LGUs". except as provided therein. pursuant to Sec 232. either by virtue of ownership. endowed with some if not all corporate powers. usually through a charter. the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234."instrumentalities" and "agencies. R. it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter. we conclude that as a general rule. including government-owned and controlled corporations. non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions. as it now asserts. and charges of any kind of the National Government." while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government." This view does not persuade us. the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133. provinces. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234. except as provided in the said section. as shown above. municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on. or governmentowned or controlled corporation. upon the effectivity of the LGC. office instrumentality. otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. a government-owned corporation. 646. that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P. 08-09: 2nd Sem. or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234. including GOCCs. In the first place. it could only be the first. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. it did not Moreover. The LGC. No. Reading together Section 133. since. as laid down in Secs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of inter alia. and prosperity of the people. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew. 232 and 234 of the LGC. and the petitioner is. they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC. for one exists. and unless otherwise provided in the LGC." These autonomous regions. Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a). municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivision. chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations". Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule. Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their power to tax. Yet. enacted pursuant to Section 3. or use of the property. municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local government. 6938. fees or charges of any kind on the national government. and the exemption from taxation. Moreover. saves as the contrary appears from the context. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges.Y. Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax. which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. including.D. "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central government. It must show that the parcels of land in question.

by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. Decentralization. with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle. Pagcor is unavailing since it was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among other things. with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal. we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam. the Assembly is enjoined. it will not make it academic. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives. assuming that there was an investigation. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy. Accordingly. What appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly that "since November. except real property tax. or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. . and there was a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the development. which. on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly ---an act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people. Foreign relations. their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse." "with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities"' specified therein. respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen. even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax. if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution. 1618. In the second place. Issue: WON the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic. Region XII. Region XII. After declaring the presence of a quorum. Petitioner then ordered Acting Secretary Alimbuyao to inform the assemblymen that there will be no session on said date as petitioner and Razul are attending the house committee hearing. Reliance on Basco vs. invited Mr. representing Lanao del Sur. The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. 1987 up to this writing. the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. Ratio: We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. it had already become even if it be conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government. unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution. We therefore order reinstatement. On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone. all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative. 1987 valid and subsisting. and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense." Hence. For." To be sure. in a conference. the Speaker ProTempore was authorized to preside in the session. This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized capital stock consists of "the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports. Regional Autonomous Government. In the first place. and to preempt the Court. it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court .Y. Mangelin (1989) Facts: Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook. in light of the forgoing disquisitions. and(e) Making the injunction permanent." except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government. . the following: 1. enterprises. Finally. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes. nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. 2. Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly. National defense and security. the Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution. Later." Certainly. Issue: What is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? Ratio: The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. Among other things. The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to the petitioner. Xavier Razul. The petitioner then went to court praying that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents during the session as null and void and holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or . and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person". applies to the petitioner." "which include. Pampook Speaker of Region XI. should it still be so minded. composed of 18 members. Foreign trade. no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Sec 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. 3. It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts. Batasan Pampook. hence. no one can doubt its wisdom. the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. local autonomy: Limbona v. wanted him to come to Cotabato City." but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled. as earlier adverted to." an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Region XII held on March 12. Indeed. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. but are not limited to. He was then elected speaker of the regional legislative assembly of central Mindanao. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant. It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions. there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook. Besides.18 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. in a conciliatory gesture. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues. and. fiscal or otherwise. to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof.

" and "ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). Issue: WON petitioner has the right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO Held: Yes Ratio: The tug of war between the Secretary of DBM and the Governor of Rizal over a position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle. Decentralization of power. exploration. The CSC affirmed. 08-09: 2nd Sem. of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. Petitioner reiterated his request for Santos’ appointment. The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. inspite of constitutional provisions and legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. and external borrowing. autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. Reynaldo San Juan informed Dir. 8. one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question. Where a law is capable of two interpretations. 10. 31. social and educational planning. In a letter. He . it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. not the Regional Director or a Congressman. the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. and that under EO 112. truly." 33 the second place. When petitioner learned of Almajose’s appointment. Government (Guanzon) S." In this initial organic act for the Philippines. Reynaldo Abella of the DBM that Ms. Customs and quarantine. 6. San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (1991) Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for Rizal Province was left vacated. Presidential Decree No. in this case. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations. 5. Under the 1987 Constitution. in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Citizenship and naturalization." At the same time. national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. The exercise by LGUs of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. Almajose was most qualified as she was a CPA. National economic. President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the Islands. But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves. then. Disposition. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable. who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. that of local autonomy. Gov. beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts. its acts are. however. And yet. However. since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Currency. Hence. it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions. as we noted. on the other hand. the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Now. DBM Regional Dir Agripino Galvez denied the request as Santos was not qualified. the Court will not resolve that controversy now. 11. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. exploitation or utilization of all natural resources. mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. the Sangguniang Pampook. 1618. But if it is autonomous in the former category only. development. foreign exchange. shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law. is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. monetary affairs. According to a constitutional author. it is the Governor. Dir Abella appointed Cecilia Almajose as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers. Hence. he protested on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO. According to Abella. both in the cities and rural communities. 9. In a memo. decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation. the Commission which combined both executive and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO and requested Dir Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos. we assume jurisdiction. DBM Undersecretary Nazario Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose. The President exercises "general supervision" over them. If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII). We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case.Y. since no controversy in fact exists." The President controls the executive departments. that Almajose lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy. is autonomous in the latter sense. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense. say. Air and sea transport. the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. Postal matters and telecommunications. it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision as may be provided by law." In relation to the central government. Petitioner. In that case. in the first place. an autonomous government of the former class is. debatably. that is. order and loyalty. involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. General auditing." On the other hand. an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition. The DBM issued a memo ruling that petitioner’s protest is not meritorious as the DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. 7. and 12. their legislative arm. Immigration and deportation. banking and quasi-banking." since in that event.19 | L o c a l 4.

Art X Sec 2-3). the decentralization of government authority. Republic Act No. nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. and denied her control. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop selfreliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds. which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. in more technical language. income distribution legislation. Also. a balancing of viewpoints. He has only supervision and that is both general and circumscribed by statute. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. Held: The 1987 Constitution did not divest the President [in this case acting through Sec of LocGov] of the power of supervision over LGUs. the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the . Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units. and discretion are manifest. It called for a local government code defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers. In his work. among other things. delegate its exercise to the President. Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras." Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. concerning discipline. which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy. although it is a lesser power than "altering". The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution (Art II Sec 25. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) was enacted. in particular. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay. however. The appointment of Almajose was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. As said earlier. albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local LGUs from over-dependence on the central government. Under Article VIII of the Constitution. The President. The Constitution did not. "local autonomy" is not instantly selfexecuting. the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. "Supervision" = overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which undoubtedly. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level.Y. the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. As we held. A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. has no such power over local governments. in the constitutional sense.20 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. intend. Sinco stated that the value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. He stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. In 1959. merger. authority. the passage of a local government code. to these regions. in 1987 still exercising legislative powers. The complete disregard of the LGUs prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom. supra. "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing". Under the Constitution. or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. 08-09: 2nd Sem. It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges.assailed on the primary ground that the President pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by Congress and the approval of such act through a plebiscite. the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. which supposedly excludes the power of investigation. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. it cannot have the spirit of liberty. 1987. and as the existing LGC has done. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. however. as in the federal governments of the US. as the first Congress had not yet convened. but subject to. Court of Appeals (1991). a local tax law. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments. Finally. DBM’s grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Dir Galvez required the Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. On the other hand. will take time. though not control. Autonomy. it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. Dean Vicente G. abolition. Cordillera Broad Coalition v. despite the autonomy. COA (1990) Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. and a national representation law. The petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers. X. sec. The change in the constitutional language merely underscores local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ "control" over local government affairs. The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further towards greater autonomy. not just administrative. it prepares the ground for autonomy. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. Ganzon v. Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces composing it. dated July 15. Legally. for the sake of local autonomy. the Charter allows Congress to include in the LGC provisions for removal of local officials. When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory. "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. "Control" = the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter. legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. which created the Cordillera Administrative Region . saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime the organic act had not yet been passed. of the legislature. In short. Any creation. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or. Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution. is subject to the guiding star.

Contravention of PD 1896. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16. the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passed Resolution 2295 prohibiting the establishment of a gambling casino. which are detrimental to the people. (1991) Facts: In 1992. as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. Inc. conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Magtajas v. like the other prohibited games of chance. which has the character and force of a statute. like other local political subdivisions. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. it is pointed out. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. 1992. we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. On the contrary. among others. Cordilleras. Resolution 2673. PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. P. the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions. Under this construction. 3355 and Ordinance No. In addition. the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance. Pryce Properties Corp. repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. rather the LGC itself changed the PD.D. which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P. Furthermore. in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. The adoption of the LGC. even mentioning it at all. the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. On January 4. In the exercise of its own discretion. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not." they are actually arguing that it is already dead. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. The CA declared the ordinances unconstitutional and void. 1869. we find that the ordinances violate P. representatives from PPC made representations with the Pagcor on the possibility of setting up a casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. Moreover. Issue: WON the Sangguniang authority to enact said ordinances Held: No Panglungsod has the Ratio: Petitioner’s Contention. reiterated this prohibition." Obviously. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Petitioner deny that the ordinance changed the PD." the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners. Morality of Gambling Not Justiciable. Section 458 declares that the Sangguniang Panglungsod has the power to approve ordinances and pass resolutions for the efficient and effective city government. Way back in 1950. On November 1992. On December 7. Ordinance No. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in CDO. Significantly. The Code is not only a later enactment than P. the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Sec 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. dated October 19. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. the petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. "gambling and other prohibited games of chance. 1992. Rationale for the rule that ordinances should not contravene a statute. Pagcor intervened claiming that Ordinance 4475 was violative of the nonimpairment of contracts and EP clauses. it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In light of all the above considerations. Strictly speaking. an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. for that matter. (f) of the repealing clause.D. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling. its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit. We begin by observing that under Sec. 1993. 1869 is not one of them. (f) of its repealing clause.D. In fact it does.Y. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid. Municipal governments are only agents of the . It prayed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Ordinance 3353. Gambling is not illegal per se. is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. 458 of the LGC. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. 08-09: 2nd Sem. The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions.21 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.D. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. Test of Validity. in fact. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. 3353 was enacted prohibiting the issuance of business permits for the operation of a casino. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto.D. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. CDO. It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P. LGUs are authorized to prevent or suppress. In this situation. We conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance. the parties executed a contract of lease involving the ballroom of the hotel which would be converted into a casino. Ordinance 3375-93 was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos. More than this. had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people. PPC filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against CDO before the CA. must be prevented. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. 1869. pursuant to Par.

" The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. and city officials. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the Administrative Code. so it may destroy. the Local Government Code has. petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the respondent Secretary. So reconciled.D. In the present petitioner for certiorari. including the listing of voters. like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax. Section 2(2) of the 1987 Consti. Secretary of DILG protesting the election of the officers of the FABC on the ground of certain irregularities. Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC Held: No Ratio: Under Article IX. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. Without meaning to detract from that policy. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. to hear a protest filed in . may refer to the conduct of the polls. the Comelec shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections. Secretary Santos nullified the election of the officers of FABC and ordered the conduct of a new one. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Padilla. filed his comment on the protest of Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing the governor’s acts of meddling and intervening in the election. and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute." in the context of the Constitution.1989. and the corporation could not prevent it. the legislature might. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right. They are. there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution. Davide. and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. No. the term "election. The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. Taule v. The governor. For all their praiseworthy motives.Y. not prohibition but declaratory relief. it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions. 1869. the mere tenants at will of the legislature. from which they have derived their power in the first place. 1869 is unwarranted. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned. the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR. Santos (1991) Facts: On June 18. Leandro Verceles sent a letter to respondent Luis Santos. the holding of the electoral campaign. 1869. Issue: WON the Secretary has jurisdiction elections contests involving the FABC elections Held: No over the Ratio: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. Hence. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress.D. the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending P. composed of eleven (11) members convened with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. In any case. True. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. which is not impossible to do. which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. The election proceeded with petitioner Ruperto Taule declared as president. the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. As it may destroy. so to phrase it. the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units.D. No. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. An election is the embodiment of the popular will. However. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the expression of the sovereign power of the people.22 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. and qualifications of all elective regional. Municipal corporations owe their origin to. They can be reconciled. or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.D. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.D. and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction. as claimed by him. these ordinances are contrary to P. 1869. As it creates. By and large. without which they cannot exist. and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong. concurring: Wrong mode. concurring: I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. however. 1869. national government. Casino gambling is authorized by P. we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. as president of FABC. No. repealed P. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. it may abridge and control. pro tanto. Relationship between national legislature and local government. provincial. which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. No.D. returns. It breathes into them the breath of life. Specifically. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Taule. sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State. and the casting and counting of the votes which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections. by a single act. C.

Supervisory power. On this ground.23 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. the law is likewise explicit. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the federation. Jr. To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments." The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. when contrasted with control. supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly.Y. Control. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego. In case at bar. Hence. the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Issue: WON the President’s appointment given to Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the FABC was valid Held: No Ratio: The Governor has the personality to file the protest. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. the Chairman of the Board. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and nonpartisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.4 of DLG Circular No. there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the walk out staged by its two other members. i. his appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such . It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. In fact. the rules would have provided so. It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered. Molina. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. presided over the elections. administrative agencies are bereft of quasi. The RTCs have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest Issue: WON the Governor has the personality to file the protest Held: Yes panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation. Hence. relation thereto and consequently declare an election null and void. Indeed. respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. Thus.The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law. There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. as it did in the elections at the town and city levels as well as the regional level.. Supervision vs Control: In administrative law. He is a member of the federation but he was not even present during the elections despite notice. it does not include any restraining authority over such body. There was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is dictated by the rules. Issue: Held: WON the election was valid No Ratio: The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2. they cannot confer it upon themselves. the Secretary of Local Government. it must be imperative or mandatory and not merely permissive. the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor.. Worse. there being a quorum. his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments. Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.judicial powers. it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan. PGOO Molina. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. The objective of keeping the election free and honest was therefore compromised. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the vice-governor. the elections should be nullified. the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments. there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. the Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body. 8909 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code. We hold that Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan.e. elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang Ratio: In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan. on the other hand. The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan." The rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or VicePresident who shall preside over the meeting. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. If it had been intended that any other official should preside.

It extends to all the great public needs. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life. gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by respondent Governor in the organization. and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health. Thus. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad. COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. education. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. morals. the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400. and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare. and maintain peace and order in the local government unit. it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. housing the urban poor. and general welfare of the community. 243. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation. an inherent attribute of sovereignty. he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. improve morals. without prejudice to the terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly appointed. and insure the protection of property therein. City Government of Quezon City v.000 for the implementation of the program. For several years. enhance prosperity. which was born with civilized government. down to our local councilors.Y. but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity. but not to exceed. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice." And under Section 7 of BP 337. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected the president of the federation but not Antonio. This should not be allowed. municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted. peace. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. comfort and convenience. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law. Public funds should only be used for public purposes. the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health. through its Council. the section . It is founded largely on the maxims. the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian. and illimitable of powers. allegedly the protege of respondent Governor. It covers a wide scope of subjects. 60. 60. Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the incumbent has as yet qualified. approved Resolution No. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power." This decision. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. maintain peace and order. and. and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in the sanggunian. of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause Held: Yes Ratio: The police power is a governmental function. is the welfare of the paupers. "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Domingo (1991) Facts: On September 27. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience. though not complete. promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. etc of the inhabitant of Makati. re-enacted under Resolution No. The appointment of Antonio. Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. 1988. should have more in law. those necessarily implied therefrom. safety. For even under the guidelines. as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety. Precious to the hearts of our legislators. emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism. the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services. insistent.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. Issue: WON Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program extending P500 to a bereaved family. 08-09: 2nd Sem. security. However. however must not be taken as a precedent. in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. petitioner Municipality. or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled. 60. safety. and as a general rule. Thereafter. It is the most essential. Paupers may be reasonably classified. appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. COA denied the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety. the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. improve public morals. Binay v. funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. comfort and convenience of the people. good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Thus. etc. Ericta (1983) Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. it is not limited thereto. and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights.24 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. morals. Resolution No. Also. Resolution No. 243. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. general welfare. while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace. health. and has been said to be commensurate with. or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation. there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10. re-enacted under Resolution No. comfort. and. The barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy. and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation.

As a matter of fact. 6118. This decision was not enforced for the petitioners were not evicted. (3) taxation. On January 12. the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. even without compensation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose. A protest was filed and the CFI decided that the land occupied by the petitioners. A fortiori. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said place. the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. had incorporated. good order. This has been the law and practise in the past. morals. playgrounds. It continues to the present. the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation. and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments.Y. the petitioners paid daily fees to the municipal government. (2) eminent domain. Vicente Macalino (officer in charge in the office of the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and engineer to demolish the stalls. In fact. was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. safety. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. Villanueva v. prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets. such as opium and firearms. respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. being public in nature. Batas Pambansa Blg. health. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. 1961. however. in turn. Moreover. Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power Held: No Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. parks. When the Local Government Code. The beneficiaries of the regulation. Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. If he is deprived of his property outright. the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. or the general welfare of the people. The necessities of public safety. the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. Expropriation. Petitioners filed a prohibition with the CFI claiming that the disputed area was leased to them by the municipal government. the Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial. in the exercise of local police power. of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Castaneda (1987) Facts: On November 7. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. On the other hand.25 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. and the Revised Administrative Code. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter. Inc. (1) police power. nay. the confiscation of an illegally possessed article. requires payment of just compensation. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The CFI denied the petition/ Issue: WON the petitioners have a right to the said land . the Local Autonomy Act. 29. the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino. 08-09: 2nd Sem. not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. In police power. to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. namely-. the Quezon City Charter. 1982.

it is hardly open to debate that the public has much to gain from the proposed widening of F. the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. . which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. upon his instructions. as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. show that the complaint was valid and that the area really needed to be cleared. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. Sevilla Boulevard." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 144 was issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon. comfort. has aggravated health and sanitation problems. to the dismay and embarrassment of the inhabitants. The trial court ordered appellants to reconvey the property to the government. and for the protection of property therein. This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof. They should have realized and accepted this earlier." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation. Gonzalez (1991) Facts: The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Tañong Malabon. by the municipal council of San Fernando. Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover the lot as: (a) the already filed sales application with the Bureau of Lands. the municipal council already adopted Resolution No. this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. to look into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. 29. Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time. The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. In this day and age. It is. It is the decision in Civil Case No. where they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and other communal activities of the town can be held. not repugnant to law. This is elementary. thereby impairing the convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. besides pervading the place with a foul odor that has spread into the surrounding areas. where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. Sevilla Boulevard. added to the fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself. in anticipation of the completion of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. of course. this. Republic v. the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation. not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract. who pay substantial rentals to the municipality. The proliferation of stags therein. de la Fuente. every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. started filling it. are deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. We rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. 08-09: 2nd Sem. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations. In Muyot vs.26 | L o c a l Held: No Government (Guanzon) S. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute. most of them makeshift and of flammable materials. Photographs of the disputed area. 29. 144. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed. declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality. promote the prosperity. being likewise beyond the commerce of man. for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. has seriously endangered public safety. In fact. On 14 April 1955. Rojas. therefore. to reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic problems. There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this hearing. Ratio: There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a public plaza pursuant to the previous case. where fish and other wet items are sold. he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando. Rizal. Cruz. which they chose to disregard. (b) he had a municipal permit to construct buildings thereon. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent. conformably to the orders from the court and the council. then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. Since the occupation of the place in question. improve the morals. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor. The Municipality of Malabon passed Resolution authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants. and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general. Indeed. who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can all be proud. Issue: Held: WON Proclamation 144 is invalid Yes Ratio: Proclamation No.Y. as recommended by the municipal attorney. which. The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F. which had become particularly aware of the increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. The entire place is unsightly. among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue. entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain. Metro Manila. which does look congested and ugly. (c) the lot occupied was not needed to widen the street and that the setting aside of the lots for parking space purposes does not redound to the public benefit. peace. Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he directed the demolition of the stalls only after. Indiscriminate parking along F. considering that even before case was decided. The regular stallholders in the public market. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause. it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Separate complaints were then filed against them. or even abrogate it entirely. The filthy condition of the talipapa. has converted it into a veritable fire trap. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic. good order. the people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza. Sevilla Boulevard and from establishment of a municipal parking area. On top of all these.

a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor." as gleaned from Ordinance 363. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is concerned. for the construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. 363. the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose. that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. since the lease. 144. hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. Asiaten who devotes said place to his laundry business. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao. petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor. Held: Yes Ratio: In the case at bar. Tepoot's lessee for laundry business. Rizal and which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 144. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. Needless to say. for under Sec. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or purposes. In fact. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. the court dismissed the complaint holding that (a) the chapel is 55. Tepoot's building was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was conducted. 08-09: 2nd Sem. However." which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. CA (1994) Facts: On November 17. private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Ave. Consequently. if any. Tepoot is being rented to Mr. In the first place. appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectively occupied by them. that is. owned by Wilfred G. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance. appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon." Petitioner was able to obtain a building permit for the construction of a funeral parlor. sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of Lands. the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and residential use buildings.95 meters away from the funeral parlor and (b) the building owned by Mr. There is nothing in Proclamation No. Issue: WON petitioner's operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City. however.Y. 144 was issued. the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. thus paving the way for the application of Ordinance No. What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to the public in the form of enhanced. The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to . was not fully substantiated. the nearest residential structure. allege that the benefits. The evidence of record discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor. After conducting an inspection. a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures. The trial court's determination that Mr. In fact. however. a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. if any there be. We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid. The reversal by the CA of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. Besides. Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of nullity of the building permit. Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot 2. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private rights. 363. once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial. even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code. Proclamation No. Unquestionably. 1982. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for the public in general. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. however. 144." To constitute public use. On appeal. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City. however limited in number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration. where the funeral parlor was constructed. therefore. the CA reversed. Davao City that the construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. It disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Mr. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code. and not of local government officials. the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954. the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. Upon the other hand. 363. that may be derived from the proposed street-widening and parking space will be confined to people who have cars. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. other than being declared for taxation purposes as such. Tepoot's building is commercial and. is strengthened by the fact that the Sanggunian has declared the questioned area as commercial. Sec. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars. 8 is inapplicable. or any other kind of building for that matter. Appellants.27 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. It is our considered view. its use as a residence. The miscellaneous sales application. The conception urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit. that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. the public in general should have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms. Thereafter. Patalinghug v. This is the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon. safe and orderly transportation on land. even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential. of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 8 But while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry paraphernalia. it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by him. was still a residential zone.

1 Police Power: Binay v. The CA invoked finality of judgment and res judicata. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder. 74634 but also by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. It covers a wide scope of subjects. security. and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. of Virac (1992) Facts: On the basis of the complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. We find the same likewise untenable. The petitioner’s MR was denied. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. an inherent attribute of sovereignty. with property. petitioners contend that there is no res judicata as there is no identity of causes of action (annulment of judgment. comfort and convenience. not only by the trial court in Civil Case No. but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity. On appeal. and has been said to be commensurate with. Mun." And under Section 7 of BP 337. in order to promote the general welfare. Domingo ( 1991) – supra. and.Y. Issues raised by the parties in their brief and passed upon subsilencio by the appellate court in a decision which has become final and executory are considered closed and can no longer be revived by the parties in a subsequent litigation without doing violence to the principle of res judicata. The committee noted that the warehouse was near residential houses and that the inflammable materials inside created danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to set aside the order of execution of judgment and to prohibit the respondents from executing the judgment. the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health. improve public morals. or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation. the CFI sentenced the petitioners to pay one Uy certain sums of money as well as to vacate the property and surrender to the same Uy. After the decision in the civil case became final and executory. and as a general rule. as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety. and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court is duty bound to discuss the pros and cons of appellant's argument. health. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power. Petitioner Chua Huat filed with the CFI a complaint for the annulment of judgment on the ground that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the civil case which was one for ejectment and not for recovery of possession. The court granted this. in its resolution denying said motion. it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. and. pass on the same and on appeal by petition for review to the Supreme Court in L47603 and L-48649. there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. insistent. . it is not limited thereto. Ratio: The police power is a governmental function. safety. and therefore the CFI had no jurisdiction over it. 119751) has been squarely ruled upon. which was born with civilized government. the state. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation. The CA denied the petition for lack of merit. the High Court in its minutes' (sic) did not rule squarely on said issue. CA (1991) Facts: First case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA and the second is a petition for prohibition with PI directed against the notices of condemnation and demolition orders issued by the City Engineer upon authority of the City Mayor. may interfere with personal liberty. maintain peace and order. It is the most essential. recovery of poseession). In a civil case. Petitioners. morals. and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health. while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace. a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It extends to all the great public needs.28 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. and maintain peace and order in the local government unit. The SC denied the petition. What more. promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. Thus. the CA did not. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC contending that the case is actually an unlawful detainer case. comfort and convenience of the people. and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. and with business and occupations. 51337-R. It is founded largely on the maxims. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). improve morals. Issue: WON the present action is barred by res judicata Held: Yes Ratio: The records of the two cases will bear it out that the issue of lack of jurisdiction (which is the cause of action in Civil Case No. 08-09: 2nd Sem. education. 74634 was raised in their MR before the CA in CA-G. comfort. Despite the case. safety. and insure the protection of property therein. the rights of the individual may be subordinated. peace. good order or safety and general welfare of the people. promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. except Ong Choan. and illimitable of powers. Plaintiff-appellant further contends that since the issue of jurisdiction in Civil Case No. No. and general welfare of the community. Thus. "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. enhance prosperity.R. morals. persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government. Resolution 29 was passed by the Municipal Council declaring the warehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the CC. those necessarily implied therefrom. Chua Huat v. Corollary thereto. but not to exceed. municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted. where the same issue among others was raised. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse which emitted obnoxious odor and dust. the CFI ordered the execution of the judgment. Tatel v. Powers of municipal corporations/local governments 8. The CA affirmed. the private respondents filed a motion to execute the same. "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare.

particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights. As pointed out in an early Philippine case. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the national streets and parks. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government. s 1952.Y. In spite of its fractured syntax. and Section 3 of Article XIII. as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. There are. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. and (6) must not be unreasonable. No. prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. . in fact. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. series of 1952. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration/enforcement. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. For an ordinance to be valid. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. the mere fact that the municipal authorities have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such matters. and acts of vandalism must be avoided. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. It is to make a mockery of the high estate AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT. As far as public policy is concerned. meets these criteria. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. riotous conduct. as guaranteed by the Constitution. 08-09: 2nd Sem. injury to property. in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it. 13. penned in 1907 to be precise. 4 As to the contention. of course. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. BP 880 Bayan v. Section 2(5) of Article IX. contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. Power of Mayor to issue permits for rallies. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI enjoining them from enforcing Resolution 29 of the Council. 13. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain. 134. Experience. however. the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted. there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. as a rule. s1952.29 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. for that matter. is directly affected by B." It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked. well-defined limits. basically. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest. The municipal officials contend that the warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.  PERMIT IS REQUIRED! LG SHOULD PLACE FREEDOM PARKS! Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Issue: WON the enactment was pursuant to a legitimate exercise of police power Held: Yes Ratio: Ordinance No. There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and. The utmost calm though is not required. The court ruled in favor of the municipal council and held that the ordinance was a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the municipal council. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. the less perfect. Petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional. will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammar but otherwise. United States v. Ermita (2006) Issue: They have. and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling. Ordinance No. what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse.P.

144 and 145 of the NIRC. while Section 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes.30 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. On June 3.D. 26-73 and PC No. repackers. repackers. being a mere municipal corporation.2 Power of taxation: local taxes and real property tax Local taxation: Basco v. all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks. Pililla. 880 is SUSTAINED. 880. The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 1 Held: Yes Ratio: PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code on manufacturers. The questioned Municipal Tax Ordinance No. of Pililia (1991) Facts: Petitioner is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product. importers. 1158 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted. but was not implemented and/or enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its having been suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular Nos.D. rectifiers. city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing. PD 231 (Local Tax Code) was issued enacted. Rizal. distillers. based on Municipal Ordinance No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. bunker fuel oil. 1977. PC No. Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). Congress has the power of control over local governments. 26 A-73 (January 9. combustible or explosive substances. importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. P. the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B. including brewers. wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC. Mun. 1973) directed to all provincial. retailers. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business. insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. as well as those which may be enacted in the future. being such. and compounders of liquors. distillers. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities. no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax on lubricating oils. sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business under Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. On June 28. 1973)was also issued instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code. (b) the above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones. retailing. hence. retailing. have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985.D. Provincial Circular No. 1974. If. Rizal. as well as mayor's permit. it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. and (d) Section 2 of P. Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya. subject to the giving of advance notices. The RTC rendered a decision against petitioner. has no inherent right to impose taxes. The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. No. distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein. with its refinery plant situated at Malaya. wholesaling. On April 13.Y. is VOID. rectifiers. with regard to manufacturers. 1973. no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. mere creatures of the State can defeat national policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. 8. From class notes: LGU no inherent power to tax? Not exactly true. storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986. or dealing in. considering Provincial Circular No. Disposition. 1 was reviewed and approved by the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal. Rizal. After 30 days from the finality of this Decision. Held: In this Decision. however. 677. 26-73 (December 27. Phil Amusement and Gaming Corp (1991) Manila. after that period. any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized. S-1974 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" which took effect on July 1. Respondent enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No.P. diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied under Sections 142. should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. 26-73 and 26 A-73. because there is constitutional basis (but can’t say that it is inherent) BASCO IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW!!! Phil Petroleum Corp v. manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. 1974. or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC. the respondent filed a complaint against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986. wholesaling. Otherwise. fees or charges . LGUs also have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC. on the businesses of manufacturing. (c) both Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective. Pililla. and granting provinces. Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC. P. except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers. in view of Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition by . Enforcing the provisions of the ordinance. no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law. distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found in the Local Tax Code. Sections 19 and 19 (a) provide that the municipality may impose taxes on business. PAGCOR. unless and until revoked. is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees. 1. PPC. gasoline. and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla. including brewers. and compounders of liquors. If Congress can grant Manila the power to tax certain matters. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Under Section 142 of the NIRC of 1939. Petition GRANTED and respondents are DIRECTED comply with Section 15 of BP No. Furthermore.

231 and P. No. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor. 5 and 10 of Lugait apply to Floro Corporation notwithstanding the limitation on the taxing power of local government as provided for in Sec. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. 231 [(m) Taxes on mines. 52 of P. 1974 to January 1. and not an executive like the mayor. and P. But P. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances.D No. said ordinances do not apply to its business in view of the limitation on the taxing power of local government provided in Sec.]. Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies.D. in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees. 08-09: 2nd Sem. combustible or explosive substances.D. 231 as amended by P.D. As already stated. Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. 5 and 10 were enacted pursuant to P. fees." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circular Nos. producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature.D. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code. No. rentals. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986. 463-22).D. and that RA 3823. wholesalers. 426. mining operations and mineral products and their by-products when sold domestically by the operator. rentals. 1 imposing the assailed taxes. since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of local taxes.D. No. which expressly prohibits the province. 26-73 and 26 A-73 issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a). relying on the case of Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. barrio and municipal district from levying and collecting taxes. 52 of P.D.Y. Floro Cement Corporation v. Gorospe (1991) Facts: The municipality of Lugait filed with the SC a verified complaint for collection of taxes against the defendant Floro Cement Corporation. 426. 5. 5m of P. royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever on defendant has been limited or withdrawn by Section 52 of PD 463. wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers. municipalities of taxes on articles. 231 and Sec. 463 which are the basis for the exemption granted to defendant are special laws whereas.D.D.D. otherwise known as the Municipal Revenue Code of 1974. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation. No. 52 of P. 1975. No. Under Section 5. and which Certificate was amended on November 5. which was passed pursuant to PD 231 and also Municipal Ordinance No. subject to specific tax under the provisions of the NIRC. were carried over into P. 463. or dealers in petroleum products.D. in the total amount of P161. The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable." It conforms with the mandate of said law. Held: Yes Ratio: Floro Cement Corporation holds that since Ordinances Nos. for five (5) years from the first date of actual commercial production of saleable mineral products that is from May 17. No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers. Petitioner likewise contends that cement is a mineral product. No. as implemented by Mines Administrative Order No.D. 1974 CQTE P. royalties or charges of any . It also contended that the defendant was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a Certificate of Qualification for Tax Exemption. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee. The taxes sought to be collected by the plaintiff refers to "manufacturers" and' exporter's "taxes for the period from January 1. No. As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees. The trial court rendered a decision ordering defendant to pay the amount of P161. Provincial Circular No. it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax. Thus. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. a permit fee like the mayor's permit. respectively. the municipal ordinance mentioned in the complaint which are based on P. There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No.875 as manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxes and surcharges. fees and charges is valid especially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P. 426.1969 to April 29. importers. but by petitioner PPC. the waiver cannot be recognized. fees.D. entitling defendant to exemption for a period of 5 years from April 30. retailers. except income tax.D.875. it should have been expressly stated in P. 463. the former prevails. if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers. entitling defendant to exemption from all taxes. Thus. Petitioner further contends that the partial exemption was rendered absolute by Sec. same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code. duties and fees except income tax. Plaintiff alleged that the imposition and collection of these taxes" is based on its Municipal Ordinance No. and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976. city municipality. the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative. inclusive. are general laws. 10 passed pursuant PD 426. 436.D. Under Section 36 of the Code. Petitioner set up the defense that it is not liable to pay manufacturer's and exporter's taxes alleging among others that the plaintiffs power to levy and collect taxes. Issue: WON Ordinances Nos. 1974 to September 30. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy. 1974 from payment of all taxes. said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P. However. 1978. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. etc. and that it is axiomatic that a special law can not be amended and/or repealed by a general law unless there is an express intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the special law.31 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. CIR. No. 426. shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code. 231 and P. it is the law-making body. Furthermore. respectively.D. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. who can make an exemption. while Section 2 of P. V-25.00 plus 25% thereof as surcharge.amending PD 231. No.

materials. it is admitted that Floro Cement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and selling. Consequently. The reason given was the failure of the respondent to comply with Resolution No. it is not merely an admixture or blending of raw materials. 231. shale and others. the taxes sought to be collected were not imposed on these activities in view of the mentioned prohibition under Sec.D. The trial court upheld the challenged measure. It is the result of a definite process-the crushing of minerals. The business of manufacturing and exporting cement does not fall under exploration.Y. Jurado ignored the requirement. including exporting of cement. No. Mayor Domingo Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. 231 and P. Jurado filed with the CFICagayan a special civil action for mandamus with actual and moral damages to compel the issuance of the mayor's permit and license. Issue: Held: WON the Resolution is valid Yes Ratio: We need not concern ourselves at this time with the validity of Resolution 9 and the implementing agreement because the issue has not been raised in this petition as an assigned error of the respondent court. If. on the other hand. tools for production. Furthermore. 5 and 10. equipment. it is to be considered a tax ordinance. This goes against the nature of a donation. It must be shown indubitably to exist. The measures have been sustained in the challenged decision. 463 refers only to machineries.D. No. Cities. development and exploitation of mineral products. More specifically stated." That is an over simplification. While cement is composed of 80% minerals. calcining adding of retarder or raw gypsum In short. hence. this Court has laid down the rule that as the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty.D. and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. On the exemption claimed by petitioner. We may observe at this time that in sustaining Resolution No. as provided in Sec. in addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances in general. grinding. Issue: Held: WON petitioners are liable for damages No Find raising scheme to finance the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building by soliciting 1% donation form the thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh within the municipality. it dismissed the claims for damages of both parties for lack of evidence. . Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes. and since the taxes sought to be collected were levied on these activities pursuant to Sec. Also. silica. The CA affirmed.D. then it must be shown in view of the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. As held by the lower court.. as lime. The CA has not offered any explanation for its conclusion that the challenged measures are valid nor does it discuss its own concept of the nature of the resolution. must be strictly construed. it found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's application for the mayor's permit and license. 1977. the CA said no more than that: “It was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers in pursuance to Article XI. On the question of whether or not cement is a mineral product. 9. subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. No. he claimed that Resolution 9 contravened the limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Section 5 of the Tax Code. On other hand. they were held liable to pay damages.32 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. These would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance. Contributions. 95 Soon Saturnino Jurado sent his agent to the municipal treasurer's office to pay the license fee of P285 for thresher operators.D. Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan. and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. he sent the P285 license fee by postal money order to the office of the 5 treasurer who. Municipalities and Barrios). the minerals had already undergone a chemical change through manufacturing process. it is outside the scope of application of Sec. Cagayan. for every presumption is against it. 426. properly apply to petitioner. While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal government merely intends to "solicit" the 1% contribution from the threshers. 52 of P. mixing. Instead. the implementing agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayor's permit. CA (1992) Facts: On March 14. returned the said amount. It is not cement that is mined only the mineral products composing the finished product. while respondent municipality admits that petitioner undertakes exploration. 19 of P. He also filed a declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the implementing agreement) for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. etc. the general rule is that any claim for exemption from the tax statute should be strictly construed against the taxpayer. No. Ordinances Nos. As such. respectively. and other contributions from the following sources: (c) Monies from private agencies and individuals. from which the respondent has not appealed. 9. development nor exploitation of mineral resources as defined in Sec. adopted Resolution No. Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayor's permit. it is provided that: Section 29. by the parties' own stipulation of facts submitted before the court a quo. Jurado claimed that the refusal to issue the permit and license constituted bad faith on the part of petitioners. the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate. which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory. However. No. 08-09: 2nd Sem. 52 of P. the barrio council may solicit monies.D. petitioners stress that they were acting in their official capacity and therefore they should not be liable for damages. CIR which was cited by petitioner.In addition to the above specified taxing and other revenue-raising powers. Section 29 of PD 231 (Enacting a Local Tax Code for Provinces. the exemption mentioned in Sec. The decision is final and binding as to him. which were enacted pursuant to P. Said taxes were levied on the corporation's business of manufacturing and exporting cement. The petitioner failed to meet this requirement. 463. 2 of P. 53 of the same decree. 52 of said decree. before cement reaches its saleable form. On appeal. 463. Tuzon and Mapagu v. It appears that the foregoing cases overruled the case of Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. nevertheless. The manufacture and the export of cement does not fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product. any law to the contrary notwithstanding. No. For his part." And under Article 4. He who claims an exemption must be able to point out some provision of law creating the right. it cannot be allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference. kind whatsoever on mines. this Court has held that it is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. mining claims and mineral products.

Franchises PLDT v. . the withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC.878. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. both the trial court and the appellate court said there was nothing wrong with it). Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. new tax declarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City were issued by the City Assessor and were received by Bayantel on August 13. The petitioners were not Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. supra. 2002. S93. or principle. The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners' acts. one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee The LGC took effect and granted the LGUS within Metro Manila the power to levy on real properties. It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution." envisaged to level the playing field among telecommunications companies. otherwise known as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines. 2002. evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status. the QCRC. much like the LGC. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Meanwhile. On July 20. only legal issues are to be resolved. 5 imposing. The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question.208. The provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. As executive officials of the municipality. the government of Quezon City. Conformably with the City's Revenue Code. the erring public functionary is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or damage the complainant has sustained. 1999. 1998. followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel's properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30.Y. (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each year. he could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate. But as the petitioners correctly observed. In any event. he could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful act. v. or profit. Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. without loss of face. SP-91.33 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The amendatory law contained an in lieu of taxes clause (3%). Act No. within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act. the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or preference. radiophone. In fact. exclusive of the franchise. pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5. embodied in Section 14 thereof.C. We agree that it was not for them to rule on its validity. withdrew tax exemption privileges in general. which reads: SECTION 14. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate. under its Section 230. City of Davao (2001) PLDT is liable for the local franchise tax. 1992. amending Bayantel's original franchise. 08-09: 2nd Sem. supra. Section 23 of the Act provides an equality clause. On account thereof. City Government of Q. On the contrary. and. in relation to Section 232 of the LGC. for some flimsy excuse. Issue: WON Bayantel failed to exhaust administrative remedies Held: No Ratio: With the reality that Bayantel's real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon. its legality would have to be presumed (in fact. Moreover. barely few months after the LGC took effect. Bayantel interposed an appeal with the LBAA. Congress enacted RA 7633. Bayantel (2006) Facts: Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under RA 3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications. enacted City Ordinance No. broadcasting and telecasting. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid. And. delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak. With its request having been denied. otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC). as here. 1995. It has been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the "bribery system. as he had in previous years. Ratio: The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 CC (Refusal to Render Service). Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. the Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. On January 7. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July 30. it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. Of relevance to this controversy is the tax provision of Rep. 3259. It cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado. took effect. he was prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom. infra. The RTC then rendered judgment exempting Bayantel from taxes. Rep. In 1993. Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties. doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.18. The only legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governemnts: in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers. 7925. 1999. Act No. one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative remedies rule is when. on March 16. a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City. the Court. the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount of P43. He could have opted for the less obstinate but still dissentient action." Official inaction may also be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service. Section 137 does not state that it covers future exemptions. they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. where the public official. 124-01013) which was received on July 14." Pendente lite. except one (Tax Declaration No. buildings and personal property. reiterating in its Section 6. In the present case. under Section 5 thereof. The grant of taxing powers to LGU's in the consti and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions in the future. Furthermore.

Clearly then. Act No. by force of Section 234 of the Code. Bayantel's "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was. Lest it be overlooked. but subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC. . as any other persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties. . Rep. 3259 effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments of Congress' inherent power to tax the franchisee's properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above. just like the LGC. as amended. And as earlier stated. are subject to realty taxes. It is petitioners' thesis that Bayantel was in no time given any express exemption from the payment of real property tax under its amendatory franchise. To petitioners. supra. with the LGC's taking effect on January 1. "exclusive of this franchise. the taxing power of local governments under both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. instead. As we explained in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority: The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress. the inevitable result was that all realties which are actually. 7633 is neither clear nor unequivocal. however." found in Section 14. as originally granted. under its franchise. Issue: WON Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are. exempt from real property tax. expressly withdrew. Act No. Bernas. himself a Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which crafted the 1987 Constitution. not long thereafter. Held: No. . Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld. . 7633 amending Bayantel's original franchise. Act No. Although as a rule. a figure which. supra. expressly withdrawn. However. Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place. however. Joaquin G. Act No. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under Section 14 of Rep. . 08-09: 2nd Sem. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Act No. however." Bayantel's posture is well-taken. Stated otherwise. As may be recalled. 3259. the power of local government units to tax is still limited. 7633. namely. must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. all tax exemption privileges in general. save those exclusive of its franchise. In a very real sense. This thus raises the question of whether or not the City's Revenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer of Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantel's real properties located within the City effectively withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise. the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which. local governments are empowered to levy taxes. Section 14 of Rep. 1992. the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise. 3259.878. While the system of local government taxation has changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution. For as the Court stressed in Mactan. Trampe: . Congress passed Rep.34 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis. of Bayantel's original franchise under Rep. therefore. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties. while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local government units' delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X. or on July 20. speedy and adequate remedy. Given this reality. Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that once again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes. Bayantel's franchise being national in character. imposing real property tax on all real properties found within its territorial jurisdiction. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and. is limited to impositions over properties of the franchisee which are not actually. . to be properly considered. administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper. Rep. To the mind of the Court. In concrete terms. And pursuant to this constitutional empowerment. Act No. Section 14 of Rep. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax. There seems to be no issue as to Bayantel's exemption from real estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of the franchise" qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its real estate. it may be exercised by local legislative bodies. buildings and personal property. filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tax provision. Ratio: The lower court resolved the issue in the affirmative. the language of Section 11 of Rep. Q-02-47292. While Section 14 of Rep.Y. Ultimately. has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. The elaborate and extensive discussion devoted by the trial court on the meaning and import of said phrase.18. as couched. the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially the same. the delegation under that provision. (a) those actually. Section 14. therefore. S. however. "the power to tax is (still) primarily vested in the Congress. required prior payment under protest of the amount of P43. But. local government units were without authority to impose and collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. an appeal to the LBAA. The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue of Section 5. juxtaposed with Section 232 of the LGC. be they real or personal. directly and exclusively used in the operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property tax. directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business. 1992. an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain. Article X of the Constitution. all properties which.. Act No. of its franchise. i. and (b) those properties which are not so used. 7633. thus: What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of municipal corporations? Section 5 does not change the . other properties of Bayantel directly used in the pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated taxing power of local governments. the Quezon City government enacted in 1993 its local Revenue Code. directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise..J. Act No. gave due course to the instant petition. Absent such enabling law. owned by the franchisee. but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5. Under the latter. supra. basically owing to the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" found in Section 11 of Bayantel's amended franchise. there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law.208. the City's Revenue Code. may have been difficult to raise up. Act No. suggests as much." are not actually and directly used in the pursuit of its franchise. no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before." This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. 3259 applies to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. exclusive of its franchise. Necessarily. under Section 230 thereof. they add. in our jurisdiction. Act No. cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved. the "exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. The remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2. real properties of Bayantel. . that is.e. supra. Act No. As the Court has said in Ty v. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category. 7633.

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doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislative authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on municipal powers. Moreover, these limitations must be "consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy." The important legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse the principle that doubts are resolved against municipal corporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. It is understood, however, that taxes imposed by local government must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass. In net effect, the controversy presently before the Court involves, at bottom, a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the local government's delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution. Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which imposed real estate taxes on all real properties within the city's territory and removed exemptions theretofore "previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical . . . .," there can really be no dispute that the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that "a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted." Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. An interpretation denying Congress such power to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure jargon, without meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation is unacceptable. For sure, in PLDT v. City of Davao, this Court has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. There, the Court wrote: Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel's properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act No. 7633 which amended Bayantel's original franchise. The more decisive question turns on whether Congress actually did exempt Bayantel's properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633. Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel's former exemption from realty taxes, Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel's exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an

express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. FELS Enregy v. Prov. Of Batangas (2007) Facts: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement, was for a period of five years. Article 10 states that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of taxes. (other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and charges. Polar Energy then assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite NPC’s initial opposition. FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor. NPC filed a petition with the LBAA. The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the real estate taxes. The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the barges–FELS, a private corporation–is the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that the petition was filed out of time. Fels appealed to the CBAA. The CBAA reversed and ruled that the power barges belong to NPC; since they are actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription did not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No. 7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reversed itself. Issue: Held: WON the petition is time barred Yes

Ratio: Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides: SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal. We note that the notice of assessment which the Provincial Assessor sent to FELS on August 7, 1995, contained a reiteration of Section 226. Instead of appealing to the Board of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC opted to file a motion for reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law. The remedy of appeal to the LBAA is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal

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assessor in the assessment of the property. It follows then that the determination made by the respondent Provincial Assessor with regard to the taxability of the subject real properties falls within its power to assess properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the LBAA. We fully agree with the rationalization of the CA, citing the case of Callanta v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we ruled that under Section 226 of R.A. No 7160, the last action of the local assessor on a particular assessment shall be the notice of assessment; it is this last action which gives the owner of the property the right to appeal to the LBAA. The procedure likewise does not permit the property owner the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor. To reiterate, if the taxpayer fails to appeal in due course, the right of the local government to collect the taxes due with respect to the taxpayer’s property becomes absolute upon the expiration of the period to appeal. [38] It also bears stressing that the taxpayer’s failure to question the assessment in the LBAA renders the assessment of the local assessor final, executory and demandable, thus, precluding the taxpayer from questioning the correctness of the assessment, or from invoking any defense that would reopen the question of its liability on the merits. In fine, the LBAA acted correctly when it dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time; the CBAA and the appellate court were likewise correct in affirming the dismissal. Elementary is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure in this regard renders the decision final and executory. Issue: WON the action was barred by res judicata

Issue:

WON forum shopping exists in this case

Ratio: Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in the second case even if the first case did not implead the latter. To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any proceeding regarding real property assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 165113, it did so not only on its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the earlier petition for review filed in this Court was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially “identical parties” as to warrant the application of res judicata. FELS’s argument that it is not bound by the erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.

Ratio: Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks another and possibly favorable judgment in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action or certiorari. There is also forum shopping when a party institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since the elements of res judicata are not present in the cases at bar; however, as already discussed, res judicata may be properly applied herein. Petitioners engaged in forum shopping when they filed G.R. Nos. 168557 and 170628 after the petition for review in G.R. No. 165116. Indeed, petitioners went from one court to another trying to get a favorable decision from one of the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases. It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Having found that the elements of res judicata and forum shopping are present in the consolidated cases, a discussion of the other issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, for the peace and contentment of petitioners, we shall shed light on the merits of the case. Issue: taxes Held: WON the petitioner may be assessed real property Yes

Ratio: The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was dismissed for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. [48] Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the sensible exercise of the judgment of men especially trained in appraising property. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed. We find no reason to depart from this rule in this case. In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v. The City of New York, et al., a power company brought an action to review property tax assessment. On the city’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held that the barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to real property taxation.

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Sem.

Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work. Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power. We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is the entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement: OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into electricity. It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by the government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in this provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement provides: OPERATION. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, subject to the supply of the necessary Fuel pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it will operate the Power Barges to convert such Fuel into electricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7. It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law between the parties. Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the parties to the contract are bound by its terms and conditions. Time and again, the Supreme Court has stated that taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and the entity that would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. Thus, applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is considered a taxable entity. The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1 of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not justify the exemption. The privilege granted to petitioner NPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between FELS and NPC and does not bind a third person not privy thereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas. It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous litigation has seriously resulted in the local government’s deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its magnitude, acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay for it. The right of local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe tax erosion. This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy

of local governments and the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. In conclusion, we reiterate that the power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Digitel v. Prov. Of Pangasinan (2007) Facts: The present petition stemmed from a Complaint for Mandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages instituted by the Province of Pangasinan against Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Section 137 LGC withdrew any exemption from the payment of franchise tax by authorizing the LGUs to impose a franchise tax on businesses at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts of the business. Section 232 lso authorizes the imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property by the LGUs within the Metropolitan Manila Area wherein the land, building, machinery and other improvement not thereinafter specifically exempted. Digitel was granted, under Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92, a provincial franchise to install, maintain and operate a telecommunications system within Pangasinan. Under the Sec 6 of the provincial franchise, the grantee is required to pay franchise and real property taxes. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also enacted Provincial Tax Ordinance 1 (Real Property Tax Ordinance of 1992). Section 4, however, expanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial franchise of Digitel to include machineries and other improvements, not thereinafter exempted,. Provincial Tax Ordinance No 4 was then enacted. Sections 4, 5 and 6 positively imposed a franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise within the province of Pangasinan. Thereafter, Digitel was granted by RA 7678 a legislative franchise. Under its legislative franchise, particularly Sec. 5 thereof, petitioner DIGITEL became liable for the payment of a franchise tax “as may be prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses transacted under it by the grantee,” as well as real property tax “on its real estate, and buildings “exclusive of this franchise.” Later, the Province of Pangasinan found that Digitel had a franchise tax deficiency for the years of 1992, 1993 and 1994. In the interregnum, on 16 March 1995, Congress passed RA 7925, otherwise known as “The Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines.” Section 23 of this law entitled Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry, provided for the ipso facto application to any previously granted telecommunications franchises of any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption or immunity granted under existing franchises, or those still to be granted, to be accorded immediately and unconditionally to earlier grantees. Thereafter, Digitel opposed Pangasinan’s claim on the ground that prior to the approval of its legislative franchise, its operation of a telecommunications system was done under a Facilities Management Agreement it had previously executed with the DOTC. It clarified that since “the facilities in Pangasinan are just part of the government owned facilities awarded to DIGITEL,” not only did the DOTC retain ownership of said facilities, the latter likewise “provided for the budget for) expenses under its allocation from the government;” hence, “all revenues generated from the operation of the facilities inured to the DOTC;” and all the fees received by petitioner DIGITEL were purely for services rendered. Further, it argued that under its legislative franchise, the payment of a franchise tax to the BIR would

Held: No The issue is then settled. Moreover. the Court ruled that Congress did not intend Section 23 to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telcos. City of Davao. Section 23 of Republic Act No. chose to restore such immunity even to a limited degree. City of Davao. lest some companies be treated unequally. the question is. established or collected by any authority whatsoever. Digitel ceased to be liable for national franchise tax and in its stead is imposed a 10% VAT in accordance with Section 108 of the Tax Code. Moreover. taking into consideration the above. However. “the phrase ‘exclusive of this franchise’ in the legislative franchise of Digitel did not specifically or categorically express that such franchise grant intended to provide privilege to the extent of impliedly repealing RA 7160. pricing. from which the grantee is hereby expressly granted. No. 7678. made inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. and personal property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay x x x. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities. In the case of PLDT v. In fact the provincial franchise made Digitel liable for the payment of such taxes.” in the face of the mandate of the Local Government Code.38 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The foregoing pronouncement notwithstanding. by passing Ra7678. The fact that Republic Act No. It ruled that provincial and legislative franchises are separate and distinct from each other. or immunity to all telecommunications entities. which such manifestation admittedly is. buildings. In said case. Collection of Sum of Money and Damages before Branch 68 of the RTC of Lingayen. 08-09: 2nd Sem.” Thus. directly and exclusively used by the grantee in its franchise. this Court has had the occasion to rule against the claim for tax exemption under RA 7925. from 1 January 1996. provincial. Stated simply.A. The more pertinent issue to consider is whether or not. by virtue of Section 23 of Republic Act No. The case at bar is actually not one of first impression. The Pronvince of Pangasinan filed a Complaint for Mandamus. exemption. Moreover. tax exemptions must be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. in view of the passage of RA 7716 abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunications companies effective 1 January 1996 and in its place is imposed a 10% VAT. Indeed. we already sustained the power of Congress to grant exemptions over and above the power of the local government’s delegated taxing authority notwithstanding the source of such power. Congress intended to exempt Digitel’s real properties actually. Tax Provisions. We rule in the affirmative. It is different if Congress enacts a law specifically granting uniform advantages. Smart and Bell. “the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to exempt” Digitel’s properties from realty taxes by its enactment of RA 7678 which contains the phrase “exclusive of this franchise. directly and exclusively used by the grantee in its franchise. including those whose exemptions had been withdrawn by the LGC. whether or not petitioner DIGITEL’s real properties located within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Province of Pangasinan are exempt from real property taxes by virtue of Section 5 of Republic Act No. the ipso facto. the Court has no recourse but to deny Digitel’s claim for exemption from payment of provincial franchise tax. According to the Province. . No. 7925. has now become functus officio. Smart and Bell. Owing to the phrase “exclusive of this franchise. among others. 7925.’ Issue: WON Digitel is exempt from the payment of provincial franchise tax in view of Section 23 of RA 7925 in relation to the exemptions enjoyed by other telcos. Digitel maintains that its legislative franchise being an earlier enactment. even if it is granted. in relation to the pertinent provisions of the legislative franchises of Globe. or national. And. it is with the caveat that such exemption solely applies to those real properties actually. The trial court decided the Province.A. “the national franchise tax for which Digitel is liable to pay shall be ‘in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind. Issue: WON Digitel is exempt from payment of real estate tax under its legislative franchise. It maintains that said phrase found in Section 5 qualifies or delimits the scope of its liability respecting real property tax –that real property tax should only be imposed on its assets that are actually. as far back as 2001. to our minds.” petitioner DIGITEL stands firm in its position that it is equally exempt from the payment of real property tax. In the PLDT v. nature or description levied. 7925 – that the word “exemption” as used in the statute refer’s or pertain’s merely to an exemption from regulatory or reporting requirements of the DOTC or the NTC and not to the grantee’s tax liability. however. municipal. it ruled that PLDT’s theory will leave the Government with the burden of having to keep track of all granted telecommunications franchises. Held: No Ratio: Prior to the enactment of its legislative franchise. it pointed out that LGH already withdrew any exemption granted to anyone. immediate and unconditional application to it of the tax exemption found in the franchises of Globe. Digitel did not enjoy and exemption from the payment of franchise and real property taxes. Therefore. 7678 was a later piece of legislation can be taken to mean that Congress. the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. knowing fully well that the Local Government Code had already withdrawn exemptions from real property taxes. Pangasinan. and operations of all public telecommunications entities and thus promote a level playing field in the telecommunications industry. be “in lieu of all taxes” on said franchise or the earnings therefrom. And. the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes” clause/provision in the legislative franchises of Globe. we already clarified the confusion brought about by the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. Ratio: Pertinent Provision: SECTION 5. The present issue actually boils down to a dispute between the inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegated authority to tax of the local government borne by the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand. privilege. It ruled that Digitel’s legislative franchise does not work to exempt the latter from payment of provincial franchise and real property taxes. There is nothing in the language of §23 nor in the proceedings of both the House of Representatives and the Senate in enacting R. – The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate. Had Congress intended to tax each and every real property of Digitel. The thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of the entry. favor. directly and exclusively used in the conduct of its business pursuant to its franchise. it would not have incorporated a qualifying phrase. regardless of whether or not it is used in the business or operation of its franchise. 7925 is thus a legislative enactment designed to set the national policy on telecommunications and provide the structures to implement it to keep up with the technological advances in the industry and the needs of the public. Smart and Bell. R.Y.

to 01 January 1987. 285 issued by petitioner Minister (now Secretary) of Finance. private respondent’s recourse is to file a case questioning the validity of Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. which echoes the disputed Regulations.d. The underlying principle behind E. for the period commencing from 29 December 1992 until 16 February 1994. No. and. on the residential house. that is sought to be resolved herein and petitioner should not depart from the issue on hand. otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code.O. In fine. A breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes showed that more than 24% of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected from private respondent by way of penalties. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 2-86 in the same way that he has assailed Joint Assessment Regulations No. Issue: WON the Ministry of Finance could legally promulgate regulations prescribing a rate of penalty on delinquent taxes other than that provided for under PD 464. alter the structure of the real property tax assessments as provided for in P. Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. Ilarde & Cipriano Cabaluna (2005) Facts: Cipriano P. in accordance with the Court’s ruling in the abovementioned Bayantel case. to our mind.” As adeptly observed by the trial court. No. 2-85 which. The Secretary of Finance avers in his petition that the last paragraph of Section 1. the penalty imposed under the assailed Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section 66 of the Real Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limited only to twenty-four percent of the delinquent tax. No. from 13 November 1992 until actually paid. the original date it was intended by E. The Court harbors doubts on the veracity of petitioner’s contention that the Regulations at issue are sanctioned by E. 941-D-1. . 2-86. No. it shall be imposed only on the lands and buildings of petitioner DIGITEL located within the subject jurisdiction. it shall be imposed only on real properties NOT actually. Petitioner further asserts that inasmuch as Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. directly and exclusively used in the franchise of petitioner DIGITEL. Cabaluna retired. No. 73 did not.” Soon. 73. Upon the other hand. was the Regional Director of Regional Office No. Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 464. No. Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 08-09: 2nd Sem. merely applies from the time of the effectivity of petitioner DIGITEL’s legislative franchise and not a moment sooner.D. was issued to implement E. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. directly and exclusively used by petitioner DIGITEL in the pursuit of its franchise. 285.O. taxes were also unpaid on Lot No. and on Lot No. the Assistant Treasurer of Iloilo City justified the assessment by citing Sec. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. by virtue of the National Franchise of petitioner DIGITEL or Republic Act No. No. as gleaned from the whereas clauses and Section 1 thereof as quoted above. Jr.D. Section 4(c) of the challenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. Despite his labors to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner’s reasoning is. according to him.O. from the date of effectivity on 17 February 1994 until the present. the now challenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. Real Property Taxation and Special Education Fund Tax Sec of Finance v. In addition to the foregoing summary. 1019 to take effect for purposes stated therein. 2-85 issued by respondent Secretary (formerly Minister) of Finance provides that “the penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum as the case may be. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. in addition to the lands and buildings aforementioned. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. The subject Regulations must be struck down for being repugnant to Section 66 of P. it shall similarly be imposed on machineries and other improvements. In response to his letter of protest. pertinent provisions of law respecting interests. penalties and surcharges shall also be made to apply to herein subject tax liabilities. in any way. 2-86. For the years 1991 to 1992. This has lead to the filing of the present case by Cabaluna to question the validity of the said regulations. not Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. however. That such is the effect of an application of the Regulations under review is not disclaimed by the petitioner anywhere in his pleadings. petitioner says. shall continue to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that the delinquency is paid for in full. The respondent judge declared as null and void the said regulations and ruled that the total penalty must not exceed 24% of the delinquent tax. 2-85. Petitioner. VI of the DOF. No.39 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. are sanctioned by EO 73 and its implementing guidelines. the denial of his protest and his MR compelled private respondent to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages assailing Joint Assessment Regulations No. respondent Province of Pangasinan can only levy real property tax on the remaining real properties of the grantee located within its territorial jurisdiction not part of the above-stated classification.D. 2-86. Iloilo City Private respondent failed to pay the land taxes on Lot No. is to advance the date of effectivity of the application of the Real Property Tax Values of 1984 from 01 January 1988. 941-D-2. 14 for the years 1986 to 1992..O. but a futile attempt to muddle the facts of the case and the issues involved. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 7678. Private respondent paid his land taxes and the receipts were issued to him by the City Treasurer’s Office with the notation “paid under protest. 2-86. and 2) as to real property tax. 2-85 of the DOF. 464 which fixed the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real estate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. In view of the unequivocal intent of Congress to exempt from real property tax those real properties actually. Recall that the present controversy cropped up when Cabaluna protested the payment of penalties on his delinquent taxes for being in excess of the 24% cap provided in p. Note that under Section 66 of P. for the period starting from 13 November 1992 until 28 December 1992. E.O. however. which is entirely consistent with the then existing Regulations. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. No. Said exemption. The Assistant City Treasurer Rizalina Tulio turned down the protest. explicitly provides for a 2% per month penalty without any limitation as to the maximum amount thereof. also known as the Real Property Tax Code. which is the law prevailing at the time material to this case. No. It is the validity of said regulations. He co-owns with his wife certain properties in Jaro. 12 and Lot No. He then filed a formal protest with the City Treasurer of Iloilo wherein he contends that the computation was erroneous since the rate of penalty exceed 24% in contravention of Section 66 of P. the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real property tax shall in no case exceed 24% of the delinquent tax.D. petitioner DIGITEL is found accountable to respondent Province of Pangasinan for the following tax liabilities: 1) as to provincial franchise tax.D. No. Ratio: Petitioner’s standpoint is devoid of basis in law or in logic. 2-86. 73. 73. flouted Section 66 of P. Said Regulations. citing Sec. 464.Y. Cabaluna. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. attempts to justify the issued Regulations’ departure from the Real Property Tax Code.

D. or modify the tax structure would be tantamount to saying that EO 73 has repealed or amended PD 464. which is the general purpose for enacting said executive order.D. 464. 73. But. No. the proper basis for the computation of the real property tax payable. supra. No.O. Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. No. On the second assigned error. such authority would have been automatically stripped off from it upon the express repeal of E. PD 464 in general and Section 66 in particular. No. unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.D.Y. To be sure. President Corazon Aquino. Despite the promulgation of EO 73. When the law does not distinguish.O. the power delegated to the executive branch. known as the Local Government Code. No. from 01 January 1992 onwards. No. we must not distinguish. No. if applicable..O. to lay down implementing rules must.O. i. 08-09: 2nd Sem. 464. in this case the Ministry of Finance. Section 5(d) of Rep. 464 covers all real property titled to individuals who become delinquents in paying real estate tax. 73. 464. In a last-ditch effort to salvage the impugned Regulations. it does not necessarily follow from that authority the determination of whether or not to impose the tax. In our mind. E. No. be refunded by the latter. as the trial court has found. 464. We find. was exercising both executive and legislative powers. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 464 inasmuch as the latter applies merely to simple delinquency in the payment of real property taxes while the former covers cases wherein there was failure to promptly pay the real property tax due. therefore. Benguet Corporation v. the official acts of petitioner as Regional Director cannot serve as estoppel for him to pursue the present course of action that he has taken as a taxpayer. however. 73. nevertheless. which repealed the Real Property Tax Code or P. Neither is this Court easily dissuaded by the submission of the Secretary of Finance that E.O. the general law on real property taxation. in view of that. At bottom. in the case at bar. However. two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof but “in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax. No. including the penalties and interests. petitioner pushes on that Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 1019 by EO No. The implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. including penalties or interests.[15] The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law. Realty taxes are national taxes collected by LGUs. 2-85 does not put him in estoppel from seeking the nullification of said Regulations at this point. 73 is the repeal of E. what is patent from Section 3 of E. In the case at bar. In any event. such conferment of powers is void for being repugnant to the wellencrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxation is generally vested with the legislature. petitioner is suing as a plain taxpayer. which in this case is merely to antedate the effectivity of the 1984 Real Property Tax values inasmuch as this is the raison d’être of E.O. The excess penalties paid by the private respondent should.[ Yes. not Section 66 of P. 73. be that provided for in Section 66 of P. Jurisprudence thrives to the effect that it is only Republic Act No. much less. No. a regulation which is in itself invalid for being contrary to law cannot be validated by any act of endorsement of any official. The Real Property Tax Code covers the wide ilk of failure to promptly pay the real property taxes due and demandable for a particular period. the fact that private respondent Cabaluna was responsible for the issuance and implementation of Regional Office Memorandum Circular No. 2-86. No. certainly. Further. No. Act No.40 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. remained to be good law. is not contrary to Section 66 of P. 04-89 which implemented Joint Assessment Regulations No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. No.” has the effect of according petitioner the blanket authority to tinker with the rates of penalty on delinquency taxes as provided for in P. he having already retired as Regional Director. 7160 provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such contracts were vested.D.D. by a subordinate of the official who issued such regulation. 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.D. 464. must be Rep.” Accordingly. In fact. No. the penalty that ought to be imposed for delinquency in the payment of real property taxes should. Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. 464 is a law of general application. as petitioner would have us believe.O. To accept petitioner’s premise that EO 73 had accorded the Ministry of Finance the authority to alter. P. Even assuming that E. No. P. It is thus clear that . No.O. Neither did E. which took effect on the 1st of January 1992[23] inasmuch as Section 534[24] thereof had expressly repealed P. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect.D. 1019. P. no such inconsistency or repugnancy between EO 73 and Section 66 of PD 464. No. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.D. Such rationalization lacks legal traction.O. His official acts as Regional Director could not have stripped him of his rights as a taxpayer. is still Section 66 of the Real Property Tax Code of 1974 or P. Estoppel. be germane to the general law it seeks to apply. Assuming argumenti that E. 73 on the 25th of November 1986. COA (1992).O. has merely designated the Minister of Finance to promulgate the rules and regulations towards the implementation of E.O. cannot make an invalid regulation valid. Act No. 7160. No. LGU’s have no alternative but to collect taxes as mandated in Sec. which provides in Section 2 thereof that: “The Minister of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive Order. for purposes of computation of the real property taxes due from private respondent for the years 1986 to 1991.D. No. Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it.D. 1019 directly or indirectly vest upon the Department of Finance the right to fiddle with the rates of penalty to be assessed on delinquency taxes as contained in the Real Property Tax Code. 1019 had vested the then Ministry of Finance with the authority to impose new rates of penalty on delinquency taxes. 464 makes no distinction as to whether it is simple delinquency or other forms thereof. 73 has authorized the petitioner to issue the objected Regulations. 73. No. particularly in Section 2 thereof. including the increase in tax due and demandable for the tax year as a result of the application of the 1984 New or Revised Assessment of the value of the subject property.O. The Court takes notice that E. increase. No. particularly on the application of the Real Property Values as of 31 December 1984. or the so-called implementing rules of E. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. the penalties imposed by respondents City Treasurer and Assistant City Treasurer of Iloilo City on the property of private respondent are valid only up to 24% of the delinquent taxes. No. at that time. While LGU’s are charged with fixing the rate of real property taxes. the law applicable.e.

The delegation of taxing power is not even involved here because the national government has already imposed realty tax in Sec. they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the enforcement of the Real Property Tax Code." The land remains "absolute property of the government. of the Assessment Law. Nueva Ecija. proprietary or business functions. supra. NDC cites Board of Assessment Appeals.31 was paid by NDC 11 of which only P3. 115 of the Public Land Act. EO 93 dissolved NWC with NDC taking over its assets and functions. A reserved land is defined as a "[p]ublic land that has been withheld or kept back from sale or disposition. Property exempt from tax. subjects the recipient (NDC ) to real estate taxation under Sec. NDC does not come under classification of municipal or public corporation in the sense that it may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations. hence. taxable. a total of P100. in 1940. of R. Cebu City (1992) Facts: National Development Company (NDC) is a GOCC authorized to engage in commercial." As its title remains with the Republic. while it may be stated that the Republic owns NDC. par (c). It also operates subsidiary corporations one of which is National Warehousing Corporation (NWC). one of the principal issues before Us is the interpretation of a provision of the Assessment Law.41 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. agricultural and other enterprises necessary or contributory to economic development or important to public interest. The same opinion of NDC was passed upon in National Development Co. thus. In 1948. 3 of the Assessment Law. NDC proceeded on the premise that the BAA ruling declared all properties owed by GOCC's as properties in the name of the Republic. whether for proprietary or sovereign purposes. The separate personality allows a GOCC to hold and possess properties in its own name and. 3 par. where "ownership" of the property and not "use" is the test of tax liability. in the case at bar. (a). it merely means "a withdrawal of a specified portion of the public domain from disposal under the land laws and the appropriation thereof. of the Assessment Law. in the case before Us. Province of Laguna v. Commonwealth Act No. the precursor of the then Real Property Tax Code and the Local Government Code. that levies the real property tax. What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferred to NDC). ownership of subject properties should first be established. Section 115 of the Public Land Act should be treated as an exception to Art. on which NDC claims real estate tax exemption. 182 which created NDC contains no provision exempting it from the payment of real estate tax on properties it may acquire. The NDC decision speaks of properties owned by NDC. 4. (a). (a). the President issued Proclamation No. cannot invoke the exemptions thereof but is an agency for the performance of purely corporate. and is subject to taxation. 1939. provides Section 3.06 was under protest. 83 are comprehended in Sec. 3.940 square meters more or less. is merely the administration of the property while the government retains ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. it is important to establish that the property is owned by the government or its unincorporated agency. par (a)." The government "does not part with its title by reserving them (lands). 38 leaving only the enforcement to be done LGU’s. Similarly. The essential question then is whether lands reserved pursuant to Sec. no similar statement appears in the stipulation of facts. By the first quarter of 1970. par. permit greater independence and flexibility in its operations. CEBU nevertheless contends that the reservation of the property in favor of NWC or NDC is a form of disposition of public land which. NPC may be sued without its consent. CTA and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA). are also owned by Republic in the same way that stockholders are not ipso facto owners of the properties of their corporation. although referring to lands which would eventually be transferred to private individuals.A. NDC asked for a full refund contending that the land and the warehouse belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. and BAA v. While ordinary public lands are tax exempt because title thereto . of the Assessment Law. was constructed thereon. For. municipality at municipal district. therefore. industrial. but simply gives notice to all the world that it desires them for a certain purpose. it is an entity different from the government. the Commonwealth of the Philippines. it is the national government. exempt under Sec. the reserved land is clearly recovered by the tax exemption provision. 115 and. 3. a warehouse with a floor area of 1. Reclamation Area No. In that case. v. and in this sense. be stated that tax exemption of property owned by the Republic of the Philippines "refers to properties owned by the Government and by its agencies which do not have separate and distinct personalities (unincorporated entities). The exemptions shall be as follows: (a) Property owned by the United States of America. 430 reserving Block no. should not apply equally to this case. of Cebu City for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. par. The foregoing discussion does not mean that because NDC. The Republic may form a corporation with personality and existence distinct from its own. Subsequently. Province of Nueva Ecija where We held that its properties were not comprehended in Sec. Ratio: To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon. city. It may.Y.895. We find no compelling reason why the foregoing ruling. expressing itself through the legislative branch. to some particular use or purpose of the general government. therefore. is apparent from its Organic Act. a GOCC. 3. Consequently." Absolute disposition of land is not implied from reservation. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Section. In 1947. v. The conflict between NDC v. National Development Co. for the time being. . 430. any province. the nature of the use of the property. it does not necessary follow that properties owned by NDC.316. the properties of NWSA. hence. Issue: WON the property is exempt from payment of real estate taxes Held: Yes Ratio: As already adverted to. The CFI ordered Cebu City to refund to NDC the real estate taxes paid by it. of the Assessment Law. hence. That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powers and. becomes immaterial. is more superficial than real. On August 10. and once government ownership is determined. 4. were exempt from real estate tax because Sec. like most GOCC's engages in commercial enterprises all properties of the government and its unincorporated agencies possessed in propriety character are taxable. 3. mining. Issue: Held: WON the NDC is exempt from real estate taxes No 470 did not distinguish between those possessed by the government in sovereign/governmental/political capacity and those in private proprietary patrimonial character. CTA and NWSA. while the BAA ruling concerns properties belonging to the Republic In the case at bar. when LGU’s are required to fix the rates.

the Provincial Treasurer Jose Meru filed a complaint praying that the company pay the said sum as well as damages. 464. and the government accepted the payment. . cannot be said to have waived his right. 83. expressly classified as quasi-contract under Section 2.435. Tersely put. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. But the lower court denied the motion. NDC does not agree. and therefore could not have been made under protest. . "Concession" as a technical term under the Public Land Act is synonymous with "alienation" and "disposition". The company filed a motion to dismiss. etc. 115 is predicated on (a) filing of homestead application. provides: SEC. 115 does not apply to lands reserved under Sec. 75 of the Revised Cebu City Charter because the issue is not the validity of tax assessment but recovery of erroneous payments under Arts.D. private respondent had been required to pay 2% franchise tax in line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators such as the private respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates. No. NDC has yet to exhaust administrative remedies by way of appeal to the Department of Finance and/or Auditor General before taking judicial action. lease. Payment was made through error or mistake. ." Consequently. 83 is to segregate a piece of public land and transform it into non-alienable or non-disposable under the Public Land Act. consequently. . This is in consonance with Sec. 470. Tarlac. Held: No Ratio: Sec. and. . created a tie or juridical relation in the nature of solutio indebiti. 40. the Real Property Tax Code. . and it was unduly delivered through mistake. These properties were declared for purposes of Taxation in the Provincial Assessor’s Office.42 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Thereafter. (c) signing of contract. The fact that petitioner paid thru error or mistake. or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands. gave rise to the application of the principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the New Civil Code. 2154 and 2155 of the Civil Code. it being a grantee of a franchise to generate. distribute and sell electric current for light. The company then filed an answer saying that under Section 40(g) of PD46 in relation to PD 551. where Sec. 75 of R. Chapter I of Title XVII CC. . "it is not a tax assessed under the charter of the City of Davao and for that reason no protest is necessary for a claim or demand for its refund. that even on the premise that there was proper demand. the subject reserved public land remains tax exempt. in the honest belief that petitioner was liable. as amended. should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic. The lower court issued an order granting said motion to prevent mootness of the case considering that the properties to be sold were the. then. it paid the real estate taxes without knowing that it is Prov. therefore. or benefit under the Act. 40(g) of P. reservation connotes retention. Petitioner is not unsatisfied in the assessment of its property. the effect of reservation under Sec. Consequently. 40. CEBU argues that in any case NDC is not entitled to refund because Sec. Issue: WON Tarlac Enterprises. . the date of the accrual of the real estate tax would be indeterminate. the taxability of the land would depend on whether reservation under Sec. The court rendered the decision dismissing the complaint. Therefore. therefore." In the case at bar. concession. Since NDC is not a homesteader and no "contract" (bilateral agreement) was signed. that it could not have acted on the first demand letter of NDC of 20 May 1970 because it was sent to the City Assessor and not to the City Treasurer. . the erroneous tax payments collected by CEBU should be refunded to NDC. In any case. 115 contemplates authorized methods for acquisition. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying the real property taxes demanded. without these words. 3857. there having been no appropriate prior demand. (b) approval of concession and." There is. par. It ruled that P. on the other hand. Judge Alcantara (1992) Facts: Tarlac Enterprises Inc is the owner of a parcel of land in Mabini.A. falls under "concession". 115 subjects them to real estate tax even before ownership thereto is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. 464 in relation to P. it would seem unedifying for the government. of Tarlac v. (a) of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from taxation real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another . is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. Liability to real property taxes under Sec. Sec. No. machinery shed and other machinery. Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax. applies to disposable public lands.D. Section 115. Section 8 and 88 of the Public Land Act provide that reserved lands are excluded from that may be subject of disposition. subjects of the complaint. homesteaders and other claimants. an ice drop factory in said land.55 including penalties were not yet paid. The court held that in lieu of said taxes. at their own expense." Logically. 10 as "any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition. use. As We view it. Clearly. As regards the requirement of paying under protest before judicial recourse. being a unilateral act of the President. therefore. the obligation to return it arises. 115 comprehends three (3) modes of disposition of Lands under the Public Land Act. the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by NDC). that knowing it has no right at all to collect or to receive money for alleged taxes paid by mistake. It disputes the applicability of the payment-under-protest requirement is Sec. Sec. petitioner. Significantly. use. while concession (alienation) signifies cession. it would be reluctant to return the same .D. that. but with complete voluntariness. indeed. that reservation under Sec. belongs to the Republic. and is defined in Sec. No. He had no knowledge of the fact that it was exempted from payment of the realty tax under Commonwealth Act No. lease. 40 (g) of P. or occupants. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu. 551. as well as any GOCC so exempt by its charter. This prompted the private respondent to file a motion praying that petitioner be directed to desist from proceeding with the public auction sale. where such obligation does not really exist . it was exempt from paying said tax. requires payment under protest before resorting to judicial action for tax refund.Y. which provides that "if something is received when there is no right to demand it. Hence. 83. Sec. Assessment having been made. are the two terms antithetical and mutually exclusive? Indeed.D. The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the years 1974 until 1992 in the amount of P532. is reservation synonymous with alienation? Or. a taxpayer should not be held to suffer loss by his good intention to comply with what he believes is his legal obligation. a different rule should apply because "[t]he exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands made by preemptioners. to wit: homestead. petitioner set the auction sale of the private respondent's properties to satisfy the real estate taxes due. as regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation. and these are taxable by the state . Inc. No. 83 is one such method of acquisition. it would appear. It cites the case of East Asiaticvs City of Davao which held that where the tax is unauthorized. However. resort to judicial remedy is premature. and contract.

551 (Lowering the Cost to Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the Franchise Tax Payable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff on Fuel Oils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public Utilities). In that case. to be exempted from payment of taxes. distribution and sale" which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in view of the imposition of the franchise tax. income and privilege of generation. Department Order No. 551 was intended to give "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations. On the other hand. the President issued AO 372 (Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998). No. in their discretion. Private respondent has utterly failed to discharge this duty. the SC contrasted supervision and control. 8. order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed. No. 852 deals with franchise tax and tariff on fuel oils and the "earnings. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding. on person paying franchise tax. then said enumerated items would not have been added when PD 852 was enacted to amend P. 1 of P. While P. It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because "taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.3 Shares of LGUS in national taxes Pimentel v. thus: "supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. the machinery for the generation and distribution of electric power.D. Lastly.. and are entirely different from. 551. . but only to conform to such rules. . Inc. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them. and the land on which said building is constructed. Aguirre (2000) Facts: On December. Private respondent contends that the "other laws" referred to in this Section is P. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. No. the President exercised the power of control over LGUs. shall be collected from business holding franchises but not from establishments whose franchise contains the in lieu of all taxes' proviso. Thus. on the other hand." to construe said decree as having granted such franchise holders exemption from payment of real property tax would unduly extend the ambit of exemptions beyond the purview of the law." Thus. The annexes attached to private respondent's comment on the petition to prove by contemporaneous interpretation its claimed tax exemption are not of much help to it. The legislative authority would have simply stopped after the phrase "national or local authority" by putting therein a period. income and privilege of generation. President Estrada issued AO 43. We also find misplaced the lower court's and the private respondent's reliance on Butuan Sawmill. nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. as amended.D. 35-74 dated September 16. therefore. . 1974 11 regulating the implementation of P. If these rules are not followed. Private respondent apparently does not quite comprehend the distinction among the subject matters or objects of the taxes involved. it went on to enumerate what should not be subject to tax thereby delimiting the extent of the exemption." thereby clearly indicating that said proviso exempts taxpayers like private respondent from paying the franchise tax collected by the provinces under the Local Tax Code. it is the taxpayer's duty to justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. No. Control. City of Butuan." In Drilon v. Moreover.D." On the other hand. On the other hand. heat and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation. Silvosa. No. distribute and sell electric current for light. are necessary for the operation of its business of generation. they may. Local Tax Regulations No. the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. the collection complaint filed by petitioner specified only taxes due on real properties.. In Mondano v. P. On the contrary. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. On December. amending Section 4 of AO 372. the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act from imposing "taxes of any kind . We likewise do not find merit in private respondent's contention that the real properties being taxed. real properties subject to tax. No.D. have no relation at all to. Lim. As correctly observed by the petitioner. receipts. the building housing said machinery. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. distribution We do not agree with the lower court that the phrase "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in the second paragraph of Sec. they should be exempted from taxation. the letter 13 of the then Bureau of Internal Revenue Acting Commissioner addressed to the Matic Law Office granting exemption to the latter's client from paying the "privilege (fixed) tax which is an excise tax on the privilege of engaging in business" clearly excludes realty tax from such exemption. Section 4 of Article X of the Consti confines the President's power over local governments to general supervision. withholding 10% of the IRA is in contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of the Constitution. 1998. they may order the work done or redone. but they themselves do not lay down such rules.Y. providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.43 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. supervision does not cover such authority. 551 is not as allencompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the items which are not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax. If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise grantees from paying real property tax and to make the 2% franchise tax the only imposable tax. distribution and sale of electric current" are the items exempted from taxation by the imposition of said tax or tariff duty. Petitioner contends that by issuing AO 372. Its pertinent provisions state: SECTION 1.The exemption shall be as follows: (g) Real property exempt under other laws. . 1997. The City of Butuan is categorically prohibited therein by Sec.D. said proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase "on earnings. distribution and sale of electric current and. 3-75 12 issued by then Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata and addressed to all Provincial and City Treasurers enjoins strict compliance with the directive that "the franchise tax imposed under Local Tax Ordinances pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Tax Code. It bears emphasis that P. The Sol Gen claims that AO 372 was issued merely as an exercise of the President’s power of supervision over LGUs. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall not be imposed. No.D. No. 551 merely reiterates the "in lieu of all taxes" proviso. viz.D. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes. 551 as amended by P. the questioned tax is a tax on the gross sales or receipts of said sawmill while the tax involved herein is a real property tax. the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate. If the rules are not observed. by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. v.D. receipts.

the President. any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. by constitutional fiat. for the purpose of enhancing self-government. fiscal and otherwise. but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials. There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government. who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals. are consistent with national goals. while authoritative. In contrast. we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them. not power. or their actions and decisions changed. (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues. By constitutional fiat." The President cannot do so unilaterally. it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. however. The LGC specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x. enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the LGC have not been satisfied. Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration. is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government. solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. be upheld. insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid Held: Yes resources in accordance with their own priorities. LGU. orders the withholding. Hence. 1998. we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character. policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.44 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. In Ganzon v. Significantly. however limited. primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing. to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide. Mangelin as follows: "Now. including autonomous regions. It extends to the preparation of their budgets. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. as well as the power to allocate their Ratio: Section 4 of AO 372 cannot. municipal governments are still agents of the national government. local governments are still subject to regulation. therefore. and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. economic. various private sectors. the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. under the Constitution. in addition to having administrative autonomy. and local government units. The language used. But to enable the country to develop as a whole. Issue: WON Section 1 of AO 372.. Indeed. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. Thus. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1. It is understood. Interior and Local Government. Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.' At the same time. the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Furthermore. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government. However. Pryce Properties Corp." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments. members of the cabined and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies. As we stated in Magtajas v. at whose will and behest they can be removed from office. and Budget and Management. . the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments. however. Inc. the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision.' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. In turn. plans and programs for the entire country. in order to ensure that local programs.Y. Court of Appeals. all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments. As such. not control. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. Rather. The provision is. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable. imperative. however." As a rule. 08-09: 2nd Sem. suspended or reversed. coordinated and integrated social and economic policies. so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. they are subject to the power of control of the President." Paradoxically. Issue: Held: WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid No Ratio: Under existing law. they are subject to the President’s supervision only. and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone. whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Section 4 of AO 372. that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. effective January 1.. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy.

the CA reversed itself and ruled that the deficiency was remedied when petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument. By virtue of Proclamation No. Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. Sec. Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when demolition was effected. Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator . 147. And in the event that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished. Petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Basilan. And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. CA Facts: A quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. Bulacan. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino. it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property. the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances". enacted on 27 December 1977. and stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Since the notifications remained unheeded. the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue. laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong. is entitled "An Ordinance Establishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the Municipality of Isabela.Y. The PPA issued to Tan Gin San. Issue: WON the Mayor could summarily. spouse of Gregoria Francisco." It is not disputed that the quonset building. which means "something held back or withheld. The permittee was using the quonset for the storage of copra. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Cruz. a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year. 147. petitioner's quonset building was completely demolished. Its property was not of trifling value. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. is located outside the zone for warehouses. often temporarily. otherwise the non-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense. By its nature. 149 (ee) ). 4 Abatement of Nuisance Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. without judicial process. It was purchased in 1946 by Gregoria Francisco. which should be relocated. Sec 16 of the Ordinance provides: A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses shall be applied for by the owner or agent of the property involved within 12mo from the . It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. However. Inc v. It stands on a lot owned by the PPA and faces the municipal wharf. and relied upon by respondents. b) Mayor's permit. The letter requested Plant Manager Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on February 20." although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Ratio: Ordinance No. On 6 September 1989. to expire on 31 December 1989. 1989 the following: a) Building permit. the Mayor ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989. the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination. Technology Developers. The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business." Hence. It follows then that the public officials of Isabela. Moreover. While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code. upon reconsideration. In its place sprang shanties and nipa huts. Maria. Concededly. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Petitioner commenced to secure "Region IIIDENR Anti-Pollution Permit. the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. It was not squatting on public land. CA (1991) Facts: Petitioner received a letter from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. and of other document. which is being used for the storage of copra. of health or of comfort of the community. The RTC denied the writ and upheld the power of the Mayor to order the demolition without judicial authority pursuant to Ordinance 147. Although temporary. as opined by the CA. petitioner undertook to comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents. but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation.45 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Sta. it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process. Any retention is prohibited. as originally held by the CA. On the contrary. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect. said land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities. At the requested conference. That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is further evident from the penal provisions. order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building. For if it does. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-conforming structure. c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Basilan. Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure. of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. 08-09: 2nd Sem. transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. the provision should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal government. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. In sum. Verily. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the mayor was not vested with power to order summarily without any judicial proceeding to demolish the Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se. Held: No approval of this Ordinance. while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis. On May 1989. it is equivalent to a holdback. the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove or relocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance No.

To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850. it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution. On April 6. PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila. now the Environmental Management Bureau. 3. nay the very lives of the people. prohibition. SEC." so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: (1) Building permit. 5. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is addressed to the National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements. the permit was good only up to May 25. As such. the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational. 4.Y. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15. pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation. Collection of Fees. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner: 1. and the like. Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit. fish enclosures. and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions. cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". in the act. without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner. All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower court. Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit. industrial." This agency was supposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces. that the rates of the fees to be collected. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community. 3. fisheries. agricultural. The NBI finding that some of the signatures in the 4-page petition were written by one person. and (3) Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution permit. Maria. 2. from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment. the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. 1988. in grave abuse of its discretion. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. after the implementation within the three-year period of the Ratio: The matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise. municipal. (2) Mayor's permit. construction. 1987. and operation of fishpens. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries. Also. 08-09: 2nd Sem. recreation. which will be shared in the following manner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments. Provided. it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained. 1987. that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health. Sta. Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari. cities and towns. mandamus with preliminary injunction against private respondent. shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board. During the MR. It must be stressed however. if necessary. irrigation. (particularly as among members of the same family). combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply. appears to be true in some instances. respondent ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant. However. No mayor's permit had been secured. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant. except fishpen fee. Maria. the Provincial Prosecutor presented his evidence prepared by Marivic Guina. directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. Bulacan. the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay. navigation. 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. 6. Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.000. CA (1995) Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority. and waste disposal purpose. The judge found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting of a bond worth P50. The certification of . irrigation. 1989. but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6." The lower court then set aside the order which granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued. and by virtue of his police power. thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation. Issue: WON the writ of preliminary injunction should be granted Held: No the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the matter must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong.46 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. fish corrals and the like. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. but on the whole the many signatures appear to be written by different persons. “Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used. the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns.

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. general in its terms. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. A special law cannot be repealed. and sustainable development. otherwise. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority.920 km2 basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces. On the other hand. 149. the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens. without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. and operation of fishpens." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute. although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.Y. that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability . In view of the foregoing circumstances. there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Held: LLDA Ratio: Section 4 (k) of RA 4850. Then came Republic Act No. however. the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. 7160 provides: "Sec. provided for a particular case or class of cases. 1234.the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region . 7160. like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. and Section 2 of EO 927. We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens. demolition shall be effected. mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. is not repealed by a subsequent statute.D. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute. which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31. including navigation. 2. the provisions of PD 813. The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. increasing the occupation drastically from 7.47 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. 813 for violation of the same laws. The 900 km lake surface water. provisions and application. 4850 and its amendments. which are enviromental protection. fish enclosures. All operators of fishpens. All fishpens. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R. Hence.000 ha in 1995. Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991. the Authority served notice to the general public that: “ 1. It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. Owners of fishpens. The motions to dismiss were denied. TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. given to all enactments of the legislature. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals. (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall. All fishpens. fish corrals and the like." One month. 3. construction. the power to grant permits devolved to respective local government units concerned.000 ha in 1990 to almost 21. constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies. thereafter. oyster. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupied almost onethird the entire lake water surface area. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Provided. prohibition and injunction. the 8 major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake.A. the present petition for certiorari. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned. 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA. navigational safety. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Fishery Rentals. RA 7160 is a general law. Issue: Which agency of the Government . fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. Meanwhile. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court. the 2. The CA dismissed the LLDA’s consolidated petitions. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region.

however. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Republic Act No. The RTC granted the motion. Section 3 of Executive Order No. of Republic Act No. "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs. Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. The municipality then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upon deposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount. old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the acts enumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 43-89. it is our holding that. petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and a declaration that Resolution No. the Municipal Motorpool. the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. Blg. Blg. It ruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari before the CA. the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Held: Yes Ratio: Eminent domain. grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. 08-09: 2nd Sem. as amended.5 Power of Eminent Domain: Moday et al v. and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case." The Resolution was approved by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. private property for public use or purpose. or order invalid is when such resolution. the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. the Municipality had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall. In the instant petition for review.Y. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive. considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. A strictly legal question is before the provincial . otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid. Velazco v. therefore." The municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday before the RTC. the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. ordinance. is necessary to conserve. What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for BP 337. ordinance. 7160 under the heading. and preserve its ecological integrity and balance. 43-89. Book II. Thus. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. which is made of concrete. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2. Inherently possessed by the national legislature. In view of the foregoing. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. Court of Appeals. both wooden structures. series of 1983. the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. 8. that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. 6138Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities. Meanwhile. the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens. It is government's right to appropriate. in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. Court of Appeals (1997) Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection. The law.P. or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay. 4850. "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. other public entities and public utilities.P.48 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S." The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. 337. the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments. Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Authority's pretense. has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA. Blas: The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution. this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not. 43-89 invalid. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter.” On the other hand. 927. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy. Section 153 of B. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The CA held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens. conservation. balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. 337.

neither did it dismiss the complaints. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution. it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or president. it is alleged that Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Guerrero. 129.00. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. The Supreme Court. As regards the accusation of political oppression. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession. ordinance. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program. 129. Pursuant to the Resolution. The trial court issued a writ of possession. Court of Appeals (1993) Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. Blg. The provincial disapproval of any resolution.Villafuerte. or order. Series of 1988.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Specifically. held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the CARK and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins. it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use." it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8.714. compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.49 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation. roads. The Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code. there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The CA set aside the order of the court and ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until the province shall have submitted the requisite approval of the DAR. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss.P. which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed. and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. board in its consideration of a municipal resolution. However. the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. Thus. in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. particularly Section 65. and (c) that the order dated December 6. following the recommendation of the Solicitor General. In their petition before the Court of Appeals. it follows that Resolution No. while the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest. 337. ordinance. pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B. Under the new concept. denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health. like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e. has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.g. convenience or benefit. necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking. public plazas. fishery and the cottage industry. fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. In an order. 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26. However. "public use" means public advantage. The CA. etc. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public. If a provincial board passes these limits. Issue: WON the expropriation was proper Ratio: The CA did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution. the livelihood of the farmers. ordinance. when the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province shall have obtained the authority of the DAR to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the CARL. 08-09: 2nd Sem. filed two cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. Prov.970 sq m formed part of the resort complex. As held in Sumulong v. evidenced by a sketch plan. "Housing is a basic human need. Both motions were denied. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. 1990. there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. safety. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property. The Province claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land. San Joaquin. San Joaquin and Efren N. which requires the approval of the DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land. Ultimately. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority.Y. the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. Perforce. It is true that . Series of 1988 be declared null and void. authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site. Reyes. Once operational. the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture. the Province through Governor Luis R. bridges. the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province to take possession of the property upon the deposit of P5. Public Purpose. or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. the environment and in sum the general welfare. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Modernly. or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution." Eminent Domain vs CARL. Of Camarines Sur v. be set aside. The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that LGUs exercise such power only by delegation.

Moreover. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money. units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Barangay San Roque v.000. Rather. Thus. 129-A. where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money. Ramirez. Heirs of Pastor (2000) Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay. etc. as holders of delegated sovereign powers. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential. besides the determination of damages. Blg. raising a pure question of law. The RTC concluded that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20. attorney’s fees. or where the money claim is purely incidental to. It reasoned that "[e) minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the RTC dismissed the complaint.50 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. the principal relief sought. it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads. because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use." On appeal. In effect. it is complete within its limits. local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. as sovereign. adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award. commercial or industrial uses. whichever was lower. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government. cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases. Jocson. Issue: WON an expropriation suit is one incapable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the RTC Held: Yes Ratio: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. In an action for eminent domain. therefore. which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.” In the present case.Y. the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. bridges. The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property. In National Power Corporation v. damages of whatever kind. it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication. the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property. such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. are unfounded. the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.P. the same being an expression of legislative policy. Likewise. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. litigation expenses and costs. an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. or its political subdivisions. which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction. hospitals. this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. As held in Municipality of Talisay v. cannot be the source of the authority of the DAR to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. In an Order. in civil actions in Metro Manila. Series of 1987. this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. or a consequence of. The opening. or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage. hence. the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or. pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. Section 9 of B. the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. This law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that involve title to or possession of real property. the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed. However. petitioner appealed directly to this Court. Ordinarily." The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Respondents contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of real property. schools. Aggrieved. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate. The closest provision of law that the CA could cite to justify the intervention of the DAR in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the CARL. it would then be the DAR to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. The Republic of the Philippines. There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes. no matter how broad their terms are. and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor. fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court. they argue that the case should have been brought before the MTC. While such delegated power may be a limited authority. the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases: . either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations. without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the DAR. demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance.

Y. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive. There is payment of just compensation. ‘of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. This.M. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. Allegedly. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before.M. 08-09: 2nd Sem. previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent. in the proceedings before the Trial Court. and (b) the cause of action. the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms. purpose or welfare. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions. he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.51 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. of course. Thus. purpose. that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In the main." In this case. for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1." Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36. which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs. as required under Section 9. which the latter did not accept. upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. 2. would an order of condemnation be a final one." the forerunners of the regional trial courts. is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a . Rule VI of the IRR of the Local Government Code. 3. over two parcels of land. It ends with an order. In fact. True. the commissioners would be final. We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel of land. the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. ’" It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. 4. Indeed. and findings of. The RTC authorized petition to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata." The Court disagrees. Realty Corp (1998) Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue." Petitioner. that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. for thereafter as the Rules expressly state. also lays down the parameters for its exercise. pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use. Hence. Feria.’ An order of dismissal. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government. "‘The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. it is not a question of who has a better title or right. The government does not dispute respondents’ title to or possession of the same. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. in his pre-bar lectures. The trial court dismissed the complaint. the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain. for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. in behalf of the LGU. Section 19 of RA 7160. like BP 129 in respect to RTCs. Verily. Issue: Held: WON the resolution is different from the ordinance Yes Ratio: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. and the observance of due process. On private respondent's motion. Indeed. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which. Series of 1993. or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. if this be ordained. but said offer was not accepted. other public entities and public utilities. V. of Paranaque v. Their reliance is misplaced. ‘no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. too. however. if not of dismissal of the action. and other pertinent laws. to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property." Mun. Article III of the Constitution. the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. if any. since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. as the public necessity. the necessity of the expropriation. 577. which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain. the courts determine the authority of the government entity. or welfare through purchase. would be a final one. convenience or welfare may demand. a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Series of 1991. its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss.’ "The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. 9395. an eminent authority in remedial law. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated. In the case at bar. too. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit. the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V. not to the jurisdiction of courts. So. To emphasize. Realty Corporation.

all others are properly complied with.Y. like police power. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. 404 and Ordinance Ratio: In the first place. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code. once all legal requirements are complied with. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation." Petitioner relies on Article 36. For example. can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. the law is applied according to its express terms. the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit. and only in passing. it was mentioned by private respondent. it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. CA (1996) Facts: Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land in Sitio Sto. the law itself. the two are enacted differently . Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. Alaska-Mambaling. 35 Accordingly. bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement. Additionally. which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties." 34 In the instant case. Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. subject matter and cause of action.52 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.demands a strict construction. for greater public purposes. which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain." "All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 . This case. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character. but also clearly defeat social justice. as an inherent power of the State. RA 7160 explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain. The complaint was initiated pursuant to Resolution No. is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337. Rule VI thereof. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity. 1993. what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules. In contrast. than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.a third reading is necessary for an ordinance. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals. appropriates the land of an individual without his consent. the Court holds that the principle of res judicata. This is clearly misplaced. 30 the previous Local Government Code. the manifest change in the legislative language . Issue: Held: WON the action is bared by res juridicata No Ratio: All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. or unjust. "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. however. In the second place. CA to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. Besides. unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. the eminent domain. absurd. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. By the same token. because Section 19 of RA 7160. the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. remains in the government. petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance. Be that as it may. and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously. which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings. City of Cebu v. In . In fact. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. 08-09: 2nd Sem. We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning. The very nature of eminent domain. But Congress did not. our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings. Moreover. the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. but not for a resolution. but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. filed a complaint for eminent domain against Cardeno with the RTC seeking to expropriate the said parcel of land. the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous noncompliance with any legal requirement. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and. The City of Cebu. there is no reason to depart from this rule. which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. When the legislature interferes with that right and. Consequently. the highest and most exact idea of property. the same is also true of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs De Knecht. and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it. as prescribed by law. it cannot. petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. Rule VI of the Implementing Rules. also requires that. but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue. Nino. however. once the said legal requirement and. since Article 32. it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property. for that matter. in exercising the power of eminent domain. since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. Issue: Held: WON the complaint states a cause of action No any event. this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23. but a resolution is temporary in nature. or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain. there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. An ordinance is a law." Thus. Indeed. Thus. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests. resolution of the municipal council.

there was no compliance with the conditions to the exercise of the power of eminent domain (valid and definite offer made to the owner and non acceptance). The foregoing should now put to rest the long drawn argument over the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. the respondent filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners. the petitioner had in fact complied with the condition precedent of "a valid and definite offer" set forth in Sec. .333. 7160.53 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. no evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint. Elaborating. private respondent posited that by definition. as We have previously held.Y. this Court departed from the aforementioned rule and held that. The doctrine finds compelling application in the case at bench. the due execution and genuineness of which are not detained under oath by the defendant. the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party. In the case of Tan v. 19 of R. For this reason. must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon. The same liberality should be applied in the instant case. other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. They claimed that the trial court issued the orders without . For as correctly averred by petitioner. the answer with counterclaim. However. No. this rule is not without exceptions. It was in fact developed and there were plans for further development. "negotiations" by itself may pertain to any of the foregoing and does not automatically mean the making of "a valid and definite offer. While petitioner reiterates that paragraph VII of the complaint sufficiently states compliance with the requirement of "a valid and definite offer". The dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner from filing another eminent domain case and from correcting its alleged error by the mere expedient of changing paragraph VII thereof. the price. The CA affirmed the of the RTC. be equated or likened to the clear and specific requirement that the petitioner should have previously made a valid and definite offer to purchase. but said negotiations failed. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as there has been negotiations for the purchase of the property without resorting to expropriation. a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein. the mode of payment. Mun. In their answer. the second whereas clause of the said ordinance provides as follows: WHEREAS. In other words.256 sq. Indeed. the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. this Court finds that the complaint does in fact state a cause of action. Moreover. 1992. technical sense. 08-09: 2nd Sem. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. idle property at the junction of the North Expressway. Ordinance No." Thus. Aggrieved. petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. from the preliminary correspondence. although the evidence of the parties were on the question of granting or denying the petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. precious time has been wasted while the salutary objectives of Ordinance No. Issue: WON expropriation may be granted Ratio: An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition for review on certiorari which has essentially become a battle of semantics being waged before this Court." At the outset. the general rule is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated thereinfor these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars. the fixing of the terms of the agreement. This Court deemed such course of action but logical where the trial court had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint. Merlita Cardeno has rejected such offer. 1418 of the City of Cebu have been put on hold by a quarrel over technical matters. . A perusal of the copy of said ordinance which has been annexed to the complaint shows that the fact of petitioner's having made a previous valid and definite offer to private respondent is categorically stated therein. a complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity. we sanctioned the act of the trial court in considering. the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose as the terminal would improve the flow of traffic during rush hours. the city government has made a valid and definite offer to purchase subject lot(s) for the public use aforementioned but the registered owner Mrs. Thus. may not be perceived to mean the valid and definite offer contemplated by law. Thus. in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. "." Likewise. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice. "cannot by any stretch of imagination. of Meycauyan (2008) Facts: On February 6. it consisting of acts the purpose of which is to arrive at a conclusion. "negotiations run the whole range of acts preparatory to concluding an agreement. However.500 (or P111. dated February 17. Director of Forestry.A. According to the CA. it must be said that without necessarily delving into the parties' semantical arguments. There is no longer any room for doubt that as alleged in the complaint. but is also deemed admitted by private respondent. Francia v. said rigid application cannot be countenanced. The error of both the RTC and respondent Court of Appeals in holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action stems from their inflexible application of the rule that: when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. Respondent needed petitioners' 16. Also. The RTC dismissed the complaint. even on the face of the complaint alone. Garcia. the property as the best site for the proposed terminal because of its accessibility. 1418. there is extant a cause of action. and as admitted by private respondent. All documents attached to a complaint.99 per square meter) was too low. m." It further added that the term "negotiation" which necessarily implies uncertainty. in addition to the complaint. 2003. Additionally. What may perhaps be conceded is only the relative ambiguity of the allegations in paragraph VII of the complaint. an allegation of repeated negotiations made with the private respondent for the purchase of her property by the petitioner. private respondent insists that the term "negotiations" is too broad to be equated with the said requirement. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid. of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose of providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-income city residents. After trial. the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and the MacArthur Highway. 1418 is not only incorporated into the complaint for eminent domain filed by petitioner. nothing else was accomplished by the dismissal of the complaint for eminent domain but a considerable delay in the proceedings. respondent's offer price of P2. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be defeated. obligations of (sic) the parties may conceive as necessary to their agreement. It planned to use it to establish a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. Furthermore.

and flood control systems is valid. no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism. Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders that. Finding that petitioners were deprived of an opportunity to controvert respondent's allegations. Complimentary support facilities (malls. That. Heirs of Ardona v. the appellate court nullified the order of expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. and that such offer was not accepted. in expropriation cases. First. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant. this Court emphasized that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. further. hospitals." The petitioners face two major obstacles. it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. According to the CA. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the PNB. waterworks. Understandably the search would be in vain. electric and telecommunications systems. Provided. Article XIV allows the State. The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. playground and picnic area on said land. it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance. An electric power grid will also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Section 13. or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless. There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads. Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use. the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area. schools. A local government unit may. etc) will also be created. The partially granted the petition. the issuance of a writ of possession became ministerial. Samus categorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous and based on a misconception of fundamentals. The defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution. Sec 2. however. or purpose. As early as 1919. Second. That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner. "public benefit". golf course. or "public welfare" and much less "public convenience.Y. It is not a grant of authority . To freeze specific programs like tourism into express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. coffee shops. in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated. The thrust of all constitutional provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction. Section 6. government office buildings. the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. hydroelectric power plants. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession. assuming that PTA has such power. a hearing was not necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required amount (with the Court). In said case. Ratio: There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. However. that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. We cite all the above provisions on the power to expropriate because of the petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision. Held: No WON the public use requirement has been complied Yes Ratio: Section 19 of Republic Act 7160[9] provides: Section 19. the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession. Issue: with Held: 08-09: 2nd Sem. parks. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to PD1533. and that since the land is under the land reform program. Also. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. their contention which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and outmoded. Reyes (1983) Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag. club house. conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. v. Eminent Domain. finally. The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use" means literally use by the public and that "public use" is not synonymous with "public interest". bridges. The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. The PTA will construct a sports complex. utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. this Court in Visayan Refining Co. Provided. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly . Provided. Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Cebu City for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. markets and slaughterhouses. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance. ports.54 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. We have never been a laissez faire State. While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation. upon payment of just compensation.

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limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follows: "The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The rule in Berman v. Parker (supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean taking from one private person and conferring on another private person applies as well as in the Philippines. An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila and Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier cited, shows that from the very start of constitutional government in our country judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain proceedings. The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, PD 564. (Disregard of Land Reform Nature) According to them, assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, the properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the purposes intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer" under the land reform program; that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the health and physical well-being of the people; and that property already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use. The petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters - less than one

hectare - is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. (Non Impairment Clause) The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v. Springs "parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good." The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. Genato which involved the expropriation of land for a public plaza. The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since the necessity for the taking has not been previously established, the issuance of the orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as well as the corresponding writs of possession was premature. Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated. The issue of immediate possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato. In answer to the issue: ". . . condemnation or expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one that is quasi-in-rem, wherein the fact that the owner of the property is made a party is not essentially indispensable insofar at least as it concerns the immediate taking of possession of the property and the preliminary determination of its value, including the amount to be deposited." Makasiar: It appearing that the petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in question and therefore do not fall within the purview of the Land Reform Code, the petition should be dismissed on that score alone. There is no need to decide whether the power of the PTA to expropriate the land in question predicated on the police power of the State shall take precedence over the social justice guarantee in favor of tenants and the landless. The welfare of the landless and small land owners should prevail over the right of the PTA to expropriate the lands just to develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only. Such a position would increase the disenchanted citizens and drive them to dissidence. The government is instituted primarily for the welfare of the governed and there are more poor people in this country than the rich. The tourism industry is not essential to the existence of the government, but the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity should take precedence over the development of the tourism industry. Filstream International Inc. v. CA (1998) Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. Petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the MTC against the occupants of the parcels of land (private respondents) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed. However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents, a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner which was filed before the RTC. The City of Manila then approved Ordinance No. 7813, authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of petitioner then occupied by private respondents. The City approved Ordinance No. 7855

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declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerero streets in Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierez, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. The City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the city which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the court denied th emotion. Concerning the first case, the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structure erected on the disputed premises. To avert the demolition, private respondents filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The TRO was granted which was later lifted. The court the dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. On appeal, the CA found merit in private respondents’ allegations in support of their application of the issuance of the writ and granted the same. The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely procedural and technical matter. Petitioner takes exception to the resolutions of the CA which ordered the dismissal of its Petition for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and unreadable. Petitioner argues that respondent appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to form rather than the substance. We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that where substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice. With regard to the other petition, G.R. No. 128077, petitioner Filstream objects to the issuance by respondent CA of the restraining order and the preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the writ of demolition issued in the ejectment suit as an incident to private respondents’ pending petition assailing the dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, of the consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by private respondents and the City of Manila on the ground of forum shopping. The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction is but a mere incient to the actual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the parties in this case over the disputed premises. In order to determine whether private respondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the source of discord. Petitioner anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties and the existence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents ordering the latter’s

ejectment from the premises. Private respondents’ claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private respondents. For its part, the City is merely exercising its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner’s properties for public use. There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this dispute. The judgment in the ejectment suit became final after private respondents failed to interpose any appeal from the adverse decision of CA. Petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already became final and executory. However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code. More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409). In fact, the City of Manila’s right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis. Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estate. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including a particular, urban land reform and housing.” We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation”. Thus the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limitations. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. Very clear from the provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use. Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above disquisitions, we now pose the crucial question: Did the city of Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions when

57 | L o c a l

Government

(Guanzon)

S.Y.

08-09:

2nd

Sem.

it expropriated petitioner’s properties? We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would indicate the respondent City of Manila complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioners’ properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream’s right to due process which must accordingly be rectified. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order. Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn. v. Mun. of Hagonoy (2002) Facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996. In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner’s members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioner’s President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner’s appeal, made over a year later, was already time-barred. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code Issue: Held: WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal Yes

Ratio: We find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was formally deficient. It is clear from the records that the petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions certified by the Department of Justice, but failed to do so on account of typhoon “Loleng.” Under the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities. Issue: Held: WON the petitioner should be dismissed Yes

Ratio: The petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already timebarred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local

Government Code. The law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory.[10] Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances. In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to file a timely appeal with the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the approved ordinance was not posted. We do not agree. Petitioner’s bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In petitioner’s two (2) communications with the Secretary of Justice,[12] it enumerated the various objections raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. These show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the proposed increase and in fact participated in the public hearings therefor. The respondent municipality likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee on Appropriations and Market on February 6, July 15 and August 19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall rentals. Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measure were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure, public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian members are elected by the people to make laws that will promote the general interest of their constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and best judgment in serving the people. Parties who participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers. On the issue of publication or posting, (Section 188 of the Local Government Code), the records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as required by law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with. Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy

1996 in three (3) public places. petitioner cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the approved ordinance.664. the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift. with no doors or protection for security. however. President Estrada issued Proclamation No. 1996.the first is public employment or the actual use by the public. It appears that the national government failed to pay to respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. On 01 March 2000. This fact was known to and admitted by petitioner. not rentals. all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. its scope matching that of taxation.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. Thus. The Ordinance was posted during the period from November 4 . petitioner’s ambiguous and unsupported claim that it was only “sometime in November 1997” that the Provincial Board approved Municipal Ordinance No. the Santos heirs remained unpaid. its demands upon the individual so increases. to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project. 1996. the taking must be for public use. themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription.[14] Posting was validly made in lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy. Petitioner made a deposit of P517. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and. as an old case so puts it. and private rights. as the condemnor and as the owner of the property. submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6. it requires no recognition by the Constitution. predecessor-in-interest of respondents.” had ceased its operations thereat. Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7. intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods along the sidewalk. the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. . pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.” two approaches are utilized . the Santos heirs. but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property. the Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke. which forms part of the expropriated area. in many respects. After its approval.80. Court of Appeals (2002) Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedingscovering a total of 544. the “Voice of America.Y.558. To be sure. whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense. or on 09 May 1984.589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos. Neither can it be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classified.00 per square meter or. the petition must fail. copies of the Ordinance were given to the Municipal Treasurer on the same day. a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings. that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests. Finally. even that of police power itself. and second. at the bulletin board of the Sta. On 26 February 1979. In the hands of the legislature. In the meantime. Bulacan. 22. viz: in front of the municipal building. transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The filing of its appeal a year after the effectivity of the subject ordinance is fatal to its cause. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Malolos. Obviously. the power is not without its limits: first. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property. Republic of the Philippines v. However. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth. and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. 28 and so the posting could not have been made in November 1996 was sufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent municipality. The bone of contention is the 76. Thus. Surely. which is to say that as society advances. and the second is public advantage or benefit. and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4. opposing the manifestation and motion. upon the other hand. Petitioner took over the premises after the previous lessee. is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property. even on the substantive points raised. This time. The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA. the burnt but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet market. by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the Office of the Market Master in the public market. on the one hand. in the due exercise of the power.58 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. the power is inherent. the Ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On November 9.25.000. The argument is of no moment. in the alternative. petitioner. and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property.000. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State. not to prove a right to possession. This fact notwithstanding. and despite the 1984 court order. The CA denied the appeal (failure to file during the reglementary period). by filing the action. to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Section 6c. at most. on October 1. such that a little over five years later. In determining “public use.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates. 1996. Given the foregoing circumstances. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the trial court issued this order condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for the property. respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property.980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway. dilapidated place.

condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. 8. being an effective forbearance. dated 01 March 2000. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment. In fine. utilized and. in what amount. Thus. providing that. which. respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which. as well as the annotations upon their title certificates. de Villaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration.[29] Article 1250 of the Civil Code. For local governments to be able to wield the power. Petitioner has occupied. the only limitation being that it be for public use.” The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties.. a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation. with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property. a power of eminent.59 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final.[31] All given. exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. Respondents. the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property. the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order. Vda. between the taking of the property and the actual payment. and matters. this Court ruled .Y. but only of inferior. Thus. The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27. for all intents and purposes. 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In previous case. this delegated power of eminent domain is not. but even then. the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated. it is. the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title. the only authority left to it being to order its execution. but merely delegated and of limited application. private respondents. it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. on the other hand. if so. was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern. plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated .but only to demand the fair market value of the same. although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property. deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6. it must.00 per square meter. as part of an airport. 19 September 1969. Verily. as well as their privies. Issue: WON failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to the court en banc Held: No Ratio: A careful reading of the constitutional provision reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases. as a result of which the decision was affirmed. decidedly. legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.e. to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent. in the expropriation suit. which . strictly speaking.“The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and. in Valdehueza vs. An in rem proceeding.[30] In other words. and ordered sold to the government. both respondents and intervenors prayed that the case be referred to the case in banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two. has strict application only to contractual obligations. Corona (1999) Facts: Concerns the MR of the court’s resolution dated November 17. at 12% per annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. are bound. they were condemned for public use. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984. be delegated to it by the national legislature. respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales. by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title. such that cases are “decided” while matters. in its 1979 decision. vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance. on the one hand. in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. In this motion. Republic[17] where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings. resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property. i. thus. After condemnation. domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. the required number to carry a decision under the Constitution (3 votes) was not met. until the due amount shall have been fully paid. to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. condemnation acts upon the property. and one who desires to sell. broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment. if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case. thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under RA 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government.6 Reclassification of lands: Fortich v. The Bulacan trial court. long final. The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property. 08-09: 2nd Sem. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment. by enabling law. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings. indeed.

as in this case. intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award. include motions. Moreover. are “resolved”. have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. while the word “resolved” must refer to “matters”. In this case. the present MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which. If there is a tie in the voting. Absent any definitive finding of the DAR. however. With this interpretation. the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. 1998 is flawed. we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a larger division. the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a MR. Likewise. therefore. they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property. nothing new as in fact they have already been raised in intervenors’ earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24. but more importantly. is prohibited. The reason is simple. On the other hand. These arguments are. Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc is justified on the ground that the issues are of first impression Held: No referral of this incident to the Court en banc. Stripped of the arguments for Ratio: This refers to the resolution “by authority of the President” modifying the Decision dated 29 March 1996 of the OP through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. the motion for reconsideration is lost. Thus. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17. their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. or CLOAs. Article VIII. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by a majority vote. Hence. 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. the rule does not apply where. The remaining 100 hectares found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer beneficiaries (FBs) in accordance with RA 6657 The resolution is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29. NQSRMDC’s (Norberto Quisumbing) Application for Conversion is approved only with respect to 44 hectares as recommended by the DA. if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a MR.Y. this having been decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur. the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court. “Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. cases heard by a division when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En Banc. the second sentence of the provision speaks only of “case” and not “matter”. Otherwise put. Before finally disposing of these pending matters. Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. if the voting results in a tie. Stated otherwise. the “Win-Win” Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In a situation where a division of 5 . Justice Martinez. and that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. the word “decided” must refer to “cases”. that our Resolution of November 17. Even then. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. Quite plainly. we feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. et al. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Rather. While it may be true that on its face the nullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. True. Section 2. 1998. the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution. 1996 decision of the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the MR which became the basis of the said “WinWin” Resolution. vs. Melo: By mandate of the Constitution. it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. To be sure. this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Section 4. Conversely. there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration. Moreover. intervenors. the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second MR Held: Yes Ratio: The contention. 1998 Decision. the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17. the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case. In their present motions. the finality of the March 29. the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants’ motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate. in relation to Rule 52. there is no decision. not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court. The issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel. Consequently. according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56. who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers. they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration.” In other words. 1998. applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.60 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the “Win-Win” Resolution. 1998 did not dispose of the earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24. Issue: Held: WON the Win-Win Resolution was valid No Ratio: The issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc.

195. is to construe something which cannot be sustained by a reading of the Constitution. through its President. the votes tied at 2-2. Hacienda Banilad. so that. the matter or issue is not required to elevated to the Court En Banc. Despite petitioner’s application for conversion. 08-09: 2nd Sem.4130 hectares of said Hacienda. and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to be reconsidered.999 ha of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL. Almost two years later. on August 6. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a “case” but only a “matter” which does not concern a case. Hacienda Palico. through the Department Secretary. had been declared a tourist zone. 1993. which was “scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the CARP. VIII). Banilad and Caylaway. through the Regional Director for Region IV. DAR. the matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc. DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Meanwhile. Art. 1993. The Secretary also denied petitioner’s withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture. On August 24. Later. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. 1993. if the required majority is not reached in a division. After the meeting.188. Before the effectivity of the law. 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. 985 of the Hacienda.2590 ha under Tax Declaration Nos.” Each Memoranda requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latter’s rejection of its offered value. petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to nonagricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Haciendas Palico. T-44664 and T44663. namely. Eduardo J. A second “Request to Open Trust Account” was sent on November 18. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6. On May 4. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution. or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. 4. that the land is not suitable for agricultural production. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. N-001796-46 (BA) with the DARAB praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued by DAR in the name of several persons. Present in the conference were representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries. 1993. or has retired.”Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by the MARO.Y. Batangas. the Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to Roxas y Cia. where the haciendas are located.e.47. the case should automatically go to Court En Banc. Congress passed RA 6657. sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioner’s voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. petitioner informed DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. the BARC. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico. The CA filed a petition for before the CA questioning the expropriation of its properties under the CARL. Roxas & Co. The DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a “Request to Open Trust Account” in petitioner’s name as compensation for 234. Land Bank (LBP) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) recommending that 270 ha and 75. petitioner. Pursuant to this. and Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner. DARAB submitted the case to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. petitioner filed with DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of EO 229. The Reports were discussed the conference. has only 4 members. petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. DAR through the MARO of Nasugbu Batangas sent a notice of acquisition to petitioner. petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.109. as mandated by the Constitution (par. the 5th member having inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate. There may. 1993. 3.023. On October 22. Proclamation 131 instituting a CARP and EO 229 providing the mechanism to implement the program. is to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting. Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under RA 6657 (CARL). sent a notice entitled “Invitation to Parties” to petitioner to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico. the petition for conversion of . Petitioner was informed that 1.61 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.3 ha of the property be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation of P8.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. CLOA’s were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. Nevertheless. particularly TCT Nos. a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any valid decision or resolution by that division. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory acquisition for distribution. Meanwhile. petitioner instituted Case No. Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. President Aquino signed in on July 1987. the LBP. be instances when a deadlock may occur. the MARO sent an “Invitation to Parties” again to Pimentel inviting the latter to attend a conference to discuss the results of the MARO’s investigation over Hacienda Banilad. if the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met. through Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu.00 and P2. On October 30. i. Sec. Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas.. v. however. Hacienda Caylawa. the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled “Request to Open Trust Account. DAR through Secretary Miriam Santiago sent a “Notice of Acquisition” to petitioner. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu. on May 11. DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. Inc. 6654. Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway. from the mother title of TCT No. and the government was offering compensation of P3.739. To say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote. DAR.. Court of Appeals (1999) Facts: This case involves 3 haciendas in Nasugbu.0800 hectares.4 million for 333. 1992. sent to petitioner two (2) separate “Notices of Acquisition” over Hacienda Banilad. all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu. sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. it was recommended that 737. Limited in Makati. Batangas. I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for reconsideration because the provision contemplates “cases” or “matters” (which for me has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned) heard by a division. 1991 over 723. even though the vote thereon in the division is 2-2. representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC). As a result. Consequently. the CARL. Roxas. DAR. then. and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural. respectively.

The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. the three haciendas was denied by the MARO. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination of just compensation. In the compulsory acquisition of private lands. the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner. But where. A CLOA is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R. farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. the land must first be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. through the MARO. Until then. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or “LBP bonds. respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment. 1989 to petitioner. there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. O. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. The landowner. Pimentel actually attended the conference on September 21. was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. O. that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the field investigation. LBP. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.Y. the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. Series of 1993. liberty or property without due process of law. 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner. the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice.62 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Series of 1990 and DAR A. Under DAR A. in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. by personal delivery or registered mail. the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. DAR claims that it. No letter of invitation was sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to DAR. O. 6657. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition. for essentially. Within 30 days from the execution of the deed of transfer. Issue: WON the Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. The Minutes was also signed by the representatives of the BARC. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Series of 1993. DAR issued CLOAs to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner’s land without just compensation to petitioner. The importance of the first notice.. Series of 1989. two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner. the landholding. administrator also of Hacienda Banilad. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain. For a valid implementation of the CAR Program. 1. the landowner. the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. in the entire acquisition proceedings. No. 1.” DAR’s opening of trust account deposits in petitioner’s name with the Land Bank does not constitute payment under the law. 9. the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. 12. The notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law. Lejano. No. speedy and adequate remedy. No. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners. The CA then dismissed the petition. sent to the various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference.A. the representatives of the BARC. With regard to Hacienda Banilad. it also notifies him. If the landowner rejects the DAR’s offer or fails to make a reply. Two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. sent a letter of invitation entitled “Invitation to Parties” dated September 29. Issue: WON the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law Held: No Ratio: Mode of Acquisition of Land Under RA 6657. Under these circumstances. The invitation was received on the same day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at the bottom left corner of said invitation. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation. and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. If the landowner accepts. the administrator of Hacienda Palico. The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The Bill of Rights provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life. and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. through MARO Leopoldo C. DAR claims that Pimentel. O. the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference. the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. pursuant to DAR A. DAR . title remains with the landowner. There was no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government. 9. After identification. the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed. Series of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A. O. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. In the case at bar. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his property shall be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right. In fact. the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and the other representatives may be present Compulsory Acquisition of Hacienda Palico and Banilad.” The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. When DAR. he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. or. Series of 1990.e. Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary. the issuance of the CLOA’s to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner. through Jaime Pimentel. No. to carry out such regulation. Within 30 days from submission. and its actual conduct cannot be understated. 12. O. No. i. his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. No.

Even DAR’s evidence does not indicate this authority.5257 hectares. and that petitioner. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. one year after Pimentel was informed of the preliminary conference. Nevertheless. Batangas. Manila nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1. Petitioner’s evidence does not show the official duties of Pimentel as administrator of petitioner’s haciendas. at the very least. avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989. and bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. could not have given Pimentel the authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or agreed upon by the parties at the preliminary conference or public hearing. Lands in Nasugbu. In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12. DAR A. No. 1520 declaring the municipality of Nasugbu. a place over two hundred kilometers away from Metro Manila. secretary. the same E. however. the Revised Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu which zoning ordinance was based on . Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. Batangas a tourist zone. Metro Manila. officers and employees. Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier.050 hectares but only 964. hence. DAR. whether these retained portions were compact or contiguous. Petitioner claims it does not know where these portions are located. the LBP. requires that the land. In fact. Is he. The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report. as in this case. before the VOS is accepted by DAR.A. the representatives of the BARC. horticulture and woodland. Makati. has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders. Why DAR chose to notify Pimentel instead of the officers of the corporation was not explained by the said respondent. Makati. however. He performed his official functions and actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu. Series of 1990 was issued and this required that the Notice of Coverage must be sent “to the landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the owner. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1. At the time the notices were sent and the preliminary conference conducted. Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway. on the other hand. was not denied participation therein.63 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner. but only 648. First of all. In 1993. A.” Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner. Manila. Jaime Pimentel is not the president. petitioner claims that it had no knowledge of the letter-invitation. and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. including the subject haciendas. as landowner. Series of 1992. which portions it could rightfully retain. petitioner’s principal place of business was listed in DAR’s records as “Soriano Bldg. O. pursuant to Proclamation No. Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes. was notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that was to be conducted by respondent DAR. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise. The right of retention and how this right is exercised.. through its duly authorized representative.” and “forest. and the notices and letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him. Metro Manila. 1992. Petitioner is a domestic corporation.. the Regional Director for Region IV of the DA certified that the haciendas are not feasible and sound for agricultural development. through the Regional Director. 6657.” Upon receipt of this notice. On March 20.O.Y. but only portions thereof. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. like Section 16 of the CARL. To reiterate. BARC and LBP representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired compulsorily.. The Notices of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed to petitioner at its offices in Manila and Makati. cashier or director of petitioner corporation. considered an agent of the corporation? The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R. Batangas adopted Resolution No.024 hectares and only 688. 19 reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu as non-agricultural. On the contrary. therefore. the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. landowner and beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be identified before the notice of acquisition should be issued. and therefore. Even respondent DAR’s evidence does not show that petitioner. his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL. then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. cannot be dispensed with. These Notices were sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was notified of the preliminary conference. Plaza Cervantes. as administrator of the two Haciendas.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. the farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. sugarland. Notice to the landowner.” Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its haciendas. not agricultural purposes. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Curiously. WON this court has the power to rule on this issue Held: No Ratio: It is petitioner’s claim that the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian reform because they have been declared for tourism. 229. DAR had information of the address of petitioner’s principal place of business. EO 229 does not lay down the operating procedure. formally accepted the VOS over two of these four titles. 1520. Issue: Assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural. 12. The Hacienda has a total area of 867. petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition. In 1975. were allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the effectivity of RA 6657. The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas.” and “7th Flr. The evidence does not indicate whether Pimentel’s duties is so integrated with the corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. DAR. 19. This Resolution approved Municipal Ordinance No. the various tax declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as “sugarland. the areas found actually subject to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by DAR. No. there is no showing that Pimentel himself was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO.O. is a juridical entity.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Notably. The land covered by the two titles has an area of 855. The haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. 1989. manager. 9. assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation. pasture land.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. much less the notice requirements. 101 Aguirre St..

8. 1993. So it is. that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. 158 (Closing the old road leading to the new Capitol Building and giving owners of properties traversed by the new road an area form the old raod).827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao Resort Complex. as so too was the closure of the road. DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. Resolution No. hence. Petitioner presents evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition. shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion. the application for conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is located. Petitioner insists that Sec. Pursuant thereto. Latorre. No. He maintains that the public road was owned by the province in its governmental capacity and. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts. Bagadiong.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt.. can close thoroughfares pursusant to Sec 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. it would seem to us. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting documents and conducts field investigation and ocular inspection of the property.Y. It goes against the basic precepts of justice. a Land Use Plan for Planning Areas for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the Philippines. the haciendas should likewise be converted. 1520 was also upheld by DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1. The city council. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. Finally. absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Angeles S. Also. This Court said: 5. is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. hence. Series of 1990. Eulogia T. Petitioner urges this Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly. DAR’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. O. pursuant to RA 5185. the RARO shall evaluate the PARO Report and forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs. The CA affirmed and found that the road was not a public road but just a trail. The PARO may conduct further field investigation and submit a supplemental report together with his recommendation to the Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same." The closure is as plain as day except that the petitioner. Vargas. subject to the approval of the Provincial Board. not with this Court." In the case of Favis v. when no longer intended for public use or for public service. the RARO shall approve or disapprove applications for conversion. Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. through no fault of their own. Reyes portions of the closed road in exchange for their own respective properties. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid. the power of the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets and withdraw them from public use was also assailed. 08-09: 2nd Sem.64 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. They border dangerously on a trifling with the administration of justice and can only prejudice the pleader's cause. In Hacienda Palico alone. we stress that the failure of DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. Baldomero Tolentino. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico. Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province conveyed to Remedios R. For lands less than five hectares. CA (1991) Facts: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. which provides: "Property of public dominion. The judge sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact said Resolution. Issue: WON the Provincial Board can validly enact said resolution Held: Yes Ratio: Resolution 158 clearly says that it is "hereby resolved to close the old road. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8. and Juan S. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. Fredeswindo F. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic Act No. Under this A. on which was subsequently laid a new concrete road leading to the Capitol Building. Petitioner claims that Proclamation No. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. and 13. Alcala. is with Congress and not with the provincial board. which has yet to run its regular course. the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land. with the blindness of those who will not see. without a prior order of closure. City of Baguio. fairness and equity to deprive these people. municipal authorities. Indeed. Learning about Resolution 158. Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages. . 2. He contended that Resolution No. CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. For lands exceeding five hectares. being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.7 Closure and Opening of Roads: Cabrera v. The Court has little patience with such puerile arguments. The findings of the MARO are subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). could not be the subject of a barter. he insists. DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner’s application for conversion. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: It sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being in accordance not only with the charter but also with Article 422 of the Civil Code. 2246 is not applicable because Resolution No. O. the Rules of Procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR. Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural. the petitioner filed a complaint with the CFI of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance. of the land they till. Anyhow. Alejandro. Elena S. Since then until the present. these farmers have been cultivating their lands. Control over public roads. refuses to acknowledge it. We do not agree.

One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive. The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street. The implementation of the MMDA’s plans. and the general welfare. which is wide and concrete. 1995. the administration of all traffic enforcement operations. infrastructure requirements. Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. traffic engineering services and . and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. . standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations. through its Chairman. however. Paranaque and Valenzuela. and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws. accredited people’s organizations. Quezon. . statutes and ordinances. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. This is not a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. He and his family were undoubtedly inconvenienced by the loss of access to their place of residence for which we believe they should be compensated. Manila. On January 2. Mandaluyong. Pateros. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. Muntinlupa. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages differing in kind. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995. this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province for the construction of provincial roads. MMDA v. Pasay.Y. The National Legislature. ordain. the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods.65 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. including the petitioner. 1996. The lower court found the petitioner's allegation of injury and prejudice to be without basis because he had "easy access anyway to the national road. Petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred. Marikina. there is no reason for not applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the closure of provincial roads. the CA ruled that the he "was prejudiced by the closure of the road which formerly fronted his house. it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts. (2000) Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila." On this issue. the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Clearly. has been giving to the public. San Juan and Taguig. convenience and welfare of the general public. 08-09: 2nd Sem. IAC. BAVA instituted against petitioner before the RTC a civil case for injunction. 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2. straight to the veterans fountain and down to the pier. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street. every individual in the province. the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street. On appeal. the governing principle was laid down in Favis thus: . plus the fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but also to the whole province of Catanduanes. The provincial board has. the trial court denied the issuance of preliminary injunction. such as it is. reaching beyond plaintiff's house. Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public Held: No Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units . For this purpose. after all. from those sustained by the public generally. After due hearing. . The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner. is a non-stock. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make. namely. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety. national government agencies.e. Bel Air Village Assn. a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. even though his property does not abut on the closed section." However.. and not merely in degree. and the municipalities of Malabon. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. Pasig. twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities. While it is true that the cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board. Las Pinas.i. programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units. may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. a notice dated December 22. public morals. From the premise that it has police power. as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. non-governmental organizations. and for the subjects of the same. BAVA was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. reaching and justifying measures for public health. for in fact the vehicles used by the Court and the parties during the ocular inspection easily passed and used it. public safety. non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village. not repugnant to the Constitution. a private subdivision in Makati City. . The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. either with penalties or without. if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. Bel-Air Village Association. Moreover. memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila. Inc. 1996. is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. a road inside Bel-Air Village." For the enjoyment of those benefits. the cities of Caloocan. On December 30. Makati. whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the new road. Inc. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Once delegated. Navotas. must be prepared to give his share. the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day. As the trial judge acutely observed. respondent received from petitioner.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation. the Metropolitan Manila Council. Under this service. Under the 1987 Constitution. Court of Appeals. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system. The MMDA is. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. whereas in local government units. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. 824. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units. coordination." When R. shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. implementation. acting through their respective legislative councils. as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. There is no syllable in R. monitoring. D. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. installation of a system and administration. Contrary to petitioner’s claim. Sangalang v. 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA. but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law." and to "advise the local governments accordingly. No.A. that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. No. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people’s productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. Unlike the MMC. President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. No. either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA. Jjlex In 1990. Esmso We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. that possess legislative power and police power. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs.) No.66 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances. R. 7924 took effect. let alone legislative power. the charter of the MMC. management." The MMA’s governing body. In the case at bar. regulation. A." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. as an exercise of police power. Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. 7924." fix. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11. traffic education programs. people’s organizations. No. It ought to be stressed. the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA. while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. In the instant case. IAC (1988) MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state . the predecessor of the MMDA. Misjuris Secondly. traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.) No. It did not have legislative power. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. The MMA’s power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila. however. hence. its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. setting of policies. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street. the President merely exercises supervisory authority. the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. A. the MMC under P. It is the local government units. Article X of the Constitution. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. A. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition. can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power. The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. Everyday. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power. A. O. approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. preparation. as termed in the charter itself. No. through its president. In fact." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. By no stretch of the imagination. an examination of Presidential Decree (P. there is no provision in R. Firstly. impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances.Y. Clearly then." In addition." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies. however. Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. much less police power. a "development authority. the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22. part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President. D. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

1990 of the municipal council subject to conditions. Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Bayanihan. 1979. under certain terms and conditions. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road. convenience and welfare of the general public. Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market. Cebu City as an abandoned road. Such . s. Mabolo. Chapter II of the Local Government Code (BP 337). city or provincial road. On 8 August 1990. The Court held that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Macasiano. Lt. the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit (LGU) (Article 422 NCC. 08-09: 2nd Sem. operation. Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Cruz. it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. Gen. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code. Hence. a service cooperative.G. 423. Cruz and J. through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code. Gabrielle. Garcia Extension and Opena streets. 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). Thereafter.G. LGU has no power to lease a road available to public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic." However. alley. cities and municipalities. e. authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets. Gacia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of the municipality. As to property for public use. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. s. maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets. Cebu Oxygen v. the Municipality of Paranaque passed Ordinance 86. City of Zamboanga. consists of the provincial roads. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran. Ratio: Property of provinces. public waters. cities or municipalities. From the premise that it has police power.G. J. Macasiano v. Gabrielle St. On 23 October 1990. 1990 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag. in the provinces. Section 10 of the LGC) which gives authority to local government units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. Bayanihan. city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Macasiano thru the OSG. municipal. Consequently. Properties for public service deemed public and under absolute control of Congress.G. When it is already withdrawn from public use. Cruz. roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas. which states “A local government unit may likewise. On 16 October 1990. Parañaque. in Baclaran. Lt. the municipality and Palanyag. street. Article 424 of Civil Code provides that "property for public use. The property of provinces. the City Council passed another resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. IAC. and public works for public service paid for by said provinces. PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command. without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. On 20 July 1990. the LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Diokno (1992) Facts: On 13 June 1990. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2. Local governments have no authority to regulate use of public properties unless authority is vested upon by Congress. Civil Code). otherwise. Lt. It is only then that the LGU can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. Bayanihan. fountains. Related case. ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G. On 13 September 1990 Brig." Legal provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. G. Article 424 NCC lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. declared the terminal road of M. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. s. Closure of roads. Cebu Oxygen v. Gabrielle G. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety. the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance 86. entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate. The legal provision (Chapter II. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Bercilles. Borces Street. and reversed and set aside the 17 December 1990 decision of the RTC which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the PNP Superintendent. close any barangay. maintain and manage the flea market with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Cruz.g. cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10. Property for public use. the municipal council issued a resolution authorizing the Parañaque Mayor to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment. The Supreme Court granted the petition. street or park. endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. 22 SCRA 1334 [1968])." In the present case. the City Council of Cebu. park or square. In Cebu Oxygen v.Y. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province. those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. the squares. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Gabrielle. On 17 December 1990. Bercilles. the same not being included in the City Development Plan. the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. Bercilles.67 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. cities and municipalities. On 20 June 1990. city streets. Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J. In such case. thus. 1990 which authorized the closure of J. the market stalls shall be dismantled. the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. promenades. the municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction. through a resolution. G.

establishment of flea market on municipality streets does not help solve problem of congestion It is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people. Likewise. Based on this objective. has already been repealed by RA7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect on 1 January 1992. Asistio. The Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i. the general public have a legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health. Contracts by Local Government governed by the original terms and conditions. the ambulances and people rushing patients to St.G. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. Baclaran area congested. in gratia argumenti. The allegations of the municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that the first condition has been met. 102 Phil. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested. Castañeda and Macalino.Y. maintain peace and order.68 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Bayanihan.e. Being outside the commerce of man. 424. the disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. v. the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. ambulances and fire engines are not able to use the roads for a more direct access to the fire area and thus lose valuable time that should have been spent in saving properties and lives. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. good order and general welfare. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio. 15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v. the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by the municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. peace.G. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Dacanay v.. And further. However. The leases or licenses granted by the City Government to stallholders are null and void for being contrary to law. Civil Code). withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract Related case. 4860). both cases involve an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Applicability of the Dacanay case. houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. safety and convenience. Rojas. Asistio. As in the Dacanay case. Moreover. that the municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance. G. the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare. ordinance cannot be validly implemented as municipality has not complied with conditions imposed by the MMA for the approval of the ordinance. 48 O. As in the Dacanay case. Rita Hospital located along GG Cruz Street are delayed as they are unable to pass through said street due to the stalls and vendors. Powers of local government unit not absolute. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion but rather leads to inconvenience to children as the normal transportation flow is disrupted. 420. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. Cruz. and Muyot v. safety. General public has legal right to demand the restoration of city streets to their specific public purpose. to pollution and deterioration of health of residents due to the garbage left by the vendors on the streets. In gratia argumenti. De la Fuente. The powers of a local government unit are not absolute. In Dacanay v. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. BP 337 (Local Government Code). et al. Gabrielle. as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. . the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. and the law in force at time the rights were vested. Espiritu v. Further. Lt. it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva. the designation by the Municipality of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent (fourth condition). Even assuming. The Executive Order issued by the acting Mayor authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. 30 SCRA 602. 869.

Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. ) We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. VACANCIES. profession or business. when she was disqualified. the petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. SYLLABUS PART 3: ELECTIVE OFFICIALS. Leyte. there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga. As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI (Faypon v. The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards the last hour of the revision day. that the Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the same. The petitioner. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. or two weeks after the election day that the same Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists. did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence. the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION.Y. He was repudiated by the electorate. when the Commission granted the decision. Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent with his registration. His application for cancellation was never submitted in evidence. Leyte. for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years.' . The COMELEC granted the petition. The story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons. Leyte.. Quirino:[M) ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies. 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (Feb 1. "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly such abandonment or loss. 1987 in the same precinct. Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor.A. She opines that under "the Election Law. sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga. Among these are: The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. which appeared only after February 1. allegedly at 4:30 P. 1988.. and 2 she then transferred her registration to Kananga.M. activities and utterances. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga.. was supposed to have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. It was only on February 15. The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in Precinct No. 15. the fact remains that the local elections of February 1. closed by the signatures of both officials showing that there were only 9 additional registered voters in Precinct 17. who gathered the second highest votes in the said area. nevertheless. Section 12. engage in business. All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutes indicating that no revision of the voter's list was made as of 5:00 PM The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered the application for cancellation at 4:30 P. Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in a sealed envelope. section 89 of R.) In the instant case. 17 are far removed from the serial numbers of the other new registrants in November 28. petitioner was not there. 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. Abella. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga. The most telling evidence is the list of voters.69 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 1987. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. COMELEC 201 SCRA 253 Facts: Initially. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. Leyte therefor. The question now is whether or not the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials . or practice his avocation. Mahawan. is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is. However." In this regard she states that . January 9. 1988) in Kananga. Leyte on November 25. however.. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein." Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. Article X of the Constitution provides: Relating therefore. Leyte (the petitioner insists that she is such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on Nov 25. although she had physically resided at Ormoc City. without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed. 1988. 08-09: 2nd Sem. SUCESSION. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS Qualifications Abella v. 179 to section 12. who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17. The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts. The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January 9. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed. submitted by the Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names. Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga. the first without the names of the Larrazabals and the second. The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from the Election Registrar or anybody else. Kananga. Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling. Emeterio Larrazabal.1988. Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga. is nor present. the animus revertendi rather than anything else..M. Leyte. hence.

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necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable. Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official." The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation is "wrong English" since nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective office. She states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have been used after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of the provincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote." The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious. In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte." Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's second division is null and void on the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991. Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three years he exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members commence and expire, that his term expired on February 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional provision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a color of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to February 15, 1991, are considered valid. Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor by virtue of Section 6 RA 6646

Ratio: Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be counted. The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered counted making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004. While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position can not assume the vacated position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a candidate for the position of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No. 88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave. ... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have

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positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion. Labo v. COMELEC (1989) FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled. ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him? HELD/RATIO:

Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo. *Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.): Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case. Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996) Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad. Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other

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qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime. The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province. It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court should allow a person like Estuye or his league to bring the action. I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly. The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice. Mercado v. Manzano (1999) FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-mayor of Makati City. Important details on Edu Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents. On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him according to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second

“dual citizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean “dual allegiance”. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar v. At the time of said travel. ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. In Sec. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications prescribed. the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registered as an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used for his last travel to the US dated April 22. Navy. the concern was not with dual citizenship per se. in 1992. Hence. being a rival candidate. 08-09: 2nd Sem. WHEREFORE. 2002.40(d) of the Local Government Code (which declares as “disqualified from running for elective local position… Those with dual-citizenship”). when it was shown that the private respondent had the most votes. Eastern Samar. Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition. and the question is WON the second placer may be declared winner. to be effective. and practiced his profession here. ISSUES: WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to intervene granted. he made these statements under oath on March 27. “I am not a permanent resident of . DISMISSED. registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992. the use of an American passport was simply an assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. it was held that “By laws of the United States… Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988. loyalty to two or more states. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood). Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a question of which state’s law must apply to him/her. Otherwise.Y. Certainly. 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. or immigrant to . Eastern Samar in the May 14. dated July 19. Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American passport. and in 1995. such persons with dual citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. 2001 elections and the order. Manzano. Congress has “command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office. after the age of majority. persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the ViceMayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment. obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth). He grew up and resided there until 1965. together with the fact he has spent his life here. He was subsequently naturalized as a U. Dual citizenship is involuntary. and 1998 Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. 2001. 1938 – Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras. by some positive act. saying: Manzano. citizen. Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motion on May 20. there has not been such a proclamation. Therefore. If Mamaril was competent to bring action. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen. dated January 30. a foreign country. COMELEC). WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so.S. petition for certiorari. Under Philippine law. it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage. so was Mercado. Manzano’s oath of allegiance. 1998.” This assumes that at the time intervention was sought. The rule in Labo v. justifying this petition for certiorari. it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex. being born in the USA.” Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.73 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vicemayor of Makati City. when he joined the US Navy. he no longer had US citizenship. petitioner Mercado’s contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent’s certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of his American citizenship. even after his . but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Yet. he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to the USA.S. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Coquilla v. therefore posting a threat to a country’s sovereignty.  Yes. of the Second Division of the COMELEC. equally without merit is his contention that. such renunciation should have been made upon reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. In private respondent’s certificate of candidacy. of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. by being born to Filipino parents. Certiorari Facts: February 17. Also. COMELEC only applies when the election of the respondent is contested. petitioner contends that through Sec. petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U. where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. 1970-1973. COMELEC. WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City. Division’s ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner. and has taken part in past Philippine elections. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy. 1995. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion. and still has an interest in ousting private respondent from the race when he sought to intervene.Special Civil Action in the SC. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras.” Therefore.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship. Manzano natural born Filipino citizen. the petitioner had. Plus. received his education here. In Frivaldo v. there had already been a proclamation of the election results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact.  No. COMELEC (2002) Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution. 1997should not be such a big deal.

" Hence. the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy. he received a copy of the order. should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. affirmed and. Hence this petition. 1998. 5 days later. petition should’ve been filed on or before Aug 27. 02.A. resolution. the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.S. 08-09: 2nd Sem. months. when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. 5 days later. Alvarez—respondent. a registered voter in the barangay. No. Issues: WON the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner. Neil M. WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras. the last of which took place on July 6. sangguniang panlungsod. 2001 – filed certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras. Contention that petitioner’s MFR did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and. Subsequently. order. 2001 and the petition in this case was filed on February 11. municipality. in the first case. the motion was so held because it was a second motion for reconsideration. not on the ground that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation but on the merits. 2000.74 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. ‘02. The 1-yr residency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected. otherwise.or it failed to substantiate the alleged errors. No. 2001. On Feb. Eastern Samar. COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14. Sec 6 & 7: Candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. “Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or legal residence—the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home. no matter . retirement from the U. or it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law. on motion of the complainant. a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. 2000 and lasted until August 5. ‘01. dated Jan. It was actually filed. and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. so and since the resolution was received on July 28. WON COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.A No. February 27.applied for registration as a voter of Butnga. ‘01 resolution on July 28. however. and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. 10. First. as earlier shown. 2001 to cure his deficiency in days. he filed this petition for certiorari. was done within the reglementary period provided by law. or the adverse party was not given notice thereof. which. Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U. incumbent mayor of Oras and reelectionist—sought cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10.petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently took his oath of office. No. 7160) provides: An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. on Feb 11. Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14. The MFR was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. city. pursuant to Rule 19. petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate. 2001 . October 15. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which was approved Nov. and COMELEC erred in ruling that petitioner’s MFR was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters. of the COMELEC en banc denying his MFR. 2000 – oath-taking as Filipino citizen. petitioner applied for repatriation under R. issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 2001. 2. or province or. or ruling of COMELEC. Petitioner’s MFR suffers from none of these defects. although he continued making several trips to the U. In the cases where MFR was held to be pro forma." March 5. §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R. 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. 2001. but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30. Oras. 2002. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 30. the same should be considered as having been filed late and should be dismissed. he remained in the U. in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan. 2002. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma. 2001. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed. 6646. Navy in 1985. 115123 three days after November 21. 2000 Nov. Eastern Samar for "two (2) years. COMELEC and Salcedo II v. §2 should be counted from receipt of decision. Petitioner’s MFR and petition for certiorari were filed within the prescribed periods. In Abella v.S. 2000 until May 14. Navy in 1985 cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10. unless. the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis the respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras.S. In this case. July 19. §4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 2002.A. 7. 2001 where petitioner won over private respondent’s by 379 votes.S. the district where he intends to be elected. or sangguniang bayan. petitioner received a copy of COMELEC’s Second Division July 19. thus. where he. 000737 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No.Y. ‘02. which have been begun before the elections. 6. 01 is not correct. in the second. Meanwhile. Private respondent contention: petition should be dismissed cause his motion for reconsideration was denied for being pro forma and did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. only on February 11. Approved by Election Registration Board on January 12. the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case. he filed his MFR. R. or it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence. on Aug. May 17. 2000 . COMELEC – the SC. 5-day period for filing MFR under Rule 19. 2000. reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates.

by having been naturalized abroad. of R. a permanent resident of the United States of America. Oras. much more does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. But. 1988. dated July 19. In any event. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately. he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress. thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. 8171. Guray). Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).A. or. In the case at bar. before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition. passport. citizen after enlisting in the U. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. 1988. No. which provides for the repatriation of.S. CA (1990) Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao. ‘00. No. Oct ‘99. Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18. Third. 8171. ‘00 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R. which. 2001. among others. From then on and until Nov. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Petitioner was repatriated not under R. Yes. what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. where he may be found at any given time. Fourth. No. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy. petitioner did not reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14. and June ‘00 is the statement "Philippine Immigration (–) Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program). Hence. It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question. Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.A.S. however. a Memorandum and a Manifestation. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras Petitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v. petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer. Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. 08-09: 2nd Sem. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are . which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the US." which entitles one to reside permanently in that country. in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. In any event. As for his entry on Aug 5. all dated March 19. on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder. In the case at bar. dated January 30." Under §2 of R. 10. Disqualifications Caasi v. No. hence.A. when he reacquired Philippine citizenship. ‘00. the fact is that. the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay. to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). On the other hand. contrary to petitioner’s claim.A. not of Bolinao. His disqualification. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.S.A. petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence.S. prior to the local elections on January 18. are complete and intact in the records. if so. if he is a former Philippine national.75 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. petitioner’s contends that his registration as a voter of Butnga. petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U. 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.A.Y. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified. he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines and had not reacquired it until November 10. in relation to §7. 00 Second. among others. the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on Oct and Dec ’98. as amended. registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency (Nuval v. 2. WON COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since the statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras. No. 473. but under R. he is entitled. petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10. the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). No. petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines (Caasi v. was sought by herein petitioner. as was the case with the petitioner. A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. In the case at bar. 2001. the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections. If immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard. Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U. he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C. Under §5(d). Issues: 1. 2630. and the order. Commission on Elections and Bengson as residency was not an issue in these. natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.A. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U. when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship. Judgment: WHEREFORE. Mateo Caasi. 2001 elections. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). CA). Navy in 1965. he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only.S. As an alien.

" The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest. Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. 1988. the country in which he resides." On its face.. 08-09: 2nd Sem. under false pretenses. 1988. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion. 18. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office. has yet to be served on private .S. they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. In other words. hence. that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.1988 local elections. did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18. his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines. 42. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18. Without such prior waiver. but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18. for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U. conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.76 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Did Miguel. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U. In the case of Merito Miguel." Despite his vigorous disclaimer. his election thereto was null and void. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. On the back of the card.S. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U. In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country. the following information is printed: Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States. 68. he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U. In the same vein.S. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office. "Permanently. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec.S. a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. he never really intended to live there permanently. We.Y. waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States? To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines. Section 18. his election thereto was null and void.S. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy. As a resident alien in the U. the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.S. hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.S. and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak. 1988. this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it. Section 18. hence. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently..S." Miguel's answer was. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides: SEC.. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. USA. Marquez v. he was issued by the U. Disqualifications .. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code. This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. it is claimed. the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States. LGC). the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Pangasinan. but not quite. The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.S. Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Immigration is the removing into one place from another. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Miguel's answer to Question No. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only 3 months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in Nov 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on Jan 18. with ease. by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay ." Therefore. he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" Miguel admits that he holds a green card.S. Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States. 1988. the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U. not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao. therefore. COMELEC (1995) Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy. Based on that application of his. Even if that were true. the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984. unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. the upper portion.

in fact. that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. "a person who has been convicted by final judgment. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law. Rodriguez. 73. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. Secondly. The Court itself. Rodriguez v.Y. submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. herein private respondent. albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. . The definition thus disregards the true and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. In his ponencia. Concurring. Thirdly. Justice Jose C. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. made this reservation: . Unfortunately. It provided: Art. The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the meaning of the term. Saguisag who. he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest. Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight . or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted. however. to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment. in reality. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. involve the issue of presumption of innocence. i. Davide. respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that country." i. Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage. not being a trier of facts. but COMELEC dismissed the petition. a public office is a public trust. COMELEC (1996) Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T." as appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. however. de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Section 1. Vitug finds the definition given to it by the Oversight Committee. Justice Vitug on the constitutionality of the disqualification based on the presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a qualified voter. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Issue: Whether private respondent. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also to those who. But this is only one side of the coin. who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice. a. Disqualifications. Before the May 1992 elections. one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. The Court certainly agrees. the disqualification in question does not. V.e.77 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition. Medyo bothered ako doon. I do not share the doubt of Mr. it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. There are certain fundamental considerations which do not support the applications of the presumption Firstly. grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Marquez. COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. . However. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice.roughly five (5) months prior to the . it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek election for a public office. as inordinate and as undue circumscription of the law. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: “(a) xxxx “(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Mr. Elsewise stated.” Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims. I further submit that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment.. a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s disqualification was filed by petitioner. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez.” Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: “Article 73. the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not. flee to avoid prosecution. I agree.. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case. the scope of fugitive. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. Jr. after being charged. 1985. 08-09: 2nd Sem.e. he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives.” It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. A. 1995 elections.

the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in the Philippine history. these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless. regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight. The various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in People v. And obviously. 1995. to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision. there was yet no case or prosecution to avoid. homeward bound.e. not long after petitioner's arrival in the country. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who. The instant petition is also an appeal from EPC No. then for the governorship. or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. i. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which transpired. In fact. the evidence of Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Marcos.” Held: No. Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. When. Verily. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US. 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court. declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision. a person leaves the territory of a state not his own. does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same. by almost five (5) months. The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. And being a figure in these developments. Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25. 1985. The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court. as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. seem to trivialize. the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. or on November 12. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment. But the COMELEC report did not end there. as interpreted by the Supreme Court. To elaborate. with their proposed expanded definition.. Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice. That petitioner did not know of the imminent filing of charges against him and that he did not flee to avoid prosecution are bolstered by the facts that: 1. thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. Jr: Petitioner returned to the Philippines from the United States on June 25. 1985 while the criminal complaint against him for fraudulent insurance claims. after calibrating the parties' evidence. The poll body expressed what it describes as its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice". While the law. institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice".Y. In arriving at this new conclusion. in good faith. They espouse the broader concept of the term and culled from foreign authoritie scited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. Therefore. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. Pinuila. Besides. grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was filed almost 5 months later. the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction. it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. Then. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. it cannot be said that he fled to avoid prosecution for at the time he left the United States. preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12. And serving the people of Quezon province as such. what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United States. And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC. as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995. 1985. However. flee to avoid prosecution. the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. Altogether. that one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him. and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country. And obviously. the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the office. on December 26. For indeed. Torres.) he returned to the United States twice: on August 14 and October 7 of the same year but arrived in the Philippines on October 26 . he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. a report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC. being charged.78 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.

thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of right and duty x x x. On the contrary. keeps. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree. The fact that he remains here even after he was formally accused cannot be construed as an indication of an intent to flee. suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. The first assailed resolution dated 6 May 1995 declared dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti. citing as the ground therefor. item. there being no compelling reason for him to go to the United States and face his accusers. Thus.” All told. 1612 that “mere possession of any goods. or buys and sells. item. an accused charged with a crime in the Philippines cannot be a candidate and at the same time flee from prosecution. Verily. Why should he not come home? Coming home to the Philippines was the most natural act of the petitioner.” The elements of the crime of fencing (as gleaned from the definition of fencing in Section 2 of PD 1612. As it is. object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code. sells or disposes. "Fugitive from justice" must be given a meaning in the instant case having regard to "the circumstances and the time it is used. By way only of hypothesis. or to society in general.e. both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. acquires. and 3. justice. or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men. the other is the denial of the motion for reconsideration. by their very nature.79 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Dela Torre filed an instant petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC. 08-09: 2nd Sem. for instance.D. the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which. For this and the reasons above discussed. by their very nature." Philosophers and jurists have tried unsuccessfully at an exact definition of such an abstruse term as justice. may we enforce in the United States our standard of justice based on Philippine Laws? I am tempted to ask these questions considering our zealousness to solve legal problems in the light of laws obtaining in the United States. (3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article. or in any manner deals in any article. COMELEC (1996) Facts: Rolando P. the question of justice is still unanswered as it ever was albeit characterized by secular skepticism. Once he goes campaigning his opponent would have him arrested. “reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of x x x possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. the forum in which it is raised should be controlling. or to return. subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. According to the election results. In fact. should even be scantily considered. Had petitioner been aware of the imminent filing of charges against him. Anti-fencing Law) are: (1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale. which have been deprived from the proceeds of the said crime. contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice.) his wife was later on arrested for the same charges. it is his official duty. Petitioner is a citizen of this country. (2) The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft.Y. both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain .000 votes more or less. are crimes of moral turpitude. anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti. 2. object or anything of value. “Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence”). honesty.” The duty not to appropriate. whether in the metaphysical sense or otherwise. the provision on disqualification of fugitive from justice. Section 40(a) of RA 7160 (i.” Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a). he would never have returned to the United States and he would not have left his wife in there. petitioner won over private respondent by a majority of 140. Finally. Unfortunately. Issue: Whether the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude Held: A crime involving moral turpitude is one which is “an act of baseness. honesty x x x or sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft.) he left his wife in the United States. vileness. a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation. and therefore should caution the buyer. De la Torre v. object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing”. possesses. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that good morals. on the part of the accused. Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. buys. although it is . as an incumbent Governor of Quezon. and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source. likewise in the same year. modesty. At any rate. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P. If the question is asked: What standard of justice should we enforce? The American sense of justice or the Philippine sense of justice? Undoubtedly. to disqualify petitioner on the shaky ground of being a "fugitive from justice" would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. are crimes of moral turpitude. the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude. to remain in the country and perform his duties as the duly elected public official. if an American flees to escape from Philippine Laws to the United States. a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which.a presumption that is. x x x. The nature and condition of the goods sold. receives. and (4) There is. intent to gain for himself or for another. No. conceals. petitioner appears to have garnered 285. Laguna in the 8 May 1995 elections. according to the Court.202 votes. who happens to maintain his residence in the country. being unnecessary and serving only to undermine one's constitutional right to equal access to opportunities for public service. or good morals. circumstances normally exist to forewarn.

Said provision reads: Section 40. within two (2) years after serving sentence. Such being the case. Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.” It appears that Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18. In this case. proclamations and administrative regulations. and again in the May 8. Sulong. the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. By applying for probation. Clearly then. 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan. his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5. In all respects. Therefore. Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. not BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another. executive orders. the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest. however. 2001 elections. he was reelected. decrees. justice. honesty. acts. or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate. the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5. although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro. Disqualifications. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from Ratio: It is the second sub-issue which is problematical. In a petition for disqualification. pursuant to §40(b) of RA 7160 which disqualifies from running for any elective local position “those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime. we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of the crime considering that petitioner did not assail his conviction.Y. COMELEC (2002) Facts: This is a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro. city charters. Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5. along with a . In the May 11. 2000.80 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. involves moral turpitude. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in Section 40 of the Local Government Code. neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzo’s proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the rightful winner. The Comelec ruled that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of mayor by virtue of Section 12 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) (crime involving moral turpitude. 1998. It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3. 1985 while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1. 2003. Also. or good morals. modesty. petitioner’s theory has no merit. Likewise. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). petitioner alleged that in 1991. or to society in general. 1992. petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery: the offender is a public officer. Nueva Ecija. petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. however. In enacting the later law. the latter is deemed repealed. . the later enactment must prevail. honesty and good morals. during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan. Furthermore. 1988. the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code states that: (f) All general and special laws. petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5. Unfortunately. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent. 1995 elections.The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Issue: Held: What law should apply in this case Local Government Code Ratio: Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Issue: WON direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude Held: Yes performing an official duty in exchange for some favors. denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5. contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice. In accordance therewith.) According to the COMELEC. Furthermore. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty. Lingating v. shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office. Magno v. Thus. Nueva Ecija in the May 14. or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust. vileness. and not the other way around. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The MR was denied the by Comelec. petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001 elections. COMELEC (2002) Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for the disqualification of Sulong. or granted amnesty. ‘Moral turpitude’ is “an act of baseness. Nueva Ecija during the May 14. It frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. inasmuch as petitioner was considered to have completed the service of his sentence on March 5. he cites Section 40 of RA 7160. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws. unless he has been given plenary pardon. 1992. which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar. the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.” Not every criminal act. being the more recent expression of legislative will. and the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men. Thereafter.

Thus. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested. 1995. 1992. said provision no longer applies if the candidate whose qualification is questioned got re-elected to another term. which provides that "[t]he President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. . . No. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified. the people of LAPUYAN have already expressed their will when they cast their votes in the recent elections as evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong to have won convincingly. Romeo Tan. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was “overtaken by the local elections of May [11. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.A. required Jim Lingating.]. Here. 12-91. considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s motion. the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Art. he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. Rulong was voted for in the elections and he won as mayor.A. 7227. is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition. since . 1992." because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices. The records of this case show that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC No. Sulong filed an MR contending that the decision has not become final and executor as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992.A. at the time of the elections on May 14. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. especially since. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. took his oath as mayor. par. Flores v. No. in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. It ruled that while it is true that one of the disqualifications from running in an elective position is removal from office as a result of an administrative case.81 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.” that on February 27. because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President.. Moreover. 2001. to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor. first par. municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. was administratively charged with various offenses. The comelec was unable to render judgment before the elections. respectively.]1992. on February 4. 13. COMELEC. the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Issue: WON Sulong was entitled to occupy the office thus vacated Held: Yes Ratio: We stated in Reyes: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided. contend that said provision is unconstitutional as under the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. to comment. §12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration. Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. however. the decision in the administrative case. and that the complainant in AC No. the filing of such motion should be encouraged before [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. that on February 18. and consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to §68 of the Local Government Code. 7. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Indeed. It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to §40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. has not until now become final. as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies. be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved respondent’s motion. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration. of R. He was thus validly removed from office and. nothing in its text or history suggests that such motion is prohibited. “for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act. Art.” Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan. IX-B. of the Constitution. 1992. 16. and that. a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on February 17. preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Indeed. VII. pursuant to §40(b) of the Local Government Code." under which Mayor Richard J. granting said decision has become final and executory. Vicente Imbing. There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. §12(c) can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide: Although Rule 139-B. malversation of public funds etc[. of the Constitution. 12-91 on February 4. finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty.” Petitioners. it was held that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B. Drilon (1998) Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. Under said provision. (b) Sec. However. The comelec then rendered a decision declaring Sulong disqualified as he was guilty of violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (d). While R. It may therefore be filed . . Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory. . the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R. falsification and malversation of public funds. and the highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan. to afford the agency rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of evidence.Y. and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint". 1992. otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992. which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory. 1992. . which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure. he filed a “motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal. he was disqualified from running for reelection. The comelec en banc. But that was because in that case. was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3. reversed. as taxpayers. the complainant in AC No. The re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision which found him guilty of dishonesty. Vicente Imbing. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires.

to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. 08-09: 2nd Sem. first par. (d). does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned. Vice-President. first par. Without passing upon this view of Senator Saguisag. 13. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection. par. of the Constitution. Hence. G. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer. e. of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts Held: Yes Ratio: The rule expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person. (d). we need not rule on its validity. a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. the contention is fallacious. had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio. instead. In other words. it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. and. attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility. 13. the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post. and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines.. 7. citing Civil Liberties Union v. the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 83896. (d). an excepted circumstance. hence. par.A. should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. 7227. of his discretion to pick his own choice. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. the Mayor of Olongapo City. In his treatise. In the case before us. the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official. i. Even in the Senate deliberations. since the constitutionality of Sec. Executive Secretary. and. It is a legislative choice. where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President. and their deputies or assistants during their tenure.Y. Congress would have. Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority." Considering that appointment calls for a selection. so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. Indeed. of the Omnibus Election Code. Here. 7. Art. 83815.R. No. "ex officio" would have been used. Art. avoided the word "appointed" and. IX-B. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts. Members of the Cabinet. of R. the Vice-President.82 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. 261. VII. IX-B. who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet. it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. Juico. Consequently. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. to discharge the duties of some office or trust. G. of the Constitution. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio.R. as Secretary of Agrarian Reform. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was stated. Indeed. In the case at bar. In any case. except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue. when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer. the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7. Hence. it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts. Issue: WON the proviso in Sec. for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. par. (c) Sec. the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only . the President as head of the economic and planning agency. of R. when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual. the Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. v. As may be defined. it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be appointive. But. 7227. who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law. IX-B. such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. (g). It is argued that Sec. which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Art..A. Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section 13. Philippine Political Law. 13. of the Constitution. by the person or persons having authority therefor. by the person or persons having authority therefor. itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity. thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex officio. par." or "[t]he selection or designation of a person. ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. No. by the authority vested with the power. directly or indirectly. while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R. a public officer or employee. at least. It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City. Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent. to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). first par. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional. an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person.e. Moreover.. the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint.."The Senator took a view that the constitutional proscription against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. without receiving any additional compensation therefor. 7. as provided in Sec. Philip Ella C. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Executive Secretary. Inc. the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. Art.g.. but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts.A. although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.

invalid. equity. hence. void because the officer was not eligible. be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party? Ratio: The fact that decisions. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA. executory. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question. the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may. and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void.e. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Section 2 (2). it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence. will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons. before the same is adjudged to be such. . or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name Galido are clearly marked ballots. an incumbent elective official was. In the present case. can qualify. . or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise. Section 7 of the Constitution. paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution. appointed to other government posts. by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law. executory and not appealable. We do not. final orders. (Article IX (C). Where. i. Finally. which petitioner cites in support of this petition. “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law. The COMELEC found that the writing of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15) ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. where the duties of the office were exercised . As incumbent elective official. does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. "one whose acts. and qualifications of all elective regional. As correctly argued by the COMELEC. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. which petitioner cites. and no other. the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final." On the other hand. one eligible. Election Cases Involving Local Elective Officials Galido v. therefore. the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. order. private respondent relies on Article IX. private respondent moved for dismissal. [or] under color of an election. . if it sets aside the trial court’s decision involving marked ballots. Such supposed power of appointment. however.. (Emphasis supplied) We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. provincial. he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions. such ineligibility.. After hearing. returns. want of power or defect being unknown to the public . On the contrary. or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. that “Final decisions. In his comment to the petition. and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion. or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. May this COMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)? Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution. . Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the dulyelected mayor. Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. as in the case of Gordon. or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body.Y. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were marked ballots and. order. respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA. Held: 08-09: Yes 2nd Sem. since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position. The main . After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law. his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. Bohol. citing Article IX (C). The fact that decisions. and not appealable. it is stated. law and justice. sans the essential element of choice. orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory. and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one. Private respondent filed an election protest before the RTC. any decision. the law. under color of a known election or appointment. executory and not appealable. he may be considered a de facto officer. and not appealable. .” We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final. COMELEC (1991) Facts: Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power of review of this Court. is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). Section 2(2). his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. any decision. the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections. Section 2(2). The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. Under Article IX (A). though not those of a lawful officer. or appointment. . upon principles of policy and justice. after a review of the trial court's decision. he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City. This finding should be conclusive on the Court. and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions. (C). i.83 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S.e. notwithstanding his ineligibility.

Such decisions. It ruled that Juan Garcia was the duly elected municipal mayor by a majority of 153 votes over Juan Rivera instead of plurality of 154 votes. and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts.222. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. Moreover. We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. . Albay. to this Court. He submits that the questioned COMELEC decision is not one that became final and executory unless restrained by this Court as provided under Section 3. Section 13(a) of Rule 18 (finality of Comelec decisions or resolutions) and Section 1 of Rule 39 (review by the Supreme Court of Comelec decisions. annulling the proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan. Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC. On the other hand. The fact that decisions. . Rule 39. pursuant to Section 1. invulnerable to an original civil action of certiorari. thus increasing the votes in his favor to 1. (it) may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5" of the same Article VIII. speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law lies from said adjudications. Section 7 of the Constitution. . any decision. the Comelec affirmed the decision." It is in truth this fundamental limitation on the Ratio: Under Article IX (A). final orders.087 votes. that is. or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final. final judgments and orders of lower courts in . order. Garcia contends that the Constitution declares that the Comelec decision on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are to be final. private respondent relies on Article IX. COMELEC (1991) Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and Juan Mitre Garcia II were candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan. under its power of control and supervision over the lower courts. or rulings of said constitutional commissions are not subject to appellate review. or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. of fact or both. but by the Constitution itself. (C). He cites Article IX-C. with this Court acting in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and exercising its power of review over alleged errors of law and. On appeal to the Comelec. He also contends that since the COMELEC decision has not yet become final and executory. prohibition or mandamus invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court. executory and unappealable character of the COMELEC's rulings. or affirm on appeal or certiorari. He continued as mayor until 10 November 1990 when he was served notice of this Court's temporary restraining order. In this petition. executor and not appealable. prescribe. orders. orders or decisions in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices. and postpone or suspend elections. the provision of Article IX-C.84 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Petitioner maintains further that he has a period of thirty (30) days from 6 September 1990 or until 6 October 1990 within which to elevate the COMELEC decision. 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor. modify. is pronounced not by statute or presidential issuance. final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final. In this light. or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final. sometimes. Flores vs Comelec: Obviously. dissenting: It bears stressing that the final. . according to petitioner. Regalado. does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Rivera prayed for the issuance of a restraining order arguing that the judgment had not yet become final and executory. which petitioner cites in support of this petition. the petition at bar has become moot and academic. Par.Y. Section 2 (2). preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari Held: Yes We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by a majority of 10 votes. the main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division. and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact and not of law. concurring: What the foregoing observations actually boil down to is that the decisions. order or ruling). orders and rulings) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.376 votes as against Rivera's 6. (specifically listed cases). and said Section 5 declares it to be one of the powers of the Supreme Court to "(r)eview. thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2. orders or rulings are not. executory and not appealable. Article VIII of the Constitution the "power to define. Section 2. purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. (2) of the 1987 Constitution. which rendered its verdict finding Garcia to have obtained 6. as the law or the Rules of Court may provide. during the local elections in January 1988. Article IX-A of the Constitution (Supreme Court authority to review on certiorari a Comelec decision. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990. Narvasa. should be read in the context of Section 7. as said rule applies only to "decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course or to disqualify a candidate. 08-09: 2nd Sem. fourteen (14) ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the Commission en banc. promulgated on 2 May 1990. This is a relevant consideration because while Congress is granted by Section 2. the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. the COMELEC has no authority to issue the assailed order and writ of execution. Actually. to pass upon errors of jurisdiction imputed to said commissions. Issue: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. We find none in this case. We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such authority. the Comelec sustained with modification the judgment. findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations.” On the other hand. This is inevitable and justified because no appeal or any other plain. Rivera v. In fact. on certiorari. however. Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions. reverse. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. executory. executory and not appealable." Lastly. Upon MR. . issued upon Rivera's motion. it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law. by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990. paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions. Albay and when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least 10 votes which were allegedly misappreciated in Garcia's favor. final orders. being final and executory and not appealable. . It is settled that in a petition for certiorari. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules. in relation to Part VII.445 contested ballots.

As ruled by this Court.A. Section 8. Clearly. and apportion the jurisdiction" of courts which is. On January 5. He served as mayor until June 30. In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R. No. 2007. He was a “private citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections. 1995 to June 30. Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes. was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. 7160 (the Local Government Code). 1998 to June 30. However. 1995. COMELEC. through Mr." Rivera v. he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. and this appears to be precisely the purpose and intent of said Section 2. No. that disposition. On January 10. Similarly. he was not elected to that position. “service for the full term. Commission on Elections which is likewise inapplicable. It is true that the RTC-Daet. To reiterate. therefore. v. when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. Justice Cancio C. Comelec affirmed. from which no appeal is prescribed by law. supra. thus: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC of Daet. modify. that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and. The Comelec ruled that his proclamation before was void and that the discharge of the duties is that of a de facto mayor. but Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001. Morales’ MR was however granted. Garcia. that self-same Constitution may itself effect that deprivation. the three-term limit rule applies to him. Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R. Jr. Talanga as mayor. He assumed the position. Here. Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1. two conditions or requisites must concur. Moreover. Article IX-C of the Constitution as written: to remove from this Court's power to review. legislative prerogative to "define. he was preventively suspended by the ombudsman. Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicitRespondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He held the position from September 2. to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post. This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. 2001. 1992.Y. Here. Alegre cited above. The Comelec ruled that Morales was disqualified to run for public office. Issue: Held: WON Morales is disqualified from running for mayor Yes Ratio: This Court. but he served the second term from July 1. Morales was elected for the term July 1. It bears stressing that in Ong v. in Adormeo v. there is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated. Indeed. the Court held that Capco’s assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the incumbent may not be regarded as a “term” under Section 8. In Borja. there was a “break” in the service of private respondent Ramon T. petitioners filed before the Comelec a petition to cancel Morales’ certificate of candidacy on the ground that the was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA 7160. Anthony Dee filed a petition for quo warranto before the RTC. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term. COMELEC.85 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 2001 only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer” because he was not validly elected as his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC and thereafter. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. In just over a month. Alegre. 1998 (first term) and July 1. 1998 to June 30. 2004. as held in Ong v. he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of the COMELEC in "election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1. it must be stressed. 6850. 2001. 7160 (the Local Government Code). COMELEC (2007) Facts: In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. revise. Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. was without practical and legal use and value. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three . that the Supreme Court may not be deprived by law of jurisdiction over certain particular cases that underlay this Court's doctrines allowing review by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of judgments and final orders of the National Labor Relations Commission under the Labor Code. Dee reiterated the previous arguments of petitioners. and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4. Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No.” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions. prescribe. his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. 08-09: 2nd Sem. resolved the same issue in Ong v. reverse. It cannot be gainsaid however that while Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of its constitutionally stated powers. for Francis. but also Borja. by June 30. a period of less than three years. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would-under the three-term rule-be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling. 2004 (third term). 2001.A. As the Court observed. this Court ruled that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8. barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. Alegre with identical facts. 1989 to June 30. The RTC dismissed Dee’s petition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did not serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat. and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 2001 to June 30.

Thus. 1988 for a term ending June 30. petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer. 2004. In the light of the foregoing. conversely. his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30. As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility. who was also a candidate for mayor. but rather. 1995. by operation of law. Commission on Elections. Petitioners and other candidates filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001. he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections. the Comelec en banc affirmed and ruled that there was no voluntary renunciation of office. 7160. sought . for the disqualification to apply. 1998. the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. on the other hand contended that voluntary renunciation of the office shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected. 2007 Elections. Comelec. Succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official. Commission on Elections the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post. and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18. 1989. v. 1995. if not abhorred by it. On May 11. he became mayor. he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position. Held: Yes Ratio: In Labo v. resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. Not being a candidate. Comelec ( 2008) Facts: Montebon. 2001-2004. 1992. `Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer. Cebu for the May 14. consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary. The comelec denied the petition for disqualification.. Commission on Elections. In Borja. Mendoza. 1998 elections. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan. On May 8. Issue: WON respondent's assumption of office as vicemayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor. the instant petition for quo warranto has become moot. This is the very situation in the instant case. succeeded him in accordance with law. Respondent. Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times. In this case. an effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Jr. Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor. the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. 1992. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code. he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30. Respondent admitted having been elected. In Lonzanida v. Ondoy and Potencioso. being the highest ranking municipal councilor. the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Having found respondent Morales ineligible. but claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit. Should he be allowed another three consecutive term as mayor of the City of Digos. COMELEC (1991) Facts: Jose Capco. the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. Cesar Borja. Petitioners. Benjamin Borja. and 2004-2007. Montebon v. Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat. respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor. Thus.86 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. Section 44 of Republic Act No. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11. Jr. the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12. On September 2. a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Jr. Held: Yes Ratio: In Lonzanida v. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. Thus.Y. he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term. Jr. this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner. Issue: WON it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms. 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states.” Section 8. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution. upon the death of the incumbent. Borja v. Consequently. 2003 should be cancelled. otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. On appeal. he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely”.

to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. Indeed. will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter’s office and serves for the remainder of the term. states that “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Monsod warned against “prescreening candidates (from) whom the people will choose” as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification. The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such official[s) ” from serving for more than three consecutive terms. X. In a real sense. §8 with regard to elective local officials. For their part. The vicemayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. While he may be appointed to the cabinet. although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election.87 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. therefore. therefore. Indeed. derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. resigns. It ruled that Capco’s succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code. the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. because we speak of “term” and if there is a special election. §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.” Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. Conversely. To consider.773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. considering that the draft constitution provision “recognizing people’s power. a consideration of the historical background of Art. if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds.” There is a difference. VI. between the case of a vicemayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies. 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. §8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30. Hence. the Vice-President.558 votes against petitioner’s 7. In running for Vice-President. Comelec ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas’ comment on Art. X. Thus. He received 16. The absence of a similar provision in Art. derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. by analogy.” The term served must therefore be one “for which (the official concerned) was elected.Y. however. he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Instead. he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. Issue: Held: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor Yes Ratio: (Purpose of the three term rule) First. permanent disability. Commissioner Bernas states that “if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. that unexpired term. X. the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.” This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide: “Yes. without it. §8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. no matter how short. they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because. This provision says that “No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. The second sentence. The second is the idea of election. X. VII. Petitioner also cites Art. in discussing term limits.” Petitioner contends that. On motion. §4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms. The first is the notion of service of term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession. . 08-09: 2nd Sem. such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. Second. or is removed from office. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the threeterm limit on local elective officials. would therefore be to violate this principle. There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. On the other hand. §7. Capco was voted for in the elections. only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office – whether by election or by succession by operation of law – would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. becomes incapacitated. It is likewise noteworthy that. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter’s death. in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office. his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. removal or resignation. the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory. which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms.

X §8. §8. Issue: Held: WON Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor No Ratio: The issue before us was already addressed in Borja. in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution. Borja Supplement: Case No. But if. It cannot be said of him. The Comelec found Talaga disqualified for the position of city mayor. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor. To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Jr. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about. he lost to Bernard G. it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. Jr. that in running for vice-mayor. (3) in the recall election of May 12. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term Case No. 1998 elections. 2001 until June 30. namely. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent.. Tagarao. Suppose B is elected Mayor and. where he again served the full term. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. where he served the full term. there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit. In both cases. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service. Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Adorneo v. as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency. COMELEC. he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. he also seeks the mayorship. 2001. He served the full term. is he qualified to run again in the next election? Yes. but he has not fully served three consecutive terms. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. Again. he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3term disqualification rule. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted. 169 (1998). he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. and. and his loss in the May 11. Under the local Government Code. he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number . He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Yes. he proves to be a good mayor. Talaga. the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Can he run again for mayor in the next election. private respondent responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred. 1. Suppose he is twice elected after that term. care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed. during his first term. 08-09: 2nd Sem. even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term. Six months before the next election. where we held.Y. 295 SCRA 157. he was re-elected in 1995-1998. The Comelec en banc reversed and ruled that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11. the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. To recapitulate. A cannot be considered to have completed one term. succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. Respondent added that his service from May 12. 2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence. on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992. voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one “for which he was elected. the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. the local official has been elected three consecutive times. In the recall election of May 12. Petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. was elected mayor in May 1992. On March 9. Petitioner contended that Talaga’s candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8. his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.” Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected. vs. In the election of 1998. and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. COMELEC (2002) Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14. the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired. He has distinct powers and functions. (2) in the election of May 1995. can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes. In the second case. Consequently. of the deceased mayor. because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. X. 2001 elections. Consequently. interrupted by the death . he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30. 2. Under Art. 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections. 2000. Talaga. it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. To recapitulate. In the first case. Case No. 2000. on the other hand. 2001. If he is twice reelected after that. Jr. he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. because he has served only two full terms successively.88 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor.

Socrates filed a petition to deny due course to the Recall Resolution but the Comelec en banc dismissed the case for lack of merit. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17. Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials. Nos. Flores F. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. regional and national officials. president of the Association of Barangay Captains. Vicente S. we said. Sandoval. Article X of the Constitution as “voluntary renunciation” for clearly it is not. and DILG officials]. In the meantime. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Petitioners Adovo. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. 155083-84. Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.Ma. he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. during his first term. 312 out of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. PNP officials. The PRA passed a Resolution declaring its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. as interim chair of the PRA. COMELEC. In the instant case. . G. Suppose B is elected mayor and. Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga. The Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. Section 8 of 1987 Constitution.” As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc. care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed. To bolster his case. Issue: Held: WON the recall resolution was valid Yes Ratio: Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. 2002.238 votes. No. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. sought to annul COMELEC Resolution No. in the case of Lonzanida vs. (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents. Socrates (mayor). Likewise. involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. print and broadcast media practitioners. The Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC. having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.R. conversely. 2.” The Comelec declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. No.Y. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X. found that the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. 2002. Hagedorn. Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC’s resolutions declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. no matter how short. The court gave the candidates an additional 15 days within which to campaign. 2002. 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.R. Joaquin Bernas. 2002. we said: …The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus.R. (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient. Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20. that unexpired. the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. respectively. This point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation: Case No.241 votes. Jr.89 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Accordingly. not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. Edward M. Socrates sought to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7. Adovo and Merly E. COMELEC city. 311 SCRA 602. can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes. The COMELEC. Socrates v. respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. If he is twice reelected after that. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about. a Constitutional Commission member. stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another. G. Unlike local government officials. 154512. Jr. of times before the disqualification can apply. Thus. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7. unless the findings are patently erroneous. to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8. however. COMELEC. the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Fr. (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority. G. COMELEC (2002) Facts: On July 2. because he has served only two full terms successively. we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC’s findings of fact are patently erroneous. will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit. and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public’s constitutional right to information. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that “Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term. In Lonzanida vs. 154683. 611 (1999).220 votes and 13.

does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. not because of his voluntary renunciation.018 votes over his closest opponent. however. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit. If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the threeterm limit. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24. 2001. Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code. the journal of the PRA assembly. When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials. however. Socrates. the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms. does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor. The clear intent is that interruption “for any length of time. 2001 to September 24. The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years following his completion of two terms. 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn’s service as mayor. Socrates. admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. . a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. First. The Constitution. Hagedorn’s new recall term from September 24. 08-09: 2nd Sem. and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections. Thus. we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24. There is no legal basis in Socrates’ claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. During the same period. but because of a legal prohibition. 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30. during the six-year period following the two term limit. Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. Second. In the case of Hagedorn. his candidacy in the recall election on September 24. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. Thus. 2002. From June 30. 2002. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution. Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. is sufficient to break an elective local official’s continuity of service. Issue: WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election Held: No Ratio: The constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. however. is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. 2001. 2001 until the recall election on September 24. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30. In the same manner. 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Hagedorn’s three consecutive terms ended on June 30. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials. Hagedorn’s recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection. In Hagedorn’s case. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. although short of a full term of three years. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. like a recall election. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn’s previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. who had reached the maximum three-term limit. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.Y. 2001. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. the nearly 15-month period he was out of office. attendance sheets. notices sent to PRA members. The framers of the Constitution did not intend “the period of rest” of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. Socrates. Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn. Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. After three consecutive terms. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. not any other subsequent election.” as long as the cause is involuntary. 2002. or whether there would be “no immediate reelection” after three terms. 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15. constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. 2002 to June 30. Any subsequent election. and not to any subsequent election.90 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 2002 when he won by 3. minutes of the PRA proceedings.

The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. 7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first. Mendoza v. On the next fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. He contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission. the term immediately following the three consecutive terms. to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998. is to ignore reality. In the case of Hagedorn. X. retroacting to June 30. COMELEC (G. not being a full term. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24. cited in the ponencia. Worse. 147927. 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections. But to consider Hagedorn’s recall term as a full term of three years. These debates clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to the fourth term. full three-term limit. MENDOZA. Therefore. or third term of the three consecutive terms. page 17. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. i. the Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election. which shall be determined by law. §8 of the Constitution. the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609). Otherwise.. hence. definitely. if not misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia. in accordance with the ruling in Borja. Mendoza and Mario E. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. he cannot have suffered “involuntary severance from office” because there was nothing to be severed. i. J. which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Ibarra. He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term. he was not a holder of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. J. joined. a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year. the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish “voluntary renunciation” of office from “involuntary severance” from office and the term of office to which it relates. joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO. in EPC No. Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House. as earlier stated.Y. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24. Thus. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not. he would still be barred from seeking reelection in the May 2001 election. in whose opinion QUISUMBING. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election. v. In short. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. 2001. or for a third term. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. Davide. Jr.e. the latter is made to apply to the banned term. the same principle applies to a recall election of local officials.. 08-09: 2nd Sem. COMELEC. 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30. an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms.A. concurring and dissenting. second. Hagedorn. Speaking now of Hagedorn. No. No. 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid. Article X of the Constitution. fully served three successive terms. 2001. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R. No. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. The dichotomy made in the ponencia between “voluntary renunciation of the office” as used in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R. is not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. applying it in the case of Hagedorn. Disqualification is. the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8. to make Hagedorn’s recall term retroact to June 30.e.A. the provision excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. This accounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place during any of the three terms. J. After due deliberation. he has to rest for the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. in the May 1998 elections. except barangay officials. which provides that: The term of office of elective local officials. 2001.” The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of “no immediate reelection” after three consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the “no immediate reelection” after the 3term limit would equally apply to the elective local officials. 295 . For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms.. 7160 and “involuntary severance from office” is unnecessary. 2002.R. not synonymous with involuntary severance. COMELEC (2002) For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L. J. voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that.. dated August 15. Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. Roman’s election as governor of Bataan on May 14. which reads: “shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.91 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition: VITUG. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. voted to dismiss the petition. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission.. More importantly. The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. 2001-5 and to declare respondent Leonardo B.

§8 of the Constitution. and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor. C. violates the provision of Section 9. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992. in election cases. he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate. X.. are not sufficient. Hence. He concluded that. No..92 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. For this reason. also dissented and voted to grant the petition. be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible elections. 2002. and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. On the other hand. If. PANGANIBAN. there being no justiciable controversy for resolution. because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. 3.. as public officials. 6. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056. Congress can devise ways and means. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056. where the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that disqualification had clearly attached. invalid and inoperative because: 1. 1995.Y. is not feasible. she voted to grant the petition and to declare respondent’s election on May 14. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who. which in effect. Oct. 1992. and in the process violating the Constitution itself. del Mar (North District-Cebu City). 1994 to June 30. the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice. resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision. 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. Lonzanida v. SR. 5. JJ. shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November. and CALLEJO. COMELEC. comprising the period June 28. JR.R. lawfully disbursed." which was signed into law on June 20. The suit was instituted by Governor Emilio M. should be considered as one term. 1995. 147927. as taxpayers. CORONA. Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution. SCRA 157 (1998). Cainglet (3rd District-Zamboanga del Norte) and Romeo Guanzon (lone District-Bacolod City). Tenure of Office Osmena v. providing for the campaign periods for Presidential. with whom DAVIDE. AZCUNA. Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution. Republic Act 7056. Gov Roberto Pagdanganan on behalf of the League of Governors of the Philippines. in Socrates. 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001). mandamus and Injunction with temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of said Republic Act 7056 and the consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel the Comelec to immediately and with all deliberate speed set up the machinery and make the necessary preparation for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May. service for less than a term. particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001. within the parameters of the Constitution.. Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995. during which respondent Leonardo B. his election on May 14. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May. at all. much less.J. 1994 to June 30. when two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight. providing that all incumbent provincial. in the present case. to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this. Wilfredo G. Representatives Pablo P. 2001 as null and void. also voted to dismiss the petition. should not be counted. J. his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. more importantly. therefore. J. He contended that respondent Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution. also voted to dismiss. J. J.. 1992. it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service. 4. they have an interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and. valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992. 2. No. holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman. J. "An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992. 311 SCRA 602 (1999). COMELEC (2002) Facts: The petition) calls for a determination of the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act 7056. G. should not count to disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position. a term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. Hence..R. as much as legally possible. 1992 violates Section 8. the period from June 28. COMELEC. and Adormeo v. joined by CARPIO MORALES. 133639. 08-09: 2nd Sem. G. Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections.). He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because. Issue: WON the Court has competence to act on the matter at bar . This case is different from Socrates. Bacaltos (1st District-Cebu). still. The Solicitor General prays for the denial of the petition on the ground that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners are merely asking for an advisory opinion from the court. The petitioners' claim they have actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case not only because. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. Since on May 14. so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30. Antonio T. Garcia (3rd District-Cebu). J. in fact. they have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution but also because.. 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2. the Solicitor General contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions. CARPIO. COMELEC. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution.. J. Arcos v. 4. joined by BELLOSILLO. He explained that. Feb. because in a democracy the people should. 1998 (res. Osmeña (Cebu).. Article X of the Constitution. arguing that it is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous. joined by PUNO. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993. is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. except only in case of voluntary renunciation. Raul V. 1991. 7056 as unconstitutional and. They pray for this Court to declare Republic Act No. concurred. by way of a petition for Prohibition. He argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term. On the merits of the case..

Y. Upon the other hand. Then also. RA 7056 provides for two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows: Sec. the Comelec (not Congress) alters the period. to start. city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections. Stated differently. It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Executive and/or Legislative but simply because the Executive. Accordingly. That the election for Senators. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056. 8. members of the House of Representatives. 1992. XVIII) is likewise evident from the following records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. 2. there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period.93 | L o c a l Held: Yes Government (Guanzon) S. brushing aside if we must. Under this provision the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy and the ensuing campaign period must be embraced or circumscribed within that election period of ninety days. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Art. 3 of RA 7056. (b) For Senatorial elections. 1995. 2. we must act on the matter. therefore. We are left with no choice then. not three years as provided for by the Constitution. it has to be stressed that the term of office of elective local officials. conformably with existing doctrine so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. the inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized election. 1992. 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. involving as it does a question of national importance. as follows: Sec. assuming the existence of such flaws. that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. But RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period. Issue: Held: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional Yes Ratio: It is evident from the wording of Article XVIII. Art. But under Sec. 1991. Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. 1992. We would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers in proper cases even political questions. and (b) An election of all provincial. 1992 to June 30. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June 30. Article IX of the Constitution provides that: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases. 5. city and municipal elective officials on the second Monday of November. except when in special cases. Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30. provided naturally. the hold-over provision for incumbent local officials. that the question is not solely and exclusively political (as when the Executive extends recognition to a foreign government) but one which really necessitates a forthright determination of constitutionality. Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. except barangay officials. The reason for the said adjustment. as much as practicable. But this is not all. Art. 5-on the second Monday of May. Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution. that the issue presented to us in the case at bar. their term would have expired on February 2. even though the successors fail to qualify with the time. ninety (90) days before the day of the election. And even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us is political in nature. It has been held that: It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years. on the procedural issue. On this point. that is. "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely. All these the postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local election from 1992 to 1995. it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. The purpose of Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section 1 thereof under the heading "Statement of Policy" . 8.. Start of Synchronization To start the process of synchronization of election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared there shall be held: (a) An election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. We held as early as in the Emergency Power Cases that where serious constitutional questions are involved. 1992. For one. the reduction of the . It thus becomes very evident that the Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to June 30. is justiciable rather than political. the synchronization of the elections so that the process can be completed in the 1995 elections with the result that beginning 1995 there shall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections for national and local elective officials every three (3) years. As for the other alleged procedural flaws lack of court standing. the Legislative and this Court are subject to the Constitution as the supreme law. X). To summarize. Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII. etc. there is Section 2. and contrary to the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. is fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec. those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months. the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. We hold in view of the foregoing considerations. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May. not the wisdom of RA 7056. On the other procedural issues raised. as well as those of the Senators. Therefore. these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30. 1992. 1992. Even if the question were political in nature. (a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election. 1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII. We are left with no other alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present cases." It would appear undeniable. There are other provisions of the Constitution violated by RA 7056. technicalities of procedure. President and Vice-President. . the same may be brushed aside. Section 9. from November 30. and (c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial. Ratio: What is involved here is the legality. Sec. is the same to synchronize the national and local elections. twenty four (24) Senators and all elective Members of the House of Representatives on the second Monday of May. The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988. .

Vacancies and Succession Jainal v. 7166 provides for the steps. Automatically deferring the canvass of the contested returns and proceeding to canvass the uncontested returns. Talib were duly certified candidates for Mayor of Indanan. The proclamation of petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons: (1) it was based on a canvass that should have been suspended with respect to the contested election returns. the returns were not signed by the members of the board of election inspectors.A. The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear and categorical language that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7. It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General evaded the issue of the constitutionality of RA 7056. is the election for Senators. During the canvassing. Entering its ruling in the prescribed form and authenticating the same. to wit: Recording the oral objections in the minutes of the canvass. No. transmission. under the provisions of the Local Government Code. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the case contending that the allegations are not the proper subject of an election protest. are violative of the 1987 Constitution.Y. Also. deserves no consideration at all. The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is. petitioner filed the instant petition. hereby extended to noon of June 30. Although he made a lengthy discussion on the procedural issues and on the legislative power of Congress. suspend the canvass of the contested election returns.A. No. 20 of R. Comelec. The proclamation of Jainal was also annulled. Summarily and immediately ruling on the objections upon receipt of the evidence. In fact. this rule admits of exceptions. Hence. 7166 was not complied with. to be synchronized with the election of the President and Vice-President on the second Monday of May 1992. No. Assuming. The appeal to the COMELEC is also reckoned five (5) days from suspension of the canvass. 20 of R. However. 7166 any further. Filing with the MBC a written and verified notice of appeal within forty-eight (48) hours from suspension of the canvass. logically. the number of votes exceeded the number of voters in two precincts.A. elevating therewith the complete records and evidence submitted in the canvass. However. Suspending the canvass after canvassing all the uncontested returns and ruling upon the contested returns. Also. 234. G. no longer viable after a proclamation has been made. The comelec annulled the election returns in nine precincts. No. included the contested returns in the canvass and immediately proclaimed petitioner. custody and appreciation of election returns. . receipt. It is worthy of note that what was filed with and resolved by the poll body is a pre-proclamation case. term of office of local officials to be elected on the second Monday of November 1992 and the change in the campaign periods. 20 of R. When Talib made his objections to the inclusion of the contested election returns. in the exercise of its legislative power enact the needed legislation. No. or any matter raised under Sections 233. These actions of the MBC rendered it impossible for Talib to comply with Sec.A. Entering in the minutes of the canvass a party’s signified intention to appeal the ruling to the COMELEC.94 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. and furnishing the parties with copies of the report. petitioner was proclaimed by the MBC as the winning candidate with a margin of 1. and suspend the proclamation of petitioner. and Making an appropriate report to the COMELEC immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal. The contention of the Solicitor General that the method of amendment or revision prescribed by the Constitution (Article XVIII) does not apply to the Transitory Provisions because in the nature of things Transitory Provisions are to be carried out as soon as practicable. the elections referred to. 7166 in his Answer and Memorandum filed before the COMELEC. 1992 (Article XVIII. In this regard. will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation.018 votes. he failed to refute the arguments of the petitioners that RA 7056 violated several provisions of the 1987 Constitution more importantly. Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. 1986 election is. 147927 (2007) Facts: Petitioner Jainal Julhatab J. 20 of R. It should be noted that the forty-eight (48)-hour period for filing a verified notice of appeal with the MBC is reckoned from suspension of the canvass. the provision also requires the MBC to perform certain acts. as when the proclamation is null and void. Petitioner does not state in what respect and on what basis Talib failed to comply with Sec 20 of RA 7166. however. 7166. for purposes of synchronization of elections. there was no other recourse for the MBC except to rule on the objections. and Congress can. including Hussi Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor who. Talib objected to the inclusion of certain returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC). it has long been recognized that among the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullify a proclamation or suspend the effects of one. to be undertaken by a party contesting the inclusion or exclusion of any election return: Submitting oral objections and thereupon entering the objections in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the COMELEC. petitioner did not even raise this issue of non-compliance with Sec. Sec. Informing the MBC of his intention to appeal from the MBC ruling on his objections. Talib filed a pre proclamation case iwith the Comelec praying for the annulment of election returns pertaining to 21 precints representing 2788 votes. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. Talib had no other recourse but to go directly to the COMELEC. 20 of R. 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation. Understandably. Members of the House of Representatives and local officials. that Sec. It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the alleged noncompliance. Submitting evidence in support of the objections within twenty-four (24) hours. Instead of doing so. and (3) it was predicated on a canvass that included unsigned election returns involving such number of votes as will affect the outcome of the election. the provision on synchronization of election.R. Issue: WON Talib should have followed the procedure outlined in Section 20 of RA 7166 for contesting election returns Held: No Ratio: Sec. Talib cannot be faulted or made to suffer for such non-compliance as it was the MBC who did not comply with its duties under Sec. On 20 May 2004. in that sequence. outlined below. and taking an appeal to the COMELEC within an inextendible period of five (5) days from filing the notice of appeal. (2) it was done without prior COMELEC authorization which is required in view of the unresolved objections of Talib to the inclusion of certain returns in the canvass. in this case RA 7056. there is no aspect in the proceedings before the MBC which legally precludes Talib from filing his petition before the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. In the absence of such proof." As discussed earlier. On May 23. after ruling on the objections. 08-09: 2nd Sem. He alleged that the watchers were asked to leave the precincts before the counting and preparation of the election returns.A. No. the MBC. 5).

ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning . Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein: (b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay. dies. quoted below. 08-09: 2nd Sem. 5-4-04 upholding petitioner’s proclamation as Mayor of Indanan. Talib could not be expected to participate therein because of his pending pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC. aside from reiterating the rule against piercing the veil of returns. Issue: WON the order of the RTC of Jolo. Particularly. or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed. only this Court has jurisdiction to nullify the COMELEC resolutions or suspend their enforcement. For purposes of this Chapter. Mayor. For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter. Indeed. invalidating eight (8) of the nine (9) questioned election returns. ─ If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor. Being an election protest or a post-proclamation case. the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. Such action on the part of COMELEC should not be countenanced and deserves disapprobation. However. the COMELEC used other copies of said suspect election returns. voluntarily resigns. 44. and Vice Mayor. Sulu precludes the COMELEC from issuing the assailed resolutions Held: No Ratio: Note that Election Protest Case No.A. not Talib. The COMELEC thereafter ordered the Election Officer of Indanan to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount. if possible. including the prayer for injunctive relief. mayor or vice mayor as the case may be. the order of the trial court in the election protest case does not conflict with nor diminish the legal effect of the COMELEC en banc Resolution. fails to qualify. Utilizing the first procedure contained in the first sentence of Sec.95 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. after notice to the parties and after ensuring that the integrity of the ballot boxes are not compromised. a detailed description of each questioned election return was provided in the Resolution of the COMELEC (2nd Division). or to report to the COMELEC the impossibility of a recount so that a special election can be immediately scheduled. it is markedly different from the case filed by Talib before the COMELEC which is a pre-proclamation case. 235. In fact. this Court intimated that a pre-proclamation case is the proper remedy if the defects and irregularities are apparent from a physical inspection of the election returns.Y. Sec. apply: Sec. 5-4-04 could not have cast an adverse or prejudicial effect on Talib’s pending pre-proclamation case. The order of the trial court directed a dismissal of the election protest on a technicality. Had he participated in the election protest. the dismissal of Election Protest Case No. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor. the assailed COMELEC resolutions remain presumptively valid. Verily. No. 7160 and Art. Clearly. the order is not inconsistent with the directive of the COMELEC to the Election Officer of Indanan to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount. Issue: WON it was proper for Comelec to pierce the veil of election returns Held: No Ratio: It is a well-entrenched rule in jurisprudence that in a pre-proclamation controversy. When this was not enough. in case of his permanent inability. shall become the governor. the issuances of the COMELEC can hardly be described as precipitate and premature. No election returns were examined and no ballots revised. vice governor. 83. Although denominated as a respondent in Election Protest Case No. vice governor. What is worse than petitioner’s forum-shopping is the poll body’s favorable action on petitioner’s Extreme Urgent ExParte Manifestation despite knowledge of the pending petition with this Court. And when it was evident that the election returns for the nine precincts were manufactured or fabricated because the printed names and signatures of the members of the BEI were absent. In Chu v. (c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots. the second highestranking sanggunian member. The trial court perfunctorily considered the report of the Revision Committee and on that basis concluded that it was no longer necessary to continue with the case because of petitioner’s "enormous lead" over Isnaji. the highest ranking sanggunian member or. the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or. it was only then that the COMELEC annulled the said election returns and petitioner’s proclamation. Sulu in Election Protest Case No. his pre-proclamation case would have been deemed abandoned because the general rule is that the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy. COMELEC. (d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors. namely the election returns submitted by Talib. it even resorted to an examination of the COMELEC copies. the COMELEC fully complied with this Court’s exhortation in Dagloc v. 5-4-04 is an election protest case filed by Isnaji. or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. Without a doubt. the COMELEC did not have to look at other evidence to conclude that the election returns were manufactured because the defects were apparent on the face of the election returns themselves. for failure of Isnaji as protestant to prosecute the protest. 44 of R. that is. Issue: WON the Comelec observed the procedure outlined in Section 235 of BP 881 Held: Yes Ratio: Contrary to petitioners’ contention. the COMELEC did not instantaneously nullify the questioned election returns as claimed by petitioner. in case of his permanent inability. the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. With the filing of the present petition. Vice Governor. mayor or vice mayor. 5-4-04. Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code governing vacancies and succession. is removed from office. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor. Position of Municipal Mayor: The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession. the second highest ranking sanggunian member. pends before this Court. refuses to assume office. Forum Shopping: The relief sought in the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation is basically the same as the prayer for a temporary restraining order in the present petition which was still pending resolution by this Court at the time the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation was filed before the COMELEC. COMELEC that the provision be followed to ascertain the will of the electorate. shall become the punong barangay. The questioned election returns could not have been examined before the trial court because they were already with the COMELEC at that time in connection with Talib’s preproclamation case. for as long as the present petition. the third candidate for the position of Mayor against petitioner and Talib. a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office. Another violation of the ban against forum-shopping lies in petitioner’s failure to inform this Court of its filing of the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with the COMELEC. In the case at bar.

However. Leopoldo E. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the DILG as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Despite these several letters of request. 1988. wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte. Tente U. Labo. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting ViceGovernor.] Verily. Applying the definition of vacancy to this case. As a result of the foregoing communications between Tente U. requesting the latter that Resolution No. notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor. on July 17. Issue: Held: WON there was a vacancy Yes Ratio: The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte. [Emphasis supplied. the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. the Court rules that. the President. Quintero and Jacinto T. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the ViceGovernor. Undersecretary Rubllar stated that since B. Thus. the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. On March 25. at that time. In the eyes of the law. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority. it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. The Provincial Administrator. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the acting ViceGovernor of Leyte. A sensu contrario. Definitely. supra. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the ViceGovernor in case of a temporary vacancy. it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. it is incomprehensible that to leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code. Menzon v. . continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. Jr. Jr. Aurelio D. the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioner’s proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly. Petilla. 1989. Modes of losing Philippine citizenship – naturalization in a foreign country. 1989. Petilla 197 SCRA 251 (1991) Facts: On February 16.P. it is doubtful if the Provincial Board. Leopoldo E. the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor. Precisely. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a fulltime occupant to discharge them. candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. it is our view that the peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte. COMELEC (1992). had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections. Menzon took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo. 1988. refused to correct Resolution No. The petition sought the nullification of Resolution No. For about two years after the governatorial elections. The annulment of Labo’s Australian citizenship as a result of the finding that his marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did not automatically restore is Philippine citizenship. however. the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice.” In view. The petitioner through the acting LDP Regional Counsel. Zosimo Alegre. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. where the electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled. Jr. there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. issued Resolution No. in the Office of the Vice-Governor.Y. a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the ViceGovernor for the province of Leyte. could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. sought clarification from Undersecretary Rubillar. Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code. Moreover. v.. there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified. express renunciation of citizenship. Resurreccion Salvatierra. Region 8. may remedy the situation. Governor Adelina Larrazabal. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Thus." Ahajan’s assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. the Secretary of Local Government. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular office. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. the Regional Director of the DILG. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. calls for the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vicegovernor temporarily. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Held: Yes Ratio: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. Rubillar. 08-09: 2nd Sem. in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy.96 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate the petitioner. There is no satisfactory showing that Petilla. in a special session held on July 7. the Acting Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 1989 opinion. Menzon. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. regarding the June 22. In the meantime. acting through her alter ego. of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. Undersecretary Rubillar replied and explained his opinion: “On the basis of the foregoing and considering that the law is silent in case of temporary vacancy. Atty. unilaterally acting. the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte.Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor.

By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case. shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor. 08-09: 2nd Sem. there was a need to fill the vacancy. in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service. Sang. wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (dated July 13. Petitioner's appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar. the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President. CA (2001) Facts : Petitioner Conrado L. In a republican form of government. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. November 27: For unknown reasons. They described the December 19 recall of Alar as "whimsical. we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices. Necessarily. 50. 2. Docena v. Abeja. Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. and if one of them is incapacitated or absent. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government. capricious and wishy-washy" for lack of a previous hearing (although they had no similar complaints about the recall of Docena's appointment although also made without hearing). There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. following the example in Commonwealth Act No. It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. the appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (1991) Facts: Luis Capito. December 19: Secretary Santos sent a letter to Alar. the majority rules through their chosen few. and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional compensation as. acting through the Secretary of Local Government. until the law provides otherwise. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. Ma. This argument has no merit. Mayor of Pagbilao. is in full accord with the intent behind the Local Government Code. the Secretary of Local Government. The respondents are ambivalent about the power of the Secretary of Local Government to recall his appointments. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice. Petitioner Agustin Docena was appointed to succeed Capito. petitoner . Quezon. 1. etc. there is no question that it was intended to be permanent. elected and serving as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) died in office. Evelyn S. filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries. As revealed by the records.. the management of governmental affairs to that extent. 1995) seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office.97 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code. after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. the appointment has the color of validity. and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. de Rama. 1990. And finally. moreover. Appointive Local Officials Common to all Municipalities. respondent Socrates Alar was also appointed by Secretary Santos to the position already occupied by Docena. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. in case of any vacancy that may occur. In view of the foregoing. Three of the said employees. and conformably to the procedure. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes. possesses no power to appoint the petitioner. for a long period of time. however. informing the latter of the prior appointment of Docena and recalling Alar's appointment Issue: WON Docena should be the appointed member to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Held: Yes Ratio: The pertinent legal provision is Section 50. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. at the very least. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment. the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation. namely: Elsa Marino. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as legitimate successor of the late Capito. LGC: SEC. The appointment of the petitioner. prescribed by the Local Government Code. we have no problem ruling in favor of the President. to be remunerated to the petitioner. exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. even granting that the President. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting ViceGovernor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. with his existing salary. there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. and Flordeliza Oriazel. Morell Ayala. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vicegovernor. In this case. From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19. December 18: the SP passed Resolution No. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor. However.Y. Cities and Provinces De Rama v. Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon. done in violation of Article VII. alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim. Concededly. 1990. Except for the sangguniang barangay. The petitioner. may be hampered. This appontment was issued by Department of Local Government Secretary Santos on November 19.

1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term shall be for five years. Based on the documents submitted by Marino. Furthermore. RA 7160. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC’s Resolution. COMELEC (1997) Facts: In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77. the Local Government Code.98 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. the Local Autonomy Code . laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around. the same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law". 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution. was enacted later than RA 6679. the later enactment prevails. and (2) to uphold the validity of said appointments." Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected "on the second Monday of May 1994. and correctly so. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. 1997 and other activities related thereto. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. It is basic that in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages. Alex L. except three years. . that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. he should not fill positions in the government unless required by the imperatives of public service. In truth. And three years is the obvious intent. the only justification he gave was that these were “midnight appointments” that are forbidden under Article VII. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12. Rillon filed a petition "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: 1. 3.Y. the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Issue : Whether or not Article VII. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. CSC denied petitoner’s request for the recall of appointments of the fourteen employees. de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. and (4) thus. (3) while Sec." This is reiterated in RA 6679. Section 43(c) of R. even assuming there was failure to present eveidence. 2 of RA 6653 "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . The CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor. for lack of merit. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years. Constitutional provision prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot apply to local elective officials. The CSC ruled. Ayala and Oriazel. 08-09: 2nd Sem. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. Section 15 of the Constitution. 8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections: Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term of office of barangay officials? Petitioners contend that under Sec. CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were midnight appointments. such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local government units.A. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. 95-01. which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. David filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. Issue: WON the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years Held: Yes Ratio: In light of the brief historical background. "there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. Under the Civil Code. Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Section 15 of the Constitution covers local elective officials. and therefore. averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments. (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned. Petitioners further aver that although Sec. 7160 which reads as follows: (c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years. In enacting the older law." This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until disproved by the CSC. they are entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions. the Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order finding that since the claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to their appointments. and declared that the appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. . COMELEC Resolution Nos. and petitioner’s failure to present evidence would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. his is the duty of a prudent caretaker of the office. 43-c of RA 7160. Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas. Records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC. otherwise. there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term. the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. First. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. Section 15 is simply an application of a broader principle that after the appointing authority has lost the elections. On the other hand." Second. DISSENTING OPINION: Mendoza. Under Sec. Decision : No. CSC upheld the validity of the appointments. Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective Officials David v. 2. Zone 7." Comelec maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other special laws relied upon by the petitioner. What the majority overlooks is that Article VII.

applying said law. 1994 barangay elections. Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman. Third. the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. If." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions. "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Petitioners are wrong.. There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec.J." The Comelec also submitted as Annex "B" 44 to its said memorandum. as claimed by petitioners. RA. . who obtained the highest number of votes among the kagawads 150.99 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 38 For a law to be nullified. the applicable law is RA 6679. the amendment was "readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved. under the Code. the Local Government Code. During the barangay elections held on May 9. mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate. thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman. the provision cannot be deemed a general law. the authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. 43-c that "the term of office of barangay officials . Issue: WON petitioners are Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms Held: Yes Ratio: Petetioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from the general provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years." Sixth. Fifth. shall be for three years. It then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-ininterest and on that ground. 43-c of RA 7160. his petition should be summarily dismissed. the latter is deemed repealed. Joaquin G. the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. Under both RA 6679 and 6653. 7 of RA 8189. under the law governing thie very claim to such offices: namely. the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three year term for such officers. the same having been scheduled in May. S. Ratio: Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex "A" of its memorandum. Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. The later law. With such particularity." Private Counsel/Lawyers for elective local officials Alinsug v. Fourth. he expressly stated under oath that he was announcing his "candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay 77. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. this Court said that "the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away. Issue: WON the three year term is in accord with the constitution Held: Yes Undoubtedly. namely. a search into the Record of the Constitutional Commission yielded only a few pages of actual deliberations. the statute permits. they vote for only seven kagawads. 1994 (second Monday). all alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of generaila specialibus non derogant. According to Fr. In its repealing clause. without any specific limitation or prohibition." These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments. Petitioners' belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body. Sec. (2) thus. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679. 39 To strike down a law as unconstitutional. which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Petitioner may be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law. there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay. Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held "immediately after the barangay elections in 1997. following petitioners' own theory. 3 of the Civil Code. the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. RA 7160. Article X of the Constitution limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years. the punong barangay should have been Ruben Magalona. being a special law. . In Paras vs. and not for the barangay chairman. should prevail over RA 7160. in accordance with Sec. much less president of the national league. it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997. 08-09: 2nd Sem. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. the election of Petitioner David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal. Jr. Hence. then (1) Petitioner David should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679. should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause." This judicial decision. Likewise. We find this theory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed. RA 7160 states that "all general and special laws . . except that of barangay officials which "shall be determined by law" was an amendment proposed by Constitutional Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G. David in the May 9. It is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. separately from the seven kagawads. The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver." Indeed. 8. a certified statement of the votes obtained by the candidates in said elections. Bernas. In said certificate of candidacy. . Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was "eligible for said office. per Article 8 of the Civil Code. 1997. it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. RTC and Mayor Ponseca (1993) . but they are incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law.Y. there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits. Davide. under Sec." It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. 43 a machine copy of the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. which was much more than David's 112. In other words. The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theory is that barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners. voters elect eight barangay officials. they cannot stand together. of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. (3) the electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads. RA 7160. Comelec. is now a "part of the legal system of the Philippines.

the only to the extent that. "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers. acts of vindictiveness. the Court therein cited Enriquez. as such representation was violative Sec. She had asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor. or his wife. not for a valid cause. The foregoing elicited a motion from the petitioner. It can happen that a government official. Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. a grave abuse of executive discretion. the indefinite detail order and. suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24 June 1992 for "a simple misconduct which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination." The order also stated that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of benefits such as salary and PERA and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity. they asserted that both the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of 1987 do not have any provision "relative to the duty of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to represent a municipality or its officials in suits filed against them by an employee or a private individual. The respondents opposed the motion. On the other hand. Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters. must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. "not including their private capacities. on the other hand. 481. Act No. The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary damages. apparently and obviously a political harassment and persecution. 10 the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions. creditor or otherwise." they should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided for by Sec. unjust. his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. in Albuera v. hence. praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged from the record. In Correa v. the Court ruled that a municipality may not be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis. On the one hand. or child. third paragraph. Thereafter. 31. petitioner's move to declare respondents in default "for having retained a private counsel" was not thereby legally sustainable. if due from the defendants. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v. Mayor Ponsica. had been a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante. in Ramos v. particularly the latter are no doubt respondent mayor's political vendetta of petitioner. While the petition below was filed against respondents as public officials. and done without giving petitioner opportunity to be heard. which. We held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance. his defense would have then been underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations. in fact. 2. were not done in good faith. when she received a permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality. The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. 177 of the RPC which penalizes usurpation of public authority. through private practitioner Samuel SM Lezama. With Sec. v. claimed that Zonsayda had not yet exhausted administrative remedies and that her suspension was in accordance with law. lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought. unwarranted. Mayor Rolando Ponsica detailed her to the Office of the Mayor." In such instance. this Court has sanctioned that representation by private counsel. On 19 June 1992. however. especially the suspension. are not awarded if the defendant had not acted in a wanton." But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not necessarily. condemnable and actionable. 10 and Art.12 These actuations of the respondent mayor in detailing petitioner to his office and eventually suspending her from work. Exemplary damages." The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel. Manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality. Issue: WON a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities Ratio: It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. And. except if and when. Barcelona) in said election. despotic. this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when "the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages. and when. CFI of Bulacan. in a case involving the municipality. and in conformity with the requirements thereof. is pecuniarily involved. a vengeance unleased on her for her children's and family's not going with and voting for him in the May 11.100 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. they have acted by authority of the law. Local Government Code) and the municipality of Escalante had not. It also cited Sec. appreasive (sic). 1683 of the old Administrative Code. its allegations were also aimed at questioning certain acts that can well bring the case beyond the mere confines of official functions. Facts: Zonsayda Alinsug. as well as litigation expenses. 08-09: 2nd Sem. he. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. Court of Appeals." Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with damages. She alleged that her suspension was an act of political vendetta. . the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. 1992 election and instead supporting the candidacy of their relative-candidate (Mr. as heir legatee. oppressive or . The lower court issued the Order denying the motion on the thesis that since the appointment of a legal officer was optional on the part of the municipal government (Art. ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity.13 The aforesaid acts of respondent mayor are clearly. and that the respondents be all declared in default on the ground that since the respondents were sued in their official capacities. if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. in an action filed against him in his official capacity. designated any such legal officer. null and void for being violative of petitioner's legal and constitutional right to due process. who was his greated (sic) worry at that time. Torres. Sr.Y. Negros Occidental." They contended that it was "unnecessary to provide such a provision because there (exist) administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the validity of the employment of a private counsel by municipal officials. 481 (b) (i) and (3) of the Local Government Code. thus 2. In one case. in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. as shown by its prayer. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis. personal liability can attach to him without. 1 of Rep. is later held to have exceeded his authority.

00 representing the tax on business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. Felix E. Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. Contrary to his pretensions. Rizal. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel. Mendiola ffiled a petition for certiorari with the SC. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Both at common law and under Section 26. CA (1997) Facts: On April 18. 08-09: 2nd Sem. et al.Y. pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. who in the performance of his duty acts in such fashion. Bulacan. a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. The corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that the mayor already received the sum as evidenced by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. does so in excess of authority. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. When Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment. against private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation. Oliviano D. Furthermore. PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. 1990. 22 Even the lawyers' right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.385. but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. A client. The court below issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment in question had already been satisfied. and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. Atty. In the instant case. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared. 1 of said municipality for the period from 1979 to 1983. is considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. which was filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence. For the aforementioned exception to apply. Mendiola has authority to file a petition in behalf of the municipality Held: No Ratio: The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter. Republic Act No. Issue: WON Atty.301. The SC affirmed the judgment with modification . The provincial . Atty. CA (1994) Facts: The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Municipality of Pililla. the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case. there is presently a manifestation and motion pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the "Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim" 24 previously filed in the case therein as earlier mentioned. and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. filed an Answer on behalf of respondent municipality. ordering therein defendant to pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5. Municipality of Pililia. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with the RTC for the examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local Tax Code. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Rizal v. At the pre-trial conference. On the same date. hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law.101 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. In the cases hereinbefore cited. through the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation. was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien. entered into a compromise agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court below two pleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim". the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. Under the above provision. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag. petitioners filed a petition before the court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. The contention of Atty. Ramos v. 2264.. Atty. Herein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. as amended. manifesting that he was counsel for the municipality. and his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability. Intermediate Appellate Court. is not only conjectural but without factual basis. The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality will file a similar petition. only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. considering that the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the initiative. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. after the decision in that case had become final and executory and/or had been duly executed. the Local Autonomy Law.. The submission of Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized. et al. malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless negligence. Meanwhile. 91 (1976) and No. the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. The provision is mandatory. where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. the provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney. a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings. Court of Appeals. A public official. Regalado. there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal. complemented by Section 3. Atty. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney. by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself. Mendiola.

The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial fiscal. 1683. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis. and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of evidence for the municipality. the Court therein cited Enriquez. provincial attorney. Issue: Who is Authorized to Representa Municipality in its Lawsuits? Ratio: In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla. Romanillos. through Mr. With Sec. creditor or otherwise. and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Justice Florenz D. stated that Atty. complemented by Section 3. as such representations was violative of Sec. thus: . Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this same case. Municipality of Pililla. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty. Rizal vs. Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the municipality. CA. the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. petitioners questioned the personality of Atty Romanillos to appear as counsel of the municipality. v. Regalado filed a joint stating that Atty. For the aforementioned exception to apply. is pecuniarily involved. not having been questioned in the lower court. IAC. 58. . Romanillos. Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial attorney. the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. only provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. It has already been ruled in this wise: The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of Hagonoy in Civil Case No. Despite the hearing.102 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer" and that the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations. 1990. an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff. this Court. None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. San Carlos City. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed. et al. there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal. Regalado. Meanwhile. is adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Regalado. Romanillos. RA 2264. and when. notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Court of Appeals held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Rizal vs. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality. Romanillos and Atty. In the instant case. The judge denied the petitioners’ motion to disqualify. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. RTC Br. These exceptions are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs. to wit: Indeed. This is anchored on the principle that only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expanded to hire private lawyers. were subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney. Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality of the appearance of Atty. It was also Atty. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v. as heir legatee. The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality. the Court ruled that a municipality may not be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis. he. As already stated. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province a special attorney may be employed by its council. set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against it. Neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. in a case involving the municipality. The provision is mandatory. hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law.. 5095-M.Y. 1683 of the old Administrative Code. private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. of the municipalities thereof. The rule on appearances of a lawyers is that until the contrary is clearly shown. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. in Ramos vs.. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases. . Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Sr. Under the above provision. et al. or child. CA. attorney appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. It was Atty. it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. or his wife." This collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not have been recognized as legal. Thereafter. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. 08-09: 2nd Sem. . if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a province and corollarily. It may be said that Atty. except in cases whereof (sic) original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court. the Local Autonomy Law. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. CA. Atty. Negros Occidental. The order of the trial court dated September 19.

et al. Marcellana and Osia were not yet members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Resolution No.. Masikap Fontanilla. respondents exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the Local Government Code and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. is merely an irregularity in the proceedings . the questioned motion not being contentious. The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainer agreement with private lawyers and paying P7. this Court does not see any injustice committed against petitioners by the adoptions of the work of private counsel nor any interest of justice being served by requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal representative of the town. This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of Atty. Issue: Would the adoption by Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial prejudice on petitioners. Guingona 257 SCRA 55 (1996) Facts: This refers to the administrative complaint filed against Albay Governor Romeo Salalima. which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Issue: Held: WON Joint Motion Need Not Comply with Rule 15 Yes the merits and not on technicalities. Lorenzo Reyeg.A. Requiring new trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice.103 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer.. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty. and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retainer contract for legal services entered into between the Province of Albay. that local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. Provided. That. and the disbursement of public fund in payment thereof. what petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorized counsel. Leviste. 380. which cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. wherein petitioners had even cross-examined the witnesses presented by Atty. the disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7. et al. The disqualification was granted. In sum. Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty.Y. if filed. It is to be noted that respondents Victoria. Regalado. Sr. such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan in court and to require trial anew to cover the same subject matter. thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners. Unless so expressly adopted. Reyeg. the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality. 129 was passed. In People vs.31 to the said private lawyers. Clenio Cabredo. 7160) requires the appointment of a legal officer for the province whose functions include the following: Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof. 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the case of Municipality of Bocaue. . Vice-Governor Danilo Azafla. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. Ramon Fernandez. Salalima v. respondents violated several provisions of law which warrants the imposition of administrative penalties against them. technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all. Romanillos in support of said motion and had even started to present their witnesses to sustain their objection to the motion would have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. . and Atty. 481 of the Local Government Code (R. on the one hand. qMoreover.31 were disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General . to hear the same witnesses and to admit the same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion of justice. Romanillos when he was private counsel for the respondent municipality of Baliuag such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve the injunction. Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Juan Victoria. v. no "notice directed to the parties concerned and served at least 3 days before the hearing thereof" 30 need be given petitioners. the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. in his official capacity is a party. No. Cabredo. this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. "an order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing. First. Litigations should. Manotok. Held: Yes Ratio: We also agree with the justification of public respondent than a motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that need not comply with Section 4 Rule 15 as to notice to the adverse party. Arturo Osia.410. be decided on Ratio: Sec. to declare the said proceedings null and void notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Atty. However. is not entitled to judicial cognizance. v. we ruled that: While it is true any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Atty. Jesus Marcellana. as much as possible. the complaint alleges that these respondents were named in the complaint because they approved the supplemental budget/appropriation ordinances providing for the payment of the attorney’s fees. As this Court held in Galvez vs. As Wee see it.380. Romanillos. such being the case. Jr. Romanillos was what petitioners were really praying for when they questioned his authority to appear for the municipality. The action of the trial court allowing the motion of respondent municipality effectively granted petitioners motion to disqualify Atty. The disqualification of Atty. a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party." It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Court of Appeals. Romanillos validate such proceedings? Held: Yes Ratio: It does not appear that the adoption of proceedings participated in or undertaken by Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against the Province. or proof of service thereof. 481 of the Local Government Code is based on Sec. on the other. although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations. Besides. The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue. Manotok. Vicente Go. 08-09: 2nd Sem. in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality. 410. in the interest of substantial justice however.

the attorney’s fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and confirmed by the other respondents are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided. and that he should be allowed to re-assume his office starting September 4 1991.R. The word “unconscionable. 01-90. who had already filed a comment on NPC’s petition against the Province. . 280 Tomas Morato Avenue.R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm are two separate entities is evident from the retained contract itself.6 million were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. 0 1-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E.5 million for one memorandum. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. in compliance with the August 5 SC Order. Blvd. respondents betrayed a personal bias to the lawyers involved and committed abuse of authority.” as applied to attorney’s fee. that. The comment filed by Atty. Even the Solicitor General. abuse of authority. the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G. Quezon City. six of the ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3. 87479. considering the labor and time involved. under Sec63 as to imposition of preventive suspensions. and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. Atty. OP. The retainer contract signed by respondent Governor was. 87479. standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client. It would work in favor of Ganzon. Hence. Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Surely. the professional character and social standing of Atty. however. In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. A balison was then taken from Garing. The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor General’s conformity dated 15 July 1993. Furthermore. An identical letter complaint was filed by Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro Benjamin Espiritu. the standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit P38. noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys. and it presumably will favor the local constituency and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever motive may be behind the intriguing action of DLG Sec in issuing the successive suspension orders especially when he could have pursued a consolidated effort. Ganzon filed a petition for mandamus with "manifestation and compliance. in this case. Jesus R. Resolution No. Cornago. The contingent fee of 18% of the ”P2l4 million” claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38. Quezon City. he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension. oppression. the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services and the professional character and social standing of the lawyers. 1991. Jose R.. respondent Governor exceeded his authority under Resolution No. CA (1991). Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance on the part of the audience. Finally. Melgar (1992) Facts: Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of DILG charging Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan. or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him. with grave misconduct. culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service. Likewise. Held: Simultaneous service of the 3rd and 4th orders of suspension can be allowed Under the bizarre circumstances of CAB. By allowing such scandalously exorbitant attorney’s fees which is patently disadvantageous to the government. or that a legal fraud had been taken of the client. Cornago are not such as would merit a P38. however obtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. one memorandum could not be worth P38. accusing Melgar of the same violations. 86-25 5 dated 2 April 1986. Cornago of Jamecca Building.” The Province has a legal officer. . The mayor also presented medical certificate proving that Garing was not hurt.5 million. No.104 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Cornago filed an appearance and subsequently a memorandum for the Province. No. When Atty. Consequently. 08-09: 2nd Sem." alleging that he had already fully served the suspension orders issued against him. not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. in his letter to respondent Governor dated 15 July 1993. Cornago because they were schoolmates at San Beda College. The mayor informed Garing to go . Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province in the Supreme Court case. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. that Sec63 (b). SC issued order that the first 3 suspensions are affirmed provided that Ganzon may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining admin charges against him. That Atty. the attorney’s fee of P38. Antonio Jose Cortes. And yet. Ricafort. Cornago not on the basis of his competency and standing in the legal community but purely for personal reasons.Y. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail of Naujan without filing any charges until his released the following day. During the hearing. “means nothing more than that the fee contracted for. and May3 1990. supra. In other words. it had not even filed because it was not the counsel of record. 1991. Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the fact that it was only Atty. Rodriguez Sr. SC takes judicial notice of recently-approved LGC which provides. Ricafort already covers the basic issues raised in the petition. Facts: DLG Secretary issued against Mayor Ganzon 3 separate orders of 60-day preventive suspensions dated Aug11 1988. On August 5. Oct11 1988.5 million. Furthermore. A fourth order was issued on July3. which. It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty.5 million fee for the legal services rendered for the Province. What is required by COA Circular No. an elective official. Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that while he was delivering a speech during a graduation ceremony. Disciplinary Actions Ganzon v. When the Mayor ended his speech. he instructed a policeman to investigate Garing. Oriental Mindoro. the petition was already been given due course by the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by the parties before the Court would issue its decision was a memorandum. respondents disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the Province in the Supreme Court in G. respondent Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. This conformity was. 86-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General. further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official.A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action Center." Espiritu v.5 million is unconscionable. the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was signed by Atty. It appeared that Garing was drunk.

to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. and therefore has already been served. Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed. Santos (1992) Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice. When the gravity of the offense so warrants. A sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep. petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in granting the preliminary injunction since the Governor is empowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective municipal official. under Sec 61 LGC. Since the mayor believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated. . the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over the complaints against any municipal official. petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to the seriousness of the charges. The RTC had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. In his letter. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Issue: WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. Comelec et al: ‘the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6. the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown. not from the courts. he filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order" in the RTC of Oriental Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant. all in Cagayan. by reason of such fault or misconduct. The Vice Governor.105 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No 55. the power of the Secretary to suspend officials was repealed by the 1987 Constitution and that the act of disloyalty committed by petitioner was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed. Also. the Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter. When the evidence of culpability is strong. he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him. to practically overrule the will of the people. Melvin Vargas was installed as Governor. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. When the people have elected a man to office. if he had been guilty of any. but he refused to go and only did so the following morning. or When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The RTC judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor Melgar On appeal. Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature. It is not for the court. The foregoing rule. Also. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections. 1991. Later. home (he had sobered up).Y. pending the outcome of the formal investigation. recommending to the Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 days pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. petitioner did not present any evidence and instead moved that the Secretary inhibit himself. During the hearing. Later. However. while Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1930 withdrew from RTCs jurisdictions over such cases. the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran. petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution. The Comelec granted the petition.’ Clearly then. While the case was pending before the SC. since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. 08-09: 2nd Sem. However. which motion was denied. Issue: mayor Held: WON the governor has the power to suspend the Yes Ratio: Under Section 63 LGC. and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct. When the mayor received the order of suspension. In this appeal. Tuao and Lasam. So. it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office. It appears that after the canvassing of votes. Aguinaldo v. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. however. within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. or as to whether they warrant disciplinary action. though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. as a general rule. the mayor has a remedy of appeal under Sec 66 LGC. the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist: When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of. he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of DILG. in this particular case.

Julius Garcia. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final. although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court. However. Davide. 4 The statutory grant found in B. repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail. G. The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8. From that moment on. 1995.00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v.000. and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. Prudence required that. Moreover. but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. BP 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the Constitution. then it can not be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution. Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the RTC was pending. 1995. until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the RPC.. The Comelec canceled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. 7160. Ernesto Manalo. Santos. Oriental Mindoro. No. order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests. Consequently. there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the RPC. the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. citing the LGC. 120905.R. Accordingly. § 67. Also. It was alleged. v. in Bagabuyo et al.P. that petitioner exacted and collected P50. In the case at bar. Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused. the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong. Held: No Ratio: The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. stated in his certification. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding. 337 itself has constitutional roots. The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading. is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution. Blg. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. But petitioner did not do so. Rogelio de Castro sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor.P. apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office. which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials. No. We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B. there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. petitioner argues that his election on May 8. The power of he Secretary of the DILG to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. COMELEC (1996) Facts: G.A. A similar provision is found in Section 3.106 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. His refusal to receive the decision may. Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: WON petitioner’s reelection rendered administrative charges against him moot and academic the . Mario Manzo. 60 and 61 of BP 337. An administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. 1995 is a bar to his disqualification. and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer. Oriental Mindoro. having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution.Y. to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. 08-09: 2nd Sem. prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later. As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 120940. 337 to show the fallacy of the same. As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of the Secretary to appoint Melvin Vargas as Governor. Blg. The Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer since a candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in an election cannot be declared winner Issue: WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof. be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision. petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy wit the Comelec. he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R. the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong. Jr.R. The Comelec en banc affirmed. the decision became final on April 2. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. contending that because Reyes was disqualified. proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. rather than resist the service. Section 2. therefore. but Reyes refused to receive the decision. Meanwhile. No. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments. issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code. Reyes v. who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes intervened. Vice Governor Pedrito Reyes.

he failed to appear. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials. Bercede) by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Veritably. 1995. hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since. suffice it to say that under R.Y. He failed to do so. void. as amended. He lost the elections. with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3. the COMELEC can continue proceedings for disqualification against a candidate even after the election and order the suspension of his proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Gozo-Dadole (1995) Facts: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against respondents (Mayor Alfredo Ouano. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials. Issue: WON Julius Garcia should be declared mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato Reyes Held: No 6646. Hagad v. had now been vested with the Office of the President. we find no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should have seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and.A. Nonetheless. 16. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1). had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. the decision has not yet attained finality. until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. except City Budget Officer Pedro M. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election. 6770. As indicated earlier. 6713. Indeed. Art. under Section 63 LGC. Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension. he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 08-09: 2nd Sem.57 to P7M without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. § 6. all public officials of Mandaue City. No. the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials. in any case. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3. Ratio: The case at bar is the very opposite of Aguinaldo vs Comelec. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. Ratio: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1. should have disqualified him before the elections.A. the TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed. respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try. he neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. enjoining him from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All in all. as well as to effect their preventive suspension. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. the petition remains unresolved. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. III of the Constitution). It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to § 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. 3019. and R. respondent Judge issued a restraining order directed at petitioner. quasi-judicial. was filed by respondent officials with the RTC. petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. although Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. the conditions would have substantially changed. A petition for prohibition. No.A No.) Article X1. he was disqualified from running for reelection. Here. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. Dionson and Bercede argued that the LGC could not have repealed. with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. As for Garcia's contention that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in not deciding the case before the date of the election. pursuant to § 40(b) of the LGC. of the 1987 Constitution. No. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. a second placer. or administrative bodies (Sec. or meaningless. The second placer is just that.364. He was thus validly removed from office and. . 6770.A. because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that. Furthermore. No. Art. R. The respondents were charged with having violated R. No.494. Issue: Held: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case Yes Ratio: That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. For the same reason.107 | L o c a l Held: No Government (Guanzon) S. therefore. Guido. Articles 170 and 171 RPC. But on the date set. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate. by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol. 7160 could not be given retroactive effect.A. he resorted to dilatory motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. acting in conspiracy. Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials. the decision of the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the petitioner in this Court and that to date. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R. herein Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however.A. the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.

upon the other hand. He again won. After his term. put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found. accordingly. . In 1995. in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. whether expressly or impliedly. the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials. claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. Rule XIX of IRR. No. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored. or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Moreover. 7160). 08-09: 2nd Sem." Quite interestingly. the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. for the suspension of his proclamation. The two provisions govern differently. The contention is without merit. Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom. as it may. Flavier. not being in the nature of a penalty. on various offices In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities. being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order.A No. as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials. and a clear finding thereof must surface. it does appear. preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". Certainly. . we have heretofore held that. The Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila. in point of fact. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. . that the evidence of guilt was strong. as so pointed out by the Solicitor General that respondent officials' petition for prohibition. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Thus. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R. Respondent officials. argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges. the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. i e. such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. Upon the other hand. since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1. respondent officials were. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R. 1981. Grego v. Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Salalima v. City of Manila. Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service. specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof. in fine. a highly urbanized or an independent component city. 6770. In Salalima v. he sought reelection in the 1992 election. However.108 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. to the extent of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991 (R. Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal. a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor). Hence. the evidence of guilt should be strong. District II. in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined). Guingona.Y. assumed office. or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. interpretare et concordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi. did not effect a change from what already prevailed. listed under Section 60 thereof. Jr. the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. whether elective or appointive. Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Court Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas." There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed. The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him. respondents insist. (b) the evidence of culpability is strong. Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988.A.(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants. praying for Basco's disqualification. Subsequently. let alone irreconcilable. Basco ran again for councilor. a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. . Finally. . who are under investigation. should not have been entertained by the trial court. conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code. and for the declaration of Romualdo S. and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly. 6770. He won and. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner Be that. local elections. Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. Naturally. William Grego. It further invalidated Article 125. before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 966. a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. COMELEC 274 SCRA 481 (1997) Facts: On October 31.. supra. The rule is expressed in the maxim. Guingona (1996). The Court nullified the rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the power to remove elective officials. In view of the proclamation. and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. 1992 .A No. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent. oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty.

1992. Thus. 1995. improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word "shall" in its rules." Under the former Civil Service Decree." Issue: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988. Thus. therefore. Neither does petitioner's argument that the term "any position" is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration. follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case. thus restoring his eligibility for public office Ratio: At first glance.) In this regard. This assumption. Moreover. In the first place. Since Section 6 of Rep. Hence. petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case. supra. is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which. or affect injuriously vested rights. of course. has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. should have suspended the proclamation. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. COMELEC. It. the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning. 16 the law applicable at the time Basco. it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom.. be legally declared a winning candidate Held: No Ratio: Obviously. as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner. there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a . Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns. according to the provision itself. Maranan. inquiry or protest. there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Finally. However.109 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 08-09: 2nd Sem. These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case. the cases of Duremdes. In light of these definitions. plebiscite. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts. We do not. the disqualification applies. Benito and Aguam. finds no application in this case. applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1.Y. What is merely made mandatory. it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings. RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC. in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC. however. there is. as well as government-owned or controlled corporations. therefore. there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioner's argument. regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code. the issue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. including its agencies and instrumentalities. a public officer. or more properly speaking. is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action. no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position. The COMELEC. petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. Issue: WON Romualdo S. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. he may not be declared a winner. as we said earlier. there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length. the Manila City BOC. Hence. Contrary to petitioner's assertion. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner. as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. (And with prejudice to reinstatement. therefore. a seventh placer. Issue: WON private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17. the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement. was administratively dismissed from office. subscribe to petitioner's view. 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him. while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC is void ab initio? Ratio: The inapplicability of RA 7166 Section 20(i) to the present case is very much patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate. cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above. unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. initiative. the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. referendum. particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement. employed the word "may. we are of the view that petitioner's contention is baseless. Furthermore. Act 6646. Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. and recall. he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth place. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions. 1992. The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the national or local government. namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified. the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously. where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate. referring only to an appointive position. Held: No Ratio: Petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1." it is.

Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita Santos. In her affidavit. In the instant case. Joson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA challenging the preventive suspension and default order. He also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false. candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions. Executive Secretary Torres issued an order placing Joson under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him. Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. if not verified. she prayed that she be dropped as one of the complainants since she had just joined the political party of Joson. Santos was one of the signatories to the letter-complaint. page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. Also. But they do not indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President. or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his alleged disqualification. which private respondents opposed the loan because the province had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. are absent in this case. Santos cannot in any way be considered an unbiased witness. the defect was not fatal. Section 60 of Chapter 4. that private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the Office of the President. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President. Issue: Held: WON the DILG has jurisdiction over the case Yes Ratio: Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Ratio: The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines. 08-09: 2nd Sem.O. nonetheless. The Secretary of the DILG. the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee. No. The CA dismissed the case. Executive Secretary Torres 290 SCRA 279 (1998) Facts: Oscar C. Assuming. that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the President. Vicente C. Joson. we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by grave abuse of discretion. Joson v. According to petitioner. however. who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. the Motion to Dismiss was denied. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondent's continuance in office as City Councilor for the Second District of Manila. thru counsel. 23. Joson’s acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan. whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. Allegedly. The court may order the correction of the pleading. Joson claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. They may give grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority. The absence of the document. Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural. and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province. is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. Joson failed to file his answer despite numerous grant of extension. Thus. She decided to reveal the intercalation because she was disillusioned with the "dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner Joson. filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the letter complaint was not verified and that the DILG has no jurisdiction over the case and has no authority to require him to answer the complaint. however. DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez issued an order declaring Joson in default. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija while Loreto P. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein. Escombien was purportedly not inside the session hall during the incident but was at her desk at the office and could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall. Palilio and Napoleon G. Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. Crispulo S.In all matters not provided in A. We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. In lieu of the DILG Secretary. the letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code.110 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Book I of the LGC enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be disciplined. Vice Governor Oscar Tinio was appointed as Acting Governor. Solita C. however. he was always accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he reported for work. Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the PNB. Her motive and change of heart render her affidavit suspect. not jurisdictional requisite. for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner. Verification is a formal. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio. The lack of these entries may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint. Pangilinan. suspended or removed from office. In sum.Y. Later. the administrative complaint against him must be verified and filed under Section 61. Joson belligerently barged into the Hall and angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at private respondents during a scheduled session. Title II. the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character. Issue: WON the filing of a letter complaint before the Office of the President was proper Held: Yes Code of 1991. Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action. The private respondents filed with the Office of the President a complaint charging Governor Eduardo Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Esguerra. Also. The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his . Santos. Secretary Barbers directed the PNP to assist the implementation of the order of preventive suspension.

To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court. 1997. petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner to answer the complaint. Section 5 of A.' Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. In the case at bar. the President. and must be. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. when respondent failed to submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct of formal investigation. Executive Secretary Torres adopted Secretary Barbers' findings and recommendations and imposed on petitioner the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. No. The failure of respondent to file his answer despite several opportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may. when the evidence of guilt is strong and. there is no denial of procedural due process. On January 8. The requisite of joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right to submit his answer. As head of the Executive Department. Each head of a department is. the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A. The records show that on August 27. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the following provisions of A. the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. after respondent has answered the complaint.Y. delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee. Strictly applying the rules. Petitioner's failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence. Petitioner's motion was denied on November 11. or that subordinate officers act within the law. Moreover. 23. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties. that is. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the witnesses. In his Order of October 8. Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged on the basis of the parties' position papers. 1997. the issues were deemed to have been joined. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the LGC. not the power to discipline. No. may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.O. O. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of one's defense. power of general supervision over local governments. The Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer. 1997. 1997. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. one may be heard also through pleadings. the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. On October 15. 08-09: 2nd Sem. the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the investigation. Issue: WON Joson was properly placed under preventive suspension Held: Yes respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. the lettercomplaint was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer. The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. 1998. Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed. is accorded. he was not denied of his right of procedural process. the history of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken. As the Disciplining Authority. petitioner submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the truth of the allegations that he barged into the session hall of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass the private respondents who were opposed to any move for the province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. however. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. either through oral arguments or pleadings. 1997. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference. The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him. Thereafter. given the gravity of the offense. there is a great possibility that the continuance in office of the . The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. this procedural lapse is not fatal. Undisputably. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. however. O.O. What is delegated is the power to investigate. Further. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to Ratio: In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer. The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation.111 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. contrary to Joson's claim. Issue: WON the Resolution finding Joson guilty and imposing on him the penalty of suspension from office for six months without pay was proper Held: Ratio: Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings. the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Where opportunity to be heard. Petitioner reiterated this motion on October 29. 23. Thus. technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. This is not undue delegation. petitioner filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. No. and as a result of this waiver. No. 23. A. the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. Undersecretary Sanchez admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but treated it as a position paper.

" It is the Administrative Code of 1987. unless otherwise provided in the Code. With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman. Position papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the complainant." the results of which "shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission. No. When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers. Florian Maghirang. Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the law Held: Yes . Mrs.112 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. to the position of barangay secretary in violation of Section 394 of the LGC. 3019. The disciplining authority in such actions is the Civil Service Commission although the Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities. for abuse of authority. the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devoted to elective officials. When an elective official is suspended or removed.A. the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted." Moreover. As respondent. No. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. is based. the appointive official or employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. the provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. he must "indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory." The "investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal" are "in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A. disciplinary actions. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition." The investigation is conducted without adhering to the technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. however. Appointive officers and employees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Code entitled "Human Resources and Development. respectively.O. local legislation. as the case may be. Monzon (1998) Facts: Complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Benjamin Maghirang. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. This can be gleaned from the LGC itself. the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman granted the MR and ordered the filing of an information for unlawful appointment against Maghirang.O. elected by popular vote. the direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint and answer. A. Jacob Montesa of the DILG declaring the appointment of Maghirang void. is directly responsible to the community that elected him." All matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units are regulated by "the civil service law and such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated thereto. Their qualifications are set forth in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. complainant filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 RPC with the Office of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the judge liable for ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. dismissed on the ground that Maghirang’s sister-inlaw was appointed before the effectivity of the LGC. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other. An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. No. cities and municipalities are also given the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. provinces. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel. the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City. In the LGC. vacancies and succession. (2) the right to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against him. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the LGC and in A.O. the City Prosecutor filed. It provides for their qualifications and election. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the case but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister in law as barangay secretary. The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from appointive officials. and recall. he is accorded several rights under the law. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. which was. A. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. serious irregularity and violation of law as Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law. The judge denied the motion and ruled that since Maghirang was reelected as barangay chairman. which prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. An elective official. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Complainant obtained an Opinion from Dir. 08-09: 2nd Sem. that primarily governs appointive officials and employees.O. 23. without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary x x x. a motion for the suspension of Maghirang pursuant to Section 13 of R. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. Later. No. 26240. and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. The OCA said that it is well settled in Section 13 of RA 3019 that the court suspends any public officer against whom a valid information was filed against him. specifically Book V on the Civil Service. (2) when the respondent is a recidivist. and (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable. In fact. The grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V are much more in number and are specific than those enumerated in the Local Government Code against elective local officials.Y. Conducto v. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. the offenses committed during the previous term are not causes for removal. in Criminal Case No." If the officer or employee elects a formal investigation. At the same time. No. The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers.

The basis of the investigation which has been commenced here.Y. The Office of the President affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Sanchez this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative. Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body politic. and that Pascual v. reprimand. does not include reelection to office as one of them.comprehending the decisions is a different matter.refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case. therefore. in Ingco v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced. Thus. Antonio's memorandum for the State. The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions. The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are in order. that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. Villapando claimed that he did not appoint Tiape. Provincial Governor and Lizares v. Villapando (2002) Facts: Solomon B. Needless to state.e. The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body politic. Pablico v. that -. is a criminal accusation the object of which is to cause the indictment and punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen. is too light. a criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice. respondent. Villapando filed a certiorari and prohibition before the CA seeking to annul the decision of the Office of the President. . which is one of laws and not of men. there was nothing shown however to indicate that he acted in bad faith or with malice. it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. of course. Fernandez (members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente. Article 9 of the AntiGraft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held. but he merely hired him and a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.and. Then on 20 June 1969. at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. while concededly. This cannot be so. There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. Chairman Maghirang. Sanchez the Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term. However. whereas in the cases cited. his nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. it would also do well to note that good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from liability. the subject of the investigation was an administrative charge against the officers therein involved and its object was merely to cause his suspension or removal from public office. Hechanova referred only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective official. and Renato M. in this instance. 08-09: 2nd Sem." It is manifest then. respondent Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denying complainant’s Motion for Suspension of Brgy. respondent was. members of the Bar -. to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. but not the criminal. failed to recall that as early as 1967 in Ingco v. "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. exceeded only by his passion for truth. in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been “continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development (sic) in law” ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in 1995. Villapando allegedly entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape (defeated mayoralty candidate) which amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one year period under the Constitution. Villapando for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution..113 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Maagad. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. liability incurred by him during his previous term of office. because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties. the penalty recommended. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is based. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection.[20) this Court likewise categorically declared that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official during his previous term of office were not extinguished by his re-election. thus: The ruling. and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. even if conferred by popular election. Also. it has been said that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual v. it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.“when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any” -.. Ratio: All things considered. et al. On the contrary. in Luciano v." While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges -.[23) He should strive for excellence. The CA declared void the decision of the OP and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simple issue. Be that as it may. and which is sought to be restrained. wittingly or otherwise. The Provincial Governor. i. under the Constitution. Thus. While the criminal cases involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines as a community is a party to the case. an administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer as (they) affect the populace of the municipality where he serves. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office. which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability. Palawan) filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against Mayor Alejandro A. for it is in that area where one’s competence may then be put to the test and proven.

in Salalima.Y. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session. et al. In Salalima v. Pimentel. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Issue: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President.. jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. are empowered to remove an elective official from office. issued a Memo wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan has no power to order Martinez’ removal from office. Martinez was declared in default and was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days. Implementing rules should conform. for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code. Roque: "the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own justification. 5. i. 2. As explained by the Court in Lacson v. from office. the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts. Nueva Ecija. insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials. can validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials Held: No Removal only by courts Sangguaning Barangay of Don Mariano v. amend. Using/spending barangay funds for repair. did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. on appeal. The complaint was later amended for Dishonesty. and not the petitioner. that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. or removed from office on any of the following grounds: An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. gasoline. for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. suspended. therefore. not clash. x x x. Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. an elective local official. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/LakbayAral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose.x x x. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection. with the law that they implement.e. Jr. deliberately intended by the lawmakers. however. However. 08-09: 2nd Sem. of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x. is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. or contravene a provision of law. The mayor. Rule XIX of IRR. since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. The Court nullified the rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its . Punong Barangay Martines (2008) Facts: Severino Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 64 of RA 7160. The evils resulting from a restricted authority to suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove. Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Rule XIX of the implementing rules. An elective local official may be disciplined." The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President. this grant to the "disciplining authority" of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. v. It further invalidated Article 125. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied. Thus. he. Even Senator Aquilino Q.. wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. et al we held that "[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials. the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. Guingona." Article 124 (b). For failure to file an Answer. 3. Jr. Issue: WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez. the decision remains valid until reversed. Held: No Ratio: The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Section 60. adds that "(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60. Martinez then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the RTC. Thereafter. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove.. RTCs. The court declared the decision void and maintained that the proper courts. x x x. Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed the following acts: 1. No rule or regulation may alter. It is beyond cavil. and was. It is clear from the last paragraph of the provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. however. and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith." Ratio: Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office. 4.[16] the legislative intent to confine to the courts. the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials.114 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. As held in Salalima. the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991. The decision was conveyed to the mayor of Bayombong. it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60. Rule XIX. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. however. Hence. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting. such as the LGC. lubricants. we think. expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b). Article 124 (b). Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code. Guingona. 6.

heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned. Furthermore. the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application.[24] Thus. amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial. thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. On the other hand. This would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers. if found guilty. would merit the penalty of removal from office. the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez. In Pablico v. Disciplinary actions over Local Appointive Officials Mendez v. and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned. it is clear that under the law. Coloyan filed an administrative complaint against the petitioner. for Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty.) The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. After three months of investigation. and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith. the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension. indeed. This allegation runs contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself. it should be applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. which is based on sound public policy and practical consideration. the local government units are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials. and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision. As a general rule. a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove. the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez from office. Thus. would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. and 13) in quo warranto proceedings. then Martinez should have sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board which reversed the decision and ruled that Mendez is guilty as charged and therefore dismissed from service. Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power to remove local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court. authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the power to remove elective officials. Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law. The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. Once the court assumes jurisdiction. the case should be filed with the regional trial court. The CSC affirmed on appeal.Y. 8) where the controverted acts violate due process. 6) where judicial intervention is urgent.115 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. In this case. thereafter. Petitioner questions the Decision of the trial court for allowing the petition filed before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. impose a penalty of removal from office. . if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted. is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified. However. rather. after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is warranted. then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court. a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus. 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice. as well as jurisprudence. if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and. 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine. If. The removal from office of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied. 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal. therefore. amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 11) when strong public interest is involved. 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant. 10) where there is no other plain. Civil Service Commission (1991) Facts: The Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N. However. Moreover. As the law stands. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal. or Sangguniang Bayan. the court. which can. it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive. Thus. as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office. speedy and adequate remedy. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office. the court declared that:The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied. allegedly for having torn off a portion of TCT 209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and for having pocketed it. 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage. Such act was patently illegal and. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal. Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan. 08-09: 2nd Sem. this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal. Villapando. Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with. The courts would be stripped of their power of review. rather.

Chang (1992) Facts: Lorinda Carlos signed a formal administrative charge approved by Victor Macalincag accusing Robert Chang of dishonesty. is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees. 807 or the Civil Service Law. they are the proper disciplining authority referred to in Sec. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance. removal or dismissal from office. The trial court ruled that until an acting municipal treasurer is appointed to replace the respondent. Otherwise stated. 41 of P. the power to appoint the aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial Treasurers and Assessors of the Municipalities concerned. Among others. neglect of duty and acts Prejudicial to the best interest of the service. but under both decrees. In the instant case. the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the preventive suspension order. the power to discipline is specifically vested under Sec. P. provinces and chartered cities who have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action. It will be noted that under the law. as in this case. Accordingly.D. there are two steps involved. It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. The lower court pointed out that in order that a preventive suspension will be implemented. 807. (d) incurring overdrafts. acting Secretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President and therefore. even assuming that the power to appoint. Upon MR. includes the power to discipline as argued by Chang. Moreover. as an alter ego. By inference or implication. the petitioner claimed that his exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37. They are for: (a) disbursing the amount of P30. the city mayor. Hence. Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati. neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. that the implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the issuance of EO 392 creating the Metropolitan Manila Authority and that the power to discipline is vested solely on the person who has the power to appoint. 807 in heads of departments. . 337. 37 of P. (c) disbursing funds for merienda of the employees. A contrary view would render nugatory the very purpose of preventive suspension. Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges. it is within his authority. Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC against Macalinlag and Carlos. Undersecretary of Finance. Metro Manila. Macalincag. 3. Correspondingly. Bureau of Local Government and approved by Macalincag.D. Verily. Executive Director. otherwise known as the Local Government Code. to preventively suspend Chang. It is very apparent from the records that Chang was administratively charged on October 6. there appears to be no question that: the Order of Preventive Suspension of respondent Chang became effective upon his receipt thereof. the order of preventive suspension dated October 6. Macalingag and Carlos v. The judge sustained the power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension. under PD 477 and later transferred to the Commissioner of Finance under PD 921. No. On the contrary. 477.D. and (f) remitting to the Bureau of Treasury the national collection. the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. Title II thereof for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer. as head of the city government. the intention of the aforesaid legislations to follow the Civil Service Laws. By and large. It was signed by Carlos. prior to EO 392. Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the Department of Finance as provided for in Sec. Rules and Regulations is unmistakable.000 to Ms. Finally.116 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. then acting Secretary. Marisa Chan during the local elections. This ruling of the trial court is untenable. A cursory reading of P. 807.D. the designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's suspension. Chang argued that EO 392 gave rise to the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) and vested in the President of the Republic of the Philippines the power to appoint municipal treasurers in Metro Manila. 1989 for dishonesty. pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P. Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below. Stated differently. Article 5. the court set aside its decision and ordered the petitioners to cease and desist from enforcing the order of preventive suspension. he maintained that it is the President who may suspend or remove him. As the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is an incident of the power to appoint. Earlier. transfer. demotion in rank or salary. 08-09: 2nd Sem. assailing the reversal of the city mayor's decision by the MSPB and the CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected by the decision" allowed by law to file an appeal. paragraph (b) of P. acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the order. which is presumed when he filed a complaint in the trial court preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension. 1989 is incomplete and cannot be said to have taken effect. Held: Yes Ratio: Chang contends that a government officer is not suspended until someone has assumed the post and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his official function. otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. provides in Section 156. viz: 1) service of a copy of said order on the respondent and 2) designation of his replacement. (b) disbursing certain funds allegedly as financial assistance to bereaved families.D. Issue: WON the exoneration made by the mayor is unappealable Held: Yes Ratio: The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. (e) transferring certain amounts from the treasurer’s safe to the realty tax division’s safe. 41 of the same law. Simultaneous with the charge. 807. designation of the replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive suspension. agencies and instrumentalities. the power of appointment was made subject to Civil Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance. Chang was preventively suspended which caused him to file a complaint for Prohibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court. No.D. Chapter 3. there is no occasion for appeal. The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension. Batas Pambansa Blg.Y.

and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. By the same token. The Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the suspension. 1991 Decision. there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan (2002) Facts: Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurer’s Office. due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense. The term “agency” refers to any of the various units of the government including a department.is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government. it should be pointed out that under the old and the present Local Government Codes. As a corollary. the CA held that private respondent was vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and employees. the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. 1985. the power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department. “ Affirming the RTC Decision. Garcia was preventively suspended for ninety days since the charge is a major offense. the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. First. was an officer under him. 1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director. However. agencies and instrumentalities. which authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees. authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance. Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant and that there was no complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an investigation on August 15. refusal to perform official duties and functions. not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument. appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law. Issue: WON the City Treasurer has disciplinary powers over the petitioner Ratio: At the outset. thus. 08-09: 2nd Sem. petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30. Thus. there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. or a local government or a distinct unit therein. but also -. the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation and issued the assailed Order. In fact. an office. the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. However.117 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. which is the reason why he was formally charged. In the case at bar. it was conducted ex parte. So. a senior revenue collector. Third. They may be removed or dismissed summarily “(1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. Dagupan City. unless otherwise specified. an instrumentality. the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees. Fourth. Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not persuasive. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. -. the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws.Y.. which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27. Likewise. a bureau. In the case at bar. Garcia v. and such rules. Second. and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. claimed that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters. Moreover. Further. the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. One may be heard. the head of a local government unit. while petitioner. petitioner chose not to answer those charges. the city treasurer may institute. . this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.” Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. as the city treasurer. (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x. Clearly. was the head of the Office of the Treasurer. shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws. a government-owned or controlled corporation. Respondent Pajaro. An investigation was scheduled but Garcia failed to appear and testify. the regional director. the Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaro’s findings in its August 1. Juanito Pajaro. as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order against him. This was affirmed by the Regional Director.” This rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code. 1990. because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty. Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order against petitioner. The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments. the chief of an agency. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor “may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city. as well as their suspension and removal.specifically Book V on the civil service -. Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1. Pajaro proceeded with an ex parte investigation. Moreover. and insubordination -. a subpoena dated July 31. he admittedly refused to attend the investigation. 2-85. 1990 formal charge against him. On the other hand. disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee.and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -through pleadings. Issue: Held: WON Garcia was denied due process No Ratio: In an administrative proceeding. The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process had been fully observed by Pajaro while investigating petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987. 1990. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against him. who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4.grounds that allowed the issuance of such Order. motu propio. regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto. provinces and cities. the head of office of equivalent rank. But despite being informed of the charges against him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation. In the present case. the City Treasurer of Dagupan City.

Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R. v.A. he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely”. until amended. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the the recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone.P. specifically repeals B. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution. in an en banc resolution. the Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO of the court. 2001. he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4. supra. by June 30. 7160 (the Local Government Code). He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. malice or gross negligence. despite due notice. There was no such showing in the present case. Evardone v. Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1. 1995. Eastern Samar. The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in futurum but also in esse. In just over a month. the three-term limit rule applies to him. Having found respondent Morales ineligible. Alexander R. Indeed. he was not elected to that position. 1992. Apelado. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Later. As the Court observed. as held in Ong v. the .” Section 8. Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative. such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature. Since there was. COMELEC (2007). But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B. his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. Petitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings. there is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated. He held the position from September 2. COMELEC. Similarly. if not abhorred by it. Jr. but also Borja. Municipality of Sulat. In the light of the foregoing. 7160 (the Local Government Code). No. 2007. Title Four of said Act. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC. In 1990. during the period material to this case. in Adormeo v. Alegre cited above. Blg. having been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. Republic Act No. In Borja. Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit. To reiterate. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process. the existing Local Government Code remains operative. the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer. 337 as provided in Sec. Issue: WON Resolution No. Morales was elected for the term July 1. Article XVIII. Alegre. 534. Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. a period of less than three years. It bears stressing that in Ong v. Not being a candidate. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid Held: Yes Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X. Talanga as mayor. Should he be allowed another three consecutive term as mayor of the City of Digos. unless there is a clear showing of bad faith. the Court held that Capco’s assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the incumbent may not be regarded as a “term” under Section 8. approved by the President on 10 October 1991. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Here. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991. He was a “private citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat. This is the very situation in the instant case. Commission on Elections which is likewise inapplicable. RECALL Rivera v. 2003 should be cancelled. Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections.A.118 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. there was a “break” in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Moreover. Section 8. the instant petition for quo warranto has become moot. Hence. 1998 to June 30. Victozino E. Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R. 2001. Blg.Y. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC of Daet. No.P. Clearly. He served as mayor until June 30. As ruled by this Court. repealed or revoked. He assumed the position. this present petition. this Court ruled that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8. Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer. Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. Aclan and Noel A. Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. 1989 to June 30. Here. This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. 2001. Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat. Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente. COMELEC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law. his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials. COMELEC (1991) Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat. was at his own peril. As to petitioner’s claim for damages.

Issue: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 55 (2) of B. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted. The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. as provided for in Article XVIII. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990." The motion was "unanimously seconded. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings. effectiveness of B. Thus. 2272. We reject this submission of the respondents.050 of the 6. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. Some mayors. viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people. They justified these selective notices on the ground that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of notice. the signing process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect. the requirement of notice is indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Thereafter. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. 5 on the second Monday of May.090 registered voters of Sulat. Held: No Ratio: In the present case. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. However. yet. he was not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. The need for notice to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members represent the different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt. respectively. or more specifically. Issue: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional Held: No Ratio: A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials. Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. 337. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado. the Vice-Mayor of Limay. and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. Indeed. The comelec dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall election.P. Needless to stress. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly. to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code Garcia v. It is included in the right of suffrage. and (b) to cut down on its expenses. especially to the members known to be political allies of Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the respondents. COMELEC (1993) Facts: Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. the the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition. Thus." Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the requirements under the LGC.P. originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate.Y. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the ground that section 70 of R. this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Consequently. to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. Honorable Oscar. As held in Parades vs. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the .A. the Honorable Ruben Roque. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992. recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. and the mayor of Dinalupihan. The due process clause of the Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. Issue: WON all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of its meeting Held: Yes Ratio: The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly. 08-09: 2nd Sem. The mayor of Mariveles. Blg. We therefore rule that Resolution No. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate.119 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. I suffered from numerous defects. the Honorable Lucila Payumo. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only after all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of their constituents. de los Reyes. Blg. 1992. Executive Secretary there is no turning back the clock. about 2. was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence. Sec.

Indeed. Clearly then. There is no democratic government that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its officials. of initiating recall elections. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption . A careful reading of the law. and referendum ." Issue: WON petitioners were denied equal protection of the laws Held: No Ratio: Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. To be sure. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution that will sustain this submission. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. adequacy. City of Angeles. the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall. too expensive and almost impossible to implement. Such presumption follows the solemn oath that they took after assumption of office. whether one or many. The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions. the contention cannot command our concurrence. especially those belonging to the minority. starts the process." The Constitution did not provide for any mode. sec. Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1. the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those belonging to the minority. will ineluctably show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. Using its constitutionally granted discretion. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome. but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Likewise. let alone a single mode. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall.Y. Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. all mayors. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. wisdom and expediency of any law." By this constitutional mandate. a power reserved to the people alone. is not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people. There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of confidence. initiative. will act in good faith and will perform the duties of their office. More specifically. at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. however. Pampanga. Thirdly. whether appointed or elected. To be sure. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render government powerless and no people need an impotent government. Before the people render their sovereign judgment. The mere possibility of abuse cannot. infirm per se the grant of power to an individual or entity. Again. it is the legislative that determines the necessity. The power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The choice may be erroneous but even then. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. By the principle of separation of powers. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself. Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. On the contrary. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. . Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any particular ground except loss of confidence. By necessary implication. especially those elected by the people themselves. to be chosen by Congress should be effective. 08-09: 2nd Sem. there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. the preparatory recall assembly. vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. albeit done indirectly through their representatives. to faithfully execute all our laws. First to be considered is the politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiate the process of recall but had de facto recalled Garcia from office. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease. however.120 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. . The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of the people. Considering their number. the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question. elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. Secondly. Consequently. all our laws assume that officials. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely.

1996 recall election is . as to the electorate would in effect be compelled to participate in a political exercise it neither called for nor decided to have. our Legislature fixed it at 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected. recall resolution by a mere majority of the PRA. the members of the PRA can be considered as constituting a segment of the electorate because they are all registered voters of the province. On the other hand. In such a case. It refuses to recognize the reality that the resolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. to caution against any idea of omnipotence in wielding the "power of recall" conferred to the "Preparatory Recall Assembly. Again. it follows that where the petition is not done through the initiative of the electorate because the latter chooses not to exercise its power to recall or finds no reason therefor. The power to initiate. At least 29. To prevent the holding of the recall election. Worse. becomes all too evident that there has been an abuse of that authority. I might add that since Congress decided to retain the 25% requirement for the traditional method of initiating recall which is the method in full accord and perfect harmony with the true essence of recall the provision for an alternative method. since the second component of the power of recall. which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election". it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been subverted. i. the Festin Law (Com. the electorate is by passed and the resulting recall petition or resolution can by no means be an authentic. being a component of the power or recall. Hence. Vitug. The power to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution. i. in the initiation of the recall. Act No. 7160). Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. the recall election. The power to initiate becomes meaningless if another body is authorized to do it for the electorate. When it.1995." Clearly implicit in any grant of power. 1996 is barred by the SK election to be held on May 1996. the exclusiveness or indivisibility of the power is necessarily impaired or negated. The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election. which characteristics are indicia of the exercise of a power. the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people. The judgment will write finis to the political controversy. Ratio: Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Congress adopted an alternative procedure for initiating the recall and made it as a mere stage of the recall process. The proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan.e. and secondly.Y.121 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. the contention proceeds from the erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. however. particularly their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. Congress also deigned it wise to give the electorate a chance to participate in the exercise twice: first. Davide Jr.e.30% of the registered voters signed the petition. especially where the delegation unduly infringes upon and impairs such power as in this case. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. if not altogether defeat. this Court will not be denied. 1995." In sum. above the 25% requirement provided by law. The reason why the initiation phase can and must be done only by the electorate is not difficult to understand. the result will be a return to the previous system of recall elections which Congress found should be improved. free. dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 08-09: 2nd Sem. does not come into play without the recall petition. The broad powers of Congress in pescribing the procedure for recall include the determination as to the number of electors needed to initiate the recall.. and voluntary act of the electorate. This is in contrast with the first recall statute in the Philippines. and corrective relief by. After conducting a summary hearing. if the electorate does not re-elect Garcia. the power of the electorate and to substitute the will of a very small group for the will of the electorate.. otherwise known as the Local Government Code. It follows then that said power cannot be shared with any other group of persons or officials. Cabanatuan City. not the validity of the law and the remedy to correct such a flaw is left with t he legislature.P. petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13. If the electorate re-elects Garcia. 560) where the participation of the electorate were denied the opportunity to vote for the retention of the official subject of the recall. necessarily includes the power not to initiate. and set the recall election on November 13. against the local elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition. If they constitute less than one per cent of the voters in the province. If the petition would succeed. the time and place of the voting and whether the process includes the election of the successor of the recalled official. Dissenting: In both B. the method of voting of the electors. like any other right. is subtly designed to negate. however. in the election of the person to occupy the office subject of the recall. therefore. As this judgment has yet to be expressed. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula. the fullness of the power of recall precludes the delegation of the corresponding authority to initiate it to any entity other than the electorate. then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed. the trial court lifted the restraining order. In a sense.A. Paras v. The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate election. The Coelec scheduled the petition signing on October 14. If it can also be done by another body. Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall assembly subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who elected Garcia with a majority of 12. an innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials. COMELEC (1997) Facts: Danilo E. petitioner filed before the RTC petition for injunction. Blg. then the proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is rejected. Quaison. that election becomes. Concurring: The intent is clear that the 1987 Constitution leaves it to Congress to provide the recall mechanism without any pre-ordained restrictions. 7160. hence the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. For more than judgments of courts of law. Concurring: It may not be amiss.500 votes. such as the PRA in this case. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is. In the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. Issue: WON the recall election to be held on January 13. 337 and the Local Government Code of 1991. appropriate judicial recourse to. is an assumption of a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. not with the judiciary. that miniscule number goes to the policy.

That it was Alex David. the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. Jr. for indeed. Needless to state. destroyed. In the absence of patent error the Court should not disturb the same. 424. in the main. or as otherwise expressed. and referendum . One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1. Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local). the Commission so holds that the requirements of notice had been fully complied with. and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118). this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesses. putting to fore the propriety of the service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Nevertheless. are not otherwise disqualified by law. or rendered insignificant. . be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated. The elective national officials are the President. nullified. The Comelec declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Barely one year into his term. and the completion of service thereof another. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election". and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied. We had earlier determined that as member of the PRA. a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. we hold that there was complete service of the notices as contemplated in Section 8. Members of the Sanggunians of provinces. he can legally exercise the prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Concurring: I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991. expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo. if there was not only service. Under the law. then. that is. . hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC. raises the issue of the validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall.122 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. those from ages 15 to less than 18. but also completion of service thereof. . if possible. COMELEC (1997) Facts: Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor. cities and municipalities. and every three years thereafter. the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature. and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. the same having been scheduled on May 1997. recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away. be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. The circumstances being thus. recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses. sending notices to the other members of its scheduled convening. and the proceedings held. viz. voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall.. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. and who are registered voters. they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election. Senators and Congressmen. Mayor Malonzo filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for TRO assailing the Comelec’s resolution. initiative. 01-96. the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. ViceGovernors of provinces. can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage." Finally.A No. In the interpretation of a statute. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. as indicated thereon. An interpretation should. therefore. constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan. specifically paragraph (b) thereof. the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code. and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him. Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age. punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays. should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall. whether national or local. and upon deliberation and election. therefore. explained away. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. nearest relative or a person of sufficient discretion in the member 's residence or office. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors. Issue: WON notices were properly sent to the members of the PRA Held: Yes Ratio: The Commission regards the sending of notice one thing. 08-09: 2nd Sem. which provides: A regular election. as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio. Local Government Code of 1991). Malonzo v. It would. by his or her spouse. Davide. we were obliged to inquire more closely into the records and we found. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996. as erroneously insisted by petitioner. President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who sent the notices is of no moment. The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials. if not by the addressee himself. It is evident from the foregoing and. meaningless. emasculated. and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Accordingly. The Petition. Vice-President. Thus. resulting in the issuance of the questioned Resolution.057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and SK chairmen. And if the SK election which is set by R. 1. Service by registered mail was evinced by the return card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There were instances when notices were served but were refused. Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities. during the second year of his term of office.Y. Thus. . met. inoperative or nugatory. Thus. repealed. Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election.

Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly. initiating Claudio’s recall.876. Claudio v. since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA. and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo. as used in paragraph (b) of § 74. considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1. Richard Advincula was designated chair. in accordance with the existing law.and not merely. while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1. and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC. (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings. and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. § 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue.there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. 1998. seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City.123 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the resolution. 01. and cannot override the substantiated findings of the respondent COMELEC.which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official. §69 provides that "the power of recall . These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall.790. the fixing of the date of the recall election. Petitioner observes that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed. First. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters.[5) However. 1999. The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to . and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction. Thus. Thus.. a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. after deliberation reported in the record. (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period..shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs. The comelec also posted the petition on the bulletin boards of certain public places. As the COMELEC pertinently observes: The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session held. The charges of graft and corruption. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter. Angeles. Rules of procedure. More importantly." On the other hand. The petition for recall was filed on the Office of the City Mayor. which was that of petitioner's recall. and Roberto L. simple they may be were formulated. excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC. The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA. the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall . 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support. considering that 10 were actually double entries." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings[6) but the power to elect an official into office. The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed the opposition. to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting. the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. is misplaced. In either case. several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. (4) the election case. In other words. before and during the session of the preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 LGC. Issue: Held: WON the proceedings held by the PRA are valid Yes Ratio: Petitioner's insistence. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned. Issue: WON Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution Held: Yes Ratio: We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory. It ruled that the 1. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall. the verification of such resolution or petition. as we shall later on establish. Ronald Langub. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman. filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court. The members of the PRA adopted Resolution No.Y. the majority of whom met on July 7. The recall proceedings. It is this . recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit. the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan. their sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. cannot be denied merit on this ground." The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. clearly. this petition. Oppositions to the petition were filed by Jovito Claudio. Hence. and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. On May 19. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. therefore. were not duly accredited members of the barangays. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion. the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election. or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall. Rev. S-1999. there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC . that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays. 1996. violence and irregularities. COMELEC (2000) Facts: Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11.073 members who attended the May 29. 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA.

is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. Issue: WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of §74 of the LGC includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election Ratio: The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n) o recall shall take place within . Moreover. which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code. As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Javellana. HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT Practice of Profession by Mayors. who notarized it. the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. 08-09: 2nd Sem. as counsel for Antonio Javiero . Thus. paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable. according to §69. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. First. As in the case of the first claim. Actually. Second. to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people. It was not raised before the COMELEC. as long as the election is held outside the one-year period. we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date. evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions. the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part. Department of Local Government.124 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. DILG and Santos 212 SCRA 475 Facts: Attorney Erwin B. petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period. According to petitioner. the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which. because Atty. be raised now. It cannot. 2000. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. Governors and other elective officials Javellana v. . Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election. more or less. paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. therefore. Nelson Ng. paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Negros Occidental. to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official. more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city. the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. and Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution. 74-58 of the same department: that on July 8. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official. that is. unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin. is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit.Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director. it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election.Y. Apparently. COMELEC. it could have expressly said so. 1989. To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2." Issue: WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. and final judging is not done until the day of the election. §74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. To hold. this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. "[p) aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election. there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b). This contention has no basis. Under the Omnibus Election Code." Indeed. To the contrary. during the second year of office. City Engineer Ernesto C. To sum up. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified. one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. Indeed. Such an interpretation must be rejected. they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent. To be sure. . in this case. Hence. as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. presumably on June 30 following his election. As succinctly stated in Paras v." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months. Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page. this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days. And third." But however the period of prohibition is determined. therefore. Third. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. Javellana was an elected City Council or of Bago City. it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. Javellana.

as provided in DECS Order No. Hence. engage in any occupation. judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia. the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the local Ratio: In the first place. the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. in the exercise of his appointing power. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Series of 1994. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia.Y. Practice of Profession. the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. A few months later. and "(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government. However. The CSC dismissed the protest complaint and held that Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situation where the DECS issues the appointments. the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. the area of public service. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions. Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur Ratio: Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments made by the Department of Education. therefore. where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-ChargeSchools Division Superintendent. complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate. 90-81 violate Article VIII. Gloria. upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director. and Rolando Catapang. the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from the DECSto the President. in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession. 75. in those instances where the law allows it. in a Memorandum dated November 3. agency. would actually be a judgment against the City Government. or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. engage in any occupation. and petitioner to the Division of Iriga City. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: "(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office. Moreover. the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September 3. This is because at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code. or affect. or teach in schools except during session hours. Clearly. 90. their real employer. In the case at bar. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule: that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city.125 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. "(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions. under the circumstances.” Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. Culture and Sports. 1997. the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to. LOCAL BOARDS AND COUNCILS Osea v. Consequently. Issue: WON Petitioner is entitled to the position of as Officer-in-Charge. 21. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City. it is because of all the professions. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession. Respondent’s appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School Board. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional and null and Issue: WON the Memorandum Circulars and Section 90 of RA 7160 are unconstitutional Held: No engaged in any occupation. the LGC was enacted which provides: "SEC. 08-09: 2nd Sem. Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. to Camarines Sur. pursuant to the exigencies of the service. Hence. We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals that. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City. or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided. by DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Series of 1996. The motion to dismiss was denied. a public office is a public trust. The appointment may not be specific as to location. 80-38 Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or . Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. assigned and designated respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur. Culture and Sports to specific division or location. petitioner prayed that respondent’s appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void. It was Secretary Gloria who. schools division superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education. President Ramos appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Malaya (2002) Facts: Petitioner filed Protest Case with the Civil Service Commission. placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers. the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments. in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. She averred that she was appointed as Officerin-Charge. In 1994. Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. whereas respondent’s appointment was made by no less than the President. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their particular stations was vested in the DECS Secretary. 1996 did not specify her station. if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government. "(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office: "(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official.

or a fine exceeding P200. is avoided. as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation. except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law. action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in . Petitioner’s designation as Officer-in-Charge. usually with its confirmation. In fact. the recommendation was not acted upon by the President. it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. For what would stop a party. from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P. Culture and Sports. the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation. 1508. petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to security of tenure. petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Go filed a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49. Where the words of a statute are clear. attachment. does not apply. No complaint. Thus. her designation was temporary. Issue: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with PD 1508 Held: Yes Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman. [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings. 08-09: 2nd Sem.D. The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: [1] Where one party is the government . ruling that the provision of Sec 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of the law..e. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily. makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level. a reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank. the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention. citing as grounds therefor. indeed. petition. The judge denied the motion to dismiss. 1982. lacks one essential ingredient. Such is the plain meaning of the said law. 2 By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay. a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official. as written. say in an action for a sum of money or damages.D. or unless the settlement has been repudiated. in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3). [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days. the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P. however. Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions. should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed. was expressly made subject to further advice from the Department of Education. [3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction. the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit. in the process. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. Subject matters for amicable settlement. the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee. 1508 reads as follows: SECTION 6. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS Barangay conciliation and mediation Morata v. Victor Go and Flora D. While she was recommended by Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. citing her endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Go (1983) Facts On August 5. 1508? And why.00. petitioners filed a motion to dismiss.00.D. Thus. delivery of personal property and support pendente lite. In fact. [5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government. plain and free from ambiguity. her appointment thereto.or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Her qualification to the office. Indeed. When completed. We should not distinguish. it would make the law a selfdefeating one. and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations SECTION 2. There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties Ratio: Section 6 of P.126 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City. On the other hand. there was a need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity.Y. by the authority vested with the power. Culture and Sports. Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all". Assistant Schools Division Superintendent. of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. as in the instant case. Worse.400. In the same vein. Thus. school board. [4] Offenses where there is no private offended party. An appointment may be defined as the selection. However. enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish. i. in defining the Lupon's authority. to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. The law.

12. and (c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned. 1508. Furthermore. the first paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation. it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No.Y. in compliance with the requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code. No. actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons. the petitioner and the respondent had in mind only P.127 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative. trial and adjudication of cases. which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor. dated November 12. then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue." Yet. juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations. . Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No.. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation. 1508]. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. whereas Sections 11. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. ever mindful that under Section 1. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree. But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11. 129. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts. Respondent judge did not do any better. actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes. is distressing. the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system. as in the said cases." has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts. The trial court’s contention that the action is about to prescribe was also unmeritorious since upon the filing of the complaint to the Lupon Tagapamayapa. The motion to dismiss was based on the failure of herein private respondents to comply with the requirement on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law. the prescriptive period shall be automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days. The trial court also stated that the accused and her witnesses had already filed their counter-affidavits and documents which implied waiver on the part of the accused to claim her right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay. Even in her instant petition. of the law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court]. petitions.D. they assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality. Further. As heretofore stated. 1979.P. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. more specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang pambarangay. she has substantially complied with it. to wit: Section 3. Moreover. regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. . The petitioner further invoked the Section 18. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon." its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. The court found the motion to be without merit whereas the barangay conciliation proceedings between the parties had started but nothing has been achieved by the barangay. However.. No.. changed tack. The filing of the cases herein assailed was premature and the motion to dismiss should have been granted." Uy v. realizing the weakness of their position under P. the private respondents. jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein. having brought the dispute before the Lupon. executive and judicial departments of the Philippines. for it should be noted that. Venue. 08-09: 2nd Sem. regarding the implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. In the proceeding before the court a quo. Contreras (1994) Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of herein respondent judge which denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss cases filed for slight physical injuries. Fernando. and 14. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Makati. now known as regional trial courts under B. the court held that the complainants may go directly to the court since their complaint was about to prescribe or be barred by statute of limitations. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss for failure of the private respondents to comply with the mandatory requirement on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural . Held: Yes Ratio: The Court granted the petition. (b) the law does not apply when the action. if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts. It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving complaints. . The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations. traditionally and historically. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991.. In their Comment. in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd.D. 12 and 14. except forcible entry and detainer cases. He should have taken judicial notice thereof. all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is situated. may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. However. No. circuit criminal courts. relied upon by respondent judge. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance. they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela.

Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. or until 22 June 1993. rules. The judge is charged with malicious delay in the administration of justice. Makati. and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof. accordingly. Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries. Before closing these cases. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should. Makati. since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and. this was done to support their contention in the said court that. respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. he claimed that the decision as a result of his honest findings and conclusion based on the evidence and the law in the hearing of the case. this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more important cases. Wingarts v. With regard to the complaint for malicious delay. Munar resulting in the third criminal case for usurpation of authority docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. 1994 after an ocular inspection of the burned premises was conducted by the court personnel. In the second charge. Section 412 of the Local Government Code. pursuant to paragraph (a). the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Thereafter." The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela.128 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the Judge that the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure. considering that per the medical certificates the injuries sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The first two criminal cases were initiated by Col. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it. The OCA ruled that the first charge is meritorious for failure to remand the case to the lupon and instead. with sincerity.H. this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level. had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. The case allegedly dragged for one year and four months in respondent's sala and was ultimately dismissed in a decision dated June 8. Issue: WON the judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law . a certification to file action is issued. there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b). 08-09: 2nd Sem. Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. No. the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed. the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati. 2696 with Col. the Wingarts made a counter-charge against Col. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system. had been duly submitted to respondent judge. The request is dated 23 June 1993. The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. This is because. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and. Rodulfo Munar. Section 410 of the Code. Munar as the private complainant therein. stability. Mejia (1995) Facts: The administrative complaints filed against Judge Mejia were an offshoot of three criminal cases decided by the judge and involving the Wingarts and Col. the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2). its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela. on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days. taking cognizance of the case." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90. Nevertheless. pursuant to paragraph (c). Evidently. 145233 and 145234. Complainant Johan L. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P. Munar as the accused. Had he done so. Section 412 of the Local Government Code. As to the third complaint. or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases Nos. no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action.Y. Accordingly. exhaust the remedies provided by that law. considering that the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays. Moreover. The case was decided one (1) month and three (3) days after it was submitted for decision. Wingarts was the accused in criminal cases for malicious mischief and grave threats. In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993.D. As for the second complaint. and that he was endorsing the filing of the case in court. the delay does not appear to be malicious nor deliberate. The judge explained that he took cognizance of the grave threats case for he believed that there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of the parties. having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela. in any event. the fact that no amicable settlement was reached by them. the OCA ruled that it does not appear that the judge was motivated by an evil or corrupt motive in rendering the decision. as earlier stated. in promoting peace. 1508 (more properly. The third complaint charges the judge with rendering an unjust decision. Makati. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993. Also. It must be stressed that the private respondents. Evidently. and progress therein. Makati. the judge was charged with incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of the case for grave threats despite the lack of barangay conciliation. the judge contended that "(t)he proceedings were continuous until the complainant was acquitted of the crime charged against him. she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit. the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. 21 He should have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991.

We have repeatedly stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves. prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment. there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but even oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. Consequently. revenge. 2696. 08-09: 2nd Sem. decided to sell his property to the tenants. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. such considerations can mitigate but will not altogether exculpate him from the charge of incompetence and ignorance of the law. The RTC reversed ruling that the sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a pending case before the NGA. In his answer. respondent judge should have exercised the requisite prudence. fraud. Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use. Also. A judge should administer justice not only impartially but also without delay. the same does not appear to be malicious nor deliberate. the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the real property. which accordingly warrants the imposition of an appropriate penalty on him. in May 1988. The CA affirmed. or some other similar motive. However. The complainants in the present case have dismally failed to convince us that respondent judge knew that his challenged judgment is unjust. and he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Corpuz v. petitions. Such an initiatory pleading. Litigants should not blame a judge for the delay which was not of his own making. We have repeatedly ruled that the proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. because the . it was reiterated that in order to hold a judge liable.Y. we find no showing that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith. As to the charge of malicious delay in the administration of justice. even assuming it to be so. judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and desultorily acting on complaints. There is no liability at all for a mere error. conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law. It is well-settled that a judicial officer. respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case No. resolve the issue of ownership. that is. dishonesty or corruption in rendering the same. is not liable criminally for any error which he commits. 20 Any kind of failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be countenanced in order to maintain the faith of the public in the judiciary.129 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. he shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. He should have carefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case which. bias or partiality on his part. Respondent judge should not be unfairly subjected to liabilities. to wit: (1) the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery. provided he acts in good faith. bad faith. 2664 of his court. if filed without compliance with the precondition. Held: Yes Ratio: Although there is no clear proof of malice. CA: “The inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. possession de facto. we agree with the observation of the Office of the Court Administrator that while there was some delay in hearing the case.500. actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa. The MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room. As expressly mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct. especially on the level of courts to which most of them resort for redress. "An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence. for contretemps which were brought about by the parties and their lawyers. In a recent administrative case decided by this Court. Refugia v. The present controversy could have been avoided had he kept faith with the injunction that a member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law never ceases. Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who. In October 1991. by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property. Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase the same. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid. As interpreted by Spanish Courts. Alvarado raised two major defenses. In any event. the term "knowingly" means sure knowledge. Moreover. the Court finds this as an appropriate occasion to once again remind the members of the judiciary to adopt measures to prevent unnecessary delays in the disposition of their cases. Due to economic difficulties. especially under the environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal case where personal liberty was involved. In the present case. As a result of the sale. it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. the Affidavit of Waiver was a forgery. envy. It cannot. however. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred. or both. malice or bad faith and that he subsequently issued an order to recall the warrant or prevent the arrest of complainant. that is. Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37. In connection with his decision in Criminal Case No. and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa. did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated legal questions. assuming that he did not act with. Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime. CA (1997) Facts: Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against Juanito Alvarado with the MTC for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the latter. As the law now stands. Issue: WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of said property Held: No Ratio: The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded. when required to exercise his judgment or discretion. a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado. after all. Complainants could not have been unaware that the delay of the hearing was due to postponements sought and obtained by the parties and their respective counsel. which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own use. after a careful analysis of the assailed decision. greed.

In an ejectment suit. respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of the mandated proceedings. After defendants filed their comment.5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure. less than fifteen days after the first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the law. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation. Thereafter. however. no action was taken by the court despite the fact that the case falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and the judge has still to come up with a determination as to whether summons should be issued or not. Dismayed by the Court’s insistence of referring the case to the barangay though it had already gone through all the requisite proceedings thereat. complainant filed a Motion praying that the proceedings already held before the barangay be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.D. the “x” before the second enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. 1996 had been Ratio: The records reveal that such Certification was improperly and prematurely issued. the judge issued the summons and opted to continue with the court proceedings without . it is necessary for the Pangkat to be constituted anew so that parties may have a second opportunity to amicably settle their dispute. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Evidently. said that since there was a failure of settlement of mediation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman. Evidently. the controversy pending in the NHA). In any event. We have ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. The OCA found respondent either ignorant or negligent in referring the case back to the barangay despite the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein. Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the law when it ordered the parties to submit to another barangay conciliation Held: No Ratio: We are not persuaded. and that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainant. We have held in Dui v. Records show that the hearing was scheduled for February 26. Judge Bellosillo (2002) Facts: In a letter-complaint. 1996 and was reset for February 29. complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings. it may be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit. We also note that the Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16. which is summary in nature. The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale. Ricardo M. It was only after a year from the time the complaint was filed that respondent ordered that summons be served on defendants. With this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by BP 129. title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property. Acting on the Motion. Bonifacio Law Office v.e. After the filing of said compliance. the doctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable. It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy.Y. It also faulted him for disregarding the Rules on Summary Procedure by (1) calling for a preliminary conference. the issue raised in this petition is far from novel. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. Bellosillo of the MTC of QC. instead of rendering judgment. Thus. (2) directing the defendants to submit their Comment to complainant’s Motion to Render Judgment. The underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit. 1996. Parenthetically speaking. the controversy pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties. When defendants failed to file an Answer. since the petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality. He then filed a Notice of Dismissal but the same was still unacted upon by respondent. In what appears to be a pre-printed standard form thereof. Salomon Jr. We cannot fault him for seeking to promote the objectives of barangay conciliation and for taking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 1996. Respondent’s position that the Pangkat was not constituted. respondent merely required defendants to comment on the motion to render judgment. respondent still did not act on the said motion.. Atty Salomon filed a compliance with respondent’s court attaching therewith a copy of his complaint filed before the barangay and the minutes of the proceedings held thereat. 1996. with ignorance of the law. the judge referred the case back to the barangay conciliation despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint that the case was already referred to the barangay and a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached to the verified coplaint. and (3) failing to render judgment within the reglementary period. Court of Appeals that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. grave abuse of discretion. he (complainant) filed a Motion to Render Judgment in accordance with the provisions of Sec. and obvious partiality. Atty. Said withdrawal however was denied by respondent on the basis of the action already taken thereon as contained in the questioned Order. the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before it. Hence. 08-09: 2nd Sem. He then inquired personally with the court about the status of the case and he was told that no action could be taken unless the Order of April 2. he decided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to withdraw complaint.130 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. The judge. 14-93. And yet. resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer." Consequently. Issue: WON the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by PD 1508 Held: No complied with. which is deemed a mere general averment. However. the Certification to File Action was issued on March 1. the proceeding outlined in P. by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon.

as the case may be. 2198-98 on the ground of prescription. Elepaño. Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada. through Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. such as a motion for reconsideration. 1998. 08-09: 2nd Sem. From the date of the commission of the alleged offense. the alleged offense took place on February 15. or on motion. Section 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. prohibition or mandamus.131 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. And in this case. The OCA correctly arrived at the following findings: “x x x (T) he Judge’s resolution (to) the complainant’s Motion to Render Judgement casts serious doubt on his understanding of the law. however. Unacceptable is his explanation that he waited for the defendants to avail themselves of their right to appeal the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution.” Respondent rendered judgment on the case only on January 7. as this Court has repeatedly stressed. and appeal. despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty. whether ordinary or extraordinary. This provision cannot. Nevertheless. 22 and 29. or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.’ the character of immediacy implicit in the latter does not exist in the former. because the law mandates him to act and decide the case promptly. deliberate and malicious. ‘shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint’ (Section 6. by any stretch of the imagination. Mendova then filed with the MTC a complaint for slight physical injuries against Palada.00 with a warning that a commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. the OCA. assuming he has erred. supposedly to be resolved under the Summary Rule. obviously. the judge’s error is judicial in nature and cannot be corrected in administrative proceedings. immediacy is the defining characteristic. Abesamis is illuminating: “As everyone knows. motu proprio. that the door to an inquiry into his criminal. to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders. Refusing to heed the Motion. Besides. However. 1998 he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion San Julian. insisting on strict compliance with the mandated barangay proceedings. respondent instead called a preliminary conference and directed the defendants to submit their Comment. whether of civil. 7160 (60 days interruption of running of prescription). thus: Issue: WON the judge is liable administratively for dismissing Criminal Case No. or a motion for inhibition. 1998. but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i. 1997. 1998. the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari. For. would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.e.e. for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. administrative.. civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality. He has no duty to wait.Y. He did so after noting that complainant was apparently not making any move to complete the barangay proceedings after the case had been remanded to the barangay. found respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be fined P3. Barangay Chairman Ronie Quintua. error in appreciation or admission of evidence. the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of. Now. almost a year from the time the case had been deemed submitted for resolution. or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.. and because respondents failed to answer the ejectment Complaint on time. a motion for new trial). What we said in Flores vs. The judge dismissed the complaint on grounds of prescription as the complaint was filed on April 20. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia Cabago also certified in an undated “Minutes In Settling Disputes” that the case was set for hearing on March 16. more than two months have elapsed. Mendova filed with the OCA an administrative complaint against the judge. these judicial remedies. are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned. or criminal nature. be construed to mean anything other than what the words themselves communicate: that the rendition of judgment is mandatory. or closed. The express language of the law states that when an Answer has not been filed within the reglementary period. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary.000. Held: Yes Ratio: It is axiomatic. that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available. “By calling for a preliminary conference and directing the defendants to submit their Comment to the complainant’s Motion. in his Certification confirmed such fact. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable. or an appeal. Hence. and that the case fell under the Rules on Summary Procedure. judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct. nor a substitute for. Revised Rule on Summary Procedure). because he chose to continue with the proceedings of the case. In its Evaluation and Recommendation. . there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. At any rate. x x x. a petition for change of venue. the judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of Ra. He alleged that in dismissing the case. as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding. ‘submission for decision’ is a far cry from ‘rendition of judgment. and that the judgment should be based only on what is contained within the four walls of the complaint. Complainant filed a Motion to Render Judgment dated March 25. Judge Afable (2002) Facts: Mendova alleged in his affidavit-complaint that on February 18. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies. when he finally resolved the motion – after the defendants had submitted their Comment – he merely ordered that the case be ‘deemed submitted for decision. It is only where the error is so gross. 1998 was filed with this Court on May 4. Moreover. the Judge went beyond the bounds set by the law x x x. capricious.’ Needless to say. provides that such cases may be revived only after the requirement for conciliation has been complied with. Mendova v. the judge. etc. whimsical. 1998. he should have rendered judgment within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the period to file an answer.

22 and 29. political. he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription. then Comelec Chairman. she will seek judicial relief. The Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution 4763 dated 5 February 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising . COMELEC (2002) Facts: The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB). Finally. his instant administrative complaint is premature.” RA 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on 15 July 2002. Montesclaros filed the petition for certiorari.” The SK in every barangay is composed of a chairperson and 7 members. The President signed the approved bill into law on 19 March 2002. Clearly. until the dismissal of the case on November 3. the House of Representatives approved the same. Here. prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. since judges must be free to judge. Alfredo L. the rules and regulations for the conduct of the 15 July 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay elections. without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill and on 13 March 2002. Montesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec. Issue: Whether there is actual controversy in the case which seeks to prevent a postponement of the 6 May 2002 SK elections. Indeed. 10 days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently. San Julian. and physical development of the youth. al. demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.” In the present case. Benipayo. and also to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK. The KB was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old. prosecution of a judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order. If at all. Instead. While respondent admitted his mistake. RA 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every three years thereafter. 1998. spiritual. In his letters. the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was “operationally very difficult” to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. the Comelec on 4 December 2001 issued Resolutions 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections on 6 May 2002. 2198-98 for slight physical injuries with respondent's court. without specifying the minimum age. such filing interrupted the prescriptive period and started to run again upon receipt by the complainant of the Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary. RA 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec shall promulgate. 1998 Criminal Case No. On 11 March 2002. following our settled pronouncements cited above. all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The KB was organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance. Thus. Robert Palada committed the crime of slight physical injuries on February 15. (2) Congress enacted RA 9164 which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be “at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months and who meet the membership age requirement. the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since Montesclaros filed the petition: (1) The 6 May 2002 SK elections and 13 May 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled. moral. et. namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy. intellectual. 1998. 08-09: 2nd Sem. otherwise. wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. Accordingly. (3) The Comelec promulgated Resolution 4846. and x x x also evidence of malice or bad faith. records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. Montesclaros. The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths “at least 15 but not more than 21 years of age. seeking to prevent the postponement of the SK elections originally scheduled 6 May 2002. the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. Sangguniang Kabataan Monteclaros v. 1998. On 11 March 2002. criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions.Y. we noticed from the records before us that the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judge’s decision dismissing the criminal case. on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order’ or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. economic. and which seeks to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK. the fear of civil. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c) of The Local Government Code of 1991. On 6 March 2002. the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. cultural.132 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. and that exceptionally. The first SK elections took place on 4 December 1992. complainant filed his complaint with the Office of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion. No reason was advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. which must be recognized independently of statute. and it is sound rule.C. ignorance or inexcusable negligence. According to complainant. that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.” The SK remains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs “to enhance the social. the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002. the Bicameral Conference Committee of the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16. The Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with. Antoniette V. he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action. On 18 February 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter. we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad faith or malice on the part of respondent judge when he dismissed the criminal case. quoted earlier. Held: At the outset. When he filed on May 4. it can only be an error of judgment. On 11 March 2002. Eastern Samar. On 20 February 2002. they should not be subject to intimidation. On February 18. 1998.

Article VIII of the Constitution states that "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. not before. the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. a date acceptable to them. under the pretense of a conference.” Held: It cannot be alleged that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muñez to his office because he had already done this the day before. however. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. Ariño 241 SCRA 478 (1995) Doctrine: Municipal Mayors cannot conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest. their prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Issue: WON SK membership is a “property right within the meaning of the Constitution” Held: No Petitioners. and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Even the State policy directing “equal access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices. the next day a warrant was issued given that complainant did not show up for the conference despite the mayor’s summons. should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. Bataan (1994) Ratio: Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership.133 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S. are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than 15 July 2002. With respect to the date of the SK elections. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership.” No one has a vested right to any public office. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. 9164. while the State policy is to encourage the youth’s involvement in public affairs. The Municipality Muñez v. having no legal effect. there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. the Court already ruled: ”Again. For its part. In the same manner. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July 15. Facts: Mayor Irisari of Agusan del Sur summoned complainant Muñez to his office for a conference regarding a land dispute with the latter and Tirso Amado.Y. based on a statutory right. Section 143 of the former LGC (BP 447) has been abrogated. a “[P]ublic office is a public trust. The second paragraph of Section 1. Municipality of Balanga. the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people. 08-09: 2nd Sem. there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. Herein. it would be necessary to consider an office a “property. but is a public trust or agency. On appeal. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership. the Mayor issued a warrant of arrest against him. rendered functus officio by the 1987 Consti which took effect Feb. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections. 1987. The Judge mrely relied on the DILG opinion which was grossly erroneous. (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found the mayor guilty and suspended him for 8 months without pay. one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office. he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office.” Mayor Irisari filed an MR using DILG resolution and Judge Arino correspondingly. this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Petitioners are not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council. well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law. violates no constitutional right or duty. but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents. As the Constitution expressly states. the constitutional question. dismissed the case. Muñez filed a complaint for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function. decided in 1920. Gabriel. which itself is a creation of Congress. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the 6 May 2002 SK elections. Greater Balanga v. 2. A 5k fine is imposed on the errant judge. who apparently desire to hold public office. In government service. In Cornejo v. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties." Thus. RA 9164 has reset the SK elections to 15 July 2002.” It is. DILG reversed saying the warrant was merely an “invitation. A public office is not a property right. No investigation was later conducted. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. We subsequently find out that the Jusge made a serious error and SC said he “showed poor judgement and gross ignorance of basic legal principles. Montesclaros. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK. any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest. since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK. Moreover. As complainant failed to attend. al. Thus. Further.” . 2002 SK elections. A proposed bill. once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age. Initially Judge Arino denied the mayor’s motion to quash on the ground that the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest ceased to exist when the 1987 Consti took effect. for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition. RA No. et. The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement of the SK elections. RA No.

235 the petitioner was to furnish and deliver to the municipality 2. called for bids for the supply of road construction materials to repair the road of the municipality. calling his attention to the fact that the sum of P19. the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. Resolution and EO were legitimate exercise of local legislative authority. The City Lim and Garayblas v. 1950 the petitioner wrote to the municipal treasurer. Leaving an entry blank is not equal to false statement. The absence of the material info in the application form was nonetheless supplied in the face of the permit signed and issued by Mayor Banzon himself. he requested that the sum be included in the appropriations for the incoming fiscal year 1950-1951 as an outstanding obligation. revoke and even refuse the same.700 cubic meters of crushed adobe stone and 1. profession.56